

HEADQUARTERS
 UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
 Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
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BULLETIN No. 8ENEMY DOCUMENTS

Doc. Inv. No.	Summary	Capture Data
9-512-65	Memorandum Copy dated 29 May 1965 by Le Van Chuong, Assistant Chief of Staff, Quang Tri Province Unit Command Committee, of memorandum # 16C/TM, 21 May 1965 by Hoang-Ngoc Cuong, in K.4CO, calling for precautions against napalm bombs, the protection of warehouses and determination to fight the U. S. Marines, in compliance with orders issued on 9 May 1965 by the Military Region.	28 Aug 65, YD135380, 2d Bn, 1st RVNAF Inf. Div.
9-526-65	Letter. Letter dated 3 July 1965 from an unidentified person in Ky Khuong Village Security Section to Ly Tin District Security Section, reporting the evacuation to the district, for interrogation, of Vo Lanh in Ky Xuan Village and Bai Tham in Hamlet 4, Ky Ha Village, suspected of spying for RVN authorities and apprehended on 1 July 1965.	During operation starlight, Chu- Lai, U. S. Marines
9-527-65	Letter. Urgent letter (undated) from Ky Khuong Village Security Section to N.7#, reporting that Nguyen Hiep, a spy for RVN officials from 1956 to 1961, has resumed his activities in Khuong Nhon Hamlet.	During operation starlight, Chu- Lai, U.S. Marines
10-478-65	List Number of cadre of an unidentified unit KIA during the first 6 months of 1965 to include: - 1 Company commander - 2 Platoon leaders - 3 Squad leaders - 2 Assistant squad leaders	10 Oct 65, XS340115, Vinh Binh Province, unknown unit.
10-479-65	Minutes of discussions Minutes of cell discussions held in late May and early July 1965 in Binh Duong Province, covering an assessment of RVN and VC situations in general, and the situation in Binh Duong in particular, a review of various activities (civilian laborers, recruits, finance-economy, working procedures) and a study of the farmers motivation plan.	2216COH Sep 65, vic XT642480, A/1/503d, 173d Abn Bde

[TN: * probably Ly Tin District Security Section]

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1C-48-65 Set of orders

Capture Data28 Aug 65, vic
YD135380, 2d Bn,
1st RVNAF Inf.

(VC) TS orders "for combat and development" #230/TM, Chief of Staff, 16 April 1965, originated Div. by the Commander and Assistant Political Officer of Thua Thien - Quang Tri Sub-Region. Addressees: Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces.

Contents of this document are broken down as follows:

1/ Assessment of RVNAF situation

- Restricted reinforcement action due to dispersion of forces.
- Low morale due to continuous operations.
- Shortage of troops.
- Heavy reliance on armor, intelligence, artillery and aircraft.
- Mobility potentials: two infantry battalions.
- Maximum armor available for reinforcement: one M-113 inter-platoon, one M-114 platoon and one tank platoon (9 to 12 vehicles) or one regional forces mechanized rifle platoon (3 to 5 vehicles).
- Maximum artillery support available: 6 to 8 guns.

2/ Assessment of VC situation

- 216 contacts with RVNAF (ambushes, counter-sweep operations, attacks on communication axes, surprise encounters, mine attacks and attacks on posts) within three months.

- Shortcomings:

- Weak leadership
- Lack of determination
- Lack of initiative
- Soldiers still balk at difficulties.
- Fear of enemy armor, aircraft and artillery is still prevailing.
- Main forces' combat capabilities do not meet the requirements.

3/ Missions of the Sub-Region

- Annihilate two to three enemy infantry battalions, one or two M-113 companies, 40 to 50 military vehicles and ten aircraft.
- Commit sapper elements and artillery to sabotage and conduct firepower raids on municipalities, airfields, depots and U. S. centers.
- Sabotage or attack communication axes (Highways 1 and 9, provincial roads, etc...)
- Step up guerrilla operations, build combat villages and consolidate liberated villages.
- Build up and train main and local forces.

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4/ Specific missions of each detachment

a. Main Forces

- Conduct combat operations throughout Quang Tri and Thua Thien, from May to 15 August 1965.

b. Province Unit (Concentrated Battalion)

- Annihilate one or two popular force platoons in each battle.

- Starting July 1965: Annihilate three to five popular force platoons, then one regional forces company or one RVNAF company.

c. District Local Forces (District Units)

- Annihilate two to three popular force platoons, sabotage communication axes and conduct harassment operations.

d. Militia and guerrillas

- Defend combat villages and hamlets against enemy sweep and pacification operations.

- Sabotage communication axes.

- Set up booby traps.

- Uncover enemy spies.

e. Province Independent Companies

Theater of operations: deep areas

Main targets: enemy popular and pacification forces.

C55's area of activity: Trieu Phong.

f. Province Sapper Platoon

- Sabotage and harass cities, enemy agencies, depots, airfields, U. S. BQ's, and other enemy units.

- Main targets in Quang Tri: Dong Ha, Quang Tri, La Vang, Cam Lo and Dien Sanh.

g. Theater of operations of the Province Concentrated Battalion

- Annihilate the enemy mobile company stationed in Cua.

- Combine with main forces to annihilate reinforcements on the Dong Ha - Dan Mau axis.

- Attack the Dong Ha - My Chanh axis.

- Annihilate popular forces deployed along Highway 1.

- One company or the entire battalion may be committed as required.

5/ Development mission

- Activate companies capable of overrunning popular force concentrations.

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- Indoctrinate and train militiamen and guerrillas
- Dig secret underground tunnels
- Build combat villages.

6/ Setting up and consolidating command guidance agencies.

- Set up and strengthen staff, political and rear service agencies.
- Provide additional cadre and specialized training to and reorganize guerrilla forces.
- Urgently set up training schools for squad and village unit leaders.
- Provide accelerated training to cadre of district units, companies, platoons, village and hamlet units.

7/ Battlefield preparation

- Collect intelligence on the enemy, reconnoiter the terrain and investigate the local population.
- Revamp the province units' military intelligence agencies and the battalions' reconnaissance elements.
- Deploy people's military intelligence networks.
- Set up information liaison routes.

8/ Command and guidance

- Step up guerrilla operations
- Make full use of the districts' capabilities.
- Break the enemy's grip.
- Build combat villages and hamlets.
- Concentrate guidance on C55, Mong Co and Hy Lap Units.
- Improve the combat capabilities of militia and guerrilla forces.

9/ Signal and liaison

- Always keep radio equipment in good operating condition.
- Familiarize personnel with liaison routes and stations.
- Set up a flash foot liaison system.

10/ Logistical support

- Insure rice and ammunition supplies to operational troops.

11/ Deadline for preparations

- Complete step 1 by 20 May 1965 and prepare for steps 2 and 3.
- Submit plans to Sub-Region on 10 May 1965.

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