

**COLOMBIA
TURNING DEFEAT
INTO VICTORY IN
CONTEMPORARY
WARFARE**

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CISA/NDU

**Panel 3: Qualitative
Assessments of
Contemporary Warfare**

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What has Happened?

WITH U.S. ASSISTANCE, ONE OF THE OLDEST AND LARGEST INSURGENT GROUPS IN THE WORLD, *FARC*, HAS BEEN DECIMATED AND FORCED TO THE MARGINS OF SOCIETY




FARC a combination of the new and the old



- Ideology: Marxist-Leninist but becomes “Bolivarian”
- Political but gun dominates
- “People’s war” but terrorism leads
- Fighting for the people but drugs & criminality funds
- Can recruit but always from the margin of the margins

1965-1995, TERROR & GUERRILLA WAR DOMINATE











1996: WAR OF MOVEMENT



FARC

DISPOSITION

CARIBE	
NOROCCIDENTAL	
MAG. MEDIO	
CDO. C. CENTRAL	
CDO. C. OCCID.	
SUR	
ORIENTAL	



BLOQUES DE FRENTE	5
CDOS. CONJUNTOS	2
BLOQUES MOVILES	2
CUADRILLAS	67
COLUMNAS	14
COMPAÑIAS	19
FRENTE URB.	4
UNIDADES	2
ESCUELA	1
~17.000 cbts	

Key Factor in Reversal: **NEW LEADERSHIP**



Paradigm Shift Critical

- “We were using American doctrine, where we conceptualized the continuum as ‘war’ and ‘other than war.’ This was absolutely incorrect. There is only war, with the enemy fielding different mixes of the elements of war.”





1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

Posiciones

Movimiento

CAPITAL DE DEPARTAMENTO

BASES FIJAS

BATALLÓN SOLDADOS PROFESIONALES

ESTACIÓN REPETIDORA (INACCESIBLE)

CP. SOLDADOS PROFESIONALES (MOVIMIENTO)

CP. SOLDADOS REGULARES (BASES FIJAS)

INICIATIVA

INICIATIVA

OFENSIVAS

Guerrillas y Terrorismo

- ATACAR GENERANDO PODER DE COMBATE
- COMBATIR CUADRILLAS

- CONTRAMANIOBRAS
- POCA DURACIÓN
- COMBATES PROLONGADOS
- MUCHAS BAJAS
- SE BUSCA CAMPO COMBATE

MITU

MIRAFLORES

EL BILLAR

PATASCOY

CARPA

DELICIAS

PUERTO RICO
PUERTO LLERAS

HATO COROZAL

OFENSIVAS

SUMAPAZ

BERLÍN

(DESTRUCCIÓN COLUMNA)

GATO NEGRO

TSUMANI

ATAQUE ÁREAS BASES



Conditions For Military Success

- New Leadership
w/Effective Approach
- New Structure
- New Manpower
- Renewed Emphasis
Upon Training
- Incorporation of
Lessons Learned
- Greater Mobility
- New Spirit



OTHER CAMPAIGN ELEMENTS

- INTELLIGENCE WAR –
correct assessment of challenge
- INFORMATION WAR - PSYOPS
- BATTLE FOR URBAN SPACE - POLICE
- SPECIAL OPERATIONS
- CIVIC ACTION





FOR STATE SUCCESS: Leadership

Uribe – Aug 02

- Runs on “War” Platform – FARC Main Foe
- Negotiations w/AUC & ELN
- Emphasis Upon Economy & Social Programs
- Enhanced Funding, Manpower (e.g. BCGs)
- Combined Civil-Military Effort – **A PLAN!**
- Local Forces & Joint Commands
- Altered Legal Environment
- Human Rights Put in Perspective

STRATEGY OF THE *DEMOCRATIC SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY*

1. Democratic Security

2. Social Policy

3. Fiscal Stability

Confidence

Private Investment

Employment and Economic Activity



THE FORMULA

- LACK OF PERSONAL SECURITY is the root of Colombia's ESP ills.
- This LACK OF PERSONAL SECURITY stems from state absence in large areas.
- Therefore, ALL ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER will end this absence thru NATIONAL INTEGRATION.

IMPLEMENTING THE FORMULA

- Step 1: RESTORE STATE PRESENCE, starting in strategically important areas.
- Step 2: ONCE YOU GET AN AREA, DOMINATE THE AREA with security forces, so that state and legal authorities can function.
- Step 3: ONCE YOU DOMINATE AN AREA, make all the other parts of democracy work so that we may have truth, justice, and the Colombian way – and win the World Cup.

Lead Weapon: Democracy



COUNCILS OF POPULAR GOVERNANCE

240 visits in First Term



**COUNCILS OF SECURITY
CONSEJOS DE SEGURIDAD**



CONSEJOS COMUNALES DE GOBIERNO

SEGURIDAD DEMOCRÁTICA

ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL

SOCIAL





FUNDAMENTAL REALITY: STATE LEGITIMACY
SECURITY FORCES ENABLE POLITICS

FOR THOSE WHO NEED A FORMULA

- **STRATEGICALLY:** Win the battle for *LEGITIMACY*
- **OPERATIONALLY:** Neutralize the counter-state (eliminate the grievances; use population & resources control; apply appropriate military measures)
- **TACTICALLY:** Systematically dominate local areas

APPLYING THE FORMULA TO COLOMBIA

- STRATEGICALLY: *LEGITIMACY*
 - *has come with good governance*
- OPERATIONALLY: Counter-state being neutralized
 - *but controversial*
 - ♠ eliminate the grievances
 - *never possible totally*
 - ♠ exercise population & resources control
 - *controversial*
 - *“cause-oriented groups” will always oppose*
 - ♠ apply appropriate military measures
 - *what’s “appropriate”?*
- TACTICALLY: Systematically dominating local areas
 - *slow, costly, manpower intensive*

Fundamental Shift in Nature of Conflict

COLOMBIAN ASSESSMENT: FARC BEGAN AS AN INSURGENCY WITH A SOCIAL BASE (EVEN IF LIMITED)

- DRUG TRAFFICKING AROSE TO MEET NEED FOR RESOURCES
- CREATED GREAT CONFUSION BETWEEN MEANS AND ENDS

NO LONGER REPRESENTS THE MASSES

LINE OF INVERSION

“THE STRUGGLE” BECOMES
ENDS, WAYS, MEANS

ORGANIZATION IS “THE WORLD”
ALL OTHERS ARE THE ENEMY

**LOGIC OF TERRORISM
(ABSENCE OF
SOCIAL BASE)**

NOW TERRORISTS DIVORCED FROM ANY SOCIAL BASE

**2002-2006
SMASHING OF
FARC MILITARY
CHALLENGE
ALLOWS 2006-2010
EMPHASIS ON
SPEC OPS**



SPECIAL OPERATIONS

WERE VERY SUCCESSFUL IN 2007 AND 2008

July 2008




**OPERACION
JAQUE**

**SPEC OPS EVEN
MORE IMPT AS
STRATEGIC
SITUATION
SHIFTS**



**WITHOUT REGIONAL
“BOLIVARIAN”
SUPPORT, FARC IN
DEEP TROUBLE**

País más grande: Brasil
8.511.970 km.2
(3.286.472 millas2)



SPECIAL OPERATIONS BEYOND THE BORDERS



VERY IMPORTANT: *FENIX* & KIA RAUL REYES



LESSONS FOR CONTEMPORARY WARFARE: BACK TO THE FUTURE

- **GET IN PLACE THAT
WHICH IS CORRECT**
- **GET IN PLACE THAT
WHICH IS SUSTAINABLE**
- **PLAY FOR THE BREAKS**

SIR ROBERT THOMPSON to MARKS

Next Speaker



August 2010 = Santos

