FM 31-73
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL
ADVISOR HANDBOOK FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY
HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
APRIL 1965
# ADVISOR HANDBOOK FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY

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CHAPTER 1

GENERAL

1. Purpose

This manual provides the U.S. Army advisor to host country forces a ready reference document on doctrine and techniques which are most frequently employed in countering latent, incipient, and active insurgency.

2. Scope

a. Tactics and techniques which are most frequently employed by advisors and host country military forces at all levels where the directives of the national government are translated into plans and operations.

b. Support operations such as fire support, air support, military civic action, intelligence, counterintelligence, and psychological operations with particular emphasis on planning and communications.

c. Relationships between the Army advisor and other members of the U.S. country team (USAID, USIS, etc.).

d. To make this text useful to advisors involved in counterinsurgency operations regardless of where these operations may occur, the doctrine, tactics, and techniques contained herein are broad in scope and involve principles applicable to many and varied locales.

e. This manual is applicable for nonnuclear environ-
ments. However, when modified in accordance with current publications and official dictionaries that provide guidance for nuclear field operations, the principles included herein may be applied in nuclear environments.

f. Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommended changes or comments to improve the manual. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which the change is recommended. Reasons should be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be forwarded direct to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, Fort Belvoir, Va., 22060.

CHAPTER 2

ADVISOR RELATIONSHIPS

Section I. THE UNIT ADVISOR

3. General

a. The U.S. Army advisor assigned to host country regular military units in the context of this manual is referred to as the unit advisor.

b. The unit advisor uses his advisory staff personnel—
   (1) As his own staff.
   (2) To advise and assist counterpart personnel in the conduct of the full spectrum of counterinsurgency operations being conducted in his area of responsibility (ch. 3).
   (3) To advise and assist, to include coordination and control on the use of U.S. resources (in conjunction with USAID, USIS, etc.).

c. Unit advisors will assist their counterparts, when appropriate, by serving as liaison with U.S. support elements. Accordingly, they must have a working knowledge of—
   (1) The Air Force tactical air control system.
   (2) The U.S. Army air request net as it is integrated with the U.S. Air Force and host country air request net.
   (3) The capabilities of the U.S. Special Air Warfare Force.
The counterinsurgency capabilities of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.

The capabilities and limitations of U.S. Army aviation.

d. Advisory staff officers at subordinate levels normally will act as staff officers for their own U.S. advisory detachment and as advisors to their staff counterparts.

e. Orders to host country forces or agencies cannot be given by U.S. advisors. Senior advisors, when conducting inspection trips without their counterparts, cannot use subordinate advisory personnel to "order his unit" to take action. Such action must be implemented through the counterpart chain of command.

4. Organization

a. The advisory structure should parallel the appropriate national force organization.

b. A type unit advisory structure is contained in figure 1. Modify this type structure as necessary to meet operational requirements.

Section II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE AREA ADVISOR

5. General

a. The U.S. Army advisor assigned as an advisor to host country government officials below the national level, in the context of this manual, is referred to as the administrative area advisor. The civil administrator, as used in this text, refers to host country government executives below the national level.

b. The civil administrator's most critical task is to retain, or to reclaim, the allegiance of the civil population.

c. The administrative area advisor advises the civil administrator on the employment of host country military and paramilitary forces which are under the jurisdiction of the civil administrator. At times, he may be the sole U.S. representative in the area, and may be required to advise on civil as well as military matters (excluding political affairs). Special guidance on such matters normally will be forthcoming from higher headquarters.

d. The civil administrator normally functions in all of the roles outlined below.

(1) Political leader of his area.

(2) The full gamut of political, economic, psychological, and sociological activities.

(3) Internal security.

(4) Law enforcement.

e. Many host country, U.S. (including USAID), international, and private agencies operate in countries to meet the economic, sociological, and political aspirations of the population.

f. The establishment of an Area Security Coordination Center (ASCC) is of primary importance to coordinate their diverse activities and to utilize the resources available (para. 8).

g. Organization

a. Military Activities.

(1) The civil administrator may control police, paramilitary, and possibly regular military forces. His responsibilities may range from police intelligence and civic action in early Phase I insurgency through regular
Figure 1. Type advisory structure (division).

combat and total defense of embattled districts in Phase III insurgency.

(2) The advisor and the advisory staff assume advisory responsibility for—
(a) Regional defense.
(b) Suppression of insurgency.
(c) Procurement and employment of direct U.S. support.

1. Individual skills.
2. Units.

b. Nonmilitary Activities.

(1) The functions of public safety, public works, health, and administration as well as finance, agriculture, education, trade and supply, and industrial management are normally the responsibility of USAID. USIS is responsible for information programs.

(2) As the U.S. military representative on the ground, the administrative area advisor programs and recommends allocation of resources provided through the Military Assistance Program and other programs. These resources are often applicable in support of military civic action. For example, in isolated areas where road transport is difficult or nonexistent, helicopters can carry tools, supplies, and survey teams, and evacuate sick and hardship cases.

(3) The advisor must coordinate his military civic action program with the USAID effort. USAID funding can furnish installable assets while MAP supported troops and equipment can perform the work.

(4) In areas where no USAID representative is permanently assigned, the administrative area advisor
may be designated to assist in the implementation of USAID functions.

(5) The civil administrator's military and paramilitary forces can provide specialized psychological warfare and civic action teams. The administrative area advisor must assist his counterpart in his primary task of influencing the population through the proper employment of these teams.

(6) In remote areas advisory personnel must learn to use all available means to promote military civic action and learn to identify and evaluate existing or potential causes of discontent.
Figure 2. Type administrative area advisory structure.
CHAPTER 3
COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

Section I. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

7. General
   
   a. Programs. The counterinsurgency effort consists of three primary program groupings—
      (1) Environmental improvement. For details of implementation, see section II.
      (2) Population and resources control. For details of implementation, see section III.
      (3) Counterguerrilla operations. For details of implementation, see section IV.
   
   b. Basic Considerations.
      (1) Programs for countering insurgency must all be completely integrated throughout planning, development, and execution.
      (2) Counterinsurgency must be initiated as early as possible. An escalating insurgency becomes increasingly difficult to defeat.
      (3) Intelligence and psychological operations are vital parts of all programs.
      (4) Effective local government is vital to carry effective counterinsurgency programs to the local populations.

8. Command and Control
   
   The advisor should ascertain the organization for counterinsurgency within his area and where none exists should induce his counterpart to establish such an organization. At all levels, counterinsurgency planning and direction should be accomplished through area security coordination centers (ASCC).
      
      a. The ASCC are composed of elements of—
         (1) All host country forces and agencies.
         (2) Assigned U.S. advisory personnel.
      b. The heads of ASCC should be military or political chiefs.
      c. A civil-military advisory committee (CMAC), composed of representatives from the area's major economic and social groups and activities, in each ASCC provides communication with and participation of the local populace, and serves as a sounding board to reflect the progress of the counterinsurgency effort.

9. Allocation of Resources
   
   a. Normally, private foreign corporations, host country private enterprises, and U.S. governmental activities cooperate in local counterinsurgency programs. Nonmilitary personnel supervising U.S. Government efforts (USAID, USIS), may be assigned at major subordinate levels of government, and often, visiting technical representatives will operate at lower levels. The administrative area advisor must coordinate his efforts and those of the U.S. government nonmilitary representatives. In the absence of civilian advisors, the administrative area advisor may be directed to monitor the execution of programs initiated but not supervised by other U.S. Government agencies.
b. Host country and U.S. (USAID, USIS) civil resources are devoted to executing economic, social, psychological, and political programs. Military resources will often be employed to augment and sometimes to substitute for civil resources in executing these programs. This is called military civic action.

Section II. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT

10. General

a. In developing nations, it is the local administration in contact with the villagers which principally bridges the gap between the remote and sometimes impersonal national government and the people. To the extent that this administration is able to satisfy the aspirations of the people and to the extent that it creates the image of a responsive and capable government, the openings for subversion will diminish. This is accomplished through civic action. Military participation is accomplished through military civic action. The advisor must be ready to propose military civic action projects based on the capabilities of the unit advised and must be prepared to give guidance on the techniques of applying these capabilities in accordance with an overall counterinsurgency plan. To perform these functions the advisor must be aware of the following objectives, principles, concepts, and checklist. Prior to implementation of military civic action projects, coordination with USAID must be accomplished to avoid duplication of effort and to insure that adequate resources and technical assistance are made available.

b. The objectives of environmental improvement programs are to—
(1) Make substantial contributions to national development.
(2) Gain the support, loyalty, and respect of the people for their government.

11. Principles of Operation

a. With the objective of conserving resources and developing an integrated economy, all projects must proceed within the framework of a coordinated plan.

b. Projects must conform to guidance issued through command and advisory channels.

12. Concept of Operation

a. Host country military forces, over and above their usual mission of suppressing insurgency, contribute to environmental improvement through military civic actions to improve local social, cultural, and economic conditions.

b. Military civic action projects must be based on the capabilities of the units recognizing that—
(1) Troops are present in areas where other government agencies may not function.
(2) Troops often are in contact with peoples whose relationships with the central government may have been tenuous and who are ripe for subversion.
(3) Military and paramilitary forces have comparatively modern equipment often not available to the local population.
(4) Military units normally are well-supported logistically and have good communications.
5. Military personnel have knowledge and skills such as preventive medicine, engineering, and commerce not found in all areas that may be applied toward improving the environment.

6. Military officials can create a favorable government image by fair dealings such as adequate compensation for locally procured rations and transport, and respect for individual rights.

7. Through contact with people, troops may discover underlying factors causing discontent.

8. In some countries, the military may have been the principal tool of government oppression. The use of the military in civic action should improve their image.

13. Resources Available

a. Many programs, such as harvesting or road improvement, can be undertaken by military units possessing little more than a labor pool. Others require more sophisticated equipment, but most MAP-supported military forces, even combat battalions, contain at least a modicum of signal, transport, medical, and engineer capability.

b. Military civic action and military service in general is a two-way street.

(1) The soldier learns his responsibility toward the community.

(2) When a soldier from one area works with a civilian from another, there is an exchange of ideas and understanding and national unity is enhanced.

(3) A soldier learns skills which will be useful later on in his home village after discharge.

(4) Soldiers who possess special talent, such as carpentering, teaching, and electrical repair, have an opportunity to maintain their skills and at the same time break critical skill bottlenecks if these skills are not available in the village.

c. Personnel should be screened to identify individuals who possess skills in—

(1) Farming.

(2) Education.

(3) Electrical repair.

(4) Carpentry.

(5) Automotive repair.

(6) Linguistics.

(7) Others.

d. Following is a checklist of possible activities which can be undertaken by various units or individuals:

(1) Food, agriculture, natural resources.

(a) Insect and rodent control.

(b) Reclaim land (clear areas for farms and markets).

(c) Grading operations to prevent soil erosion (irrigation, drainage).

(d) Planting, thinning, and harvesting of forests.

(e) Construct compost pits.

(f) Construct animal pens.

(2) Industry and commerce.

(a) Assess and develop sand and gravel resources for road construction and repair.

(b) Construct housing and buildings.

(c) Encourage establishment of small retail business, new products. Improve marketing facilities, practices.
(3) Communications.
   (a) Install, operate, maintain telephone, telegraph, radio systems. Install loudspeakers for public announcements.
   (b) Operate emergency communications centers, especially during disasters.
   (c) Construct postal facilities.

(4) Public utilities.
   (a) Power production and distribution (water wheels, windmills, steam, electric, gasoline, animals).
   (b) Public storage facilities.
   (c) Support blacksmith facility. Organize sawmill operations.
   (d) Organize central public hand tool facility.
   (e) Organize, support village department of sanitation.

(5) Transportation.
   (a) Construct, repair, improve roads, bridges, railway equipment, wharves, harbors.
   (b) Construct, repair, improve, operate airfields and helicopter landing pads.
   (c) Remove people from disaster areas.
   (d) Small boat construction.
   (e) Transportation safety (directional markers for roads, waterways).
   (f) Construct intermediate pickup shelters.

(6) Health sanitation.
   (a) Improve preventive medicine standards (safe water supply, food decontamination measures, disposal of human and animal waste, insect and rodent control, immunization requirements and procedures, elimination of dangerous animals, and control of disease in domestic animals).
   (b) Improve treatment standards (establish and operate dispensary units, outpatient clinics and hospitals, employ roving medical teams, establish medical evacuation systems).
   (c) Improve medical training standards.
      1. Initiate training for all military personnel in sanitation, personal hygiene, and first aid.
      2. Educate the civilian populace regarding preventive medicine measures.
      3. Encourage advanced training of medical personnel.

(7) Education.
   (a) Provide basic and technical education to military.
   (b) Construct schools (use military facilities until schools are completed).
      1. Provide instructors for schools, basic and technical (train teachers).
      2. Provide instructional materials (audiovisual equipment, movie halls).
      3. Teach literacy courses (night school programs).
   4. Village libraries.

(8) Public administration.
   (a) Provide guidance in police, fire protection, civil defense.
   (b) Establishment of village council.
   (c) Supervising services listed above.
   (d) Flood control.
(9) **Community development, social welfare, housing.**
   (a) Provide for planning, surveying, supervision for schools, civic centers, churches, orphanages, medical centers, etc.
   (b) Sponsor worthy projects, such as children's shelters.

(10) **Civil information.**
   (a) Organize hamlet/village meetings.
   (b) Posters, wall newspapers.
   (c) Organize, indoctrinate key communicators.
   (d) Supervise publishing local newspapers, newsheets.

14. **Other Resources Available**

There are many organizations and extensive resources available to aid developing nations, and the advisor should not overlook the aid these organizations may provide. Such agencies include—

**a. Host Country.**
   (1) **Commercial.** Host country business enterprises may exist which sponsor public relations programs, including environmental improvement activities. Normally, the representatives of the U.S. country team or the advisor's counterpart can furnish information concerning these organizations.
   (2) **Nonprofit.** Variable from country to country: e.g., Red Cross Red Lion, etc.

**b. United States.**
   (1) **Government.**
      (a) U.S. Agency for International Development (or USOM).
      (b) MAAG/Mission.
      (c) U.S. Information Service.
      (d) Peace Corps.
      (e) Regional programs such as Alliance for Progress (Latin America).
   (2) **Commercial.** U.S. business enterprises such as petroleum companies, import-export companies, etc., often engage in environmental improvement activities through community relations programs.
   (3) **Nonprofit.** There are over 200 agencies of this type (in coordination with counterparts, advisors may contact local USAID representatives who can provide specific information or secure it from: Technical Assistance Information Clearing House of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, Inc., 44 East 23d Street, New York, N.Y., 10010). Examples are—
      (a) Missionaries.
      (b) Foundations.
      (c) Charitable organizations.

15. **Advisor Responsibilities (Environmental Improvement)**

The advisor, in conjunction with the local USAID representative, should monitor the application of the following principles. The counterpart should understand them, give each careful consideration, and provide the advisor an assessment of program development.

**a. The Civic Action Element.**
   (1) **Communication.** Through the counterpart, the advisor must get his ideas and intentions across. A plan to develop a potable water supply must include a means to explain the connection between potable
water and health. Programs can be advertised through—

(a) Community meetings.
(b) Contests.
(c) Informal lectures.
(d) Demonstrations.

(2) Image of the government team. In many areas, relations between rural villagers and the government have not always been satisfactory. The government team should—

(a) Establish rapport with the people.
(b) Speak their dialect.
(c) Understand their culture.
(d) Be sympathetic.
(e) Select projects of real interest to the people.

(3) Demonstration. The villagers should be shown dynamically how a program works.

(4) Participation. The villagers should participate voluntarily in a plan in order to—

(a) Instill in them a feeling of ownership and responsibility.

(b) Learn how the system functions to keep it operational after the government team leaves.

(5) Traditions. Projects should be adapted to local traditions and customs by the delegation of authority to local leaders and observing local taboos which do not materially conflict.

(6) Environment. The local environment should be used to advantage. In soil erosion projects, use only areas which are slightly eroded, where improvements will not be difficult and the chances of failure are diminished.

(7) Timeliness. Big work projects should be initiated during seasonal unemployment, not during harvest time.

(8) Flexibility. Projects should be altered if unforeseen conditions arise.

(9) Continuity. Confidence that the government intends to see it through must be instilled. Material and guidance should be continuous.

(10) Maintenance. The people should be left with the means, the know-how, and the interest to maintain the project. Spare parts should be available after initial government assistance leaves.

b. Population factors. The population factors inherent in local culture can affect the project. These should be recognized and turned to advantage.

(1) Motivation.

(a) Felt need. The project should be something that the villagers themselves want.

(b) Practical benefit. Benefits must be readily apparent as in the case of improved or new crops which bring a higher market value.

(c) Prestige emulation. Villagers may accept a program because they wish to emulate more successful or prestigious members of the community.

(d) Competition. Groups may strive to improve their status vis-a-vis other groups, clubs, villages, or families.

(e) Reward. A civic action project must provide immediate rewards.

(f) Novelty. A project may be accepted or rejected, either because it is impressive, or because it is suspect and fearsome.
(2) Traditional culture. Rural traditions are resistant to change and often will work against the project. Some of these factors and examples of countermeasures are—

(a) Social structure.
1. Role of the individual. Individuals influence a proposed improvement. For instance, although women are not traditionally included in village institutions, a cooperative endeavor formed without them may fail because they feel their interests are being ignored and consequently may withhold their support.

2. Kinship. It may be possible to form an institution, such as a cooperative, around a family group.

3. Ethnic group. Ethnic minorities may have separate cultures and traditions and consequently require special efforts if they are to be integrated into a regional effort. It may be advisable to assign functions within the project according to the existing status framework. Efforts to rupture suddenly the existing social system may lead to overwhelming opposition.

4. Political group. It will be necessary to work through the existing political structure. In any case, the authority of the legally constituted government must not be undercut. The advisor must take into account traditional and respected leaders who may not necessarily be government appointees. It may be possible to include village elders or headmen on the planning council.

5. Vested interests. Individuals will react favorably or unfavorably depending on whether the project will benefit or hinder their situation. A middle-

man, for instance, would probably oppose the formation of a cooperative.

6. Religious fraternity. The advisor should consider soliciting aid from local religious orders or individuals in selling the project.

(b) Economic pattern. Projects should be planned according to the capability and availability of local labor. Easily trainable technicians in rural areas generally are not available, nor is it easy to attract technicians into areas where living conditions are substandard.

(c) Beliefs. Religious and supernatural beliefs exert powerful influences and must be taken into account.

(d) Recreation pattern. Projects must not inadvertently interfere with cherished local pastimes.

(e) Consumption pattern. Products must fit reasonably well into the local consumption pattern.

(f) Value system. Projects must not transgress traditional beliefs of the right or wrong.

c. Monitoring the Program. Official progress checks should be made. A responsible host country official should be designated to assume responsibility, and he and the facility should be subjected to periodic inspections. Neither the advisor nor this counterpart should be satisfied to defer all projects until the arrival of specialized aid. They should make the most of what they have. Progress should be compared with such items as—

(1) Preplanned budget.
(2) Time scheduling.
(3) Technical specifications.
16. Advisor Check list (Community Analysis for Military Civic Action)

a. Community Map.
   (1) Obtain a map of the area or the community. If no map is available, draw one to scale.
   (2) Indicate road network (include main and secondary roads).
   (3) Show location of religious institutions, schools, community hall, market place, etc.
   (4) Indicate distances to adjacent communities.
   (5) Describe what determines the center of the community, and what factors are most important in giving the community its identification.
   (6) Describe the relation of the community as to the political, trade, school, and religious areas with that of the adjoining communities.
   (7) Describe the weather and terrain features directly affecting the location or life of the community.

b. History (as it affects the present situation).
   (1) Natural crises in the history of the community.
   (2) First settlement.
   (3) Incidents giving rise to conflicts or cooperation in the community.
   (4) Immigration and emigration.
   (5) Outstanding leaders and famous citizens in the community.

c. Population.
   (1) Census.
   (2) Occupations.
   (3) Ethnic groups if applicable.

d. Communication.
   (1) Transportation (roads, water, rail, air).
   (2) Electronic (telephones, radio, telegraph, television).
   (3) Printed material (newspaper, posters, magazines).
   (4) Mail facilities.
   (5) Connections with other communities.
   (6) Degree of self-sufficiency or isolation.

e. Community Integration.
   (1) What groups or individuals are independent of the local government; e.g., groups or individuals directly responsible to an outside or higher government? What effects do these have on the community; what is the attitude of the local citizens to these individuals?

f. Economic Situation.
   (1) Natural resources.
   (2) Industries.
   (3) Agriculture (crops and products, markets ownership and tenancy). Who are the landlords? Are they in the community or absentees?
   (4) Are there any local merchants? What is their influence on the community?
   (5) Professional (teachers, doctors, ministers).
   (6) Credit associations and their relations to the community.
   (7) Relative economic status of the people (debt, savings, taxes).

g. Religious Situation.
   (1) Number, make-up, attitude, and membership of each sect.
   (2) Buildings and equipment.
   (3) Church schools.
   (4) Clash or cooperation with other groups.
h. Educational Organizations.
   (1) Schools (number, size, territory served, buildings, equipment, libraries).
   (2) History (how and by whom were schools constructed).
   (3) School activities and relation to the community.

i. Voluntary Organizations.
   (1) Number, types, composition of membership, equipment, activities, and their relation to other phases of community life.
   (2) Farmers' Co-ops (4-H type organizations, home economic organizations).
   (3) Other occupational groups.

j. Recreational Facilities.
   (1) Organizations for recreation (community buildings, athletic clubs, soccer teams, ball fields and courts).
   (2) Traditional forms of and local attitudes toward recreation needs.

k. Health.
   (1) Physicians, health workers, nurses.
   (2) Public and private health organizations, national and international (hospitals, dispensaries, clinics, school health program).
   (3) Health status of the people. Prevalence, incidence, and types of diseases.

l. Political Situation.
   (1) Political structure and government (solidarity or strife and causes).
   (2) Dominant personalities.

m. Community Activities, Customs, and Ideals.
   (1) Community events other than religious observances.
   (2) What are the community customs or traditions (taboos or social disapprovals)?
   (3) Activity characteristics and pastimes.
   (4) Ideals. What are the community's attitudes on progress?

n. Leadership.
   (1) Dominant leaders. Family control.
   (2) Is leadership democratic or autocratic?
   (3) What is being done to develop new leaders?
   (4) Attitude of people toward new leaders.

o. Community Organization.
   (1) What is being done to integrate the community?
   (2) What are the needs for community organizations?

p. Status of Law and Order.
   (1) Organization and capabilities of law enforcement agencies.
   (2) Police techniques.
   (3) Crime rate and trend.
   (4) Unusual enforcement problems.

Section III. POPULATION AND RESOURCES CONTROL

17. General
   a. The insurgent's primary target is the people; therefore, counterinsurgency must separate the insurgent from the people and their resources.
   b. Population and resources control is implemented as required to support and to complement the programs
of environmental improvement and counterguerrilla operations. The advisor must be knowledgeable of the tasks, principles, concept, and techniques of population and resources control in order to advise his counterpart on their implementation.

c. The primary objectives of population and resources control are to—Identify and neutralize the insurgents, their organization, their activities, and influence.

18. Principles of Operation

a. Civil control measures are basically police functions. Civil police should initiate controls because—
   (1) They are best suited by training and experience.
   (2) Their area orientation results in a closer relationship with the local population.
   (3) They permit military forces to concentrate on offensive counterguerrilla operations.

b. Where local police are incapable, local paramilitary forces, including home guards, village militia, and police auxiliaries are organized and trained as reserves.

c. Military forces are used only as expediency since extended assignment to this duty detracts from their main mission of counterguerrilla offensive operations.

d. Continuous psychological operations are mounted to—
   (1) Counter the effects of insurgent propaganda.
   (2) Create a favorable governmental image.
   (3) Relate controls to the security and well-being of the population.

e. Control measures must—
   (1) Be authorized by national laws and regulations (counterparts should be advised not to improvise unauthorized measures).
   (2) Be tailored to fit the situation (unwarranted measures will do more harm than good).
   (3) Be capable of enforcement.
   (4) Apply the minimum force required to achieve the desired result.
   (5) Be lifted as the need diminishes.
   (6) Be instituted in as wide an area as possible to prevent by-passing or evading.
   (7) See section I, chapter 4, for intelligence requirements.

f. Special considerations must be given to acquiring adequate communications equipment to support control operations (para. 45).

19. Concept of Operation

A control program may be developed in six phases—

a. Defending the area.
b. Cordon and search.
c. Screening and documenting the population.
d. Establishing internal security.
e. Organizing internal security, intelligence and defense activities, and forces.
f. Conducting public administration, to include resource control.

20. Defending the Area

Defense begins concurrently with, or immediately subsequent to, offensive operations. Since a district contains several villages, hamlets, and larger communities, the entire political administrative unit, as well as each
individual community, eventually must be defended. In areas under insurgent influence, it will be necessary to construct defenses around existing hamlets and concentrate rural populations into defendable population units. Normally, this will be accomplished concurrently with counterguerrilla warfare, environmental improvement, and population and resources control programs.

a. Defended Hamlets.

(1) Defended hamlets may be constructed if—
   (a) Less restrictive measures have failed to eliminate population support of the guerrilla.
   (b) Government forces have been unable to provide defense or internal security.
   (c) The population must provide their own defense to release military forces to conduct counterguerrilla warfare.
   (d) They are required as bases from which to mount operations.

(2) Advisors can assist in the development of the defended hamlet by—
   (a) Coordinating requests for USAID support with appropriate USAID area representatives.
   (b) Providing assistance and advice in the following areas:
      1. Planning hamlet defenses to include provisions for support.
      2. Organizing, training, and equipping hamlet defense forces.
      3. Insuring that military defense forces are provided until such time as local defense forces are adequate and are supported by regional paramilitary and military forces.

b. Relocation.

(1) Relocation, the most severe of the restrictive measures, is accomplished when—
   (a) Wide dispersion of the population prevents effective defense, internal security, and control.
   (b) Requirements exist to evacuate or populate selected areas.

(2) Advisors can contribute to the implementation of this technique by providing assistance in the following areas—
   (a) Psychological operations to condition the population for relocation.
   (b) Defense during relocation. If relocation is combined with the defended hamlet technique, the advisor can further assist, once relocation is completed, by participating as indicated in section II, chapter 3.
   (c) Logistical requirements, such as subsistence, medical assistance, and transportation, to facilitate movement and relocation of populations and possessions.

21. Cordon and Search

a. Frequently utilized by counterinsurgency forces conducting a population and resources control mission
against small centers of population or subdivisions of a larger community.

b. Sufficient forces to effectively cordon off the target area and to thoroughly search target areas, to include areas below surface level, must be provided.

c. Ample time must be allocated to conduct thorough search and interrogation of residents of affected areas.

d. Operation should be rehearsed thoroughly whenever possible.

e. Firm but fair treatment must be the rule. Every effort must be made to avoid any incident which results in unnecessarily alienating the people.

f. Cordon and search forces should contain augmentation in the form of psychological warfare, civic action, and specialist interrogation teams to further the effectiveness of such operations.

\[ g. \] Cordon and search operations may be conducted as follows:

(1) Cord\[on\]. Individual communities are cordoned off.

(\(a\)) Disposition of troops should—

1. Facilitate visual contact between posts within the cordon.

2. Provide for adequate patrolling and immediate deployment of an effective reserve force.

(\(b\)) Priority should be given to—

1. Sealing the administrative center of the community.

2. Occupying all critical facilities.

3. Detaining personnel in place.

(\(c\)) Key facilities include—

1. Administrative buildings.

2. Police stations.

3. News media facilities.

4. Post offices.

5. Communications centers.

6. Transportation offices and motor pools.

7. Prisons and other places of detention.

8. Schools.

(2) Search.

(\(a\)) The system for immediate search and seizure should be carefully documented in SOP and implemented by trained personnel. Search operations should be carried out prior to or concurrent with screening.

(\(b\)) A search SOP should provide for the following:

1. Search teams of squad size.

2. One target assigned per team.

3. Room searches conducted by individuals or two-man teams.

4. Room-search teams armed with pistols; all other personnel armed with automatic weapons.

5. Pre-search coordination.

(\(a\)) Between control personnel and screening team leaders.

(\(b\)) Study of lay-out plans.

(\(c\)) Communications, i.e., radio, whistle, and hand signals.

(\(d\)) Disposition of suspects.

6. On-site security.
(a) Guard entrances, exits, to include roof, halls, corridors, and tunnels.
(b) Missions for reserve.

7. Room search.
(a) Search occupants.
(b) Immobilize occupants with one team member.
(c) Search room with other team member.
(d) Place documents in a numbered envelope and tag individual with a corresponding number.

8. Security duties. Search teams are provided security for screening operations and facilities.

22. Screening and Documenting the Population
Screening and documentation include—

a. Systematic identification and registration.

b. Issuance of individual identification cards containing—
   (1) Picture of individual.
   (2) Personal identification data.
   (3) Fingerprint(s).
   (4) An official stamp.

c. Family group census cards, an official copy of which is retained at the local police agency, containing—
   (1) Picture.
   (2) Appropriate personal data.

d. Frequent use of mobile and fixed check points for inspection, identification, and registration of documents.

e. Preventing counterfeiting of identification and registration documents by laminating and embossing.

f. Programs to inform the population of the need for identification and registration.

23. Establishing Internal Security
Internal security measures consist of—

a. Intra-community perimeter guard.

b. Fixed posts at critical facilities.

c. Road blocks.

d. Foot and motor patrols.

e. Reserves.

f. Restricted access to such installations as city hall, police headquarters, radio and TV stations, and newspaper offices.

   (1) Passes required in addition to personal identity cards.

   (2) Special passes provided to selected personnel who are necessary for the health and welfare of the population.

g. Pass-issuing offices not collocated with sensitive installations.

24. Organization of Law Enforcement, Intelligence and Security Activities
The following police services should be provided:

a. Police command group.

b. Records and communications division.

c. Patrol division.

d. Detective division.

f. Laboratory facilities.

f. Identification facilities.

g. Prisoner custodial facilities.
Public Administration Including Resources Control

a. General. Public administration at local levels is normally of the executive type. It is at this level that resources are managed and controlled. After screening has been completed, action must be taken for continuation of governmental functions, and the following factors should be considered:

(1) The combining of internal security and defense activities under a public safety office.

(2) The employment of population surveillance (overt and covert) based on area coverage to include—

(a) Overt surveillance, the responsibility of the police patrol division, and conducted with conventional police procedures, using the officer on the beat as the lowest official of government in contact with the public. Police patrols—

1. Frequently vary routes and movement to avoid establishing a predictable pattern.
2. Should not be limited to the confines of the community but should include adjacent areas.
3. Must be coordinated with the activities of military and paramilitary forces to avoid duplication of effort and confusion.
4. Use military dogs to contribute to overall effectiveness.

(b) Covert surveillance, a collection effort, the responsibility fixed with the intelligence/security division or with the detective division of the police department. Covert techniques, ranging from application of sophisticated electronics systems to informants should include—

1. Informant nets. Reliability of informants should be verified. Protection of identity is a must.
2. Block control or the division of a community or populated area into zones where a trusted resident reports on the activities of the population. If the loyalty of block leaders is questionable, an informant net can be established to verify questionable areas.

b. Movement Control. Movement control of personnel and goods can be established by requiring passenger and cargo manifests, fuel rationing, trip tickets, and route clearances. Contraband must be clearly defined and made known to the general public. Techniques include—

(1) Individual travel passes. Travel passes issued on a one-time basis permitting the holder to go to a certain point or points and return can be used in conjunction with the movement of specified goods listed on a manifest.

(2) Check points. Check points should be both fixed and mobile and points at which both vehicular and pedestrian traffic is checked and searches conducted.

(a) Fixed check points.
1. Are established in open country and on high ground to decrease vulnerability.
2. Have turn-off space to avoid traffic congestion.
3. Are established on routes which make it necessary for traffic to pass through the check point.
4. Are established a reasonable distance apart to avoid unnecessary inconvenience to the population.

(b) Mobile check points.
1. Are used in conjunction with fixed check
38 points to prevent traffic from evading the fixed point.
2. Can be established with surprise and rapidity.
3. Should have characteristics of fixed check points.

c. Curfew and Blackout.
(1) Curfew and blackout is resorted to only in conditions where extraordinary measures are indicated and is based on analysis of all factors, to include—
(a) Effects.
(b) Objectives.
(c) Enforceability.
(d) Duration.
(e) Proclamations and explanations required.
(f) Intelligence value.
(2) The key objectives of curfew are—
(a) To screen military movements and other activities during critical phases of operations.
(b) To prevent movement which might be useful or helpful to the insurgent forces, especially before interim public order has been established.
(c) To restrict movement within specific hours throughout a specified area or community or to restrict movement to specific routes during specific time periods.
(d) To permit government forces to identify and take action on the assumption that the only person moving in a designated area within the specified hours is an insurgent.
(e) To disrupt the insurgents’ communication or support systems as far as they are based on use of the community.
(f) To deceive the insurgent.
(g) To deter the assembly of crowds.
(3) Curfews are usually imposed during the hours of darkness which is when the insurgent normally operates and should not be associated with planned military or police operations in such a manner as to tip-off the operation.
(4) Public announcement of curfews and blackouts should include—
(a) Periods of time and areas in which citizens may circulate to take care of their needs.
(b) Categories of persons who may be excepted from the restrictions.
1. The hours in which they may circulate to perform their functions.
2. Systems to control the number, identity, and special documentation of persons so excepted.
d. Resource: Control Measures. Blanket application of resource control measures without sufficient requirement causes more harm than good; these measures should be applied selectively. They include—
(1) Forbidding civilians to enter without permission any place locked or placed under guard.
(2) Ordering that all weapons and radio sets be surrendered.
(3) Ordering that designated categories of persons identified with the insurgent, cadre, or guerrilla organizations be apprehended.
(4) Ordering civilians to report all unexploded bombs, shells, and other explosives.
(5) Ordering cameras to be turned in.
Controlling all raw material and livestock which could be of value to guerrilla forces.

Establishing price and monetary controls and a rationing system.

Control of medical facilities and drugs.

Evacuation of designated areas to forestall acts of collaboration.

Denial and destruction operations against insurgent installations, materiel, and crops.

e. Interim Public Order. Measures to protect the population in extraordinary situations include—

(1) Burial of civilian and animal dead.

(2) Ordering that all government and guerrilla dead be reported but not molested.

(3) Ordering that all strange civilians or unknown refugees report to counterintelligence units for investigation.

(4) Frequent checks to insure that local authorities run their communities honestly, efficiently and quietly, set prices, establish a rationing system, distribute food and, if appropriate, provide accommodations for refugees.

(5) Censoring communication media such as radio, telephone, mail, telegraph, and keeping close surveillance of nontechnical communication systems where appropriate.

26. Port, Border, and Travel Security

Port, border, and travel security operations consist of the special application of security measures to control airports, seaports, land and sea frontiers, international air boundaries, and all nonmilitary travel into and out of an area of operations.

a. Port Security. Ports serve as entries or exits for personnel, documents and materiel; therefore, they become focal points for travel control. These facilities are primary insurgent targets and must be protected against sabotage. A port facility normally will be under the control of civil port authority.

(1) Port security may be provided by harbor or port police, paramilitary forces, and military police, and requires close coordination and cooperation between military and civil authorities. Counterintelligence personnel assist in establishing and maintaining security measures and consider the following:

(a) The port facility itself.

(b) Nearby communities.

(c) Port employees.

(d) Insurgent subversive activity focused on the port.

(e) The ships in port.

(f) Seamen serving aboard ships who may be serving as insurgent couriers or agents.

(2) Port security objectives include the following:

(a) Secure and neutralize insurgent intelligence targets.

(b) Coordinate counterintelligence measures, intelligence targets, and security controls with other interested agencies.

(c) Conduct counterintelligence surveys and inspections.

(d) Survey adjacent towns or areas.
Monitor security measures.

Investigate port employees in coordination with civil police.

Maintain a “Black List” of known or suspected insurgent agents or collaborators who might use the port or live in the area.

Assist in screening ship crew and passengers.

Recommend security measures for fishing or harbor craft control.

Conduct necessary liaison with all interested agencies.

b. Border Security. Border security and control in counterinsurgency operations is designed to prevent insurgent forces from using adjacent countries as sanctuaries.

Subsidiary objectives. The following are related subsidiary objectives of border security and control:

(a) Preventing sabotage and espionage by excluding agents.
(b) Apprehending or neutralizing insurgent couriers.
(c) Neutralizing propaganda and subversion by excluding foreign funds and literature.
(d) Preventing undesirable persons (political, military leaders) from escaping or re-entering.

Planning considerations. Border security and control plans should provide for the following:

(a) Authorized road and rail crossing points along the frontier.

Border control posts at authorized crossing points to—

1. Identify persons attempting to cross.
2. Enforce restrictions on the movement of goods and currency.
3. Border patrols to apprehend anyone trying to evade border control regulations.
4. Control of persons residing near borders to include restricted zones.
5. Interrogation and disposition of suspects.
6. Control of refugees and displaced persons who try to cross the border.
7. Liaison with border control authorities of neighboring countries.
8. Recommendations concerning personnel required and their training.
9. Normal civilian traffic should be disrupted no more than necessary to meet security requirements.
10. Whenever expedient, separate crossing points for military and civilian traffic may be designated.

Use of informants.

(a) On both sides of the border to pick up information concerning routes, participants, and time of planned border crossings.
(b) Acquainted with blackmarket operators. (Invaluable in discovering border control violations because of the connection between blackmarket, international smuggling, and espionage.)

27. Advisor Responsibilities

In conjunction with the USAID area representative(s), advisors can assist counterparts in—
a. Developing appropriate population and resources control plans.

b. Developing training programs for population and resources control forces.

c. Recommending personnel for participation in USAID public safety schools.

d. Coordinating plans and requests for materiel support control activities.

e. Inspecting, monitoring, and submitting recommendations to improve overall effectiveness of control activities.

1) Preparation for initiation of control.

(a) Select, organize, and train population and resources control police, paramilitary forces, etc.

(b) Develop psychological operations to help win the confidence of the people and establish a base of political allegiance.

(c) Coordinate control activities through the ASCC.

(d) Refine and establish defense and internal security systems.

(e) Intensify intelligence activity and psychological operations, particularly aimed at uncovering and eliminating insurgent cadre.

(f) Implement control measures on movement of resources and personnel by block warden systems.

(g) Establish and refine systems of coordination and communications with other organizations.

2) Establishing maximum control. Continued guerrilla success, combined with a resultant increase in willing or unwilling population support, will dictate intensifying control measures applied. In such situations, the following measures can be used:

(a) Establish defended hamlets and relocate population (as a last resort).

(b) Intensify the measures outlined in e(1) above.

(c) Initiate and publicize amnesty and rehabilitation programs.

(d) Offer rewards for capture of insurgent cadre.

(e) Adopt and publicize lenient treatment for informers.

3) Relinquishing control. As counterinsurgency succeeds, population and resources control should decrease. Relinquishment of control should be offered to the population as an incentive for their cooperation. Controls should be lessened in two stages—

(a) Stage A. Reduce intensity of controls.

1. Continue general area controls but reduce such operations as raids, ambushes, and cordon and search.

2. Pass primary responsibility for control to police and paramilitary units, phasing out military police participation.

3. Continue intelligence activities.

4. Accelerate environmental improvement, supported by psychological operations, to eliminate the causes of insurgency and resurgency of insurgent strength.

(b) Stage B. Reduce controls to a minimum.

1. Lessen individual restrictions and block warden systems.

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2. Continue controls on resources and population movements.
3. Reduce paramilitary unit operations to a standby basis; however, continue organization and training activities.
4. Continue intelligence and psychological operations.
5. Emphasize environmental improvement and building a solid base of political allegiance.

f. Imposition of control measures during any phase will result in the capture and detention of insurgents, sympathizers, suspects, and other violators as well as the confiscation of contraband and other critical material. Provisions for handling, accountability, and disposition should include—
   (1) Local detention and interrogation facilities.
   (2) Circumstances of capture documented and recorded in local police files for analysis of trends and patterns.
   (3) Captured insurgents and others properly referred for prosecution or, in some instances, for rehabilitation.
   (4) Confiscated material should be fully identified, including circumstances of confiscation, safeguarded and turned over to the appropriate authority when requested.

g. Amnesty, pardon, rehabilitation, a system of rewards, and re-education play distinct and significant roles in an effective population and resources control program. Reward programs are implemented after necessary legislation is adopted. Payments are provided for information, capture of guerrilla leaders, and turn-in of guerrilla weapons and equipment. Insurgent defectors can be profitably used in psychological operations directed toward the population to counteract insurgent propaganda. Amnesty and rehabilitation programs should include—
   (1) Provisions to allow disaffected members of the population to revert to the support of the government without undue fear of punishment for previous antigovernment acts wherever possible.
   (2) Just, equitable, and scrupulously observed execution of the programs aimed at causing disaffection among the insurgent and his supporters.
   (3) Rehabilitation of former insurgents and their supporters through a program of re-education.

Section IV. COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

28. Objectives

The primary objective of counterguerrilla operations is to neutralize and eliminate the guerrilla insurgent and, together with population and resources control measures, establish an environment in which political, social, and economic progress is possible. A detailed discussion of counterguerrilla operations may be found in FM 31-16.

a. Offensive Operations.
   (1) Gain and maintain contact with the guerrilla.
   (2) Harassment operations may assist in locating and fixing the guerrilla. Operations of this type will prevent the guerrilla from resting and reorganizing, will inflict casualties, aid in gaining detailed knowledge of the area of operations, and cause the guerrilla to expend his limited resources.
(3) When a guerrilla force has been located, every attempt to encircle the force should be made, even if piecemeal deployment is required. Normally, such operations require that the counterguerrilla force be much larger than the guerrilla force (figs. 3 through 5 and FM 31–16).

(4) When contact is made with a guerrilla force, the probable reaction of the guerrilla force will be to inflict the maximum casualties on the regular force without becoming decisively engaged, and then flee the scene of action. This method of operation dictates that military forces operating against guerrilla forces be particularly adept in the conduct of pursuits (FM 31–16).

(a) The unit that makes the initial contact with the guerrilla force will require rapid augmentation to maintain pressure against the fleeing force, envelop it, and eventually effects its destruction. These augmentation (reaction) forces should be given the highest priority for use of available transport to insure their delivery to the scene of action as soon as possible.

(b) The pursuit force is organized into two elements, the direct pressure force, and the encircling force(s) (includes blocking force). The direct pressure force pursues the enemy and maintains constant offensive pressure on him as he withdraws. The encircling force(s), employing superior mobility (preferably by using airmobile or airborne forces), conducts local envelopments (single or double) to cut him off and destroy him (fig. 6).

(5) Area ambush is an effective counterguerrilla technique. The area ambush consists of the primary ambush element which triggers the ambush, supported
Figure 3. Initial encirclement.
Figure 4. Contraction of encirclement.

Figure 5. Reduction of encircled guerrilla force.
Figure 6. Pursuit.
by smaller ambush groups which cover all likely routes of withdrawal. Once the ambush is triggered, the smaller ambush groups open fire as the guerrilla force attempts to withdraw from the area.

b. Defensive Operations.

(1) Defense is oriented on the location of the community or installation rather than upon the most favorable terrain. Since defense of the specific community or installation is paramount, plans for withdrawal to rearward positions are de-emphasized.

(2) Surveillance and security measures must be coordinated for 24-hour operations. The provisions for perimeter defense, as discussed in FM 7-11, are particularly applicable in defense of communities or installations against guerrilla attack when regular counter-guerrilla forces are preparing and conducting the defense. When using local paramilitary forces, training must instill the necessary confidence and ability to provide an adequate defense for a community under attack until supporting forces can be delivered or until troop reinforcements can arrive.

(3) By prearranged standing operating procedure (SOP) to include communications, forces, and fire support, larger communities and the surrounding smaller ones mutually assist in the defense of one another until other support or reinforcements arrive.

(4) In areas where offensive operations have been conducted to eliminate guerrilla control of the population, regular military forces will be required to assume the responsibility for defense of the liberated community until adequate local defenders can be trained and equipped.
Detailed planning for security of column movement must consider (also, see sec. I, ch. 4)—

(a) Mounted.

1. Column cover if available. Coordination with supporting air units to include a thorough understanding of how air support will be utilized to assist the mounted column both in preventive measures and close combat operations including counterambush actions.

2. Fire support. All air and ground fire support elements within range of the route of the mounted column must take measures to insure close and continuous fire support. Fire planning, to include registration, must be as complete as time allows. Continuous communications must be assured to include airborne radio relay if necessary.

3. Individual and unit SOP of maneuver for preventive action and counterambush action.

4. Prepositioning of security elements along the route.

5. Possible use of airmobile hunter-killer teams.

6. Assistance available from friendly units occupying positions along or adjacent to the route.

(b) Dismounted. Security for movement when dismounted presents several considerations which are different from security for mounted columns. These include—

1. The need for secrecy which may preclude air cover.

2. Restrictions on registration of artillery and the inability to plan concentrations when the route cannot be determined in advance.

3. Flank security is easier for dismounted movement, particularly if ground or air transportation can be used to position security elements.

4. Silent movement of dismounted columns, particularly at night, can allow security elements to locate ambush forces.

5. Extended formations which allow part of the column to be in position to maneuver against an ambush force that strikes a different part of the column.

29. Advisor Check List (Counterguerrilla Operations)

a. Concentrate on elimination of the guerrilla, not on terrain objectives.

b. Maintain the offensive in all kinds of weather (do not bog down during the rainy season—limited offensive operations are preferable to a passive attitude).

c. Designate priorities of effort to provide guidelines for allocation of counterguerrilla forces.

d. Get counterguerrilla forces out of garrisons, cities, and towns; off the roads and trails into the environment of the guerrilla.

e. Plan for and use all resources (both regular and special units).

f. Avoid establishment of semi-permanent patrol bases laden with artillery and supplies that tend to tie down the force (special attention to prevent mobile units from becoming semi-fixed).

g. Emphasize secrecy and surprise. Plans should provide for—

(1) Effective and secure communications.

(2) Constant indoctrination of the individual soldier.
(3) Variation of methods and the use of unorthodox tactics and techniques to avoid establishing patterns.

h. Assign areas of responsibility to commanders.

i. Emphasize that command and staff action should include—

1. Centralized planning of small-scale decentralized tactical operations.

2. Emphasis on unity of command.

3. Training programs which stress developing the offensive spirit, physical stamina, and a desire to seek out the guerrilla and destroy him.

4. Extensive contingency planning for employment of reserve forces.

5. Detailed coordination of the intelligence collection effort accomplished by—

   a. Coordination with civil and paramilitary intelligence nets.

   b. Creating informer nets with the local population.

   c. Thorough interrogation of prisoners and suspects.

   d. Detailed planning and coordination of activities with civilian officials in any area of operations where the civilian population is concerned.

6. Incorporation and monitoring of military civic action into the operational plan by—

   a. Planning for, and augmenting a plan of military civic action, propaganda, and population control to recover population under insurgent influence.

   b. Requesting and distributing supplies for resettlement of population.

   c. Training paramilitary forces for security operations and insuring continuous support for these forces.

   d. Detailed integration of combat support and combat service support functions (especially aerial supply) into all tactical planning (ch. 4).

   e. Judicious application of the minimum destruction concept in view of the overriding requirements to minimize alienating the population. (Bringing artillery or air power to bear on a village from which sniper fire was received may neutralize guerrilla action but will alienate the civilian population as a result of casualties among noncombatants.)

(9) Consideration of the use of all means of mobility, to include aircraft, tracked and wheeled vehicles, boats, animals, and porters.

(10) Providing for the rapid collection and dissemination of all available information and intelligence so that counterguerrilla forces can take immediate action to destroy the fast-moving guerrilla (difficult but a must) (sec. 1, ch. 4).

(11) Communications requirements to include—

   a. Offensive and defensive requirements for AM, FM, SSB.

   b. Air to ground; FM, UHF, or VHF for—

      1. Ambushes.

      2. Patrols.

      3. Convoys.

      4. Raids.

      5. Emergency.

      6. Medical evacuation.

   c. Fire support plans.

   d. Emergency nets in various regions.
Section V. CLEAR AND HOLD OPERATIONS

30. General

The clear and hold operation is a focus of the three primary counterinsurgency programs, supported by intelligence and psychological operations, on a specific geographical or administrative area or portions thereof. The tactics and techniques used to conduct clear and hold operations are treated throughout this advisor guide. The clear and hold operation is concentrated in a specific high priority area experiencing overt insurgency and has the following objectives:

a. Creation of a secure physical and psychological environment.

b. Establishing firm government control of the population and the area.

c. Gaining willing support of the population and their participation in the governmental programs for countering insurgency.

31. Planning Considerations

a. Clear and hold operations should expand outward from a secure base, such as an urban industrial complex whose population support the government effort and where military forces are in firm control.

b. No area or its population which has been subjected to the intensive organizational efforts of a subversive insurgent organization can be won back until—

(1) A commander, responsible for the clear and hold operation, is allocated sufficient military forces clearly superior to the insurgent guerrilla force known and suspected to be in the area or immediately available in an adjacent area.

(2) Sufficient nonmilitary resources are allocated to effectively carry out all necessary environmental improvement and population and resources control operations within the area.

(3) The guerrilla has been cleared from the area.

(4) The insurgent hard-core organization and its support structure has been neutralized or eliminated.

(5) A governmental organization, to which the local population gives willing support, has been established to replace that of the insurgents.

32. Implementation

The clear and hold operation is characterized by execution of four generally overlapping stages, i.e., preparation, clearing, holding, and consolidation.

a. Preparatory Stage. The preparatory stage, during which inventory, assessment, and planning is conducted, is characterized by the following major actions:

(1) Selection and delineation of a specific area to undergo clear and hold operations (accomplished at the national or lower level based on national objectives).

(2) Designation of chain of command and formulation of concept of operation.

(3) Collection of data and information on the area of operations (area assessment).

(4) Estimate of resource requirements, both military and nonmilitary.

(5) Preparation of clear and hold operations plan. During preparation of the plan, consideration to many factors will be given, included in which are the following:

(a) Emergency legislation, to provide a legal
basis for population and resources control measures, legality of use of armed forces, etc.

(b) Key points which may require establishing static defense posts.

(c) Police forces and paramilitary forces requirements and organization.

(d) Coordination, to include provisions for joint training and operations, involving military, police, paramilitary, intelligence, psychological, and civilian administrative agencies and forces.

(6) Psychological preparation of the population of contiguous areas to explain the necessity for these operations.

b. Clearing Stage.

(1) This phase, characterized by counterguerrilla operations and population and resources control operations, is designed to—

(a) Deny the insurgent organization the capability to function in the area.

(b) Establish the physical presence of government military and population and resources control forces throughout the area.

(c) Establish firm security in the area under the protective shield of government forces.

(2) The clearing stage can be initiated by sweep-type operations to either disperse or force reaction by major guerrilla elements within the area of operations. Once this has been accomplished, a combination of offensive small unit operations, such as area saturation patrolling, area ambushes, and other techniques as contained in section IV, chapter 5, are initiated.

(3) Repressive and retributory actions against the general population in the area must not be condoned. A characteristic of all counterinsurgency operations is firm and impartial treatment whenever and wherever possible since often it will be impossible to identify the insurgent at the onset of operations.

(4) Population and resources control forces introduce surveillance and restrictive control measures as necessary (sec. III).

c. Holding Stage.

(1) Operations during this phase are designed to—

(a) Establish firm government control over the area and the population therein.

(b) Develop a local capability for area security.

(c) Establish a government political apparatus to replace the insurgent apparatus.

(d) Develop a dependable network of informants.

(2) Major actions occurring during this phase include—

(a) Designating and allocating area-oriented regular military forces to continue offensive military operations in the area. Other regular military forces who participated in clearing stage actions are now released or are assigned to carrying out other parts of the counterinsurgency effort in the area.

(b) Introduction of elements of other agencies of the government, as the area achieves a more secure status, to begin carrying out environmental improvement programs. Resources to support these agencies and their operations should be introduced, as needed, at this time.
(c) Thorough population screening to determine insurgent elements and to uncover local leadership.

(d) Area surveys, assisted by local leadership, to determine resources and precise and current needs of the area and its people.

(e) Motivation of population, by such actions as environmental improvements, designed to psychologically condition the population and induce them to participate in the reconstruction of the area and in the defense of their area against attack by guerrillas (sec. II and III).

(f) Government support to those willing to participate in reconstruction, based upon their needs and upon the principle of self-help, wherever possible, and willingness to defend what they accomplish.

(g) Training of local paramilitary forces, including arming and involving them in one or more successful operations against guerrillas.

(h) Establishing a communications system tying the area into a larger secure communications system.

(i) Progressive efforts, such as formation of youth clubs, participation of population in election of local leadership, participation in community-sponsored environmental improvement and other projects, to develop national consciousness and rapport between the population and its government.

d. Consolidation Stage.

(1) During this stage all activities of the clear and hold operations are expanded and accelerated with the objectives of—

(a) Turning primary responsibility for local security and government over to the local population as soon as they are capable of accepting such responsibility.

(b) Maintaining complete security.

(c) Continuing the reconstruction effort with support being provided, as necessary, from local or government resources, or a combination thereof.

(d) Continuing development of national consciousness and the local political base willingly supported by and participated in by the local population.

(2) The redeployment of the bulk of the area-oriented counterguerrilla force to carry out operations in adjacent or other high priority areas occurs during this phase. However, redeployment must not take place until local paramilitary forces are capable of providing local security. Further, a general reserve force must be constituted that can respond swiftly to guerrilla attacks which are beyond the capability of local or regional forces. A national level reserve force such as airmobile, airborne, or marine units may be made available to provide assistance.

e. Other Considerations. The attainment of clear and hold operations objectives requires considerable expenditures of resources and time. The advisor and his counterpart must be prepared for a long-term effort. Based upon experiences in insurgency-stricken areas in which clear and hold operations, or similar type operations, have been conducted, several years may be required to achieve complete and enduring success.


See appendix II.
CHAPTER 4
SUPPORT

Section I. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

34. General

In a Phase I counterinsurgency situation intelligence and counterintelligence requirements will be developed at the national level. However, since certain elements of intelligence and counterintelligence activities launched during Phase I will appear during Phase II and Phase III, general guidance in these areas is provided in the Advisor Check List (Intelligence and Counterintelligence) (para. 37). During a Phase III counterinsurgency situation, intelligence activity, as tactical activity, is essentially the same as for conventional-type military operations. The majority of special requirements and peculiarities with which advisors will be faced will appear in Phase II insurgency and will primarily concern counterguerrilla operations. Some of these are as follows:

a. Requirement for rapid collection and dissemination.

b. Requirement for augmentation of organic intelligence personnel and equipment.

c. Knowledge of the area of operations must approach that of the guerrilla force.

d. Terrain analysis and selection of avenues of approach, to include consideration of the most likely avenues of approach of the guerrilla, must include effects of the weather on visibility, trafficability, and men and equipment.

e. The selection of objectives in counterguerrilla operations is based not only on consideration of the conventional military aspects of terrain but includes consideration of the sociological, political, economic, psychological, and logistical aspects of the area of operations.

f. Detailed knowledge of guerrilla tactical doctrine and the insurgent organization is essential.

g. The area of operations to include its civil populace is the most prolific source of information.

h. An increased number of collection agencies will be required (FM 30–5).

i. Collection planning must be more elaborate and detailed.

j. Collection techniques as contained in FM 30–18 (U) must be employed in order to obtain information of significance.

k. Timely dissemination of intelligence is of the utmost importance.

l. Effective counterintelligence measures are critical to successful operations.

35. Advisor Intelligence Functions

a. General. The advisor must be thoroughly familiar with various intelligence and counterintelligence organizations and techniques. The adaptation of these techniques must be based upon known methods of insurgent operations. Tactics of a set pattern invariably play into the hands of the insurgents.
b. Functions. The following are functions which the advisor normally will fulfill:

1. Assist in establishing an operations center within the ASCC for coordinating the civil-military overall intelligence effort within his counterpart's area of responsibility (see para. 8 for discussion of ASCC).
2. Establish work-level relationship with his military counterpart for collection of intelligence and for planning and conducting operations.
3. Maintain liaison with local police and other intelligence agencies responsible for countersubversion operations against insurgent underground political organizations in the area.
4. Provide intelligence support to U.S. advisors working at other levels.
5. Establish secure and reliable communication channels.
6. Prepare daily summary reports dealing with insurgent activity within the area (include psychological vulnerabilities).
7. Assist counterpart in developing effective techniques and procedures for the collection and rapid dissemination of tactical intelligence.
8. Assist counterpart in establishing appropriate military security controls to prevent penetration and sabotage.

36. Treatment of Prisoners

a. Article 3, common to each of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, requires that captured insurgents be treated humanely. This article forbids violence to life and person, in particular, murder, mutilation, and torture. Likewise, it is forbidden to commit outrages upon personal dignity, to take hostages, and to pass sentence and carry out executions without prior judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all judicial guarantees recognized as indispensable by civilized people. U.S. forces capturing insurgents are required to observe these rules. Advisors will encourage their counterparts to do likewise.

b. Advisors may find that prisoners are treated and interrogated far more harshly than could be tolerated in the U.S. Army. When such treatment is advised against, advisors may be told that the prisoners are accustomed to such hardship and that a lesser degree of treatment will not affect them at all. Still, the advisor should emphasize the fact that the standard of treatment is not determined by what the prisoner is accustomed to but by Article 3 of the Geneva Convention. In addition, other facts to be remembered are—

1. Advisors must not become involved in atrocities. Advisors should explain this to counterparts and further explain that they must report to their superiors any atrocities of which they have knowledge.
2. Captured insurgents should be interrogated initially at the lowest level possible for information of immediate tactical value, and forwarded to higher headquarters for more detailed interrogation.
3. An interrogation must produce valid information. Information or a confession furnished by a prisoner is of no intelligence value if he provided what his interrogators wanted to hear, simply to terminate the interrogation.
4. The loss of a prisoner, whatever the justifica-
tion, is a loss of a very valuable intelligence source (FM 30-15 and FM 30-17).

37. Advisor Checklist (Intelligence and Counterintelligence)

(ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS WILL BE CLASSIFIED. MAKE NO ENTRIES ON THIS CHECKLIST.)

The following checklist provides basic guidance, a reminder, and a source of reference identification for the advisor on intelligence and counterintelligence matters (items pertaining to activities to be pursued during all three phases of counterinsurgency are included):

a. Obtain and study the area study for the assigned area.

b. Obtain and study the most recent area assessment for the area.

c. Compare the two and attempt to detect the trend of changes.

d. Carefully evaluate all information (divorced from opinion) pertaining to—

(1) The advised G2/Intelligence Section, their operating procedures, their effectiveness, and reason for any lack of effectiveness.

(2) Personalities of counterparts, their personnel, their commanders, and any other persons with whom business is routinely conducted. Problem areas and the reasons for their existence should be explored.

(3) Chain of command and communication channels of the staff section and unit advised. Determination of communication adequacy to provide rapid dissemination of intelligence.

(4) Projects initiated by predecessors which have not been completed.

(5) Projects which the advisor believes should be initiated.

(6) Advisor communication channels.

(7) Reference material available (local and non-local).

(8) Other intelligence agencies that may be operating in conjunction with counterparts.

(5) Prepare and maintain a list of EEI and insurgent indicators such as—

(a) Insurgent infiltration of village or installation.

1. Increase numbers of vendors, workers, applicants for employment.

2. Frequent visits of relatives from distant or neighboring communities.

3. Strangers seeking to join paramilitary force or seeking employment without recruitment.

4. Several specific individuals leaving village on many or regular occasions.

5. Known or suspected insurgents or individuals of unknown allegiance contacting inhabitants or members of paramilitary force.

6. Pilfering.

(b) Attack of village or installation.

1. Initiation of propaganda lectures (usually conducted 5-15 km from village or installation).

2. Small probes by recon patrols.

3. Firing on or ambushing local security patrols.
4. Indication of insurgent force movement or shift of location.
5. Increasing or larger recon actions.
6. Quiet period, threats of attack, propaganda directed at village.
8. Rumor based on fact or fantasy of populace about an attack.
9. Unexplained departure of local officials.
10. Area being used as an infiltration route.
1. Crops grown away from immediate vicinity of village.
   (a) Crops grown in areas not under friendly control.
   (b) Food caches or way stations located in area.
2. Foot paths and trails circumventing population centers (villages, camps, installations).
   (a) Unusual amounts of broken branches and debris.
   (b) Undergrowth beaten down on trails and in fields.
   (c) Signal markers or signs.
3. Abandoned camp sites.
4. Adequate water supply. Year-round water supply located near trails or cache sites.
5. Game animals.
   (a) Adequate to support small groups.
   (b) Small animal traps and snares in use.
6. New or transient enemy units sighted or reported.
7. Absence of man traps, foot traps, and spikes along route.
8. Lack of insurgent combat action along route.
   (d) Known or suspected sympathizers, individuals, groups, and villages.
1. Apparent freedom of movement of individuals or entire village population.
2. No security for workers in fields.
3. No fear of insurgents.
4. No insurgent action against village or village inhabitants.
5. Trails leading from village to known or suspected insurgent areas.

In the execution of an intelligence function, certain procedures must be followed in order to accomplish the necessary planning, recording, and reporting. In U.S. Army intelligence these functions have been formalized in prescribed plans, files, and reports. While it is not necessary that counterparts exactly follow the U.S. Army procedures in this field, the basic principles are necessary and must be followed, to the appropriate degree, at all levels of intelligence. The following check list of selected items is provided to assist in advising counterparts in these functions:

(1) Collection Plan (formerly Collection Worksheet) (FM 30-5).
(2) Intelligence SOP (FM 30-5).
(3) Journal (FM 30-5).
(4) Intelligence Workbook (formerly Intelligence Worksheet and G2 Worksheet) (FM 30-5) (fig. 7).
(5) Counterintelligence Workbook.
(6) Situation Maps (FM 30-5).
(7) Intelligence Files (FM 30-5).
Figure 7. Sample guide intelligence workbook for counterinsurgency.

(8) Spot Reports (FM 30-5).
(9) Intelligence Report (INTREP) (FM 30-5).
(10) Supplementary Intelligence Report (SUP-INTREP) (FM 30-5).
(11) Intelligence Summary (ISUM) (FM 30-5).
(12) Periodic Intelligence Report (PERINTREP) if appropriate (FM 30-5).
(13) Weather Forecasts, Reports and Summaries (FM 30-5).
(14) Analysis of the Area of Operations (FM 30-5).
(15) Intelligence Estimate (ch. 4, FM 30-5).
(16) Intelligence Annex (FM 30-5).
(17) Counterintelligence Estimate (FM 30-5).
(18) Counterintelligence Measures Worksheet (FM 30-5).
(19) Counterintelligence Plan (FM 30-5).

f. Does the counterpart have an aggressive counterintelligence program? (FM 30-17).
   (1) Defensive.
      (a) Is information that would be of value to the insurgent limited to those who actually require it? How?
      (b) Do individuals having access to such information understand and practice security precautions for its protection?
      (c) Is access to those areas where sensitive information or important materiel is located positively controlled?
      (d) Are on-line and/or off-line encryption systems available and used in transmitting sensitive information? What is the source of such systems?
(e) Are communications personnel instructed in proper communications procedures? Do they follow them?

(f) Are personnel having access to sensitive information or areas investigated to detect hostile agents or unreliable persons? How effective is the investigation? Is it designed to detect family ties or other pressure points that would make the individual susceptible to hostile pressure?

(g) Are security inspections of military installations conducted at regular intervals?

(h) Are periodic security lectures conducted?

(2) Offensive.

(a) Does the counterpart have a clandestine (activities conducted in such a way that secrecy or concealment is assured) counterintelligence program?

(b) Does the degree of coverage provide reasonable assurance of his gaining knowledge of hostile intelligence, subversive or sabotage activity anywhere within his area? Are all sources exploited?

(c) What means of communication are employed between his office and his sources? Do the communication media jeopardize the security of the source? Of the operation?

(d) What is the expected elapsed time from acquisition by a source to receipt of his report by the counterpart? From issuance of instructions to a source to receipt of the instructions by the source? Does this elapsed time allow for successful reaction by friendly forces?

(e) What means do counterparts employ to establish the reliability of the source? Do they consider the reliability or lack thereof in evaluating the information?

(f) What means do counterparts employ to evaluate the accuracy of information received from the source?

(g) What means do counterparts employ to protect operations against—

1. Double agents (agents working for both sides)?

2. Dual or multiple agents (agents reporting to two or more agencies of the same government, thereby confirming their own information)?

3. Paper mills (agents fabricating their information)?

(g) Does the counterpart have a clandestine intelligence program? (FM 30-18.)

(h) Are factors that favor the insurgent target considered in the intelligence and counterintelligence program?

(i) Are effective measures utilized to protect the clandestine agent’s identity? (FM 30-17 and FM 30-18.)

Section II. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

38. General

PSYOP should support counterinsurgency programs—

a. Before Implementation. By influencing the people’s thoughts toward elements of the program. In environmental improvement an example of this would be a PSYOP educational program about mosquitoes and malaria before spraying the village.
b. During Execution. By influencing the people’s thoughts along desired lines as the mission progresses. In population and resource control, an example would be a PSYOP program that convinces the people that curfews are the result of guerrilla activity, and not the act of an oppressive government.

c. After Completion. By solidifying the people’s thoughts favorably toward the government. In counter-guerrilla operations, an example would be a local “victory” parade or rally following a guerrilla defeat by local self-defense forces.

39. Advisor Check List (Psychological Operations)

a. Integration. Be certain PSYOP are integrated into counterinsurgency programs at all levels by all host country government personnel and agencies.

b. Intelligence. Be certain PSYOP programs are based on intelligence that is—

   (1) Accurate.
      (a) Confirm intelligence. For example, do the police reports agree with the military that check points are not a sore spot with the people? Do newsmen agree with educators that a certain tribal group has a particular taboo?
      (b) Be alert to statistics or glowing accounts of progress which may be presented because they are nice to hear.
      (c) Stress the need for honesty in PSYOP intelligence reporting. Explain that PSYOP programs will be fitted to the facts in furthering the aims of the recognized government.

   (2) Timely.
      (a) Do not delay the dissemination of information because of the requirement to prepare lengthy written reports.
      (b) Go out and make personal contacts.
      (c) Explain PSYOP intentions to intelligence collection agencies.
      (d) When PSYOP programs uncover intelligence information, insert it into intelligence channels.
      (e) Evaluate established PSYOP efforts in light of new intelligence.
      (f) Adjust or discard outmoded PSYOP programs.

   (3) Meaningful. Do not waste time gathering data which cannot be exploited because of host country restrictions.

   c. Implementation. (FM 33-5.)

      (1) Resources.
      (a) Make a survey of all equipment and personnel who can contribute to the PSYOP effort (typewriters, loudspeakers, movie equipment, mimeograph machines and operators).
      (b) Pinpoint amateur artists, linguists, newsmen, and maintenance personnel.

      (2) Mission analysis.
      (a) Study the overall mission.
      (b) Determine what PSYOP means can best support it.

      (3) Target analysis.
      (a) Study the entire target audience in the area of operations.
      (b) Select those local leaders who are susceptible
to PSYOP efforts, and who will be effective in passing the message to others.

(4) Psychological objectives. Determine what changes in attitude or behavior should be accomplished among the target audience to support the overall mission.

(5) Themes. Themes present the psychological objective to the target audience in the most palatable manner possible. Good themes are—

(a) Timely. The fighting effectiveness of government forces should be emphasized after a victory, not during a withdrawal.

(b) Consistent. A long standing theme that emphasizes complete religious equality can be destroyed by a short term one that provides extra privileges to a specified sect.

(c) Credible. Truth alone does not assure credibility because truth is not always believed.

1. Monitor PSYOP programs that make lavish abundant promises of future affluence.

2. Adjust the themes to the specific target audience.

(6) Media. Media are employed to disseminate themes to the people. In developing areas primitive communication modes are the rule, not the exception. In many instances, the media employed will have to counter the efforts of the insurgent propagandist.

(a) Skits and shows.

1. Use entertainers when available. Include local performers in anticommmunist roles.

2. Use guerrilla defectors if possible in on-stage satire of their past life. Timid or cooperative ex-guerrillas can effectively destroy the myth of guerrilla invincibility.

(b) Radio.

1. Receivers donated to a community should be for the benefit of all and not the sole property of the trustee.

2. Receivers can be used in conjunction with loudspeaker systems to encompass the entire village into a listening audience.

3. Community receivers are a prestige item and if necessary may be distributed as a mark of village merit.

(c) Printed matter.

1. Mass leaflet air drops are wasteful. Concentrate on villages, trails, and watering sites.

2. Stress the importance of a rapid and routine newsheet delivery system. The door-to-door approach is desirable.

3. Host country personnel may tend to become discouraged if their propaganda leaflets are not avidly read by recipients, and thus look upon these efforts as useless.

4. Never disseminate candy, cigarettes, or other items with English inscriptions without first acquiring an exact translation in host country language. If there is no misunderstanding the gift as a medical or health item, then distribution is permissible.

(d) Motion pictures.

1. Examine all existing U.S. and host country motion picture activities for integration and cross support. Built up areas may be receiving over attention at the expense of outlying villages.
2. Rural audiences take great delight in motion pictures. These audiences are undemanding in plot and subject matter. Mix subtle propaganda themes with entertainment. Avoid political harangues.

3. Film production should be decentralized and oriented on local items of interest if possible.

4. American type "home" movies are popular.

(e) Loudspeakers.
1. Survey all loudspeaker equipment in the area of operations. Keep it moving.
2. Use them at every opportunity in events such as parades and rallies.
3. Attempt to keep addresses short, pointed, and appropriate.

(f) Face-to-face persuasion.
1. Use persuasion, not argument.
2. Keep your approach audience-centered. Think as they do. Avoid antagonism.
3. Use audience feedback to adjust or to substantiate your original approach.

d. Information. The host country may not have a staff system that parallels that of the U.S. Army. Be prepared to assist in the following areas if requested:

1. Troop information programs.
2. Military dependent information programs.
3. Government information activities.

(a) It may be necessary to serve in a liaison role between host country government news agencies and the USIS for supplies, equipment, and advice.

(b) On occasion, influence may have to be brought to bear to cause host country armed forces to make distribution of civilian handbills and newsheets into threatened areas.

e. Innovation. Innovate freely but conform to framework of the overall PSYOP plan. If something appears that will work, consider it, plan carefully, and it probably will.

1. Rallies. Rallies are popular in developing countries.

(a) Include introductory music, singing, speeches, and films.

(b) Try for an emotional setting to include flags, portraits of leaders, and "plants" in the audience.

2. Information centers. Central locations where events can be conducted on a periodic basis are valuable.

(a) Public theaters, gymnasiums, or other large buildings are examples.

(b) Do not overlook the importance of simple bulletin boards if nothing else is available.

3. Contests. Contests can be used to facilitate the dissemination of propaganda quickly and at little expense.

(a) Short essays by high school scholars and posters by elementary students are examples.

(b) Offer prizes.

(c) It may be necessary to promise anonymity to the winners.

4. Field expedients. Use any amateur artistic talent available.

(a) Posters hand drawn with crayon on wrapping paper frequently have more local impact than do finished national level products.
(b) Banners made of cheap cloth and ordinary oil paint are effective.
(c) Billboards can be constructed in market places using locally procured material.
(5) Slogans. Spontaneous slogans often arise which elicit great emotion. Seize and exploit them.
(6) Symbols. Symbols that are suggestive and simple are best. The two-fingered version of "V" for victory is an example.

Section III. COMBAT SUPPORT

40. General

a. This part of the advisor handbook is directed toward all advisors who find themselves with combat support responsibilities.
b. The combat support which may be available in counterinsurgency operations includes—
   (1) Artillery.
   (2) Tactical air support.
   (3) Army aviation.
   (4) Engineer.
   (5) Signal.
   (6) Chemical.
   (7) Intelligence.
   (8) Psychological warfare.
   (9) Navy and marine.

41. Field Artillery

a. Mission. Support normally will be given to small-scale combat operations which may vary in size from squad to possibly a regiment (—). The artillery commander is the principal advisor to the force commander on all fire support matters. Similarly, within the advisory structure, U.S. Army artillery officers must assist the U.S. advisor of maneuver units at all levels on fire support matters. Activities to be supported may include—
   (1) Clear and hold operations.
   (2) Patrols.
   (3) Ambushes.
   (4) Counterambushes.
   (5) Village or community defense.
   (6) Reserve units in an alert status.
   (7) Suppressive fires for airmobile operations.

b. Organization. Flexibility in structuring artillery organizations for task assignments is critical in counterinsurgency operations.
c. Weapons Capabilities and Characteristics.

   (1) These weapons characteristics have a major impact on artillery employment techniques in counterinsurgency operations.

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</tbody>
</table>

(2) The fire plan for a hamlet or village defense where supporting weapons include the above, should also include crew served weapons such as 60mm and 81mm mortars. Direct fire weapons, such as machine guns and grenade launchers, should be employed.
(3) The light weight of the 4.2" mortar and the 75mm howitzer, as compared to the 105mm or 155mm howitzer, may be the deciding factor in the selection of supporting artillery for mountain and jungle operations or for those areas with few or no roads.

(4) Maximum effective ranges of weapons will be an important consideration when planning artillery support of patrols or surface convoys.

d. Techniques.

(1) Employment.

(a) To provide effective artillery fire support, artillery is employed to—

1. Provide maximum area coverage with available weapons.

2. Support combat operations as a primary mission.

3. Support security and village defense forces as a secondary mission.

(b) In order to provide maximum coverage, single gun deployment will frequently be the rule rather than the exception. For this reason, additional personnel should be trained in fire direction control procedures.

(2) Mobility. As a minimum, artillery must be as mobile as the supported force. In addition to normally associated prime movers, many other means of mobility are available.

(a) Boats. The landing craft, utility personnel can be used for artillery up to and including the 105mm howitzer. Load muzzle first in order to facilitate unloading.

(b) Helicopters. The 4.2" mortar, 75mm howitzer, and the 105mm howitzer can be lifted by most helicopters. Provisions for ammunition resupply should be granted priority when utilizing helicopters as a mode of artillery transport. (para. 43.)

(c) Armored personnel carriers (M113-MS9). The 4.2" mortar and the 75mm howitzer can be transported by this vehicle.

(3) Requests for fire.

(a) Forward observers. The use of forward observers is vital, especially in areas where maps are marginal, survey is difficult, and the population is friendly. Defensive concentrations must be fired in, and at periodic intervals refired, to check validity since advanced gunnery techniques are rarely employed. Important considerations for fire direction—

1. Provide at least one trained artillery FO with each company-size combat unit.

2. Selected Army aviation pilots should be trained in the adjustment of artillery fire.

3. Provide trained FO in aircraft to support large scale operations.

4. A minimum of one individual in each rifle platoon or patrol should be trained in adjusting and obtaining artillery fire.

5. Selected individuals in paramilitary units and village defense forces should be taught a simplified method of requesting and adjusting artillery fire.

(b) Simplified method of adjusting artillery. One such technique is the "colored quadrant." Essentially, it is a round board with each quadrant painted a different color, i.e., red in the 1st quadrant (0-90 de-
The round board is then permanently mounted in the village and oriented to a north-south line, and hamlet defenders can call for fire using a color direction indicator. This technique requires close coordination with artillery units, and as many prefired concentrations as possible. More sophisticated methods can be devised depending on the time allowed for training and the receptability of instruction. Any technique will require reliable and responsive communications.

(4) Harassing and interdiction fires.

(a) Harassing fires are employed against insurgents to restrict movements, inflict casualties, lower efficiency and morale.

(b) Interdiction fires are employed against targets such as assembly areas, crossroads and bridges that are to be denied to the insurgents. This type of fire frequently is used during hours of darkness and requires the expenditure of large quantities of ammunition.

(5) Selection and preparation of positions.

(a) Positions should afford 6400 mil firing capability.

(b) Positions should be selected to facilitate direct fire missions.

(c) Avoid masking artillery when positioning it in or near built-up areas.

(d) Although position security is a primary consideration, the ability to perform the mission is always paramount.

(e) Alternate position areas should be selected to add to the flexibility of the employment of artillery.

(6) Coordination and control.

(a) General. The advice on coordination of fire support furnished by U.S. units is an inherent responsibility of the senior U.S. artillery adviser. In host countries, artillery commanders at battalion, division, and higher echelons exert little or no influence over artillery fire control and maneuvers beyond the initial stages of operational planning. This is due to the fact that artillery elements support many small unit operations simultaneously with platoons and, in rare instances, batteries. Once operations are underway, coordination is conducted at battery or platoon level.

(b) Communications. Numerous communication means are available.

1. Artillery fire and liaison channels.
2. Command communications links.
3. Airborne or ground radio relay.
5. Commercial telephone systems, if available.
6. Prearranged visual signals.

(c) Advisory problem areas.

1. Language barriers.
2. Differing military backgrounds.
3. A tendency on the part of tactical commanders to personally direct artillery or other supporting fires.
4. Frequent use of fire-for-effect without first adjusting on target.
5. Failure to request and provide for forward and/or aerial observers for combat operations.
6. Fire requests must be evaluated from their
psychological effect as well as their physical effect on the populace and the insurgents.

7. When the insurgent is intermingled with the populace, positive identification of each target is mandatory.

8. A lack of roads in rough terrain, or inundated terrain, may tend to discourage counterparts from displacing artillery to best accomplish the mission.

e. Supply and Maintenance.
   (1) Standard logistic procedures will apply; however, problems of delivery and distribution become more difficult.
   (2) All methods of surface transportation and air delivery should be exploited.
   (3) Maintenance should receive more than normal emphasis.
   (4) The advisor must be prepared to devote considerable time to this effort.

f. Planning Factors. When advising a host country counterpart in the planning of an operation that includes artillery, insure that the responsibilities enumerated below are clearly defined.
   (1) Answers call for fire from ____
   (2) Establishes liaison with ____
   (3) Establishes communication with ____
   (4) Has as its zone of fire ____
   (5) Furnishes forward observer(s) ____
   (6) Displaces on order of ____
   (7) Has its fires planned by ____

42. Tactical Air Support

a. Employment. Allocation of tactical air support is controlled at the highest echelon to insure optimum utilization.

b. Organization. Organization of the host country air force may follow the USAF pattern. Armament available normally will include: machine guns, rockets, bombs, napalm.

c. Command and Control. Request channels for tactical air support are similar to U.S. request channels.
   (1) Forward Air Controllers (FAC) are allocated to maneuver units.
   (2) In the absence of a FAC tactical air support can be directed by—
      (a) Artillery forward observers.
      (b) Aerial observers.
      (c) Army air guides.
   (3) Communications (para 45).

   (1) U.S. Air Force may provide tactical air support. Basic doctrine for employing USAF resources in counterinsurgency is in chapter 6, AFM 1-1.
   (2) USAF Special Air Warfare Forces have the following responsibilities:
      (a) Conduct air operations as part of a U.S. force.
      (b) Conduct air operations in conjunction with host country forces.
      (c) Participate as instructors or advisors to host country air force.
      (d) Special air warfare operations include—
         1. Assault airlift.
         2. Utility airlift.
         3. Psychological operations.
4. Civic actions.
5. Close air support.
6. Reconnaissance.

(e) USAF air liaison officers assigned at division, or equivalent, operational level provide—
1. Coordination and planning assistance on tactical employment of U.S. and host country air forces.
2. Information on capabilities and limitations of U.S. and host country air forces.
3. Detailed information on rules of engagement that apply.
4. Information on USAF air liaison officers assigned at division, or equivalent, operational level provide—
5. Coordination and planning assistance on tactical employment of U.S. and host country air forces.
6. Information on capabilities and limitations of U.S. and host country air forces.
7. Detailed information on rules of engagement that apply.

(f) Tactical Air Control System (TACS). This system is employed to control—
1. Counterair.
2. Interdiction.
3. Close air support.
4. Tactical air reconnaissance.
5. Airlift operations.
6. Reconnaissance.
7. Close air support.
8. Tactical air reconnaissance.

(a) Air Force Forces Command Post (AFFCP)—usually in close proximity to the army command post.
(b) Tactical Air Control Center (TACC). The operations center of the AFFCP providing coordination with ground forces in preplanned missions and centralized control of the force (established at highest level).
(c) Direct Air Support Center (DASC). Established probably at corps, or equivalent, level. Highly mobile, provides fast reaction to ground force requirement for tactical air support.
(d) Tactical Air Control Party (TACP). Located at battalion, or equivalent, level. Consists of

an air liaison officer (ALO), a forward air controller (FAC), and communications personnel and equipment. TACP collocates with the fire support coordination center (FSCC).
(e) Forward Air Guides may augment FAC. Forward Air Guides are host country army personnel trained in the FAC techniques of guiding aircraft in delivery of ordnance on target.
(f) U.S. Army Aviation Aerial Fire Support (para. 43).

43. Army Aviation
a. General. Army aviation can provide support to U.S. and host country forces in five functional areas—
1. Command and control.
2. Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition.
3. Mobility (maneuver).
4. Aerial fire support.
5. Logistics.
Aviation support is classified as combat support and

Figure 8. Tactical air control system.
combat service support. A detailed discussion of U.S. Army aviation organization, operations, tactics, techniques, and employment may be found in FM 1-100 and FM 5-7. Army aviation advisors have the same advisor relationships to counterparts as ground advisors.

b. Missions. Typical missions which can be performed by U.S. Army or host country aviation are as follows:

(1) Combat support.
   (a) Hunter-killer operations (eagle flight).
   (b) Command and control (aerial command posts).
   (c) Reconnaissance and surveillance (visual, photographic, infrared, radar).
   (d) Target acquisition.
   (e) Conduct of fire (aerial artillery OP).
   (f) Battlefield illumination.
   (g) Armed aerial escort.
   (h) Snooper flights (f(1)(c)5 below).
   (i) Airdrop (pathfinders, paratroopers, equipment and supply).
   (j) Airmobile operations.
   (k) Outpost relief or withdrawals.
   (l) Smoke laying.
   (m) PSYOP loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflet dissemination.
   (n) Search and rescue.

(2) Combat service support.
   (a) Liaison and courier service.
   (b) Logistics supply and resupply.
   (c) Aeromedical and PW evacuation.
   (d) Wire laying.
   (e) Radio relay.
   (f) Administrative troop movement.
   (g) Military civic action.
   (h) Message drop and pickup.

c. Host Country Aviation. Host country aviation units may be similar to U.S. Army aviation organizations. The advisor should insure that his counterpart has requested host country aviation support whenever possible.

d. Capabilities and Limitations:

(1) The advisor can get information on unit capabilities and limitations from the U.S. aviation commander, his representatives, or the army aviation liaison officer.

(2) Aircraft capabilities and limitations to include useful load, cruise speed, endurance, type of fuel, and takeoff distance are found in appendix IV and V.

(3) Night and conditions of restricted visibility should not be allowed to totally restrict movements by air.

(4) IFR flights can be executed if the proper equipment has been installed in the aircraft and at ground stations.

(5) Several limiting factors pertaining to operations conducted in various types of terrain must be considered in planning aviation support.

(a) Jungle operations.

1. Reconnaissance will be limited because of jungle vegetation.

2. Navigation is difficult due to lack of adequate air navigation facilities, accurate maps, and the limited number of well-defined reference points.
3. Lack of suitable landing areas.
4. Aircraft require considerable more maintenance due to moisture and corrosion of component parts and electrical systems.
5. High temperature conditions restrict the load-carrying capabilities of aircraft.

(b) Mountain operations.
1. Navigation is difficult due to lack of adequate air navigation facilities, accurate maps, and the limited number of well-defined terrain features.
2. Lack of suitable landing areas.
3. Atmospheric conditions and altitude requirements restrict the load-carrying capacity of aircraft.
4. Air turbulence conditions.
5. Early morning fog and cloud cover conditions prevalent in these areas restrict visibility.

(c) Desert operations.
1. Navigation is difficult due to lack of prominent landmarks and terrain features.
2. Maintenance, landing, and take-off problems are magnified due to blowing sand.
3. High temperature conditions restrict the load-carrying capabilities of aircraft.

(d) Inundated and swampy areas.
1. Limited landing areas for fixed wing aircraft.
2. Difficulties in selecting landing areas for rotary wing aircraft.
3. Maintenance requirements increase due to moisture and corrosion.

(e) Control of Army Aviation Resources.
(1) In Phase II operations, control is vested at the lowest level of command that has a continuing need.
(2) In Phase III operations, control is vested at the highest levels of command commensurate with effective employment.
(3) Usually, the U.S. Army senior advisor has operational control of U.S. Army aviation resources.
(4) Host country aviation is controlled by host country commanders, with the U.S. advisor providing advice on its employment.
(5) The U.S. Army aviation unit commander has command and control over his unit.
(6) Normally, the senior infantry commander will be appointed as the task force commander.
(7) Army aviation, though centrally controlled, should be decentralized to the lowest element having a continuing requirement for aviation support. Priority of aviation support is usually established by local directives and generally is as follows:
(a) Combat support missions.
(b) Commitment of reserves and resupply.
(c) Aeromedical evacuation.
(d) Supply.
(e) Liaison, command visits.
(f) Courier.
(g) Administrative flights.
(h) All other combat service support missions.
(8) Request channels.
(a) Advisory channels.
(b) Counterpart channels for aviation support parallel advisor request channels.
Requests for any aviation support are forwarded to the aviation units.

f. Combat Support. Typical combat support missions are listed in f.1 above. Major elements of aviation combat support are airmobile operations, aerial fire support, and command and control.

(1) Airmobile Operations. These operations in which the combat forces and their combat equipment move by air, under the control of a ground force commander, to engage in ground combat (FM 57-35, para 43h, and app III). Airmobile operations are particularly useful in difficult terrain and as blocking forces for providing rapid deployment of forces in areas where road nets are poor and guerrilla ambush actions may delay or prevent the movement of forces.

(a) General considerations for airmobile operations for the advisor are—

1. Thorough familiarization with aviation unit airmobile operation SOP's.
2. Insure operational coordination between subordinate advisors, U.S. and host country aviation units, and host country forces.
3. Timely and accurate planning information to assist in developing the ground tactical plan in order to permit U.S. advisors, commanders, and planners to—
   (a) Evaluate requirements.
   (b) Evaluate current intelligence.
   (c) Make recommendations on employment of aircraft.
4. Plans are prepared in the following order—
   (a) Ground tactical plan.
   (b) Landing plan.

   (c) Air movement plan.
   (d) Loading plan.

(b) Specific considerations for airmobile operations—

1. Intelligence. Timely and accurate.
2. Landing areas. Close to objective. Security precautions may preclude extensive reconnaissance; hence, exact landing zones may have to be selected by flight and ground commander upon arrival in objective area.
3. Flight routes. Avoid using same approach and departure routes if multiple lifts are required.
4. Flight altitudes. May be nap-of-the-earth, tree top or higher, depending on terrain, enemy observation, and antiaircraft capability.
5. Observation aircraft may be used as spotter aircraft to vector airmobile forces to the objective area or landing zone.
6. Armed escort aircraft can provide aerial fire support en route to the objective and on the flanks and rear of the landing zone during the critical landing time.
7. Aerial fire support provided by armed helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft can extend and complement the fires of the ground forces during ground combat operations.
8. Equipment failure will require that spare aircraft be available to replace those which abort and cannot proceed with the mission.
9. Weather conditions are important considerations. Low ceilings may prevent close air support. Worsening weather may prevent reinforcement, resup-
ply, or aerial fire support throughout all phases of the
terpretation.
10. Troop orientation. Changes in landing
direction due to enemy situation, terrain, or wind con-
ditions may change the direction troops must move after
dismounting. A method of troop orientation—
(a) Pilot briefs crew chief on landing direc-
tions and direction troops must deploy;
(b) Crew chief uses large card with dia-
gram of aircraft and grease pencil to indicate direction
troops must deploy.
11. Staging area(s) should—
(a) Be of sufficient size to accommodate
aircraft, troops, refueling, and rearming locations.
(b) Allow orderly and adequate spacing of
troops for loading.
(c) Be a safe area for rearming armed heli-
copters.
12. Loading plan insures distribution of key
personnel throughout the flight.
13. Insure troops are trained in rapid loading
and unloading and in the procedure for orientation of
movement towards the objective or assembly areas in
landing zone.
14. Insure call signs and frequency are known,
that pyrotechnics and other visual signals are coordi-
nated, and that radios are in operating condition.
15. Insure that ground forces elements are
properly and clearly marked for easy identification from
the air.
16. Insure provisions are made for prisoner of
war evacuation by aircraft.

17. Insure that aero-medical aircraft are avail-
able and that medical support is available in the staging
area.
18. Procedures for downed aircraft should be
contained in the aviation unit SOP. The advisor must
be familiar with these procedures. Some procedures
are—
(a) In loading zone—Passengers secure the
downed aircraft until it is repaired, destroyed, or
vacuated.
(b) En route to landing zone—Troop-
carrying aircraft may be directed to land nearby to assist
and secure the downed aircraft. Other aircraft will be
made available to evacuate survivors and sensitive equip-
ment. Armed air cover may be desirable.
(c) In landing zone—Crews will stay with
the aircraft. Proper disposition of aircraft will be made
when the tactical situation permits.
(d) Personnel in aircraft forced down in
hostile territory, if not recovered immediately, will move
to predesignated pickup points or secure areas.
(e) Specific factors and considerations for cer-
tain combat support missions—
1. Hunter-killer operations (eagle flight) or
raids. Teams consist of a small fighting force of platoon
strength or more with appropriate number of transport
helicopters plus a platoon of armed helicopters. Three
methods of employing hunter-killer teams are—
(a) Search and kill. One or more aircraft
act as decoys, find the enemy, and the entire force attacks.
(b) Search of predetermined area.
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(c) Reaction force or pursuit force in conjunction with other airmobile or ground operations. Hunter-killer operations require careful coordination and reliable communication between all elements. These forces should be trained to fight together.

2. Armed aerial escort may be provided for airmobile, rail, vehicular, or river craft columns.

3. Target acquisition and target marking. Identification of hostile targets is one of the most difficult tasks in a counterinsurgency situation. Positive identification of hostile targets is of paramount importance. Targets may be marked from fixed or rotary wing aircraft by—

(a) Rockets with smoke.
(b) High explosive.
(c) White phosphorous.
(d) Smoke grenades.
(e) Circling over.
(f) Making low passes.
(g) Machine gun tracer fire.

4. Reconnaissance. Route reconnaissance, specific search, area photographic, visual and imagery reconnaissance can be provided by army aviation. The advisor should ensure that his counterpart has made a parallel request for aerial reconnaissance support. Host country aerial observers normally are provided to the supporting aviation unit.

5. Snooper flights. Snooper flights are armed aerial reconnaissance missions performed by two or more aircraft; ground troops are not transported in the aircraft. They are particularly effective at last or first light and should be used to flush out suspected guerrilla activity.

6. Airdrop (pathfinder, paratroop, combat equipment).

7. Coordination with artillery. Army aviation can provide aerial platforms for artillery observers and assist in the rapid displacement of artillery pieces. Conversely, artillery units can provide suppressive fires for airmobile operations.

8. Battlefield illumination. Army aircraft, both fixed and rotary wing, are capable of providing continuous flare illumination for periods of up to one and one-half hours per sortie. When requesting battlefield illumination, it is important—

(a) That the call sign and frequency of the requesting unit be furnished to the army aviation supporting unit.
(b) That an estimation be made of how long the illumination will be required.

9. Reserve forces.

(a) The parent unit’s most rapid means of deploying its reserve force is generally by aircraft.
(b) Planning factors for staging and deploying a combat assault for airmobile operations also apply for reserve forces.
(c) Reserve forces should be collocated with supporting air transport helicopters.
(d) Weapons and compatible ammunition should be loaded aboard the same aircraft.
(e) Supplies and equipment should be prestocked and all necessary preplanning accomplished prior to the commitment of the reserve force.
10. Day and night combat and security outpost relief. Outpost relief during daylight hours is conducted in the same manner as combat assault operations. Night outpost relief is a much more complicated maneuver.

(2) Aerial fire support. Armed helicopter support may be the most rapid means available for bringing firepower to bear on the insurgent. Armed helicopter aerial fire support may be planned in advance, or be on call. Check local SOP for request procedures. Immediate aerial fire support may be provided if the armed helicopter unit has been assigned to a tactical unit for a specific operation.

(3) Command and control. Army aviation can provide the advisor with the means for control of coordinated ground attacks. See figure 26 for an example of an airmobile command post.

(4) Psychological operations. The use of army aircraft in support of psychological operations activities for propaganda dissemination includes leaflet distribution and loudspeaker operations. In addition, the appearance of host country and U.S. Army aircraft may have a positive effect on the local populace.

(5) Search and rescue. Search and rescue operations, although normally associated with the rescue of air crews and recovery of downed aircraft, also encompass the rescue of other troops and personnel. The advisor should, as early as possible, learn and understand the SOP that pertains to search and rescue, and evasion and escape procedures.

g. Combat Service Support. Combat service support missions are typically administrative and logistical in nature. A listing of representative missions is included in b(2) above. The requesting procedures are similar to the requirements stated for combat support. Specific factors and considerations for certain combat service support missions—

(1) Liaison and courier service. Because of the decentralized nature of counterguerrilla operations advisors and their counterparts must travel great distances to coordinate and control their units.

(2) Supply. High priority supplies such as ammunition, medical supplies, and food may require immediate movement by air. The aircraft commander is responsible to determine the maximum payload weight that can be moved by that particular aircraft under prevailing conditions. Appendix IV lists additional planning data for use of army aircraft.

(a) Prior to arrival of aircraft—
1. Organize loads by size, weight, and priority for ease of loading and unloading.
2. Brief personnel as to specific tasks in loading the aircraft.
3. Insure that an interpreter is available to assist the aircrew and cargo-handling personnel.
4. Notify the personnel at destination of the expected arrival time to enable them to provide ground security and rapid unloading of cargo from the aircraft.
5. Insure that related items should be kept together and loaded on the same aircraft.

(b) Upon arrival of the aircraft—
1. Coordinate with the flight leader.
2. Assist in the supervision of the loading.
(3) **Medical Support.** U.S. air medical ambulance detachments may be available. In addition, the host country may have aeromedical evacuation aircraft. However, all U.S. Army aviation units do have the capability of transporting or evacuating wounded and injured personnel.

(4) **Wire Laying.** Army aviation can assist in laying wire over difficult and hazardous terrain. Because of the slow speed of wire-laying aircraft, the need for armed aerial escort must be considered.

(5) **Airborne Radio Relay.** Army aircraft may be used effectively as radio relay stations to assist in maintaining contact over great distances.

(6) **Troop and Personnel Movements.** Administrative or combat service support troop movements should be as carefully planned as combat assault operations. The advisor and counterpart should accomplish the following:

   (a) Insist that other means of transportation be investigated prior to requesting aviation support.

   (b) Inform the aviation unit of the total lift requirement, pickup area, and destination.

   (c) Assure that only authorized personnel, supplies, and equipment are allowed to move by army air transportation.

   (d) Establish priorities for movement of military and civilian personnel.

**b. Advisor Check List (Support of Tactical and Non-tactical Operations):**

(1) Reference FM 57-35 and FM 31-16.

(2) Brief counterpart and other advisors on U.S. and host country aviation support available, to include capabilities, limitations, request procedures, and priorities of use.

(3) Evaluate aviation support requests, preplanned and immediate.

(4) Insure that the U.S. senior advisor or commander having operational control of U.S. aviation resources is advised as early as possible of required support.

(5) Coordinate with the airmobile force commander in the detailed planning of airmobile operations.

(6) In the framework of supporting unit SOP, establish a free exchange of information between supported, supporting units, and other advisory elements.

(7) Insure that appropriate SOI and SSI are made available to aviation support units.

(8) Critique aviation support missions to assist in refining procedures and to emphasize effective employment of aircraft.

(9) Maintain adequate fuel stockage and dispensing facilities to support current and future operations.

**44. Engineer**

**a. General.** The engineer advisor should encourage his counterpart to use host country resources before requesting assistance from USAID, or U.S. military engineer support. The relationship between engineer advisors and host country engineer counterparts are the same as advisor/counterpart relationships treated in this text. The advisor may find it necessary to employ the technical skills and capabilities of the engineer units of the host country forces in order to provide the construction necessary for projects supporting environmental im-
provement programs. However, the advisor must stick to fundamentals and avoid the more advanced techniques and procedures, particularly those that are incompatible with requirements imposed by limitations of terrain, road nets, size of host force, and mobility. Every advisor must be fully alert to the possibilities of improvisation in the event that standard equipment is not available.

b. Construction Units.
(1) Organized normally as battalions or separate companies and are self-sustaining.
(2) The mission of the construction battalion is to construct roads, bridges, buildings, airfields, water supply facilities, and other projects in support of counterinsurgency operations.
(3) Engineer units may be further subdivided because of the size and location of projects.
(4) The advisor should encourage adherence to the basic principles of planning and organization.
(5) The advisor must encourage improving the capabilities of the unit through on-the-job training.
(6) Support for paramilitary forces and local villages may include small engineer units for the construction of—
(a) Sanitation facilities.
(b) Housing.
(c) Medical facilities.
(d) Cantonment areas.
(e) Farm-to-market roads.
(7) Only those projects which contribute to the overall counterinsurgency operation should be undertaken.

c. General Construction Tasks. See section II, chapter 3.
(1) During the planning stage of a construction project, the engineer advisor should review—
(a) Logistical problems.
(b) The adequacy of the plans for civic action projects.
(c) The proficiency status of the construction troops, and whether further technical training is required.
(d) The possibility of employing expedient construction techniques and devices.
(e) Principles of equipment utilization and capabilities.
(f) The applicability of the records and procedures for recording and reporting work progress.
(g) The measure conversion factors (fig. 9).
(2) The advisor should be knowledgeable in the fundamental construction techniques such as—
(a) Rough carpentry.
(b) Expedient construction devices and methods such as—
1. Fabricating bricks and blocks from local clays.
2. Constructing drainage facilities with logs and stakes.
3. Constructing buildings using straw roofs, bamboo framework, adobe siding, without steel nails and drift pins (figs. 10 and 11).
4. Rigging and lashing techniques.
5. Constructing expedients for jetted or driven
wells (fig. 12); filtration gallery; and small water supply reservoirs.

d. Military Engineer Tasks.

(1) Field fortification.

(a) Emphasis on protection should be more
from direct fire weapons rather than blast from heavy artillery, large explosives, and bombs.

(b) Requirements for overhead construction and dispersion should be planned.

(c) Considerations should be given to interconnecting trench-type fortifications around small fixed installations.

(d) Local resources when available should be used for revetments to reduce logistical requirements.
(e) The advisor should suggest prefabrication of components of field fortifications for ready availability when required.

(2) Obstacles.

(a) Emphasis should be placed on antipersonnel obstacles rather than antivehicle obstacles because insurgent forces normally have few if any vehicles.

(b) Installation of minefields and barbed wire should be considered whenever applicable.

(c) Consider utilizing impenetrable brush and nuisance items, such as sharpened stakes or nails or other impaling devices.
(d) Consider installing man traps, such as camouflaged pits with sharpened stakes at the bottom and impaling devices (figs. 13 and 14). Care and consideration must be exercised to prevent friendly local inhabitants from being injured by such devices.

(e) Construction of watch towers and moats have proven valuable to provide warning of attack and restricting infiltration.

(f) Natural obstacles should be used whenever possible.

(g) Reliance should not be placed on such natural obstacles as swamps, cliffs, and rivers.

(3) Booby Traps.

(a) Improvised booby traps (FM 5–31) can be used as warning devices for local security.

Figure 13. Camouflaged pit with sharpened stakes.

Figure 14. Sample impaling device.
Figure 15. Three-strand rope bridge.

(b) They can be effectively installed to kill infiltrators.

(c) Items such as clothing, ammunition, medical supplies (prime targets of guerrilla pillage) can be booby trapped.

(d) Antipersonnel mines should be employed extensively in conjunction with defensive systems. (Plant, record, mark, and report.)

(e) Provide sufficient safety measures to avoid killing friendly civilians.

(4) Demolitions.

(a) Demolitions can be used to improve mobility of tracked vehicles by the reduction of steep banks or dikes.

(b) They are effectively used to destroy tunnel entrances and cause collapse of underground hiding places.

(c) In inundated areas, they can be effectively utilized against guerrillas hiding underwater (using a small breathing straw).

(5) Bridges, ferries, and rafts.

(a) Bridges may be constructed of steel, concrete, lumber, logs, or rope (fig. 15).

(b) Depending upon the time and materials available, bridges vary from permanent multilane to very crude, expedient types (fig. 16).

(c) Bridges should always be provided protection against floating mines by upstream floating mine barriers.

Figure 16. Typical improvised bridge.
(d) Maximum use must be made of hand labor and such techniques as gin poles, tripods, shears, boom derricks, cableways, expedient pile drivers and trestles (fig. 17).

(e) Raft construction often will be of locally available materials and improvised. Examples are shown in figures 18, 19, and 20.

(6) Routes of communication.

(a) Construction excludes final road surfacing (this might be performed by civilian contractors).

(b) Road surfacing expedients such as ches-paling mats, bamboo mats, planks, corduroy, and log tread roads should be considered when necessary (figs. 21 and 22).

(c) Conduct frequent reconnaissance of the road trace, proper shaping and ditching, and the rapid construction of bridges and culverts (fig. 23).

(7) Small boat operations.

(a) Inundated areas present special problems in counterinsurgency operations.

1. Roads and bridges are usually of low vehicle capacity.

2. Guerrilla forces can restrict the movement of attacking elements by destroying the few existing bridges.

(b) Engineer boat platoons can improve the mobility of tactical counterinsurgency forces.

1. Engineer boat platoons may comprise thirty to fifty personnel each, with half as many small boats.

2. Boats found to be most practical are the small shallow-draft craft of the U.S. Army assault boat variety.
Figure 18. Expedient ferry using native boats.
3. Assault boats, powered by 25–40 hp outboard motors, are capable of carrying 10 to 15 infantrymen in addition to the engineer crew of two.

4. Engineer boat platoons may be assigned to a nondivisional engineer group or battalion or attached to the divisional engineer battalions.

Figure 19. Expedient ferry using brush-filled canvas.