CHAPTER 5

TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

Section I

GENERAL

51. In Chapter 2, Section II, the concepts and objectives of pacification were discussed. The overall strategic concept includes these separate but mutually supporting tasks:

   a. Military Offensive. US/FWNAF have been assigned primary responsibility for conducting the military offensive to defeat the VC/NVA main force units. RVNAF participates in this task when possible in conjunction with their primary task of military support of pacification. It should be noted that in IV CTZ, RVNAF currently has the primary task for the military offensive as well as the support of pacification.

   b. Revolutionary Development. RVNAF and GVN civil elements conduct this task with RVNAF having the primary responsibility for providing territorial security for RD. US/FWNAF is assigned this responsibility when directed by COMUSMACV. This task is conducted in three phases which are clearing, securing, and developing.

   c. Nation Building. Government of Vietnam civil elements conduct this task with assistance of US/FW civil agencies to complete the development of a nation-wide political, economic and social institutions necessary for a viable, free noncommunist Republic of Vietnam.

52. This chapter will present certain of the tactics and techniques applicable to operations of the military offensive and those in support of pacification when US/FWNAF/RVNAF are supporting a GVN/US civil effort. In all cases, military operations should be so conducted as to be integrated fully with civil pacification objectives.

Section II

TACTICS

53. US/ARVN doctrine and tactics are being reviewed continuously to determine their adequacy and effectiveness in the combat environment of Vietnam. This continual review has proved that combat doctrine as published and taught in US service schools is valid for application in Vietnam. The "Handbook for US Forces in Vietnam", April 1967, is a valuable source of tactical guidance in concentrated form to augment the standard doctrinal sources. Additionally, "Combat Tips" and
During clearing, military operations will give surveillance and early warning of enemy movements. In reenforcing, clearing and/or in adjacent areas, in order to prevent the reentering. During this phase, the clearing forces normally will operate in company and battalion size operations, although regiment or division size operations may be required initially, depending on VC/NVA capabilities and probable reaction. Later, when the VC/NVA cannot operate in large formations, the clearing force will be able to operate correspondingly in smaller formations covering larger areas. Saturation patrolling, day and night operations, and search and destroy operations will be conducted to locate, engage, and destroy remaining main force and local guerrilla units. Psychological operations will be conducted in support of these activities with emphasis on persuading the VC/NVA military and civil cadres to defect from the VC/NVA cause and rally to the GVN. In coordination with province officials, short term, high impact civic action projects are accomplished. The area will be outposted to give surveillance and early warning of enemy movements. Larger scale operations will move outward to the perimeter of the area undergoing clearing and/or in adjacent areas, in order to prevent the VC/NVA from reentering. During clearing, military operations will be oriented on the enemy within a designated area.

55. In securing an area, continued emphasis is placed on small unit operations (company and platoon), outposting, day and night ambushes, and security missions. Military operations are oriented on providing area security, but are characterized by aggressive offensive operations throughout the area. Psychological operations, particularly in civic actions, are intensified. Securing continues until the VC capability is reduced to individual terrorist activities.

Section III
TECHNIQUES

56. GENERAL. A number of techniques have evolved as US and RVNAF forces have worked together in coordinated military operations. The techniques described here in no way describe the limits of this type of operation. Imagination and adaptability to local circumstances...
are the only limits to the development of other similar techniques.

57. PATROLLING. Saturation patrolling previously has been identified as one of the principle tactics of clearing and securing operations. US forces have developed several variations of this tactic, variously identified as SATURATION PATROLLING, RECONDO, CHECKERBOARD, and HUNTER KILLER. All have basic similarities, the minor variations primarily being adaptations to the existing state of training, terrain, enemy, and resources availability (primarily helicopters).

a. SATURATION PATROLLING as a Technique for Finding and Fixing the Enemy. SATURATION PATROLLING is the most expeditious and effective means of finding and fixing the enemy in a specified area of operations (AO).

(1) To implement this technique an infantry battalion base of operations, with supporting artillery and an appropriate security/reaction force, is centrally located in an AO. Rifle companies may occupy different bases of operations, from which platoon and squad patrols are dispatched. The positioning of the 4.2 inch mortar platoon in a company base of operations increases the patrol range while remaining within range of indirect fire support. Platoons and squads may be airlifted into landing zones several thousand meters from the company or battalion base of operations to search assigned areas generally leading back to either a base area or a predetermined ambush site. A variation of this technique is to land separate elements of a company in several landing zones and have them converge on a common, selected location while searching the area of operation en route. When patrols and companies are issued two or three days rations, disclosure of friendly unit locations by resupply helicopters is eliminated. There are many variations of this technique, all involving rapid movement and helicopter support. Centrally locating the battalion base of operations enables an infantry battalion to search and clear an area of approximately 144 square miles without moving its base or displacing the supporting artillery.

(2) SATURATION PATROLLING by helicopters has certain disadvantages which should be noted. First, heliborne assaults require extensive artillery and air preparations on selected landing zones. This, in conjunction with the presence of large numbers of helicopters, definitely alerts the enemy to the intended area of operations. Secondly, the enemy can be expected to leave the area, hide, or move into prepared and advantageous positions to fight on his own terms.

b. RECONDO - CHECKERBOARD Concept of Operations. The CHECKERBOARD concept is a tactical technique whereby patrols--steadily moving from one small topographical square to the next--are played like checker pieces, intending to jump or block the enemy.
(1) The key to this operation is the dispersal of counter-guerrilla equipped units, preferably platoons, in night operations. These units, provided an increased communications capability and light equipment to increase mobility, are called RECONDO patrols. These RECONDO patrols are kept constantly on the move and normally occupy the same position for one or two days only. They are delegated the authority to exploit enemy targets within their capability. Control is decentralized to the lowest level possible, and the primary direction from higher headquarters is in the form of specific geographic areas in which each patrol concentrates its efforts. Experience has demonstrated that decentralized execution tends to foster maximum ingenuity, initiative, and guile on the part of the small unit leader. Since such operations provide a good flow of current intelligence, sizeable enemy units are located occasionally. The RECONDO patrols act autonomously in their assigned area of responsibility until an enemy unit is located, or the area threatened. Battalion headquarters thereafter directs various adjacent units to occupy blocking or ambush along likely avenues of escape, while others are directed to converge on the target. The overall battalion objective is to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces. Where RECONDO squads or platoons encounter superior forces, the requirement is to fix the enemy until adjacent units can converge and/or additional forces can be introduced by helicopter.

(2) The best method of employment is to have two companies infiltrate and saturate the TAOR in a CHECKERBOARD configuration. Each company employs its platoons in the following manner:

(a) At night one squad from each platoon, as required, moves out approximately 3-6 kilometers, remains overnight, and is in place the following day with the mission of observing selected trails or suspected enemy areas from concealed locations.

(b) The following night each platoon (-) infiltrates to positions where the squad has previously been located, and a squad again moves forward 3-6 kilometers.

(c) This procedure is followed until contact with the enemy forces is established at which time the squad or platoon attempts to exploit. In the event the enemy force is too large to destroy, contact is maintained and the battalion commander assumes control to employ the resources within his capability. These resources can be other CHECKERBOARD units, a reserve company, or the normally available brigade reserve and supporting elements.

c. HUNTER-KILLER Concept. The HUNTER-KILLER force consists of two components carefully tailored to the mission, situation, weather,
and terrain; a swift, highly mobile, lightly equipped, hunter element to seek out the enemy; and a much larger, heavily supported killer force which remains centrally poised and carefully positioned ready to pounce on and destroy enemy located by the hunters. As the hunt progresses, the killers carefully monitor its progress and tentatively plan commitments that might materialize.

(1) When the killers are committed, the principle of mass (sudden application of overwhelming force) both in combat power and helicopter lift must be observed. The size of the committed force will depend on the situation. The principle of economy of force will also be followed - measured forces might be applied. To provide rest for the constantly moving hunters, rifle platoons from the killer force should be rotated with those of the hunter force. In this manner, the hunter phase would be maintained for considerable periods, but there always would be fresh units in the killer force ready to close with the enemy.

(2) This concept offers many advantages. In this war the big problem is to find the enemy. Large areas can be searched with minimum cost in manpower and helicopter time; infantrymen do not wear themselves out searching; the "stay time" of a battalion or brigade in the field with all supporting elements is increased; searches of remote areas are easier to support; and fresh units are always ready to pounce upon any force located.

58. CORDON AND SEARCH.

a. The CORDON AND SEARCH may be used alone or may be integrated with the County Fair, Hamlet Festival or Go Team, which will be discussed later. The concept of the CORDON AND SEARCH operation is to form a blockade around the target area - usually a hamlet - prevent movement into or out of the target area with one force, and then conduct a detailed search with a separate force. The CORDON AND SEARCH is most effective when the cordon is established silently and under the cover of darkness. This frequently will entrap draft evaders, deserters, and local guerrillas or VC local forces who have spent the night in the hamlet; therefore, the cordon forces must maintain surveillance and be prepared to engage enemy forces inside the perimeter as well as outside the perimeter.

b. Although the cordon force may be ARVN, US, or FVMAF, the searching force should always be Vietnamese. They may be ARVN, RF/PF or NPFF. The searching force should receive special training on the tactics and techniques of conducting a search, should be organized into search teams, each with specific assigned tasks, and should be briefed on the specific area or hamlet to be searched. Whenever possible, aerial photographs or a sand table should be used.
during the briefing, in order that each team leader knows and understands his responsibilities.

c. For the purpose of the following discussion, a sizeable searching force is assumed, i.e., an RF company. The actual searching force may be considerably smaller, but the principles still apply. Each man, team, squad, or platoon must be selected for, trained for, and preferably rehearsed for a specific job during a specific search phase. The search will produce proper results only when it is well coordinated and carefully controlled during execution. The search should be as thorough as time permits: a sloppy or halfhearted search does not achieve satisfactory results.

d. The search operation can be divided into two phases - first, the sweep, and second, the deliberate search. Prior to initiating the sweep, the searching force moves as close as possible to the objective before detection. If possible, movement will be made under the cover of darkness, maintaining light and noise discipline.

e. **Sweep.**

   (1) The sweep phase should be conducted rapidly, taking advantage of the element of surprise. The purpose of the sweep is to inspect rapidly the objective area, seize arms, ammunition, or other contraband before it can be hidden; detect any obvious booby traps; immobilize the population; and apprehend any suspected persons for further questioning. The sweep must be executed rapidly and decisively. The physical layout and the availability of approaches to the objective area may require that the sweep be conducted only from one point. It will be more effective, however, if a converging sweep can be initiated from two or more approaches.

   (2) The sweep phase is terminated when the entire objective area has been given a visual inspection or when resistance or the threat of resistance by entrapped VC forces is encountered. Sweep forces always must be prepared for offensive combat if resistance develops.

f. Organization for the sweep should include the following functional teams, which may consist of from two or three men to a squad in strength:

   (1) **Command Group:** Maintains overall command and control over the search operation. Maintains communication with the commander of the cordonning force and with the overall commander for the operation.

   (2) **Sub-Command Group:** If two or more search sectors are established, each should have a senior NCO or an officer in charge.
The commander should maintain radio communications with the search force commander. He should control directly the fire support team.

(3) **Fire Support Team:** This team consists of a minimum of one automatic rifle or light machine gun, with crew. It displaces as required under control of the commander or sub-commander so as to be prepared to provide supporting fires to search teams if opposition is encountered. If converging sectors of search are being used, care must be exercised to preclude endangering friendly personnel.

(4) **Search Teams:** This team conducts a rapid visual search of each habitation and its surrounding ground. During the sweep, emphasis is on maintaining speed, to search as rapidly as possible to detect contraband or apprehend suspicious persons before they can be hidden. If such are located, they should be taken immediately to the command group for safe keeping by only one or two of the search team while the balance of the team continues the search. The search team should be equipped with signs, marking tape, or other means of marking booby traps or mines for later destruction. The location of mines, booby traps, tunnels, and underground bunkers should be reported immediately to the command group.

(5) **Loud Speaker Team:** A portable bull horn or loud speaker is considered essential for establishing rapid and positive control of the population. If possible, a minimum of one loud speaker per search sector under the immediate control of the commander/sub-commander should be provided.

g. Tunnels and bunkers normally will not be searched during the sweep; however, surveillance of entrances must be maintained. Smoke or CS may be placed inside for immediate flushing action. If an extensive network of tunnels is detected, the search commander may consider this to be a sufficient threat so as to require a suspension of the sweep and an initiation of a deliberate search, which includes tunnel flushing and destruction/denial operations. If significant opposition is encountered, the cordoning force may reinforce the searching force and reduce the hamlet by normal combat action.

h. **Deliberate Search.**

(1) Upon completion of the sweep, the deliberate search phase of the search operation is initiated. This phase is characterized by a detailed and methodical search of the entire objective area. The search force is organized into functional teams, each of which has received training and is equipped to carry out a specific search procedure.
(2) Mines and booby traps must be located, marked and
neutralized or destroyed.

(3) Tunnels that have been by-passed and kept under
surveillance during the sweep phase are flushed with CS or smoke;
either may cause personnel inside to come out and also will assist in
detecting additional tunnel entrances. Considerable success has been
experienced employing tunnel search teams which actually make a de-
tailed search of the tunnel complex to kill or capture the enemy and
capture weapons, documents, and other supplies.

(4) Each house or hut receives a methodical search.
Walls and roofs are tapped or probed to detect hiding places or con-
traband. Floors are probed. A few bucketfuls of water spread evenly
over the floor frequently will detect buried objects, as recently
disturbed earth is more porous than the packed earth and absorbs water
faster. Flagstones or hearth stones are examined carefully for evid-
ence of being removable and, if in doubt, are lifted and the area be-
neath probed. Again, water poured over the area will be absorbed more
rapidly between stones that have been disturbed. Family altars are
examined carefully but with consideration for the religious sensi-
tivities of the inhabitant. Sleeping platforms are dismantled and
searched, the earth probed. Frequently, glazed pottery jugs are
dug in beneath the sleeping platforms, to be used for hasty shelter
or storage. These jugs are lifted and the interior of the hole
examined and probed. Conventional mine sweeping gear or other metallic
d Detectors may be used to sweep the walls and roof, but the usual amount
test equipment - tie wires, nails and scrap - usually gives a high
percentage of false reading. Exterior and interior measurements are
taken to determine if walls or partitions of unusual thickness are
present. Bagged rice is probed or, if possible, weighed on an
improvised beam scale to determine if any contraband is hidden in-
side.

(5) The outside area is examined carefully to detect
evidence of buried objects, particularly around and under bushes and
trees. Tree trunks are tapped with a hammer or rock to locate hidden
openings. Caches frequently are located on platforms hidden by the
foliage on the tree limbs. Wells must be inspected carefully by a
search team member physically descending inside; tunnels frequently
are constructed exiting into well shafts. Fish weirs and holding
ponds must be examined carefully for underwater entrances to caves
or tunnels. Grave sites should be examined carefully but with
consideration for the religious sensitivities of the local inhabitant.

(6) Care must be exercised to return the searched area
to its normal state of order and repair as in those cases where no
evidence of enemy complicity is found.
1. Added details which must be considered are that:

(1) The search force commander must allocate tasks and areas to ensure that the entire area is subjected to a detailed search.

(2) The senior member of the family, preferable the male member, should be inside the house with the search team during the search. This will tend to discourage looting by the search team. After the search has been completed, the search force commander assembles the hamlet elders and determines if any looting was done by the search teams.

(3) During the deliberate search of the area, interrogation teams assemble the inhabitants, conduct a documentation inspection, and as appropriate, conduct a detailed interrogation of selected subjects.

59. COMBINED CORDON AND SEARCH TECHNIQUES.

a. Three specific variations of cordon and search have been developed in Vietnam. Each of these utilize both US and Vietnamese personnel. Although these techniques may be used during support of RD, they are used primarily during clearing operations. These techniques are:

(1) The Hamlet Festival.

(2) The Go Team.

(3) The County Fair.

b. Basically, the three techniques are similar in that all include the cordoning of the hamlet selected for the operation, a search of the hamlet by GVN forces, and finally, conduct of PSYOP for the purpose of evidencing GVN concern for the people of the area. First, the Hamlet Festival concept will be described in brief. Then the Go Team and County Fair will be covered, pointing out the significant differences which require amplification.

c. Annex B describes the Hamlet Festival layout and task organization and functions of the RVNAF teams of the Hamlet Festival conceived and employed by the 1st US Infantry Division. The physical layout and the task organization shown in the annex are idealized; both may vary according to terrain, equipment available, and mission requirements.
60. **HAMLET FESTIVAL.**

a. The Hamlet Festival operation conceptually includes three components: the external cordon of military forces; the search force, always Vietnamese; and the Hamlet Festival force, also Vietnamese. These operate as a permanent task force under a combined staff of US and GVN personnel. It is used most profitably where military security and GVN civil influence are planned to be permanent.

b. In the actual operation, the military force moves in under cover of darkness and establishes a cordon around the hamlet: the search force then enters. As the search force enters, VC, ARVN deserters, and other illegal residents will attempt to escape: the cordon force will apprehend them. The searchers, normally RF/PF or NPFF units, assemble all males and females in the 15-45 age bracket and screen them. Search techniques are discussed in paragraph 58.

c. As this search is being conducted, the remaining hamlet residents are assembled for a Hamlet Festival. The purpose of this phase of the operation is to subject the people to intensive propaganda for the purpose of indicating to them that there does exist concern for their welfare on the part of the GVN. Food, clothing, agricultural advice, medical attention, all these are utilized as material evidences of the GVN concern. In addition, ID cards and family identity books are issued and lectures and entertainment are provided.

61. **GO TEAM.**

a. The Go Team differs from the Hamlet Festival in these respects:

1. A combined staff for the operation is not required.

2. The purpose of the operation is not to establish a permanent GVN presence, but rather to assist the progress of a military operation by clearing hamlets in the operation area and by providing evidence of GVN concern for the people even though adequate security is not available for the introduction of revolutionary development teams.

b. The operation of the team is similar to the conduct of the Hamlet Festival, except that a formal festival layout is not used. The Go Team consists of:

1. Police or RF/PF units who conduct the search and elicit intelligence.

2. A specially trained Vietnamese team which operates
with the US unit and assists in conducting night ambushes and patrols.

(3) Hoi Chanh, if available, who operates in the same manner as in the Hamlet Festival.

(4) PSYWAR/CA personnel who also operate in the same manner as in the Hamlet Festival.

(5) The intelligence team which gathers and confirms information and attempts to recruit informants and agents for future use.

(6) Medical personnel who attend to the simple medical needs of the people and thus provide a very tangible example of GVN interest.

c. Upon completion of the search and the Go Team's function, the entire operation moves on. The Go Team operation usually can be accomplished in a single day. It is most important in the Go Team operation that the people fully understand that the GVN presence is only temporary so that they do not needlessly expose themselves to the threat of later VC reprisal.

62. COUNTY FAIR.

The County Fair is much like the Hamlet Festival but is on a lesser scale. It falls half-way between Hamlet Festival and the Go Team. US units provide the tactical cordon within which GVN teams similar in composition and mission to the Go Teams, carry out their operation. The County Fair may be used in clearing operations in areas in which the GVN does not intend immediately to maintain its presence permanently, but desires to prepare the population for later assimilation. No attempts are made to obtain a commitment to GVN by the population at the time of the County Fair.

63. COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM.

a. The Combined Action Program, bringing together US Marines in III MAF and Vietnamese Popular Forces into wholly integrated units of platoon size, was initiated in August 1965. From a modest beginning of one Combined Action Platoon at Phu Bai in August 1965, the program had grown by May 1967, to 75 platoons. The program has exhibited strength and promise from the start. Villages with a Combined Action Platoon have moved rapidly toward a condition of peace and stability. A clear evidence of a Combined Action Platoon's effectiveness is the fact that the VC have never been able to re-establish control over a village protected by a Combined Action Platoon. In order to provide for effective operations and the orderly expansion of the Combined
Action Program and to ensure its integration into the Revolutionary Development Campaign Plan, items of joint policy have been agreed to between the I ARVN Corps and III MAF. These policy items are directive in nature and are distributed in a Vietnamese translation of this instruction to the military units of I ARVN Corps.

b. The basic Combined Action unit is the Combined Action Platoon (CAP) composed of one PF platoon equipped according to the TOE with a combat strength of 35 PF soldiers, and a Marine rifle squad of 14 Marines plus one Navy corpsman. The PF platoon retains its basic organization, while the Marines become advisors to the entire platoon, with the Marine squad leader serving as the advisor to the Vietnamese platoon leader. The individual Marines are integrated into the PF squads. Within the CAP, command relationships are on a coordination and cooperation basis between the PF platoon leader and the Marine squad leader. The Marine squad leader does not command the PF element of the CAP, nor does the PF platoon leader command the Marine squad.

c. The Missions/Tasks of the CAP are to:

(1) Destroy the VC infrastructure within the village or hamlet area of responsibility.

(2) Provide public security and help maintain law and order.

(3) Protect the friendly political/social infrastructure.

(4) Protect bases and communication lines within the village and hamlets in which they are located by conducting day and night patrols and ambushes in their assigned areas.

(5) Contribute to combined operations with RF and other PF, ARVN or FWMAF in their area of activity.

(6) Participate in civic action and conduct propaganda against the VC.

(7) Participate and assist in RD activities to the maximum extent possible with the accomplishment of the foregoing missions/tasks.

d. The subsector commander (district Chief) exercises control over the CAP through the Combined Action Team (CAT) located at subsector headquarters. The Combined Action Team is composed of a VN section of 1 or 2 officers and the necessary enlisted personnel and one or more
Combined Action Company Headquarters of 1 Marine officer and 5 enlisted USMC; plus liaison personnel from FWMAF units as required, such as artillery liaison and fire support coordination personnel. The CAT is designed to evolve into a complete operations center for the sub-sector commander to direct and coordinate the security efforts of CAPs, PF platoons, and RD cadre groups in the district with ARVN, FWMAF units, and RD campaign activities. The actions of the CAT include all matters necessary to accomplish the missions set forth in subparagraph c above.

e. The activation of a CAP or the relocation of the Marine element of a CAP mutually determined by CG, I Corps and CG, III MAF is based upon recommendations made by subsector commanders forwarded through ARVN or III MAF Combined Action Program channels. In general, CAP locations are selected to contribute directly to the accomplishment of the RD Campaign Plan, to provide defense of the LOcs, and to solve particular security problems unique to a given district such as those caused by the influx of refugees.

f. The training objective of the CAP is to enhance combat effectiveness of the PF platoon as soon as feasible in order to relocate the USMC squad in another hamlet/village area. Subsector commanders, insofar as practicable, attempt to keep the PF platoons in the same hamlet for a sufficient period of time to accomplish this training objective. All members of PF platoons assigned for duty in a CAP have completed basic military training. Additional on-the-job training is conducted by the Marine squad leader, operating in coordination with the PF platoon leader. Additional training guidance is provided from time to time to the elements of the CAP through the I Corps and III MAF Combined Action Program channels. Marine/Navy personnel assigned to the Combined Action Program as replacements or to form new CAPs attend the Combined Action School in DaNang or Phu Bai prior to such assignment.

g. The Combined Action Program is still in the development stage, but it is anticipated that shortly, certain platoons will have progressed to the point at which the Marine squad can be withdrawn and moved to a new area. It is estimated that the Marine squad will spend from six to twelve months with each PF platoon. Results of the program to date are the quantum jump in efficiency of the reinforced platoons and the consequent proportional increase in the degree of security that they are able to provide.
64. Training objectives to improve the effectiveness of ARVN and RF/PF units in the role of supporting pacification are:

a. To assist ARVN and RF/PF units to understand the reasons for and importance of military support of pacification.

b. To teach tactics and techniques for providing the secure environment that is essential to pacification by means of in place training.

c. To emphasise the necessity for close coordination and cooperation between ARVN, RF/PF, RD cadre groups, National Police, civilian agencies, and the population.

d. To outline procedures to assist the population in achieving local community and public service projects.

65. This chapter will trace the organization for training for ARVN, RF and PF as it now exists and briefly discuss trends for the future.

Section II

MOBILE TRAINING TEAM OPERATIONS

66. To meet the objectives stated in Section I above, mobile training teams (MTT) were organized by ARVN to indoctrinate and reorient ARVN and RF/PF.

67. The ARVN training is conducted by 14 MTTs each consisting of 12 officers. Each of the four corps and ten divisions is represented by a team. RF training is conducted by 68 MTTs, each consisting of four officers. Every province has at least one team; provinces with a large number of RF units have two or three teams. ARVN RD MTTs are assisted by one US officer advisor and RF RD MTTs by one US officer advisor per province. ARVN RD MTTs received a two week course of instruction during the period 1 - 15 Dec 66. RF RD MTTs received an improved three week course of instruction which incorporated specialized instruction tailored to RF functions during the period 17 Jan - 3 Feb 67. Advisor conferences were conducted at the conclusion of
each course. Training for PF MTTs was conducted initially for 4 MTTs from the national level and 44 MTTs from the provinces. Each team consisted of five members (2 officers and 3 NCOs). These PF MTTs in turn, trained 241 subsector MTTs which conduct RD training for PF platoons concurrently with existing motivation indoctrination training under a revised motivation Indoctrination/Revolutionary Development Program.

68. US forces in the various Corps Tactical Zones currently have several types of organizations and concepts to assist in the training and improvement of RF/PF units.

a. Mobile Advisory Teams (MATs). MATs, consisting of five US, and two ARVN personnel, are employed to advise and assist RF/PF units on field fortifications, barrier systems, request and adjustment of indirect fires, small unit operations with emphasis on night operations and ambushes, patrols, weapons employment, emergency medical care, and other topics related to RF/PF missions. In addition, MATs assist units in the improvement of their administrative and logistic support procedures, and provide liaison with nearby US military forces. The US members of the MATs are assigned to the Province Advisory Team and are normally placed under the operational control of a District Advisor. They work and live with the RF/PF units in the field, returning to district compounds as necessary for instructions, supplies, and rest.

b. The Combined Mobile Improvement Teams (CMIT) and Combined Mobile Training Teams (CMTT) are currently used in II CTZ. While the organization and concept of operation may vary somewhat to meet specific requirements, the mission is similar to MATs, i.e., to improve the training and effectiveness of RF/PF units. CMIT and CMTT are programmed for conversion to MATs during 1968.

c. The Combined Action Platoon (CAP) and the Combined Action Company (CAC) are used in the I CTZ by the US Marines. The CAP or CAC consists of a squad or more of Marines and an RF or PF unit. The mission of the Marines is to advise, train, and assist the Vietnamese unit, while participating in all of its operations and activities. MATs, composed of US Army personnel, are also employed in I CTZ.

69. ARVN RD MTTs initiated the first cycle of training during the period 3 - 10 Jan 67. ARVN maneuver, combat support, and combat service support battalions were trained throughout the year. The RF initiated the first cycle of training on 28 February 1967 and units were trained throughout the year. PF RD training of units started on 2 May 1967, and was continued throughout the year.
70. The RD training program has convinced ARVN and RF/PF commanders that other training can be conducted as effectively at the unit level. Further, most commanders realize that the RD training has improved the ability of the unit to carry out its operational mission. Advisors and commanders alike must take advantage of the momentum achieved. The unit assigned to perform an RD mission must execute its required RD tasks as a primary role. However, an aggressive commander can improve the effectiveness of his unit while he is on an RD mission by training concurrently with RD operations. For example, the advisor can encourage his counterpart to require his units not committed actively to RD to work on improving individual weapon marksmanship, crew served weapons proficiency, small unit tactics, patrol and ambush techniques, search techniques, maintenance of weapons and equipment, and other subjects directly related to the RD and other operational missions. Throughout all phases of the training, the advisor can emphasize the role and responsibilities of junior leaders. Patrolling techniques also can be improved by requiring briefings, debriefings, and after action critiques as a standard operating procedure for all patrols.

71. As a result of strong command emphasis, thorough planning and preparation, and excellent advisory supervision and assistance, the RD training program has been successful. The program must continue to receive a high degree of advisory and command supervision at all levels. It is essential that this training be prepared and presented effectively to all ARVN and RF/PF personnel concerned if the vital RD effort is to succeed. Senior US commanders and all US advisors personally must assume active roles in this undertaking and work closely with their counterparts to facilitate successful training. Advisors must take positive steps to ensure success of the training. By their presence at RD training, they demonstrate to the troops their active and continuing support of RD. Advisors must strive to ensure that the greatest possible number of officers and NCOs participate in this vital instruction. Guidance and command policy pertaining to the advisory effort is covered in directives as listed in paragraph 74.

72. JGS/CTA has directed corps and divisions to allocate 20% of their quarterly training funds to support the ARVN RD training. RF and PF are receiving comparable training funds to support their programs. Funds for training aids material and services are essential to an effective training program. In some instances, RD MTT chiefs may need advisory assistance to obtain the fiscal assets authorized. Training aids to support the RD training are available through ARVN channels at the Training Aids Center in Saigon and the Subcenters located at Da Nang, Nha Trang and Can Tho. Aids include training films, projection equipment, outdoor projection boxes, megaphones, etc. Advisors and commanders are encouraged to supervise operation and maintenance of aids. Spare parts and maintenance support are available at the Training Aids Center and Subcenters.
73. A Revolutionary Development Refresher (RDR) training program which will retrain ARVN battalions in military support of pacification began in November 1967. The training will be accomplished by corps and division MTTs under a two-week POI for maneuver battalions and a reduced one-week POI for combat support and combat service support battalions. All battalions are scheduled to complete RDR training by November 1968.

74. The current basic references, both JGS and MACV, applicable to the RD training mission are as follows:


b. JGS/CTA CONF Memo #6576, dated 23 Dec 66, Subject: Training of Regional Forces in Support of the Rural Reconstruction Program.

c. JGS Dir #0046, dated 5 Jan 67, Subject: Military Support of RF.

d. JGS/CTA Memo #0849, dated 17 Feb 67, Subject: Correction of Deficiencies in Training of the Rural Revolutionary Development Military Support Units.

e. CTA Memo #1159, dated 3 Mar 67, Subject: Military Support for RD Training Plan for PF Units.

f. JGS/CTA Msg #6724, dated 4 Mar 67, Subject: Training Funds for RF RD Training.

g. MACV Dir 350-5, dated 21 Oct 67, Subject: Revolutionary Development Refresher (RDR) Training.

h. MACT CONF Msg #54593, dated 27 Dec 66, Subject: Support of RD Training.

i. MACT CONF Msg #002, dated 1 Jan 67, Subject: RF RD Training.

Section III

FUTURE TRENDS

75. The training of ARVN, RF and PF has been further augmented during recent combined operations such as FAIRFAX/RANG DONG. Vietnamese and US commanders have exchanged squads, platoons and companies with good success. RF/PF have worked in direct support of
US forces. US forces have assisted ARVN, RF and PF by providing combat and combat support units in direct support of Vietnamese operations. Both forces have benefited from this exchange. US forces have learned much from their Vietnamese friends who have detailed knowledge of the terrain and enemy. The Vietnamese have proved adept at learning from and adapting to the tactics and techniques being demonstrated in combat by US forces. Both Vietnamese and US forces should take advantage of every opportunity during coordinated military operations to exchange units.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRIBUTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - SJS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - J1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - J2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - J31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - J32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - J33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150 - J34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - COC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - COC (JOD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - J4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - J5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150 - MACCORDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - MACDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - MACSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 - MACT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - MACOI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - MAGSOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - FWNAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 - FWNAO (AFV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 - FWNAO (ROK-V)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - FWNAO (NZV Force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - FWNAO (MAGROG-V)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - FWNAO (PHILCAG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - Combined Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - ACTIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - OSD/ARPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - Mil History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - AFTU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - NRDU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - USAHAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - Cdr, 7th AF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 - MATTLO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 - CG, III MAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400 - CG, USARV (175 each to I FFORCEV and II FFORCEV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - Each Chief, AF Adv Gp; Chief, US Naval Adv Gp; Railway Security Adv Det</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300 - Each SA, I, II, III &amp; IV Corps (3 to each Sr Adv down to and including Bn and subsector level)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DISTRIBUTION:

- CG, 5th Mech Div (5)
- CG, USACDC (15)
- CG, USACDEC (2)
- CO, USACDCIA (1)
- COMPHIBPAC (3)
- COMPHIBTRAPAC (3)
- COMPHIBTRALANT (3)
- CCMUSMACHTHAI (5)
- COMUSJAPAN (2)
- CHMAAGCHINA (10)
- CHMAAGJAPAN (2)
- CHPROVMAAGKOREA (2)
- CHMILTAGINDONESIA (2)
- CPMEDBURMA (2)
- Chief, ARPA RDFU (THAI) (1)
- Chief, JUSMAG, PHIL (10)
- JFK Center SW (12)
- Defense Document Center (3)
- CO, Seal Tm 1 (3)
- CO, Seal Tm 2 (7)
- COMRIVFLOT ONE (6)
- COMCOSRON ONE (6)
- COMRIVERON FIVE (2)
- CCMDT, NWC (5)
- COMDT, AFSC (2)
- COMDT, ICAF (5)
- COMDT, USAWC (2)
- COMDT, Air War College (2)
- President, Naval War College (5)
- COMDT, USAINTS (5)
- COMDT, USAARMS (10)
- COMDT, USAIS (5)
- COMDT, USAAVNS (2)
- COMDT, USA Jungle Warfare Sch (2)
- COMDT, PMG Sch (2)
- COMDT, USA Trans Sch (2)
- COMDT, USA Sig Sch (2)
- COMDT, USMC Sch (2)
- COMDT, USN Amph Sch (2)
- COMDT, USA CA Sch (12)
- COMDT, USAPHS (2)
- COMDT, USAMCS (6)
- COMDT, USAAMS (2)
- COMDT, USAAD Sch (5)

- COMDT, USACHLCS (2)
- COMDT, USAOGMS (2)
- COMDT, USAOGCS (2)
- COMDT, USAAES (5)
- COMDT, USARPAC Intell Sch (5)
- Supt, USNA (2)
- Supt, USNPGS (2)
- Supt, USMA (3)
- Supt, USAFA (2)
- USA Sch of Americas (5)
- CO, NAVPHILBSCOL CORO (2)
- MAI (5)
- Dir, US Air Univ Library (1)
- Dir, Special Air Warfare Sch (1)
ANNEX A

RD HAMLET CRITERIA

The purpose of this annex is to set forth definitions and criteria utilized to describe the hamlet system.

A. There are three categories to be considered.

1. AP DOI MOI (Real New Life Hamlet): An Ap Doi Moi (ADM) is a hamlet designated in a provincial RD plan for a program of development under the supervision of a RD cadre group to achieve the eleven objectives (aspirations) in the framework of the 1968 RL program. The ADM will represent a prosperous community, capable of further political, social, and economic growth on its own.

2. AP BINH DINH (Pacification Hamlet): An Ap Binh Dinh (ABO) is a hamlet designated in a provincial RD plan for a program of construction to achieve the first two of the 11 objectives (aspirations). Construction activities may be accomplished under the supervision of an RD cadre group or other authorized GVN personnel. ABO may have more objectives depending on the capabilities of the social organization. The recruiting and training of self-defense forces, the organizing of a defense system against guerrilla forces, and the electing of a hamlet government council should be underway. An ABO should be ready for conversion to an ADM in the following year. Normally, an ABO hamlet will be located on the periphery of the area in which ADM are being developed, along critical LOC, or adjacent to a military installation.

3. AP TAN SINH (New Life Hamlet): An Ap Tan Sinh (ATS) is a hamlet which has achieved a six-point criteria prior to 31 December 1966 and is designated in a provincial RD plan to be maintained under the supervision of a RD cadre group or other authorized GVN personnel. ATS hamlets that no longer meet the standard will be consolidated to achieve again the six-point criteria shown in paragraph C below.

B. AP DOI MOI OBJECTIVES.

1. Eliminate the VC infrastructure.
2. Eliminate corrupt practices and discharge corrupt officials.
3. Develop a new spirit.
4. Establish popular government and social organizations.
5. Organize the people for self-defense.
7. Eliminate disease and unsanitary conditions.
8. Implement land reform.
9. Develop agriculture and handicraft industries.
10. Improve lines of communications.
11. Reward deserving soldiers, public servants, and citizens who have contributed to RD programs.

C. SIX POINT CRITERIA.

1. A census of residents has been completed; the VC infrastructure has been destroyed or neutralized.
2. Self-defense forces have been selected and trained and also equipped, as appropriate.
3. An effective hamlet defense system has been established.
4. A liaison and logistics system has been organized.
5. A social organization has been established.
6. A popular hamlet government has been elected.
ANNEX B

THE HAMLET FESTIVAL

1. The purpose of this annex is to set forth the task organization and functions of the RVNAF teams of the Hamlet Festival force employed in a cordon and search operation. In addition, a discussion of the physical layout of the Hamlet Festival is presented.

2. Task Organization and Functions of RVNAF Teams.

a. GVN Provincial Teams.

(1) RD cadre group. When available, RD cadre groups will initiate RD tasks.

(2) National Police. This force checks all individuals for proper identification and family census papers. They conduct a thorough search of houses and the surrounding area for contraband and attempt to extract and/or confirm intelligence.

(3) PF Platoons. Platoons gather and/or confirm information and attempt to recruit informants and agents for future use.

(4) Vietnamese Information Service (VIS). This team provides two entertainment groups; a jazz combo and the cultural team. The VIS also provides movies and literature for distribution.

(5) Hoi Chanh. If available, Hoi Chanh act as guides, identify VC, their families, caches, assembly areas, and lines of communications. In addition, they explain the Chieu Hoi program and its benefits from their own point of view and urge people to encourage their VC relatives and friends to rally to the GVN.

(6) Interrogation Team. Interrogates suspected persons and provides intelligence information to the commander of the operation.

(7) Cultural Team. Presents traditional dances and pantomimes and other entertainment.

(8) Agricultural Team. Presents information about farming and explains how the GVN can assist the farmer.

(9) Youth Services Team. This team is designed to entertain and control the children at the hamlet.

(10) RF/PF Band. This unit provides music for the hamlet area.
b. ARVN Teams.

(1) Civic Action Team. This team is used to guide and control the population. During the festival this group hands out clothes and food packages to the population.

(2) PSYWAR Team. This team presents the GVN policy, disseminates pro-GVN literature, organizes games and additional entertainment, and explains the presence of US/FWMAF troops in VN, particularly in the targeted village.

(3) Cultural Team. Complements the efforts of the province cultural team.

(4) ARVN Band. Provides music for the hamlet area if a FR band is not available.

c. Additional ARVN groups utilized on occasion, include:

(1) Medical Teams, assisted by MEDCAP personnel available, attend to the needs of the population and serve as an example of the government's interest in the people.

(2) A specially trained Vietnamese team, sometimes known as counterterror troops, assist US forces in the conduct of night ambushes and patrols.

3. Figure B-1-1 depicts a typical layout of a Hamlet Festival. In this idealized condition, the area is fenced in or marked off and arranged so that when hamlet or village residents are guided through the area they proceed to exhibits and events in a logical manner. Entertainment and food are available. Agricultural service is provided. Each person is required to go through the identification area where a temporary ID card is provided for those that do not have one. After this they pass through an interrogation area. Selected individuals are questioned for intelligence information and each family is given a quantity of rice.

4. Actual US participation in the Hamlet Festival normally is limited to a security role; plus logistical support for the operation, as required.
TYPICAL HAMLET FESTIVAL LAYOUT

Entrance

Reception Center

Entertainment

Youth Service

Shelter Tent

Entertainment

Shelter Tent

Shelter Tent

Mess Tent

Medical Team

MEDCAP

Rice Distribution

Interrogation

ID Tent

* - Indicates water point.

Figure B-1-1
ANNEX C

GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

This annex presents terms and abbreviations found in the hand­book. In addition, some often heard words and abbreviations are included for information purposes.

A & DSL Company - Administrative and Direct Support Logistics Company. There is at least one per sector for support of RF/PF with Personnel Finance, Maintenance, Supply, Medical and Transportation sections.

AIK - Assistance in kind. Those materials and services which MACV furnishes the GVN without reimbursement.

AO - Area of operation.

ARVN - Army of Vietnam. The common term used to refer to regular army forces to include airborne and ranger units.

ALC - Area Logistic Command. An ARVN organization that provides logistical support to units within a specified area.


CARE - Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere.

CAT - Combined Action Team. A control element in the Combined Action Program.

CHIEU HOI - The "Open Arms" program for encouraging the VC to defect to the GVN side.

CIC - Combined Intelligence Center.

CIDG - Civilian Irregular Defense Group. Local Vietnamese or an ethnic paramilitary force.

CORDS - Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support. The MACV agency that provides single manager direction of all US civil/military pacification activities in RVN.

CRDC - Combined Revolutionary Development Council.

CRS - Catholic Relief Service.

CSCC - Combat Support Coordination Center.

CTZ - Corps Tactical Zone. The geographical area of responsibility of a Corps, but frequently erroneously used to refer to the Corps Headquarters itself; e.g., "CTZ will review...", "DTA will submit to CTZ...". The term "Region" is sometimes used interchangeably with CTZ. Both areas encompass the same geographical areas.

DGNP - Director General, National Police.

DIOCC - District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center.

DSA - Deputy Senior Advisor.

DSU - Direct Support Unit. The third echelon technical service support unit. Each serves in a particular technical service chain; e.g., Ord DSU, QM DSU.

DTA - Division Tactical Area. The geographical area of responsibility of a division, but frequently erroneously used to refer to the division headquarters itself, as with CTZ above.

FWMAF - Free World Military Assistance Forces.

GVN - Government of South Vietnam. Used to refer to the national government, to the entire governmental structure, or as an adjective to describe one of its agents or agencies.

Hoi Chanh - A returnee coming in under the Chieu Hoi "Open Arms" program.
- "Working Together." The program for priority attention to expanding GVN control in critical areas. Hop Tac I is the program to expand the Saigon-Cholon base.

    - Headquarters Support Activity Saigon.

    - International Voluntary Services.

    - Joint United States Public Affairs Office. Services US interest as well as advising Vietnamese in the information and psychological operations field.

    - Vietnamese Special Forces.

    - Marine Amphibious Force.

    - Medical Civic Action Program.

    - Military Provincial Hospital Assistance Program. Under this program, 16 man Free World medical teams render medical assistance to province hospitals.

    - Naval Forces, Vietnam.

    - Naval Support Activity.

    - National Police Field Force.

    - Office of Special Assistant to the Ambassador.

    - Public Administration Division. A USAID agency with interest chiefly in assisting in the development of the Vietnamese governmental organization and administration.

    - Peoples Action Team. 34 man Armed Propaganda Team which is incorporated now in the Revolutionary Development Cadre Group.

    - Peoples Army Vietnam. North Vietnamese regular forces.

    - Public Health Division. A USAID agency with interest in assisting the Vietnamese public health program.
- Popular Forces. Military forces recruited and employed within a district; organized into platoons.

- Public Safety Division. A MACCORS agency which assists Vietnamese development of police forces.

- Revolutionary Development.

- Regional Forces. Military forces recruited and employed within a province. Organized as companies primarily.

- Republic of Vietnam. The nation itself although sometimes used interchangeably with GVN when referring to the government or with SVN when referring to the land.

- Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. All armed forces of the RVN; all services.

- Seabee Technical Assistance Team. A construction team which drills wells, constructs sewers, and accomplishes other public works type projects. These teams also initiate self-help projects and render technical assistance.

- South Vietnam. Generally connotes the land itself.

- Tactical Area of Interest.

- Tactical Area of Responsibility.

- The entire United States team, headed by the US Ambassador and including all US forces and agencies assigned to Vietnam to assist the South Vietnamese Government.

- United States Agency for International Development. The section of the US Mission generally responsible for the civil side of US advice and assistance, with the exception of that related to the information service.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USARV</td>
<td>United States Army, Vietnam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USASF</td>
<td>United States Army Special Forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAC</td>
<td>Village Administration Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC</td>
<td>Viet Cong. Communist insurgents against the South Vietnamese Government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCC</td>
<td>Village Citizens Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIS</td>
<td>Vietnamese Information Service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VN</td>
<td>Vietnam, Vietnamese.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNAF</td>
<td>Vietnamese Air Force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNN</td>
<td>Vietnamese Navy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNMC</td>
<td>Vietnamese Marine Corps.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>