STABILITY OPERATIONS - U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DECEMBER 1967
# STABILITY OPERATIONS
## U. S. ARMY DOCTRINE

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1. **Purpose and Scope**

   a. This manual provides information and guidance to commanders, staffs, and advisors concerning operational aspects of internal defense and internal development by host country (HC) and U.S. forces. It prescribes general doctrine for the roles, missions, and employment of U.S. Army forces in stability operations within the overall interdepartmental internal defense and internal development effort. This manual is based upon the broad, general guidance found in FM 100–20.

   b. This manual contains doctrinal guidance applicable to the army components of MAAG, Missions, and Military Assistance Commands upon which to plan and execute stability operations. It should be used jointly with other doctrinal publications providing guidance, techniques, and procedures for field operations.

   c. This manual applies to army force employment in—

      (1) Chemical, biological, and radiological environments.

      (2) Limited war.

      (3) Cold war, to include stability operations.

2. **Recommended Changes**

   Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommendations for the improvement of its contents. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of text in which the change is recommended. Reasons should be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be addressed to the Commanding Officer, United States Army Combat Developments Command Special Warfare Agency, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307. Originators of proposed changes which would constitute a significant modification of approved army doctrine may send an information copy through command channels to Commanding General, United States Army Combat Developments Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060, to facilitate review and follow-up.

3. **Definitions**

   See glossary for terminology related to internal defense and internal development.
CHAPTER 2
CHARACTERISTICS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Section I. INTRODUCTION

4. General
This chapter provides guidance concerning the characteristics of developing countries and the problems inherent to transitional societies. It describes those environmental factors which must be considered in internal defense and internal development operations and the effect of these factors on U. S./HC and insurgent forces.

5. The Dynamics of Developing Nations
a. A developing nation is one which has advanced beyond a traditional society and is striving toward an advanced economy and an efficient, popularly supported government. In achieving these goals, a nation must overcome those features characterizing a traditional society such as a static economy, limited technology, immobile social structure, and rule by custom and traditional law. The social, political, and economic transformation involved in this transitional process often creates an atmosphere of national tension and disorder.

b. Each developing nation is unique. Each has its own history, culture, preferences, and goals which are blended in a combination resulting in problems different from those existing in any other nation. For example, many of the African states and former Asian colonies have gained their independence only recently; others, as in Latin America, have been independent for a century or more. The aggregate problems of these developing nations provide a new dimension to the cold war which complicates, intensifies, and often affects decisively the problems confronting all nations.

Section II. THE HOST COUNTRY

6. The Problems of Transitional Societies
a. Impatience for Progress. Little economic progress is possible without the establishment of a stable and effective government which inspires confidence in the future. Construction is necessary to provide the means of transportation, rapid communication, and industrial power which will insure that products can be moved easily and economically to markets. These early steps toward modernization are essential to progress, but do not always result in immediate benefits to the people. The "revolution of rising expectations" resulting from the knowledge and ideas spread by mass media may cause the people to be impatient for immediate, tangible evidence of progress. Popular leaders seeking to gain additional recognition as spokesmen for the people intensify this impatience by demanding early government action. Under pressure from the people, the government may make concessions and divert resources to satisfy demands. Since these diversions may postpone the orderly achievement of the long-range goal, they should be limited to those requirements which satisfy popular demands.

b. Hesitations to Leave the Past. New ideas may not be accepted easily by most members of the government or the population. The reluctance to leave the past will be based initially upon an attachment to and confidence in traditional methods, coupled with a lack of knowledge and appreciation of the benefits of modernization. This attitude may impede in-
ternal development programs and tend to sustain the customs and traditions of the past.

(1) The intelligentsia will disagree on the types of programs which should be initiated and on how much change is desirable; additionally, disagreement may extend to political considerations. The type of government (Communist, democratic, or autocratic) necessary to accomplish these programs may be argued. In addition, the intelligentsia will differ as to the extent of development that should be undertaken, particularly where development may affect adversely their own position and vested interest in the society.

(2) Finally, the government will be caught in the stress of these diverging desires. In many cases, it will have achieved power under the value scale of old traditions and, as the government is pressured for progressive change, its political fabric may be altered to the extent that political leaders may be forced to undermine their own base of power.

c. Population Support. Only limited internal development is possible in an atmosphere of violence and insurrection. Although the people may lack political maturity or a knowledge of their own best interests and how to make their desires known, they possess a great deal of political power. Political forces in opposition to the government may discover the means of mobilizing the attitudes and opinions of various segments of the population and be able to pressure the government into meeting some of their demands.

d. Dissident Factions. When the government is intolerant of opposition, dissident factions will be forced either to forego any activity or to adopt covert means. On the other hand, if the government is tolerant of disagreement with its policies and provides legal means for a loyal opposition, the probability of dissident factions resorting to force is reduced. The government must establish the limits of its prerogatives and authority to encourage a loyal opposition without establishing a base for general political instability. Although it usually is not possible to insure that all dissident groups fall into the category of loyal opposition, a system to accommodate such opposition must be established in order to reduce possible discontent which otherwise may manifest itself in an insurgency.

e. Minority Groups. As the government pursues the task of progressive reform, it must insure assimilation of minority groups into the national structure and create within these groups a sense of national identity and responsibility. Minority groups which differ in race and language, or, are located in remote areas will be more difficult to assimilate than those which live in close proximity to the predominant group. If progressive programs do not bring hope and the promise of a better life to the minorities, they will lack faith in the government, and may provide an exploitable base for the insurgent movement.

f. The Military. Military groups possess considerable political and social influence, and have a capability to play significant roles in the political, social, and economic development of the country. The amount of success that the military achieves will vary with the efficiency of the government; the existence and intensity of insurgency; the presence or absence of an external threat; and the strength, efficiency, disposition, and leadership of the armed forces.

(1) The military often plays a political role, particularly when it is entrusted with the enforcement of law and order. Since it controls the power to dominate most other agencies of government, the military is likely to develop a political position of its own to perpetuate its strength and prerogatives. In this respect, the military may block, permit, or promote some of the activities of the civil government. Military involvement in politics may be beneficial when it provides the stability, which may be lacking under civil government, for political, social, and economic improvement; however, care must be taken to insure that it does not inhibit the political develop-
ment of the government or the people.

(2) The military often is the first to be exposed to "Western" or modern ideas and concepts. This exposure frequently may cause it to be among the earliest segments of society seeking progressive reforms and the military may provide one of the few channels for upward social movement. Recruits with little or no previous formal education may leave the service as literate citizens possessing skills which will be useful in overcoming traditional ways and in spreading new ideas.

(3) The military is a repository of many skills such as electronics, engineering, medicine, meteorology, management, ship-building, communications, and firefighting. The military assists in internal development through the application of these skills.

7. The Tasks of the Government

The tasks of the government are numerous and closely interrelated. These tasks generally include the following:

a. Providing a program of internal development.

b. Winning the support and confidence of the people for the government.

c. Assimilating dissident factions without undermining the government's capability for action.

d. Maintaining internal security with minimum disruption of internal development.

e. Establishing an effective government.

Section III. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL FACTORS

8. Economic Factors

a. Nations or regions with low levels of real income and capital per individual generally are referred to as developing. Using this standard, the term "developing" would apply to all the nations of Asia (excluding Japan); the Middle East (except certain of the oil-rich kingdoms); Africa (with the possible exception of South Africa); Latin America (with Argentina sometimes omitted); and parts of Eastern and Southern Europe. These developing regions encompass approximately three-fourths of the population of the world.

b. The economies of the developing countries may have many common characteristics—

(1) There is a lack of large-scale application of modern science and technology to agriculture and industry;

(2) Markets are relatively narrow;

(3) Transportation and communication facilities are inadequate; and

(4) Contribution of modern manufacturing industry to the gross national income is comparatively small.

c. Despite the technical backwardness which developing countries share in common, prominent differences exist between them. The dissimilarities in terms of primary economic activities are immediately apparent. For example, among nomadic peoples, such as the Ogaden Somalis, the economy centers upon animal husbandry; in parts of Africa, activities such as hunting and fishing are crucial factors in the economies of some cultural groups; in most of Southeast Asia and Latin America, farming is the predominant means of livelihood. Moreover, the economies of these countries contrast strikingly in terms of rate of development. There are differences in the rate of growth of both total real income and income per individual, in the accumulation of capital, and in the application of modern techniques to agriculture and industry. To complicate further the economic differences of the developing countries, there are glaring variances in wealth, economic progress, and technical developments within each country.

d. Some of the gravest problems currently facing the developing countries arise not only from economic stagnation but also from rapid and uneven rates of economic development. A significant socio-economic effect of rapid development has been that the changes in economic
activities and relationships have outpaced the emergence of a suitable value system to replace the partially discredited traditional discipline. In times of crisis, the individual may find himself in an alienated position in which, lacking culturally established channels to express his resentment, rebellion appears the only alternative.

e. Uneven rate of economic development has produced even more noticeable contrasts within developing countries. Cities and towns with higher standards of living and levels of technological achievement exist alongside regions with economies which are barely subsistent. To a great extent, the uneven rate of development is a result of the archaic transportation and communication facilities, which hinders satisfactory economic and cultural relationships between proximate geographical regions.

f. The vast range of economic diversity existing within and between developing countries precludes the development of an overall plan which embraces the whole spectrum of human economic activity and the resulting sociopolitical effects. Consequently, primary attention must be focused on those economic activities and problems of development which are most widespread throughout the underdeveloped world. On this basis, the state of development of agriculture and human resources and their roles in economic growth will receive extensive consideration in conceptual planning. Secondly, factors pertinent to the internal security or insurgency problem arising from the more common economic vulnerabilities will be considered. These factors include such effects as economic stagnation and growing poverty, rapid economic progress and the breakdown of the traditional structure, and foreign economic domination.

9. Social Factors
a. After determining the economic factors in a survey of the human environment the social, psychological, and cultural elements must be considered. The complex interaction among these three elements causes difficulty in setting up a plan which will identify the various units or groups in the social structure and indicate the complexity of the culture (e.g., languages, dialects, idea systems, and activities) and the social forces within the environment.

b. In their attempt to modernize, developing countries face the problem of integrating many diverse elements. It is dangerous to ignore the force resulting from the tenacity with which the loyalties and sense of identity of the people remain bound with ties of blood, race, language, locality, religion, or tradition. With the onset of the modernizing process, these people are asked to give up much of their traditional identification and to become absorbed into a culturally integrated mass. This demand reaccentuates the reality and security of traditional loyalties, even though the population is made aware of the possibilities for social reform and material progress. Thus, a conflict ensues as the population is torn between desire for “progress” and fear of the accompanying social change. Because the modernizing process and the accompanying disruption of the traditional social order largely is irreversible, the longstanding loyalties of a people assume increasing importance in understanding the psychological gap which often develops between these people and their government.

c. The part of a history which is meaningful to a tradition-conscious people is that part which underscores and supports their feeling of uniqueness; more often than not, this history is in the nature of conflict with alien groups. Events which should be considered significant are those that have resulted in latent antagonisms and hatreds which are exploitable by a subversive element.

d. An observable phenomenon in the modernization process of a country is the breakdown of the traditional social structure and social mores of a people—an inevitable byproduct, perhaps, of increasing physical mobility. The extent to which this occurs varies from one situation to another. In many urban areas in Latin America, the breakdown is rapid and total; this is in contrast to some African situations where tribes attempt to
transplant certain institutions to the urban areas which safeguard traditional social mores and ties. The variability of this phenomenon depends upon the strength of family and ethnic ties, the degree of social and cultural integration of a people, and the strength of local leadership.

e. An assessment of a people's standard of living, together with the degree of their contact with other cultures and involvement in a money economy, will provide insight into the relative degree of socio-economic discontent which exists in a community. Further, the key role which education plays in the modernizing process is widely recognized, both as an incentive for social change and as an instrument in developing a loyalty to the nation. On the other hand, the recent introduction of government sponsored and supervised educational systems in many countries provides a potential, and in some cases actual, conflict with those groups (missionary, church, and others) previously responsible for support and supervision of the schools.

f. There is no one set of observable phenomena to be probed as far as the attitudes and behavioral responses of a people are concerned. The following are some of the indicators to look for in the human environment, with emphasis upon the "world view" of the group under survey. Examples of indicator questions are—

(1) What strong taboos and beliefs, both religious and nonreligious, have a definite influence among these people?

(2) What contact occurs with other cultures?

(a) Is this of an economic, cultural, or other nature?

(b) Is there a minority group living in this area such as a trading class which is ethnically or racially distinct?

(3) Are there taboos or strong traditions against marrying outside of the clan or ethnic unit?

(4) What evidences are there of in-group antagonism such as feuding between families and clans?

(5) What are the attitudes toward social mobility? For example, is there a strong desire evidenced for children to improve themselves through education?

(6) What are the attitudes toward and contact with the government? Is there tangible evidence of the government's interest in these people such as road building and vaccination?

(a) Is there a feeling among the group that the government is, or is not, interested in them?

(b) Is there evidence that people feel the government is trying to "buy" their loyalty through gifts such as roads or bridges?

g. Terms such as "parochialism," "tribalism," or "communalism" all refer to the same condition—that of cultural complexity and ethnic multiplicity. Communalism in India takes the form of religious cleavages; in Nigeria, it takes the form of tribal divisions; and in Malaya, communalism refers to racial contrasts. Since few developing countries are completely free of this problem, an attempt must be made to isolate the actual or potential "units of cleavage" which are to be found in the country under survey. Generally, the vulnerabilities which develop from population cleavages arise from suspicion, rivalry, and antagonism on an intergroup level. The usual picture in the developing countries is one of a large gap between the masses and key groups which is emphasized by the wide disparity in their living standards.

h. A result of the growing expectations of radically improved standards is the drift of unabsorbable numbers of rural people into the metropolitan areas expecting to find jobs and easy affluence, only to be disillusioned by lack of employment and poor living conditions. The accompanying breakdown of protective traditional and family ties as a result of physical estrangement and contact with other cultures accentuates the miserable living conditions of the urban masses.

i. The major social significance of organizations and associations which are formed in a
modernizing society is that they replace traditional organizations for an urban mass that has severed its ties to the family in the rural society. These organizations provide an outlet for expression of social discontent and the leadership very quickly becomes vocal on a political level.

10. Political Factors

a. Regardless of its stage of development, each country has a political culture which reflects the society's concepts of authority and purpose and its basic political beliefs. This political culture properly can be called the "real" constitution. This "real" constitution should be distinguished from the formal written document which has been declared the supreme law of the land. Often this written document reflects an attempt to absorb alien political experiences, practices, and ideals which have little applicability in the society; however, the written constitution must be analyzed to determine the aspirations of its framers and the gap between those aspirations and reality.

b. The theoretical organization of government as expressed in the constitution may serve to highlight those factors which the authors considered to be the major problems of the nation. For example, a constitution could indicate that regionalism, cultural diversity, or geographical fragmentation were of concern. On the other hand, a constitution might indicate that centralized control was either undesirable or impossible at the time the constitution was created.

c. In transitional or developing nations, the theoretical organization of government under the constitution may reflect the incorporation of alien ideals and the idealized expression of the aspirations and objectives. Furthermore, constitutions do not always enjoy the same status and function in these societies as in our own. Such instruments may lack effectiveness as precepts for government if based on social and political concepts that are foreign to the political culture of the people to whom they are applied. In order to determine the true distribution of power, it is necessary to make objective observations and evaluations concerning the actual organization and operations of the government. Further, a critical evaluation of the actual practices is essential to avoid unwarranted application of our own political and cultural values to a foreign system with its own distinct values.

d. Observation and evaluation of the executive, legislative, judicial, and electoral functions are necessary to the study of any political structure. Such observation and evaluation should provide the information necessary to determine whether a government actually exists and whether that government is adequate or inadequate to satisfy the actual requirements of a nation in the present international environment.

e. Where socio-political development has resulted in the emergence of new states and new socio-political orders, the regional or provincial government may have been destroyed or, in fact, never have existed; however, in rural or agrarian nations, leadership and government at the local level will tend to be well defined and traditional in orientation. A major problem for national governments in developing countries is the strengthening of the middle class structure to bridge the gap between the upper and lower classes, thus enabling proper representation and interpretation of national policy at the local level.

f. Administrative and civil service systems generally reflect the cultural heritage and political experience of the nation. In the older developing countries, the bureaucracy tends to be tightly stratified along traditional class and educational lines which limits the development of a technically competent administration. In an unstable political situation where leadership is in a state of flux, there is likely to be social disorganization resulting in a continuous turnover in the bureaucratic hierarchy which will further prevent the development of a stable and responsible civil service.

g. A political party serves as an institution for developing leaders to represent various segments of the "popular" will and as a tool through which those leaders can guide the population into common thought and action. Since "popular" means little more than the...
membership of the party, it is necessary to
determine the actual power position of political
parties in relation to the population as a whole.
The political party system will vary with the
nation. A new nation often has an official party
which does not permit opposition, the purpose
being to protect the thin fabric of the new
political society from the many divergent in­
terests which remain within it. The older
nations often will evidence a two-party system
ostensibly divided along liberal and conserva­
tive lines; however, in most cases, these parties
represent members of the same class—the
elite.

h. Within every country there are associa­
tional groups, consciously organized, which lie
outside the formal structure of government but
which include political functions among their
stated objectives. These groups serve to articu­
late demands in society, seek support for these
demands among other power groups, and at­
tempt to transform these demands into public

policy. Often in developing nations, these
groups exercise functions which in Western
societies might best be performed by political
parties. In addition, within each nation there
are groups which are not formally organized
and which are latent and potential rather than
actually functioning political groups. These
groups usually reflect interests based on class,
ethnic kinship, religion, or regional factors.

i. Each country has formally constituted
organizations which exercise accepted roles in
both the social and the political system. The
political functions of these institutions may
differ radically from their established or ob­
vious roles in society. These groups may com­
prise actual elements of the government or
elements of the social structure. These groups
may presuppose a strength of organization and
political influence which cannot be ignored by
a government, although they might be some­
what limited in their ability to influence
governmental policy decisions.
CHAPTER 3

SUBVERSIVE INSURGENCY

Section I. TYPES OF REVOLUTION

11. General

This chapter delineates those characteristics of subversive insurgency which distinguish it from other types of revolution. It describes the evolutionary nature of subversive insurgency as set forth in Communist doctrine and portrays the organizational structure which the party strives to establish in an insurgency movement.

12. Distinctive Characteristics

In order that insurgency may be viewed in perspective, other forms of revolutionary activity must be noted. A revolution in which a small group of men within the government or its armed forces seizes control of government generally is viewed as a coup d'état. The use of open, organized, and armed resistance in which the inhabitants of an area seek to obtain autonomy or independence but make no attempt to alter or overthrow the central government, is a rebellion. The initial stage of a revolution which is still localized and limited to seeking modifications of government policy and does not yet pose a serious threat to state or government in power normally is referred to as an insurrection. The attempt by a dissident element to organize and incite the population of a country into forcible overthrowing its existing government is called subversive insurgency.

13. Revolution From the Top and From the Bottom

a. To distinguish between the two principal types of revolution, coup d'état and subversive insurgency, the illegal acquisition of governmental power may be considered to be of two types: revolution from the top, and revolution from the bottom. In a revolution from the top (coup d'état) a small group tries to obtain control of or neutralize the armed forces and other government agencies, usually with little or no violence and rarely seeking popular support until after the coup has been initiated or has succeeded. The instigators of the coup, normally men in top echelons of government or the armed forces, seize the instruments of power such as mass-communications media, military materiel, transportation facilities and power stations, and, finally, the symbols of power such as administrative and legislative buildings in the capital city. On the other hand, revolution from the bottom (subversive insurgency) involves more violent seizure of power and largely is the result of social disorganization and unrest. A mass movement, encouraged or directed by a hard insurgent core, develops slowly in a long evolutionary process until armed fighting occurs through a precipitant event. Since mobilization, organization, and manipulation of a sizeable segment of the population are prerequisites for successful revolution from the bottom, it is known as subversive insurgency. The Communists refer to such revolutions as "wars of national liberation."

b. Although this manual deals primarily with subversive insurgency, those involved in preventing or defeating it must be alert to the possibility that there may be a mixture of two or more forms of revolution. Such was the case in Russia wherein a movement from below was combined with a Communist coup at the top.
Section II. COMMUNIST PHASES OF INSURGENCY

14. Doctrinal Requirements

a. The principal components of Communist insurgent doctrine were developed primarily by two men—Nicolai Lenin and Mao Tse-tung. They provided the doctrinal base and, more significantly, the order of priority for those activities which must follow in organizationally and politically escalating internal attack. To succeed in protracted revolutionary war, one must have—

1. Disciplined organization of professionals;
2. Concept of strategy which permits opportunism and varies tactics according to the social classes to which appeals are directed during any particular phase of operations;
3. Techniques through which the party can assert its control over any extraparty organization; and
4. Military doctrine built around the political impact of tactical operations.

b. According to both Lenin and Mao, insurgent forces will be weak in the early stages of a revolution and, therefore, unable to engage in open warfare. Time in which to develop strength is one of the essentials for a successful insurgent campaign, and planning envisages a period of years to reach the stage where insurgent forces, formed into standard combat units, are able to engage in conventional-type warfare. The protracted nature of the insurgent campaign thus is one of its outstanding characteristics.

c. Mao's doctrine on protracted war in its militarization phase has been used by Communist insurgent leaders in developing specific doctrine which provides that protracted military war has three stages—

1. Passive stage (strategic defense stage).
2. Active stage (or strategic stalemate stage).
3. Counteroffensive stage.

A brief synopsis of these stages is presented to depict the general characteristics inherent in each.

15. The Passive Stage (Strategic Defense Stage)

a. The passive stage is that initial period of the conflict during which insurgent elements must be on the defensive to insure completion of the necessary political and military preparations for the succeeding phases. This stage is the most difficult and protracted of the three stages of the insurgent campaign. During the passive stage, specific conditions must exist and specific objectives should be achieved before the insurgency can enter successfully the active stage. These conditions are as follows:

1. The Communist party must be strong in selected base areas.
2. A popular cause or reasons for the revolution must exist or have been created.
3. Class warfare must be at an advanced stage. This will be linked with (2) above.
4. A population base must have been created to provide manpower, matériel, and political support for insurgent forces.

b. To achieve the above objectives, party doctrine stresses both constructive and destructive measures. These include—

1. The expansion of the active party organization and the creation of a covert Communist-controlled Revolutionary Committee System at all organizational levels of the legal administration.
2. The penetration of government offices, other political parties, trade unions, and movements with the purpose of obtaining intelligence, fostering popular support, or insuring the elimination of political rivals.
3. The creation of military forces for the purpose of organizing and controlling mass civil organizations.
carrying out intimidation measures, terrorism, and sabotage; and engaging in minor military operations, e.g., "hit-and-run" ambushes, attacks on isolated posts, and similar actions.

(4) The promulgation of propaganda for both internal and external consumption to obtain material and psychological support for the revolutionary forces and demoralize legal government supporters.

(5) The identification of the aspirations of the masses with Communist aims.

c. A study of the above objectives and the measures necessary to achieve them will show that none are likely to be attained within a short space of time; hence, the prolonged duration of the passive stage. No Communist insurgency contemplates anything other than eventual complete success, which means in effect that all potential dangers to the party have to be eliminated; thus, time is no object.

16. The Active Stage (Strategic Stalemate Stage)

a. The active stage is initiated for the purpose of extending political control and increasing military action in armed resistance against government forces. The principal goal during the active stage is to further the Communist cause and standing in the country and, through this, to make possible the rapid buildup of military capabilities. This goal is achieved through the accomplishment of specific political and military objectives. Although, in practice, Communist political and military activity is integrated, the objectives of each are cited separately for clarity. Political objectives in the active stage are—

(1) Extension of the political control and influence over the masses and establishment of Communist government and administration in "liberated" areas.

(2) Further demoralization of the legal government and its organs and supporters, and the penetration and subversion of police, military, and paramilitary forces.

(3) Conversion or elimination of neutral or opposition groups.

b. The measures employed in the early passive stage will be continued and amplified to include—

(1) The creation or re-establishment of bases.

(2) The employment of insurgent forces in such activities as farming, fishing, and lumbering in order to win population support.

(3) Intimidation through the use of systematic terror, selective sabotage, and guerrilla action.

(4) Demoralization through the negation of government successes, political or military; exaggeration of government failures; creation of doubt concerning the justice and efficiency of government countermeasures; and attacks on the character, good faith, and morals of government leaders at all levels.

c. Military objectives during the active stage are—

(1) Tying down the maximum number of government troops in static defense tasks and destroying lines of communication, supplies, and other government resources.

(2) Expanding existing base areas and "liberating" new territory.

(3) Forming cadres for recruitment to communist military forces through intimidation, persuasion, and terror, continued control of the masses, and liquidation of opposition elements.

d. Military measures employed during the active stage will include ambushes against military and police convoys and columns, attacks on pro-government villages and hamlets, and sabotage against all forms of communication. Increased Communist influence and military strength will enlarge the number of insurgent dominated villages. Government reaction will be to attack these with consequent loss of men and equipment. Villages captured by government forces will require dispersal of HC military personnel and equipment in order to prevent recapture by insurgents. Should HC
forces succeed in defending villages they have captured, ambushes will be organized to cut off government supplies and reinforcements and prevent the withdrawal of troops. Insurgent doctrine requires the reoccupation of such villages after they have been vacated by government troops. It also requires that village systems organized for defense include provision for concealment and evacuation.

e. "Preparation of the battlefield," or of those areas where insurgent regular forces are contemplated for deployment against government troops in future conventional battles, is supervised by the Central Committee of the Communist party at national level during the active stage. Preparation of such areas will include—

(1) The acquisition and storage of arms, ammunition, combat materiel, and food.
(2) Conduct of intelligence surveys of government force capabilities.
(3) Establishment of local population controls.

17. The Counter-Offensive Stage

This is the final stage in the insurgency process and is initiated when the Communists believe they have gained sufficient military strength and population support to meet and defeat the government forces in decisive combat. It is difficult to define the end of the active stage and the beginning of the counter-offensive. The active stage insures that the conditions for decisive battle in strategically selected areas are all in favor of the insurgents, and the concentration of their forces must be handled in such a manner that the outcome cannot be in doubt once these battles begin. Terrain itself will continue to be of little strategic importance to the Communists and will be used primarily to gain tactical advantage over government forces. On the other hand, terrain temporarily occupied must be of sufficient tactical or strategic importance to the government to compel the commitment of principal government forces. When the counter-offensive stage is ready to begin, the following conditions should have been met—

a. The government will have reached a stage at which it can react only in the manner desired by the Communist insurgent forces.
b. The concentration of government forces in the battle areas will be such that their destruction will insure the collapse of the entire military control of the country.
c. Government forces outside the battle areas will be absorbed completely in controlling the areas in which they are stationed.
d. Civil administration will have collapsed or will collapse as soon as military control is removed.
e. Insurgent forces will be strong enough to overwhelm their enemy in the battle areas and sufficient forces will be available to conduct subsidiary operations.
f. The intelligence organization of the government will be ineffective and will receive only the information fed to it by the insurgents. The Communist intelligence organization will be so efficient that no move or decision will be made by the government without insurgent forces being quickly aware of it.
g. The bulk of the population will be politically immobilized and completely obedient to the insurgent forces.
h. Plans will be available to prevent government reserves from influencing directly the outcome of the battle.

Section III. THE PARTY CORE

18. General

a. At the heart of every Communist-dominated insurgency may be found a tightly disciplined party organization, formally structured to parallel the existing governmental structure in the country. In most instances, this organization will consist of committees at
This chart portrays the interlocking structure which enables the Communist party (CP) to control an insurgent organization.

Figure 1. Type Communist insurgent organization.
The overall Communist insurgent organization is composed of three major elements—

1. Party core.
2. Mass civil organizations.
3. Military forces.

These elements are interlocked organizationally to insure at all times that the party exercises complete control over their activities. Figure 1 depicts an optimum type Communist insurgent structure. While the exact organizational relationship of its elements may vary in detail from one insurgency to another, all will employ the “interlocking directorate” arrangement which insures absolute control by the party over the entire organization. FM 30-31 contains detailed information on the Communist insurgent organization.

19. The Party Cellular Organization

a. At the base of the party structure exists the “cell.” The cellular structure of any Communist party, legal, or illegal, is its most critical characteristic, and communism as a way of life and organizational development is not possible in the absence of the cell. A Communist party member normally belongs to two or more cells; his party cell (in which the fundamental dynamics of communism are to be found) and one or more functional cells which exist in his place of daily employment such as the party committee, school, or factory. While both party and functional cells are separate and distinct elements, they may appear to overlap, since the same cell members often will work together in daily employment as well as participate together in strictly party activities.

b. Party Groups normally are created to control and coordinate the activities of two or more party cells. Under this arrangement, the cell captain is responsible to the First Secretary of his respective Party Group which also consists of an Assistant Secretary and an Executive Committee. Party Groups, in turn, are responsible to yet another higher office which exists at each echelon of the party hierarchy. This office is known as the Interparty Committee and is the supreme Communist organ at its particular level of organization, responsible only to its counterpart office at the next higher echelon. Like the Party Group, it also is composed of a First Secretary, Assistant Secretary, and an Executive Committee. The chain-of-command within the overall party structure is from the Central Committee of the Communist party at national level down through each of the Interparty Committees at interprovincial, provincial, and district levels.

20. The Party Committee System

a. Although all authority within a Communist insurgent movement stems from the hard core cellular party organization, functional committees, composed of both party and non-party members, are required to carry out the party’s day-to-day activities. The primary organization used for this purpose is the Party Executive Committee, commonly referred to during an insurgency as the Party Revolutionary Committee. Like the party’s cellular organization, these committees normally exist at national, interprovincial, provincial, and district levels. Below district level, clusters of cells perform their daily functional tasks under the direction of local village committees. At national level, control is exercised by the Secretariat of the Central Committee.

b. At each hierarchical level of operation, the hard core party cellular organization and its counterpart Revolutionary Committee exist side-by-side in interlocking fashion. All party members in a given branch or section of the Revolutionary Committee concurrently will be members of a cell in the party organization. Since the allegiance of the party member is to his cell, Party Group, and Interparty Committee, this last body exercises authority over its counterpart Revolutionary Committee.

21. The Party Youth Organization

a. The Party Youth Organization is the third parallel structure within the Party Core control apparatus and is an indispensable affiliate of any Communist party. The Youth Organization is a “half-way” house into which likely future party members may be drawn in their early youth before they reach the required age for candidate membership in the party proper. This age varies from 18 to 26 years.

b. Party Youth members may engage in
most of the activities conducted by actual party members in an insurgency. This organization is considered a training school to prepare Communist youth for the assumption of inner-party responsibilities. Party Youth members are employed to the maximum extent possible in a manner similar to their seniors in order that they may acquire experience in the multiple phases of party work. This will make it possible for them to enter the hard core of the organization when they are of eligible age.

Section IV. THE MASS ORGANIZATION

22. General

a. Communists have never aimed at the conversion of great masses of people to communism. Their entire concept is that of a small party which is compact, mobile, disciplined, and dedicated. It is the task of this small group to utilize scientifically the social forces which move and direct the masses of the people so that the Communist party may exercise power over them and forcibly impose the Communist program. The Communist aim, therefore, is to recruit into the service of the party great numbers of individuals, most of whom are unaware that they are serving the Communist cause.

b. In revolutionary context, Communists consider that three separate organizational elements constitute the Mass Civil Organization. These are—

(1) Popular Organizations.
(2) Special Interest Groups.
(3) Village Militia (popular guerrilla) Units.

Popular Organizations are the most significant of the mass organizations in that they are organized on a nation-wide scale with committees at the national, interprovincial, and district levels with basic units in the village and hamlets. These organizations seek to appeal to a broad segment of the population, particularly workers, farmers, women, and youths. Special Interest Groups are narrower in scope than Popular Organizations and include those groups whose focal concerns and activities are oriented on special issues. Examples of Special Interest Groups are medical associations, sporting clubs, and teachers’ groups. Literally, any organization expressly created to further the special interests of a parochial group falls in this category. The Village Militia also is considered an element of the Mass Civil Organization although it often is construed as a part-time and inferior arm of the military. The more correct perspective, however, is to view the militia elements as elite formations among the multiple mass organizations.

23. The Village Militia

a. Three distinct paramilitary elements appear to exist in the Village Militia—Self Defense Force, Combat Guerrilla Unit (Liberation Troops), and Secret Guerrilla Unit. The elements are employed as follows:

(1) The Self Defense Force normally is organized, trained, and employed for the defense of villages and other insurgent facilities, whereas the guerrilla force constitutes the local instrument to inflict damage on the enemy and to gain and maintain population control.

(2) The Combat Guerrilla Unit of the Village Militia is employed by the party in the support of regular military forces or is used independently to conduct small operations.

(3) The Secret Guerrilla Unit is used primarily to enforce the will of the party in a given area, and is composed to a large degree of party members.

b. Although young men are sometimes coerced into service, the individual enrolled in a village guerrilla unit normally is a volunteer. In most small villages, the identity of the members of the Village Militia undoubtedly is known to most of the inhabitants, but fear of brutal reprisal keeps them quiet. Consequently, the village guerrilla is not readily identifiable to government forces. He operates in or close
to his home village, sometimes in conjunction with regional and main force units. By day, he works at his normal job; at night, or during emergencies, he is available for assignment by his party superiors. The insurgent leadership prefers at least five to ten guerrillas in each village. In those villages under insurgent control, a full squad of 10 to 17 personnel or a platoon of from three to four such squads is normal. A type insurgent village guerrilla platoon is shown at figure 2.

![PLATOON COMMAND COMMITTEE](Image)

**Figure 2. Type insurgent village guerrilla platoon.**

**Section V. THE MILITARY FORCES**

24. **General**

a. According to Communist doctrine, the military forces are but one of several instruments through which the party seeks to consummate its power. Actually, of the three principal organizational elements of the Communist insurgent organization (Party Core, Mass Civil Organization, and Military Forces), the military forces are considered the lowest in organizational importance. Communist planning provides for military reverses and the possible necessity for retrenchment, restructuring, or even the temporary disbanding of its military forces should enemy strength prove overwhelming. Party strategy is based realistically upon the assumption that as long as the Party Core and the Mass Civil Organization remain intact, the military arm of the insurgent movement can be reactivated or replenished; however, without the party nucleus and mass civil base, the movement cannot succeed.

b. Communist insurgent military forces fall into two classes—Main Forces, and Regional Forces. These two elements are distinguished from the Village Militia which, although paramilitary, does not fall within the military chain of command. The Main Force normally is a body of well trained soldiers, many of whom may have been infiltrated into the country from the outside. It is a highly motivated, elite fighting group, many of its personnel being full or candidate members of the Commu-
nist party. Although deployable where needed, the Main Force usually is controlled at interprovincial level. The Regional Force is made up predominantly of indigenous personnel recruited directly from the Mass Civil Organization or promoted from the ranks of the Village Militia. Units of this type operate in specified areas of no more than provincial size.

25. Command and Control

a. Totally distinct but parallel channels of both military command and party control exist within the staff divisions, sections, and operational units of Regular Forces. Military command stems from the commander, and, in a traditional manner, flows to the commanders of subordinate elements. Party control is exercised through the Interparty Committee, special Interparty Committees of the military, and those Party Groups and cells which are imbedded in the military structure.

b. The seemingly sharp compartmentation of command and control functions is smoothed over by the interlocking structure of the entire Communist insurgent organization in which key personnel hold dual or multiple positions in several of these bodies. For example, the Military Affairs Committee, whose leadership is represented on both the Current Affairs Committee and the Party (cellular) Committee, will bring together a select body of individuals who are—

(1) Party-oriented.

(2) Aware of the realities of the military operational situation.

(3) Cognizant of the overall current insurgent effort and the problems confronting it.

Section VI. LEGAL STATUS OF INSURGENCIES AND INSURGENTS

26. General

a. An insurgency may be distinguished from a belligerency primarily by the different nature of the conflict involved. An insurgency is an “armed conflict not of an international character” that occurs in the territory of a particular state between the duly constituted government and revolutionaries who, for political reasons, have banded together and attempt to displace the established government in whole or in part by force. An insurgent movement becomes a belligerency when the insurgents are accorded belligerent status. This status may be accorded when—

(1) The guerrilla-type action typical of an insurgency escalates into a general state of hostilities.

(2) The insurgents occupy a substantial portion of the territory of the state concerned.

(3) The insurgents possess a government capable of administering such territory.

(4) The revolutionaries or insurgents conduct the armed conflict under a responsible authority and observe the customary rules of land warfare. This requirement usually is considered to be met when the insurgents bear their arms openly, are commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, have a fixed distinctive insignia recognizable at a distance, and obey the rules of land warfare.

b. It is considered permissible under international law for another state to provide assistance to an established government threatened by an insurgent movement; however, as a general rule, it is not permissible for another state to provide assistance to the insurgents. If such assistance is provided, the states concerned may consider themselves to be engaged in an international armed conflict which may be either limited or general in nature. While insurgents who rise against a legally constituted government are not entitled to belligerent status, this historically has been of little concern to insurgent forces and has had little effect on their operations.

27. Treatment of Prisoners

a. Under the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
(GC), guerrillas who meet the criteria for and are accorded belligerent status must be accorded prisoner-of-war status.

b. Insurgents usually cannot meet the criteria for belligerents and are considered outlaws by the established government. Historically, the condition called insurgency has few international legal consequences because, prior to 1949, there was little that could be ascribed to a "status of insurgency" in international law. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 gave cognizance to an "armed conflict not of an international character" which essentially is the condition of insurgency. The Conventions furnish protection to captives of these conflicts by prohibiting—

1. Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture.
2. Taking of hostages.
3. Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.
4. The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

c. The threatened government has the authority and responsibility for promulgating and enforcing policies relating to the treatment of insurgent prisoners. Even if supporting Allied forces elect to treat captured insurgents as prisoners-of-war while in their custody, such prisoners must eventually be turned over to the government for prosecution under existing law. In this respect, it is important that the HC abide by certain minimum standards such as those cited in the preceding paragraph. A U. S. commander may not turn over prisoners-of-war captured during a belligerency to a nation that is not a signatory to the GC; however, a U. S. commander may turn over insurgents captured during an armed conflict not of an international character to a HC that is not a signatory to the GC. Care must be exercised to insure that the status afforded captured insurgents does not imply recognition of the insurgency as a legal movement under international law. It is important to note that Article 3, GC, specifically states that providing the minimum protections referred to in b above shall not affect the legal status of the parties to the conflict.
CHAPTER 4
U. S./HC OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY

Section I. INTRODUCTION

28. Purpose and Scope

This chapter presents an overall picture of internal defense and internal development from the HC national viewpoint. Key considerations affecting national strategy and planning and their relationship to the operational programs of internal defense and internal development are discussed. U. S. strategy and policy in the attainment of internal defense and internal development also are summarized.

29. National Objectives

The objectives of governments combatting insurgency may vary greatly, change with time, and be altered as insurgent strength changes and as the probable cost of success fluctuates. The primary objective of these governments, however, normally will be the attainment of internal security which will permit economic, political, and social growth.

30. National Strategy

National internal defense and internal development strategy entails the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, sociological, psychological, and military resources of a nation in order to secure national objectives. In the past, the strategy to defeat insurgencies has been viewed mainly, if not entirely, as a counterguerrilla problem and has been handled largely by military and police actions. Viewed as part of the larger problem of internal development, the prevention of subversive insurgency includes measures for internal political, economic, and social development. Military support of internal development programs is a major preventive measure. A nation or region afflicted with subversive insurgency cannot be brought under effectivegovernment control until it has been purged of insurgent organizations and activities and the causes of insurgency removed. Should the insurgent movement be supported by a sponsoring power or powers, measures must be taken to control the flow of personnel and materiel support across land and water frontiers. Basically, national strategy of internal defense and internal development will be directed toward two main considerations—the insurgent and the population.

a. The Insurgent.

(1) Elimination or neutralization of the insurgent leadership and infrastructure is of major consideration in the development of national strategy. Examination of Communist organization reveals that a small, hard core leadership faction exists at the heart of every insurgent movement. Although this faction usually is well concealed, it must be sought out and destroyed or otherwise rendered ineffective. The elimination of this hard core will contribute materially to the disintegration of the entire insurgent organization. All component parts of the insurgent organization are interlocked; thus, removal of party leadership elements will result in fragmentation of the insurgent structure, elimination of centralized direction and control, disunity, and the eventual destruction of the insurgent machine.

(2) The defeat of insurgent tactical forces is also of prime consideration in the formulation of national strategy. Pressure must be maintained on in-
surging forces through tactical operations for the purpose of inflicting casualties, destroying supplies and equipment, and lowering morale. Tactical operations must be aimed at fragmenting large insurgent forces into smaller units thus enabling the HC military forces to deploy smaller-sized units and cover a larger area. Concurrent with tactical operations, strategy must provide for programs aimed at defeating the insurgent and rehabilitating him into a loyal citizen. Such programs offer an alternative to the insurgent which permits him to surrender without fear of extreme punishment and tends to weaken his resolution to continue fighting under adverse circumstances.

3) National strategy must finally provide for separating the insurgent from the population, thereby depriving him of a source of personnel, materiel, and intelligence support. Populace and resources control operations, to include frontier denial, must be initiated and adequate police and paramilitary forces created to enforce control measures.

b. The Population.

1) Gaining the support of the population is of paramount importance in the formulation of national strategy. It is not enough merely to deprive the insurgent of population support through control measures. Since populace and resources control operations tend to be restrictive and repressive in nature, they must be offset by vital and dynamic programs aimed at winning the active support of the people. One of the first considerations of national strategy must be the protection of the populace from insurgent ravages and reprisals. Regardless of other measures taken to improve conditions and otherwise gain population support, unless the people know they will be protected from insurgent coercion and acts of terror, their response to other government overtures will be minimal; therefore, basic strategy must provide for the establishment of relatively secure and stable environmental areas within the country in which internal development and other measures aimed at gaining population support can be conducted effectively.

2) Removing the conditions which are exploited by the insurgents to foster an insurgency must be a part of the national strategy. The military can contribute materially to the overall strategy of winning the confidence of the people by providing security, but their efforts must be accompanied by attendant economic, social, and political changes. The deep, underlying resentments and desires of the population, both majority and minority groups, must be analyzed carefully before strategic measures are decided upon. Within resources and capabilities normally available, it will be virtually impossible to satisfy the desires of all; therefore, the designation of priorities, allocation of resources, and assignment of tasks require consideration of numerous factors. These factors must be appraised realistically in the light of their short and long-range impact on the population and the benefits which will accrue to the government.

3) The employment of psychological operations (PSYOP) in government programs aimed at eliminating the insurgent menace and winning the support of the population is of paramount importance to success. The government must achieve a psychological victory over the insurgents, convincing them that their defeat is inevitable. Insurgents must be convinced of the wisdom of surrendering to a tolerant government while leniency is still available. Likewise, psychological programs must assure the
population of the intent of their government to provide for their protection and to accomplish in good faith those popular changes which have been announced. Each government success must be exploited psychologically to generate a spirit of confidence and optimism among the people.

Section II. INTERNAL DEFENSE

31. General

Internal defense is intended to create an atmosphere of internal security and relative peace within which internal development can assure national growth through controlled social, economic, and political change. Both internal defense and internal development must be coordinated and mutually supporting at all levels. Together, they constitute the overall strategy for preventing or defeating subversive insurgency.

32. Objectives

Internal defense embraces the full range of measures taken by a government and its allies to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The objective of internal defense is internal security or a state of law and order within the nation. The emphasis placed on internal defense will necessarily vary according to the intensity of insurgent tactical operations and the degree of influence and control exercised over the population by the insurgents.

a. Phase I Insurgency.

(1) Intelligence operations are of critical importance in the early phase of insurgency. These operations should be designed to identify and neutralize the insurgent infrastructure and its leadership and to develop an intelligence database. Analysis of this data base may enable a more accurate determination to be made of the degree of insurgent control in various areas of the country. This determination allows the government to formulate internal defense and internal development programs based upon logical assumptions regarding insurgent activities.

(2) Populace and resources control operations receive emphasis to separate the population from the insurgents and thus deprive the insurgents of personnel, materiel, and intelligence support. These operations also serve to protect the population from insurgent control and domination. Populace and resources control measures should be only as restrictive as absolutely necessary to achieve objectives, since repressive actions tend to spread popular discontent and further insurgent aims.

(3) Action is taken to reduce the insurgent threat by exposing, discrediting, and destroying the insurgent infrastructure. Every effort is made to reduce the insurgent threat while a large amount of national resources can be applied to internal development projects aimed at gaining population support. As an insurgency escalates, more and more of these resources must be diverted to defense programs with resultant decrease in the amount of support which can be provided popular programs.

(4) Maximum effort must be made to establish psychological rapport with the people and to inflict maximum psychological damage upon the insurgents. Insurgent objectives and methods must be discredited and subversive propaganda effectively countered. The efforts of the government on behalf of the people must be widely publicized as well as what is expected of responsible citizens in assisting in establishing a stable national environment.

b. Phase II Insurgency.

(1) The advent of Phase II insurgency requires a change of emphasis in
internal defense. Internal defense measures, particularly populace and resources control operations and the employment of military forces in support of internal development, must be reoriented toward internal defense operations—action directly against armed insurgents, their underground organization, support system, external sanctuary, or outside supporting power. To the extent possible, internal defense forces will continue to assist in internal development projects aimed at gaining and maintaining the good will of the population. Priorities of effort must be established within geographical areas critical to the government. In those areas selected, the population must be assured that internal defense and internal development measures, once initiated, will not be abandoned.

(2) During Phase II, the government is faced with tactical assault as well as continued subversion. The adoption of an internal defense plan oriented toward effective, comprehensive internal security is required. When adequately trained civilians are not available, military personnel may be employed in civilian functions. The police must be expanded and reorganized to meet effectively increased security requirements. Paramilitary forces may be organized or expanded to augment the police or the armed forces. The armed forces are increased in size and reorganized to perform their roles in internal defense and to prepare for possible escalation of the insurgency or external attack.

(3) Intelligence and populace and resources control operations initiated in Phase I are continued and extended to meet the insurgent tactical threat. Intelligence operations are directed toward the collection and processing of information relating to insurgent tactical forces, leaders, and plans as well as other essential order of battle information. Populace and resources control operations are expanded to prevent or sever relationships between the population and the insurgents and to reduce to a minimum the internal and external support available to insurgent forces. Frontier denial operations and lines of communication (LOC) security are stressed.

(4) The presence of insurgent tactical forces will require HC tactical operations which may have to be conducted at the expense of internal development programs. This reduction of internal development programs may serve to alienate the population. PSYOP must explain the reason for this reduction in internal development, placing the blame on the insurgent.

(a) If the government concentrates exclusively on the insurgent tactical forces, the insurgent infrastructure will be relatively free to grow and to increase its influence over the population. Overemphasis of effort toward either threat tends to create an imbalance in the government effort and presents areas of relative weakness which the insurgent may exploit.

(b) The people are the key to the struggle and represent the prime target of every insurgent activity; therefore, they must be protected and their support won for the government.

(c) The government must determine the amount of effort which may be devoted to internal development and the amount which must be applied to internal defense.

c. Phase III Insurgency. In a Phase III insurgency, the government may face an immediate danger of military defeat. Though other insurgent activities continue, the imminent danger of military defeat must be averted if the government is to survive. During this
phase, the combat requirements of the military take priority and other activities continue only after military defense has been assured.

(1) In addition to defeating the military threat, government operations are continually aimed toward the ultimate objective of winning popular support for the government through internal development of the nation. The requirement to direct more and more resources to support the achievement of internal defense will reduce the amount of resources which can be allocated to internal development.

(2) Internal defense measures become more comprehensive and are administered more strictly. Armed forces are expanded and reorganized to permit larger-sized unit operations and to increase the firepower, mobility, and support needed to cope with the increased insurgent tactical threat.

33. Populace and Resources Control

When nations become targets of subversive insurgency, the internal security objective, though retaining its identity, becomes part of the overall internal defense strategy. In advanced forms of insurgency, armed and paramilitary forces may be required to reinforce and integrate their efforts with police and other internal security forces, or may even assume overall responsibility for the internal security mission.

a. Phase I Insurgency. Although populace and resources control normally is provided by the police and paramilitary forces, the armed forces augment the police where needed. All forces conducting populace and resources control operations are expanded as necessary and steps are taken to insure coordination of effort among them.

(1) The police must be organized, trained, and equipped to control and reduce insurgent activity. This involves the use of repressive measures which aim at the destruction of the insurgent infrastructure and the use of protective actions which isolate the insurgent from loyal and neutral citizens. The government may possess or organize and train paramilitary units to assist its police efforts or to provide increased potential for later use. Armed forces may be trained, equipped, and organized to participate in populace and resources control operations. The armed forces must be able to assist as required in the containment and reduction of the insurgent threat, and must be prepared to overcome the threat if it should escalate to Phase II or Phase III.

(2) If a neighboring country is suspected of sponsoring or supporting the insurgent movement, strong frontier denial efforts may be required. If the insurgency is concentrated in areas near an international border, the neighboring country may be requested to engage in active operations against insurgent supply and training facilities located on its side of the border and against infiltration of insurgent personnel and materiel across the international border.

b. Phase II Insurgency. The efforts of all organizations participating in populace and resources control operations are coordinated to support the extension of operations in government-controlled, contested, and insurgent-controlled areas. The training of personnel and units continues, and operational experience concerning effectiveness of various procedures and organizations is reflected in training or organizational modifications.

(1) The police carry out the primary role in the establishment of populace and resources control operations within communities. The police force at every level should be increased to deal with the mounting threat in areas in which government control is being extended. The integration and interdependence of populace and resources control operations and tactical operations is a prerequisite to success. The police may make increasingly frequent re-
quests for armed and paramilitary force support. This applies in the extension of government-controlled areas and in operations conducted in contested and insurgent-controlled areas.

(2) Efforts to close the borders of the nation may be initiated or extended during Phase II insurgency.

c. Phase III Insurgency. The police continue their populace and resources control operations; however, they may rely heavily upon armed forces and paramilitary support for relocation of families and resettlement of communities. As contraband lists are increased, rationing initiated, and resources control expanded to cover production, transportation, storage, and utilization of critical materiel, additional military assistance to the police may be necessary. The police contribute to large-scale tactical operations by providing intelligence and counterintelligence assistance, guides, and interrogation and screening teams to accompany and assist the armed and paramilitary forces.

34. Military/Paramilitary

In mounting a campaign against insurgents, the armed and paramilitary forces are mobilized to support the attainment of national internal defense and internal development objectives. In Phases II and III insurgency, more traditional military objectives may develop. Tactical, populace and resources control, civil affairs, advisory assistance, intelligence, and PSYOP constitute the primary military capabilities which may be employed. All of these capabilities may be employed in different degrees, depending on the intensity of the insurgency and the type of operation being conducted.

a. Phase I Insurgency. When government armed forces initially are strong and other conditions permit, they may be assigned missions, to include military civic action projects, which further internal development programs, win allegiance to the government, and establish favorable military-civilian relationships. Advisory assistance to paramilitary and other developing forces will be furnished to develop their capabilities. PSYOP to support civil information efforts will be conducted by military PSYOP resources. Similarly, civil intelligence agencies may be augmented by military intelligence resources, and populace and resources control assistance may be provided civil security and police agencies by military forces. The police and armed forces should develop an airlift capability for liaison, reconnaissance, limited troop and supply movement, and visits by governmental leaders. The U. S. may provide some or all of this air transportation while undertaking to assist in the development of a HC airlift capability. As the armed forces prepare for tactical contingency missions, many long-range tasks may be undertaken. Coordinated training and mobilization programs may be initiated. Personnel may be trained in occupational specialties requiring long periods of instruction, such as fixed and rotary-wing pilots and electronics technicians. Facilities such as airfields, roads, bridges, communications networks, and tactical barriers may be constructed. These construction programs may have the additional value of introducing government control into formerly inaccessible areas. During the latter part of this phase, military forces may be employed in rural or remote areas where the incidents of violence and lawlessness are beyond the capabilities of the police to combat.

b. Phase II Insurgency. The destruction and neutralization of the insurgent tactical force is the primary military objective. Armed forces are used to support the expansion of government-controlled areas and to conduct operations against insurgent tactical forces in contested and insurgent-controlled areas. They also are used to support frontier operations which are a part of the populace and resources control effort. Armed forces engaged in expanding government-controlled areas have a primary responsibility of providing protection for the population against insurgent activities. In contested and insurgent-controlled areas, military forces conduct deep patrols, raids, ambushes, and attacks against targets of opportunity. They collect information, restrict insurgent force freedom of action, destroy in-
surgent tactical forces, and demonstrate a continuous potential for operations in these areas. HC normally organize or expand their paramilitary units during Phase II. These forces, including both full and part-time soldiers, usually are equipped with less sophisticated weapons and receive less training than do the armed forces. Further, the government may undertake to organize more primitively equipped irregular forces along tribal, religious, or ethnic minorities. In addition to providing a means for the rapid augmentation of the armed forces, the organization of paramilitary forces may deny sources of recruits to the insurgent organization. In those situations where forces committed to tactical operations cannot effectively locate insurgent forces, their efforts should be directed to the location and destruction of fixed insurgent bases.

c. Phase III Insurgency. In Phase III insurgency, the survival of the government depends upon its ability to conduct successful tactical operations. The military capabilities of the government must remain significantly superior to those of the insurgent organization. As the strength of the insurgent military force increases, the government must concentrate its resources on defeating insurgent tactical forces or reducing their ability to engage in open combat. If insurgent forces organize for mobile warfare, government forces must defeat them, using appropriately modified operations.

(1) Armed forces continue to be employed in tactical operations. Large units conduct operations over wide areas while smaller units patrol, raid, and act as reserve forces. Ranger-type units supported by air and naval forces conduct deep raids and protracted, long-range patrols into remote areas. As insurgent forces hold ground for longer periods with stronger units, changes are necessary in the tactics used by government military forces. Artillery previously dispersed to provide both tactical and territorial coverage must now be used for massed fires. Land, air, and water transportation to and within the battle area is organized and employed under threat of large caliber and massive insurgent firepower.

(2) As the insurgent military capability expands, significant increases in the capability and size of regional paramilitary forces normally will be desirable because of the need to operate over larger areas. Paramilitary forces should not be left unsupported in those geographical areas temporarily abandoned by government armed forces. Where continued presence in an abandoned area might result in their annihilation by insurgents, paramilitary forces should be transferred as a unit or their personnel absorbed into the armed forces. Where possible, paramilitary forces should be retained and expanded during Phase III. since they can perform functions otherwise requiring more highly trained and extensively equipped armed forces or police units.

(3) The government should initiate, or extend, and support programs to recruit paramilitary or irregular forces from tribal and other minority groups. These forces can be used for operations against insurgent base areas and infiltration routes, for border control or harassment, or to support tactical operations performed by other forces.

Section III. INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT

35. General

Internal development promotes advances in the economic, sociological, and political fields. These advances will not necessarily be balanced since advances in one field may force imbalances in others. The concept of development calls for a maximum effort with priority to internal security and law and order, the shield
which protects and allows development. The end objective is improvement of individual attitudes, status, and standards of living. The intensity of the insurgency and resources available will dictate priorities and intermediate objectives. Active insurgency requires immediate and large-scale action; latent or incipient insurgency permits more detailed planning, but quick corrective actions will achieve greater success with fewer resources.

36. Objective

Although the basic objective of internal development is to contribute to internal independence and freedom from conditions fostering insurgency, its immediate practical goal is gaining population support. Economic, political, and social development programs are aimed at establishing rapport between the government and the people which will result in support of the government to the detriment of the insurgent movement. In most developing nations, internal development cannot take place effectively without the assistance of internal defense forces. The military has the capability to augment civilian agencies with critical skills and the manpower necessary to engage in large projects. Further, the military has the responsibility for providing a secure atmosphere, free from insurgent domination and terrorism, in which internal development programs may be conducted. Through carefully planned and implemented internal development programs, properly publicized, the people can be convinced that their interests are being addressed by the government, thus depriving the insurgency of a base for popular support.

a. Phase I Insurgency. Internal development offers the best promise of eventual, long-term peace in a nation, but its short-term impact may involve an increase of internal pressures. Progress in one field may affect progress in others; therefore, a requirement exists for an overall, integrated program of political, economic, and social action. Failure to initiate positive action in this phase may result in escalation of the insurgency.

b. Phase II Insurgency. The need for resources and personnel to combat the insurgent threat normally will require a reduction in internal development operations. The threat will require that development programs at all levels be reoriented to support internal defense operations. Internal development should be given priority in government-controlled areas and be maintained to the maximum extent in the remaining areas. Political development increases because of the effort to extend governmental presence where it may not have existed previously. Economic development may be reduced because of the requirement to provide resources for internal defense and because of the difficulty of expansion into areas where security cannot be assured. The necessity to deal with the problems of displaced persons, relocated communities, militant factions, and former insurgents will add to the social development problem.

c. Phase III Insurgency. As resources are committed to the defeat of the insurgent tactical threat, development of political, economic, and social programs necessarily will become militarily or emergency-oriented. Some important internal development actions can be completed, although many of these will be a fallout of the overall operation and would not be required except for the insurgent threat. On the other hand, the eventual impact on the internal development program must be considered in the planning for all military operations.

37. Economic Development

The government must create an environment which will encourage economic growth, attract foreign capital, and enable the establishment of a stable currency.

a. Phase I Insurgency. Economic development requires basic efforts in many related fields. Appropriate skills and experience must be acquired; a modern fiscal and monetary system must be established; agriculture must be expanded to create a degree of self-sufficiency and freedom, particularly from the one-crop economies; and the preconditions for economic growth must be achieved (e.g., the establishment of power and communications systems, transportation networks, a workable credit and marketing system, and other elements of the economic infrastructure).
b. Phase II Insurgency. In economic development, emphasis is shifted to projects which support the internal defense effort, including those which are involved directly in achieving internal security and those which demonstrate government concern and ability to benefit the people. For example, transportation facilities constructed to support troop movement should be located, where possible, to contribute to the support and development of the economy. There should be a shift toward short or mid-range economic development projects which are immediately apparent and beneficial to the people. Some long-range projects should be continued in government-controlled areas. When government-controlled areas are being extended, emphasis should be on projects which will satisfy the people's immediate needs, be completed in a relatively short time, show tangible results, teach the people "self-help" techniques, and be maintained with locally available resources. Continuous study is required in order to ascertain which short-range projects can be extended to mid or long-range undertakings, thereby enhancing the government's image in the eyes of the people. Military civic action projects should be undertaken wherever armed forces or paramilitary units are stationed.

c. Phase III Insurgency. Short and mid-range economic development projects are continued whenever and wherever possible. Long-range projects are continued in government-controlled areas. The scope of such projects may be curtailed to divert resources to short-range projects in areas where a critical need exists.

38. Political Development

Training and education perhaps are the most significant aspects of a remedial political development program in that they provide a continual flow of knowledgeable people into various branches of the public administration system. Success of an internal development program depends on the effectiveness of the public administration system which develops plans and provides leadership at all levels; therefore, continuous attention should be paid to the selection and training of those personnel who are qualified for civil service.

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cial or district governmental leaders may be military personnel or may be assisted by military deputies and staffs which operate in concert with civilian governmental officials.

39. Social Development

Major areas of social development that require attention are health, education, urbanization, population, leadership, status, citizen groups, land reforms, and housing. The main objectives of social development are to improve health standards, to increase the range and quality of human skills, and to instill a personal sense of participation in a larger local and national effort.

a. Phase I Insurgency. Once the progress of social development has begun, an action in one area affects actions in other areas and the cycle continues, thereby establishing its own momentum and acceleration. In this process, it is difficult to determine which social changes were required to permit progress and which ones were the result of progress. The conflicts and stresses between traditional and modern ways offer possibilities of new grievances which could increase the strength of the insurgent movement. The social development problem involves changing the basic attitudes and values of the people to conform to those required in a new nation.

b. Phases II and III Insurgency. In addition to the social problems which are part of the internal development process, problems evolving from disruption of the social system due to threats of violence must be dealt with. The added disruption of the social organization due to insurgency is not entirely negative, since it provides an initial shock which tends to displace fundamental traditional relationships. Disruption may permit the reordering of the social structure with relatively less resistance. The government must provide practical programs for dealing with displaced persons, the relocation of communities, and the demands of militant factions or antagonistic minorities. In addition, it must rehabilitate former insurgents or insurgent supporters who have come under government control.

Section IV. U. S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

40. General

This section outlines U. S. economic and military foreign assistance strategy and policy in attaining internal defense and internal development objectives.

41. Concepts

U. S. military and supporting economic assistance are used to prevent or defeat immediate internal or external threats to the national security and independence of friendly nations. In nations lacking effective administrative services and political stability, U. S. foreign assistance may help establish these assets for internal development. In other nations, U. S. capital and technical assistance may be used to facilitate existing national internal development programs.

42. Coordination of Foreign Assistance

U. S. foreign economic and military assistance programs are mutually supporting and are coordinated with the assistance programs of other Free World nations. U. S. programs are administered by the Country Team which is the senior, in-country, U. S. coordinating and supervising body, headed by the Chief of the U. S. Diplomatic Mission—usually an ambassador—and composed of the senior member of each represented U. S. department or agency.

a. U. S. Interdepartmental Coordination. Coordination between U. S. economic and military assistance programs is particularly significant in those nations in which large military assistance programs may create problems of resource allocation. Coordination by the Country Team to minimize possible conflicts is particularly important at the HC national level where it is accomplished by interdepartmental analysis of the specific needs of internal defense and internal development programs. U. S. foreign assistance coordination takes into consideration the comparative costs and benefits of alternate combinations of the
two types of assistance in order to maximize the total contribution toward HC national security, to include internal defense and internal development objectives. Improved military capabilities contribute indirectly to national security through increased economic productivity and investment. Conversely, economic, political, and social development often increase the effectiveness of internal defense programs.

b. International Coordination. The U. S. views its foreign assistance program as a component part of Free World assistance rather than as an isolated effort. The general objective of coordination is to promote the most effective use of those resources available from all assisting nations. Coordination is required to insure compatible approaches to assistance and to facilitate an effective division of responsibility among assisting nations in order to satisfy specific requirements and avoid duplication of effort.

c. Coordination With the HC. At the HC national level, the U. S. Ambassador or the principal U. S. diplomatic officer is responsible for insuring that all U. S. military, economic, social, and political assistance programs in the country are integrated and coordinated. Although not in the line of military command, the ambassador works closely with the commander of the U. S. MAAG, Mission, or unified or specified command to insure full coordination.

(1) The U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is employed in foreign nations to provide economic assistance. The activities of USAID are coordinated closely with those of the U. S. Information Service (USIS) and MAAG. Normally, the USAID representatives in the HC are responsible for the coordination of all economic development assistance, social and political, and for advising and otherwise assisting the HC government in all national development functions. Additionally, USAID representatives are charged with overall responsibility for aiding and advising in developing the national police and other law enforcement agencies. In this capacity, they may require assistance from U. S. military forces, especially when HC police forces have paramilitary characteristics. Coordination with USAID should be accomplished for the care of refugees, aid to damaged villages, and provision of food supplies when shortages result from tactical operations. Maximum use should be made of HC military and civilian leadership, with U. S. representatives providing advice, assistance, and support.

(2) The U. S. Information Agency (USIA), referred to in-country as the U. S. Information Service (USIS), operates in foreign nations in support of U. S. foreign policy objectives. In U. S. Missions abroad, the Agency is the principal U. S. advisor and coordinator of psychological programs, to include communication with foreign mass audiences and selected target groups. USIS supports the internal defense and internal development effort by furnishing equipment and technical assistance to the HC to carry out its internal defense and internal development information program.

(3) Military assistance is coordinated at the national level by MAAG/Mission staffs operating with HC counterparts and at lower unit levels by advisory teams operating with subordinate HC armed forces and paramilitary units.

43. U. S. Strategy

U. S. foreign military assistance programs are designed to make the HC response to the internal defense threat as rapid and aggressive as possible. Parallel internal development assistance is directed at eliminating the conditions contributing to the insurgency and promoting the general welfare of the population.

a. A total program is required for prevent-
ing and defeating subversive insurgency. Success depends on accurate, carefully evaluated information and a unified concept of operations tailored to the situation in which civil and military measures interact and reinforce each other.

b. The U. S. should induce HC government leaders to take the required remedial action before a crisis limits the alternatives and necessitates the use of force. The U. S. Country Team is designated as the primary organization for assessing developments within a nation to permit the U. S. Government to determine its best courses of action.

44. National Development Assistance

Foreign economic assistance is the primary means through which the U. S. directs its resources to support HC national development. While the nature of this portion of foreign assistance is primarily economic, it also is designed to support HC social and political internal development objectives. In addition, private enterprises and charitable organizations may play a significant role in the development process.

a. Objectives. The immediate objective of U. S. foreign assistance is to help developing nations reach the point at which their own increased human and material resources are adequate to sustain development. U. S. foreign assistance is intended to help them preserve their political independence and achieve economic self-support as rapidly as possible.

b. Concept. Foreign economic assistance programs are classified according to the nature of U. S. objectives and the extent of U. S. participation. In those nations where active insurgency exists, it is necessary that the U. S. help establish internal security before turning to long-term economic and social development. The general objective of assistance in these circumstances is to establish degrees of security within which economic, political, and social development can thrive. A mixture of military and supporting economic assistance usually is provided in the early stages of this sequence and, as the environment improves, a gradual shift in emphasis is made toward economic development.

45. U. S. Overseas Internal Defense Assistance

When the overall internal defense of the HC is threatened by subversive insurgency, the introduction of U. S. Army forces may be appropriate, and military assistance may be increased or established. The primary method used by the U. S. in rendering direct military assistance to the HC is the Military Assistance Program (MAP).

a. Objectives. Military assistance is used to increase collective security among friendly nations in order to develop their capability to defend themselves against internal and external aggression. It also is used to assist HC forces in undertaking military civic action to promote economic, social, and political development.

b. Coordination. The MAP is administered directly by the Department of Defense; however, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 charges the Secretary of State with the responsibility for the supervision and general direction of the entire foreign assistance program, including military assistance. This responsibility has been delegated by the Secretary of State to the Administrator of USAID in his capacity as Coordinator of Foreign Assistance.

c. Concept. The U. S. Government furnishes military assistance to friendly nations or international organizations in order to promote world peace and strengthen the security of the U. S. Assistance may be provided by loan, grant, sale, lease, exchange, or other means. MAP furnishes the materiel support required to resist external aggression, maintain internal security, and participate in collective security arrangements. It also furnishes training and operational assistance and advice and guidance in the use and maintenance of materiel. MAP also may provide limited equipment to be utilized in civic action programs. Except in urgent cases, MAP discourages the buildup of forces beyond the level which the HC would be capable of supporting after U. S. participation ends.
Figure 3. Military Assistance Program, Executive Branch Organization.
CHAPTER 5
ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDANCE

Section I. INTRODUCTION

46. Purpose
This chapter provides an organizational concept for planning and conducting internal defense and internal development operations. It presents a type national organization and describes the responsibilities and functions of each of its elements at various governmental levels.

47. Organizational Objective
The objective of organizing a nation for internal defense and internal development is to enable efficient planning and conduct of operations. The organization must coordinate the efforts of existing government agencies in internal defense and internal development matters and yet permit them to carry on their normal routine functions.

48. Organizational Concepts
While national organizational structures vary from nation to nation, a means of centralized direction and control and decentralized operations must be established. This may be accomplished by forming a National Internal Defense Coordination Center (NIDCC). Below national level, control and direction is vested in a series of subordinate Area Coordination Centers. This concept admittedly involves numerous agencies and hundreds of individuals and requires an extensive security program to minimize chances for penetration by the insurgents.

Section II. NATIONAL INTERNAL DEFENSE COORDINATION CENTER (NIDCC)

49. General
The NIDCC is the highest-level organization concerned with planning and coordinating operations. Responsible to the Chief Executive, the NIDCC is headed by a Director who supervises the activities of the major staff offices represented in the NIDCC. These staff offices are responsible for formulating national plans in their respective specialized fields. After appropriate coordination with other staff offices, these plans are disseminated to subordinate Area Coordination Centers to be used as a basis for their planning and conduct of operations. Depending upon U. S./HC agreements, U. S. advisors may be assigned to various posts within the NIDCC and subordinate Area Coordination Centers. The extent and means of imparting advice will depend on the U. S./HC agreements and, most importantly, the personalities involved and type of U. S. personnel assigned or functioning as advisors in these critical posts.

50. Organization
The major offices found in the NIDCC normally correspond to those branches and agencies of the national government which are concerned with internal defense and internal development. In most instances, these offices are extensions of existing government branches and agencies and concentrate their attention upon internal defense and internal development problems.

a. Planning Office. Responsible for internal
Figure 4. Type National Internal Defense Coordination Center.
defense and internal development planning and establishing long-range objectives and priorities.

b. Economic, Social, Psychological, and Political Affairs Offices. These separate offices develop operational concepts and policies for inclusion in the national internal defense and internal development plan. These offices constitute elements representing their parent national-level branches or agencies.

c. Populace and Resources Control Office. Develops programs, concepts, and plans and provides general guidance on the operations of all forces in the security field. Its primary staffing represents those branches of government concerned with law enforcement and justice.

d. Intelligence Office. Develops programs, concepts, and plans and provides general guidance on intelligence as it relates to national security. It also coordinates intelligence activities; correlates, evaluates, and interprets intelligence relating to national security; disseminates intelligence; and exercises staff supervision over the national intelligence agency.

e. Military Affairs Office. Develops and coordinates broad, general plans for the mobilization and allocation of armed and paramilitary forces. It defines service roles, assigns tasks, establishes priorities, allocates resources, and insures coordination of all military activities in stability operations.

Section III. AREA COORDINATION CENTER

51. General

Below the national-level NIDCC, Area Coordination Centers responsible to the area commander (military or civilian) are established as combined civil/military headquarters at regional, provincial, district, and local levels. These Centers have the responsibility for planning, coordinating, and exercising operational control over all military forces and official civilian organizations within their respective areas of jurisdiction. U. S./HC policy and agreements will determine command relationships between combined forces. The Area Coordination Center does not replace unit tactical operations centers (TOC), nor does it replace the normal government administrative organization in the area of operations.

52. Mission

Area Coordination Centers perform a two-fold mission: they provide integrated planning, coordination, and direction of all internal defense and internal development efforts and they insure immediate, coordinated response to operational requirements.

53. Organization

The Area Coordination Center is headed by the senior government official who supervises and coordinates the activities of a staff which is responsible for formulating internal defense and internal development plans and operations within their separate areas of interest. These staffs normally are composed of selected representatives of major forces and agencies assigned to, or operating in, the Area Coordination Center's area of responsibility. The Area Coordination Center should include members from the —

a. Senior area military command.

b. Senior police agency.

c. Local and national intelligence organizations.

d. Public information and PSYOP agencies.

e. Paramilitary forces.

f. Other local and national government offices involved in the economic, social, and political aspects of internal defense and internal development activities.

g. U. S. military/civilian organizations, if provided for under U. S./HC agreements.

54. Civilian Advisory Committees

Committees composed of both government officials and leading private citizens should be formed to assist the Area Coordination Center in evaluating the success of its various activ-
ities and to elicit population support. These committees evaluate the results of various actions affecting the civil population and provide a communication link with the people, thus providing feedback upon which to base future operations.

a. The organization of a civilian committee will vary depending on local requirements and must be flexible enough to meet changing situations. The appointed chairman ordinarily will be a leader in the community or area. General membership normally should include—

1. Local police chief.
2. Superintendent of schools or school principal.
3. Priest(s), ministers, or other leaders of religious faiths.
4. Health director.
5. Judge and/or other judiciary representatives.
7. Editors of local news media.
8. Business and commercial leaders.
9. Other influential persons.

b. The civilian committee normally will meet on call of the committee chairman. Some representatives possibly may hold dual membership positions in both the Area Coordination Center and the civilian committee.

Section IV. REGIONAL AREA COORDINATION CENTER

55. General

Civilian governmental structures normally do not exist at the regional level; however, it may be feasible to establish regional Area Coordination Centers to facilitate span of control. If formed, these Centers normally would coordinate the activities of military and civilian organizations operating in the area and assume operational control of large-scale operations which cross established jurisdictional boundaries. They are structured to meet the requirements posed by the threat within a region.

56. Functions

At the regional level, the Area Coordination Center generally will perform planning, coordination, and supervisory functions similar to those performed by the NIDCC. In addition, it may serve as the regional area operations center to provide command and control of large-scale interprovincial operations. Chapter 9 contains a detailed discussion of regional force organization and operations.

Section V. PROVINCIAL AREA COORDINATION CENTER

57. General

The first and primary political subdivision of the nation having a fully developed administrative apparatus normally is the province or state. Provincial governments usually are well established and have exercised governmental functions over the area prior to the onset of insurgency. The province normally is the level of administration closest to the people which has the capability to administer the full range of internal defense and internal development programs. The economic, social, psychological, political, and military aspects of internal defense and internal development are focused at this level. In order to exploit this potential, provincial Area Coordination Centers should be established.

58. Organization

The provincial Area Coordination Center is a combined civil/military headquarters and operations center which plans, coordinates, and conducts provincial internal defense and internal development operations. The provincial Area Coordination Center normally is headed by the senior government official who

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Figure 5. Type provincial (state) Area Coordination Center.
supervises and coordinates the activities of a permanent military and civilian staff. Staff members are the appointed representatives of the major branches and agencies of the provincial government and military and police organizations. The actual composition of the provincial Area Coordination Center will be determined by the local situation and available resources, but should contain the necessary organization for the control of all assigned and attached internal defense and internal development forces and elements. The provincial Area Coordination Center does not replace unit tactical operations centers nor does it replace the normal provincial government administrative organization. Figure 5 depicts the organization of a type provincial Area Coordination Center and the relationships between it and various provincial governmental offices.

59. Mission

The principal missions of the provincial Area Coordination Center are to provide integrated planning, coordination, and direction of internal defense and internal development efforts in the province and to insure immediate, coordinated response to operational requirements. The provincial Area Coordination Center, through the civilian committee, insures that communication is maintained with the people and that the people participate in programs designed to improve their economic, social, and political well-being.

60. Operations

a. Provincial Area Coordination Center operations are conducted on a continuing basis. During normal day-to-day operations, the various elements of the provincial Area Coordination Center coordinate actions with their parent counterpart governmental branches or agencies which support the provincial Area Coordination Center according to their capabilities.

b. Suggested major elements responsible for the preparation of appropriate portions of operational plans are as follows:

(1) Personnel. Composed of representatives of the military draft board and other governmental offices dealing with manpower and personnel allocations and utilization.

(2) Intelligence. Composed of representatives of national and provincial intelligence organizations—military and civilian—operating in the province.

(3) Operations. Composed of military and civilian personnel who are qualified to coordinate the operational activities of the other provincial Area Coordination Center elements. Within the operations element is located the fire support coordination group, composed of representatives from ground, air, and naval forces, which coordinates all fires within the province.

(4) Armed/paramilitary. Composed of representatives of the armed and paramilitary forces assigned or attached to the province. Although these forces maintain and operate their own TOC, the provincial Area Coordination Center provides centralized planning, coordination, and control.

(5) Logistics. Composed of representatives of both civilian and military logistical agencies and units which provide food, materiel, equipment, transportation, storage, and distribution in support of internal defense and internal development.

(6) Internal development. Composed of representatives of major economic, political, and social organizations and teams operating in the province.

(7) Security. Composed of national and provincial police and representatives of police and paramilitary forces in the province.

(8) Information. Composed of representatives of military and civilian PSYOP/information organizations in the province.

(9) U. S. (advisory) team. Composed of representatives of U. S. civilian and
military advisory organizations functioning in the province. One U. S. representative should be charged with the responsibility for coordinating the programs of all members of the team.
CHAPTER 6
PLANNING GUIDANCE

Section 1. INTRODUCTION

61. Purpose and Scope
This chapter contains information on planning and organizational procedures. It is designed to assist U.S. military personnel in the development and execution of plans associated with internal defense and internal development operations. It provides an insight into the planning and organizational requirements for the effective use of HC, U.S., and other Free World resources. It also discusses the planning concepts, objectives, operations, and U.S. assistance required to mold HC internal defense and internal development plans into an integrated program designed to eliminate those conditions contributing to insurgency and to defeat insurgent organizations. For additional details concerning internal defense and internal development plans and programs, see FM 81-78, FM 41-10, FM 100-5, FM 100-10, FM 100-15, and FM 100-20.

62. Planning Policy
a. The policy of the U.S. is to support sound plans developed by the HC rather than to force U.S.-prepared plans on another government. In some nations where there is a severe shortage of qualified professional personnel, the U.S. may have to provide specialized assistance to the HC in the preparation of an internal defense and internal development plan.

b. As members of the Country Team, military personnel may participate in planning, reviewing, and evaluating HC internal defense and internal development plans and programs. This may involve projects designed to improve military/civil relationships.

c. Military planning assistance usually is accomplished under the MAP which is administered by the MAAG/Mission or Military Assistance Command stationed in the HC. MAAG Headquarters and each lower advisory echelon must understand the provisions of higher-level plans when preparing and executing their assistance missions.

63. Planning Objectives
The primary objective of planning in insurgency situations is to insure that internal defense and internal development plans are molded into a unified strategy tailored to attain national objectives. Some of the more significant planning tasks include—

a. Developing appropriate objectives.

b. Examining the structure of government and governmental agencies to insure coordination of national objectives and production of internal defense and internal development plans and activities.

c. Understanding the attitudes and intentions of HC key political figures.

d. Providing necessary monetary appropriations to support procurement and operational costs.

e. Legislating necessary conscription laws to insure adequate personnel for the support of operations.

f. Providing the legal structure and legislating suitable laws to prosecute offenders against internal security.

64. Planning Concepts
An internal defense and internal development plan is prepared at national level which sets forth HC objectives and broad, general guidance concerning priorities of effort, budget...
limitations, resource allocation, and other similar factors. The national plan should be sufficiently detailed and comprehensive to enable its use as a basis for planning at subnational levels. The national internal defense and internal development plan is supported by detailed annexes prepared by various departments and agencies of government whose resources and functional capabilities can be utilized in the implementation of the master plan. These annexes are, in essence, plans which set forth specific departmental responsi-

Figure 6. Type stability operations plan.
abilities, resources, and the manner in which these resources will be employed in accomplishing coordinated internal defense and internal development programs. Based on the national plan, regions and provinces develop similar plans for operations in their areas.

65. Planning Organization

The composition of the planning organization will vary with the degree of mobilization required. In latent insurgency situations, planning may take place within existing governmental agencies. In more advanced phases of insurgency, planning normally will overextend the capabilities of individual government agencies and a special planning and coordination group, such as the NIDCC, will be required. Planning and directing operations will take place within this structure; however, government agencies remain involved in providing personnel resources and assistance. The internal defense and internal development coordinating group is not intended to replace or perform the functions of government agencies; rather, it provides a focal point for coordinating and applying the skills and resources of these organizations. See chapter 5 for a discussion of a suggested internal defense planning and coordinating organization.

66. The Military Plan

The military plan (stability operations plan) annex to the national internal defense and internal development plan will be prepared by the HC defense establishment. It will constitute a realistic and detailed blueprint of the resources, capabilities, and employment of the armed, paramilitary, and irregular forces in support of the total internal defense and internal development effort. The stability operations plan also may include police resources and employment since, during an insurgency, the police often perform paramilitary functions. The following discussion is based on figure 6 which depicts the components of a type stability operations plan. (See app B for an example of a type stability operations plan.)

a. The stability operations plan should encompass the totality of resources and effort to be expended. Of vital importance, all functional elements of the plan, which may be represented as appendices, should be closely coordinated so that proper and judicious use will be made of available personnel and materiel resources. Failure to coordinate all aspects of the plan may result in an idealistic rather than realistic blueprint of the government's military capabilities. As reflected in figure 6, the stability operations plan should include the following functional appendices:

(1) **Advisory assistance.** Contributes to the stability operations plan by insuring that an adequate advisory program exists which will insure effective planning, organization, operations, training, and equipping of HC military forces to conduct internal defense and internal development operations. This appendix considers individual, military training team, and larger unit training cadres as well as U.S. and other Allied combat support and combat service support assistance which must be provided to increase the capabilities of HC forces to operate efficiently and to perform their missions in the given operational environment.

(2) **Civil affairs.** Includes those major phases of activity which embrace the relationship between the military forces and civil authorities and the people. The civil affairs appendix contributes to the stability operations plan by developing programs designed to organize and motivate the civil population to assist in governmental internal defense and internal development projects. Specifically, this appendix establishes civil affairs requirements in support of the stability operations plan and designates those personnel and materiel resources necessary to fulfill these requirements.

(3) **PSYOP.** Prescribes those military PSYOP resources and measures necessary to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of
friendly, neutral, and hostile groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national internal defense and internal development objectives. Based upon these objectives, the PSYOP appendix categorizes target audiences, prescribes themes, and establishes criteria for the evaluation of effectiveness of PSYOP measures employed. It also specifies concepts of operations and provides operational guidance for PSYOP personnel.

(4) Intelligence. Supports those internal defense and internal development objectives and programs contained in the stability operations plan by insuring general and specific knowledge of the area of operations and insurgent forces. The intelligence appendix denotes those intelligence assets and measures necessary to collect, process, and disseminate intelligence information concerning the insurgent, weather, terrain, and population. It further prescribes those counterintelligence activities necessary to reduce to a minimum insurgent espionage, subversion, and sabotage. Intelligence support of specific programs, such as PSYOP and civil affairs, also may be included.

(5) Populace and resources control. Prescribes proper employment of available resources and measures necessary to preserve or re-establish a state of law and order in which other stability operations programs can be conducted effectively. The populace and resources control appendix includes detailed backup in support of the stability operations plan on such activities as protecting LOC, severing relationships between the insurgent and population, amnesty and rehabilitation, law enforcement, and border denial.

(6) Tactical operations. Includes all aspects of mobilizing, equipping, training, and directing armed and paramilitary forces in tactical operations. The objectives of tactical operations are to destroy insurgent tactical forces and their bases and establish a secure environment within which internal development is possible. This mission must be accomplished within a broader framework embracing both internal defense and internal development; therefore, this appendix considers the impact of tactical operations on other military and civilian non-tactical operations being conducted to achieve national objectives.

b. Stability operations plans at all levels should—

(1) State objectives clearly.

(2) Be based on a careful assessment of available personnel and materiel resources.

(3) Present an analysis of those social, cultural, political, and psychological forces stimulating or obstructing the attainment of military objectives.

(4) Project targets, trends, and relationships to other factors of internal defense and internal development.

(5) Evaluate alternate courses of action and the impact of each on other interrelated economic, political, military, and social factors.

c. The area assessment guide is a means of updating area and background studies and presenting those aspects of greatest pertinence to stability operations planning. Once the area assessment is completed, it should be followed by an estimate of the internal defense and internal development situation which evaluates insurgent and government capabilities and develops courses of action. A type national internal defense and internal development estimate of the situation format is shown in appendix C.

67. U. S. Planning Assistance

U. S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy (OIDP) is the primary document upon which U. S. Country Team planning is based. It includes both internal defense and internal development aspects of U. S. assistance.
a. Based upon guidance contained in the OIDP, an internal defense plan is prepared by the Country Team. This U. S. plan is the basis for programs developed by all U. S. departments and agencies in the country and provides a framework within which to assess programs suggested by the HC.

b. Based on long-range forecasts by U. S. national departments and agencies, the internal defense plan—

(1) Insures continuous attention by the Country Team to the HC situation.

(2) Enhances the Country Team's ability to forecast dangerous trends.

(3) Facilitates planning and program coordination.

**Section II. INTERNAL DEFENSE PLANNING**

68. General

Internal defense planning is based on knowledge of the threat, operational environment, and national objectives, organization, requirements, and other plans. Planning at all levels involves more detail, greater scope, and closer coordination between the civil/military community than is required during limited and general war. Plans must provide for the employment of available support from the armed forces and other organizations. Assistance from Free World nations may be required to mobilize internal defense forces; therefore, plans must permit efficient integration of external assistance.

69. Objective

The objective of internal defense planning is to provide for the efficient employment of military resources to support both internal defense and internal development programs. The national plan provides long-range guidance, whereas lower-level plans provide short-range and more detailed implementing guidance.

70. Concept

During Phase I, internal defense planning accentuates the employment of military resources in support of internal development programs through military civic action, advisory assistance, and PSYOP. Standard operating procedures should be formulated for as many types of military activities as possible. During Phases II and III, internal defense planning is expanded to meet the insurgent tactical threat. The internal defense plan must—

a. Be responsive to nationally established priorities of resource utilization and must be closely coordinated with the internal development plan.

b. Anticipate insurgent activities and prepare to meet them offensively rather than reacting to insurgent operations.

c. Provide an organizational structure which will facilitate coordination and implementation of all plans.

d. Refrain from establishing fixed time schedules. Military forces do not control the operational environment as they do in limited and general war; therefore, fixed time schedules are virtually impossible to maintain.

71. Operations

The following are some planning aspects which should be recognized:

a. Planning for internal defense operations will be far more detailed and comprehensive than that required in limited and general war.

(1) Planning should include provision for clear division of responsibility and precise lines of authority.

(2) Tasks should be assigned based on unit capabilities and limitations.

(3) When areas of responsibility are assigned to a unit, the extent of responsibility must be clearly defined.

b. Planning objectives are not limited to terrain or enemy forces, but include people.

c. Combat power must be applied selectively and its effects modified to preclude harming the population. In many instances, commanders may have to choose between a course of action which will assure entrance into a given area with minimum troop losses and a course of...
action which will require the selective application of combat power so as to preclude harming the population.

d. In addition to tactical operations, internal defense planning provides guidance for the conduct of advisory assistance, civil affairs, intelligence, PSYOP, and populace and resources control operations.

e. Regional and provincial plans coordinate activities in detailed, comprehensive orders, insuring that lower unit commanders are furnished adequate operational guidance as to the requirements within their specific operational areas.

f. Planning must give close attention to political, economic, social, psychological, and military situations. Estimates are based on the analysis of the area of operations, the mission, and information previously outlined.

g. All plans must be coordinated closely between U. S. and HC military and civilian agencies. Planning staffs must anticipate greater difficulties in gaining approval for unit plans and adequate time must be provided to process these plans at higher, lower, and adjacent levels.

h. During latent and incipient insurgency, when few or no tactical operational requirements exist, HC combat support and combat service support forces, such as engineers, should be activated early to carry out non-tactical internal development missions.

Section III. INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

72. General

Internal development planning outlines specific programs to be undertaken by a government to improve economic, social, and political conditions. It also outlines the objectives to be attained and the policies and strategies to be used in accomplishing the stated objectives. Subordinate agencies must provide input to, and base their planning on, national plans.

73. Objectives

HC objectives of internal development planning include—

i. During all phases of insurgency, the ratio of combat service support elements to combat forces will be significantly higher than in limited and general war.

j. National and regional-level plans for military operations should consider the roles and capabilities of the provincial paramilitary forces.

(1) Provincial-level planning considers all aspects of provincial activities. Contingency planning for tactical operations is based on strike missions; however, this planning also must include advisory assistance, civil affairs, intelligence, psychological, and populace and resources control operations.

(2) Supply procedures and other administrative and logistical support activities should be planned for both routine and emergency operations.

(3) Regional-level planning should provide for the contingency that provincial efforts may require military forces in excess of those available at provincial level. The designation of special units to be attached to the provincial government may suffice; however, the NIDCC may establish an Area Coordination Center designed to coordinate internal defense and internal development operations within the region.
74. **Concepts**

National internal development planning may be originated by the NIDCC to assist in the attainment of political, sociological, and economic objectives through effective use of available resources.

a. Fundamental characteristics of internal development planning include the clarification of a nation's objectives and an assessment of its willingness to make sacrifices for future growth. In order to be fully effective, planning should stimulate private contributions to the development process.

b. It should assure that private business receives an appropriately large share of scarce resources in order that it may make its proper contribution to the expansion of the economy.

75. **Organization**

In planning and executing a development program, governments may have to create, supervise, and operate activities and organizations contributing to the political, social, civil, psychological, and economic development of the country, such as—

a. **Political.**
   (1) Discussion groups.
   (2) Voting apparatus.
   (3) Drafting of a constitution.
   (4) Establishment of political parties.
   (5) Enactment of laws that support national objectives.
   (6) Broadening the bases of political power through education, health, skills, group leadership, self-confidence, and initiative.

b. **Social and civil.**
   (1) Public health programs.
   (2) Public education programs and facilities.
   (3) Specialized training programs.
   (4) News media.
   (5) Civil service system.
   (6) Civic organizations.
   (7) Crime prevention programs.
   (8) Agricultural extension programs.

c. **Psychological.**
   (1) Information programs.
   (2) Pictorial campaigns.
   (3) Motion picture service.
   (4) Raffles and contests as a means of assembling the population for orientation.

d. **Economic.**
   (1) National development bank.
   (2) Industrial development company.
   (3) Housing authority.
   (4) Water resources authority.
   (5) Port authority.
   (6) Land development authority.
   (7) Electric power corporation.
   (8) Transportation authority.
   (9) Food distribution authority.
   (10) Medical authority.

76. **Operations**

Factors pertinent to HC internal development planning include—

a. Recognizing the proper relationship between official and private organizations.

b. Planning for the participation of nongovernmental personnel, organizations, and groups.

c. Ascertaining the impact of internal defense activities on internal development.

d. Coordinating internal defense and internal development plans.

e. Phasing the internal development effort to insure coordinated action and availability of personnel and materiel resources. For example, recruiting and training of personnel must precede initiation of work.

77. **National Development Planning Assistance**

USAID responds to requests for assistance in planning economic, social, and political development.

a. HC governments are encouraged to make and finance their own contracts for planning advisory services, since they are more likely to accept advice from a group which is employed by and responsible to the government. Even where the contract is financed by USAID funds, planning advisors are responsible directly to the HC.
b. USAID policy is to encourage governments to formulate and improve internal development plans and the administrative machinery for their initiation. U. S. assistance is related to the OIDP and support of HC objectives and priorities is in this context.
CHAPTER 7
NATIONAL CAMPAIGNS

Section I. INTRODUCTION

78. General

This chapter provides guidance concerning the primary campaigns conducted to attain internal defense and internal development objectives.

79. Concepts

Three major types of campaigns are conducted to accomplish national programs of internal defense and internal development. Each campaign requires a mixture of both internal defense and internal development resources. Planning of these mutually supporting campaigns is conducted at national level and their implementation normally is accomplished at province and district level. These major campaigns, described in this chapter, are—

a. The Consolidation Campaign. Conducted to establish or re-establish HC control of populations and areas in order that the full range of internal development activities may be pursued within a relatively secure environment. Consolidation campaigns often have been referred to as “clear and hold,” “strategic hamlet,” “pacification,” “rural reconstruction,” and “revolutionary development” operations.

b. The Strike Campaign. Conducted to find, fix, and destroy insurgent tactical forces and characterized by offensive tactical operations.

c. The Remote Area Campaign. Essentially a consolidation campaign conducted in remote areas to establish islands of resistance in insurgent-dominated areas.

Section II. Consolidation Campaign

80. General

Operations to support the national consolidation campaign are organized in priority areas as an interdepartmental civil-military effort. Normally conducted at the provincial level, this campaign integrates the internal defense and internal development programs which are designed to remove the causes of insurgency and to destroy the insurgent movement. The consolidation campaign is conducted to restore HC governmental control of the population and the area and to provide an environment within which the normal economic, political, and social activities of the population may be pursued and improved.

81. Concepts

The consolidation campaign may be conducted in all phases of insurgency, although it is more assured of success if mounted during Phase I or II. The concepts described herein are based on the presence of a relatively major insurgent threat, to include the presence of insurgent tactical forces, and must be adjusted to lesser threat situations.

a. National Concept. Operations conducted as part of the consolidation campaign should expand outwardly from such areas as urban industrial complexes or communications centers in which the government is in full control. The government must have a secure base and must place first priority on the denial of this base to the insurgent. Government-controlled areas, normally rich in resources and densely populated, generally have adequate transportation and communications routes. Extension of
operations into contested and insurgent-dominated areas, with priority to population centers, resource locations, installation sites, and routes of communication, facilitates the spread of government influence into surrounding areas.

b. Provincial Concept. Consolidation operations normally are a provincial-level function supported by national, regional, provincial, and other resources.

(1) Consolidation operations may be conducted simultaneously in provinces where remote area and strike operations are being conducted. Both remote area and strike operations support the consolidation campaign by harassing and interdicting insurgent forces and areas. Expansion of consolidated areas decreases the contested zones in which strike operations will be conducted.

(2) Control is established initially by clearing insurgent tactical forces from various subareas, which subsequently will be expanded and linked together. Authorities should extend consolidated areas only to the limits of combined civil/military capabilities. Once an area has been cleared, sufficient tactical defense capabilities and internal security must be established and maintained to defend and secure the area. Every effort should be made to prevent controlled areas from reverting to insurgent domination. During all stages, populace and resources control operations, such as the screening of civilians, are conducted to prevent insurgents from re-infiltrating newly consolidated areas.

(3) Consolidation operations are characterized by the execution of four generally overlapping stages: preparation, offensive, development, and completion. The sequence of events in establishing government-controlled areas involves the accomplishment of many concurrent actions based upon local considerations.

82. Preparation Stage

The preparation stage is a planning, training, organizing, and equipping period during which all participating civil and military forces prepare for operations. During this stage, integration of effort is required between civilian and military planners.

a. Concept. The preparation stage envisages the planning for efficient mobilization of available personnel and materiel resources. Successful planning and execution requires continuous coordination among the participating military and civilian agencies at all levels. Policies relating to national objectives may be directed to regional and provincial government officials. These policies become the basis upon which plans are developed for the accomplishment of the assigned consolidation mission.

(1) District, village, and hamlet planning is conducted within the degree of capability which exists at these levels. Initial detailed requirements may be developed and forwarded by the district chief to the province governor for incorporation into the province consolidation operations plan.

(2) Province consolidation operations plans are developed based upon the internal defense and internal development situation, objective areas designated in national plans, civilian and military resources available, and estimated capability to achieve the objectives. Plans include requirements and means by which operations will be accomplished. The province plan is forwarded to the region for approval and an information copy is sent to the NIDCC.

(3) The NIDCC coordinates all national-level internal defense and internal development activities, reviews region or province plans, establishes priorities for their implementation, and allocates resources.

b. Organization. Organizations participating in consolidation operations are combined into a province task force (TF) which, in turn, is subdivided into district, village, and hamlet
TF. All TF are interdepartmental and consist of civilian and military operational elements structured to assume political, economic, social, psychological, populace and resources control, intelligence, and tactical responsibilities in the designated area of operations. All elements of the provincial TF normally are controlled by the province governor who exercises operational control through senior officials of each element. Subordinate district, village, and hamlet TF usually are controlled by leaders within the political structure who also exercise operational control over designated military elements. When possible, boundaries and phase lines are established to include entire political subdivisions. Communications are planned to provide an interlocking, integrated network used by police, armed forces, paramilitary, intelligence, and internal development organizations.

c. Operations. Consolidation operations involve the implementation of integrated activities of the armed, paramilitary, and police forces and the economic, social, political, psychological, and civic action cadres. When civilian facilities or organizations are ineffective, the armed forces may provide these until civilian development programs have taken effect.

(1) Internal defense. Planning insures that adequate personnel and materiel for tactical, populace and resources control, and intelligence operations are available at the beginning of the consolidation operation or are programmed to become available as required. Forces allocated should be superior to the insurgent force threat in the operational area. Force requirements include armed and paramilitary forces to engage insurgent tactical forces and police and intelligence forces to maintain law and order, control populace and materiel resources, and locate, identify, and neutralize the insurgent infrastructure. Plans must establish effective command and control measures to insure that force capabilities are applied effectively and are coordinated through the provincial Area Coordination Center.

(2) Internal development. Planning insures that sufficient personnel and materiel resources are available or are programmed to provide adequate support for each stage of the consolidation operation. Force requirements include sufficient political administrators, social workers, economic advisors and operators, and PSYOP/information personnel to attain internal development objectives.

(3) Training. All internal defense and internal development forces required to conduct consolidation operations should be trained prior to actual operations. Training and indoctrination of armed, paramilitary, and police forces, and intelligence, political, economic, civil administration, and PSYOP cadres should be conducted on a team basis. Interdepartmental TF elements organized to meet the requirements of the hamlets, villages, and districts should be trained together in a central government training facility and their training should include information concerning the specific populations with which they will be working.

(4) Combat service support. Combat service support provides support for both the internal defense and the internal development aspects of the campaign. In some nations, military combat service support systems and resources may provide personnel, administrative, logistical, and civil affairs support; however, this support normally is furnished by a combination of civilian and military organizations. Some combat service support considerations peculiar to consolidation operations are—

(a) Effort should be made to provide adequate resources to provincial agencies before operations are undertaken.
(b) Proper funding procedures should be established to provide for unanticipated expenditures. For example, if, during the initial stages of a consolidation operation, hamlets are found to be inaccessible to trucks, then ox carts, pack animals, and porters may have to be hired. Compensation should be made for losses of personal property, and proper PSYOP support should be employed to avoid confusion and loss of faith in the government.

83. Offensive Stage

The initial requirement is to clear the area of insurgent tactical units. Once this is accomplished, adequate government forces should remain in the area to provide protection to the population.

a. Concept. The offensive stage entails moving the civil/military TF into the operational area; destroying, dispersing, and clearing insurgent tactical forces from the area; locating, identifying, and destroying or neutralizing the insurgent infrastructure; and installing an efficient HC governmental administration.

b. Organization. TF are structured to conduct offensive tactical operations with command and control exercised through the military chain of command. TF headquarters move directly to the district headquarters location and subordinate TF headquarters move to their assigned villages or hamlets. Intelligence and police forces may accompany the tactical elements.

c. Operations. Forces must be prepared to react to unexpected levels of violence from either the insurgent force or the population; however, to protect the population, only the degree of combat power necessary to accomplish the mission should be employed. In addition to clearing the area of tactical forces, continuing effort must be made to neutralize the insurgent infrastructure which has the capability of replacing insurgent forces from the population.

(1) Tactical operations. Offensive combat patrolling, saturation patrolling, and small-unit actions are used to disrupt insurgent operations and to gain information. If insurgent units are large and well trained, strike operations conducted by large forces may be required to destroy them. Ambushes, raids, and other techniques are employed in conjunction with saturation patrolling and large strike operations.

(2) Populace and resources control operations. Curfews, spot checks, searches, a system of information reporting, and other similar measures are initiated. The police and other security organizations institute surveillance and populace and materiel control measures to deprive the insurgent of population support. In addition, they identify and neutralize the infrastructure in order to provide the basis for effective internal defense in the development stage. PSYOP personnel assist in making populace and resources control measures more acceptable to the population.

(3) Intelligence. An intelligence program is established by intelligence agencies and police forces. Interrogation, loyalty screening, and cataloging of information are undertaken to assist in identifying and attacking the insurgent infrastructure.

84. Development Stage

The development stage is characterized by the cessation of territorial expansion initiated in the offensive stage. The objective of the development stage is to establish TF firmly in their respective areas to permit the introduction and establishment of internal defense and internal development organizations and operations. The primary task is to provide adequate defense for population centers and other vital areas and installations against insurgent tactical, propaganda, and intelligence operations.

a. Concept. The development stage entails
defending the area against insurgent attack to permit civilian and other governmental agencies to conduct internal development and security programs. It may involve training local irregular and paramilitary forces to assume the defensive and security missions of the regular armed forces. Tactical operations are conducted to deny insurgents access to support and to provide a secure base from which the campaign can be extended into other areas. Offensive tactical operations are required to eliminate insurgent tactical forces; however, defense of areas such as population centers, tactical bases, logistical installations, and LOC also are important and necessary. PSYOP are continued to gain and hold population support.

b. Organization. TF structuring remains essentially the same as for the offensive stage except that internal development, security, and combat service support elements join the tactical elements which are tailored for aggressive defense of the area.

c. Operations. In the development stage, operational emphasis shifts from military internal defense to civilian internal development. In essence, the armed and paramilitary forces adopt an aggressive defensive posture to protect the enclaves established during the offensive stage. This permits other TF elements—primarily the political, economic, social, and psychological action cadres—to conduct their activities effectively.

(1) Internal defense. In the development stage, tactical operations, to include saturation patrolling and defense of the area, are the primary mission of designated armed or paramilitary forces. During this stage, advisory assistance is continued in training paramilitary and irregular forces to participate in area internal defense and internal development programs.

(a) Tactical operations. Saturation patrolling, extended in range and scope, is conducted over the entire area to be controlled. Efforts are made to seek out the insurgent and block approaches into the controlled area. Follow-up offensive operations of the strike variety are mounted only after the necessary intelligence organization has been established and is providing timely and accurate information.

(b) Populace and resources control operations. Police cadres organize, plan, and operate forces to maintain an adequate, effective state of law and order. They also control the movement of personnel and materiel and secure materiel items during production.

(2) Internal development. As the area is defended and secured, governmental and private agencies insure that necessary resources are introduced to conduct internal development activities. This includes political administrators who assume the responsibilities of government. Surveys are conducted with assistance from the local population to determine locally available resources and current requirements.

(a) Economic, social, and political development is undertaken by the armed forces, paramilitary, and civil agencies. These include short and mid-range self-help projects which involve the training of local personnel in skills suitable for the continued economic, social, and political growth of the area. Loyal village and hamlet governmental leaders and administrators are selected and trained. When the situation permits, local personnel may be recruited and trained for local defense or service in the armed forces.

(b) Psychological/information activities are continued to motivate and condition the population to support both internal defense and internal development efforts. Internal development activities and supporting military civic action are used to
demonstrate government concern for the population and to solicit its participation in reconstruction programs and in defense against insurgent attack.

85. Completion Stage

The completion stage represents establishment of an environment which will enable peaceful development. This is necessarily a gradual process. Although it cannot be identified precisely, completion, as a deliberate operational stage, eventually comes to an end. Completion stage operations are conducted to permit the population to pursue normal activities and to attain economic, social, and political objectives within a peaceful environment.

a. Concept. The completion stage entails acceleration of internal development programs and is marked by the capability of the local population to insure defense against both internal and external insurgent attack. Concentrated effort is made to return local governmental control to the people at a rate commensurate with their ability to conduct normal governmental functions.

b. Organization. TF organization undergoes a greater modification in the completion stage than in any other stage.

(1) Structuring. District and hamlet TF may begin to lose armed forces and certain internal development cadre elements. Only when the entire province has been consolidated will provincial TF undergo the same changes. Elements released from districts, villages, and hamlets are consolidated within the provincial TF for employment in other districts.

(2) Command and control. Province, district, and other leaders begin to relinquish centralized control over lower-level internal defense and internal development activities and allow more freedom of action to subordinate elements. As the threat is reduced, province governors allow district directors to administer their districts.

c. Operations. As local administrators gain experience, outside cadres which have performed these functions may be released for other assignments. As the local police become more efficient, they may be reduced or moved to other areas. If a local paramilitary force has been recruited and trained and has achieved a sufficient measure of confidence and ability, some of its elements may be withdrawn and reassigned. Prior to the reduction of security forces or their transfer from a given area, permanent government control must be established. Before initiating the extension of government-controlled areas, the government must insure that it has adequate resources to carry out its program. Requests for protection and assistance may be received from hamlets and villages outside the area. Such requests should not be honored until the government is prepared fully for the extension of consolidation operations into these new areas; however, strike operations may be mounted to relieve the pressure on these hamlets and villages and to reassure the people that the government is interested in their welfare.

(1) Internal defense. Redeployment must not take place until local paramilitary, police, and intelligence forces are capable of maintaining tactical defense and security. A local reserve force should be established and provincial reserves provided if they are needed. Regional armed forces provide an additional reserve capability which can be used in responding to insurgent attacks.

(2) Internal development. Economic, social, political, and psychological development activities should be conducted within a political framework acceptable to the population.

86. U. S. Assistance

U. S. and Allied economic and military assistance may include funds, materiel, and advisors. Permanent U. S. advisory efforts, to include those of the U. S. Department of State, USAID, USIS, and the military, may extend from national down to local level. U. S.
advisors with internal development agencies and HC armed, paramilitary, police, and other forces assist in planning and conducting the various aspects of the campaign. In concept, the advisory effort at each level is organized similarly to the U. S. Country Team at national level. In this respect, it is desirable that one U. S. representative be charged with coordination responsibility for the programs of all U. S. advisors at his level. FM 31–73 contains further details on advisory assistance.

Section III. STRIKE CAMPAIGN

87. General

The strike campaign consists of a series of combat operations; therefore, other internal defense activities are minimized during an actual strike. The strike campaign is conducted against insurgent tactical forces and bases outside of provincial areas of control. Strike operations are conducted either in zones under insurgent control or in contested zones. FM 31–16 contains additional guidance on strike operations.

88. Concepts

Strike operations are conducted in remote or contested areas by armed forces and are coordinated through appropriate Area Coordination Centers in the strike area. Since the main objective of a strike is either destruction or harassment, strike forces normally do not remain in the area of operations after mission accomplishment.

89. Organization

Forces assigned strike missions should be relieved of area responsibilities well in advance of the operation. Preferably, such forces are controlled at the national or regional level and are assigned no permanent area responsibilities. Strike forces are organized as self-sufficient TF which are capable of operating for given periods of time in areas remote from home bases. The strike force normally is assigned a specific area in which to conduct operations. In addition to combat forces, TF may contain intelligence, police, and other military and civilian elements.

90. Operations

Once insurgent forces or bases have been located, strike forces maneuver to destroy them. The insurgents' ability to hide weapons and to assume noncombatant guises in attempting to avoid capture may require thorough reconnaissance and search of the area. Suspects must be managed firmly but treated fairly and with respect to avoid turning innocent suspects into insurgent sympathizers. When small units conducting reconnaissance operations sight relatively large insurgent tactical forces, surveillance should be maintained until strike forces can be deployed to destroy them. Due to the necessity to react in a timely manner to intelligence concerning insurgent forces, thorough analysis of all factors affecting the situation is rare in strike operations. When an area is suspected of harboring insurgent forces or installations, reconnaissance should be conducted, followed by an attack or raid.

a. Type strike operations include encirclement, pursuit, raid, sweep, and coordinated attack. Combat support and combat service support of strike operations are planned to insure responsiveness to the operations plan. Operations outside of the support range of fixed combat service support installations may require that these elements be attached or assigned directly from field depots and tactical bases. The coordination of these activities is accomplished between the TF commander and the appropriate headquarters.

b. Reconnaissance to locate and test insurgent dispositions and strengths or to develop additional intelligence may be followed immediately by a coordinated attack or raid. Reconnaissance should emphasize thorough reconnoitering of an area and is characterized by continuous, decentralized, small unit operations. If a sizeable insurgent force is located, friendly units maintain contact until strike
forces can be deployed to assist in the de­
struction of the insurgent force.

c. Since strikes are conducted in insecure
areas, plans must provide for force with­
drawal after mission accomplishment.

91. U. S. Assistance

The U. S. may assist the HC strike campaign
through military advisory programs and com­
mitment of combat, combat support, or combat
service support units.

Section IV. REMOTE AREA CAMPAIGN

92. General

The remote area campaign is undertaken in
contested areas to establish HC strongholds or
in areas under partial insurgent control. These
areas usually are populated by ethnic, religious,
or other isolated minority groups; however,
remote area campaigns may be conducted in
areas devoid of civilian population within
which insurgent forces have established training
bases, rest areas, weapons factories, farms,
or major infiltration routes. Remote area opera­
tions normally are conducted by specially
trained and selected units. The material con­
tained herein should be used in conjunction
20A, FM 31–21, FM 31–21A, FM 31–73, and
FM 41–10.

93. Concepts

The remote area campaign is conducted to
establish islands of resistance in insurgent­
infested areas. These islands of resistance serve
as HC operational bases to support strike and
consolidation operations. Success of a given re­
 mote area operation is more assured if there
is a segment of the resident population willing
to support the remote area program. Oper­
a tions can best be undertaken in areas under
insurgent control if the remote area force con­
tains personnel indigenous to the operational
area who can influence the local population.
Initially, additional combat and combat sup­
port forces may be required to assist the re­
 mote area force in establishing secure opera­
tional bases.

94. Organization

a. Remote Area Tactical Forces. The remote
area tactical force should be composed mainly
of personnel indigenous to the operational
area. The type of tactical force employed
(armed, paramilitary, or irregular) will de­
pend on the objectives, characteristics of the
area, attitude of the local population, political
climate, and the logistical support available.
The size and composition of the force depends
on the degree of area control exercised by the
insurgents and the potential for recruiting and
developing an adequate local force. When the
tactical force is recruited from local inhab­
ants, local leaders must be used even though
their military capabilities may be limited. By
using local leaders, more positive control is
assured and training, indoctrination, and in­
corporation of the local force into the HC gov­
ernmental structure is enhanced.

b. HC Forces. Few nations have or will have
military units which are capable of conducting
a remote area campaign. A nation with the re­
quirement to conduct a remote area campaign
has the following alternatives:

(1) It may employ existing armed forces
or paramilitary organizations and
rely on U. S. military assistance to
provide the skills and capabilities
lacking in its own forces.

(2) It may organize units similar to the
U. S. Army Special Forces to conduct
remote area operations; however, con­
siderable time must be allowed to
organize, train, and deploy such a
force.

(3) If the HC has an immediate need to
conduct a remote area campaign and
has inadequate resources, it may pro­
vide those personnel necessary for
government administration and re­
quest that U. S. military forces be
used in operational and training roles.

(4) The HC may desire that the U. S. con­
campaign to provide a "bridge" between the HC government and various tribal, religious, racial, or political minorities.

95. Operations
Remote area operations generally are of long duration and encompass the functional areas of advisory assistance and tactical, civil affairs, PSYOP, intelligence, and populace and resources control operations.

a. Planning. Consideration must be given to geography, sociology, economy, politics, and other fields which may enhance or hinder success of remote area operations.

(1) Important political considerations are the motivations, ambitions, and influence of the existing leadership. A complete understanding of the theoretical and actual power structure of the operational area is necessary since actual control may rest with non-governmental religious, tribal, or other groups.

(2) Important sociological considerations are population size and distribution, basic racial stock, minority groups, social structure, religion, and culture, all of which may be either a source of trouble or assistance.

b. Stages. Remote area operations include a preparation stage followed by the operational stages of offense, development, and completion. All operations are long-term and continuous in nature, and are directed at defeating the insurgent movement through the destruction or neutralization of its infrastructure and tactical organizations.

(1) The preparation stage entails delineation of the area of operations; collection and assessment of data and information of the operational area; an estimate of resource requirements; and, finally, preparation of the operations plan.

(2) The offensive stage entails moving the remote area force into the operational area; establishing a secure base from which to launch operations; destroying, dispersing, or clearing insurgent tactical forces from the area; neutralizing or destroying the insurgent infrastructure; and establishing or re-establishing HC government.

(3) The development stage entails the conduct of aggressive defense operations, primarily by saturation patrolling. In this stage, short-term military civic action programs are continued and serve as the medium through which long-term internal development programs are initiated. Advisory assistance in training paramilitary or irregular forces for populace and resources control, intelligence, and PSYOP is initiated. Advisory assistance in civilian activities and the extension of U.S.-sponsored internal development programs may be required in such areas as health, welfare, and education.

(4) The completion stage entails continuing development stage activities, transferring operational control to appropriate civil agencies, and initiating new remote area operations in adjacent areas.

c. Tactical Operations. Tactical operations consist primarily of raids, ambushes, and combat patrols which are conducted to interdict and harass insurgent forces, training areas, and logistical installations. These operations deny the insurgents free movement within the operational area and access to local support. Reconnaissance patrols may provide intelligence as a basis for initiating tactical operations. FM 31-16 contains a detailed discussion of tactical operations.

d. Intelligence Operations—Both Covert and Overt. Intelligence operations provide specific and general knowledge of the area of operation, the general population, and the insurgents.

e. Civil Affairs Operations. Military civic action is the medium through which HC and U.S. internal development programs are initiated in remote areas. A successful military civic action program produces intelligence, personnel re-
sources, and psychological support for the remote area force.

f. PSYOP. PSYOP are directed at the civilian population, the remote area tactical force, and the insurgent. In most remote areas where minority groups are present, PSYOP themes must be tailored to specific target audiences.

g. Populace and Resources Control Operations. Populace and resources control operations normally are conducted by civil agencies; however, in the remote area operational environment, these civil agencies may be nonexistent, insurgent-dominated, or otherwise ineffective. This may require that the remote area force conduct its own populace and resources control operations or augment, control, and advise local forces. The remote area force must be fully capable of conducting populace and resources control operations and organizing and training local security forces. The attitude and cooperation of the population normally determine the extent of populace and resources control imposed; however, care must be taken not to alienate the population by establishing excessively rigid measures. To insure understanding by the population, populace and resources control programs must be supported by PSYOP.

h. Advisory Assistance. The remote area force usually is supported by a program other than the MAP; however, U. S. advisory assistance forces may be required to extend MAP activities into the operational area. One example would be the organization, equipping, training, and advising of paramilitary units to assume the defense of the operational area as part of development stage activities. FM 31–21A contains additional discussion of advisory assistance efforts in remote area operations.

96. U. S. Assistance

Remote area operations are particularly suited for U. S. Army Special Forces units which are trained, equipped, and organized to conduct them. U. S. MAP and USAID economic assistance programs may support the remote area campaign by furnishing advisory assistance, weapons, communications equipment, clothing, and other military materiel. In addition, they may provide seed, fertilizer, civic development construction materials, and other economic support necessary for internal development.