CHAPTER 8
OPERATIONS

Section I. INTRODUCTION

97. Purpose and Scope

This chapter delineates the six major operational roles which military forces may employ to accomplish their stability operations missions. The objectives, concepts, and modes of performing these roles are explained. Further, the interrelationship of these roles and the manner in which they support national campaigns are clarified.

98. Stability Operations Roles

Military forces accomplish stability operations missions through the conduct of advisory assistance, civil affairs, psychological, intelligence, populace and resources control, and tactical operations. These operations may be conducted by the military alone or in coordination with other governmental agencies in support of internal defense and internal development programs. Through these operational roles, the full capabilities of military forces can be coordinated and directed toward the attainment of internal security objectives.

Section II. ADVISORY ASSISTANCE

99. General

U.S./HC and Allied advisory assistance includes furnishing advice on military organization, training, operations, doctrine, and materiel. In addition, U.S. advisory assistance may include providing and controlling U.S. combat support and combat service support for HC military forces.

100. Objective

The objective of advisory assistance is to increase the capabilities of HC organizations to operate efficiently and to perform their missions in the given operational environment. Accomplishment of the advisory assistance objective will insure effective planning, organization, operations, training, and equipping of forces to conduct stability operations.

101. Concepts

Organizations and individuals possessing higher skill and material resource levels assist in imparting their knowledge to less developed organizations and individuals through advisory assistance. Although advisory assistance continues throughout all phases of insurgency, it is most important during Phase I. Some organizations perform advisory assistance as a primary mission, whereas other units may conduct it as a secondary or ancillary role. In the latter instance, advisory assistance requirements may necessitate temporarily downgrading the primary mission in order to train, organize, and equip other forces. When the U.S. provides combat support and combat service support units to the HC, U.S. advisors normally will exercise operational control over these forces.

102. Organization

All organizations must be prepared to provide temporary or long-term advisory assistance to those with less developed capabilities. The provision of advisory assistance cadres to
major organizations is coordinated at the national level by the NIDCC and at subnational levels by the Area Coordination Center. The conduct of advisory assistance may involve the tailoring of mobile training teams to accomplish specific missions. If required, training centers may be established. On-the-job training may be conducted by units having specialized equipment for other units which are projected to receive this equipment in the near future.

103. Operations

Advisory assistance supports both internal defense and internal development. Specifically, advisory assistance operations—

a. Insure that plans are properly prepared, coordinated, published, and disseminated. They also insure that plans are feasible and support national objectives.

b. Help establish effective training programs and assist in the organization and conduct of training.

c. Assist in the organizing and equipping of newly activated units.

d. May include providing and controlling U. S. combat support and combat service support units which are supporting HC forces.

104. U. S. Advisory Assistance

U. S. advisory assistance is provided primarily through DOD, USAID, and USIS. Assistance also may be provided by other official and unofficial organizations. Within DOD, the principal agency charged with providing advisory assistance is the MAAG, Mission, or Military Assistance Command. The military advisory organization performs the following tasks:

a. Organizing, equipping, training, and advising armed and paramilitary forces in the conduct of stability operations.

b. Training and advising HC armed forces on new equipment provided by MAP.

c. In coordination with USAID, organizing, equipping, training, and advising HC police organizations.

d. In coordination with USIS, advising HC armed and paramilitary forces and governmental agencies in PSYOP/information activities.

e. Providing and controlling U. S. combat support and combat service support forces operating in conjunction with HC forces.

f. Monitoring the utilization, maintenance, and operation of MAP-provided equipment and supplies.

Section III. CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

105. General

a. Civil affairs is a responsibility of military commanders at every echelon. Civil affairs includes any activity of command which embraces the relationship between the military forces and the civil authorities and people in a friendly or occupied country or area. Civil affairs operations may involve the performance of specified functions or the exercise of certain authority by military forces which normally is the responsibility of the local government.

b. The scope of civil affairs operations will vary with the type of local government, status of forces agreements, degree of authority accorded, and influence of the economic, social, and political background of both the country and the population. When U. S. forces are committed to stability operations, their mission is political as well as military. All of their actions will have civil-military implications, and they will be engaged in civil affairs activities whether designated as such or not. The scope of civil affairs can be divided into seven major activities.

(1) Prevention of civilian interference with tactical and logistical operations.

(2) Support for the functions of government for a civilian population.

(3) Community relations of the military forces.

(4) Military civic action as part of stability operations.
106. Objectives

The objectives of civil affairs operations are to organize and motivate the civil population to assist the government and military forces by eliminating or reducing political, economic, and sociological problems.

107. Concepts

a. In Phase I insurgency, civil affairs efforts are devoted primarily to providing staff assistance in planning, organizing, and training military forces in civil affairs aspects of internal defense. In addition, civil affairs units and staff elements may assist HC military and civilian agencies in internal development activities, mainly through military civic action.

b. In Phases II and III, civil affairs efforts may be concentrated on providing normal civil affairs staff and operational assistance to military forces conducting strike, remote area, and consolidation operations. Representatives of military units also may be assigned to civil governmental agencies to coordinate civil affairs activities.

108. Organization

a. All military units have a capability to conduct civil affairs, particularly military civic action. In some instances, this capability may be great, whereas in others it may be minimal. This requires that each military organization assess its capabilities and be prepared to make civil affairs contributions as part of its overall mission. Some combat support and combat service support units, such as engineer and medical, may be assigned a primary role of military civic action and may be organized specifically for this mission.

b. Within major commands, civil affairs organizations may be established. Units as small as battalion TF may be assigned civil affairs elements to assist in carrying out plans for which the civil affairs staff officer has responsibility.

c. Civil affairs liaison should be established between all U. S. and HC military forces and government agencies. This may be accomplished through a system specifically designed for this purpose or through the civil affairs staff elements of existing U. S. units or advisory teams.

109. Operations

a. Civil affairs operations may range from the informal day-to-day community relations activities performed by individuals to the planned and organized operations of units. Civil affairs operations should be based upon good relationships with the population. Civil affairs operations conducted to compensate for lack of troop discipline, discourtesy, or dishonesty in dealings with the people will attain minimal results. On the other hand, where sound rapport has been established between U. S./HC forces and the population, properly administered civil affairs operations may be expected to contribute materially to the attainment of internal defense and internal development objectives.

b. Planning for civil affairs operations is comparable to other planning conducted for internal defense and internal development. Policies and objectives must be defined clearly to insure adequate guidelines for those responsible for developing overall internal defense and internal development plans. Civil affairs planning must consider political as well as military aspects and provide for possible future modifications. Planning for civil affairs should consider the following:

(1) Military civic action operations to be conducted by HC military forces and U.S. support required.

(2) U. S./HC civil affairs mobile training team requirements and resources.

(3) Civil affairs personnel and units required to support U. S. and HC agencies at subnational levels.

(4) Civil affairs training program requirements for U. S./HC and Allied forces.

(5) HC civil affairs requirements to provide government administration in areas of the country where needed.
c. Combined U. S./HC planning at national level should integrate civil affairs requirements into the overall internal defense and internal development plan and provide adequate guidance for similar planning at subnational levels.

d. Certain civil affairs responsibilities assigned to a tactical commander may include functions beyond his capability and will require the employment of specialized civil affairs personnel or units. (See FM 41-10 for a detailed discussion of civil affairs organizational capabilities.) Examples of tasks which may require specialized civil affairs assistance are:

1. Increasing the efficiency of the local administration.
2. Expediting payment of legitimate claims.
3. Developing the efficiency of the civil police organization and enhancing its image with the population.
4. Improving local health through public health measures.
5. Initiating or improving public welfare activities.
7. Establishing school systems, procuring teachers, and initiating training programs.
8. Organizing and modernizing public facilities.

e. Military civic action will be the most prevalent civil affairs function performed by military forces in stability operations. This function involves the participation by military or paramilitary forces, using their military skills, equipment, and resources, in economic and sociological projects that are useful to the population at all levels. These projects may be in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, and sanitation, which contribute to the general welfare and serve to improve the standing of the HC government with the population.

1. "Do-goodism" for do-goodism's sake seldom is beneficial, often is costly, and in many instances may provoke and alienate the population rather than win its support; therefore, when planning military civic action projects, the following criteria should be considered: (A military civic action worksheet, such as shown in fig. 7, will prove of assistance in formulating civic action projects.)

(a) Degree of need expressed by the people.
(b) Extent of benefit to the majority of the people.
(c) Ability of the people to help themselves in the project.
(d) Pride and morale resulting from completion of the project.
(e) Speed of completion to provide immediate impact in the minds of the people.
(f) Degree to which these projects support internal defense and internal development plans and programs.
(g) Extent of improvement of the government image in the target area.

2. The degree of emphasis placed on military civic action varies with the intensity of insurgency. During Phase I, military civic action concentrates on the development of the socio-economic environment. In the absence of tactical operations, a significant allocation of military resources may be devoted to civic action projects which provide both long- and short-range benefits. An example is the training of conscripts in skills which have both military and civilian application in order that these personnel may make meaningful contributions to their communities after release from military service. Remote areas, inhabited by ethnic and other minority groups susceptible to subversion, should be given civic action priority. During Phases II and III, military civic action will be concentrated on projects designed to prevent intensification of the insurgency. These projects should produce noticeable improvements
### PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION

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### FEASIBILITY

| Does it conform to local customs? | | | |
| Are all necessary skills available? | | | |
| Are labor, materials, and equipment available? | | | |
| Can it be supported by current programmed funds? | | | |

### JUSTIFICATION

| Does it support overall internal defense and internal development plans and programs? | | | |
| Will it provide maximum return on investment and effort? | | | |
| Will it avoid serious impairment of primary military mission? | | | |
| Does it avoid duplication with efforts of other agencies? | | | |

(Complete by indicating yes or no response with detailed explanatory notes attached)

* Close association with civil affairs functional teams.
* * Other functional areas as required.

Figure 7. Type military civic action worksheet.
within a comparatively short period. Examples of such projects are farm-to-market roads, bridges, short-range educational programs, basic hygiene, medical immunization programs, and simple irrigation projects. In the advanced stages of insurgency, priorities placed on defense programs may reduce military civic action to such immediate tasks as providing medical aid to sick and wounded civilians and procuring and distributing food and shelter to displaced persons.

110. Interaction With Other Military Roles

Civil affairs operations impact upon and interact with other major military roles. When planning and conducting civil affairs operations, the following interrelationships must be considered:

a. Advisory Assistance. Military forces should be advised and trained in their responsibilities and capabilities in the field of civil affairs, particularly military civic action. In addition to the constructive role which the military forces play in internal development, advisory assistance also should stress proper conduct of military personnel in their relationships with the civilian population.

b. PSYOP. Civil affairs must be supported by PSYOP to insure that projects under consideration will have the desired effect upon the population. To avoid misunderstanding, confusion, and possible discontent, civil affairs programs should be preceded and accompanied by PSYOP to inform the population of what is being accomplished in their behalf and why. PSYOP follow-up should be conducted to provide feedback on the eventual impact of civil affairs projects.

c. Intelligence Operations. Civil affairs must be based to a large extent upon information concerning the population and insurgent activities in the area. Intelligence operations can assist in providing this information. Civil affairs personnel and units, in turn, can provide intelligence information gained from on-the-ground observation while conducting civil affairs projects.

d. Populace and Resources Control Operations. Populace and resources control operations should be conducted in conjunction with civic action projects. Populace and resources control operations must insure that personnel and resources are protected from insurgent actions and that maximum benefits accrue to the civilian population. They also should insure that the completed civic action projects are used for the purposes intended and not exploited to the detriment of the people.

e. Tactical Operations. During Phases II and III of an insurgency, tactical operations must insure that civil affairs operations are conducted in a relatively secure environment. Prior to the initiation of civil affairs activities, tactical operations should attempt to reduce the insurgent military capability to jeopardize the successful accomplishment of civil affairs activities. During the conduct of civil affairs operations—particularly civic action—tactical operations protect participating personnel and organizations from insurgent attack and harassment.

111. U. S. Assistance

a. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 contains the basic authority for U. S. armed forces to provide assistance and to engage in military civic action. Responsibility for carrying out nonmilitary U. S. foreign assistance is vested in USAID which also has the responsibility for the central direction and coordination of military and economic assistance programs. The objectives of such assistance are to increase the capabilities of foreign governments and reduce their dependence upon the U. S.

b. Military aid to foreign governments usually is furnished under the provisions of the MAP which provides for both materiel and training support. U. S. military policy encourages the use of armed and paramilitary forces in developing countries on projects helpful to economic and social development, provided such activities do not detract from capabilities to perform primary military missions. The MAAG is the U. S. military organization normally charged with the responsibility for administering the MAP and insuring that HC
military forces realize the importance of good civil/military relationships.

c. The MAAG or the Military Mission operates within the framework of the U. S. Country Team which coordinates U. S. interests with those of the HC government. MAAG responsibilities and functions are detailed in paragraph 148. Military assistance programming, funding, and technical assistance require a coordinated Country Team effort. At this level, decisions are reached as to which portion of available U. S. funds for HC development should come from USAID and which should come from MAP; which U. S. department or agency should be assigned responsibility for specific projects; and how U. S. personnel and resources should be allocated.

d. While some military civic actions may entail a major outlay of personnel and materiel resources, U. S. military policy emphasizes advice and guidance at the local level to include the initiation of self-help programs which can be accomplished with available local resources.

Section IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP)

112. General

Both the HC government and insurgent forces need the support of the population to accomplish their respective programs; therefore, attaining population support represents a major struggle between these forces. PSYOP are an integral part of all internal defense and internal development activities and are tailored to meet specific requirements of each area and operation. Military and nonmilitary actions must be prejudged in terms of potential psychological impact. This often may require that short-range tactical advantages be sacrificed in order to preserve long-range psychological objectives. FM 33-1, FM 33-5, FM 100-5, and FM 100-20 contain further guidance on PSYOP.

113. Objectives

PSYOP are designed to support the achievement of national objectives and are directed toward specific target groups. The main target groups and associated PSYOP objectives are discussed below.

a. Insurgents. PSYOP objectives are to create dissension, disorganization, low morale, subversion, sabotage, and defection within insurgent forces. Emphasis should be placed on national programs designed to win the insurgent over to the side of the government and rehabilitate him into a loyal citizen.

b. Civilian Population. PSYOP objectives are to gain, preserve, and strengthen civilian support for the HC government and its internal defense and internal development objectives.

c. HC and Allied Stability Operations Forces. PSYOP objectives are essentially the same as for the civilian population, and thus contribute to building and maintaining the morale of these forces.

d. Foreign Groups. PSYOP objective is to gain support for HC efforts, thus denying this foreign support to the insurgent.

114. Concepts

The national PSYOP program, containing national objectives, guidance, and desired approaches, is prepared and directed by the NIDCC. Military organizations and civilian agencies at all levels develop PSYOP within the parameters established by the national PSYOP plan. The plan is interpreted at the various military and political levels in terms of local requirements and is coordinated through appropriate Area Coordination Centers. The U. S. and HC PSYOP efforts are mutually supporting and promote the attainment of population support for the HC government rather than for the U. S. To achieve maximum effectiveness, all psychological activities are executed vigorously within clearly established channels, and PSYOP planners develop a limited number of appropriate themes which can be disseminated by unsophisticated means. These themes, using words familiar to
the target audiences, should be clear, easily understood, and repeated frequently.

115. Organization

Units are organized and trained to emphasize psychological activities at all levels.

a. National Level. Both military and civilian PSYOP organizations exist at national level and, through the NIPCC, are responsible for—

(1) Planning the national PSYOP program.
(2) Organizing, training, and allocating HC PSYOP units and resources.
(3) Conducting strategic PSYOP.
(4) Developing criteria of program effectiveness.
(5) Monitoring all types of propaganda.

b. Regional, Provincial, and District Levels.
The regional Area Coordination Center translates national PSYOP programs and directives into implementing guidance for subordinate provincial and district Area Coordination Centers, military commanders, and civilian agencies. The provincial Area Coordination Center provides direction to provincial paramilitary forces, military forces, civilian agencies, and PSYOP teams which may be attached to the province. Since paramilitary organizations normally do not have organic PSYOP teams, PSYOP support is provided by civilian or armed forces organizations. Both military and civilian PSYOP personnel are responsible for—

(1) Advising the commander on the psychological implications of nonmilitary and military courses of action under consideration.
(2) Explaining and emphasizing the importance of the PSYOP program to U. S. advisory personnel and HC counterparts.
(3) Participating in the Area Coordination Center.
(4) Interpreting national PSYOP policies and guidelines.
(5) Establishing and executing a local PSYOP program.
(6) Using PSYOP to support all other internal defense and internal development operations.
(7) Requesting outside PSYOP support as required.
(8) Coordinating with HC or U. S. military units operating in political subdivisions to insure that their PSYOP is aligned properly with the area PSYOP programs.
(9) Indoctrinating military and civilian government personnel in the proper standards of conduct and behavior toward the population.
(10) Notifying adjacent, higher, and lower headquarters of PSYOP opportunities.
(11) Expediting the flow of PSYOP intelligence.

c. Military. PSYOP staff elements and military units plan and conduct PSYOP in consonance with national programs and directives developed by the NIDCC. Staff elements are responsible for planning and coordinating PSYOP. They frequently are supported by military PSYOP units whose operations range from national strategic PSYOP to local tactical PSYOP and consolidation PSYOP. PSYOP units are organizationally tailored to meet mission requirements and should possess the capability to employ radio, loudspeaker, printing, motion picture, and other photographic equipment necessary in conducting PSYOP.

d. Facilities and Equipment. Facilities and equipment required for PSYOP vary depending on the area and scope of operations. All equipment capable of delivering a message or producing tangible items for distribution to the target audience is considered applicable to PSYOP.

(1) At the national level, relatively permanent structures are used to house radio and TV broadcasting equipment, heavy printing presses, photographic facilities, supplies, and operating personnel. These facilities often provide backup support for mobile PSYOP teams operating at lower echelons.
(2) At lower military and political levels, PSYOP capabilities often parallel those at national level, but equipment and facilities usually are less sophisti-
116. **Operations**

Operations range from strategic PSYOP at national level to consolidation and tactical PSYOP at the regional, provincial, district, and village levels. At the national level, operations exploit the broad aspects of internal defense and internal development programs, are general in scope, and deal primarily with national policy and programs. Tactical and consolidation PSYOP are responsive to local intelligence and address more specific target audiences. In nations containing large minority groups, PSYOP employ those languages and dialects deemed necessary. Military PSYOP and civilian information services planning must be closely coordinated and supervised at all levels to insure effectiveness and credibility.

a. **Command Responsibility.** Since military forces are representatives of the government and, in many cases, a major factor in the formation of attitudes, opinions, and behavior toward the government, commanders must constantly be aware of the psychological impact of operations conducted in their areas of responsibility. Every military operation has some degree of psychological impact upon the population, and the success of an operation often may depend upon the commander's awareness of both the military and political situation.

b. **Basic Considerations.** The armed forces of many HC will not be organized or trained to conduct PSYOP effectively. When this is the case, U. S. forces may be required to conduct PSYOP training for HC military and paramilitary forces.

c. **Planning.** The basic requisites for PSYOP planners are—

1. An intimate knowledge of the background and history of the HC and its population, and the insurgent's organization and motivations.
2. A knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses which characterize ideological and political opponents.
3. A continuing awareness of the morale patterns of friendly, neutral, and insurgent elements.
4. An assurance that PSYOP plans support national objectives.
5. A knowledge of all means of communication available to carry out PSYOP.
6. The ability to categorize accurately the population into various types of audiences for the purpose of devising appropriate themes tailored to the susceptibility of specific groups.
7. The availability of continuous, timely, accurate, and detailed intelligence.

d. **Supported Campaigns.** PSYOP themes must be tailored to support the type of campaign being conducted.

1. In support of the consolidation campaign, PSYOP themes should stress the degree of security that is being afforded the population and the internal development benefits that can accrue with popular support.
2. In support of the strike campaign, PSYOP themes should explain the purpose of the operation and stress that every effort is being made to provide for the safety of the civilian population. The decision to employ PSYOP prior to the actual conduct of military operations is weighed carefully against compromising surprise and security.
3. In support of the remote area campaign, PSYOP themes are tailored to maintain the morale of remote area forces and to solicit the support of the population.

117. **Interaction With Other Military Roles**

PSYOP support and interact with other military operational roles as follows:

a. **Advisory Assistance.** MAAG and Mission advisors assist in establishing PSYOP capabilities within HC forces. PSYOP units and mobile training teams also may be employed. The PSYOP advisory effort includes—

1. Assisting in organizing and equipping HC PSYOP units.
(2) Establishing HC PSYOP schools.
(3) Augmenting the capabilities of USIS and other U. S. civil agencies.
(4) Assisting in the preparation of propaganda and PSYOP media materials, dissemination of PSYOP media, and conduct of PSYOP.
(5) Assisting in the development and conduct of a national PSYOP program.
(6) Evaluating in-country PSYOP resources and developing new requirements and contingency plans.
(7) Assisting in establishing PSYOP training programs.
(8) Fulfilling approved HC PSYOP requirements.

b. Civil Affairs Operations. The success of civil affairs operations will, in large measure, depend upon the degree of support, coordination, and integration achieved with the PSYOP effort. The basic PSYOP approach is to prepare the population to accept and understand the value of proposed civil affairs projects. To project a favorable image of the national government, PSYOP support in this field must be directed toward the population. Particular emphasis should be placed on the beneficial aspects of civic action projects conducted at province, district, and village levels. For these operations, the following should be considered:

(1) Selecting those civil affairs projects which can best be supported by PSYOP in order to achieve desired results. For best PSYOP impact, long-range activities are subdivided into limited short-range objectives which are within the capabilities of the participating units.

(2) Arranging cross-visits of influential and respected persons between villages to provide eyewitness accounts of civil affairs operations.

(3) Using personalities who are known and respected to give speeches extolling the progress and virtues of civil affairs operations. Tapes of these speeches should be prepared for dissemination.

(4) Preparing motion pictures which portray military and civilian cooperation and stress civil affairs progress.

(5) Examining each civil affairs and PSYOP plan in light of local customs, religions, and taboos.

(6) Preparing PSYOP contingency plans to minimize adverse effects of removing troops from a partially completed project should this become a necessity.

c. Intelligence Operations. Intelligence is vital to a sound PSYOP program since population attitude and behavior, ranging from passiveness to hostility, must be reshaped into genuine acceptance of the HC effort. In supporting intelligence operations, the PSYOP objective is to convince the entire population that providing intelligence information to the government forces is to their benefit. PSYOP uses all means of communication to inform the people that—

(1) Strangers, suspicious persons, and unusual activities must be reported. Methods of reporting also should be explained.

(2) Rewards are available for specific types of information, to include information leading to the apprehension of insurgents and capture of their equipment and weapons. (Such rewards must, in fact, exist.)

d. Populace and Resources Control Operations. Actions resulting from populace and resources control operations often are unpopular because of restrictions imposed upon the population. PSYOP explains the need for these operations and the positive gains accruing to the individual from them. PSYOP support of populace and resources control operations—

(1) Makes the imposition of controls more acceptable to the population by relating their necessity to safety and well-being.

(2) Emphasizes that controls are imposed on the population solely because of insurgent activities and that controls will be reduced or lifted when insurgent activity in their area is reduced.

(3) Points out that food controls give the population an excuse to reduce or
eliminate the need to provide the insurgents with food.

(4) Educates the population concerning the importance of self-defense programs.

(5) Informs the population of the importance of protecting raw materials, factories, and crops against sabotage, pilferage, and waste.

(6) Informs the people that the insurgent cannot survive without population support, and that denial of this support will hasten the reduction of controls.

(7) Promotes the cooperation of the population in areas under consolidation and gains support for local programs and national objectives.

(8) Exploits the successes of military, paramilitary, police, and other security forces while protecting the population.

(9) Emphasizes the HC ability to protect the population in consolidated areas from violence, lawlessness, insurgent propaganda, and sabotage (providing the HC is able to do so).

(10) Educates the population to help destroy the insurgent infrastructure by reporting known insurgents and their activities to proper authority.

e. Tactical Operations. The ultimate PSYOP goals in support of tactical operations are to convince the armed insurgents to cease resistance and to persuade the population not to support the insurgent movement. Some means of obtaining these goals are—

(1) Educating and indoctrinating military and paramilitary forces on the importance of proper conduct and behavior toward the population.

(2) Informing the population of the purpose and nature of past and future tactical operations (security permitting).

(3) Informing the population where to receive medical aid and other assistance.

(4) Stressing the insurgents' responsibility for the destruction of life and property.

(5) Employing divisive propaganda themes which attempt to subvert insurgent leadership, create disunity and confusion, and lower troop morale in areas under insurgent control.

(6) Publicizing amnesty programs.

(7) Utilizing leaflets and air or ground loudspeaker surrender appeals against known or suspected enemy locations. This may be particularly effective if defectors are used to deliver loudspeaker messages.

(8) Indoctrinating troops with the need to honor surrender appeals.

118. U. S. Assistance

Support and advice to the HC government normally is conducted through the establishment of a Country Team subcommittee for PSYOP. Usually chaired by the USIS public affairs officer (PAO), this subcommittee is composed of representatives from each of the other U. S. departments and agencies on the Country Team. The subcommittee formulates the U.S. PSYOP program in-country and provides guidance for both military and civilian U. S. advisors and organizations. When PSYOP requirements exceed the capabilities and resources of USIS, augmentation may be required from U. S. Army PSYOP organizations. Normally, this assistance is provided by military advisors using MAP equipment with the objective of developing a PSYOP capability within the HC.

Section V. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

119. General

The collection, processing, and dissemination of available information concerning all aspects of a nation or areas of operations susceptible to insurgency are vital to successful internal defense and internal development operations.
Of particular importance are those aspects of intelligence activities which are devoted to neutralizing or destroying the effectiveness of the insurgent infrastructure and protecting the HC against espionage, subversion, and sabotage. See FM 30–31 and FM 30–31A for detailed guidance on internal defense and internal development intelligence operations.

a. To a large extent, internal defense and internal development operations are dependent upon intelligence and counterintelligence due to the fact that subversive insurgency relies on the population for success. The population is both a target of the insurgent and a principal source of his intelligence, cover, personnel, and logistical support; therefore, the people must be considered as a fourth major consideration of intelligence in addition to the three traditional considerations of enemy, weather, and terrain.

b. The interlocking nature of the insurgent infrastructure presents a complex and difficult target for intelligence operations. The party control apparatus normally will have been engaged for years in the subversion of the population and is securely imbedded and secreted within the mass civil organization. A thorough understanding of the insurgent infrastructure and the environmental situation is essential for intelligence planning and operations at all levels.

c. Intelligence operations in support of internal defense and internal development must be oriented toward the collection, processing, and dissemination of information concerning insurgent activities and insurgent/civil relationships. Specifically, major intelligence targets are—

(1) The infrastructure;
(2) Insurgent military forces; and
(3) The civilian population.

Both covert and overt measures must be employed in attacking these intelligence targets.

d. Counterintelligence operations must protect U. S./HC information against espionage, personnel against subversion, and facilities and materiel against sabotage. The insurgent is dependent upon espionage, subversion, and sabotage for success, and counterintelligence operations must reduce these activities to a minimum, employing both active and passive measures.

120. Objectives

Intelligence operations must support overall internal defense and internal development planning and operations by providing general and specific knowledge of the area of operations and the insurgent forces. In broad terms, intelligence objectives are to—

(1) Determine the indicators of portending insurgency;
(2) Obtain information concerning the insurgent, weather, terrain, and population; and
(3) Reduce to a minimum insurgent espionage, subversion, and sabotage.

121. Concepts

Insurgents employ a full range of measures to bring about the internal destruction and overthrow of a constituted government. During Phase I, subversion is the primary measure by which the groundwork is laid for the more advanced stages of insurgency. This subversion is designed to alienate the population from the government and win the support of the people for the insurgency movement. During Phase II, guerrilla warfare erodes the strength and morale of government forces while, concurrently, insurgent strength and population support are increased. During Phase III, when sufficient military strength and population support have been gained, insurgents initiate a war of movement to defeat the government forces in decisive combat. Subversion precedes other insurgent activity and continues throughout the entire process, just as guerrilla warfare, once introduced, continues to support the war of movement.

a. As early as possible in Phase I, intelligence operations should attempt to establish evidence of subversion and whether this subversion is related to an insurgency movement so that the movement can be attacked and destroyed. This will involve operations directed against the Communist party infrastructure which consists of the hard core cellular party apparatus, its Revolutionary Committees, and its Party...
Youth Organization. Also considered as part of the infrastructure are those ostensibly legitimate civilian organizations which are insurgent-penetrated and controlled, popular front organizations, and covert village militia (guerrilla) forces. Counterintelligence operations include formulating and conducting security training programs and carrying out security measures necessary to protect U. S./HC information, personnel, facilities, and materiel against insurgent intelligence operations. These intelligence and counterintelligence measures continue throughout all phases of insurgency.

b. During Phase II, intelligence and counterintelligence operations initiated in Phase I continue and are expanded to include insurgent regional military forces. Regional forces receive their direction and are controlled by the hard core insurgent apparatus through a complex, interlocking organizational structure; therefore, personnel engaged in intelligence planning must be concerned primarily with identification and destruction or neutralization of the overall insurgent organization, rather than with piecemeal attacks on its organizational components.

c. During Phase III, intelligence and counterintelligence operations must be expanded to include insurgent main military forces. Since the mission of Main Force units is to engage government forces in a war of movement, intelligence and counterintelligence operations against insurgent Main Forces will approximate those conducted in limited and general war environments.

122. Organization

A unified, centralized intelligence system is essential to the effective conduct of internal defense and internal development operations. The tempo of intelligence must be maintained at the highest level of capability and intelligence operations must employ effectively both intelligence and counterintelligence measures. At national level, the intelligence system must provide for the following responsibilities and prerogatives: operate freely throughout the nation; maintain a centralized system of source control; coordinate all intelligence and counterintelligence activities; collect, process, and disseminate intelligence and counterintelligence information for the benefit of all authorized users; prepare national intelligence and counterintelligence plans and estimates; and coordinate those intelligence and counterintelligence operations mutually conducted with personnel of friendly foreign nations. Below national level, central points should be established at each level of government where the U. S. and HC intelligence efforts can be coordinated.

123. Operations

A thorough understanding of the societal environment is an essential element in the conduct of intelligence operations. Internal and external forces supporting or subverting a society must be understood in order to conduct effective intelligence operations. The basic intelligence on a specific area and situation is derived from strategic intelligence reports and studies augmented by available current intelligence information of the area. These form the basis for preparation of the estimate of the situation and subsequent plans. The essential elements for processing this information are contained in FM 30–5 and FM 30–31.

a. The planning for production of intelligence is a continuous process at all levels, since the attack of specific targets may be initiated at any level. There are two significant areas attending intelligence collection planning. The first is strategic intelligence which may expose actual or potential insurgency problems and usually is derived from political, economic, and socio-cultural developments. The second encompasses such intelligence functions as combat intelligence and security. Planning in both areas is important in Phase I, and collection plans must insure that orders or requests for information to collection agencies are clear and concise.

b. Initial intelligence functions which must be accomplished to support current activities and to prepare for possible future operations are—
(1) Preparation of detailed studies regarding the terrain, weather, and population groups (to include ethnic, religious, and tribal minorities).

(2) Preparation of strength and vulnerability analyses of the U.S., HC, and the insurgent.

(3) Preparation, production, and distribution of nation-wide terrain maps and, where appropriate, aerial photographs.

c. The objective of intelligence production is to provide accurate and timely intelligence which satisfies military and civil requirements at each operational echelon. There must be a steady flow of intelligence information to and from higher, lower, and adjacent U.S./HC and Allied headquarters and agencies. This necessitates frequent interdepartmental coordination between military and civil police and intelligence organizations. Intelligence requirements vary according to echelon, user, and mission. No single format, scope, or standard of detail is adequate for all users; therefore, production programs must be flexible and must contemplate production in several degrees of detail. Determination of production objectives and priorities is a matter requiring careful analysis.

d. Timely dissemination of intelligence is perhaps the most critical aspect of the intelligence process. The frequent need for immediate reaction on vital intelligence information dictates the establishment of systems for quick processing and transmission of this data to military and police units at all levels. Primary, alternate, and special intelligence channels of communication should be established when facilities and resources permit.

e. Military security applies to military information, personnel, facilities, and materiel. Classified information must be protected by all available means and entrusted only to appropriately cleared personnel who require such knowledge or possession. Even after individuals have been investigated and cleared, commanders and intelligence personnel must continue to exercise close supervision and observation over the activities and behavior of individuals who, for one reason or another, may be subjected to insurgent coercion, influence, or pressure. Each unit must prepare and maintain standing operating procedures which prescribe the security discipline, measures, and modes of conduct to be observed.

124. U.S. Assistance

See FM 30–31 and FM 30–31A.

Section VI. POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL OPERATIONS

125. General

Populace and resources control operations are necessary to control the populace and its materiel resources and to deny access to those resources which would further hostile aims and objectives against the HC. This section provides general guidance on various activities which comprise populace and resources control operations and establishes a basis upon which to develop tactics and techniques.

a. Objective. The objective of populace and resources control operations is to assist in preserving or re-establishing a state of law and order within a nation or area. Component tasks include: protecting LOC and hamlets from insurgent attack; safeguarding materiel and personnel; strengthening or establishing national authority over the population; severing relationships between the insurgent and the population; detecting and neutralizing insurgent organizations and activities; and preventing civilian interference with internal defense and internal development operations.

b. Concept. Police, intelligence, and other security agencies normally are established to maintain law and order in a peacetime environment. Their organizations are tailored to perform such tasks as protecting the population from common criminals and law-breakers and enforcing the established system of controls necessary to maintain reasonable order. In an active insurgency, security organizations have far more to contend with than the routine preservation of law and order. They are con-
fronted with a well organized insurgent machine which is adept at the disruption of a society through subversion, espionage, and sabotage. Coping with this problem normally is beyond the capabilities of peacetime security forces, and they must be expanded and reinforced by military and paramilitary forces.

(1) During Phase I, insurgents seek to gain control of the populace through a combination of persuasion, terror, and civil disturbance. In many cases, the government of a developing nation learns too late that it actually does not control its more remote areas. For this reason, insurgent activities and influence in these areas may expand rapidly, creating political vacuums which insurgents then attempt to fill. Early deployment of security forces to remote areas should take place in order to establish or re-establish a climate of law and order in which government administration and other development activities can be conducted. During Phase I, urban populace and resources control operations also may be expanded to deny insurgents materiel support from these areas. The number of insurgent elements in any area is based upon population density. Party cells normally are established in various blocks, districts, and regions throughout a city, as well as in such organizational elements as labor unions, youth groups, and social organizations, to conduct espionage, subversion, and sabotage.

(2) In Phases II and III, populace and resources control operations must be expanded to cope with increased societal disruption and the deterioration of law and order. In these phases, the insurgents possess a capability to conduct combat operations which necessitates the commitment of larger security forces to village and hamlet defense duties in order to permit the conduct of offensive operations by government armed forces.

c. Organization. Forces conducting populace and resources control operations should be organized, equipped, and trained to insure unity of command and to permit their operational employment with other forces. National agencies determine those populace and resources control requirements within their respective areas of responsibility and present them to the NIDCC. The NIDCC, assisted by these national agencies, prepares the overall national plan to insure interprovincial coordination of such operations as railway and frontier security and the protection of communications lines which cross provincial boundaries. Subnational Area Coordination Centers prepare their populace and resources control plans based on instructions and guidance provided by the NIDCC.

d. Operations. Populace and resources control measures must be limited to those which are absolutely essential and, once established, they must be enforced justly and firmly. Populace and resources control measures must conform to legal codes. In addition to prescribing possession of certain items, requiring permits for possession or movement of others, and regulating population movements, clear laws must be enacted governing authorized methods of enforcement and disposition of contraband. Populace and resources control operations must be closely supervised to prevent alienation of the population since populace and resources control operations lend themselves readily to graft and extortion. Equal emphasis should be placed on both in-country controls and control of imports. Populace and resources control operations are designed primarily to survey and control population and resources movement. These operations include, but are not limited to—(See FM 31–73 for a detailed discussion of the activities involved in these operations.)

(1) Employing population surveillance (overt and covert) based on area coverage.

(2) Controlling movement of both personnel and materiel.
(3) Establishing check points and roadblocks.
(4) Establishing curfews and blackouts.
(5) Screening and documenting the population.
(6) Conducting cordon and search operations.
(7) Establishing rationing and price controls.
(8) Controlling refugees and displaced persons.
(9) Protecting resource storage areas from insurgent attack.

126. Law Enforcement

Law enforcement is primarily a police operation to protect the persons and property of the population against criminal acts, including those perpetrated by insurgent elements. Enforcement laws must be enacted temporarily authorizing governmental security and defense forces greater powers than ordinary. Procedural protections, such as search and seizure laws, often must be diminished to permit effective law enforcement measures against organized, mobile insurgents. PSYOP measures should be taken to inform the population of such changes in the law and to turn resentment of these changes and the resulting inconvenience against the insurgents. Emphasis should be placed on the strictly temporary nature of such legislation and its basic purpose, which is to protect the bulk of the population against the insurgents. Additional legal machinery, such as courts of limited jurisdiction to try particular classes of offenses, may be required to process the increased flow of prosecutions. In any case, early attention must be given to the capability of the court system to process cases quickly and fairly. Long periods of pretrial confinement tend to turn even the most loyal citizens against the government.

127. Defended Hamlets

Hamlets are organized, equipped, trained, and supported to provide their inhabitants with a self-defense capability.

a. Objectives. Specific objectives of defended hamlets are to provide security and defense for the population, sever relationships between the population and the insurgents, and facilitate internal development operations.

b. Concept. As far as possible, existing hamlets are converted into defended hamlets to enable the inhabitants to continue their normal pursuits. Converting existing sites more readily facilitates internal development, since people are more willing to defend their traditional homes and land; however, for tactical and other reasons, new hamlets may have to be established. New hamlets should be sited in areas easily defended and where the inhabitants can pursue their normal modes of livelihood. Defended hamlets should have a capability to ward off attack by small insurgent guerrilla units and to withstand assault by insurgent Regional or Main Force units long enough to permit reinforcement.

c. Organization. Hamlets which comprise a village are organized to be mutually supporting and provide defense in depth throughout the village complex.

(1) Hamlet defenders are recruited from the inhabitants and are formed into irregular forces.

(2) Both the complexity of hamlet defensive works and the size defense force needed are based primarily upon the insurgent threat and the terrain. Maximum use is made of local materials and personnel to construct defensive works.

(3) Organization of hamlet defense includes a security system that will provide continuous all-around protection. In order to organize the system in depth, various techniques are described in the four major zones below:

(a) Interior zone—area within the perimeter. Within the installation, underground or covered shelters are constructed. Covered routes are dug to defensive firing positions. The installation is divided into areas of security responsibility or compartmentalized.
(b) Perimeter zone—area immediately outside the installation. The perimeter should contain barriers, weapons positions, guard towers, and numerous obstacles. Maximum use is made of local materiel. Sentinels are essential and dogs are useful.

(c) Restricted zone—area outside of the perimeter zone. This area extends out to effective range of small arms fire; is cleared to provide good fields of fire and observation; is clearly marked to protect innocent wanderers; and contains numerous artificial obstacles and early warning devices. Traffic is checked and suspicious traffic rerouted. Emplaced explosives are kept under surveillance to prevent their use by the insurgent.

(d) Secure zone—area outside the restricted zone. This area extends out several kilometers or miles. In this zone, patrolling occurs and observation and listening posts are established. Local civilians are recruited into an early warning net.

(4) Measures to provide additional security include: curfews, blackouts, changing sentinel routes and times of relief, relocation of crew-served weapons, alert drills and rehearsals, and preplanned reaction capabilities.

d. Operations. The participation by all members of the hamlet in providing their own defense is accomplished by the integration of military, political, economic, and sociological activities into one operation.

(1) Prior to undertaking a defended hamlet program, the following questions should be resolved:

(a) Does the situation warrant the establishment of defended hamlets?

(b) Is the development of defended hamlets within the capability of the government?

(c) Does the terrain or area favor the establishment of defended hamlets?

(d) How will the inhabitants react to the establishment of defended hamlets? If reaction is unfavorable, how can this be changed?

(e) Will the advantages accrued by the establishment of defended hamlets outweigh the disadvantages?

(2) Plans to establish a defended hamlet should include—

(a) Priorities for development of complexes.

(b) Locations of defended hamlets.

(c) Methods by which the population can be motivated to enter the program voluntarily.

(d) Allocation of fortification materiel.

(e) Allocation of engineer assistance.

(f) Programs for training hamlet defense forces.

(g) Organization of the hamlet administrative system to include appointment and delineation of duties of hamlet chiefs, councils, committees, and others.

(h) Internal development activities.

(3) Resettlement of some families may be required to make the hamlet more compact and easily defended. When possible, resettlement should be made to sites within easy reach of the inhabitants’ original agricultural plots or work areas.

(a) A house site for each family is designated.

(b) Advance warning of movement is given each household if feasible.

(c) Free transportation and sufficient time are provided to move families, animals, possessions, and salvageable building materials.

(d) Building materials are made available at the new site.

(e) Each family is given a subsidy to purchase needed materials and is compensated for losses and damage incurred during movement.
(f) Emergency food stocks are made available at the new site.

(g) Markets and shops are established.

(h) Temporary shelters are made available for resettled families.

(i) Forces participating in resettlement programs are especially considerate to resettled families.

(4) The concept of defended hamlet security also involves mobile defense. See FM 31-16 for guidance concerning the conduct of hamlet complex defense.

128. Frontier Operations

U.S. and HC armed forces may be required to conduct frontier operations independently or to reinforce other security forces normally charged with this mission.

a. Objectives. The objective of frontier operations is to deny infiltration or exfiltration of insurgent personnel and materiel across land, sea, and air frontiers. Tasks which may be performed in attaining this objective include—

(1) Customs inspections.

(2) Intelligence and counterintelligence operations.

(3) Smuggling control.

(4) Passport control.

(5) Refugee control.

(6) Population relocation.

(7) Communications jamming.

(8) Interdiction operations.

(9) Military civic action.

(10) PSYOP.

(11) Transfrontier pursuit.

(12) Surface and air defense.

b. Concept. In Phase I insurgency, frontier operations normally are handled by police, customs, and other security forces. In Phases II and III, combat requirements incident to frontier operations may necessitate assistance from the armed and paramilitary forces.

(1) The physical sealing of a frontier may be infeasible since such an operation could entail the commitment of forces and materiel which are excessive in the light of overall national requirements.

(2) Since it may not be possible to place forces at all possible crossings or entry sites, priorities must be established. Natural barriers are strengthened and patrolled or guarded and, where appropriate, tactical barriers are constructed.

c. Organization. National frontier forces may be comprised of border police and guards. Frontier forces also may include provincial paramilitary forces and the armed forces of regional commands which have responsibility for portions of the international frontier.

(1) Direction and control. Frontier operations are planned, directed, and supervised from the national level. Provincial governors and armed force area commanders may be delegated authority for the conduct of frontier operations.

(a) Specific frontier commands may be organized to provide unity of command.

(b) Along the coastal frontiers, the navy conducts operations which are coordinated within the Area Coordination Center in coastal provinces.

(c) Naval support may be needed along land frontiers consisting of extensive waterways. Under such circumstances, the establishment of primary interests and responsibilities must be coordinated closely at national and lower level armed forces headquarters.

(d) Frontier units normally operate under direct control of appropriate armed force area commanders. Since they operate within the provinces, units maintain close liaison with the provincial Area Coordination Center and with national and provincial internal security and intelligence officials in their areas of operation.
(e) Frontier operations require an extensive communications and warning system.

(2) Structuring. Frontier TF are tailored units designed to meet requirements in the area to which they are assigned. They should contain sufficient combat support and combat service support units to permit independent operations for an indefinite period.

d. Operations. When physical sealing of a land frontier is not feasible, restricted zones or friendly population buffer zones should be established. Regardless of which method is used, continuous patrol activity, detailed surveillance, and a system for command and control must be established.

(1) Surveillance. Continuous and detailed surveillance is conducted to determine infiltration and exfiltration routes and sites; frequency and volume of traffic; type of transportation; terrain conditions; and probable locations of sanctuaries. Surveillance and control of extensive coastal areas normally require the use of coordinated ground patrols on the shoreline; coordinated offshore patrols; static observation posts along the shoreline; and an effective system of licensing and identifying friendly military and civilian watercraft.

(2) Restricted zone. An area of predetermined width contiguous to the border is declared a restricted zone, and personnel residing within this zone are relocated. Appropriate proclamations are made to the effect that all individuals or groups encountered in the zone are considered to be insurgent force elements.

(a) Within the limits of practicality, restricted zones are cleared of vegetation and other obstacles which limit observation, using defoliants where appropriate.

(b) Restricted zones are controlled by the use of ground and aerial observers, electronic sensory devices, ground surveillance radars, listening posts, and patrols.

(3) Friendly population buffer. The civilian population living within the area of operations is limited to those believed to be loyal to the government. This can be accomplished by relocating persons of doubtful loyalty. This concept provides a good potential for the establishment of informant nets and the employment of loyal citizens in self-defense border units. It denies insurgents potential civilian contacts and base areas for use in border-crossing activities.

(4) Military operations. Border units establish operational bases at battalion and company levels to direct frontier operations. Supplemental signal, engineer, and fire support normally will be required.

(a) Naval patrols interdict, inspect, and, if required, detain ships and other watercraft plying coastal waterways. They enforce populace and resources control measures established by law to prevent sea infiltration and exfiltration.

(b) Air force support is facilitated by the air force plans officer attached to TF headquarters. Air force liaison officers are furnished from the armed forces headquarters to border TF headquarters and tactical air control parties are attached to the combat elements of border TF.

129. Lines of Communication Security
Open and secure lines of communication (LOC) are vital to the survival of a nation and are priority targets for insurgent forces. LOC include highways, rail lines, intercoastal and inland waterways, transmission lines, and pipelines.

a. Objective. The objective of LOC security is to obtain the secure and uninterrupted flow of government and civilian traffic, communications, and materiel.

b. Concept. Basic operations to secure LOC
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consist of detailed surveillance, security of key installations, escort of convoys and trains, and the establishment of priorities for the protection of key or primary LOC.

c. Organization. Forces employed for LOC security may include armed, paramilitary, and irregular forces; police; and intelligence agencies. Forces are organized to guard bridges and tunnels and to provide convoy security elements. Army, navy, and air force aircraft are employed to provide convoy escort and conduct surveillance and route reconnaissance. Convoy and train movements must be well coordinated with all agencies involved through the various provincial, regional, and district Area Coordination Centers. Specialized forces for LOC security, although national in organization, should be under the operational control of the Area Coordination Center in the province in which they are operating.

d. Operations. Effective LOC security requires careful planning, detailed training, and rapid response to insurgent attacks.

1. Highway security. The objective of highway security is to protect individuals, traffic, and convoys, and to secure roadways, bridges, tunnels, and other installations from destruction and sabotage. Since avoidance of insurgent attack is not always possible, methods such as the following must be employed to minimize the effects of attack:

(a) Taking counterintelligence measures to prevent insurgents from gaining information concerning convoy movements and defensive measures to be employed.
(b) Clearing roadsides of concealing growth, using defoliants where appropriate.
(c) Using air cover to prevent or minimize the effect of ambushes.
(d) Using troop units to provide armed convoy escorts and to conduct route or area ground reconnaissance.
(e) Establishing communications links between convoy commanders, convoy elements, and supporting forces.

2. Railway security. Since railway tracks, bridges, defiles, tunnels, and workshops are difficult to protect, they are particularly attractive targets for insurgent attack. Although some degree of railway security may be provided by area and regional armed forces as well as province and district forces, special railway security forces normally are organized and charged with the primary mission of rail security.

(a) Organization. Railway security forces may include provincial para-military forces, national and local police, railway company employees, armed forces, and intelligence agencies.

1. National-level agencies provide centralized planning and guidance for railway affairs, to include coordinating railway security operations. A policy-making body for rail security should be established within the NIDCC composed of representatives from the various governmental departments. This policy body should be duplicated at regional armed forces areas and provincial levels to develop and coordinate local railway security measures.

2. Military railway security forces are specifically trained in rail line, train, and escort security duties. The military railway security forces escort trains and provide weapons crews and armed guards for terminals and key way stations. The military coordinates with railway operating personnel in maintaining communications; movement and security of the train; reconnaissance and aerial surveillance; and the defense of primary installations along the route.
3. Regional armed forces conduct tactical operations, patrolling activities, and ground and aerial surveillance along rail lines.

4. Provinces may provide additional security forces for checkpoints, bridge and tunnel security, and reinforcement of attacked trains.

(b) Active measures. Even when friendly forces dominate an area, there is always a possibility of deliberate sabotage and overt attacks against railway lines.

1. Rail line patrols are conducted by trackwalkers, local armed forces, and paramilitary combat and reconnaissance patrols, supplemented by air observation and photo reconnaissance teams. In addition, military rail security forces may conduct periodic day and night patrols along selected portions of the line on an unscheduled basis.

2. The military rail security force normally does not guard installations; therefore, bridges, stations, workshops, defiles, and tunnels may have to be guarded by the armed forces. Bridges should be defended against insurgent swimmers attempting to emplace demolition charges.

3. Aircraft are employed for track patrolling, escort of selected trains, and close air support of beleaguered trains.

4. Countermeasures against electrically-detonated mines may include mine detectors, trackwalkers, pilot-cars with sensory equipment, and mine pre-exploder and neutralizer devices. Countermeasures against armed attack or ambush of trains include the use of heavily armed and armored cars, counter-ambush barrage weapons, and smoke, riot control agents, and flame dispensers.

5. Parallel and access roads should be developed and maintained to facilitate ground reconnaissance and the reinforcement of beleaguered trains and key installations.

(c) Communications. Good communications are necessary for the timely provision of assistance to a beleaguered train or installation.

1. Radio communications are established to cover the entire line and to net with the military rail security force headquarters, armed forces regional commands, direct air support centers, and provincial headquarters.

2. Direct air-ground communications systems must be provided on trains to enable security forces to contact and direct the fires of the close air support aircraft.

(d) Intelligence. Intelligence and counterintelligence measures are essentially the same as for highway security.

3. Inland waterway security. Naval, marine, police, and aviation forces conduct security operations along inland waterways. In addition, armed and paramilitary forces assigned to provinces containing water LOC may participate in inland waterway security.

(a) Organization. Inland waterway security forces may include national-level governmental agencies, armed, paramilitary, and police forces, and irregular forces.

1. A planning board should be organized in the NIDCC to plan and coordinate the operations of the various forces charged with inland waterway security.

2. The navy normally is given the primary responsibility for securing inland waterways.

3. The army may provide assault
forces for operations along inland waterways and furnish guards for important canal intersections, bridges, dams, and locks.

4. Aviation resources may conduct surveillance, reconnaissance, and close air support.

5. Provincial paramilitary and police forces may provide canal patrols, installation security forces, and checkpoint personnel.

(b) Intelligence. Intelligence and counterintelligence measures are essentially the same as for highway security.

(c) Active measures. Operations along inland waterways are similar in many respects to those along highways and railways.

1. Navy patrols and river TF ply the main waterways maintaining checkpoints and conducting reconnaissance and surveillance operations. Armed and paramilitary forces conduct patrols and operations along the banks of main canals and waterways.

2. Curfew is imposed during hours of darkness; this facilitates the detection of clandestine or illegal traffic by the use of night aerial radar, ground surveillance radar, and infrared surveillance devices.

3. In those regions where inland waterways provide the principal mode of travel, hamlets often are established on the banks of canals. If defended, these hamlets provide an excellent means of securing many miles of inland waterways.

(d) Communications. Communications measures to support waterway security are essentially the same as for highway security.

(4) Transmission line security. Transmission line traffic consists of electrical power, communications, and liquids. These lines often traverse rough and relatively inaccessible terrain and are difficult to secure. Primarily, transmission line security consists of guarding important installations, such as power plants, dams, transfer stations, and pumping stations; conducting patrols and surveillance along the line; and repairing portions of the line which may become damaged.

(a) Organization. Organization for transmission line security is similar to that provided for the security of other LOC. National-level planning and coordination boards or agencies are formed to provide high-level guidance and allocation of resources. Planning is accomplished at NIDCC and the various Area Coordination Centers along the route of the line. Armed forces provide security elements for certain key installations and for repair and construction crews. Aircraft conduct surveillance along the route. Provincial paramilitary and police forces patrol and reinforce the defense of key installations.

(b) Intelligence. Intelligence and counterintelligence measures for security of transmission lines are essentially the same as those provided for highway security.

(c) Active measures. Transmission line security should be incorporated into the defense plans of contiguous areas. The strategic and tactical value of the transmission lines should not be publicized; however, public announcement of insurgent damage to those transmission lines which provide power, communications, water, and fuel to the population can be of psychological value in discrediting insurgent action against public property.

1. Transmission lines should be routed along less direct routes, such as secured highways, rail lines, and waterways. Some lines
may be routed from plants or main transmission stations to the sea, and thence as underwater cable to the terminal station.

2. Unprotected minefields should not be used to secure towers and other installations since the mines may fall into insurgent hands.

3. Technical devices should be installed to indicate the exact location and time of the damage or failure of the line.

4. PSYOP are useful in playing down the military value of transmission lines and in emphasizing the humanitarian requirements for their continuous operation.

(d) Communications. Communications requirements for transmission line security are essentially the same as for highway security.

130. Disarming the Population

It is customary in many developing nations for mature males to be armed even though bearing arms may be illegal. Disarmament, therefore, is important to prevent these weapons from falling into the hands of insurgents or other dissident groups which may attempt to assume power and thus threaten the legally constituted government.

a. Objectives. The objective of disarmament operations is to account for and control all weapons to prevent their use by insurgents and other dissident groups.

b. Concept. Disarming the population may be initiated during hostilities as a vital step in the restoration of internal security.

(1) Law-abiding elements of the population who voluntarily surrender their arms are guaranteed protection by those forces charged with the restoration and maintenance of internal security. The effectiveness of disarmament measures depends to a large extent on the size of the population, the extent of territory, and the number of troops available; however, if executed properly, a large portion of the population may be disarmed voluntarily. Others must be disarmed by the military or police, using measures designed to locate and confiscate arms possessed clandestinely. Although complete disarmament will be difficult, the enforcement of ordinances restricting the possession of arms will result in the possession of arms only by insurgent forces, outlaws, and a limited number of inhabitants attempting to evade this ordinance. The success of disarmament operations, particularly those based on voluntary surrender of arms, will tend to be in direct proportion to the degree of security which can be afforded by the government.

(2) Upon cessation of hostilities, one of the initial steps is disarming insurgent forces and friendly paramilitary and irregular forces. For maximum effectiveness, this action must be timely and the full cooperation of government leaders and the population must be secured through proper psychological conditioning. To secure this cooperation, the government must have the confidence of the population and must be able to insure adherence by all parties to disarmament laws. This involves providing security for those who have depended upon their weapons for self-protection.

c. Organization. Civil police authorities, armed forces, intelligence agencies, and other security forces may be employed to collect firearms, ammunition, and explosives.

(1) Civil authorities. The use of civil officials has many advantages over the employment of the armed forces in disarming the population. It is the most normal means of accomplishing the desired objective and is less likely to engender antagonism or create friction. It gives peaceful law-abiding citizens the opportunity to surrender their weapons without being sub-
jected to what might be considered the indignity of personally surrendering to military authorities.

(a) The success attained through the employment of civil authorities in disarmament depends upon the spirit and conscientiousness with which they operate.

(b) The national police may assist in the collection and confiscation of firearms by using their knowledge of the nation and their familiarity with the habits of the people. If it appears that civil officials have exhausted their capabilities to collect arms, governmental authorities may issue orders to the effect that, after a given date, the armed forces and intelligence agencies will be responsible for collecting arms and gathering evidence for conviction of persons involved in violating disarmament laws.

(2) Intelligence agencies. Disarmament action taken by intelligence agencies generally involves comparatively large quantities of illegal firearms and ammunition held by individuals and groups who are intentionally trying to avoid detection. Special operations may be employed for several years following the cessation of insurgency to trace imports of arms and ammunition. Governmental permits and correspondence, customs files, and other records assist in identifying the receipt and disposition of these munitions.

d. Operations. Prior to issuing orders or decrees for the disarmament of the population, an estimate of the situation should be made to analyze all features of the undertaking.

(1) The analysis should include the following:

(a) Determining type of PSYOP/information programs to be conducted in support of the disarmament program.

(b) Determining those measures required to enforce the arms control law.

(c) Designating the civil and military authorities responsible for issuing disarmament orders or decrees.

(d) Designating those forces responsible for enforcing disarmament laws.

(e) Determining methods of promulgating orders or decrees.

(f) Designating and preparing depots, buildings, and bunkers for the storage of collected arms, ammunition, and explosives.

(g) Disposing of collected munitions.

(h) Accounting for collected munitions.

(i) Designating types and classes of munitions to be collected.

(j) Designating those agencies (civil and military) responsible for securing and transporting collected munitions.

(k) Preparing instructions for agencies charged with the execution of orders and decrees.

(l) Preparing instructions for the manufacture and importation of munitions.

(m) Preparing instructions for the sale and distribution of munitions.

(n) Establishing time limits for compliance with orders or decrees and the penalties to be imposed for violations or infractions.

(2) A feature of the disarmament program which may cause difficulty and misunderstanding is the question of retaining machetes, knives, stilettos, and similar instruments. The populace should not be deprived of implements on which they depend for their livelihood. Sufficient time should be allowed for all elements of the population to surrender their arms.

(3) Prior to actual disarmament, laws must be enacted and published for-
bidding the general public to possess firearms, ammunition, weapons, and explosives except by specific authority. Wide publicity must be given these laws and related administrative regulations.

(a) At the cessation of hostilities, governmental or arbitral forces institute measures to secure the area and to achieve the cooperation of the opposition leadership to prevent the caching or illegal sale of weapons.

(b) Personnel must be designated to receive, protect, and maintain the materiel surrendered. An accurate accounting system should be devised to keep complete records of materiel received, and instructions issued designating the agencies which are authorized to accept the materiel and give receipts. A receipt must be furnished for each weapon received except those which are confiscated as contraband. If reissue to governmental agencies is contemplated or if return of weapons to the populace will not take place within a reasonable time, compensation should be made to the owners rather than issuance of receipts.

(c) Classification should be made as to the manner in which arms are collected: materiel voluntarily surrendered for which a receipt has been issued; materiel confiscated; or materiel otherwise received. The custody of materiel implies responsibility to guard and preserve it for eventual return to the rightful owners. Serviceable materiel may be of a type, caliber, and condition suitable for reissue to HC troops, local police, special agents, or others requiring arms. Unserviceable materiel or that which is hazardous to store is disposed of as directed. Whenever materiel is disposed of in any manner, permanent records should be made of the action. In general, records are made and subscribed to by witnesses whenever materiel is destroyed or otherwise disposed of. Permanently confiscated materiel should be stored separately from the materiel which the government holds temporarily in custody.

(d) Designated authorities determine who shall be empowered to issue arms permits and to whom they may be issued. The process must be coordinated to prevent conflicts or overlapping authority. Certain civil officials, such as provincial governors, judges, and others carrying out security functions, may be authorized to carry arms. Certain permits issued are honored throughout the nation; others are valid only in specified areas.

(e) Planning should include measures to discourage illegal production or procurement of firearms from either within or outside the nation. If national laws prohibiting possession of arms are inadequate, measures should be taken to improve them. If there are remote areas in which law enforcement is difficult, certain concessions may be necessary in order that inhabitants in these areas may protect themselves against lawless elements.

131. Protection of Voters and Polls

During active insurgency, the use of military and police forces to protect voters, polls, and electoral records may be necessary to insure a valid election. These forces are employed to prevent violence to personnel conducting the election, destruction or seizure of ballots and electoral records, and for general protection of the population moving to and from polling stations. Whenever practical, forces required to guarantee an impartial election should be provided by the HC. To avoid the charge that
the election has been unduly influenced, the use of HC and foreign armed forces at or near the polls should be limited to those needed to insure security.

132. U. S. Assistance

To the maximum extent possible, populace and resources control operations should be performed by HC agencies.

a. U. S. force participation in populace and resources control operations may range from minor operational support to extensive operations in U. S. base areas; however, any populace and resources control operation conducted by U. S. forces will be coordinated in appropriate Area Coordination Centers. Normally, U. S. forces function as a reserve to be deployed only in cases of emergency to assist the HC police and armed forces in populace and resources control operations.

(1) Adherence by U. S. personnel to local laws, customs, and regulations is essential to insure that U. S. forces do not hamper HC populace and resources control operations and that the U. S. maintains the respect and confidence of the population.

(2) U. S. civil affairs elements plan and provide staff supervision for those aspects of populace and resources control programs conducted by U. S. forces and agencies.

b. USAID and MAP assistance is provided to train, equip, and advise HC populace and resources control forces. In addition, USAID and MAP may support specific operations. For example, MAP support is provided to defended hamlets in the form of construction materials, weapons, ammunition, and communications equipment. USAID assists by providing livestock, seeds, fertilizers, farm equipment, wells, pumps, and other items. In some areas, radios and mobile movie units are provided and schools and public health facilities are constructed.

Section VII. TACTICAL OPERATIONS

133. General

Tactical operations are the most violent and extreme of all those employed in internal defense. They are the primary operations used to conduct the strike campaign and are employed to support consolidation and remote area campaigns. This section provides guidance on the objectives, organization, and doctrine used in conducting tactical operations. References which provide further guidance on tactical operations include FM 31-16, FM 100-5, and FM 100-20.

134. Objective

The objective of tactical operations is to destroy insurgent tactical forces and bases and establish a secure environment within which internal development is possible. Tactical operations are coordinated with civilian agencies through the Area Coordination Center.

135. Concepts

Tactical operations rarely are conducted as independent sporadic actions aimed solely at the elimination of insurgent tactical forces and bases. They usually are conducted as part of a larger campaign involving the employment of other internal defense and internal development forces in the attainment of broader objectives.

a. Phase I Insurgency. In Phase I, insurgent activities range from threats of violence to situations in which subversive incidents and activities occur with frequency in an organized pattern. These activities normally are countered by civil security and counterintelligence forces. Armed and paramilitary forces engage in training for contingency tactical operations or are employed in military civic action. They may be deployed in show-of-force operations in rural areas where insurgent activities are acute.

b. Phases II and III Insurgency. When the subversive insurgency movement has gained sufficient strength and population support, guerrilla warfare is initiated (Phase II) and,
as insurgent capabilities develop further, insurgent tactical forces may mount mobile warfare (Phase III). Subversion, guerrilla warfare, and mobile warfare may be conducted simultaneously or in any combinations in various geographical areas. Regardless of the purpose and method of employment of U. S. and HC tactical forces, they must be prepared to accommodate concurrently all forms of insurgent activity.

136. Organization

Armed and paramilitary forces are organized primarily to conduct tactical operations; however, civil security forces such as the police may be assigned certain limited combat missions. Tactical operations must be coordinated by Area Coordination Centers, where intelligence, psychological, and other activities required to support tactical operations are integrated. Organizational emphasis for tactical operations is placed on firepower and mobility. Organization should stress tactical self-sufficiency and provide adequate intelligence, signal, transportation, and other combat support and combat service support elements to conduct semi-independent or independent operations. Moreover, consideration should be given to providing the tactical force with capabilities for dealing with the civilian population by attaching or assigning civil affairs and PSYOP personnel or units.

137. Operations

a. Tactical Operations. Tactical operations against guerrillas include the use of saturation patrolling to locate and fix insurgent forces and conducting offensive operations to destroy them. Saturation patrolling entails the deployment of patrols over a selected area of operations so that insurgents cannot move without detection. Patrolling is conducted by squad and platoon-size forces which maintain contact with insurgent forces sighted until larger units can be deployed to destroy them. The following tactics are most frequently employed:

(1) Conducting saturation patrolling by foot, track, wheel, air, and water mobile units on a 24-hour schedule. Patrols visit villages and hamlets, establish mobile checkpoints on routes of communication, and preserve law and order outside of hamlet boundaries.

(2) Organizing ambushes in depth and width which are backed up by adequate reserves.

(3) Conducting raids against hamlets and areas known or suspected of harboring insurgent personnel and/or materiel.

(4) Maintaining reserves to permit deployment of forces to meet offensive or defensive operational requirements.

(5) Manning of outposts and other installations with minimum essential forces, relying upon artillery, close air support, and mobile reserves to relieve beleaguered posts.

(6) Making maximum use of police patrols to maintain security.

(7) Employing fire support for both territorial defense and support of tactical forces.

(8) Immediately attacking insurgent guerrilla forces which have been detected and isolated.

b. Mobile Warfare. The tactics outlined above must be modified significantly to meet a mobile warfare threat. Mobile warfare cannot be considered as positional or guerrilla warfare. While the same objectives are sought, larger reserves are maintained, the size of operating units is increased, artillery fires are massed, and larger security and defense detachments are required. In mobile warfare, utilization of terrain, organization of fires, and maneuver are used to seize and hold the initiative, not terrain; therefore, commanders must not expect tactics such as envelopment, penetration, or turning movement to produce the same effects on insurgent forces as they would if terrain were the key consideration. Caches, safe areas, and population support may be dispersed so strategically that insurgent tactical units are not dependent on critical logistical bases which they must protect, and they may
maneuver in any direction in reaction to an offensive maneuver.

c. Principles of Operation. Continuous pressure against insurgent forces must be maintained and commanders must be particularly cautious not to consider them destroyed merely because opposition has ceased. If contact with the insurgent force is lost, aggressive efforts must be made to re-establish it. Long periods of inactivity permit insurgent forces to rest, reorganize, and resume offensive operations. The following are some salient principles which govern tactical operations.

(1) Commanders must orient their efforts on the destruction or neutralization of the insurgent force rather than on the seizure of terrain.

(2) Front and rear lines normally do not exist; therefore, units always must remain vigilant and ready for any contingency which might arise.

(3) Tactical areas assigned to military commanders should not be defined by straight, linear boundaries, but should encompass complete political subdivisions to facilitate coordination with civil agencies.

(4) When possible, defensive tasks should be performed by paramilitary and irregular forces to permit armed forces units to concentrate on offensive operations.

(5) Purely defensive measures allow the insurgent force to become stronger; therefore, continuous pressure, regardless of weather conditions, must be exerted to prevent the insurgent from resting, obtaining supplies, and conducting offensive operations.

(6) Informant nets should be established within the population.

(7) Small detachments should not be deployed in defensive operations without adequate fire support and available reinforcements.

(8) Large forces should not be dispatched to destroy or attack insurgent units unless the insurgents have been found and fixed.

(9) Large military forces should not be garrisoned in the hope that the physical presence of troops will deter insurgent operations.

d. Offensive Operations. The purpose of offensive operations is the destruction or neutralization of insurgent tactical forces and base areas.

(1) Harassment tactics prevent the insurgent from resting, reorganizing, and massing personnel and supplies for large-scale attacks; aid friendly forces in gaining intelligence of the area of operations; and cause the insurgent to expend his limited resources. Harassment tactics also may be conducted as an economy of force measure in low priority areas to deny the insurgent absolute freedom of operations.

(2) Once an insurgent force has been located, it is eliminated by combat power applied through strike operations. Encirclement offers the greatest possibility for fixing insurgent forces and for achieving decisive results.

e. Defensive Operations. Defensive operations normally are conducted as coordinated military and civilian programs. Defensive operations are employed to—

(1) Reduce the insurgent capacity for offensive action.

(2) Deny the insurgent entry into an area.

(3) Destroy or trap the insurgent force.

(4) Develop more favorable conditions for offensive action.

(5) Economize forces in one area in order to apply decisive force elsewhere.

f. Retrograde Movements. Except in Phase III, insurgent forces seldom will be able physically to push government tactical forces from an area; however, it may be desirable for economy of force or other reasons to retire and
retrograde movements must be planned for this eventuality.

g. Bases of Operation. Bases are secure localities from which operations are projected and supported. Bases may be permanent or semipermanent installations containing essential command, control, communications, combat support, and combat service support elements and attachments. FM 31-16 contains details of base establishment and defense.

138. Combat Support

a. Artillery. Artillery provides fire support for both assault and territorial defense elements. Tactics and techniques applicable to limited and general war employment require some modification in an insurgency environment, but the basic tenets of artillery employment remain valid.

(1) Planning must include the fire support of paramilitary, irregular, and police forces. Planning is centralized and detailed for consolidation operations, while planning for strike operations may be decentralized to provide for flexibility.

(2) Consideration must be given to the restrained application of fire because of hamlet activities and movements of civilians within the area of operations.

(3) Artillery target acquisition agencies should be employed to assist in locating insurgent forces. For detailed discussion of fire support planning and coordination principles and procedures, refer to FM 6-20-1, FM 6-20-2, and FM 31-16.

b. Engineers. Tactical operations require increased engineer support because of poorly developed road nets, insufficient key installations, and the inadequate capability of bridges and culverts. For a discussion of the capabilities and organization of engineer units, teams, and detachments, see FM 5-1, FM 5-135, FM 5-136, FM 5-142, and FM 31-16.

(1) When conducting tactical operations in remote areas, direct support is desirable since it allows flexibility in meeting engineer support requirements throughout the operational area.

(2) The full capabilities of engineer units cannot be realized if a large portion of their troops must be employed in providing their own security in the operational area; therefore, they normally are provided site security.

c. Communications. Units must be provided multichannel facilities which permit connection with civil and military communications systems. Vulnerable forward area signal centers should be located where they can be provided local security.

(1) Portable radio sets, in addition to short-range transceivers, will be required. A requirement may exist to provide squads and platoons with company-level radios and companies with battalion-level radios.

(2) Augmentation may be required for the purpose of constructing, rehabilitating, and maintaining civilian communications facilities.

d. Tactical Air Support. Preplanned and immediate close air support, tactical air reconnaissance, and tactical airlift are requested through army and air force channels as discussed in the FM 7-series, FM 61-100, and FM 100-27.

e. Aerial Fire Support. Highly accurate, discriminatory, and responsive firepower is provided by organic or supporting army armed helicopters to complement tactical air support. Procedures for employing, requesting, and controlling armed helicopters is discussed in FM 1-100, FM 1-110, FM 57-35, and FM 61-100.

139. Combat Service Support

a. Supply. Effective supply is essential to the support of tactical operations; however, until valid experience data can be accumulated, consumption factors, basic loads, stockage levels, and basis of issue must be adjusted to fit the operational area. Similar factors must
be developed for Allied military and civil forces that may be supported in whole or in part from U.S. resources. The possible need for special items must be taken into account early.

1. It may be necessary to establish and maintain stockage levels of supply at echelons below those where such stockage normally is maintained.

2. Troops may be provided supplies through unit distribution, supply point distribution, or a combination of the two. When the terrain affords a high degree of mobility and when the command has adequate transportation, unit distribution may be preferable. When the terrain or feasible use of ground transport limits movement, distribution through supply points supported by airlift operations may be desirable or essential.

3. Local procurement is used when practicable to reduce transportation requirements; however, the overall impact on the economy of the host country must be a major consideration.

4. Army forces must be prepared to provide essential items of supply to support civic action programs, to include aid to isolated population centers, groups relocated or concentrated for security reasons, and civilian victims of attack. Such supply normally is limited to subsistence but may include such other survival necessities as medical supplies, clothing, construction materials, and fuel.

5. Supervision must be exercised over the distribution of civilian supplies which could be used by hostile forces. Although local civilians are employed in these functions to the greatest extent possible, in some situations the military must assume this responsibility.

6. Security of supply installations is vital. Supplies are conserved for consumption by friendly forces and are denied to hostile forces. Supply personnel should be prepared to cope with insurgent attack and guard against contamination, pilferage, and robbery. Supply installations are prime targets and precautions must be taken for their security.

b. Maintenance. The nature of operations may preclude elaborate maintenance support; therefore, both a high level of preventive maintenance and responsive support from direct support units are stressed.

1. Direct support repair teams may accompany combat and combat support units to provide on-the-spot minor repairs and limited direct exchange. Mobile maintenance teams assist using units in preparing for operations and in rapid recovery after completed operations. In operations where maintenance elements cannot accompany combat units, direct exchange of such unserviceable items as weapons and radios must be provided for in selected forward stockage.

2. Time is needed before and after each mission to perform repairs and obtain replacement items.

3. Direct support elements must provide rapid maintenance support at each security post and combat base. Although emphasis is on repair by replacement (direct exchange), efforts are made to repair items without performing complete overhaul or rebuild. Stockage of float items is planned to insure that only fast-moving, high-mortality, combat essential items are stocked.

4. When items cannot be repaired at direct support echelon, they should be evacuated or otherwise disposed of. In no case, however, should equipment that can be used or cannibalized be permitted to fall into insurgent hands.

c. Transportation. Internal defense and internal development operations need a reliable transportation system that is responsive to
requirements of tactics and logistics, capable of operating over varied and difficult terrain, and of using various modes of transport. Control of transportation should pass to the appropriate commander during operations and revert to the parent transportation unit upon completion of the mission.

(1) Minimum essential items needed to support operations, that cannot be man-packed by soldiers or carried by organic vehicles because of terrain conditions, must be transported by such other modes of transportation as bicycles; porters; pack animals; rafts, sampans, or other watercraft; and aircraft. Such modes of transportation should be planned well in advance and standing operating procedures and control organizations developed to supervise their use.

(2) Modes of transportation should not be restricted to the most convenient, for to do so may be detrimental to the overall mission. The use of surface transportation enables internal defense and internal development forces to gain intelligence information, to expand or retain control of areas, to gain access to remote areas, to establish emergency routes, to gain flexibility in movement, and to provide a show of force to both the insurgents and the friendly population.

(3) All modes of transportation are subject to ambush, attack, sabotage, capture, and destruction. Efforts must be made to keep knowledge of movements limited to a need-to-know.

(a) In transporting cargo, special consideration should be given to the type cargo to be moved. Certain items of great value to insurgents require greater security. Such security may require the use of priority air transportation. Some cargo may require special handling.

(b) Because of their speed, relative security from ground attack, lack of sensitivity to terrain conditions, and adaptability to small unit movement, aircraft often are the most effective means of supply or troop movement. Both army aviation and aviation of other services may be used. Terrain, the tactical situation, and availability of airstrips normally require resupply by airdrop as well as by air landing.

(c) En route security is provided for surface movements. Appropriate measures include intensive driver training, the armoring and arming of vehicles, and the use of armed escorts including armed helicopters.

(d) Medical Service. Poor health and sanitation conditions may be anticipated in many areas. Such conditions may include inadequate water supply and sewage disposal facilities, insufficient housing, and lack of good sanitation control and medical care facilities. Any or all of the following measures may be adopted, as appropriate and feasible:

(1) Provision of medical treatment and patient holding capabilities at lower echelons of medical service than is normal, such as at area control bases and security detachments. Patients to be evacuated by ground transport are held until movement by means of a secure convoy is arranged.

(2) Provision of sufficient air or ground means to move medical units or elements.

(3) Maximum use of air evacuation means.

(4) Provision of small medical elements to furnish unit-level medical support to tactical units on long-range missions.

(5) Assignment to mobile units of specially trained medical personnel, capable of operating medical treatment facilities for short periods of time with a minimum of immediate supervision.

(6) Formation of non-U. S. litter bearer teams to accompany combat units
where terrain or other obstacles preclude transportation or evacuation of patients by other means.

(7) Strict supervision of sanitation, maintenance of individual medical equipment, and advanced or special first aid training throughout the command.

(8) Greater emphasis on basic combat training of medical service personnel; arming of medical service personnel, as required; and use of armored carriers for ground evacuation.

(9) Use of Allied medical resources and capabilities whenever they are available.

e. Military Police. Military police functions and responsibilities in internal defense and internal development operations differ from those in conventional operations in that military police may become directly involved with civil controls and enforcement of emergency regulations. Military police place special emphasis on circulation control, security, riot control, prisoner handling, resources control, intelligence, and other specialized techniques for control of civilians. Military police can provide plans, advice, training, and supervision to civil police personnel in populace and resources control measures, technical police operations, and investigations.

f. Labor. The movement, maintenance, and storage of supplies require large amounts of labor. The need for local labor is particularly acute in internal defense and internal development operations where no logistic base has been established and where there is a need to build up storage sites, airfields, depots, and transfer facilities; however, in internal defense and internal development, additional personnel security precautions must be taken.

140. U. S. Assistance

U. S. advisory, combat support, and combat service support forces may be introduced in Phase I in training, advisory, and support roles. During Phases II and III, U. S. combat forces may be committed to assist HC forces in conducting tactical operations.

a. Planning. Deployment plans normally will consider the following:

(1) Mission—consolidation, strike, remote area, or other.

(2) Training, organizing, and equipping of forces.

(3) Points of entry, to include tactical bases.

(4) Status-of-forces agreements.

(5) Liaison between U. S. advisors, MAAG, Missions, and unified commands and joint TF, HC organizations, and Allied forces.

(6) Base development.

(7) Command relationships.

b. Points of Entry. Points of entry are those secure harbors, installations, or air bases where U. S. troops are introduced into the HC. Facilities must be established at points of entry to permit coordinated, secure deployment. They are established in areas from which forces can initiate and sustain operations.

(1) Opposition. Although the HC forces may be in control of the point of entry, U. S. forces must be prepared to meet opposition at the outset.

(2) Tactical deployment. Initially, U. S. forces may be concentrated in the general point of entry area. U. S. forces may subsequently be deployed to battalion or brigade areas should escalation of the insurgency appear probable.

(3) Relationship with HC forces. Liaison between U. S. and HC armed and paramilitary forces should be established in preparatory operations. As soon as practicable after forces arrive at points of entry, Area Coordination Centers should be established or liaison elements sent to existing Area Coordination Centers. The initial concern of these Centers should be the coordinated defense of the points.
of entry. U. S. force commanders, in coordination with HC officials, should begin screening and recruiting indigenous personnel for duty as guides, interpreters, porters, and laborers.

(4) Local security. U. S. forces are responsible for their own local security, regardless of the assumed responsibility of this function by the HC.

(5) Operations. While processing at points of entry, U. S. forces may initiate limited civil affairs, intelligence, advisory assistance, populace and resources control, psychological, and tactical operations.
CHAPTER 9
FORCES

Section I. HOST COUNTRY FORCES

141. General

a. HC forces which normally are employed in preserving or re-establishing internal security may be categorized as follows:

(1) Security forces.
(2) Armed forces.
(3) Paramilitary forces.
(4) Irregular forces.

b. In addition to their primary internal defense mission, these forces also may contribute to internal development through the application of their special skills and resources.

142. Security Forces

Security forces include such organizations as police, national intelligence and security agencies, border guard, customs and census agencies, and special investigative organizations such as internal revenue and treasury services.

a. Mission. The mission of security forces is to maintain a state of law and order by effectively coping with violence, subversion, and lawlessness within a nation.

b. Concept. During peacetime, most nations depend primarily on the police to conduct law enforcement, intelligence, and counterintelligence activities. During an insurgency, the problem of maintaining security becomes much greater and the police may find themselves unable to cope with the situation without assistance.

(1) Phase I insurgency. Police units, particularly at the lower levels of government, normally are augmented and fully integrated into the internal defense system to counter insurgent activities. They attempt to penetrate the insurgent movement, prevent insurgent support across international borders, and deny insurgents internal support. To accomplish these tasks, the police may require assistance from the armed forces.

(2) Phase II insurgency. Security organizations normally must be enlarged, and all or part of the security tasks may be accomplished by police organizations augmented by paramilitary forces; however, normal police responsibility for frontier operations may be transferred to the armed forces.

(3) Phase III insurgency. Security forces, particularly the police, may be curtailed territorially and their employment confined largely to consolidated areas. Territorial and border control may become part of territorial defense, a primary responsibility of the armed forces.

c. Organization. The HC police force may consist of national, municipal, and rural police. Special police may be mobilized and trained for tasks such as guarding factories, plantations, mines, railroads, and other facilities. In addition, combat police may be organized to man outposts, secure ports and airstrips, and conduct limited tactical operations such as patrols, raids, ambushes, and searches.

(1) National police normally are comprised of both uniformed and civilian-clothed personnel who enforce
populace and resources control measures. They may be organized along military lines and their authority may transcend political boundaries. Early action should be taken to enable national police to move without political boundary restrictions. Inability to cross political boundaries could cause failure of national police missions. A type national police system is shown at figure 8. National police missions may include—

(a) Securing national government installations and LOC.

(b) Assisting provincial police in the execution of populace and resources control operations.

(c) Gathering intelligence information.

(2) In some nations, rural police may be organized to perform law enforcement functions under the control of a political subdivision such as a province or district.

(3) Municipal police maintain or re-establish security in urban areas. They normally are under control of the city authorities and their jurisdiction usually extends only to the city boundaries.

d. Operations. The operations of security forces include the full range of police and intelligence activities necessary to preserve law and order within a nation. These operations range from combating common crime to riot control and countering subversion, espionage, and sabotage.

143. Armed Forces

In this manual, armed forces are the regular and reserve units of the standing military establishment, to include army, navy, air force, marine corps, and coast guard.

a. Mission. The primary mission of armed forces in internal defense and internal development is to seek out and destroy insurgent combat forces. Armed forces also provide support to other governmental agencies through populace and resources control, psychological, intelligence, civil affairs, and advisory assistance operations.

b. Concept. In addition to defending the nation against internal and external attack, the flexible organization, multiple skills, and varied resources of the armed forces are required to support internal economic, social, and political growth.

(1) Phase I insurgency. The armed forces may engage in—

(a) Training for internal defense operations.

(b) Establishing military representation in Area Coordination Centers.

(c) Expanding intelligence operations.

(d) Developing and refining internal defense contingency plans.

(e) Conducting drills and parades as a part of a systematic plan of show-of-force PSYOP.

(f) Assisting in the training of paramilitary forces.

(g) Conducting military civic action.

(h) Conducting PSYOP.

(2) Phase II insurgency. The dispatch of armed TF from the regional commands to insurgent-infested provinces may mark the beginning of Phase II activity. In addition to those activities performed in Phase I, TF may support provincial police and paramilitary forces in conducting populace and resources control operations. In provinces which are re-establishing provincial authority through the consolidation campaign, TF may be employed to conduct the offensive and development phases of campaign operations. In provinces containing insurgent-dominated areas which are not programmed for early consolidation, armed forces may conduct strike operations against insurgent forces and bases.

(3) Phase III insurgency. The threat is so critical that provincial forces will be engaged primarily in defending
Figure 8. Type national police system.
critical population centers and key installations. The major effort of armed forces in this phase will be devoted to tactical operations against insurgent combat forces.

c. Organization. At national level, the structure of the military establishment should enable joint centralized command and control over subordinate armed, paramilitary, and irregular forces. In most cases, the national armed forces staff structure for internal and external defense will remain the same. Below national level, HC leaders should be encouraged to structure their military organizations and control apparatus after those which have proven successful in past insurgencies. This requires the formation of regional and provincial commands. Regional commands provide TF for operations conducted in those areas in which operations regularly overlap provincial boundaries. Provincial commands conduct the full range of stability operations within their areas of jurisdiction, except those reserved by regional commands.

(1) Regional forces. Regional commands are established to facilitate span of control, provide a centralized source of training and logistical support for subordinate forces, and conduct special operations. The following are functions normally performed by regional commands.

(a) Providing direction and control over regional forces.
(b) Reinforcing provincial tactical forces.
(c) Providing combat support and combat service support to provincial forces.
(d) Conducting strike operations.
(e) Establishing TF to conduct special missions which are beyond the capabilities of provinces.
(f) Providing centralized training facilities for both armed and paramilitary forces.
(g) Equipping provincial paramilitary forces.

(k) Conducting special operations which overlap provincial boundaries. Examples of such operations are border control and protecting interprovincial LOC.

1. Administration and logistical support of these special operations normally is provided by regional commands.

2. Operational command over forces engaged in special operations is exercised by regional commands except when these forces are attached to a province for operations.

(2) Provincial forces. Provincial forces have responsibility for the overall internal defense of a province except for those areas designated by regional commands. Armed, paramilitary, and irregular forces operate under the centralized direction of provincial commands. In addition to their primary combat role, all provincial forces contribute to the overall internal defense and internal development of the province through the application of their special skills and resources.

d. Operations. The operations of HC forces are oriented primarily toward carrying out their strategic, tactical, training, and administrative missions. In an internal defense and internal development environment, the operations of HC forces are expanded to include activities designed to strengthen the government politically, economically, and socially and make more viable its national life.

(1) Advisory assistance. A mission of the armed forces is to assist provincial and other commanders in training armed, paramilitary, and irregular forces. This may be accomplished through the establishment of training centers which provide basic individual training, advanced individual training, for selected personnel, and unit training for provincial and district forces. Armed forces instructors or units may be detached from appro-
Figure 9. Type regional armed forces organization.
appropriate command headquarters to assist in the training mission.

(2) *Civil affairs (military civic action).* Armed forces are operationally trained and equipped to conduct many military civic action projects which come within the purview of internal development. Among these are flood control; bridge, road, and airfield fortifications; and warehouse construction. These projects have both military and civil application. Consistent with tactical requirements, armed, paramilitary, and irregular forces may be employed in civic action projects coordinated by the NIDCC or the appropriate Area Coordination Center.

(3) *PSYOP.* Armed forces PSYOP support both military and civilian psychological development programs. When armed forces units are committed on a relatively long-term basis, such as during a provincial consolidation operation, they should be provided with an organic PSYOP capability.

(4) *Intelligence.* Armed forces intelligence operations support both internal defense and internal development programs. These operations are designed to collect information which will assist in the establishment of a data base in the areas of political, economic, sociological, geographic, insurgent military, and insurgent infrastructure intelligence. Intelligence information collected and collated at all levels should be channeled to a central body having responsibility for producing a composite intelligence picture for the country as a whole. This body normally will be the intelligence branch of the NIDCC, organized specifically to direct and coordinate the collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence information. Intelligence operations of Area Coordination Centers at major subnational level are performed by intelligence branches with format and function similar to that of the NIDCC. See FM 30–31 and FM 30–31A for information pertaining to intelligence operations in the internal defense and internal development environment.

(5) *Populate and resources control.* Populate and resources control measures usually are established by civil authority and armed forces participation in these operations should be in accordance with prescribed laws and regulations. The responsibility for populate and resources control normally is vested in the national and local police and in paramilitary forces organized for this express purpose. The role of the armed forces in populate and resources control operations within urban areas normally is a supporting one. In rural and border areas, the armed forces must be prepared to conduct the full range of populate and resources control operations. These operations are coordinated by the NIDCC and the appropriate Area Coordination Center.

(6) *Tactical operations.* Armed forces seek out and neutralize or destroy insurgent tactical forces.

(a) The army performs the primary mission of seeking out and destroying insurgent land tactical formations, provides units to serve under regional and provincial commands, and provides training, combat support, and combat service support to other forces, as required.

(b) The air force provides air defense (in coordination with the army) and close air support to army, navy, marine, police, paramilitary, and irregular force operations; air reconnaissance; and troop and cargo lift.
(c) Navy and marine forces provide coastal, navigable inland waterway, harbor, port, and border defense. In addition, they provide training, combat support, and combat service support to other forces, as required.

144. Paramilitary Forces

Paramilitary forces are distinct from the armed forces of a nation, but are similar in organization, equipment, training, and mission. They normally are employed in times of national crisis to augment the armed forces or to assume responsibilities which otherwise would divert the armed forces from their primary mission.

a. Missions. The missions of paramilitary forces are tactical operations and the support of civil police forces in rural areas and villages. Specific roles which they may perform in carrying out these missions include advisory assistance, civil affairs, psychological, intelligence, populace and resources control, and tactical operations.

b. Concept. In an insurgency, it may be necessary to employ paramilitary forces in populace and resources control operations in order to allow the armed forces to concentrate on offensive operations.

(1) Provincial paramilitary units normally are separate tactical organizations consisting of a provincial paramilitary force headquarters and sufficient units to accomplish assigned missions. Commanders of subordinate paramilitary units report through the chain of command to the provincial paramilitary commander and receive their directions directly from that authority or the provincial Area Coordination Center.

(2) District paramilitary forces are established to provide defense and security for the areas lying between villages. District forces may be used as patrol units and small strike forces and for reinforcing village paramilitary or civil police units. Commanders report directly to paramilitary leaders at district Area Coordination Centers or district paramilitary headquarters.

(3) Village paramilitary forces provide secure bases from which other paramilitary and armed forces units may operate against insurgent forces and installations. The organization and employment of paramilitary forces at this level provides for local defense and enables the population to participate directly in the internal defense and internal development effort.

c. Organization. The organization of paramilitary forces will vary with mission and level of employment. In those cases where paramilitary forces assume the major responsibility for internal defense, their organization will be large. When these forces are used primarily to reinforce existing police or armed forces, their organization may be relatively small. Normally, paramilitary forces are organizationally tailored for the specific operation they will be conducting.

(1) Provincial paramilitary unit organization should provide for mobile forces which are immediately deployable for strike operations. These mobile forces should be capable of sustained operations of up to three days without resupply.

(2) District paramilitary forces normally are organized from locally recruited personnel and may be deployed anywhere within the district. They should have an organizational capability for deploying small forces for patrols and similar missions and should be self-sufficient for periods of up to three days without resupply.

(3) Village paramilitary units are organized essentially for defensive operations. They usually perform static guard duties and assist the local civil police in the preservation of law and order. Their offensive tactical capabilities are limited to patrol ac-
tivities within and immediately outside village perimeters.

d. Operations. The operational roles and responsibilities of paramilitary forces are basically the same as those of the armed forces. Paramilitary force training programs should stress basic military skills and those tactics and techniques most applicable to the particular mission of the force and its area of operations.

(1) Advisory assistance. Although their state of training is lower than that of the armed forces, paramilitary forces have the capability to render advisory assistance to less proficient paramilitary and irregular forces.

(2) Civil affairs. Paramilitary forces often are in contact with the population in the same area over long periods and are excellently suited to conduct military civic action operations. For large-scale projects, they will require augmentation from civilian agencies or the armed forces.

(3) PSYOP. Below regional level, paramilitary forces normally operate in close association with the civilian population. In order to facilitate
establishing rapport with the populace and to gain its support for the government, paramilitary forces should be provided a PSYOP capability.

(4) Intelligence. Intelligence operations conducted by paramilitary forces normally involve the collection of information for which there may be a tactical response.

(5) Population and resources control. The primary mission of district and village paramilitary forces is conducting populace and resources control operations. These operations, normally in support of the police, include—

(a) Securing villages and hamlets.
(b) Securing vital installations, LOC, and communications centers.
(c) Protecting persons working or residing outside of hamlets and villages.
(d) Enforcing populace and resources control measures.

(6) Tactical operations. At provincial level, paramilitary forces engage in strike and other tactical operations in much the same manner as the armed forces. At district and village level, paramilitary forces primarily are employed in tactical defense.

145. Irregular Forces

In this manual, irregular forces are considered to be any individual or group not part of the armed or paramilitary forces which are armed for the purpose of defense. Examples of groups which may constitute irregular forces are political parties, trade unions, fraternal organizations, and isolated ethnic minority groups.

a. Mission. The primary mission of irregular forces is the defense of their own villages or hamlets. They also may conduct psychological, intelligence, and populace and resources control operations and perform limited civic action.

b. Concept. Irregular forces usually are volunteer groups organized and trained to provide local defense and security for their own villages or hamlets. Tribal groups may be organized as irregular forces and trained for limited tactical operations, such as patrolling, trail watching, border surveillance, and, to a lesser extent, ambushing and raiding insurgent forces and bases. Other irregular organizations, such as female auxiliaries and youth organizations, may perform specific tasks such as political education, economic improvement, and civic development.

c. Organization. Irregular forces are not standardized and their structures generally parallel those of the multiple groups from which they are formed. In view of the many types of organizations represented in irregular forces and the varied capabilities which they possess, the training, assignment, and supervision of these forces must be centralized to prevent confusion, duplication of effort, and their possible misuse.

(1) Irregular force organizations vary, depending on requirements and level of development. Should the force become company or battalion-size, it normally assumes all of the aspects of a paramilitary force and may be employed, equipped, and organized as such. Whenever feasible, former military, paramilitary, and police personnel should be utilized to form cadres for these units.

(2) Irregular forces are commanded and controlled at the lowest levels. When situated in remote areas, hamlet, tribal, or village chiefs normally command these forces. Broad, general missions are assigned by HC authorities and operations are coordinated within the district or provincial Area Coordination Center. Higher-level armed or paramilitary force commanders may provide limited combat support and combat service support to irregular forces.

d. Operations. The operational capabilities of irregular forces approximate on a reduced
scale those of paramilitary forces at district level. In conducting their operations, irregular forces must be particularly security conscious. Since many of these forces are organized around societal groups which have been targets for insurgent penetration, they are particularly susceptible to subversion and espionage by secret agents within their ranks. On the other hand, since members of irregular forces usually are more closely united through common group interests, they can more effectively detect and prevent subversion and espionage than can armed or paramilitary forces. For the same reason, they are in an excellent position to collect information regarding local insurgent activities.

Section II. U. S. FORCES

146. General
This section furnishes guidance concerning the employment of U. S. forces in a developing nation faced with preventing or defeating insurgency. It presents doctrine and detailed guidance on missions, concepts, organization, and operations of U. S. forces found in—

a. FM 100-10, Combat Service Support.

b. FM 100-20, Field Service Regulations—Internal Defense and Internal Development Operations.

c. FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations—Larger Units.


e. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, Unified Action, Armed Forces.

f. AR 1-75, Administrative Support of MAAG, J MAG, and Similar Activities.

147. Legal Aspects

a. U. S. forces engaged in stability operations are subject to international law, U. S. law, and, except as otherwise specifically agreed, local law. Personal attitudes and action for U. S. military personnel are contained in the "Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States" (AR 350-30 and Pamphlet 21-71).

b. U. S. military personnel should have a full understanding of their status in the HC. This may be established by agreements between the U. S. and the HC which spell out their status. These agreements may provide for full diplomatic immunity or very little immunity from local law. In the absence of an agreement, military personnel are subject to local laws, customs, and the jurisdiction of local courts. Regardless of the degree of immunity afforded them, U. S. military personnel are expected to observe local law.

148. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG)
The term MAAG is used in this FM to mean the U. S. military agency present in a HC which is responsible for MAP administration. Normally, this is a MAAG; however, it may be a Military Mission, a Joint U. S. Military Advisory Group, Military Assistance Command, or a Military Attache.

a. Mission. The overall mission of the MAAG is to administer U. S. military assistance planning and programming in the HC and to support military requirements of the Country Team. It also makes recommendations to the commander of the unified command concerned. MAAG organizations vary according to existing HC requirements.

(1) Logistical MAAG. Logistical MAAG missions are—

(a) Programming of MAP equipment, supplies, services, and training.

(b) Advising and monitoring the utilization, maintenance, and operation of equipment and supplies.

(2) Training MAAG. Training MAAG missions are—

(a) Advising and assisting in the development of training programs.

(b) Advising and assisting HC field units.
(c) Instructing HC staff personnel in organization, operations, and training.

(d) Administering the Military Assistance Training Program.

(3) Military Assistance Commands. When U. S. foreign assistance includes sizeable U. S. combat, combat support, and combat service support forces, a Military Assistance Command may be established which normally assumes the functions of the MAAG.

b. Concept. The MAAG is a joint service group normally under the military command of the commander of a unified command who represents the Secretary of Defense. The Chief, MAAG, normally is the senior military representative on the US Country Team and is responsible for ensuring that the military aspects of the U.S. internal defense and internal development effort are coordinated with other U. S. departmental representatives in the HC.

c. Organization. A MAAG normally is divided into army, navy, and air force sections, each of which is responsible for the accomplishment of its service portion of MAAG activities. In a large MAAG, there may be joint, general, and special staffs. If the MAAG has a training mission, it will have an advisory group responsible for advising HC counterparts on operational and training matters. A type Training MAAG organization is depicted at figure 11.

(1) Command. The Chief, MAAG supervises the military aspects of the MAP in the HC and advises and assists the HC armed forces in tactical, technical, organizational, administrative, logistical, and training matters. In addition, he exercises operational command over all U. S. armed services personnel of the MAAG.

(2) Advisory chain. The MAAG advisory chain parallels the organization of the HC forces in order to facilitate the advisory effort; however, it is not a part of the HC chain of command.

When U. S. representation in both the internal defense and internal development fields is performed by both U. S. civilian and military advisors, a single advisor should be designated as the senior interdepartmental representative.

(3) Personnel status. The status of MAAG personnel varies according to the provisions of applicable Mutual Defense Assistance Agreements and Status of Forces Agreements.

d. Operations. The Chief, MAAG, is guided by the policies and procedures set forth in the Military Assistance Manual, applicable DOD directives and instructions, and such other directives as may be issued periodically by appropriate authority.

(1) Strategic operations. Complex military problems can arise in nations in which an insurgency is developing, and the MAAG must be prepared to provide solutions. For example, it may be necessary to reorient the HC military effort from external defense to internal defense against insurgency. Insurgency requires the development of extensive HC counterintelligence and security systems. MAAG may not have the personnel qualified to assist the HC in these fields and must be augmented by the necessary specialists.

(2) Tactical operations. U. S. combat service support, combat support, and combat units may be introduced to assist HC military forces in coping with an insurgency. MAAG normally will assume operational control over these U. S. forces.

(3) Advisory operations. Advising is construed to mean advising, assisting, and influencing one's counterpart in performing his duties more effectively. Although advisors are not considered instructors in the formal sense of the word, they must realize that teaching is an aspect of their duties. Thus, the principles of in-
Figure 11. Type Training MAAG organization.
149. Mobile Training Teams

Mobile training teams (MTT) may be attached to MAAG to assist developing nations in building modern, efficient armed and paramilitary forces.

a. Mission. Each MTT is organized to present instruction in a special occupational field such as intelligence, PSYOP, engineering, and civil affairs. MTT are used primarily to instruct HC military personnel who, in turn, will teach their countrymen. The following are normal tasks performed by MTT:

1. Giving on-the-ground instruction in the maintenance and operations of specialized and complicated equipment.

2. Assisting in the establishment and revitalization of operations, maintenance, supply, training, and personnel, and other management systems.

3. Recommending military or civilian civic action projects.

b. Concept. Temporary military advisory requirements may be handled by MTT provided by the unified commander from his own resources or from CONUS. MTT are dispatched to reinforce temporarily the capabilities of MAAG. If long-term assistance is required, the MAAG organization should be modified to provide permanent assistance personnel of the type needed.

c. Organization. MTT strengths usually vary from one to five personnel, but may consist of more. Such teams may be joint in nature and composed of representatives of two or more services. The size and composition of MTT are determined by the operational environment and mission to be accomplished. At theater level, the area-oriented, partially language-qualified, immediately deployable resources of the U.S. Army Special Action Force (SAF) are the primary source for MTT. (See para 154 for further discussion of SAF.)

Section III. U.S. ARMY FORCES

150. General

This section summarizes the missions, concepts, organizations, and operational capabilities of U.S. Army forces in order to provide an overall picture of U.S. Army capabilities for stability operations. It presents doctrine concerning the missions, organizations, and operations of specially trained U.S. Army internal defense assistance forces, larger units, and branch organizations.

a. Mission. The in-country mission of U.S. Army forces is to assist the HC in attaining its internal defense and internal development objectives. This mission includes the following significant tasks:

1. Supporting U.S. civil governmental agencies which are assisting the HC.

2. Assisting HC armed and paramilitary forces through the MAP.

3. Providing U.S. Army combat, combat support, and combat service support units.

b. Concept. Many nations subjected to subversive insurgency depend on the U.S. for military assistance in those areas involving advanced technology. In view of the length of time required to train and equip HC forces, it may be necessary to introduce selected U.S. Army units to assist HC forces in combat support and combat service support missions. Integrating HC personnel into these combat support and combat service support units will hasten the attainment of HC self-sufficiency and also may help to negate insurgent propaganda. When insurgency is latent or incipient, U.S. Army resources may be employed to assist HC forces in providing a stable environment for attaining internal development objectives. If the insurgents resort to tactical
operations or related forms of violence, U. S. Army participation may be expanded to include combat, combat support, and combat service support. When an insurgency reaches the stage where the HC forces cannot contain or defeat the insurgent forces, major U. S. Army tactical forces may be deployed at the request of the HC government. Provision must be made for advanced logistical planning and support. At the earliest possible time, logistical planning must begin for the support of U. S. forces.

(1) Concurrent with the planning for the deployment of any U. S. forces (advisory personnel, special action forces, or tactical units), planning for the logistical support of these forces must be conducted.

(2) Prior to, or concurrent with, the deployment of combat forces, logistical units, particularly supply and service units, should be deployed to establish a logistical base. This early deployment is required to provide continuous logistical support when long shipping times and unimproved HC facilities are major considerations.

c. Organization. U. S. Country Teams coordinate U. S. activities in support of the U. S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy. Army elements of MAAG contain only the personnel and equipment essential to conduct routine operations. Unusual requirements must be met from outside resources.

d. Operations. Capabilities which all branches of the U. S. Army can bring to bear on the internal defense problem generally parallel those of HC armed forces. These capabilities include advisory assistance, civil affairs, psychological, intelligence, populace and resources control, and tactical operations. In some cases, these operations will be conducted simultaneously. Combat support and combat service support units must be introduced early to provide for orderly support to combat forces.

151. Theater Army Forces

All forces assigned to theater army components of unified commands are considered potential stability operations forces. Within subordinate unified commands established primarily for stability operations, the army component may assume tasks of the type and magnitude normally assigned to a theater army.

a. Mission. The stability operations mission of theater army is to provide assistance, through the unified command, to the requesting HC in order to prevent or defeat insurgency.

b. Concept. Theater army organizations and units have a collective capability for performing in-country surveys; planning, training, advising, and supervising internal defense and internal development programs; providing combat service support and combat support; and deploying combat forces to cope with conditions of deteriorating internal defense. While the SAF is not expected to provide the total quantities of advisors, MTT, and support or combat units required by any one nation or region, they should be capable of providing the initial increments of qualified army advisory elements required.

c. Organization. The theater army is organized and possesses the capability to meet any contingencies which might arise in stability operations. This includes the capability of assisting governments which are threatened by subversive insurgency. Personnel and units may be drawn from any segment of the theater army; however, elements assigned stability operations as their primary mission (specially trained and designated forces) should be linguistically, culturally, and professionally qualified to advise their HC counterparts.

d. Command and Control. The unified command exercises operational command over in-country MAAG and other military advisory activities.

(1) Theater army responsibilities are concerned primarily with providing and supporting army elements involved in military advisory activities.

(2) Theater army forces with a primary stability operations mission should not be assigned to army commands below theater level for training, ad-
ministration, or other nonoperational purposes.

(3) The following considerations will affect theater army planning for stability operations:

(a) Civil affairs resources will be required at lower echelons than in limited and general war.
(b) Engineer requirements will be much greater due to the developing status of HC.
(c) Military police will be needed in significantly greater numbers because of increased security requirements.
(d) Intelligence resources, distributed to much lower echelons, will be required in greater numbers because of the primacy of intelligence in operations against subversive insurgency.
(e) PSYOP resources will be required to assist HC armed and paramilitary forces and, through USIS, HC civilian information and PSYOP agencies. These resources will be required at much lower echelons than is normal in limited and general war.
(f) Army aviation requirements to support all phases of internal defense and internal development operations will be greatly increased in nations where an adequate surface transportation system does not exist or when insurgents control surface transportation routes.
(g) Supply, maintenance, and medical resources will be required in greater numbers for support of both U. S. and HC efforts in stability operations.

e. Operations. The commander of the army component of a unified command is responsible for supporting U. S. Army activities in MAAG. In fulfilling this responsibility, he provides forces in response to the requests from MAAG for advisory, planning, and training support. In addition, he evaluates the situation in countries within the area of responsibility of the unified command, and apprises the MAAG of those army resources which can be made available. The following principles should be observed whenever theater army forces are deployed on stability operations missions:

(1) Army elements serve under the guidance of the Chief, U. S. Country team, and their efforts should be integrated with those of other U. S. Government agencies and military services.
(2) Resources should be committed initially in strength sufficient to deter insurgency.
(3) Combat service support elements should be introduced into the HC early enough to provide adequate support to forces involved.

152. Larger Units

The requirement for field army, corps, and division-size units must be determined on the basis of the threat posed by the insurgents and the capabilities of the HC to meet this threat. The headquarters element of these larger units may be required for purposes of command and control of U. S. forces deployed over wide areas or engaged in combined or joint operations. The staffs of these larger units may be used in advising HC counterparts.

a. Field Army. A force as large as a field army normally will not be deployed in stability operations; however, the field army may be required to train, equip, and dispatch elements for these operations.

(1) The mission of the field army includes three related tasks—
(a) Reinforcing MAAG or Missions in Phase I insurgency operations by providing specialists, MTT, and other support.
(b) Providing advisors and instructors and combat support and combat service support units to the MAAG in Phase II insurgency operations.
(c) Providing combat, combat support.
and combat service support units to operate with HC forces in Phases II or III insurgency operations.

(2) Operations of the field army normally will involve—

(a) Assisting the HC in preparing comprehensive national internal defense plans.

(b) In coordination with MAAG and other agencies, training and equipping police, paramilitary forces, and civilian agencies.

(c) Training HC army personnel in advisory assistance, civil affairs, psychological, intelligence, populace and resources control, and tactical operations.

b. Independent Corps. The independent corps, organized with infantry and airmobile divisions, is well suited for internal defense operations. It is provided a Corps Support Command (COSCOM) to furnish functionalized combat service support (see FM 54–4). The COSCOM contains sufficient field army-type service support units to make the corps administratively and logistically self-sufficient.

(1) The Corps may command and control subordinate US or combined forces conducting strike, remote area, and consolidation operations. It may be assigned area responsibilities, replacing HC forces normally assigned this mission.

(2) An independent corps may provide forces to unified commands to support internal defense requirements or it may be committed as a unit to operate as part of a Military Assistance Command. When deployed as a unit, the corps may require augmentation in such specialties as civil affairs and PSYOP.

(3) When structured for stability operations, artillery and chemical elements are increased and air defense elements may be reduced.

c. Divisions. The division, with suitable augmentation of its organic units, is well suited for stability operations.

(1) The division is capable of furnishing assistance ranging from MTT to brigade-size backup forces. In the more advanced stages of insurgency, the entire division may participate in stability operations through advisory assistance, civil affairs, psychological, intelligence, populace and resources control, and tactical operations.

(2) The division TOE should be analyzed to insure that only appropriate personnel and equipment are deployed. A requirement normally will exist for increased aviation, PSYOP, civil affairs, intelligence, military police, signal, medical, engineer, and other combat support and combat service support forces.

153. Brigades

Area-oriented and partially language-qualified brigades selected to operate in specific regions can provide specially trained units and MTT to MAAG. Backup brigades may reinforce MAAG or other organizations engaged in stability operations. These brigades provide a pool of specially-trained infantry, artillery, and armor MTT, and engineer, PSYOP, signal, civil affairs, intelligence, aviation, Army Security Agency, medical, military police, and other support units of varying sizes and capabilities. These forces have a capability for training, advising, and operationally supporting HC civil, armed, and paramilitary forces. For additional doctrine on brigades committed to stability operations, see FM 31–16 and FM 31–22.

154. Special Action Forces (SAF)

The SAF is a specially trained, area-oriented, partially language-qualified, ready force available to the CINC of unified commands for the support of stability operations.

a. Mission. The mission of SAF is to provide training, advisory support, and operational assistance to HC forces engaged in internal defense and internal development operations.
b. Concept. Within the SAF, most of the capabilities of the army as a whole are represented on a small scale in a form specifically designed for stability operations. Elements of SAF are deployed as MTT or as an advisory/training TF to meet the requirements of MAAG, Missions, or Military Assistance Commands. The characteristics of SAF are—

(1) It is maintained in a state of operational readiness.

(2) Its members are prepared from the standpoint of training and psychology to work in remote areas with foreign personnel, including primitive groups, under conditions of relative hardship and danger.

(3) It provides a pool of resources from which training assistance and operating teams and forces can be deployed to meet the widely varying requirements of internal defense and internal development operations.

(4) It represents a regional repository of experience in internal defense and internal development operations.

c. Organization. A SAF consists of a special forces group and selected detachments which may include civil affairs, PSYOP, engineer, medical, intelligence, military police, and Army Security Agency detachments. It is a composite organization composed of elements organized under approved TOE. Each SAF is tailored to the requirements of the theater to which it is assigned.

d. Operations. The SAF is assigned to the theater army under the operational control of the overseas unified command. Whether operating as a separate organization or as the major element of the SAF, the special forces group trains its detachments to meet theater requirements. Prior to deployment, SAF detachments remain under the command and operational control of the commander of the special forces group to which they are attached. When SAF elements are deployed to a HC, they normally function under the operational control of the MAAG. (See FM 31-22 for a detailed discussion of SAF.)

155. Army Combat Forces

All U. S. Army combat units are potential stability operations forces and receive training for this mission. In addition to their primary tactical roles, all U. S. combat forces possess a capability to engage in advisory assistance and to conduct or support civil affairs, psychological, intelligence, and populace and resources control operations. This paragraph contains doctrine for the employment of U. S. Army combat forces in stability operations. Consult appropriate field manuals for specific branch-oriented stability operations doctrine and techniques.

a. Infantry. U. S. Army infantry stability operations missions include closing with and destroying insurgent tactical forces and defending installations and base complexes. When engaged in stability operations, basic infantry tactics must be modified to accommodate local economic, social, psychological, and political considerations. Further, modification of existing infantry unit TOE also may be required to facilitate mission accomplishment. For further information, see FM 7-20, FM 7-30, FM 31-16, and FM 57-35.

(1) Personnel trained in civil affairs and PSYOP work are required on brigade and battalion staffs.

(2) Infantry communications requirements are much greater for stability operations than for limited or general war operations.

(3) Infantry scout dog platoons may be required for patrols, tactical operations, and the security of base areas.

(4) Stability operations intelligence requirements may require greater use of saturation and long-range patrols and aerial reconnaissance and surveillance.

b. Armor. Flexibility of organization and equipment enables armor units (tank, armored cavalry, or air cavalry) to be mission-tailored for employment in any operational environment. In stability operations, maximum aggressive use of armor units in suitable areas will deny these areas to the insurgents and re-
lease larger infantry forces for employment in terrain which is restrictive to armor. In Phase I insurgency situations, MTT may assist MAAG advisors in developing HC armor capabilities. In Phases II and III, U.S. armor units may operationally support HC armed forces. Armor units may be most profitably employed in raid, border control, pursuit, and counterattack operations. These operations involve the employment of forces which must have greater mobility, firepower, and staying power than that possessed by the insurgents. Separate armored brigades, organized and equipped for the operational environment, are particularly useful due to their self-contained combat support and combat service support capabilities. The armored cavalry squadron and regiment with their organic air cavalry elements, flexibility, combined arms, and extensive communications also are extremely effective. Armor organization staffs may require augmentation by civil affairs and PSYOP personnel. For further information, see FM 17-1, FM 17-15, FM 17-36, and FM 17-95.

c. Artillery. Artillery missions in stability operations are the same as in limited and general war—providing close and continuous fire support to other ground forces and providing depth to combat and corollary operations. The mere presence of artillery discourages movement in restricted areas. In Phase I insurgency situations, MTT may assist MAAG advisors in developing HC artillery capabilities. During Phases II and III, MTT and fire support units may operationally assist HC forces. The following considerations govern the use of artillery in stability operations. For further information, see FM 6-20-1 and FM 6-140.

(1) Selection of targets must always consider the psychological impact upon the civilian population.

(2) Aerial and airmobile artillery, searchlight units, and countermortar and ground surveillance radars are most commonly employed.

(3) Requirements to provide simultaneous territorial fire support may necessitate reorganizing artillery battalions to increase the number of firing batteries.

(4) Artillery units are highly susceptible to attacks and ambushes; therefore, they should be collocated with other combat arms forces and be prepared to deliver direct fire in position defense. In the event it is not possible to collocate artillery with other combat forces, additional security forces may be required.

(5) Maintenance, supply, and other logistical activities may be difficult to conduct and methods must be devised to provide this support when artillery units are deployed or when insurgents control surface transportation routes.

156. U.S. Army Combat Support and Service Support Forces

All U.S. combat support and service support units are potential stability operations forces and are trained for this mission. Employment usually will be based upon the requirements for special skills contained in these support forces and may differ considerably from traditional missions. Normally, employment will involve assisting U.S./HC civil and military forces in advisory assistance, civil affairs, psychological, intelligence, populace and resources control, and tactical operations. During Phase I insurgency, U.S. combat support and service support advisory personnel, MTT, and units usually will be employed in training and advising HC counterparts. During Phases II and III, this advisory assistance may be expanded to provide operational support to U.S./HC internal defense and internal development forces. In this operational environment, the political, economic, social, and psychological impact upon the population of all support forces activities must be considered.

a. Engineer. U.S. Army engineer units possess a wide range of capabilities to provide advisory assistance and unit support to U.S./HC military and civilian internal defense and internal development forces. U.S. engineer advisors, MTT, or units may be employed to
support operations in a HC during all levels of insurgency. They may be deployed separately or with a U. S. TF for the accomplishment of specific projects; however, when possible these projects should be carried out jointly with HC armed, paramilitary, and civil organizations. Improvisations and the use of field expedients will be the rule rather than the exception. Since engineer forces normally will operate in small teams dispersed over wide areas, defense against insurgent attack is a major consideration. Insecure routes of surface transportation will impose obstacles to the administration and logistical support of dispersed engineer unit bases. For further information, see FM 5–1.

b. Signal Corps. U. S. Army signal corps organizations possess capabilities to plan, construct, maintain, and instruct in the use of communications systems necessary for a nation's civil and military development. As with engineer and medical units, signal corps operations basically are constructive in nature and provide services useful to both civil and military forces. In Phase I insurgency situations, signal corps units, MTT, or individuals may be deployed to assist in developing HC military and civil communications capabilities. In Phases II and III, U. S. Army Signal Corps units may be committed to provide support for HC combat forces. Signal communications requirements are greater in stability operations than in limited and general war because of the lack of installed communications in typical developing nations; rugged terrain and poorly developed surface communications; insurgent activities; and widely dispersed operations. For further information, see FM 24–1.

c. Army Aviation. Army aviation units support U. S./HC forces by augmenting their capabilities to conduct prompt and sustained ground combat. Army aviation tactical operations enable ground combat forces to attain and maintain the offensive by providing continuous surveillance, airmobile support, and coordinated aerial fire support. U. S. Army aviation units are deployed in support of stability operations to meet previously established military assistance requirements. These units have the capability to support HC armed and para-military forces, MAAG, or the army component of an established unified command. The build-up of aviation forces normally is gradual and commensurate with the escalation of the insurgency and the ability of the HC to support such a build-up. An increase in army aviation resources is accomplished as the insurgency intensifies and must be preceded by sound planning and the establishment of adequate logistical support. Maintenance facilities, stockage of parts, POL, development of airfields, and bivouac and billet areas must be provided. U. S. Army aviation units deployed to support stability operations conducted by U. S./HC forces are organized essentially the same as they are for limited or general war; however, modification of equipment and addition or deletion of personnel may be required depending upon the overall situation, terrain, and climate. For further information, see FM 1–100, FM 1–105, and FM 1–110.

d. Military Intelligence. Military intelligence units support U. S./HC internal defense and internal development operations by maintaining a detailed intelligence data base, collecting and producing current intelligence, and assisting in establishing and maintaining security. The documentary data base is essential for long and short-range contingency planning and for the training of personnel and units. It contains detailed intelligence on six broad areas: political, economic, sociological, geographic, insurgent military, and insurgent infrastructure. Current intelligence includes that information required for timely and accurate monitoring of insurgent activities and is essential for the refinement of contingency plans, reorientation of training, and the conduct of stability operations. Security involves those counterintelligence functions designed to detect and neutralize insurgent espionage, sabotage, and subversion. U. S. military intelligence advisors, MTT, and units have a capability to advise and assist HC counterparts, conduct unilateral operations, or participate in joint or combined intelligence operations. Experience indicates that stability operations require a larger number of operational intelligence and counterintelligence personnel than is required for lim-
ited and general war. For further information, see FM 30–5, FM 30–16, FM 30–31, and FM 30–31A.

e. Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR). Chemical personnel and units support U. S./HC internal defense and internal development operations by providing advice and support in defoliation and crop destruction operations, and the use of riot control agents and flame. They provide guidance in the use of chemical agents in tactical operations and in defense against enemy use of chemical and biological agents. Further, chemical units can advise and provide teams for insect control and shower points. During Phase I insurgency, U. S. Army chemical personnel and units may be deployed to provide advisory assistance to HC forces. During Phases II and III, chemical officers and units may provide advice and support to U. S./HC combat, combat support, and combat service support elements in chemical and biological operations. For further information, see FM 3–10, FM 3–50, FM 20–33, and TC 3–16.

f. Military Police. U. S. Army military police units may assist HC security forces in both tactical and nontactical operations. Normal police operations include riot control, area control, public relations, police information, physical security, and general investigations. In an insurgency, these operations may be expanded to include populace relocation, screening, identification, and registration; enforcement of curfews; operation of patrols and checkpoints; and investigation of crime. Intelligence and counterintelligence operations also are a major responsibility of the police. In coordination with HC intelligence organizations, the police participate in operations against the insurgent infrastructure and in detecting and neutralizing other individuals and groups whose goals and activities are inimical to the government. U. S. Army military police assistance to HC civil police normally is coordinated with USAID. For further information, see FM 19–1, FM 19–2, and FM 19–3.

g. PSYOP. The range of support which U. S. Army PSYOP units are capable of furnishing U. S./HC forces includes propaganda research, analysis, intelligence content development, news collection, broadcast monitoring, and the skills and equipment required for mass communications. Radio, press, and audiovisual teams are available to advise, train, and operationally support HC forces. Types of operations which U. S. Army PSYOP teams have a capability to conduct include providing timely and appropriate propaganda to demoralize insurgent forces; disseminating information, directives, and appeals to the population; and creating diversions from tactical operations. The activities of U. S. Army PSYOP teams normally are coordinated with USIS. For further information, see FM 33–1 and FM 33–5.

h. Civil Affairs. Civil affairs are those activities of a commander which embrace the relationships between the military forces and the civil authorities and people. These activities necessarily will vary depending on the type of local government, the customs and political background of the population, the state of economic, social, and political development of the country, and capabilities and resources of HC military forces. A vital service rendered by civil affairs personnel is that performed by civil affairs staff sections. Without their planning, coordination, and supervisory effort an effective program is unlikely. Army civil affairs units possess the capability to conduct or assist in the planning, supervising, and executing of military civic action and programs designed to prevent civilian interference with tactical and logistical operations. In internal defense and internal development operations, PSYOP support of civil affairs activities is of paramount importance. For further information, see FM 41–5 and FM 41–10.

i. Transportation. U. S. Army transportation units possess the capability to plan and develop reliable transportation systems in those areas where there are uninproved and insecure lines of communication, poor seaport and aerial terminal facilities, and limited HC civil and military transportation resources. Within an internal defense and internal development operational area, transportation units may be required to mobilize and organize HC surface
transportation including trucks, buses, water-craft, porter units, and pack animals. Aircraft normally will provide the most secure means of transporting men and materiel and regulatory and air route traffic systems must be organized. U. S. transportation units have the capability to provide air transport units, truck companies, boat and amphibian companies, terminal support units, and maintenance units in support of HC forces. Should U. S. combat forces be committed, U. S. transportation organizations may become the nucleus of a transportation command. For further information, see FM 55–11, FM 55–35, FM 55–46, and FM 55–58.

j. Finance. The primary mission of U. S. Army finance units is to insure the prompt and accurate payment of U. S. troops. They also control, disburse, and supervise the use of funds for military construction and recommend measures to prevent the introduction of massive dollar resources from disrupting the HC economy. Through advisory assistance and military civic action, finance personnel may assist HC forces in instituting proper financial accounting procedures and other systems of monetary control to support the attainment of national internal defense and internal development objectives.

k. Adjutant General. U. S. Army adjutant general units provide U. S. Army elements and forces normal adjutant general support in administration and personnel services. In addition, adjutant general responsibilities encompass welfare and morale services which include casualty reporting, decorations and awards, personal affairs counseling, postal services, and special services. They also assist HC forces in attaining stability operations objectives by providing advisory assistance in normal adjutant general matters. In the internal defense and internal development operational environment, wide dispersal of U. S. troops may necessitate augmentation of adjutant general TOE resources in order to accomplish the many and varied services which must be performed. Army adjutant general responsibilities, outlined in FM 101–5, can be easily tailored to support the operations of independent corps, divisions, brigades, and special action forces.

l. Chaplain. U. S. Army chaplains are deployed as individuals to perform their religious missions in support of both U. S. and HC personnel. In internal defense and internal development, they may be considered as teachers, counselors, administrators, psychological operators, and liaison officers between U. S. and HC forces. Chaplains provide the soldier a spiritual sense of obligation to duty and the courage to fight for the defense and freedom of his nation. They assist in developing tolerance and faith and in unifying religious factions, cults, and denominations into unified forces in support of peace and national unity. They teach and inform, as well as learn from chaplains of other faiths and, in so doing, create bonds of friendship and mutual understanding.

m. Judge Advocate. U. S. Army judge advocates provide legal advice to both U. S. and HC forces. Judge advocates assist U. S. forces and personnel by providing legal assistance and rendering legal opinions on personnel actions, procurement activities, and civil-military jurisdiction. Judge advocates assist in the administration of military justice and in providing a claims service. Judge advocates assist HC forces by providing advice and training on legal procedures, claims, and military justice. Judge advocates also may assist in developing status of forces agreements and a code of military justice for HC armed forces.

n. Supply and Service. U. S. Army supply and service personnel and quartermaster elements of supply and service, air delivery, and petroleum supply units handle all classes of supplies except Class V, which may be handled by a separate ammunition service brigade or similar organization. Supply and service organizations provide laundry, bath, clothing exchange, and graves registration services to supported units. Although HC forces normally receive support under the MAP and operate their own logistics systems, in stability operations it may be necessary for U. S. Army supply and service elements to operate supply
points and depots and otherwise support HC forces. Wide dispersal of tactical forces in sta-

bility operations normally will necessitate augmentation of supply and service TOE per-

sonnel and resources. For further information, see FM 29-3, FM 29-10, FM 29-45, and FM 100-10.

o. Ordnance. The reorganization of the support structure for the field army has, for the most part, eliminated units that carried the ordnance designation. In their place, direct and general support maintenance battalions have been provided. These units provide maintenance support on a functionalized basis for a wide variety of equipment. They are composed of ordnance personnel and elements, as well as personnel and elements for the repair of other commodities of equipment, as required (e.g., chemical, engineer, signal, aircraft, quartermaster). Units still retaining the ordnance designation include ammunition service units, missile maintenance units, and the ordnance tire repair company. Maintenance support units should be concentrated in secure bases at lower levels than in limited or general war to permit mission accomplishment in an operational environment where wear and tear on vehicles and other items of equipment is excessive. Failure of the HC to stress maintenance support and preventive maintenance will increase dependence on teams of U. S. maintenance personnel for advice and assistance. Since vehicles and other equipment found in the HC are of varied manufacture and foreign origin, U. S. maintenance personnel may require additional knowledge which would not be required in limited or general war. For further information, see FM 9-6, FM 29-22, and FM 55-45.

p. Medical Service. Medical service has proven to be one of the most effective U. S. Army resources for gaining population support. The high health hazards prevalent in most developing nations and the general lack of HC medical personnel and facilities place a high premium upon U. S. medical services. Because medical resources are scarce and the need for them critical, medical systems must be established to provide for the concurrent conduct and support of both tactical and military civic action operations. U. S. Army medical service personnel and units must be prepared to assist HC forces in developing their capabilities in this field. For further information, see FM 8-10, and FM 8-15. Medical services which may be provided are—

1. Establishing outpatient clinics operated by HC personnel with scheduled visits by a U. S. Army medical officer.

2. Furnishing medical supplies and establishing HC medical supply distribution systems.

3. Using aircraft for evacuation of emergency cases, especially those resulting from insurgency action.

4. Advising and assisting on sanitation matters.

5. Providing emergency dental service.

6. Providing veterinary assistance and advice.

q. Women's Army Corps. Women’s Army Corps (WAC) personnel are trained in varied military occupational specialties and are capable of replacing men in many administrative, medical, and technical duties. U. S. WAC personnel provide U. S. Army elements and forces normal WAC support in administrative and technical services. They also may assist the HC by providing advisory assistance to HC armed forces women’s service organizations.