This operation was a pacification and jungle clearing operation of the first Brigade, 25th Infantry Division in DI CHI and TRAN BANG Districts of Hau Nghia Province and Phu Hoi District of Binh Dom Province. Numerous small unit actions, which included Bushmasters (extensive company size patrols), C&S of suspected VC hamlets, road-runners (mine sweeping of roads) and checkmate (road blocks in unannounced locations to check for VC personnel or supplies being moved by surface transportation), enabled the brigade to reduce VC capability to move freely. In addition, S&D were conducted, when intelligence reports located VC units in the area.

Artillery support for Operation BARKING SANDS envisioned many new concepts which proved to be highly successful in a jungle war against guerilla forces. BARKING SANDS, as never before, utilized the concept of airlift of light artillery batteries to exploit important intelligence data. Further, it was in Operation BARKING SANDS that the concept of a minimum of one artillery battalion equivalent would be used to support any maneuver force larger than a platoon. The results of these new ideas were a greater kill ratio per artillery round fired and most certainly added a confusion factor to the enemy as to the size force which was opposing him.

Jungle clearing operations were continued in the FILHOL PLANTATION in Binh Dom Province as Operation KUNIA which had begun on 16 September as a jungle clearing operation in the HOBO WOODS. "Road-runners" were conducted between PHU HOA DONG (XT 7119) and DI CHI Base Camp in order to keep the line of communications open. Contact with the enemy was very light during this operation which was part of Operation BARKING SANDS. The objective of Operation KUNIA was to eliminate the HOBO WOODS and the FILHOL PLANTATION as safe havens for the VC through extensive clearing and destruction of VC base camps and forces.

KAWELA, AKUMU, and WAIJEA are other operations which were conducted as part of BARKING SANDS, but were completed before this reporting period. Overall, BARKING SANDS had a kill ratio of 1/2.77 in favor of US forces.

(e) DIAMOND HEAD (1May - 7December 1967). This operation consisting of S&D operations and security missions was conducted by the 3d Brigade from base camps at TAY NHINH and DAU TIENG. Also the 3d Brigade had the mission to secure engineer repair work conducted on the road network in its area of operation (AO).

As the operation continued in November, the 3d Brigade conducted S&D and C&S operations in the upper BON LOI WOODS, Binh Chai PLANTATION and along the eastern bank of the SAIGON RIVER south of DAU TIENG. During the first part of November, operations were curtailed due to two battalions being OF CON to the other brigades. While conducting S&D operations near the MUSHROOM bend on the SAIGON RIVER during the period 24-25 November, the 2d Battalion, 25th Infantry encountered a company size VC force resulting in a VC body count of 20 plus another 25 more possible KIA's. Contact with enemy forces was light during the remainder of November with December contact being very similar.

Results of Operation DIAMOND HEAD were: Personnel losses -
missions employing airmobile combat assaults into the IRON TRIANGLE were conducted, when intelligence reports located VC units in the area.

Artillery support for Operation BARKING SANDS envisioned many new concepts which proved to be highly successful in a jungle war against guerrilla forces. BARKING SANDS, as never before, utilized the concept of airlift of light artillery batteries to exploit important intelligence data. Further, it was in Operation BARKING SANDS that the concept of a minimum of one artillery battalion equivalent would be used to support any maneuver force larger than a platoon. The results of these new ideas were a greater kill ratio per artillery round fired and most certainly added a confusion factor to the enemy as to the size force which was opposing him...

Jungle clearing operations were continued in the FILHOL PLANTATION in MINH DUONG Province as Operation KUNLA which had begun on 16 September as a jungle clearing operation in the HOBO WOODS. "Road-runners" were conducted between PHU HON DONG (XT 7119) and CO CHI Base Camp in order to keep the line of communications open. Contact with the enemy was "very light" during this operation which was part of Operation BARKING SANDS. The objective of Operation KUNLA was to eliminate the HOBO WOODS and the FILHOL PLANTATION as safe havens for the VC through extensive clearing and destruction of VC base camps and forces. Extensive use of Agent Orange.

KAWILA, AKUMU, and WAIMEA are other operations which were conducted as part of BARKING SANDS, but were completed before this reporting period. Overall, BARKING SANDS had a kill ratio of 1/2.77 in favor of US forces.

(e) DIAMOND HEAD (13 May - 7 December 1967). This operation consisting of S&D operations and security missions was conducted by the 3d Brigade from base camps at TAY NINH and DAU TIENG. Also the 3d Brigade had the mission to secure engineer repair work conducted on the road network in its area of operation (AO).

As the operation continued in November, the 3d Brigade conducted S&D and C&S operations in the upper BIL HO WOODS, BEN CHI PLANTATION and along the eastern bank of the SAIGON RIVER south of DAU TIENG. During the first part of November, operations were curtailed due to two battalions being OF CON to the other brigades. While conducting S&D operations near the MUSHROOM bend on the SAIGON RIVER during the period 24-25 November, the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry encountered a company size VC force resulting in a VC body count of 20 plus another 25 more possible KIA's. Contact with enemy forces was light during the remainder of November with December contact being very similar.

Results of Operation DIAMOND HEAD were: Personnel losses -