US ARMY
SPECIAL WARFARE SCHOOL
Fort Bragg, North Carolina

LOUDSPEAKER OPERATIONS
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LOUDSPEAKER OPERATIONS

PART I - FUNDAMENTALS AND MESSAGES

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CHAPTER 1  ST 33-152

FUNDAMENTALS OF LOUDSPEAKER OPERATIONS

1. General. Of the several media employed to convey propaganda to enemy target audiences during combat operations, only the loudspeaker affords immediate and direct communication. It achieves, in effect, face-to-face contact with the opposing forces. These forces become, during the loudspeaker broadcast, a captive audience who cannot escape the message; and, if the message is well conceived and properly tailored to the situation, they cannot escape the psychological impact of the message. Because of this, the audience becomes mentally conditioned, to some degree at least, in a way that is favorable to our side. Furthermore, loudspeakers are the only medium from which reaction can be immediately ascertained. This is important to the propagandist since it enables him to evaluate his output in terms of its effectiveness upon his audience. If, ideally, his message results in obtaining prisoners of war, interrogation may reveal what it was that persuaded the prisoner to heed the message and what facts or circumstances concerning the remaining enemy can be exploited in subsequent broadcasts. Other reactions—such as enemy fire directed against the loudspeaker equipment or noises made by the enemy for the purpose of drowning out the message—are also of value since it is probable that these measures would not be taken unless enemy leaders feared the broadcast might have its intended effect. Likewise, a lack of reaction may indicate that a different approach is necessary.

2. Characteristics of the military loudspeaker. Every useful mechanical device, including every weapon of war, has certain inherent qualities or characteristics of performance which enhance its capabilities and others which limit them; the modern military loudspeaker is no exception.

a. Favorable characteristics:

(1) Mobility. An important capability of the loudspeaker is that it can be readily transported to wherever an exploitable propaganda opportunity is found. Also, it can follow the target audience when the audience moves. Although commonly mounted on a 3/4-ton truck with trailer, a loudspeaker can readily be carried on a larger truck, a tank, a boat, or an aircraft. Broadcasts can be made from all these without dismounting the equipment. When proximity to enemy positions prevents the close approach to vehicular mounts, the components of the set may be hand-carried to within hearing range of the target. Today, helicopters can quickly transport loudspeaker teams with all their equipment over long distances to formerly inaccessible broadcast sites.

(2) Unaided reception. Unlike radio, the loudspeaker does not require that the target audience have any special receiving equipment.

(3) Literacy is not a factor. There is no need for the enemy soldier to be able to read in order to understand a loudspeaker message. This can be an important consideration; if a high percentage of illiteracy exists among enemy troops, printed propaganda loses much of its effectiveness.
Approximates personal communication. Of all military propaganda media, the loudspeaker most nearly approaches face-to-face communication with the enemy. This enables the propagandist to achieve a more personalized and realistic touch. Speaking directly to a person conveys a thought much more forcibly than less direct methods of communication.

"Pin-points" the target. The loudspeaker is aimed in a similar manner as a conventional weapon, and its message is especially tailored to its particular target audience. Loudspeakers can exploit any propaganda opportunity which suddenly arises, and can reach the target more quickly than other media.

Immediate evaluation. The results of a loudspeaker message frequently can be evaluated immediately after it is broadcast (by target response).

b. Limitations:

Weather. Weather conditions and types of terrain have a considerable effect upon the propagation of sound from the horn of the loudspeaker set to the ears of the target audience. Dry air carries sound better than humid air, and cold air better than warm air. Consequently, the greatest audibility range can be achieved in cold, dry weather unless there is snow on the ground. Snow tends to absorb and muffle sound. Wind is another important factor. When wind direction is from behind the broadcast site and toward the target, audibility ranges may be increased several hundred yards. Broadcasts into the wind reduce the range. When coming from the left or right, wind deflects the sound in the same manner as it does a rifle bullet; so, loudspeaker horns must be aimed to the right or left of the target just as windage is taken on a rifle sight. Winds with velocities exceeding 15 knots create such turbulence that broadcasts, except over very short ranges, become impractical. Likewise, a heavy rain or thunderstorm creates such noise interference that audibility at normal ranges is destroyed.

Terrain. Terrain also has important effects on loudspeaker broadcasts. In hilly or mountainous country, it is necessary to emplace the loudspeaker on the forward slope facing the enemy. Likewise, in built-up areas the horns must be so positioned that structures do not intervene between them and the target. The ideal surface for maximum audibility is water or flat land without trees or heavy brush. Trees and brush, like snow, tend to absorb and muffle the sound. In terrain subject to echoes, the echo effect will reduce or destroy intelligibility even though the sound of the broadcast remains audible to the enemy.

Limitation of range. Loudspeaker sets currently in use are necessarily a compromise between power of output, transportability, and ruggedness. A more powerful set would require the sacrifice of one or both of the other qualities. While it is possible under ideal conditions to achieve a range of two miles, a single set under average battle conditions cannot be expected to be effective beyond 1,400 yards. Loudspeaker teams prefer to operate at a range under 1,000 yards whenever possible.
(4) Technical failures. Amplifying equipment by its very nature is complicated and relatively delicate. The amplifier in particular, consisting of hundreds of small and fragile parts, is subject to mechanical breakdown even though great care has been taken by the manufacturer to make it durable and rugged. When a loudspeaker team is assigned a mission at the front, it may be obliged to haul the equipment in a 3/4-ton truck many miles over rough roads or even cross-country.

(5) Enemy countermeasures. Enemy commanders frequently endeavor to prevent their troops from listening to the broadcast. One way of doing this is by opening fire to destroy or drown out the loudspeaker. In Korea, Communist commanders sometimes required their troops to sing loudly in order to prevent messages from being heard.

(6) Requirement for skilled personnel. The human factor in loudspeaker operations is extremely important. Personnel with the highly developed and widely varying skills needed for these operations are difficult to obtain. Loudspeaker support of a tactical military operation will be ineffectual if members of the loudspeaker team are poorly qualified for their duties.

(7) Requirement for close coordination. Close coordination by personnel conducting loudspeaker operations with personnel of the unit they are supporting and with other elements supporting the unit is extremely essential but sometimes difficult to achieve. Commanders within audibility range of the broadcasts must be oriented concerning support for loudspeaker operations. Troops in the vicinity must be instructed concerning measures to be taken in case the broadcast results in prisoners of war or other enemy reaction. If the loudspeaker message is of the ultimatum type--threatening artillery fire or air attacks--prearrangements must be made that one or the other will take place as announced. Artillery forward observers at company headquarters assist in obtaining this support for preplanned loudspeaker missions, but the team chief must obtain the approval of the unit commander when unexpected propaganda opportunities arise while he is in a front-line location. Disapproval or indifference on the part of local commanders or lack of priority for artillery or air support may reduce the effectiveness of the appeal.

(8) Vulnerability to enemy fire. This limitation can be partly overcome by keeping the 3/4-ton truck, or other mount; the generator; and the amplifier in covered positions. This is not always practical, for the speaker must be emplaced in a forward position, often in line-of-sight with the enemy. The speaker is so constructed, however, that it will continue to function unless a vital component is damaged or destroyed.

3. Military situations adapted to loudspeaker operations. The key to a successful loudspeaker operation lies in correct employment of propaganda in a given situation. A cardinal principle in all tactical loudspeaker operations is that any loudspeaker broadcast, if it is to be effective, must be carefully tailored to fit the situation. Loudspeakers are particularly useful in tactical support of the exploitation, the retrograde movement, and
the static situation; they are also valuable in support of consolidation and counterinsurgency operations.

a. The exploitation. When friendly forces are exploiting the breakthrough of enemy lines, the loudspeaker can accomplish its most spectacular results. Enemy units which are surrounded, isolated, or bypassed become targets for surrender broadcasts. Road blocks, towns containing enemy troops, and other points of enemy resistance also provide profitable targets. The primary mission of the loudspeaker, therefore, in the exploitation, is to obtain surrenders. It may also be used to deliver ultimatums or to bring about "white flag" missions in which the enemy commander or his representative is requested to discuss capitulation. The advance of friendly forces is speeded and casualties are reduced when such loudspeaker missions prove successful.

b. The retrograde movement. During a withdrawal, the loudspeaker can support military operations by assisting in clearing roads for military traffic, controlling refugee movements, and warning the civil populace against acts of sabotage.

c. The static situation. When lines are stabilized or when a truce situation exists (such as that in Korea when peace negotiations were in progress), loudspeakers assume the long-range mission of undermining the enemy's morale and reducing his combat efficiency. This can be accomplished by exploiting the enemy's weaknesses--tactical, economic, psychological, etc. Frictions and tensions known to exist among enemy troops are aggravated. Nostalgic themes, designed to make the enemy soldier discontented with his lot and to worry about the affairs at home, are frequently employed. Music and female voices are used to enhance the nostalgic effect. News is broadcast regularly, particularly news which the enemy leaders are likely to withhold from their troops. Other news, the truth of which the target audience can verify, is also broadcast. This builds credibility for the entire propaganda effort and, in particular, builds audience acceptance of loudspeaker broadcasts. Such news broadcasts may be the only reliable source of news the enemy frontline soldier has. In this type of situation, primary objectives are not to obtain surrenders but to lower the enemy's morale and, consequently, his fighting effectiveness by encouraging dissatisfaction, malingering, and individual desertions. Loudspeakers may also be used in a static situation to support counterguerrilla operations.

d. Consolidation operations. In newly occupied or liberated territory, the loudspeaker can be used very effectively to broadcast instructions and proclamations to civilians and, in general, to assist civil affairs personnel in controlling the population. Loudspeakers are also employed in traffic control, particularly to prevent refugees from clogging roads and hindering military movement. They are also valuable in mob control.

e. Counterinsurgency operations. Loudspeakers may be used to broadcast a wide variety of programs and propaganda messages to the civilian population, and to guerrillas in support of tactical operations in the destruction phase. The range may be greatly extended by mounting the horns
on aircraft and broadcasting over areas believed to contain guerrillas or their supporters. Loudspeakers support the isolation phase when employed in conjunction with civic actions and morale building activities.

4. The use of military intelligence. Military intelligence is the basis for all loudspeaker combat support operations. Effective results depend upon the analysis of every scrap of information to discover propaganda opportunities. No loudspeaker operation should be attempted without adequate intelligence information. Such information may frequently be obtained in sketchy form at field army or corps level; but, for the most part, it is best procured at lower echelons, particularly near the forward edge of the battle area where friendly patrols and recently captured prisoners of war can provide detailed, current information. Civilian line crossers and enemy documents are other valuable sources of information. Close contact with battalion S2's and with company and platoon commanders frequently yields the loudspeaker team chief the timely, personalized type of information, including detailed order of battle data, that makes for successful broadcasts.

5. Coordination. Without thorough and continuing coordination of activity, the most carefully made plans for psychological support cannot achieve maximum effectiveness. Coordination is required in several directions; commanders and staffs at higher, lower, and adjacent echelons must know what is being attempted and what success is being achieved. If artillery and/or air support is required for loudspeaker operations, precise and detailed arrangements must be made. The local commander and troops near the zone of action must have thorough knowledge of what is taking place. Without coordination, the many hours of planning and preparation which necessarily precede a loudspeaker mission will be in vain.
CHAPTER 2

LOUDSPEAKER MESSAGES

1. Introduction.

a. General. In tracing the development of organized military psychological operations in World War II and in the Korean conflict, one finds an ever increasing percentage of propaganda output for combat psychological operations produced by the military loudspeaker. Since this trend is likely to continue in any future conflict, and loudspeakers are widely used in counterinsurgency operations, it is apparent that loudspeaker messages must be based on sound propaganda principles. Like the leaflet writer and radio scriptwriter, the propagandist employing the loudspeaker medium must follow established doctrine, use relevant themes, make effective use of intelligence, and deliver his message in understandable, persuasive language. Lessons learned in World War II and Korea provide some guideposts for loudspeaker message writing.

b. Basic requirements for planning effective loudspeaker messages:

   (1) Sound background and experience of the scriptwriter.

   (2) The prior establishment and the continuous maintenance of credibility.

   (3) A thorough understanding of the mission at hand.

   (4) The availability of current and appropriate military intelligence. Background information of the target audience is vital to the message writer. How enemy soldiers are recruited, what percentage are volunteer, how many serve unwillingly and why, and what were their civilian backgrounds are only a few of the items that the scriptwriter should know beforehand. Highly localized intelligence as well as current tactical intelligence is needed. Current tactical intelligence may be gathered by close liaison with local S2's, from front-line soldiers, and from prisoners of war. Information on the enemy order of battle, on target audience morale, and on matters which are currently troubling or worrying the enemy soldier is of great value to the scriptwriter in the formulation of his loudspeaker message.

   (5) Consistency in the content of loudspeaker messages, tempered, however, with adaptability to frequently changing enemy situations. In a fluid situation, plans must be extremely flexible in order to meet changing conditions, but the requirements or principles outlined here are still applicable. Time, of course, is an important factor to the loudspeaker scriptwriter. Preplanning will materially aid him in these rapidly moving situations. In relatively stabilized situations, more time is available for detailed planning, and greater control and coordination of operations is possible.

   (6) Strict adherence to policy directives and compliance with specific instructions from superiors.

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(7) Coordination with friendly forces in any way concerned with the loudspeaker mission and with the implementation of the operation by those forces.

2. Loudspeaker script preparation. The text of every loudspeaker message is specifically tailored for a certain situation. While it is not intended that hard and fast rules be set forth for the preparation of texts, experience has established the validity of the following guiding principles:

a. Openings must gain attention. In any type of loudspeaker message, the writer should use an opening which will immediately attract the attention of the enemy soldiers. If the first sentence contains important information, it may not be heard or understood solely because the enemy soldier who has not been expecting the broadcast has not yet set his mind to listening to it. For this reason, there must be some opening expression or phrase which will alert the listener and draw his attention to what is to follow. The opening can contain the formal designation or the nickname of the unit addressed, or it can identify the terrain feature upon which troops are located. Again, it might announce the source of or authority for the broadcast such as, "This is a message from the United Nations Command!" If a cooperative prisoner of war delivers the message, he may identify himself by name or he may use the names of former comrades in addressing his unit. This, in effect, is personalizing the message, a technique which is likely to gain the interest and attention of the target audience.

b. Brevity. In the exploitation or similar fast moving situation, each individual broadcast should be kept as short as possible. Ninety seconds is considered the maximum duration for such messages. This limit does not apply to static, retrograde, or consolidation situations in which messages of somewhat greater length may be employed. However, in any case, care must be taken that the broadcast is not of such length that the audience loses interest.

c. Applicability. The message must apply directly to the situation in which the listener finds himself. This may be done by a clear and concise statement of the military situation or of other circumstances surrounding or difficulties confronting the enemy which have rendered him a likely subject for a propaganda attack.

d. Coming to the point. Loudspeaker messages should come to their principal point or argument early in the body of the text. Because of countermeasures the enemy may take or the limited length of time he may listen, the important points to be made in the broadcast should be stated quickly. If necessary, explanation or expansions can be added after the central theme of the message is broadcast.

e. Simplicity. The message must be phrased in simple, readily understandable terms and tailored to the general level of intelligence of the target audience or to somewhat below this level. The greatest number of individuals who are likely to respond to the message possess a lower-than-average degree of literacy. Again, in certain situations, there may not
be more than one opportunity to deliver the broadcast; therefore, it must be kept simple so that it can be understood even without repetition. The writer should refrain from involved, argumentative type of message; as loudspeaker broadcasts, these have little power to convince the enemy and if they are not heard in their entirety the whole effect is frequently lost.

f. Repetition. Important phrases or "punch lines" in the loudspeaker message should be repeated to insure that they are understood by the target audience. Emphasis and force can also be increased by such repetition. Interruptions in the broadcast's intelligibility caused by battle noises or other sounds can be minimized by proper use of repetition. Not only may individual phrases or sentences within the text be repeated, but the entire message should be rebroadcast one or more times if the situation permits.

g. Authoritativeness. Every loudspeaker message should have an authoritative ring to its phraseology; and, if it is a particularly authoritative message, one demanding positive action on the part of its audience, then it should be delivered in an authoritative sounding voice. Insofar as content is concerned, such statements as, "I am speaking for the American armored force commander," or, "General Jones sends you this message," will impress the target audience that there is power and authority behind the broadcast. Such expressions are especially effective in surrender type loudspeaker operations.

h. Instructiveness. When a loudspeaker message is broadcast to an enemy audience whose members are asked to perform, or refrain from performing, some specific action, precise instructions should be given as to how individuals or groups are expected to act. For example, in a surrender broadcast, when the soldier is asked to leave the relative security of his fox-hole, exposing himself to our fire and, in some cases, to fire from his own troops seeking to prevent his surrender, detailed assurances and instructions must be included in the message. Promises that he will not be fired upon by our forces must be valid and a plan for escaping from his own lines must be workable. Failure of a surrender attempt by a man who follows such instructions can result in a serious loss of credibility.

i. Personalization. Since the loudspeaker has the capability of "pin-pointing" its target, an opportunity is presented the propagandist to increase the psychological impact of his message by personalizing it. One way in which the scriptwriter may accomplish this is by the use of order of battle intelligence from a local S2. He can provide information which enables the broadcaster to include in his message the designations and locations of units and the names of unit leaders or other personnel. Also, indices of unit morale, obtained from the same source, are invaluable in preparing a personalized message to a particular unit. Prisoners of war and, to a lesser extent, civilian line-crossers provide additional sources of information. The height of personalization is reached when a captured enemy soldier will broadcast to his former comrades in arms identifying some by name, describing his good treatment, and his ease of escape through the lines, and finally advising them to follow his example.
j. Avoidance of scripts which antagonize. No word or sentence should be used in a loudspeaker broadcast which arouses antagonism on the part of the enemy audience toward the broadcaster or other friendly personnel. The loudspeaker announcer is ostensibly the friend of his listeners, seeking to benefit them by sound advice concerning wiser actions to take or wiser courses to pursue. The message which angers the enemy is worse than useless since it will in all probability induce him to fight harder and delay surrender longer.

k. Credibility. Credibility, or faith on the part of the target audience in the truth and reliability of the loudspeaker message, is as essential to successful loudspeaker operations as it is in all other types of propaganda activities. Such a reputation for telling the truth does not normally exist in the initial stages of conflict, and it must be painstakingly developed and fostered as the loudspeaker tactical support campaign progresses. When established, credibility must be carefully guarded, for once an enemy detects a falsehood in a message all other broadcasts become suspect. Even certain truths which the target audience finds unbelievable should be withheld. An example of this occurred in Korea when, during a broadcast to obtain prisoners of war, reference was made to the fact that prisoners already in POW camps were given eggs and white bread for breakfast. Although this was true, subsequent intelligence revealed that the enemy soldiers could not believe that the United Nations forces had enough eggs or, if they had, would waste them on prisoners. As a result, credibility for the entire appeal was lost.

3. Application of scripts to differing military situations. It has been shown that the finished text of a successful loudspeaker message is one that has been carefully designed in subject matter and phrasing to carry conviction and to induce the target audience to react to a particular situation in a way which is favorable to the sponsor. While adhering to the principles outlined above, the scriptwriter may employ any propaganda technique or device as long as the information in his message is truthful and does not violate established policy.

a. The offensive situation. Loudspeaker messages delivered in support of offensive operations fall into two classifications: the before-battle or pre-attack broadcast and the exploitation broadcast which is employed against a withdrawing, bypassed, or disorganized enemy following a breakthrough of his lines.

(1) Before-battle broadcasts. Loudspeaker messages employed before a battle should be highly personalized, naming units and individuals of the opposing forces. Allusions to the unit's record may be made if they are known and are of value from a propaganda standpoint. Enemy reverses on other sectors of the enemy front--facts probably heretofore unknown by the target audience--are stressed. If the target unit is in a critical tactical situation, this can be described and emphasized. Known enemy weaknesses, such as lack of ammunition, food, medical facilities, communications, etc., are outlined. Should the target constitute a holding or delaying force, the sacrificial nature of their mission is stressed. The purpose of such
broadcasts is to reduce the enemy's combat efficiency by lowering his morale and undermining his will to resist. These messages also assist in psychologically conditioning the enemy soldier's mind in such a way that surrender messages to be delivered after the breakthrough will receive a favorable response. Pre-attack broadcasts carefully avoid derogatory or insulting words and statements since these may strengthen the enemy's hostility and intensify his determination to resist. Care should also be taken by the loudspeaker propagandist to abstain from premature surrender instructions since these also may increase the enemy's will to fight. All broadcasts during the before-battle phase should be brief but should be repeated for clarity and emphasis.

(2) Exploitation broadcasts. Following the breakthrough of enemy lines and during the pursuit and exploitation phase of the attack, isolated and/or demoralized enemy groups provide the most lucrative of all loudspeaker targets. Cut off in by-passed towns, bunkers, road blocks, etc., enemy troops are likely to be at, or to be approaching, a psychological condition (feelings of isolation and despair) which will cause them to respond favorably to surrender broadcasts. Here, the loudspeaker message should be especially forceful and authoritative, giving a concise and accurate statement of the target's tactical situation and emphasizing the futility of further resistance. The scriptwriter still carefully avoids words implying dishonorable action, such as "surrender," "desert," "capitulate." Enemy troops should be told that they have fought honorably and well, but that, in their present hopeless situation, it is no disgrace for them to lay down their arms; that further resistance is useless and will result only in their death; and that the alternative of returning alive to their homes and families is open to them; and, finally, precise instructions as to "how" to surrender should be broadcast. A thorough orientation of friendly commanders and troops in the vicinity of the operations is essential in order that enemy troops responding to the broadcast will not be fired upon.

b. The static defensive situation. Loudspeaker scripts written for broadcast when both sides are in the static defense need not be as brief as those used in an offensive situation, although they should not be so lengthy that the target audience loses interest in the message. The propagandist now seeks to build an attitude among his listeners which will make them more receptive to future propaganda broadcasts. He does this by presenting late and accurate news reports, by broadcasting commentaries, and by employing, in general, techniques similar to those of radio broadcasting. In addition to increasing credibility, loudspeaker operators in a static situation can effectively employ their equipment to lower enemy morale. This can be done by stressing the weaknesses in the target audience's situation, both strategic and tactical, and by broadcasting music and messages designed to arouse nostalgic feelings in the enemy soldier's mind. Nostalgic effects are increased by the use of female voices. Since the military situation is not undergoing rapid change, messages written and taped by expert propagandists at field army or theater level are available for broadcast. Still another type of loudspeaker message employed in a static situation is one which encourages defection, desertion, and malinger- ing among enemy troops. While large-scale results cannot usually be
expected from this type of broadcast, some success may be achieved, and, at least, the seeds for such actions are planted in the enemy's mind.

c. Broadcasts during a retrograde movement. When friendly forces are withdrawing, either for strategic reasons or in the face of an enemy advance, the employment of loudspeakers against opposing forces is usually of little avail. At such a time enemy morale is high and his vulnerability to tactical psychological operations is likely to be slight. Loudspeakers can, however, give valuable support to military operations by broadcasts to indigenous civilian personnel to assist in keeping the routes of withdrawal open. Encouragement can be given to civilians of friendly or allied nations, and instructions can be issued in accordance with the requirements of military commanders. In territory inhabited by a hostile populace, stern warnings against committing acts of sabotage or otherwise interfering with military operations may be broadcast. Such admonitions should be authoritative and forceful and may set forth punitive measures which will be taken if instructions are unheeded. Instructions to both friendly and unfriendly populations usually are concluded with the phrase "by order of General so-and-so" to enhance the authority of the broadcast. Other principles of loudspeaker text preparation should also be followed in writing messages for use during retrograde movements.

d. Broadcasts in support of consolidation operations. When friendly areas have been liberated or enemy territory occupied, loudspeaker operators are frequently called up to assist civil affairs personnel in the restoration of order and control in civilian communities. Proclamations and instructions can be broadcast at centers of population or where listeners may congregate. Pending restoration of the normal mass communication media, news or other types of information may be broadcast. In occupied areas, loudspeaker consolidation missions often include orders to turn over weapons at designated places and to surrender enemy military personnel who are stragglers or in hiding. Scripts used in consolidation situations should be slower paced and more carefully developed than in any other loudspeaker situation. The script should include all important details since the time element is comparatively unimportant. Loudspeaker teams may continue to function in a consolidation role until civil affairs personnel have the community under firm control.

4. Contingency scripts. Contingency loudspeaker scripts are messages prepared in advance to be used by loudspeakers in the exploitation of propaganda opportunities which are likely to occur. They can be used exactly as written or with minor alterations to fit them to situations differing slightly from those foreseen by the writer. Most of these situations or contingencies recur with more or less frequency in combat. Some may never have taken place but may be reasonably expected to occur sometime or other. Contingency scripts have great value for the loudspeaker team chiefs who have difficulty phrasing messages and for local nationals or indigenous personnel who are active as announcers, but who have no knowledge of psychological operations and thus could not prepare scripts themselves.
a. Surrender messages. This type of broadcast lends itself well to the employment of contingency scripts. Such appeals contain many stock words and phrases which can be used over and over again. Situations in which enemy troops can be expected to surrender in response to a loudspeaker broadcast can be readily visualized by script writers, and carefully written messages to fit each of them can be prepared well ahead of time and provided to the announcer. Blank spaces are left in the message for the insertion of personalizing material such as the names of units, persons, or localities.

b. Contingency scripts for static situations. In a completely stabilized situation (such as when truce negotiations were being conducted in Korea), time is available for writers of professional caliber at field army or higher level to prepare scripts precisely tailored to the situation at the front. In other static situations, such as the before-battle phase of an offensive operation or in the defensive, announcers can adapt contingency messages to their needs by minor alterations or additions.

c. Contingency scripts for retrograde movements and consolidation operations. Contingency scripts are normally not as readily adaptable for use in situations such as these. However, messages dealing with clearing main supply routes, curfews, and other matters of fixed policy may be prepared in advance.

5. Announcer qualifications and techniques. A loudspeaker script, regardless of how well written and carefully tailored to a specific enemy situation, cannot be expected to produce optimum results unless it is properly delivered to its target audience. Proper delivery of the broadcast depends upon the personality of the announcer and his proper use of the sound source—in this case, the microphone.

a. Announcer qualifications. Several qualities are recognized as virtually indispensable for a good loudspeaker announcer. The following qualifications may be used as criteria in the selection of announcer personnel:

(1) He should possess a good command of the language of the target groups.

(2) He must be able to speak vigorously without displaying hatred of the target and without bringing, by manner of expression or choice of words, some stereotype hatred to the surface in the mind of the typical target individual.

(3) He must have an intimate and detailed knowledge of the customs, folklore, and manner of speech of the target group and thus be able to adapt his script and presentation to conform to their concepts and idiosyncrasies. In most cases, this will be matter of his having made an exhaustive study of, or having spent many years in, the country of the target audience. Should an otherwise qualified announcer not possess this background, enemy nationals or prisoners of war of unquestionable trustworthiness
may be utilized. Cooperative prisoners of war are frequently used regardless of the qualifications of the announcer since they have been in close touch with the current topics of discussion, slang expressions, and grievances of the enemy soldier. If doubts exist concerning the reliability of an enemy national who is used as an announcer, the message should be tape-recorded and carefully checked to determine if irony or sarcasm in the announcer's expression has distorted the intended meaning of the message.

(4) The announcer should have a flexible and alert mind. It is seldom possible to forecast accurately how a particular target group will react to various themes employed in loudspeaker messages or whether the results achieved by a given loudspeaker approach in a specific enemy situation will compensate for the effort expended. Therefore, there is a need for a discerning announcer who can alter his script to meet unexpected developments. In the early stages of a conflict, all loudspeaker operations must be considered essentially experimental. Hence, there is need for a scriptwriter announcer who is capable of conducting continuous, careful observation of the target audience's reaction to various themes and techniques with a view to determining which may be most profitably employed in later stages of the war. He must not permit himself to duel with enemy propagandists he must keep his focus on his true audience.

(5) The announcer should possess a clear and commanding voice, preferably of higher-than-average pitch; and he should be capable of varying inflections to convey various of emotional appeals.

(6) An announcer should have a perceptive understanding of the many varying military situations in which he must operate, particularly in regard to their implications for the enemy; otherwise, he will be unable to make optimum use of the military intelligence and background information he may possess.

b. Techniques of message delivery. A well-qualified announcer equipped with a carefully tailored script and a smoothly functioning amplifier emplaced on a well-chosen sight, still may not achieve the maximum effect in his broadcast unless he observes certain rules governing speech delivery through a loudspeaker microphone. Briefly summarized, these rules are as follows:

(1) Speak loudly but do not shout.

(2) Take time for message delivery; speak deliberately.

(3) Maintain a constant voice volume with an even rate of delivery.

(4) Never slur over or drop words.

(5) Avoid a sing-song type of delivery.

(6) Sound each syllable of each word.
(7) Sound the final consonant of each word.

(8) Think of each word as it is spoken.

(9) Keep the lips close to (almost touching) the mouthpiece.

(Note: Excellent examples of good delivery and enunciation are newscasters Lowell Thomas, Chet Huntley, David Brinkley, and singers Nat King Cole and Caterina Valente.)
UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL WARFARE SCHOOL

LOUDSPEAKER OPERATIONS

PART II - CASE STUDIES

ST 33-152
CHAPTER 3
ON THE PSYWAR FIRING LINE*

On the PSYWAR firing line in Korea there was too much audience reaction. It was in Korea, among the ground loudspeaker teams, the Korean WAC loudspeaker plane announcers, the "leaflet kickers," the pilots and crews of leaflet and voice planes, that the heroes of PSYWAR were found and the Purple Hearts were passed out:

Here is the job description of a front-line loudspeaker team chief, supposedly a sergeant but more often a corporal or a private first class.

"<writes loudspeaker scripts and programs and broadcasts to tactical audiences in accordance with the principles of psychological warfare. Has some knowledge of history, politics, sociology, psychology, customs, traditions, or culture of enemy against whom he operates, and knows something of the language and dialects of principal enemy population groups and of the media of mass communication. Has knowledge of enemy leaders, military and civilian."

By the time he completed his tour in Korea, he also had sufficient knowledge of combustion engines to repair a generator, and of electronics to fix an amplifier or a tape recorder-reproducer. He had also earned a combat infantry badge, for when he blew into a barrel, the barrel blew back.

Positioning his loudspeakers to best advantage and setting his generator and amplifier in defilade, he would retire to a bunker with his Korean or Chinese assistant and his recorder-reproducer. Everyone else in the area similarly took shelter, for the enemy rarely failed to evidence his displeasure at having his troops harangued.

This brought the loudspeaker teams into low repute in some units, and high regard in others. The 1st Marine Division was so impressed with the Eighth Army loudspeaker teams which served with them that they organized two of their own, using Navy "Beachmaster" public address sets, when the Army teams were needed elsewhere. The 1st Loudspeaker & Leaflet Company had organic personnel and equipment for only 12 teams for the whole of the Korean front, but by persistent scrounging and assistance from the ROK Army in the way of personnel, they managed to keep an average of 19 teams on the line.

When the Marine Division went into reserve, their teams did not relish the inaction, and volunteered to go back into the line with the 25th Infantry Division, which welcomed them. Throughout the Korean conflict, the 25th Division was outstanding in its employment of PSYWAR, its interest extending to assignment of PSYWAR officers to each regiment, in contrast to other divisions which had them only at division level, and at that often only part time.

*Extracted from a manuscript by Colonel Kenneth K. Hansen, Psychological Warfare Officer, APFE, 1951 - 1954.
The Eighth Army loudspeaker teams had tapes to cover standard situations, and when sex was permitted to play its part in PSYWAR they mounted "Operation Heartache." This was a wicked campaign against the morale of enemy front-line troops, recorded by Korean WACs, and female Chinese civilian announcers—the same girls who braved enemy flak in voice-planes almost nightly until the last few months of the conflict. In keeping with the dignity of the UN Command, and in great contrast to Communist loudspeaker tactics, the operation was in the best of taste, but devastating nevertheless. The feminine Communist loudspeaker announcers promised to bed themselves with any UNC deserters as the very first token of enemy good treatment. The Communist approach was not only in extremely bad taste, but extremely bad psychology. American and British troops were profane in their reaction. Since Asians are inclined to be reticent about sex, its use in PSYWAR increased in effectiveness with indirectness. The ROKA troops were first embarrassed at such Communist employment of Korean women, and then furious.

Feminine voices were employed in voice-planes not for a "heartache" effect but simply because their voices, both in Chinese and Korean, were more distinct and more easily heard. When enemy flak amounted to unsafe proportions, experiments were conducted with tape-recorded announcements, but the recorder-reproducers available in Korea simply couldn't take the jolts and jars of weather plus evasive action.

The girls contributed mightily to the PSYWAR effort, nevertheless. In Collier's in December, 1952, Peter Kalischer quoted a Chinese Communist soldier who had just surrendered, and who was asked why he had given himself up.

"Four months ago," he told his interrogators, "I heard a woman broadcasting in Chinese from one of your voice-planes. I thought, if the Americans can circle a slow plane over our positions with a female in it, then I'm fighting on the losing side."
CHAPTER 4

LOUDSPEAKERS AT GEILENKIRCHEN*

An excellent example of a well-conceived, coordinated propaganda plan was the employment of a special leaflet and a loudspeaker to support the reduction of the Geilenkirchen salient, in November 1944.

After the reduction of Aachen, the US XIX Corps found itself with a sizable foothold on German soil, having penetrated the outer Siegfried defenses as far north as Beggendors. But Geilenkirchen, having proved itself a tough nut to crack, remained in German hands and formed the tip of a salient which threatened the Corps' left flank.

The 84th Division, having only just arrived from the United States, and never having fired a single shot in anger, was given the mission of taking Geilenkirchen itself--one of the strongest points in that section of the Siegfried Line.

Division Headquarters was just settling down in its first operational CP in the railroad station at Palenberg, when the Psychological Warfare Liaison Officer reported in and offered support for the forthcoming operation. If the G2 and G3 were skeptical, they at least briefed him on the details of the offensive.

"Who is defending the town?" asked the Liaison Officer.

"We know that it's occupied by elements of the 183d Volksgrenadier Division," replied the G2, "and we think that they are part of the 343d Regiment, but that hasn't been confirmed."

"They should be duck soup for this sort of deal, sir," said the Liaison Officer. "I'll hop right back and see if we can get the leaflet out in time. I'll see if I can pry a loudspeaker loose to go along with the 333d, too."

"Okay," said G2.

"Hop to it," said G3.

By dawn on 19 November, when the 333d Infantry was ready to make the final assault on Geilenkirchen itself, the stage was set.

At 0655 that morning, the artillery fired a five-minute preparation, the last rounds of which were the modified smoke shell containing the special leaflets telling the Germans that Geilenkirchen was surrounded and that their only choice was between surrender and death. At 0700, the

*Extracted from an article entitled "Baloney Barrage" by Major Edward Caskey published in the December 1949 issue of the Infantry Journal. Copyright 1949 by United States Infantry Association, and reproduced by permission.

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333d jumped off with the 1st Battalion in the lead; Company A on the left side of the Wurm River (which runs through Geilenkirchen); and Company B on the right; Company C, held in reserve, followed behind Company B. A loudspeaker team from the Tactical Propaganda Company went along behind Company C.

About eight hundred yards southeast of Geilenkirchen, the loudspeaker team halted and made a broadcast. The announcer told the Germans that they were gallant soldiers, and had done all in their power for the Fatherland, but that their country could gain no possible advantage from the useless sacrifice of their lives. He pointed out that retreat was impossible, because we held the ground in their rear, and that their only sensible recourse was to surrender.

Company B ran into their first live enemy soldiers about five hundred yards outside of Geilenkirchen, six Germans who walked out of a trench had surrendered without firing a shot. The company walked into the town, taking many more prisoners as they went, and the only casualties they received were caused by wooden Schu mines, which the mine detectors could not pick up.

By 0900, Company B had taken its part of the town.

On the other side of the river, Company A had slower going, but it was caused more by the terrain than by the enemy. They had to cross a gravel pit, then a 30-yard wide minefield covered by trenches and wire barriers, then a "Sportsplatz" (German infantry liked to hold out in sports arenas) and, finally, a series of high walls separating a group of orchards.

All of these barriers were crossed by a surprised Company A without receiving any enemy fire, and it is conceivable that they might have walked through the town on their side, just as Company B had on theirs, had it not been for one incident. A German soldier trying to surrender, waving one of the special leaflets in his hand, was shot and killed by a jittery American soldier.

That did it!

Some of the Germans opened up with small arms and mortars, and that slowed the company down some more. But the majority of the enemy soldiers surrendered anyhow, and the town was taken surprisingly easily. Over 350 prisoners were taken, and the battalion's casualties were remarkably light.

Geilenkirchen, the strongest point in that part of the Siegfried Line, had fallen relatively easily to two companies while it had taken a whole regiment two days to take and hold Prummern.

Why?

The obvious answer is that the hard fighting which won Prummern, plus the drive of the 43d (British) Division on Bauchem and Niederheide, had
placed Geilenkirchen in a most untenable position.

But would the ordinary German soldier in Geilenkirchen have known that his position was untenable if we had not had a means to communicate with him and planned its use intelligently?

How many American lives would it have cost to take the town if those 350 Germans had fought it out instead of surrendering?

The full credit for the reduction of the Geilenkirchen salient must rightfully go to the 84th Infantry Division. But didn't tactical propaganda help a little?
CHAPTER 5

SITZKRIEG*

The French had started the war with a Maginot Line complex. In the bitter winter of 1939-1940, the British forces were back, well away from the Germans, on the Franco-Belgian frontier, and Goebbels was not slow to paint to the French a picture of a drunken soldiery living in comfort, seducing their wives and daughters. The French forces, on the other hand, in the Saar and along the Rhine were living within sight of the enemy, under conditions of considerable discomfort, even if warlike activity was very limited.

The Reich Propaganda Ministry found a very saleable slogan: "The British are ready to fight to the last Frenchman." Day after day it was hammered into the French army and civilian population—and with very considerable success. I do not believe that the morale of the French army was destroyed by the savage attacks of 1940. I believe it just curled up and died in the icy months of the winter of 1939-1940.

In the French section of the Western Front in the winter of 1939-1940, the morale was so bad that one could almost feel it. With a few notable exceptions like the Chasseurs Alpins, the majority of other ranks in most units were discontented, dispirited, bored, and homesick. They constituted highly receptive material for the rumors and propaganda that were being pumped into them by a well-organized fifth column supplemented by the German loudspeakers across the Rhine, the first time this political warfare device was used in the war.

Most of the officers were bored, cynical, and anti-British. The weather did not help to maintain morale; periods of snow and hard frost alternated with icy, penetrating rain that turned the forward positions into pools of muddy slush. The long tunnels of the Maginot Line and its barrack rooms, dark, cheerless, walls sweating moisture, combined with too little to do, produced their own form of cafard in the garrison.

#Cafard means "blues," depression, discouragement, or low morale.

*Extracted from "The Big Lie" by John Baker White, a prominent British PSYWAR planner and operator in World War II. Reproduced by permission of the publisher, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York. The term "Sitzkrieg" literally means "sitting war." The phrase was coined by the Germans to describe the static condition of the Western Front during the winter 1939-1940.
MAMASAN LETTER TO SON

The following script of a nostalgia-type loudspeaker broadcast was actually used in Korea during "Operation Heartache." It is reproduced here to serve as an example of the employment of loudspeakers in a static situation.

************

Title: Letter from a North Korean Mother to Her Son at the Front

Type: Voice Cast

Time: 14 Minutes

OPENING: Greetings ... Soldiers of the North Korean People's Army! I trust things go well with you now that the cold winter has passed and beautiful spring is with us again. In a few minutes, a mother would like to read a letter to you. This letter will speak the words and thoughts a beloved mother would express were she able to speak her heart to you. First, let us listen to a familiar melody.

MUSIC: Vocal group singing spring song.

INTRO: A North Korean mother now reads a letter to you. These are the innermost sentiments your own dear mother would speak were she able to reach your ear. Listen!

MUSIC: Flute up for establishment and under for...

ANNCR: Reading of Letter to Son.

MUSIC: Flute up to finish.

MAMASAN LETTER TO SON

Dear Son,

How are you faring? I hope you are in good health and that you do not suffer too greatly.

Here at home, I am making out as well as possible. You, as I, know the unhappiness brought in by this terrible war. Before the outbreak of the war--before you left for the Army--we were both so happy.

As I write, I think back to those happy days of your boyhood. I recall the pride felt by your honorable father, my beloved husband, at
his son's accomplishments.

Dear Son--do you remember how we eagerly anticipated the coming of spring? In past years the end of the cold winter was greeted with great joy by all. The flowers beginning to bloom--the happy songs of the farmers in the fields--all was so peaceful and calm.

Now that spring is here again, my son, it is not the same as before. All the glorious wonders of nature cannot fill the void in my heart caused by your absence.

Do you remember the celebrations of Tan O Day? What happy times were enjoyed by all the people. I recall, as if it was yesterday, the young girls in their bright colored dresses having such merry times on the swings. I remember so well, my son, how you enjoyed yourself on Tan O Day. I filled with deep pride at your prowess in the wrestling matches, for you were indeed the finest wrestler among the young men in our village.

And so, dear son, with Tan O Day approaching, your absence fills me with great sadness. The spring has come again but in some strange manner the flowers do not have the same appearance. There is no singing in the fields for now there are few farmers who remain to do the spring planting. There is need for you at home, my son. Many men have been taken to the Army, and many more are conscripted into special Communist labor brigades. I am attempting with all my strength to plant the spring crop. But though the spring is willing, the body is not always physically capable. Would that this terrible war ends and you come home so that the remaining years of life could pass happily with your presence.

We are simple people, my son. This war was not of your doing or mine. Why is it that, always, little people are caught in a tide of unfortunate circumstances that you or I in no way occasioned or wanted? Why must the young and old suffer unbearably for selfishness and greed of few? The Communists fill my ears with so many grand words.

I am not an educated woman, my son. I do not understand the meaning of many of the words I hear, but my eyes are truthful reporters of the actions around me. The Communists promise us reunion with our sons and loved ones. They promise food--they promise us victory--all, if we work harder than the ox. But their words are not borne out in fact. I have worked hard--never have I worked such long hours and so hard. I work so hard because they tell me this is the only way you, my son, will be able to come home again quickly.

I have lived many years and, though I am a poor woman with little understanding of men's affairs, my eyes are educated to notice all things--and my heart has always faithfully shown me what was right and what was evil--that which was truth and that which was falsehood.
Grand words do not comfort aching hearts. Grand words cannot fill empty stomachs. Grand words cannot grow crops or till the soil. Grand words do not end this terrible war nor bring you, my dear son, home to happiness and sweet contentment. My eyes and my heart do not deceive me.

My dear son--would that I spared you these excessive womanish emotions. The coming of spring fills my heart with longing for your presence. The tears I weep are those of an old woman with sweet thoughts of years past and knowledge that, in truth, the simple secret of life's happiness is measured by scale of memories.

I pray for your health and quick safe return to our home.

Always anxious.

Your mother.
CHAPTER 7

CHECKING OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY
OF LOUDSPEAKER EQUIPMENT*

On 15 September 1950, two American combat divisions landed at Inchon, Korea, behind the main lines of resistance of the North Korean Communist forces. They pushed inland to liberate the Seoul sector and to threaten the security of Communists further south. The North Korean Army was thus forced into a hasty retreat from South Korea. With this withdrawal, the United Nations forces broke out of the Taegu perimeter, pursuing Communists as they retreated northward to escape capture or destruction.

As the North Korean troops scattered in hasty retreat along the highways leading north, it became evident to those Americans on the spot that the Eighth Army psychological warfare effort under such circumstances was severely handicapped by the lack of loudspeaker equipment sufficiently rugged to withstand the difficulties of terrain, mobile enough to reach the advanced outposts of resistance, and sufficiently powerful to carry an intelligible message above the din and noise of battle. It was then that the proposal was advanced to mount a loudspeaker system on an airplane.

This proposal was not original. During World War II, the Navy mounted loudspeaker systems on planes for use in combat propaganda operations. Four PV-1's were outfitted with loudspeaker systems in the United States during 1944. Three of these were sent to Europe and North Africa; however, two of the three cracked up and the third received but slight attention. The fourth PV-1 was dispatched to the Pacific area where it was assigned to the PSYWAR section of the Central Pacific Command for use in operations against the Japanese. However, despite a big publicity buildup, tests which were designed to assess the audibility of messages from 2,000 or more feet proved so disappointing that little support could be secured for promoting its use in contested combat areas.

Following the Okinawa campaign in midsummer 1945, the original Navy voice plane "Polly" was abandoned for four Privateers—a four-engine, Navy version of the Army B-24 Liberator bomber. This plane mounted a large speaker system, could carry more electrical equipment, and was equipped with heavier defensive armament. Only one of these planes actually reached the Pacific war theater, and this one did not get nearer to Japan than Hawaii prior to VJ Day.

A Navy veteran who was in Korea in 1950 remembered these attempts to mount a loudspeaker system on aircraft in World War II and suggested that an effort be made to get such equipment for use in Korea. Under conditions

then prevailing, it was believed that psychological warfare's most important requirement was a powerful speaker system so mounted that it could reach out to the heads of the furthermost retreating columns to invite harassed troops to surrender. In a country so devoid of modern highways only an aircraft could fulfill such a need.

A transoceanic telephone call was thus made to the U. S. Air Force Headquarters in Washington, on 30 September. In this conversation the Korean requirements for a plane-mounted loudspeaker system were outlined. Immediately steps were taken to locate the required equipment. Two speaker systems, believed adequate for the purpose, were located at a Naval Air Station in California, and arrangements were made for these and three electronic technicians to be flown at once to the Far East. A transpacific radio message from Washington to the Far East Command suggested that C-47's be secured for mounting the speaker equipment, as these were considered the most appropriate among the various types of aircraft then available.

On 3 October 1950, three days after the telephone conversation with Washington, the technicians and the equipment landed in Japan. The task of mounting the speakers and adapting the planes for combat loudspeaker missions was undertaken immediately. Nine o'clock on 5 October was set as the target hour for the completion of the installation of the first plane. However, even though the men followed a round-the-clock schedule, the speaker system did not pass a ground test until 7 October. On 8 October at 2:30 a.m., the first plane mounting a speaker system with newly assigned crew took off from Japan for Korea.

During the period when the equipment was being assembled and mounted, considerable advance discussion of the project occurred in Korea. As early as 1 October Korean time, at precisely the time the equipment was being moved aboard aircraft in California, the psychological warfare officer at Eighth Army had notified the separate corps and division that "a powerful loudspeaker had been procured and shipped from the ZI," which would be mounted on a plane and probably placed in operation by 3 October. This premature announcement brought a flood of requests from the several divisions, each asking that psychological warfare missions be flown over their separate sectors of responsibility. Since the first plane was not placed in operation until several days later, those early requests led to much disappointment.

The plane, with the newly mounted equipment, reached Eighth Army headquarters early on the morning of 8 October. The first airborne loudspeaker mission undertaken in Korea was a test flight near the Eighth Army headquarters. The project officer, assigned to supervise the maintenance of the equipment, described this mission as "most unsatisfactory." Broadcasts were made in the Korean language, but no one was located to whom the broadcast had been intelligible, and no Korean-speaking person had been designed to monitor the broadcast.
Yet, even though the first tests of the equipment proved so disappoint­ing, the plane was assigned two flight missions the following day. Five separate messages were broadcast over each of the two targets, but again no one was assigned to check on either the audibility or the intelligibility of the messages broadcast. The next day, 10 October 1950, the plane and crew were directed to the northeast coastal city of Wonsan to broadcast messages appropriate to a city then under UN attack. Because the air over the city was a beehive of activity, with F-80's, F-51's and B-26's flying combat missions, the VOICE (the name given to this first plane) was ordered to fly at 10,000 feet for thirty minutes and then to come down to a height of 8,000 feet for another forty-five minutes. (It was later ascertained that messages broadcast from such altitudes could not possibly have been intelligible to anyone on the ground.) An American news correspondent who was in the city with Republic of Korea troops stated that a noise was heard coming from the plane, that Koreans, civilian and military, stopped, looked, and listened with a bewildered expression. Yet, no one thought to ask these Koreans what, if anything, they heard or understood from the broadcasts. The crew aboard the plane was thus unable to ascertain whether their messages were intelligible to the target addressed.

With only time out for necessary maintenance of speaker and aircraft equipment, both the Voice and the Speaker (the second loudspeaker plane), which reached Korea in mid-November, continued in operation until mid-March 1951, with no one demanding that adequate tests be flown to ascertain the capabilities and limitations of loudspeaker systems mounted on fast-moving, relatively low-flying planes. In mid-March, after determined clamor by a few individuals in the Eighth Army PWD, tests were flown over the Army headquarters. Again, the results observed were most discouraging. When the plane was flown at altitudes higher than 1,500 feet only a small part of the message was intelligible. When the plane flew at altitudes lower than 1,500 feet the noise of the motors drowned out a great part of the message. Even when the plane flew at an altitude permitting maximum audibility, the intelligible part of a broadcast message was not more than approximately eleven seconds in length. On at least two experimental flights, not a sound was heard on the ground, even though the individuals on the plane reported that the amplifying equipment was reproducing a terrific volume of noise. It thus became apparent that one could not test audibility, much less intelligibility of airborne loudspeaker broadcasts from within the plane. For maximally effective results, it was really necessary to have a ground-to-plane communications system, and someone should be stationed on the ground to communicate listening results immediately.

These tests, which were conducted during March and April after nearly six months of operations in the combat zone, clearly showed that a number of changes were desirable. First, the speaker panel should be mounted on the plane's fuselage to provide audibility from greater altitudes. Second, a two-way, plane-to-ground communications system was required to test the audibility of messages broadcast. Third, since the electronics equipment...
proved to be so fragile, it was desirable, if not necessary, that the system be checked out for operational efficiency prior to each mission flown.

Following this series of tests which was conducted under field and pseudo-field conditions, a number of changes were ordered. First the two planes were ordered to return to an airbase in Japan where the speaker horns were removed from the left rear door and placed under the fuselage. This was to permit greater audibility of broadcasts from higher altitudes. Second, radio sending and receiving sets, of the kind used by infantry patrols, were placed aboard each plane so that it became possible for the propaganda crew in the plane to communicate through two-way conversation with groups on the ground. This move was designed to accomplish two objectives: One, to permit a more effective and meaningful check-out of the equipment and, two, to allow for greater flexibility of control and direction when in flight over friendly units.

The airborne loudspeaker equipment used in Korea from October 1950 to April 1951 proved to have one characteristic in common with ground loudspeaker systems used both in Korea and in the various war theaters of World War II. The operational efficiency of the equipment was highly unpredictable. Tubes would blow out and generators would fail to start. These were all too often discovered just prior to the time set for broadcasts. This points inevitably to the conclusion that the operating efficiency of electronic equipment should be checked frequently and certainly prior to taking off on every important mission. Non- or malfunctioning parts may be replaced, and if this is not possible in the time available, it may be better to forego a planned mission rather than risk the loss of men in what could only be an ineffective operation at best.

Loudspeaker equipment, of whatever design, no matter how mounted, is composed of many intricate and fragile parts. Poor adjustment of parts and rough treatment given equipment in combat surely leads to low output; that is, the audible range of broadcasts may be lowered almost to the zero point of efficiency. As was discovered in Korea, any instrument as delicate as a high-powered loudspeaker system can be operating at a greatly reduced level of efficiency without the announcer, or those near him, being aware of this deficiency. Thus, to be certain that one is capable of performing the mission undertaken, periodic examination and assessment of equipment is essential.

Observations of loudspeaker missions undertaken in Korea in 1951 and reports of experiments performed in the Pacific area in World War II suggest that there may be wide variations in the hearing capacity of individuals of different cultures. A loudspeaker system which was installed in a jungle area in the last war was audibly and clearly heard by United States Marines at a distance of 500 yards, but could be heard by Japanese troops at a maximum distance of 300 yards. This experiment may have been such that differences indicated were neither real nor typical of those
which may exist between individuals from separate and distinct cultures. However, nothing would be lost in checking broadcasts with representative persons from target audiences under near-field conditions. It is possible that some languages carry better over loudspeaker equipment than others, even when spoken by the same individual. Surely, there are differences in the voice tone, modulation, and pitch as between different announcers. Thus, in checking the operational efficiency of equipment, it is not enough merely that someone test the audibility of messages spoken in English, when this is not the language of the audience to be addressed.

In summary, one may say relative to checking the effectiveness of any psychological warfare operation involving the use of loudspeakers, either airborne or ground, one should first check the operating efficiency of the equipment. It is not enough to assume that it is operating efficiently as was done for five or six months in Korea, during which time, incidentally, there were numerous reports of how broadcast messages had influenced enemy soldiers to react in predetermined and desired ways. Psychological warfare personnel, in attempting to evaluate results obtained from specific missions, became suspicious when they were unable to locate individuals who had heard or who could repeat what had actually been broadcast in any known broadcast utilizing loudspeakers. When actual tests were flown, serious doubts were raised whether anyone could have been influenced to desert or surrender through the utilization of a medium which performed so poorly or inadequately.
CHAPTER 8

A SUCCESSFUL LOUDSPEAKER MISSION*

Task Force BURRESS was an infantry-tank team of the __ Infantry Regiment, __ U. S. Division. Added to that force's normal support units were an anti-aircraft artillery section and a PSYWAR loudspeaker team. The mission was to move on 14 February 1951 around the right (east) side of "HILL 191," a key terrain feature held by the enemy and located between __ Infantry and the Han River; to block, in conjunction with another task force which was to move around the left side of the hill, the enemy's route of escape across the river; and to return to the assembly area on order. That mission was designated to isolate all enemy troops remaining south of the Han River in the __ Infantry zone.

For several days prior to that patrol, the __ U. S. Division psychological warfare officer had been planning for the right situation in which to use his loudspeaker team. He was briefed continuously on the latest intelligence. He knew what enemy units were in his zone. He maintained close check on his loudspeaker team and its equipment, arranging a high priority for its vehicular and signal equipment repairs. The psychological warfare officer checked with the IPW team for latest prisoner of war indications, paying particular attention to the morale, status of supplies, and identifications. Once the plans for Task Force BURRESS were known, he endeavored to coordinate the loudspeaker's place in the operation. He gave the loudspeaker team chief adequate information from which as many messages and themes as were deemed suitable could be composed, translated, and rehearsed beforehand. He considered the type of mount for the loudspeaker and planned to use a M39 personnel carrier to give the team some armor protection and to mobilize the team for movement with the tanks. However, when it became known that the tanks would be limited to the road and that the loudspeaker would be moving no faster than the foot troops, he decided to leave the loudspeaker mounted on the 1/4-ton truck and trailer for the mission. He made the final coordination with the __ Infantry and with the task force commander the day before the mission on the place and time for the team to join the patrol and on the overall concept of the psychological warfare plan.

The importance of the patrol was increased during the night of 13-14 February 1951 when elements of a North Korean division infiltrated the lines of the __ Infantry and reached the division command post before they were stopped. By daylight, however, it was seen that those elements had been annihilated with no further contact reported on the front line. From some of the dead soldiers lying near the command post the G2 verified the identity of the enemy unit and relayed that information to the loudspeaker team immediately. That identification was a change from the previous night's briefing. Also, it had become a probability that the enemy was unaware of the __ U. S. Division situation and was in position to be surprised by the two task forces.

*From a report by Captain Jay V. Russell, Section Leader, 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company.
The loudspeaker team joined the task force as it lined up for the patrol and checked with the task force commander to reaffirm the loudspeaker position in the column and received last minute instructions. The only change in the prepared messages for the loudspeaker was the inserting of the name of the newly identified enemy unit in place of the old one.

Almost immediately upon leaving the friendly lines, the task force commander was informed that a large enemy force had made contact with Company C, __ Infantry, on "HILL 19t" by stumbling into its outposts. The task force was in a flanking position to the right of the hill at that time, and the task force commander observed enemy troops moving in mass toward Company C's positions. Coordinating with Company C, the task force was permitted to fire directly into the enemy. Simultaneously, the other task force from its vantage point on the left side of the hill engaged the enemy's right flank. The power of the twin 40-mm anti-aircraft guns, the quadruple .50 caliber machine guns, and the 76-mm tank guns havocked the enemy ranks, completely breaking up the attack. It was at this time that the loudspeaker team chief, knowing the situation and anticipating the future pincerlike movement of the two task forces, felt that a threat-surrender type message broadcast to the remnants of the enemy division would produce dramatic results. He sold the task force commander on the idea and took the few minutes needed to direct his loudspeaker on "HILL 19t" while the remainder of the patrol ceased its firing and the infantry remained behind cover. The message broadcast contained the following appeal:

"Attention soldiers of the __ North Korean Division. Your attack has been halted by United Nations' fire power and with great loss to you. United Nations' troops are moving to cut off your route of escape. Look around you to see your dead and wounded comrades. Why cause useless bloodshed by continuing to resist. Take this opportunity to save your own life. Throw away your weapon; move down from the hills and into the open places with your hands held above your head. Move along the roads and wave a white cloth to indicate to United Nations' troops your honorable intentions."

The message was repeated three times. Many of the enemy troops surrendered to the __ Infantry that day; the patrol, however, could not wait for prisoners and continued on its mission to cut off the escape route as planned.

The tanks continued down the road covering the infantry platoons as they moved along the adjacent low hills. A few hundred yards south of the Han River, one of the platoons approached a small village. The village was about seven hundred yards distance from the road and was within easy range of the loudspeaker. The loudspeaker, along with the task force commander, was following the leading tanks. Again the loudspeaker team chief recommended to the task force commander that the loudspeaker could be used. This time he expressed his opinion that the loudspeaker could reduce the unnecessary hazards involved in assaulting the village. The commander concurred with the recommendation and personally used the loudspeaker to recall his platoon. The platoon moved back to covered positions while the loudspeaker broadcast its first message. The message was directed toward the civilians in the village and urged them to move into the open and to send a representative to
the loudspeaker location. Instantly, people began streaming out of the houses and started running toward the loudspeaker. The loudspeaker requested everyone to halt; it repeated the order that only a representative was to continue to the loudspeaker location. The people responded favorably and their representative brought the information that there were many North Korean soldiers in the village, some of them wounded. The next broadcast was made to those North Korean troops. It directed them to surrender, laying down their weapons and bringing their wounded with them. Another message was broadcast to the civilians; it directed them to assist in moving the wounded out to the road. As a result of these broadcasts, thirty North Korean soldiers surrendered. That small force might have been slaughtered unnecessarily or it might have caused delay for the task force.

During the surrender there was an air of suspense and even resentment on the part of a few individuals of the friendly force. Yet, the good discipline in the unit brought quick repudiation of the "shoot them all" feeling.

The infantry platoon followed up the broadcasts and searched the village to find that no one had remained there. The task force continued to the Han River and then returned, after dusk, to friendly lines without further use of the loudspeaker. One North Korean Division had been completely destroyed that day by the combined effectiveness of all weapons available to the commander of the __ Infantry.
On the day of Cherbourg's fall (June 26, 1944), a regiment of the 79th Infantry Division was engaged in a thick wood just outside of Cherbourg. Although the Germans were surrounded in a thick wood, it was thought that they might be persuaded to surrender. A mobile loudspeaker was called for. The loudspeaker moved into position about 250 yards from the main German position. The Colonel spoke to the Germans in English and then members of the unit repeated his message in German and Polish. Their talks followed along these lines:

"Your position is hopeless. If you come over to us, you will be treated as honorable prisoners of war. If you persist in fighting this out, you will sacrifice your lives in vain. It is for you to decide whether you desire to see the Fatherland again or to be buried here in France. You have ten minutes in which to decide. Should you decide to come over, you will approach this truck with your hands on your head and showing a white emblem."

The American troops waited in their positions while the minutes were counted off over the loudspeaker. At the end of five minutes the first German appeared. More and more followed until six hundred were gathered in the lane. A few minutes later, a captain, a lieutenant, and a sergeant appeared. The captain said that the colonel in command of the German force could not surrender until conditions had been more honorable. It seemed that honor forbade him to submit to a threat from a loudspeaker, but a few phosphorous grenades might satisfy him inasmuch as he had no defense against phosphorous. Six grenades were then thrown in the direction of his hideout. This display of overwhelming force saved the German colonel's honor and he soon appeared, together with a few more of his men, and formally surrendered.

The next morning the same loudspeaker unit was ordered into Cherbourg to deal with a force estimated at six hundred to two thousand men who were holding out in the arsenal under the command of a German general. This was the most strongly fortified position in the port. German officers captured the previous day had told the Americans that the men in the arsenal would never surrender because their position was impregnable, some of the defenses being as much as eighty feet below ground level. Although they had been under attack for three days and

*Extract from Carrol: Persuade or Perish, Houghton Mifflin Co; Boston, 1948. Reproduced by permission of the publisher.
although they knew that their leaders, General von Schlieben and Admiral Hennecke, had surrendered they had shown no inclination to give up. They had plenty of food and ammunition, and it was feared that they might hold out for weeks.

The loudspeaker was moved into position about five hundred yards from the arsenal wall. American intelligence officers told the loudspeaker team everything they had learned from their questioning of German prisoners about the morale of the defenders. Then the crew tried the formula which had succeeded the previous day, but with considerably more emphasis on "honor."

"This is an appeal by the American General commanding the United States Army for honorable surrender. General von Schlieben and Admiral Hennecke and their staffs, together with twenty thousand men, gave up yesterday. Your position is just as hopeless. You have fought bravely and distinguished yourselves. You have done honor to your country, but further resistance means that you will sacrifice your lives in vain. If you come over to us, you will be treated honorably as prisoners of war. You will have good food and treatment. You will be cared for in our hospitals, and you will have mail from home...You have ten minutes to make up your minds. It is now two minutes past nine. If by twelve minutes past nine an officer of your unit carrying a white flag does not appear, you will be reduced to dust by our artillery which is awaiting our orders...This is your last chance to save your lives with honor."

At ten minutes past nine several white flags were seen flying from the arsenal. A German officer who came to parley told the Americans that the men would come out immediately. Again it appeared, however, that the general in command could not surrender to a loudspeaker--he would have to be shown a tank. Accordingly, a Sherman tank was brought up to the arsenal wall. The general considered that he had been subjected to a tank attack and could surrender honorably.
CHAPTER 10

THE PROPAGANDA TANK*

Every Armor soldier knows that one of the essential characteristics of all tank action is shock—shock, that strikes at the enemy's mind, increases his anxiety and paralyzes his ability to fight. Psychological warfare is that branch of the Army whose primary concern is lessening the enemy's ability to fight through action on his mind. One would think because of this similarity that Psychological Warfare and Armor would be constantly working together. Yet, probably because of the woefully limited use made of battle propaganda during World War II, the two have not trained together during this uneasy peace.

Properly used combat propaganda exploits the speed, violence, and surprise inherent in every well-planned armored attack to tremendously increase the shock effect. The effect of this shock causes the enemy such anxiety that he can no longer fight effectively and may even surrender. This saves American lives and gets the commander on the objective that much more quickly.

Because so little is known about the operation of tank-mounted loudspeakers, a glance at a World War II operation is instructive. The tank-mounted loudspeaker was operating with an advance column of the 2d Armored Division. Arriving before a fortified town, the column deployed. Some fire was received from the town. The loudspeaking tank informed the garrison of the town that a large armored task force stood on the outskirts. The broadcast also informed the people that the commander didn't want to destroy the town. The garrison was then informed that American artillery was ranged on them.

Over the tank communications system, word was sent back to the artillery. Six leaflet shells, containing surrender instructions for towns, burst over the village. The occupants of the town were then informed that American fighter-bombers were overhead. The Forward Air Controller called down a P-47, that laid a leaflet bomb squarely over the center of the town. The tanks then moved forward without firing, while the loudspeaker continued to call on the town to surrender. As the tanks brushed through a light curtain of fire, the firing stopped and white flags appeared. A garrison of some 800 men with anti-tank weapons surrendered.

*During World War II a great deal of experimentation and improvisation took place with respect to the mounting and use of loudspeakers on tracked vehicles. Captain Arthur T. Hadley, a PSYWAR officer with XIX Corps, participated in the development of the tank-mounted loudspeaker and pioneered the tactical employment of the weapon. This abridged account was prepared by Captain Hadley and appeared in Armor, January-February 1951, pages 32-33, and is reproduced by permission of the publisher.
Admittedly, this was an ideal operation. Usually the results achieved are not so spectacular nor is the coordination so perfect. However, several important aspects of battle propaganda can be gathered from this operation. Most important of these is the realization that no one is surrendering to the propaganda. What they are surrendering to is the military force, the tank attack. However, that force has been exploited by the battle propagandist for its fullest psychological effect. Nothing could be more wrong than the idea, unfortunately prevalent in many quarters, that psychological warfare is a wonder weapon operating by itself to achieve spectacular results. It is merely another supporting weapon, though of overlooked power and like any supporting weapon its fullest results are only achieved through cooperation.

In this particular instance, the tanks and supporting infantry never returned the hostile fire. There is a customary battle propaganda device that exploits the shock action of tanks to the fullest. Once the fire fight has been joined, the enemy gets some relief from his anxiety in action and it becomes harder to get the maximum psychological result. This points up the need for peacetime training in this field. It takes a well-disciplined unit to hold their fire. During World War II, it would take on the average of ten to fifteen loudspeaker missions before troops learned to make the adaptations necessary for psychological warfare to be a success. Some outfits that had bad initial experiences with loudspeakers never learned. The intricacies of tank-infantry-loudspeaker cooperation should be forged now in training.

The individual tanker and armored infantryman also has to be trained to think in terms of psychological warfare. At the time the enemy first starts to surrender, any single soldier can change the outcome of a battle by shooting down the surrendering soldiers. This makes the enemy feel betrayed and he settles down to really fight. Also the belief that it is "sissy" to take prisoners must be eradicated. It is a far more soldierly course to get on the objective quickly with few casualties through taking prisoners than to reach the objective after a hard battle in which no prisoners were taken, so heavily hurt yourself that you cannot exploit your gains. After all, Armor is the arm of speed and violence and taking prisoners often increases your speed a hundred fold.

There are a host of other questions that should be ironed out in training. What is the best position for the loudspeaking tank to take in an attack? How should its radio set be hooked up? Who should command it? Through what chain of command? Then there are the technical questions of the best form of power supply, the best position for the loudspeaker on the tank, the exact distances the speaker can be heard in different terrain and weather?

There are also to be investigated the numerous supplemental benefits that derive from the presence of a loudspeaker tank. The most striking of these is the use of the loudspeaker in the control of infantry during an attack. The loudspeaker can reach every infantryman at once without having to go through the radio net. For example, after the tanks have finished
putting fire on a strongpoint, the infantry can be informed of this over the loudspeaker. This way they can attack the strongpoint immediately without the lag that lets the enemy reorganize. The 2d Armored used this method with great success, particularly in towns where control was always difficult.

The question of how many loudspeaker tanks there should be and the command channel should also be gone into. The combat arms have a vital interest in this question; yet few armored experts have given the problem more than passing attention. At the risk of sounding like that famed loser of future wars, "the old expert," I believe the following to be the proper ratio of loudspeakers.

There should be one organic loudspeaker tank with every tank battalion in the armored division. There should be two such tanks with the separate armored mechanized reconnaissance regiments that operate out of Corps. There should be a PW officer in Division Hq responsible for training the crews in PW techniques and leading the key loudspeaker unit in combat. The loudspeakers must be organic. World War II proved that you cannot attach them to a division for an operation any more than you can attach a tank battalion to an infantry division on the eve of an operation and expect real results.

Looking briefly into the future, loudspeakers are due to play a tremendously important part in airborne armor units. In the airhead, which is shock action at its highest, the mobile loudspeakers will range 'round the perimeter. Whenever confusion is found they will exploit it, calling on the enemy to surrender, enhancing his fears with battle noises, increasing the confusion through phony orders to his troops.

To further its mission, Armor needs the tank-mounted loudspeaker and the techniques of battle propaganda. To be effective, battle propaganda must work with Armor and the other mobile combat forces. The lateness of the hour almost demands that the marriage take place soon.
CHAPTER 11

PROPAGANDA ORIENTATION OF COMBAT TROOPS*

One of the greatest disadvantages of being on the outside of the military structure was the inability of the Team to carry through a program of troop orientation. During the early days of the battle for Myitkyina in June 1944, reports began to reach the Assam team concerning single Japanese soldiers and groups of Japanese soldiers who were shot while attempting to surrender.

Later, when a combat psychological warfare unit was flown to Myitkyina to conduct loudspeaker operations, an attempt was made to verify actual cases of Japanese surrendered personnel being shot down. Members of the Myitkyina psychological warfare unit tracked down leads, interviewed American and Chinese soldiers, gathered eye-witness reports, and attempted to secure names; the main interest was in details of the incidents and, where possible, motivation.

Within a short time, a considerable amount of evidence had been collected. The incidents in most cases were similar; these, being typical:

A Japanese was seen edging forward from his own lines, taking careful cover, but occasionally coming into view and each time being closer to the Chinese lines. When the Japanese was within 50 yards of the Chinese positions, he half rose, hands in the air, waving a piece of paper. Several weapons along the Chinese lines opened up and the Japanese fell.

A Japanese crawled forward from a clump of bush opposite a point where the Chinese and American lines joined. Japanese riflemen in his rear and Chinese riflemen to his front both opened up, getting in aimed shots each time he was in view. At one point the approaching Japanese raised his arms and began to run forward toward the Chinese and American positions. He was shot down.

During the four-day period of loudspeaker operation at Rhadapur near Myitkyina, bodies of unarmed Japanese were found each morning.

*Extracted from a report on the operations of the OWI Psychological Warfare team, Northern Burma by Ralph Block, General Representative, India Division, Office of War Information.
in front of the American perimeter. In another operation, witnessed by three members of the PWT unit, a group of 16 Japanese coming forward unarmed to surrender after a loudspeaker appeal were driven back by American automatic weapons fire. In this case the fire was in direct violation of orders. Other incidents were noted which involved numbers of the American 537th Combat Troops, (mostly new replacements, American engineers, and Gurkha irregulars).

In the period immediately after Myitkyina, a number of additional reports were received. Several unsuccessful surrender attempts were reported by POW's who were taken in later mopping-up operations. When the two regiments of the Mars Task Force entered the campaign, more incidents were reported. British liaison officers, visiting the Assam base, reported similar experiences with their own Gurkha and Punjabis in the Imphal fighting.

The reasons for the aborted surrenders seem to include all of the following:

1. Poor fire discipline, particularly among new, inexperienced troops.

2. Distrust of the Japanese, a deep-seated fear of trickery, in most cases born of experience and fed by the stories of Jap booby traps, ambushes, and infiltration tactics that were passed along among combat troops.

3. Inadequate orientation, not only of enlisted men but of company officers and even some field officers, of the need for prisoners as sources of military intelligence.

Of these three factors affecting the acceptance of surrenders, only the last seemed within the sphere of the Assam team. Some weeks after the Myitkyina campaign, an orientation program was laid out and approved in principle by both the NCAC and theater commands. In practice, only a portion of this campaign was carried out, shortage of OWI personnel and lack of Army interest serving to limit the program. Difficulties with Chinese command were a further limiting factor even though, in the opinion of many American liaison officers, the Chinese were more willing to take prisoners than our own troops. Both the Assam staff and the NCAC G-2 felt that under the existing command organization full cooperation could be obtained only with American troops.

The orientation program, as planned and partially carried out, included the following:

1. Orientation lectures, for delivery to combat troops undergoing final training in staging areas. Two one-hour lectures were
prepared, one outlining the need for prisoners as a source of military intelligence, another explaining the operation of combat propaganda and its value in helping to induce surrenders. These lectures were delivered to limited numbers of officers, NCO's, and enlisted men of the Mars Task Force by members of the OWI staff. The lectures were also used by the evacuation and field hospitals in the Ledo area, where light casualties and fatigue cases were given an orientation course before their return to combat.

2. Surrender instruction sheets, issued as orders from the military command, were distributed to troops in the field. These sheets contained an explanation of the need for prisoners, a translation of the surrender pass, with a sample of the surrender pass attached. Separate instruction sheets were prepared by the Assam team for the Myitkyina Task Force, in Chinese and English; for the Marauders; for the Chinese New First Army; for the Mars Task Force; and for British 36 Division. Distribution was usually through Army channels although in some cases the sheets were distributed by air to units in forward positions.

In one case an American general ordered the sheets to be dropped over Japanese as well as Allied lines. The general felt that those Japanese who could read English or Chinese would see in the instruction sheets evidence of Allied good faith and thus would be encouraged to surrender.

3. Public address operations were supported by both instruction sheets explaining the reason for the loudspeaker broadcasts and the need for prisoners and by direct appeals over the PA speakers to Allied troops in the lines.

In addition, several other steps in surrender orientation were approved, in principle, by theater G-2 but were never carried forward to completion.

4. A short training film, explaining the need for surrenders. (The 10th AAF-OWI film "Burma Mail," shot in March 1945, was planned to include most of the necessary scenes for such an orientation film. A specific commentary and revised cutting of this film should provide an excellent propaganda and surrender orientation movie.)

5. A short cartoon booklet for distribution to G.I.'s who attend orientation lectures or the orientation film. (The original suggestion for this booklet and for the film came from theater G-2.)

6. Posters for distribution through Army channels. Posters explaining the operation of propaganda and the need for prisoners were prepared but never reached actual field distribution.
The Assam team found that, in practice, troop orientation materials, like other long-range projects, were difficult to plan and produce in the field. Army personnel, even when interested and in full agreement with the need for surrender orientation, were reluctant to issue orders, prepare materials, provide facilities. More often, army men (excepting intelligence officers) were unmindful of any special need for a flow of Japanese prisoners. For these reasons the orientation program actually carried out with troops of the NCAC command fell far short of meeting the need for which it was devised.
CHAPTER 12

LOUDSPEAKERS IN THE BATTLE OF MYITKYINA*

Propaganda operations at Myitkyina were returned to OWI control during the final month of the battle. A new commanding general agreed to our sending a combat psychological warfare team into the area, equipped with loudspeaker equipment, with responsibility for all psychological warfare operations.

During the final weeks of the battle, our men made daily loudspeaker broadcasts from front-line positions and directed the coordinated dropping of leaflets from liaison planes. The long period of loudspeaker operation allowed a considerable amount of experimentation; in addition to broadcasts from dug-in front-line positions, the PA was used on more than one occasion in patrol and mopping-up operations.

Considering the experimental nature of the propaganda work at Myitkyina and the high morale of the enemy, resulting from their long successful defense against overwhelmingly superior force, the results of our work were most encouraging. A number of surrenders resulted from the loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflet drops, and later interrogations indicated that the propaganda served as a measurable depressant on the enemy's morale during the final weeks of the battle.

During the battle for Myitkyina and in the later mopping-up operations, approximately 200 Japanese were taken prisoner. Most of these had seen our leaflets and had discussed them with their comrades prior to capture; many of the POW's had heard the loudspeaker broadcasts. The interrogation of these POW's, conducted during the monsoon summer months, provided the long awaited check on our early propaganda efforts. From them came a series of criticisms and suggestions which served to sharpen up the team's later output.

*Extracted from a report on the operations of the OWI Psychological Warfare Team, Northern Burma by Ralph Block, General Representative, India Division, Office of War Information.
CHAPTER 13

ESCAPE TO CAPTIVITY*

1. We reached the ELBE River at 1000, 25 April, opposite Abbendorf. The sector had been reported quiet for the last several days, German troops could occasionally be seen on the far bank, but they showed no offensive intentions. We directed two loudspeaker appeals at the villages of Abbendorf and Gnevsdorf which brought no response whatsoever from the other shore. When a surrender ultimatum was disregarded, several rounds of mortar fire were placed on German foxhole positions which sent some 30 German troops scurrying further inland behind the dike.

2. In the afternoon of the same day we picked another location opposite the confluence of the Elbe and Havel for a second surrender broadcast. The enemy shore seemed deserted, but during the address German troops could be observed behind the dike. After the presence of German troops on the East bank had been established, we made another appeal, asking them to send a representative to the river's edge to negotiate about the surrender. In response, a white flag was waved from the German side, but no one came to the water's edge despite repeated reassurances that we would not fire. At 1630, we gave the German troops a 30-minute ultimatum. They were to send a representative to the river bank by that time. Otherwise we would shell their positions. Again, white flags were visible, but no representative appeared. Literally in the last second before the ultimatum ran out—the officer in charge of the mortar platoon was just about to give the firing order—two German soldiers, one of them carrying a white flag, began to advance toward the water's edge. We told them to come over to our side of the river, which they did after patching up one of the boats along the bank of the river. The two negotiators introduced themselves as 1st Lt Haas, platoon commander in the KG (Task Force) Sander, and his 1st Sergeant.

3. Haas explained that he had arrived in the sector in question on 12 April with 80 men in his platoon, which originally had been part of the Motor Park Perieberg. None of the men, most of whom had been inducted seven to eight weeks previously, had fired a shot since arrival. Haas had heard of our appeal to Abbendorf in the morning and had immediately begun to sound out Captain Sander, CO of KG Sander, and the other officers on the prospect of a surrender of the entire unit. There were some rather heated arguments on that score, and Haas thinks that all of the officers really were in favor of surrendering but did not trust each other. Anyway, no decision was reached; Haas, himself, however, was determined to cross the river the following morning to make arrangements for the surrender of his own platoon. Two other platoon commanders, Lts Mertens and

*This report by T/Sgt Max W. Kraus, dated 15 May 1945, originally entitled "Surrender of German Troops Across the Elbe," describes the experiences of a loudspeaker team chief in one of the most fantastic operations of World War II.
Missulis, both of them in their early twenties and recently commissioned, were in accord with Haas' decision. While these arguments among the officers of KG Sander were still going on, a messenger came into Haas' CP and informed him that the loudspeaker had just announced a half-hour ultimatum for surrender. Haas thereupon immediately rushed to the river and arrived just in time to prevent the threatened barrage.

4. While Haas told us his story, his unit was assembling on the far side of the river. It was determined that they would be ferried across and that Haas and his 1st Sgt would recross the Elbe in order to send runners to the other platoons of the KG Sander, notifying them of the decision and telling them to assemble at the crossing site at 2200 if they also wanted to surrender. Two U.S. engineer assault boats were brought to the river, manned by German troops, and were used to ferry Haas' platoon across. Haas' request, that his wife and the wife of his 1st Sgt should be permitted to come to our side also in order to protect them from possible reprisals, was granted. After all of Haas' platoon had arrived safely, Haas himself made an appeal over the loudspeaker to the remaining elements of KG Sander and told them that he and his men had been treated decently by us and advised them to surrender also. Haas' appeal brought a steady stream of soldiers to the river bank, all of whom were promptly ferried across.

5. As darkness began to settle on the river, the scene was rather strange. American liaison planes were landing right at the river's edge in full view of the enemy shore, none of our troops made an effort to conceal themselves, and German troops continued to arrive at the river to be ferried across. Haas, more or less the hero of the proceedings, made several more PA appeals, warning any and all fanatics on the other side that the crossing operation was under the protection of the U.S. Army and that we would fire on all German troops who tried to interfere with the surrender. When we left at 2330, 250 German troops had arrived safely on our side, including one unit which had retreated from the Russians at Rathenow the same morning and had arrived at the Elbe just in time to join in the surrender.

6. The following morning we made a surrender appeal across the Elbe to the garrison of Wittenberge. No immediate results could be observed. This proved to be the last surrender appeal made by us since we got orders from higher headquarters to discontinue our activities along these lines in order to avoid "international complications."

7. We returned to the 334th Regiment to discover that surrender appeals were no longer necessary. Ever since Lt Haas had established the precedent, German troops were crossing the Elbe in ever-increasing numbers. The crossing site at the mouth of the Havel had reached an almost official status. In the place of the two assault boats, the engineers had put into operation two ferries, consisting of five assault boats each, over which a bridge section had been put. They were powered
by three outboard motors each. The ferrying service operated every day from 0800 to 1700. German troops were directed to the ferry site by civilians in the neighboring towns, all of whom had learned about it and who came down to the river occasionally to watch the operations. Much to their regret, they were barred from the use of it since no German civilians were permitted to come across.

8. The personnel that came over presented an amazing variety of types and units. Most of the KG Sander came within the first three days after Haas' surrender. Captain Sander himself, the CO, arrived as the last man of the unit on 1 May and was greeted enthusiastically by the IPW team of the 334th Inf Regt and who reproached him for his tardiness. Major Brasche, CO of a Battalion bearing his name, came across to arrange the surrender of his unit. When he returned to the other shore, he found his unit gone. He had been relieved of his command while negotiating, and his Battalion had been ordered into a different area. Brasche returned to the PW cage by himself but was soon followed by his unit which deserted in larger or smaller groups while being marched away from the river. Another unit, the Service Btry of an Arty Regt committed in Berlin, had been ordered out of the city by the Regtl commander who wanted to avoid having his men trapped in the city by the Russians since he had no more use for the Service Btry. The Btry arrived in the vicinity of the Elbe in five trucks and one passenger car. The CO, a young 1st Lt, decided that he would surrender his men and reconnoitered for a crossing. He met another German soldier who told him of the ferry site and pointed it out to him. The Lt determined to take his unit across in the evening, but changed his mind when he found an order at his CP upon his return to report to higher headquarters for commitment of his unit at 1530 hours that day. He immediately put his executive officer in charge, gave him an order to bring the company to the river while he himself went ahead in order to make the necessary arrangements with the U.S. troops. He arrived at the PW cage with the news that he expected his company in approximately 30 minutes. That information turned out to be entirely exact, and the Lt had the opportunity of holding a last formation of his company at the PW cage during which he announced that, effective immediately, the old type salute would be used once more to replace the Hitler salute. This brought forth an enthusiastic "Ja Wohl, Herr Oberleutnant" from his troops. This unit was, incidentally, the best observed during the entire period as far as personnel and soldierly appearance was concerned. A large amount of medical personnel surrendered, many of whom immediately felt at home in the PW cage when they saw the dog which an early arrival, Oberstabszprzt Mehner, had left there. Nearly all of the medics knew De Mehner and his dog, it seemed. One Luftwaffe Lt arrived with his very pretty girl friend, a Labor Corps Leader; and both of them were extremely disappointed over the fact that she was not permitted to accompany him to the PW camp. There also were many wounded who had been evicted from the overcrowded hospitals in the Berlin area with the advice to try to get through to the Americans since there was neither personnel nor medical supplies to take care of them.
9. Undoubtedly, the most pathetic case was the CO of a Landesschützen (Home Reserve) unit who also appeared with all of his men at the PW cage. At 52, the Captain was the youngest member of the unit. He immediately made it clear that he had been captured and had not surrendered. This brought forth some astonishment among the IPW personnel present. He explained that his unit, which was stationed in Gnevsdorf, was just about to sit down to dinner when two American soldiers walked into the house in which they were. The two Americans were just on a sightseeing tour on the East bank of the Elbe, a rather popular pastime by that time. That was enough for the Captain to serve as a pretext for surrendering his unit and accompany the two GI's across the river. He had decided long ago that his old men would not fire a shot if the Americans were to attack across the river. He admitted the futility of further resistance and further waste of human blood. He expressed himself strongly against the Nazi regime. Yet, he was emphatic on the point that he felt himself bound by his oath of allegiance and that his oath would not permit him to take an active step toward the surrender of his unit. Perhaps his civilian occupation—he was a Protestant clergyman—is a clue to this strangely warped mental attitude. A young Wehrmacht Unterarzt (doctor with rank of sergeant and in high spirits) said to his companions (two nurses and an enlisted medic), after talking to the Captain for a few minutes, "Oh, the old gent is a little bit batty." The final irony became evident that evening. The Captain had declared that, if Hitler were dead, he would no longer feel himself bound by his oath. That evening the German Radio announced the Fuehrer's death. If the Captain had waited a few more hours with his surrender, he would have been able to spare himself his obvious pangs of conscience.

10. The announcement of Hitler's death, coupled with the imminent approach of the Russians, brought matters to a climax on 2 May. On the morning of that day the undersigned was in the G2 office of the 84th Div. A telephone call from the 333d Regt of that Div announced that the 199th German Inf Div was lined up along the Elbe with about 4,000 men and wanted to surrender. Brig Gen Luz, the Div commander, was already across the river in order to make the arrangements. He wanted to make it one of the conditions of the surrender that American troops would cross the Elbe in order to fight off possible SS interference with the surrender. After that condition had been rejected, he decided to surrender his division anyway. This message had hardly come in when a phone call from the 334th Regt that General Frahner, CG of KG Frahner, a unit of 2,000 men, was on his way to the Div CP to arrange the surrender of his unit. The undersigned was asked to act as interpreter between Maj Gen Bolling, CG of the 84th Div, and Maj Gen Frahner.

11. Maj Gen Frahner, a short, stocky man in his middle fifties with close-cropped white hair, was dressed simply and without the usual paraphernalia German generals display. He wore a Luftwaffe blouse which only had the shoulder boards of a Major General. The collar patches of his rank and all decorations were noticeable by their absence. He wore
the plain, rough green Wehrmacht combat trousers and heavy, hobnailed ski-boots. From his aide, a young Luftwaffe Lt. we learned that General Frahner had risen from the ranks. He had received his commission in the German Air Corps during the last war for bravery before the enemy, which also earned him the gold medal for bravery, the highest award of the last war for which enlisted men were eligible. The negotiations were brief and to the point. General Frahner explained that his unit of 2,000 men had formerly been a Pilot's School which had been bodily transferred to the infantry due to lack of gas. His men, the general explained, were all topnotch mechanics or pilots and he wanted to surrender them to the Americans, rather than let them fall into Russian hands. In addition, he wanted to bring 250 river barges of 300 tons each which contained the equipment of the school, ranging from rations and clothing to tools and spare parts for planes, including the latest jet propelled models. He declared that he would rather blow all of the barges up than let them fall into Russian hands. The barges had been moored in the Havel, and the preceding night, as soon as the General had heard of Hitler's death, he had given orders to move them close to the mouth of the Havel in preparation to the surrender the following morning. After the preparations for the surrender had been completed, the General returned to his unit to lead them into captivity.

12. After assisting in the negotiations with General Frahner we returned to the Elbe, opposite Abbendorf. The scene which presented itself was utterly fantastic. About 20 German hospital barges which had come down the Havel from Berlin were being unloaded by German PW's. About 100 PW's who had just arrived from the East bank were being searched by MP's prior to joining a group of some 500 who were sitting on the dike awaiting evacuation. The Eastern shore of the river was black with over 2,000 German troops who were standing in line for the ferry boats which were hauling them to the American shore. More troops were arriving continuously on foot, in trucks, or all sorts of horse-drawn conveyances and joined the waiting lines. Fires were visible where units had destroyed their vehicles or guns in order to save them from falling into Russian hands. The thunder of guns could be heard from the rapidly approaching Eastern front. Soon machine gun and small arms fire became audible, and Russian shells could be seen bursting fairly close to the river's edge. The ferrying service had to be abandoned so as not to endanger American troops. That prompted a few hardy ones among the German troops to shed their clothes and plunge into the cold water of the Elbe, which is 300 yards wide at that point and flows rapidly, in order to make their way to our lines. Suddenly, the battle noises from the Eastern banks ceased. A short while later, two tanks and a motorcycle drove up to the assembled troops on the right bank, to all appearances more German troops trying to surrender. However, a few minutes later, an American assault boat landed a Russian officer on the American shore. While a wild celebration started among the American troops, panic broke out on the other side. Suddenly there were hundreds of Germans swimming across the river. They landed on our side, most of them stark naked,
and started to search among the equipment of their captured comrades for dry clothes. Some of them built improvised rafts in order to help them stay afloat and bring along their belongings.

13. Maj Gen Bolling, 84th Div CG, and his staff arrived and crossed the river in order to greet our Russian Allies. Thus, the first formal meeting in this particular sector of the front took place between some 40 Americans and a dozen Russians as over 2,000 German soldiers, most of them still fully armed, surrounded them to watch the proceedings. It was a compelling symbol of the defeat of a once feared army.

14. At the request of the Russians, we made several loudspeaker broadcasts along the river, telling the Germans that we considered all of them who were still on the East bank of the Elbe PW's of the Russians; that we would fire on all who attempted to cross to our side, and designating a Russian PW collecting point to which the Germans were to report. It was later learned that this broadcast was not very successful since large numbers of German troops still crossed the river during the night and the following day, with most of them swimming over to our side. The PW count for the 84th Div on 2 May was 15,954, as the war came to a close in that sector.
CHAPTER 14

COMBAT PROPAGANDA AGAINST THE JAPANESE

In one situation in the South Pacific, the shortage of qualified linguists necessitated the use of a rather ingenious hookup. The American tank officers and crews obviously could not speak good Japanese. The Japanese were dug in like rats and in a condition of desperation which made them fight to the last man. Even if the Americans shelled the openings of their caves or ran armored bulldozers over the holes, burying the enemy alive, there was the chance that the Japanese would run through long underground passages and pop up later, possibly at night, to cause more damage before they were killed. With Americans and Japanese unable to talk to one another, this condition might have led to a severe loss of life in fighting through hundreds of such small Japanese strongholds. The American tanks had loudspeakers mounted on many of them; they had radio telephone communication for use between tanks or between the command tank and the CP.

At the CP, Japanese Americans (Nisei) whose American accent had been trained out of their voices in special public speaking classes, sat ready and waiting. The tank team would come into a valley, and the American commander would make an estimate of the situation. He would then call the CP on his radio and the conversation would go something like this:

"Hillside ahead of me; no unusual features. Five or six holes, but I cannot tell which have Japs in them. I can get up the hill. There are two trees at the crest of the hill, and a bunch of those native graves over on the left."

The Nisei at the CP would say: "Regular announcement, sir? Do you want them to assemble at the graves or at the trees?"

"Tell them to stand in front of the graves. That way they'll be coming down hill. Want to be cut in?"

"Yes, sir," said the Nisei at the CP.

The tank commander would then cut his radio into the loudspeaker set, and the other loudspeaker sets would do likewise. Then a voice loud as the voice of God would fill the entire valley, coming from everywhere at once and speaking good, clear Japanese:

"Attention, Japanese troops, attention! This is the American tank commander calling. I am going to destroy all resistance in the valley. I have flame throwers. These will be used on all dugouts and cave mouths. No Japanese can hope to escape. Japanese soldiers are commanded to cease resistance. Japanese personnel must assemble in front of native burial place; to American left flank, Japanese right flank."

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The tank commander would watch while the loudspeaker blared. First one Japanese, then more, would come in small groups to the assembly point as directed. The commander would then call back to the Nisei and say:

"I think they're holding out on the hill crest. Try that. Just a minute or two. If they don't start coming, I'll go after them and cut you in just when I reach the top."

"Yes, sir. Which part of the hill crest?"

"I cannot tell. Anywhere!"

The speakers would be cut back in: "Attention, Japanese forces remaining on the hill crest. Japanese forces just behind us under the command of Colonel Mushashi surrendered last night and are now being well treated. You are being given the same choice. Attention. I will soon come up the hill."

There were thousands of prisoners taken on Okinawa, which only goes to prove that Japanese do surrender once the logical approach has been found.
Screaming

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