From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, First Marine Division (Rein)
Via: Commanding Officer, 5th Marine Regiment (Rein)

Subj: Command Chronology for period 010012 Jun67 to 302400H Jun67

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2A
     (b) FMF PacO 5750.8
     (c) DivO 5750.2B

Encl: (1) 3rd Bn, 5th Mar, Combat After Action Report, Operation UNION II
       (2) 3rd Bn, 5th Mar, Combat After Action Report, Operation ADAIR

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a), (b) and (c), the Command Chronology for the month of June with enclosures (1) and (2) is hereby submitted.

C. B. WEBSTER

5TH MAR DIV FILES
00871-67
COPY NO. 1 OF 12

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DECLASSIFIED
HEADQUARTERS
3rd Battalion, 1st Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein) FMT
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
"0000Z" Jun67 to 002400Z Jun67

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PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. DESIGNATION

3rd Bn, 5th Marines

COMMANDER

LtCol C. B. WEBSTER (27 May 67)

SUBORDINATE UNITS

H&S Company

2/Lt G. E. ONSLEY (1 May 67-8 Jun 67)
2/Lt B. T. HEIDTKE (9 Jun 67)

I Company

Capt H. W. STACKPOLE (1 Apr 67-2 Jun 67)
2/Lt K. W. MOORE (2 Jun 67 - 18 Jun 67)
Capt P. M. BURKE (19 Jun 67)

K Company

Capt J. R. TENNEY (25 May 67)

L Company

Capt P. R. GOTTLEIB (1 Jun 67-5 Jun 67)
Capt H. D. PITTENGILL (6 Jun 67)

M Company

Capt J. R. McELROY, Jr. (16 Dec 66-25 Jun 67)
Capt B. A. GREENE (26 Jun 67)

2. LOCATION

1-30 June at BT 533089, Chu Lai Installation, RVN

3. STAFF OFFICERS

ExecO

Maj B. R. CUMMINS (22 Apr 67)

S-1

2/Lt W. M. GORTZ (6 Mar 67)

S-2

1/Lt S. E. LINDBLOM (7 Jan 67)

S-3

Maj E. S. PIPER, Jr. (16 Nov 66)

S-4

2/Lt W. W. KING (19 May 67)

S-5

Lt J. E. LOUIS (MC) USNR (5 Apr 67)

Supply Officer

Capt S. C. THOMPSON, Jr. (1 Apr 67)

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

USMC

USN

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<th>OFF</th>
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PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

This Battalion has experienced no major problems in the area of personnel administration. Shorthces exist in certain MOSs and there is a shortage of Sergeants in all MOSs.

The Battalion Scouts have been engaged continuously in the battalion operations. The Battalion's Kit Carson Scout has been extremely effective in operations and is one of the most valuable of all the Vietnamese personnel attached to this Command. Enemy activity has been heavy at times.

The Battalion has completed two successful operations, Operation UNION III (26 May 67-6 Jun 67) and Operation ADLIR (15 Jun 67-24 Jun 67), and is currently engaged in Operation CALHOUN (25 Jun 67-current).

At the present time there are no major logistical problems in the Battalion.
PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1. Topics

a. Personnel and Administration

(1) The Battalion began the month of June with an on-roll strength of 35 Marine Officers and 115 Marine Enlisted. The current on-board strength is 33 Marine Officers and 135 Marine Enlisted.

(2) Rotating during the month of July 1967 are 1 Marine Officer and 49 Marine Enlisted. Critical shortages exist in NCO O-382 in the officer ranks and in H55 O-369 in the enlisted ranks.

(3) The regular monthly promotion cycle to Corporal helps to alleviate the shortages in the junior NCO ranks.

(4) This Organization has experienced no major problems during the month in the area of personnel administration.

b. Intelligence

(1) There were no personnel changes for the month of June. However, the Chief Scout, (a Staff Sergeant billet), is being filled by a Corporal.

(2) For the past month the S-2 Scouts have been used by the Company to handle all the intelligence materials and information gained on the last part of Operations UNION II, ADAIR and CALHOUN. Between operations the scouts took part in classes on map reading, handling of documents, writing of spot reports and radio procedure.

(3) Enemy activity for the past month was especially heavy when the Battalion made contact on the afternoon of 2 June. Throughout the month, sporadic sniper fire was experienced on 15 and 16 June. The Command Post received mortar fire. Few mines and booby traps have been encountered due to the fact that the Battalion has been on static, fast moving operations deep in enemy controlled areas wherein the enemy has had little support with respect to air and artillery harassment efforts.

(4) Use of the Battalion's Kit Corps Scout continues to be very successful. He continues to be used to talk to the people about the Chieu Hoi program and their movement as refugees to New Life Hamlets. Use of a Chieu Hoi proved very successful on Operation CALHOUN.
(1) During the month of June only ten (10) days were available for training due to operational commitments. During these ten days the Battalion held classes on radio procedure, FO procedures, FAC procedures, and field sanitation. PAM firing was conducted for all the Marines in the Battalion using their TO weapons. All companies held classes on fire team tactics, squad tactics, FM and hand signals, utilization of support arm, small unit tactical formations, principles of patrolling and ambush techniques.

(2) During the month of June, selected personnel of the Command attended the following formal schools in Japan, Okinawa and Da'Nang:

(a) Vietnamese Language - 2
(b) NCO Leadership School - 2
(c) Field Radio Ops School - 1
(d) Field Wire Ops School - 1
(e) Psychological Warfare - 1

4. Operations

(1) From 1-5 June the Battalion was actively engaged with the enemy on Operation UNION II which concluded on 5 June. (See Combat After Action Report, enclosure (1)).

(2) From 11-18 June Company L was under the operational control of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines.

(3) From 15-24 June Company K (-), Company F, Company M and the Battalion's Alpha Command Group were participating in Operation ADAM.

(4) From 25 June to date Company K (-), Company L, Company L and the Battalion's Alpha Command Group are participating in Operation CALHOUN.

6. Artillery Support. See the Combat After Action Reports: enclosures (1) and (2).

f. Logistics

(1) General. The overall logistic status of the Battalion is excellent. At the present time there are no major logistical problem areas. See Combat After Action Reports: enclosure (1) and (2).
(2) Supply

(a) Efforts have been made to eliminate the problems concerning the cleaning of the M-16. All M-16 parts and cleaning materials have been requisitioned on 05 priority. The Supply Officer, an armorer, and two company representatives attended a class on the care and cleaning of the M-16 held at FLC in Da Nang. Each person reporting from CONUS to the battalion is given a class in the care and cleaning of and FAM fired with the M-16 rifle.

(b) On 30 June 1967 the Battalion supply section staged all its material at the Chu Lai Sand Ramp for further transportation to Da Nang.

(3) Motor Transport. At the present time Motor Transport has two vehicles depleted, one in 3rd echelon and one in the 2nd echelon. Supply has been maintaining repair parts in adequate quantities. Parts for the M-131 are necessary to bring the 3rd echelon vehicle back into operation.

(4) Construction. No construction is in progress at this time.
2 June Capt H. C. STACKPOLE, Company Commander, Company I, MIA and med-evac'ed.
2/Lt S. C. MEISS Platoon Commander, Company L, WIA med-evac'ed.
2/Lt V. A. RANSOM, Platoon Commander, Company I, MIA.

5 June Capt M. T. HALL, Battalion FAC, transferred.
Capt H. C. STACKPOLE, Company Commander, Company I, transferred.
Battalion Command Group, Company I, Company K(-), Company L, and
Company M returned to the LSA at Tam Ky from Operation UNION II.

6 June Capt P. GOTTLIEB, Acting Company Commander, Company L, transferred
to the 5th Marines.
Major L. E. JOHNSON rejoined to 5th Marines HQ from 3/5 as
acting S-3.

10 June Major L. E. JOHNSON, Acting Battalion S-3, transferred to the
5th Marines.

11 June Company L was attached to 7th Marines to help provide perimeter
security. OPCON of Company L was transferred to the 7th Marines.

12 June 1/Lt R. J. MOLLER, Battalion FAC, joined.

15 June Company H, Company I, Company K (-) and the Battalion's Alpha
Command Group began Operation ADAIR.
Capt J. R. TENNEY, Company Commander, Company K, WIA med-evac'ed.

18 June Company L flew to Que Son. OPCON of Company L reverted to 1/5.

19 June Capt F. M. BURKE, joined the Battalion and relieved 2/Lt K. W.
MOORE as Company Commander, Company I.

24 June Company I, Company M, Company K (-) and the Alpha Command Group
returned to Que Son terminating Operation ADAIR. OPCON Company
L returned to 3/5.

25 June LtCol D. E. ESSLINGER, Battalion Commander, WIA was transferred.
Company I, Company K (-), Company L, and the Alpha Command
Group began Operation CALHOUN.

26 June 2/Lt F. J. SMITH, Platoon Commander, Company I, joined.

28 June 2/Lt J. R. ROBBINS, Battalion FAC Officer, joined.
HEADQUARTERS
3rd Battalion, 5th Marines
1st Marine Division (Rein) FdF
P.O. San Francisco, California 94602

3/Cw/plb
3121
15 July 1967

From: Commanding Officer, Third Battalion, Fifth Marines
To: Commanding General, First Marine Division
Via: Commanding Officer, Fifth Marines

Subj: Combat After Action Report

Ref: (a) Division Order 3480.1
(b) Verbal Proc Order from 5th Marines of 151350h June 1967

Enc: (1) Route Overlay of Battalion Command Group

1. Code Name. Operation ADAIR.


5. Task Organization.

3rd Battalion (-) (Rein), 5th Marines

LtCol C. B. WEBSTER

H&S Co (-)
Det, btry F, 2nd bn, 11th Marines (M-1m)
Det, 1st SP bn, (HST)
Det, 1st ANG bn
Det, 1st tank bn

Co I (Rein)

Capt F. M. BURKE

Co I
Det, H&S Co
Det, Med Plt
Det, 81mm Mort Plt (FO 1m)
Det, Comm Plt (F-1 "m"
Det, Int Sect (Scouts and Chieu Mei)
Det, btry F, 2nd bn, 11th Mar (FO 1m)
Det, 1st ANG bn
Det, 1st SP bn (HST)
Co K (hein)

Capt J. R. Heilhoi, Jr.

Co K
Det, HSS Co
Det, med Plat
Det, 81mm Ht Plat (FO Tm)
Det, Com Pt (PA Tm)
Det, Int Sect (Scouts and Interpreter)
Det, Spy F, 2nd Bn, 11th Marines (FO Tm)
Det, 1st SP Bn (HSI)

3rd Plat (-), Co Hn, 1st Ang Bn

2nd Plat (-), Co K, 1st SP Bn

3rd Plat (-), Co A, 1st Tank Bn

En Reserve

Co K (-) (hein)

Capt J. R. Tenney
2Lt J. C. Carcida

Co I
Det, HSS Co
Det, med Plat
Det, 81mm Ht Plat (FO Tm)
Det, Com Pt (PA Tm)
Det, Int Sect (Scouts and Ht Grenn Soldiers)
Det, Spy F, 2nd Bn, 11th Marines (FO Tm)
Det, 1st Ang Bn
Det, 1st SP Bn (HSI)

6. Supporting Forces

a. Artillery

(1) During the course of Operation ADLX, the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines received artillery support from Battery F and Battery W, 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines. Battery F was in direct support while Battery W was in general support. At no time during Operation ADLX was the battalion without artillery support.

(2) Artillery was used to prepare battalion and company objectives on a continuing basis. Preparation fires were timely, coverage was excellent, and results were very effective.
(1) Operation All-In took place inclusively from 15 June 1967 to 24 June 1967. There were no periods during the Operation where weather was a deterrent to utilization of close air support.

(2) Fixed wing air support was utilized well during the first 24 hours of the Operation. A total of 12 flights were run during this period with excellent target coverage. One Ud-13 strike was run on 18 June in support of resupply helicopters.

(3) All fixed wing air strikes were controlled by a Tactical Air Control (airborne). Ground forward air controlling again proved to be difficult because of poor target acquisition due to high foliage.

(4) The AN/PSQ-25 was used extensively during this Operation and proved once again to be a very reliable unit. The AN/PSQ-41 was only marginally satisfactory due to difficulty in keeping it in operating condition under field conditions.

7. Intelligence

a. Local force VC units were encountered on Operation ALLAIR, although the Operation did take place in the operational area of the 3rd NVA regiment and the 21st NVA regiment. There were reports during the Operation of NVA units moving in the area but these were in small groups of 10-30 men and they were all reported moving during the hours of darkness.

b. The first encounter of the Operation was with a platoon sized force armed with small arms, automatic weapons, M-79 grenade launchers and 60mm mortars. This unit withdrew rapidly when an air strike was called in on its position. Sporadic sniper fire was received during the first three days of the Operation with the Battalion CP receiving three rounds of 60mm mortar fire during the first night. On the third night the Battalion CP received approximately 20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Two booby-traps, both M-26 grenades, were detonated by Marines during the Operation. On 22 June the Battalion CP was bracketed with two 75mm recoilless rifle rounds. From this time until the end of the Operation only light sniper fire was encountered. The Operation produced five (5) Viet Cong suspects, three (3) captured enemy weapons and assorted enemy equipment.

c. The initial area of operation, BT 1634, was flat with slightly terraced rice paddies. Hamlets in this area afforded good protection and concealment for night defensive positions. Moving north towards the mountains, BT 0538, thick brush with trench lines and many fighting holes were found. The Battalion then moved west between the ridge line and stream, BT 0538, sweeping the area as it moved. This area consisted
of very thick undergrowth with rice paddies and the usual hedgerow with plenty of cover and concealment available for the enemy. Many fighting holes were found on and just off most of the trails, with trench lines over the entire operational area.

d. On 17 June 70 VN civilians requested relocation from BT 1130 and were heli-lifted out of the area into a New-Life Hamlet area. The individual corpsmen helped the civilians with any medical aid they could provide and both parties seemed to benefit from the service. The Marines again were involved in the Civic Action Program in their usual ways, handing out candy and soap, talking to the people and helping them carry personal belongings when they were being flown out. Many civilians volunteered information concerning VC movement and activity in their area. Again a small "psychological warfare" program was effected by the evacuation of civilians from a VC controlled area.

8. Mission. During the conduct of Operation ADAIR, the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines was assigned the following missions:

a. Heli-lift from the LSA at Tam Ky (ST 292232) to LZ (BT 166341) and move by foot to assist Company K (-), 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines.

b. To conduct Search and Destroy operations in assigned zones of action.

9. Concept of Operations. At 151300H June 1967 two Companies, Mike and India, and the Alpha Command Group were heli-lifted from the LSA at Tam Ky (ST 292232) to LZ (BT 166341) to assist Company K (-), 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines. Escort and LZ preparation was provided by UH-1D and A-4U aircraft.

10. Execution

a. 15 June 1967

(1) At 151250H the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines received a verbal frag order over the land line to mount out two companies and an Alpha Command Group to reinforce Company K (-), 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines as they were in heavy contact with the enemy. At the time of contact Company K was OPON to 5th Marines.

(2) At 151325H the first elements of Company K left the LSA at Tam Ky for the designated LZ.
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(3) At 15430h Company M moved out from the LZ to link up with Company K.

(4) At 151500h the last elements of Company I landed at the designated LZ thus completing the heli-lift for all units.

(5) At 151515h Company K estimated their casualties at 4 USMC KIA and 15 USMC WIA while inflicting at least 5 KIA (probable) on the enemy.

(6) At 151545h Company I and the Command Group moved out from the LZ and received two incoming M-79 rounds from an undetermined enemy and from an undetermined direction. No friendly casualties were sustained.

(7) At 151615h Company M and Company K physically linked up.

(8) At 151630h Company K (BT 161325) found 2 VC bodies in black PJs and packs which contained clothes and documents. A U.S. Carbine serial no. 3076864 with 30 rounds of ammunition were found inside one of the bodies. Results were 2 VC KIA (confirmed).

(9) At 151630h a Marine spotter aircraft sighted numerous VC crossing an open rice paddy at BT 147328. Two air strikes were called in resulting in 10 VC KIA (probable).

(10) At 151730h all units arrived at their night positions which was as follows:

(a) CP and Company K - BT 168329

(b) Company I - BT 160325

(c) Company M - BT 157328

(11) At 151800h Company K found 3 VC bodies, two large blood trails and drag marks, 8 expended M-79 rounds, numerous carbine rounds and an 81mm Caliber .45 Thompson SMG serial No. 309832 with the number 3/7 on the stock at BT 169330. Results were 3 VC KIA (confirmed) and 2 VC KIA (probable).

(12) At 151810h Company I found 5 VC bodies, an AK-47 serial No. 13560, 150 rounds small arms ammunition, 3 Chicom grenades and 4 NVA packs along the trail and in the bushes in the vicinity of BT 160328. Results were 5 VC KIA confirmed.

(13) At 152000h the corrected total casualty figures for Company K were 9 USMC KIA and 20 USMC WIA.
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(14) At 152035H the Command Group (BT 16329) received 3 incoming mortar rounds from an unknown enemy position. One of the three rounds was a dud. No casualties were sustained.

(15) At 152100H the Battalion Intelligence Officer received the following information from Company K's Kit Carson Scout who had monitored VC radio transmission on the FM radio frequency 43.00 between 140000H and 141830H:

(a) VC were planning an ambush for the 14th or 15th of June. No area was given.

(b) After an air strike was run the VC said that at 142000H their group (30 VC plus their casualties) would move to the northwest to their objective, Que Son.

(c) The VC mentioned three camps but communications were interrupted and the locations of the camps could not be obtained.

b. 16 June 1967

(1) At 160545H all units moved out to seize their respective objectives.

(2) At 160800H Companies M and I reached phase line Blue (trail running from BT 148330 to BT 140297).

(3) At 160830H Company K (BT 161304) found 1 VC body with green trousers and leather cartridge belt with one canteen; An-NVA helmet and a heavy blood trail were found leading away from the body to a thick hedgerow. The interpreter talked to the local people who stated that a large number of VC had moved to the foothills in the West to set up another ambush. Haystacks were destroyed in the area which resulted in four secondary explosions. Results were 1 VC KIA (confirmed) and 1 VC KIA (probable).

(4) At 161000H Company M secured Objective No 1 (BT 128311) and prepared to support Company I's attack on Objective No 2 (BT 130302).

(5) At 161200H Company I secured Objective No 2 (BT 130302) and prepared to support Company M's attack on Objective No 3 (BT 121303).

(6) At 161230H Company K apprehended one male VC who was wounded by the mornings artillery preparatory fires. On his person he had an ID card stating that he was 50 years of age, but he appeared too interrupted and the locations of the camps could not be obtained.

6
be much younger. He also had a document given to him by the VC security cadre in the village of Binh Phu. The document had a written security diagram of the village. The VC's stated that last night numerous VC wearing both black and khaki uniforms with cartridge belts, small arms weapons and some wearing helmets moved to the Northeast.

(7) At 161300H Company M secured Objective No 3. (BT 121303) and prepared to support Company I's attack on Objective N.

(8) At 161515H Company I secured Objective N (BT 112303).

(9) At 161530H Lieutenant General R. E. CUSHMAN CG III MAJ visited the Battalion CP. He departed at 161550H. At nightfall all units had set in around Objective N in the following manner:

(a) Command Group - BT 111302
(b) Company I - BT 110300
(c) Company K - BT 112300
(d) Company M - BT 113304

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(1) At 170002H Company I on the southern portion of the perimeter received approximately 20 rounds of 82mm mortars from an enemy position at BT 133111. Artillery called in counter-battery fire on the suspected enemy mortar position with good target coverage. Two Marines were slightly wounded. Both were med-evac'ed at first light. Both were wearing both black and khaki uniforms with cartridge belts, small arms weapons. (2) At 170135H Company I received three incoming 82mm mortar rounds from an undetermined enemy position. No friendly casualties were sustained. (3) At 170200H Company K's lines received one incoming grenade. Three grenades were returned with negative results. No friendly casualties were sustained. (4) At 170700H Company I encountered 61 Vietnamese civilians in vicinity BT 13311 that requested to be evacuated as refugees. They were escorted to the Battalion CP and heli-lifted to a New Life Hamlet.

(5) At 171000H Company I encountered 61 Vietnamese civilians in vicinity BT 13311, that requested to be evacuated as refugees. They were escorted to the Battalion CP and heli-lifted to a New Life Hamlet.
(6) At 171005H Company K apprehended one male VC (BT 296105) hiding in the bushes with radio batteries in his possession. VC was wearing black trousers and white shirt. Results were 1 VC.

(7) At 171030H Company H spotted a number of VN digging trenches at BT 123310. Patrol was engaged with automatic weapons fire and VNs fled. An artillery mission was called in on the enemy position with excellent target coverage. Results were 7 VC KIA (confirmed) and 10 VC KIA (probable).

(8) At 171300H a heavy section of tanks (BT 146311) enroute to join the Battalion received sniper fire from BT 144316. The tanks returned the fire with their MG's which resulted in 1 VC KIA (probable).

(9) At 171330H Company K encountered 9 VN (BT 110301) who requested to be evacuated as refugees. They were escorted to the Battalion CP and heli-lifted to a New Life Hamlet.

(10) At 171600H the heavy section of tanks was escorted by Company N to the Battalion CP.

(11) At 171600H a resupply helicopter received 7 rounds of SA fire. Company I returned 40 rounds SA fire and called in an artillery mission with excellent target coverage. Results were 1 VC KIA (probable).

(12) At 171730H all units moved out to their night time positions which were as follows:

(a) Command Group and Company K - BT 118303
(b) Company I - BT 115308
(c) Company M - BT 124303

(13) At 171900H Company M spotted 15 VC wearing black PJs, fleeing to the West. Called in an 81mm mortar and an artillery mission, both with good target coverage. Results were 5 VC KIA (probable).

d. 18 June 1967

(1) At 180000H all units moved out to seize Objective 0 in vicinity of BT 158348.

(2) At 181130H Company K (BT 142336) found a dud bomb. A charge was set and the word passed for all hands to take cover. Two
Marines did not observe the warning and were wounded slightly by shrapnel from the bomb. Both were med-evac'd shortly thereafter.

(3) At 181345H Objective O was secured and units were in the following positions to receive resupply:

(a) Command Group and Company K - BT 160346
(b) Company L - BT 166350
(c) Company M - BT 150348

(4) At 181505H Company I's resupply helicopters (BT 165340) received approximately 200 rounds 50 caliber fire from an estimated six VC. Three VC were wearing black PJs and one VC was seen wearing a khaki uniform. Company I returned 500 rds 50 caliber fire, 10 rounds 81mm mortars and 20 rounds 105mm artillery, all with good target coverage. A patrol searched the enemy positions finding one blood trail and one cartridge belt. Results were 4 VC killed (probable).

(5) At 181700H all units moved from their resupply positions to the following night positions:

(a) Command Group and Company K - BT 129355
(b) Company L - BT 084363
(c) Company M - BT 125358

(6) By 182000H all units had arrived at the above night positions.

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15 July 1967

(1) At 190600H all units resumed the attack to seize Objective R (BT 085369).

(2) At 191000H Capt. F. M. BURKE arrived and assumed Command of Company I, relieving 2/Lt. K. W. MOOKE.

(3) At 191100H Objective K was secured. Units were in the following positions:

(a) Command Group and Company K - BT 096369
(b) Company L - BT 084372
(c) Company M - BT 084367
15 July 1967

(4) At 191515H all units resumed the attack to seize Objective S (BT 015375).

(5) At 191545H the attack was halted on order, with units in the following positions:
   (a) Command Group - BT 085369
   (b) Company I - BT 084373
   (c) Company K - BT 087369
   (d) Company M - BT 084367

(6) At 191915H Company M discovered an old VN male observing a night activity position. He was detained overnight and released early the next morning.

20 June 1967

(1) At 200700H all units sent out patrols to conduct S&D operations in the immediate area. All unit CPs remained in last nights positions.

(2) At 200830H Company I questioned VNIs in village at BT 103375. They stated that one platoon of VC moved through their village in an easterly direction at 200300H. They were carrying two machineguns, one mortar and one M-79. They were wearing black PJs and some wore gray shirts.

(3) At 201200H Company I apprehended four VCIs at BT 069373. After initial interrogation only one male, age 18-20 years, was detained and forwarded to the 5th Marines.

(4) At 201600H all units resumed the attack toward Objective S (BT 015375).

(5) At 201715H all units assumed the following night positions:
   (a) Command Group and Company K - BT 065374
   (b) Company I - BT 064382
   (c) Company M - BT 057376

(6) At 202300H a Company K LP (BT 065376) received 4 SA rds from an enemy 100 meters to the northeast. The Marines returned 25 rds
• of small arms fire and one grenade with negative results.


g. 21 June 1967

(1) At 210600H all units resumed the attack toward Objective S (BT 015375). Enroute, Company I assumed OPCON of the tanks to secure Objectives No. 4 (BT 050384), No. 6 (BT 032385) and No. 8 (BT 021383). Company M was assigned Objectives No. 5 (BT 036377), No. 7 (BT 027373) and Objective S.

(2) At 210705H Company M had secured Objective No. 5 and Company I had secured Objective No. 4.

(3) At 210755H Company I's platoon detonated a booby trap wounding two Marines. The booby trap consisted of an M-26 grenade placed inside of a piece of hollow bamboo with a wire tied to the grenade and across the trail. When the wire was moved the grenade was pulled out of the bamboo. The pin had previously been pulled so that the spoon would fly off when the grenade was pulled out of the bamboo. Both Marines were med-evac'd.

(4) At 210815H Company K's Kit Carson Scout talked to some VNs at BT 053385 learning that 10 VC with weapons, but no packs, dressed in black PJs, passed through their hamlet moving northwest about 210200H.

(5) At 211000H Company M secured Objective No. 7. Company I's progress was shown by the inability of the tanks to negotiate the wet rice paddies.

(6) At 211120H Company M's point detonated a booby trap wounding one Marine. The booby trap consisted of an M-26 grenade inside of a can with a wire tied to the grenade and across the trail to a tree. The pin had previously been pulled on the grenade. The Marine was only slightly wounded and was med-evac'd later in the day.

(7) At 211300H one platoon from Company I accompanied the tanks eastward, back around the small ridge line to the South and on to Que Son as the terrain became unsuitable for their employment. The paddy dikes were too high and the paddies themselves were too wet.

(8) At 211400H Company I (-) secured Objective No. 6.

(9) At 211500H Company M secured Objective S and Company I (-) secured Objective No. 8.

(10) At nightfall units were situated as follows:

   (a) Command Group and Company K (-) - BT 024386

   (b) Company I - BT 018383

   (c) Company M - BT 015375
(11) At 211830H some documents were discovered in a cave at BT 029386 which included a list of names of the VC in the hamlet at the above coordinates and two South Vietnamese I.D. cards. Villagers stated that the VNs to whom the I.D. cards belonged had defected to NVA forces.

(12) At 211915H the Command Group received 2 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle fire from an unknown enemy position.

(13) At 211930H the Command Group and Company K (-) moved to join Company I (-) at BT 018383.

(14) At 212130H the Command Group and Company K (-) effected the linkage with Company I (-).

22 June 1967

(1) At 220330H all units moved out to attack Objective W (BT 000315). enroute, Company I was assigned to secure Objectives No 2 (BT 010360) and No.4 (BT 006326) and Company M, Objectives No.1 (AT 999353), No.3 (AT 999357) and No.5 (AT 988326).

(2) At 220815H Company I (AT 993365) received 10-15 rounds of enemy SAF (AT 986366) wounding one Marine. Company I returned 50 rounds SAF, one 3.5 round, and 10 M-79 rounds resulting in 2 VC KIA (probable).

(3) At 220840H Company K (AT 996366) received 2 rounds sniper fire from a position 150 meters to the Northwest. No fire was returned due to the close proximity of adjacent units. No friendly casualties were sustained.

(4) At 220845H Company K (AT 997367) received 20 rounds SAF from an estimated 3 VC at AT 996372. Company K returned 50 rounds SAF, 5 rounds M-79 and two artillery missions that covered the target adequately and silenced the snipers. Results were one USMC WIANE and 3 VC KIA (probable).

(5) At 220945H Company M secured Objective No 1.

(6) At 221000H Company I made contact with and resumed OPCON of the tanks and their rifle platoon which had been providing security.

(7) At 22123H Company M secured Objective No 3 and attacked toward Objective No 5.

(8) At 221310H Company I secured Objective No 2.
(9) At 221450H Company K's Kit Carson Scout was informed by a Hamlet Chief at BT 008330 that 10 VC armed with carbines moved West through the above coordinates at 220100H.

(10) At 221500H Company M secured Objective No 5.

(11) At 221515H Company M flushed one VC wearing a khaki uniform from a village at AT 993345. As he ran from the patrol the Marines tried unsuccessfully to halt him and then fired and killed him at a range of 100 meters. Results were 1 VC KIA (confirmed).

(12) At 221530H Company M secured Objective No 4.

(13) At 221530H Company M (AT 993339) spotted one VC (AT 990338) wearing a khaki uniform running from a village. Company M took him under fire with a MG at a range of 300 meters killing him. Results were 1 VC KIA (confirmed).

(14) At 221600H Company M (AT 993332) received 60 rds of automatic S.A.F. Company M returned 100 rds S.A.F and one artillery mission which gave good target coverage and silenced the automatic weapon. Results were 1 VC KIA (probable).

(15) At 221700H Company I secured Objective W.

(16) At 221830H Company M (AT 983323) received 29 rounds S.A.F (AT 975323) at a range of 100 meters. Company M returned 100 rds S.A.F, an 8mm mortar mission and an artillery mission both with excellent target coverage. Results were 1 VC KIA (probable).

(17) At nightfall units were located as follows:

(a) Command Group and Company K (-) - BT 001329

(b) Company I - BT 009324

(c) Company M - BT 991326

(18) At 222105H Company K's (BT 001329) LP spotted 4 VC crawling West along the river bank at a range of 50 meters. One VC had a weapon. LP opened fire with 20 rounds S.A.F and two grenades. Results were 2 VC KIA (probable).

i. 23 June 1967

(1) At 230700H all units moved out to conduct S&D operations enroute to the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Combat Base.
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(2) At 230900H all units arrived at the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Combat Base (BT 023346).

(3) At 230900H transferred OPCON of the tanks to the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines and resumed OPCON of Company L, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines.

(4) At 231100H units were located in the following positions and commenced patrolling the local area:

(a) Command Group - BT 024346
(b) Company I - BT 021345
(c) Company K - BT 024343
(c) Company L - BT 023347
(e) Company M - BT 026345

J. 24 June 1967

(1) Unit CPs remained in their previous locations and patrol of the local area was conducted.

(2) At 241200H Operation ASMR was secured.

11. Results

a. Enemy

(1) The following is an assessment of VC personnel casualties inflicted:

(a) VC KIA (confirmed) - 19
(b) VC KIA (probable) - 51
(c) VCSS at least 1 - 5
(d) Refugees - 70

(2) The following is a compilation of enemy equipment and material captured or destroyed:

(a) Babies (destroyed) - 1
(b) Paks (destroyed and evacuated) - 6
(c) Company M - 14
(b) Chicom grenades (destroyed) - 3
(c) M-26 grenades (destroyed) - 2
(d) Documents (destroyed and evacuated) - 6 lbs
(e) Small arms ammunition (destroyed) - 675 rds
(f) The following is a list of weapons that were captured and evacuated:

1. M-1 Carbine - 1
2. M16 Thompson SMG - 1
3. AK-53 - 1

(g) Rice destroyed - 2003 lbs.

b. Friendly

(1) Casualties sustained were as follows:

(a) Killed in Action - 9
   1. Gunshot - 5
   2. Shrapnel - 4

(b) Died of Wounds - 0

(c) Wounded in Action - 33
   1. Gunshot - 15
   2. Shrapnel - 17
   3. Punji Stick - 1

12. Administration

a. Resupply

(1) Resupply was accomplished from the Logistical Support Area (LSA) at Tam Ky.

(2) Normal resupply of all classes of supply was accomplished every other day. Emergency resupply was accomplished when requested.
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(3) Availability of helicopters was a controlling factor, but overall support was excellent.

(4) The HST net was used as a logistical, administrative and helicopter control net. No problems were encountered in this area.

b. Maintenance. Replacement of defective equipment was accomplished through the LSA. Maintenance of equipment was accomplished in the field.

c. Treatment of casualties, evacuation and hospitalization. Evacuation of personnel was accomplished smoothly and usually within a minimum of time. Again, availability of helicopters was a determining factor. Wounded were removed expediently from the battlefield and excellent care was received throughout the evacuation chain.

d. Transportation. No problems were encountered with transportation. Replacements and special supplies were transported by truck to the LSA. All resupplies and special supplies were delivered to the field by helicopter from the LSA.

e. Communications

(1) The AN/PRC-25 continues to be a thoroughly dependable means of communication. The Battalion used the AN/PRC-25 on its TAR net (normally an AN/PRC-47 is used). By utilizing relay via Regiment, their FM radio equipment was used for TAR requests.

(2) The HC-292, less the AB-125, proved adequate for extending the operating range of the AN/PRC-25. A bamboo pole serves as an excellent base for this antenna.

f. Medical Evacuation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Killed in Action</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Wounded in Action</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Died of Wounds</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Combat injuries non-wound</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Non-combat injuries</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Wounded in Action non-evac</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Total number of medical evacuees</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
13. **Special Equipment and Techniques**

a. This was the first time that the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines had worked with tanks. The Battalion had OPCON of a heavy section of tanks for a period of seven days. Only once during this period did the tanks materially hinder the maneuverability of the Battalion and this was easily alleviated. The company that was working with the tanks had very few sniper incidents, whereas the other companies working in the same area encountered a greater volume of sniper fire. The tanks proved to be an asset in the hard flat terrain and dry weather in which Operation ADAIR was conducted.

14. **Commander’s Analysis**

Operation ADAIR was initiated by the need of support for Company K’s combat patrol which met a well entrenched force of Viet Cong on the afternoon of 15 June. The initial action caught Kilo’s lead elements in open flat terrain but the patrol regrouped, assaulted, and then held its ground until the arrival of relief forces. The enemy withdrew and was later estimated to be a reinforced company strength; this Viet Cong unit was heavily hit by air strikes as it retreated inland. The link-up with Company K and subsequent area sweep were successful and revealed the extent of damage inflicted upon the Viet Cong which was greater than earlier believed. In continuation of search and destroy missions for the remainder of ADAIR, this Battalion was fortunate in having tank support. While there was minimal enemy contact for the duration of ADAIR, the presence of tanks appeared to largely eliminate sniper fire against the company of which they were in support.

The Operation was not particularly fruitful in terms of enemy destroyed however the wide coverage and sweep of enemy held areas showed again that the Viet Cong and NVA forces are very reluctant to face organized offensive action, and avoid contact even in strongly pro-enemy territory whenever possible.

15. **Recommendations**

a. That tanks be utilized in support of infantry operations whenever terrain and weather permit. The almost instantaneous direct fire support renderable more than compensates for the slight delays sometimes encountered in their movement across poor terrain. It is an excellent weapon with which to neutralize the numerous fortified emplacements consistently encountered, as well as a deterrent to the average VC/NVA sniper.

b. That, unless in actual physical contact and/or pursuit of sizeable enemy units, more time be allocated to search and destroy missions.
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more thoroughly examine and/or destroy tunnels, fortification, etc., in the objective area.

C. B. WEBSTER