HEADQUARTERS
2d Battalion 4th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division
Subj: Command Chronology for the period 1-31 Dec 1968

Ref: (a) FMFPacO 5750.6
(b) DivO 5750.1B
(c) Map Vietnam, Quang Tri Sheet No. 6412 IV, series 7014,
Cam Lo Sheet No. 6432 I, series 7014,
Ba Long Sheet No. 6312 II, series 7014.

Enc: Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure
(1) is submitted herewith.

W.R. Kent
By direction

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DECLASSIFIED
HEADQUARTERS
2d Battalion 4th Marines
3d Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1-31 December 1968

INDEX

PART I
ORGANIZATIONAL DATA
PART II
NARRATIVE SUMMARY
PART III
SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
PART IV
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

ENCLOSURE (1)
1. 2d Battalion 4th Marines

2d Battalion 4th Marines

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. SUBORDINATE UNITS

H&S Company

R Company
Fr 5 Dec 68
Fr 6 Dec 68
Fr 22 Dec 68
To 15 Dec 68
Fr 16 Dec 68
Fr 23 Dec 68
Fr 18 Dec 68

S-6
To 5 Dec 68
Fr 6 Dec 68
Fr 22 Dec 68
To 15 Dec 68
Fr 16 Dec 68
Fr 18 Dec 68

F Company

G Company

H Company

I Company

J Company

II Company

I. Location

Quang Tri Combat Base; 1-31 December 1968

3. Staff Officers

Executive Officer

S-3

S-2

S-6

Supply Officer

Communications Officer

Motor Transport Officer

Medical Officer

Chaplain

Major W. L. Kent

1st Lt J. D. Clarke

Longshoreman

Communications Officer

Motor Transport Officer

Medical Officer

Chaplain

The average monthly strength during the period:

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{OFF} & \text{USMC} & 36.2 \\
\text{ENL} & 1099.0 & 53
\end{array}
\]

Critical MOS's and rank deficiencies have been closely monitored and requested.

The following number of personnel were transferred during the period:

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{OFF} & \text{USMC} & 8 \\
\text{ENL} & 167 & 3
\end{array}
\]

DECLASSIFIED
The following number of personnel were joined during the period:

<table>
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<th>Service</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>75</td>
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<tr>
<td>USN</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENL</td>
<td>145</td>
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The following casualties were incurred during the period:

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<th>Number</th>
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<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>INJURED</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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NOTE: The figure for WIA's listed above does not equal the number or WIA's one would arrive at were the daily reports of wounded to be added together. This apparent inconsistency is the result of two facts.

First, the daily summary only reports activities of those units under the operational control of 2/4. In this regard, a WIA incurred by Company G on 1 December 1968 while under the operational control of 3/4 does not appear in the daily summary but is properly included in this section.

Second, the daily summary lists only KIA's and those wounded who were evacuated due to wounds. The number of wounded who do not require evacuation is kept only by the corpsman and reported on through casualty reports submitted to L-3 and C-1.
PART II
NARRATIVE SUMMARY

During the past five months 2/4 has been a nomadic battalion. With few exceptions the unit has been constantly operating in the jungle-covered mountains and ravines of the northern I Corps area. The constant movement in accord with this division's program of frequent visitations upon the whole territory in order to 'closely' monitor enemy activity and to make it impossible for him to conduct a large scale build-up.

The battalion again this month fulfilled their role in this kaleidoscope of movement, covering in excess of 50,000 square meters of territory in the operation along the DMZ alone. Destruction of bunkers and caches took place at a substantial rate, and, most importantly, the enemy was driven from a piece of real estate he had decided to occupy and hold.

December opened with 2/4 well spread out. Companies G and E were opconed to 3/4, aiding them in the search of the area around FSB WINCHESTER (XD 935596). Company E returned to 2/4 on the second of December and was deployed with one platoon on hill 950 and two platoons sweeping south of FSB SHEPARD and west to Khe Sanh.

Company H was doing defense duty for Task Force Hotel at Vandegrift Combat Base and Ca Lu. Company F was deployed over FSB CATES, hill 691 and hill 950 until Company E returned to 2/4.

The opportunity to get the battalion together again came with the assignment of 2/4 to an operation planned for early December. On 7 December the operation commenced with a helilift into four planned landing zones east of FSB MACK. One of the planned LZ's was the scene of several secondary explosions set off by the artillery prep fires and was bypassed, with the company scheduled to enter LZ diverted to a safe LZ. Operating three thousand meters north of Dong Ha Mountain the battalion landed on two ridges, one beginning at XD 996617 and the other XD 997040.

On 8 December Company E had a patrol moving in the 0364 grid. At 1800 the patrol took small arms fire from a treeline. Moving to engage the enemy, they noted about ten armed enemy troops moving away into the heavy brush. Two more squads were sent to reinforce the engaged squad, and to prevent the escape of the enemy. The platoon thus engaged maneuvered forward until they found that the enemy had taken cover in a heavily fortified trench and bunker complex. As the platoon entered the bunker complex, it was discovered that the position was occupied by at least fifty NVA with mortars and automatic weapons. With darkness nearing, and casualties mounting, the platoon was disengaged, bringing all its wounded out with it, and rejoined Company E for the night. Meanwhile, heavy air, artillery and mortar bombardment was continued on the bunker complex throughout the night, and fires were centered on suspected routes of enemy reinforcement or egress.

Rapid deployment of the other maneuver companies at the outset of contact permitted a partial block to be set up around the grid square before nightfall, the hope being to catch the NVA on their way out by setting in across the avenues of egress. But the enemy apparently
"hit the ground running!". No further contact was made and a sweep of the area the following day went unchallenged.

At this point Company F was ordered to move to assault the ridge beginning at TD 01858 and extending along the southern boundary of the DMZ to the northeast and then directly east. The high ground at TD 024661 was designated Objective B. After heavy air and artillery strikes Company F moved against Objective B. They seized the western portions without any resistance except for thirteen rounds of ineffective mortar fire. But as they continued east, they were quickly taken under small arms fire. As they fought their way forward they came into intensive and deadly fire from bunkers and at least three machine guns. They were to remain in constant contact all day. Company H, alerted to follow in F's trace earlier in the day, was committed to reinforce Company F in the early afternoon. Attempting to envelop from the north they too ran into heavy fire and a fierce fire-fight ensued. Once Company H was able to bring its full fire power to bear the enemy began to withdraw. Company G, helilifted from its position after H came into contact, arrived late in the afternoon. By this time, however, the battlefield had become quiet.

The following day Company G led out in the assault of the remainder of Objective B. However, the enemy, those who could, had left. One live and armed NVA soldier was pulled from a bunker. He was unharmed and quickly whisked off to higher command, along with a complete issue of NVA weapons, ordnance, and equipment. Through interrogation of this prisoner and other intelligence estimates, it was determined that Objective B was occupied by major elements of the 27th NVA Regiment.

In the following days the entire ridge line east and west was checked out. Using tactics designed to draw the enemy in, the battalion moved away from the area as if leaving, then quickly struck back into the area. But the enemy had apparently decided not to contest the terrain and no further physical contact occurred. Pursuit of the enemy into the DMZ was not permitted by higher headquarters.

In all, the totals for the operation were impressive. By body count, at least forty-five NVA were killed. Many more were dragged off into the DMZ. And the heavy air strikes and artillery missions on the fleeing enemy probably took a large additional toll of NVA casualties. Post action intelligence reports stated that the assault at Objective B annihilated the battalion commander and staff of the 1st battalion, 27th regiment. It is probable that his battalion suffered the same fate.

In the way of armament the battalion captured forty-six individual weapons, three hundred thirty-five 82mm mortar rounds, three hundred twelve 60mm mortar rounds, 5 120mm mortar rounds, 108 chicom grenades, 79 chicom claymores, 3 Chinese or Russian anti-tank mines, 36 RPG rounds, 5775 rounds of 50 caliber, 4800 rounds of small arms ammunition, one complete 60mm mortar including sight, one 82mm mortar base plate, plus large numbers of detonators, incendiaries and over 100 pounds of TNT.

Of other supplies they wore 375 pounds of rice, 140 pounds of salt and much miscellaneous 782 gear.
During this operation the battalion was on the receiving end of 82mm and 60mm mortar rounds on three separate occasions. In addition three rounds of friendly artillery landed in the LZ of Company E. Fortunately neither enemy nor friendly fires caused any casualties.

On the day after Christmas the battalion left this area and was heli-lifted into the Cua Viet area, where Companies F, G and H perfectly executed the cordonning of the village of XUAN THANH to permit its search by the 3d battalion, 2d ARVN regiment, while also patrolling and ambushing the banks of the Cua Viet west to Dai Do. This operation terminated on the 30th of December, when the battalion heli-lifted to an area south of Cam Lo and east of Mai Loc to conduct further search and destroy operations.

Battalion operations during the month of December were characterized by two notable factors traditionally held in high esteem by all Marines: It was the skillful use of supporting arms to a maximum degree, and the inspiring and magnificent combat spirit of the individual Marine. In the battle for Objective Bravo (later locally christened "Foxtrot Ridge") small unit leaders leaned closely into artillery and mortar prep fires on every occasion, and at least two Marines received minor napalm burns from soft air ordnance skillfully directed against bunker systems only thirty meters from the front lines. Perhaps the basic spirit of the Marine Corps itself was echoed and exemplified in the actions of Lt. Stephen Broderick, Company F, in the seizure of Foxtrot Ridge. Having sustained heavy casualties in the initial fierce fire-fight in the central bunker complex, he extracted his casualties by a heroic effort, reorganized his platoon, and after another heavy air and artillery preparation, turned to his troops and shouted, "All right, Marines--take this hill--and earn your pay!" He then gallantly led his platoon in a valiant and aggressive assault back into the heavily defended complex, and continued forward until he was killed by a direct burst of fire from an enemy automatic weapon. The exemplary and indomitable fighting spirit of this valiant Marine and others like him made the seizure of Objective Bravo, and the defeat of the NVA forces therein, an inevitable conclusion.
PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

01 December 1968

The battalion had two companies under the operational control of 3/4 and one company under the control of Task Force Hotel at the beginning of this month. Company F was under the control of 2/3 and was operating from FSB CATES, hill 691 and hill 950. The area was quiet and three fireteam LP's found no contact.

02 December 1968

Company E was lifted to FSB CATES. Companies E and F conducted operations from FSB CATES, hills 691 and 950, and added a platoon sweep south of the area of FSB SUBBARO, which had been closed a few weeks before. The sweep found no indication of enemy encroachment into that area.

03 December 1968

Companies E and F continued to defend their positions with extensive patrols and night ambushes. Three squad-sized patrols, three squad night ambushes and four LP's were conducted with negative results.

04 December 1968

The patrolling and search and destroy operations continued. At AD 9°2990 a squad from Company F discovered approximately thirty to forty NVA rifle from bunkers and fighting holes. Their best estimate was that the bunkers had not been used in the last three months. No gear was found, and the bunkers were destroyed. A trail running east and northeast from Hill 994 was the site of an ambush for that evening. No one appeared in the killing zone, and five LP's did not hear any movement.

05 December 1968

Six squad patrols were run, three of which became night ambushes. The battalion was alerted to be ready to be relieved in its positions and lift to Vandegrift Combat Base in preparation for a battalion operation.

06 December 1968

Patrolling and ambush operations were continued, while plans were being completed for a hellfire into an area south of the DMZ and north of Dong Ha Mountain (FSB FOLDER). No enemy contact was made this date.

07 December 1968

The operational control of all IB units was returned to IB for the upcoming operation. Companies E and F (-) were helilifted to join Company G at VCB. Company H moved from Ca In to VCB while one platoon
of Company F remained on 950. At approximately 1000, H-hour was set at 1200 and preparations made accordingly. When the lift commenced, only two of the four proposed LZ's were utilized due to evidence of booby traps and inadequate prep fires on the others. Company E, Company F (--) and Company H landed in LZ JUNIOR; Company G, Headquarters and Whiskey landed at TA MARYN. All units moved to their assigned positions and established perimeters, IP's and squad-sized ambushes.

09 December 1968

All units moved toward new objectives in the morning. At 1525 a squad patrol from Company E received small arms fire from a tree line and trench line at TD 033614. The squad called for supporting arms, and 60mm mortars, artillery and then air were brought to bear on the enemy. Two squads were sent to reinforce and to exploit the situation, but the attacking units found themselves caught in a crossfire of chicom, AK's, white smoke or gas, and at least two M-16's. With darkness approaching Company E withdrew its platoon, three members of which were missing and reported killed by enemy fire. Nine other Marines were wounded.

The final enemy KIA count was set at eight, four by small arms and four by air strikes. Company E also captured a 60mm mortar complete with night and forty rounds for the weapon, along with two packs full of medical supplies.

Upon withdrawal of all Marines from the bunker complex an air strike and heavy mortar and artillery fires were placed on the positions. AC's reported two secondary explosions in the area during the strike, and that two of the bunkers had fires in them.

Company E was reinforced with one platoon from Company H while other units established blocking positions and night ambush sites around the area of contact.

09 December 1968

All units moved to clear the enemy position of the previous day, with Company F on the north, Company G east and south, Company H behind Company E, and Company E assaulting from west to east over the ground involved in the previous day's action. The enemy had withdrawn during the night, however, and no further contact was made. The bodies of the three KIA Marines were recovered. The sweep showed the enemy to have been well set up and dug in with a large bunker and trench line running NE/SW nearly one hundred meters long. Some ten other bunkers were in the complex as well as thirty firing holes. Five clear trails were found leading to various parts of the complex. The trails were booby-trapped with 60mm mortar rounds. The position was estimated to have housed an NVA company.

Company G, in sweeping north and east in the same area, found two AA positions with strong, well built bunkers attached containing three hundred rounds of 12.7mm rounds. Additional sweeps turned up another
bunker complex north of the first one, at YD 034645, and a living area along the stream at YD 037645. A search of the latter revealed two hundred pounds of rice, a bandage with fresh blood on it, twelve 60mm mortar rounds, the base plate for a 60mm mortar, and assorted 782 gear and eating utensils.

At about dusk, Company F received seven 82mm mortar rounds and six 60mm mortar rounds from YD 018659. No casualties were sustained. 81mm mortar and artillery counter-battery fires resulted in excellent coverage of the suspected launch area and no further rounds were received. It was later determined that the counter-mortar fires were directly on target.

Night acts consisted of three squad-sized ambushes and seven LP's. No contact resulted.

10 December 1968

Company E continued to search and destroy the area of its encounter (grid 036h). Company G secured Objective 8 (YD 038633), prepared to receive the command group and to move on order to Objective 9 (YD 01663h), all of which was accomplished by 1500. Company H relieved Company F at YD 015618 and Company F moved out for Objective B (YD 018658), the approximate location from which the enemy mortar fire the night before had originated. Air strikes on the high ground at YD 018658 and on a mortar position at 021658 forced Company F to stop short of the high ground. They held up for the night at YD 018654. The three air strikes destroyed four hundred meters of trail, five bunkers, one .50 caliber position, damaged five bunkers, and set off four secondary fires.

Night acts consisted of four squad ambushes and eleven LP's.

11 December 1968

Plans for 11 December were as follows: Company E was to continue its intensive search and destroy operations in grid 036h and the ground south of YD 016635. Company G was to conduct similar activities in the area north and south of YD 016635. Particular attention was to be paid to any further indications of routes used by the NVA when vacating the area where Company E made contact two days earlier. Company H was to heavily patrol the ridge and surrounding areas at YD 028652. Company F was ordered to seize the highground at YD 024660 and YD 026664, called Objective B for this operation. Action in this vicinity changed the above plans.

At 0825 Fox 1 took 60mm mortar and small arms fire. 81mm support was called in and an AO came on station and reported having enemy in sight. Pressing forward toward YD 024660 the lead elements came under small arms and automatic weapons fire. The enemy were well entrenched and the dense vegetation made it difficult to spot the sources of enemy fire. As it was later discovered, Company F had fought its way into the middle of a large, well laid out bunker complex. Having fought their way in, the company found it extremely difficult to maneuver its way out, due both to the fires of the enemy and the problem of carrying their wounded.
Air strikes were called and four flights were flown, after which mortars and artillery continued to work the area over. Shortly after the contact was initiated Company H was dispatched forward to reinforce Company F. Reaching the area of contact around noon, Hotel was opened to Company F and shortly thereafter was committed to take the pressure off pinned-down Company F units.

Once Company H was in position its concentrated fire power assisted greatly in forcing the enemy to withdraw. Artillery, 81's and air continued to work over the enemy positions and possible routes of egress, artillery being responsible for at least one secondary explosion. By 1620 the field quieted. Company H stood by to interdict enemy escape to the north. While Fox began the task of reorganizing and consolidating Golf was positioned to reinforce F and H. Darkness was rapidly approaching and drawing the curtain on this, the battalion's first major combat effort in almost five months. At the end of the day the companies in contact had recovered all their wounded. Marine units reported definitely killing at least seven enemy, but no search of the battlefield was yet possible.

The three companies formed a united, well placed perimeter on the western portion of Objective B, with Company E and the battalion command group on the ridge across the valley to the south at YD 019468. Battalion night acts consisted of three squad ambushes, and regular LP's.

Friendly casualties on this day were thirteen Marines KIA (four JTO) and thirty-one WIA. Enemy losses were unknown at the close of the day, except for seven bodies found in addition to the seven reported killed by Marines in the course of the action.

12 December 1968

Early this morning the battalion command group received one dud artillery round and two other rounds in their positions. Fortunately no casualties resulted.

The battle plan for the day called for Company G to envelop into the complex from the southwest on a small spit of land not shown on the map. It was hoped that this route would put the company on the right or southern fringes of the complex. Company H was to move back out onto the finger to the north which they had occupied the previous day and act as a base of fire for Company G if the latter were to encounter resistance. Either company was to be ready to support the other if one route of approach was seen to be more favorable than the other.

Following air strikes, artillery preps and an 81mm mortar mission, the fires to zero in the 60mm mortars, Company G moved out. The enemy had fled, however, and no contact was made. One NVA soldier was found slain and unharmed in a bunker. He was relieved of his loaded light machine gun and holilifted to higher headquarters.

Companies F and H recovered their BNR's. A careful and thorough search of all bunkers turned up a vast array of material of all kinds. Besides the live POW the units found: three AK-47's, one SKS, one light machine gun and drum, one M-14, one M-16, 24 RPG rounds, 62 82mm mortar rounds, 300 60mm mortar rounds, 37 chico grenades, 10 anti-personnel...
mines, 49 chicom claymore mines, 1600 rounds of small arms ammunition, 1600 rounds of light machine gun ammunition, medical supplies, documents, assorted clothing and 782 gear, one 82mm mortar base plate, and 600 pounds of rice. Five NVA bodies were found this day.

10 December 1968

The mission for this day consisted primarily in continuing along the ridge running north and east from Objective B. Company G moved out after air, artillery, 81mm's, and 60mm's were fired in. Company H occupied the ground G vacated and expanded the search of the battle area. Company F continued its search and destroy operations in the area of YD 018658.

No resistance was encountered. Company G uncovered another freshly killed NVA body, fifteen new chicom grenades, 61 82mm mortar rounds, 300 AK-47 rounds, three machetes, nine bags of rice, two cans of cooking lard, two smoking pipes, and a tin grave-marker with the date "Sept 7, 68" punched into it. Six bunkers were found but none had any signs of recent use.

The trail along the top of the ridge continued to show signs of having been used within the previous two days.

Company F, working the ridgeline to the south of Objective B, found thirty-six weapons, only two of which were complete. There were twenty-two German Machine guns, two Japanese light machine guns, two French Mat-49 sub-machine guns, one British Sten gun, one B.A.R., and eight unidentified rifles.

11 December 1968

Company G moved out at 0955 to seize hill 262 in grid 0366. Company H followed in trace of Company G to hill 262, and then moved through Company G to seize a knoll about four hundred meters further east on the ridge line. Companies E and F continued local security and search and destroy patrols in their immediate vicinity.

Company G found a bunker on their objective containing sixteen chicom grenades, four of which were still in their wrappings.

Eleven IPI's and two platoon-sized night ambushes made up the night acts for the battalion. None of the night acts reported any contact or movement.

12 December 1968

Companies E and G swept east to the vicinity of the C665 grid to seize a hill mass denoted as Objective II, and which intelligence sources reported to hold one NVA company. A search of the area produced negative results, so Companies E and G were doubled back to night positions at YD 020648 and YD 020648. While this was done Companies F and H conducted search and destroy patrols in their respective areas of operation. The only finds of the day were by Company F who found seven 82mm mortar
rounds, two 60mm mortar rounds and 1800 7.62 rounds.
Ten LP's and three squad-sized ambushes comprised the night activities.

16 December 1968

The battalion now moved to search the terrain west from Objective B.
Company E moved to YD 005640. Company F and the command group set in at
YD 008613. Company C took up a position at YD 002653, and Company H
held up at YD 006652 for the night. The only significant finds for the
day were made when a platoon from Company F, accompanying the S-2 on a fact-
finding mission discovered two large huts, 30' by 30', with thatched roofs
and raised floors, at YD 02622. Two other partially completed huts were
found. All were destroyed.

17 December 1968

Patrol activity in the area of each unit's night positions produced
some interesting results. At about 1130 Company F found a partially de-
composed enemy body wrapped in a poncho. One squad of Company G found a
bunker complex and graveyard at YD 003656. The wooden markers indicated
the presence of nine graves. These were all dug up and a skeleton was
found in each. No other gear was found in any of the graves.

Two other squads of Company C, sent out to help the first squad,
took a different trail and came into the middle of a large bunker complex
with the center at approximately YD 000555. This complex took all after-
noon to search, and even then the unit reported it still hadn't reached
the outer boundaries of the complex. It was spread over three fingers
and obviously had been a large staging area and resupply point. The
bunkers were at least six months old and showed signs of recent use by
small groups. Found in this complex were: 80 82mm mortar rounds,
eighty blasting caps, two hundred half-pound blocks of TNT, six hundred
30 caliber rounds, three hundred AK-47 rounds, two rice-weighing scales,
35 rifle grenade fin assemblies (without warheads), a flare pistol and
the barrel of a 30 caliber machine gun, and two chicken coops. In this
complex were large, well-built hooches and deep, heavily covered bunkers.
There were a total of about thirty bunkers and rice storage hooches.
All were destroyed.

Company H found a large bunker complex at YD 005657, consisting of
about forty bunkers. Two manual tracking device kits (sights) in good
condition, for 50 caliber and 12.7 mm antiaircraft guns were found.
Nearby were numerous expended 50 caliber casings. In addition
Company H found 46 82mm mortar rounds, six illumination rounds still
in their canisters, twelve increments and eight boosters.

The companies deployed four squad-sized ambushes for the night,
plus one fire team ambush and nine LP's.

17 December 1968

The companies completed extensive search and destroy missions
indicated the previous day. Schematics of trails and bunker complexes
were drawn up and turned in to S-2. Night acts made no contact.
19 December 1968

Company E moved to occupy the high ground at XD 988628 and to conduct search and destroy operations in the four grid squares surrounding that point. Company G secured XD 992658. Company H moved to XD 992647 after checking out YD 001617, XD 995615 and XD 995650. Company F alone remained in place.

At about 1500 the battalion command group noted ten 60mm or 82mm rounds landing in the valley to their north, at YD 011648. It was estimated from the sound of the pop that the rounds originated in a valley about seven hundred meters north of XD 018658. 81's and artillery were fired and a fixed-wing strike called in on the position. No more rounds came in.

Company G found two 82 mortar rounds at an old mortar pit at XD 992660. They also searched out a trail complex leading north from their position and turning west along the ridgeline at XD 98864. No bunkers, fighting holes or trenches were found. Company F came across a fresh grave containing the body of a recently killed NCO or Officer. The marker read "Vietnam Hero". Five other graves were dug up with negative results.

The battalion further located thirteen 82mm rounds, five mortar pits, and three bunkers at YD 008648. All were destroyed.

The night acts, eight LP's and five ambushes, did not report any activity.

20 December 1968

Company H was ordered to move to XD 986656 and sweep the southern two-thirds of grids 9865. Company G was ordered to move to XD 971658, from where they were further ordered to secure the high ground at XD 971660. Company F, originally assigned to provide CP security, was given the mission of returning to Objective B to determine whether the enemy had attempted to reoccupy that ground. Company E assumed CP security.

At 0000 at YD 009615 twenty bunkers were found with assorted 762 rounds. All but three bunkers were destroyed, the remaining bunkers being seeded with CS.

21 December 1968

On this day all companies operated from their night position except for Company F which returned from Objective B after a search of that area.

At 1200 ten rounds of enemy 60mm mortar fire landed again in the 2/1 AO at YD 012665, the same area fired on two days earlier. Counter battery fire was called on the suspected mortar sites, with unknown results.

At 1900 Company G was ordered to return to its position of two days before, YD 002651, while Company H moved to YD 006652.

Company F reported finding one 120mm mortar round at YD 031659, 1000 rounds of 50 caliber at YD 028662, and a two week old mortar pit that appeared to have been deepened and widened within the past twenty-four hours at YD 023659.

The night acts called for six LP's and a squad ambush. Again negative contact resulted.
22 December 1968

All units prepared to lift to a new operational area with Company E and the OP group at YD 016664, Company G and H in their former night positions, and Company F on the same ridge with Company E and the Command group. When orders arrived cancelling lift all companies conducted search and destroy operations in their vicinity.

Company F made the only find of the day when they discovered two NVA bodies well off a trail.

22 December 1968

Companies G and H were ordered back to Objective B, to prevent enemy reoccupation of that ground, which dominated the area. While these companies were enroute, all 2/4 units heard approximately fifteen to twenty mortar pops from roughly north of the DMZ boundary, but no units received any rounds in their vicinity. The rounds were fired from the same vicinity as on two previous occasions, but apparently impacted within the DMZ. There was little doubt as to the source of these rounds and the other enemy mortar rounds fired at the OP group on 19 and 21 December. AO reports indicated heavy trail activity, 40 to 60 new bunkers, and fresh mortar pits about 1000 meters north of Objective B. Intelligence reports indicated that the elements of the 27th NVA Regiment located at Objective B had withdrawn to those positions within the DMZ.

Later in the day, one platoon of Company G, moving several hundred meters north of the rest of the company to check out an assigned objective at YD 016664, located another bunker complex at YD 016659 consisting of thirty-five bunkers and two old AA positions. Seven 82mm mortar rounds, two R 6 mines, 150 AK rounds, and some 782 gear were found and destroyed.

The 2/4 order for the following day called for preparations to be lifted to a new objective.

23 December 1968

Company G reoccupied terrain at YD 026664. All other companies stood fast. Continued patrolling was the order of the day. Night acts consisted of eight LP's and one squad sized ambush. A 24 hour cease-fire was ordered for the period 2400 H to 2500 H December 1968.

25 December 1968

Christmas day saw a complete meal delivered to the field while security was maintained by OP's, two platoon patrols, and two squad patrols. Company C first platoon checked out a trail going from YD 036658 to its terminal point at YD 027657. Four 120mm mortar rounds and one hundred 50 caliber rounds were found and destroyed, except for one 120mm mortar round, which was sent to the regimental S-2.

Four squad night ambushes and eight LP's stood guard this Christmas night.
26 December 1968

Once again the battalion prepared to move. This time it was to set up a cordon operation with ARVN units in the Cuu Viet lowlands. Ocon changed to Task Force Bravo, Companies G and F and the battalion command group lifted into YD 305683. Company H went into YD 321711. Company E was passed by TFB to the control of 2/3 and was sent to Hill 64 at YD 092618.
All units of the battalion (-) executed a diversionary feint to the north from respective LZ's, then moved to establish a cordon around the village of Xuan Thanh, to the south, after dark.

27 December 1968

By 0300 the cordon had been established by Companies G and H.
Company F set out seven ambushes in the area to the north and west of Xuan Thanh, while Companies G and H established 4 LP's to the north of their cordon.

28 December 1968

While maintaining the cordon, Companies G and H conducted long range patrols: G to the 2971 grid, H to the 3171 grid. During this day the battalion took OCON of an amtrac company to aid in increasing the range of their operations, and to provide logistical support by surface means. Company F continued heavy ambush activity in their AO.

29 December 1968

Company F was moved by amtrac to relieve Company G on the cordon, dropping off a squad ambush for the night at a trail intersection at YD 293676. Company G moved by PBR and amtracs to set up nine ambushes in an area roughly bounded by Ky Truc (YD 249661) on the west, the 6726 grid on the north, 6730 grid on the east, and a village called Dai Ke (YD 251628) on the south.
Heavy patrol activities found 2/4 units going west to the YD 2465 and 2468 grids.
At 1300 while checking some civilians in the area at YD 264661 a unit from Company G turned up one Vietnamese female without an ID card. An old man in the vicinity identified her as a VC operative and both were passed to higher HQS for further interrogation.
Eleven widely-spaced night ambushes failed to make contact.

30 December 1968

All 2/4 units assembled at YD 307681 to await a lift to a new AO.
At 1100 the lift began. By early afternoon all lifts were complete. Headquarters was at YD 171516; Company F at YD 175512; Company G Hill 68 at YD 165511; Company H at YD 159523.
Company G, moving to the west, began finding a series of old bunker complexes. At YD 161511 they reported four bunkers, partially destroyed by fire and enemy. At YD 163515 there were fifteen bunkers, thirteen of which had been destroyed by air strikes.
At YD 159521, two very old bunkers in a heavy treeline and an old trail running generally east and west were located. In all cases, neither gear nor any signs of recent use were discovered.

Sixteen night ambushes were spread over as many likely areas of enemy traffic as could be found. The heavy night activity did not discover any enemy on the move.

30 December 1968

The plan for the day was a general movement of all units to the west on two axes, Companies F and H on the north and Company G on the south. H and F, when on a line from YD 137527 to YD 162510, swept south into a blocking position established by Company G on a line from YD 138507 to YD 147502. There was no contact, and no sign of recent enemy activity.

More old positions were found in the area, the most promising and recently used of which was a squad-sized position at YD 172512 where bags of rice estimated to be two weeks old were found. At YD 171514, ten bunkers, thirty-five fighting holes, one small cooking area, and an old trail were found. A thorough search of the area failed to turn up anything of importance. At YD 164508 a stream with numerous trails was found; none recently used. At YD 130515 an old 82mm mortar round rigged as a surprise firing device was found wedged in a tree. It was destroyed.

The battalion settled down to welcome the New Year and the enemy with nineteen ambushes.

One item worthy of note was that intelligence sources reported that the Battalion, in its attack on Objective B on 11 December, had killed the Battalion Commander of the 1st Battalion, 27th NVA Regiment, and had virtually decimated his staff.
PART IV

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td>A</td>
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<td>B</td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>LOGISTICS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS</td>
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<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>FIRE SUPPORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>MEDICAL AND DENTAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>CHAPLAIN SUPPORT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Intelligence operations during the period were satisfactory.

2. Mission

   a. The mission of the 2d Battalion for the greater part of December was to search out and destroy enemy troops, equipment, material and living/fighting sites, and to locate areas of possible infiltration north of the Cam Lo refugee center and south of the DMZ.

   b. During the month of December the 2d Battalion was under the operational control of the 4th Marine Regiment.

3. Enemy Contact and Activity

   a. During December 2/4 had solid contact with NVA forces on two occasions.

      (1) On 8 December, Company E sent out a squad-sized patrol from the third platoon to search and destroy enemy fortifications in the 3D 0364 grid. The squad came upon an estimated seven or eight NVA soldiers and pressed forward for the kill. The enemy took refuge in a fortified area and the rest of the platoon was sent to help in the assault. The entire platoon came under an intensive cross-fire, however, and were pinned down. Due to approaching darkness the platoon was pulled back and contact was broken. Air strikes and artillery were called in on enemy positions, and a sweep of the area was made the next day to gather gear and intelligence information. The sweep made no further contact.

      (2) On 11 December, Company F made contact with an unknown number of NVA in a well developed bunker system in the vicinity of 3D 0266.9. After several hours of fighting, Company F, heavily engaged with a large, well-entrenched enemy force, was joined by Company H (-), and their combined fire-power succeeded in driving the enemy off the northern slope of Objective B. Air strikes and artillery were called in on enemy avenues of escape.

         The following day a POW who was hiding in a bunker was found by a squad-sized patrol from Company G.

         The bunker complex was found to contain 178 bunkers.

4. Friendly Disposition

   a. For the first five days of December the battalion command post was located at FSB CATES along with one company as security. Two companies were under the operational control of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, while the fourth company was sweeping south of FSB SHEPARD.
On 7 December, the battalion command group landed in the vicinity of XD 985642 with Company G; the rest of the battalion landed at LZ JUNIOR at XD 013645.

(1) For three days the battalion command post moved to various positions with one platoon of Company G. On 11 December the command and support Companies F and H in their contact with the enemy. From 11 to 25 December the battalion command moved up and down the ridge line from XD 008648. On 26 December the battalion moved to the Cua Viet area for a cordon operation and a search and destroy mission throughout the area.

(2) Company E landed at XD 013645 and proceeded to the vicinity of XD 013645 where they met enemy contact on 8 December. On 11 December Company E moved out to patrol the area west of the rest of the battalion. They assumed duties as CP security from 23 December up until 26 December when they were under the operational control of 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines and operated around Cam Lo.

(3) Company F landed at XD 013645 and proceeded to the vicinity of XD 013645 to investigate that area. On 11 December the company moved to XD 022659 where they made all day contact. Company F stayed in this area to destroy bunkers and collect gear until 15 December when they became battalion security. On 23 December they re-took Objective B at XD 022659. On 26 December Company F moved to Cua Viet with the rest of the battalion.

(h) Company G also landed at XD 985642 along with the battalion command. On 11 December Company G moved to XD 019645 to assist Company F. From the 11 to 25 December Company G operated throughout the area just south of the DMZ clearing enemy bunkers of ammunition caches. On 26 December Company G moved out to the Cua Viet.

(h) Company H landed at LZ JUNIOR (XD 013645) and moved east along the ridge line. On 6 December Company H sent a platoon to assist Company E at XD 0362. On 11 December they moved over to XD 022659 to assist Company F. From 11 December through 26 December they operated near Company G throughout the area south of the DMZ as a search and destroy capacity. On 26 December Company H moved into the Cua Viet on the battalion's cordon operation.

5. Reconnaissance Inserts Operations

Reconnaissance inserts were generally not used until late in the month. Inserts in the DMZ indicated a regimental size unit south of the Ben Hai River in the general area of XD 020700. Reconnaissance units made only light contact, once resulting in the capture of a POW. Inserts in other areas showed negative results.

6. Artillery, Rocket, Mortar Attacks

There were no artillery or rocket attacks during the month of December. There were three instances of enemy mortar fires, but no casualties were inflicted. Mortar capability was present as indicated.
by the large numbers of captured enemy 62mm and 60mm mortar rounds. Numerous mortar pits were found throughout the area. On 8 December an enemy 60mm tube complete with sight was captured by Company E.

7. Ground Surveillance Devices

Ground surveillance devices were used only at the last of the operational period. They were placed at strategically located areas north of hill 366 (YD 006612) along trails and avenues of approach. The read out for these devices is at Dong Ha Mountain.

8. Scout Dog Teams

a. Scout dog teams were not used by units of 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines in the month of December.

9. Enemy Situation

a. The enemy intentions for the month of December appeared to be to build-up for an attack against a civilian village (such as Cam Lo) or a major military installation. Operations in December by 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines are believed to have curtailed or set back all major enemy operations for an indefinite time. The enemy's loss of a great deal of ordinance and personal gear, along with the destruction of front line bunkers, should considerably affect the enemy's plans.

b. According to intelligence information enemy morale is fair and the troops now, having infiltrated from the north within the last few months.

10. Enemy Disposition

a. Enemy disposition and strength in the Scotland II area of operation was reported to be as follows during the month of December 1968.

(1) 27th NVA Regiment, strength 1065, location YD 1369.
(2) 2nd Battalion, 27th NVA Regiment, strength 250, location YD 1268.
(3) 3rd Battalion, 27th NVA Regiment, strength 250, location YD 1169.

b. Operations of 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines indicate that the First Battalion, 27th NVA Regiment, strength about 250, was located at YD 0266 (Objective B).

11. Terrain

a. The terrain in the area of responsibility/operations is a rugged, mountainous, highland region in the northcentral part of Quang Tri Province. The terrain for the most part is difficult to move in because of irregularities of terrain pattern. There are few places that afford easy movement.
Many ridge lines in the area of operation have trails and old camps which allow a degree of ease in movement.

12. Cover and Concealment

a. Cover: The enemy is afforded excellent cover in the operational area. The irregular pattern of the terrain provides the enemy many places where he can establish his harbor sites/base camps. The steep terrain and many fingers provide defensible sites for his bunker complexes.

b. Concealment: Where heavy air, artillery and trail dust activities have occurred the enemy does not have sufficient cover to operate in his customary fashion. For the most part, however, the terrain and vegetation are such as to provide the NVA good cover and concealment for whatever use they desire to make of the area.

13. Vegetation

a. Vegetation on the rugged highlands is dense jungle with bamboo, banana trees, and dense undergrowth. The vegetation in the valleys or clear areas is elephant grass or brushwood.

14. Results

Total enemy KIA's, weapons captured, and POW's for the month of December:

| Enemy KIA's:       | 45 |
| Weapons: Individual | 46 |
| Crew-served:       | 1  |
| Enemy POW's:       | 1  |
| Total enemy KIA since 5 May 1965: | 3118 |
| Total enemy weapons captured since 5 May 1965: | 1170 |
| a. Individual weapons: | 934 |
| b. Crew-served:     | 336 |
| Total enemy POW's since 5 May 1965: | 199 |

Appendix

Subsequent reports state that the assault on 11 December at "Foxtrot Ridge (XD 0264) annihilated the Battalion Commander and staff of the 1st Battalion, 27th NVA Regiment."
All new personnel reporting to the field receive instructions on a variety of subjects. The present program consists of talks on care and cleaning and troubleshooting the K-16, first aid and personal hygiene, supply discipline, an intelligence briefing, and a series of short dissertations on the pay roster, MPC, safe handling of weapons with a discussion of accidental discharges, the availability of chaplain, dental aid, and the Red Cross, and a warning on the use of drugs.

In addition all newcomers are taken to the Quang Tri Combat Base Firing range to zero their weapons.

While at Vandegrift Combat Base in the first week of December, classes in a wide area were planned as is SOP when 2/4 gets to the rear. Most of those were cancelled due to the sudden order to move out. All training had to be done in the field on the small unit level.

In the future it is anticipated that the training program will expand, if tactical commitments permit. The biggest boost should come with the appointment of a training officer for the battalion and completion of a battalion training SOP.
LOGISTICS

During the month of December, the Battalion moved several times and normal resupply problems were encountered due to shortage of transportation, i.e., trucks and helicopters, and the difficulty of coordinating LSA assignment of helos to staged gear on short notice (after the company had halted and assumed its night defensive position). RA 386 radio batteries are in critically short supply and the Battalion cannot carry out its assigned missions without them. Rifle cleaning gear and helmets are also a critically short item. The continued shortage of helmets create a large problem in that newly joined personnel cannot be moved forward without them.
1. **Significant Events**

During the month of December elements of the communications platoon continued to participate on operations in the Scotland II and Napoleon/Sedim areas.

2. **New Developments**

N/A

3. **Problem Areas**

Lack of AN/PRC 77 Radios prohibits any backup of the portable voice cryptosystem causing great inconvenience and weak security. The slow return of RT-505/AN/PRC-25 creates a problem in maintaining communication.

4. **Status of Equipment**

a. As of the 31st of December 1968, the following equipment was deadline:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nomenclature</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RT-505</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Return time is long. Henceforth Priority-02 will be used</td>
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<td>H-189</td>
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<td>C-2328A</td>
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b. An overage in the following has been brought to our attention by Bn Supply:

| GRA-88               | 2        |                                               |

5. **Security Violations.**

None Reported
6. Number of Messages Sent and Received:

Sent  -  41
Received  -  531

7. Personal Status:

Oversizes
1 2511 Pvt
1 2533 Sgt
Shortages
1 2512 Pvt
1 2511 Sgt
2 2511 Pvt
1 2533 Sgt
### FIRE SUPPORT

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<th>ROUNDS EXPENDED</th>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>105mm Howitzer</td>
<td>16 Missions</td>
<td>50 WP 347 HE 0 HCS</td>
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<tr>
<td>81mm Howitzer</td>
<td>12 Missions</td>
<td>0 WP 60 HE 4 Illum 0 HCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2&quot;</td>
<td>1 Mission</td>
<td>0 WP 30 HE 0 HCS</td>
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**TOTAL MISSIONS:** 32  
**TOTAL ROUNDS EXPENDED:** 50 WP 137 HE 4 Illum 491 TOTAL

**ARTILLERY H&I'S**  
219

**ARTILLERY CONFIRMS**  
7 NVA 0 Ordnance

| 81mm Mortar        | 48 Missions    | 45 WP 81 HE 0 Illum |
| 81mm Mortar H&I'S  | 143 Missions   | 183 WP 1542 HE |

**MORTAR CONFIRMS**  
0 NVA
2. AIR SUPPORT

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</table>
### MEDICAL AND DENTAL

1. **SIGNIFICANT EVENTS**
   - NONE

2. **NEW DEVELOPMENTS**
   - NONE

3. **PROBLEM Atlas**
   - NONE

4. **AVERAGE NUMBER OF PATIENTS SEEN DAILY**
   - 24

5. **TOTAL NUMBER OF PATIENTS SEEN FROM 1 DEC 68 THRU 31 DEC 68**
   - 764

6. **NUMBER OF REFERRALS TO NSA, USS REPOSE, USS SANCTUARY, 3RD MEDICAL BATTALION, ETC...**
   - 180

7. **ROUTINE COMPLAINTS**
   - (a) DIARRHEA
     - 18
   - (b) URI
     - 18
   - (c) DERMATITIS
     - 80
   - (d) LICE
     - 29
   - (e) NEURONAL DISEASE
     - 8
   - (f) INVERSION FOOT
     - 0
   - (g) OTHERS
     - 151

8. **SIGNIFICANT DISEASE AREAS**
   - (a) Malaria
     - 6
   - (b) Typhoid

9. **NUMBER OF EMERGENCIES**
   - (a) BURNS
     - TOTAL 1
     - EVAC 1
     - KIA 0
     - DOW 0
   - (b) IA GERMATIONS
     - TOTAL 5
     - EVAC 2
     - KIA 0
     - DOW 0
   - (c) HEAT CASUALTIES
     - TOTAL 11
     - EVAC 7
     - KIA 0
     - DOW 0
   - (d) SHRAPNEL WOUNDS
     - TOTAL 12
     - EVAC 12
     - KIA 0
     - DOW 0
   - (e) GUNSHOT WOUNDS
     - TOTAL 18
     - EVAC 12
     - KIA 6
     - DOW 0
   - (f) OTHERS
     - TOTAL 6
     - EVAC 0
     - KIA 0
     - DOW 0

10. **IMMUNIZATIONS AND PROPHYLACTICS ADMINISTERED**
    - 71

11. **DENTAL REFERRALS**
    - 12

12. **OFFICERS SEEN AT SICK CALL**
    - (a) OFFICERS SICK CALL
      - 4
    - (b) EVACUATED WITH SHRAPNEL AND GUNSHOT WOUNDS
      - 1

---

**J. E. FRANGER LT MC USNR**

**BATTALION MEDICAL OFFICER**

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**DECLASSIFIED**
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