UNITED STATES ARMY

SPECIAL WARFARE SCHOOL

INTERNAL/DEFENSE DEVELOPMENT PLANNING GUIDE

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INTERNAL DEFENSE AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING GUIDE

FOREWORD

This guide contains information on internal defense and internal development (ID/D) doctrine and ID/D planning procedures. It is designed to assist military personnel in the development of ID/D plans.

The material contained herein reflects doctrine as currently taught at the U.S. Army Special Warfare School and is derived from material prepared for school use in resident and nonresident instruction. Users are cautioned that the principles outlined herein are of a broad nature, with general application, and must be modified as required to meet the needs of specific situations. The term “internal defense and internal development” replaces the term “counterinsurgency” for United States and host country level reference. The term “stability operations” replaces the term “counterinsurgency” whenever reference is made to U.S. Army operations in ID/D situations.

This is the third edition of the Counterinsurgency Planning Guide now known as the Internal Defense and Internal Development Planning Guide. It incorporates all of the subject material of previous editions and reflects current terminology. It includes some United States Army doctrine on stability operations as well as other agency thoughts on ID/D operations.
Suggestions and recommendations for changes or corrections should be submitted directly to the Commandant, U.S. Army Special Warfare School, ATTENTION: Director of Instruction, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307.
In the years since World War II, international communism has won a succession of victories in its struggle for world domination unequaled since its existence. During this period, nearly 700 million people and 5 million square miles—about one-tenth of the total land areas of the world and about one-quarter of its population—have been brought under the control of Communist regimes.

While occupying the attention of the free world through pressure and threat of overt military action along the periphery of the "Iron" and "Bamboo" Curtains, the Communists have concentrated their efforts on the seizure of power in target nations through internal means. These target nations presently constitute a major portion of South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Using their established worldwide subversive apparatus to manipulate Communist Party cadres, the Communists have exploited a wide variety of techniques ranging from psychological and political action to civil war, revolution, terrorism, and guerrilla warfare to achieve established goals. Allying themselves with budding national independence movements in colonial areas and popular front governments in former dictatorships, the Communists have scored notable successes and gained considerable public support through promises of material betterment and achievement of nationalistic aspirations in a wide variety of situations and areas.
The primary and ultimate objective of the Communists has been, and will remain, the total subversion and seizure of governments in all target nations. This includes the replacement of governments with totalitarian Communist dictatorships.

Temporary pauses in this conflict in certain regions have been acceptable to the Communists upon achieving interim objectives such as representation in national front governments, acceptance of Communists in the civil, military, and police establishments, and political recognition of the local Communist Party. These "phase-line" pauses afford the Communists the opportunity for regroupment and preparatory action in the organizational, psychological, and subversive fields before the resumption of the offensive in all-out bids for power.

Diplomatic and financial reorientation of target governments toward Communist powers is a recognized intermediate objective with the achievement of an anti-West or neutral status of the target nation as a minimum goal.

Communist strategy and tactics in the form of the so-called "peoples war" waged by revolutionary warfare have evolved through trial and error in 5 years of civil war in Russia (1918–1923), 25 years of conflict in China (1924–1949), and struggles in Greece, Indochina, Malaya, the Philippines, Vietnam, and elsewhere since 1945.
The pattern and complete nature of the conflict have no precedent in Western Europe or American history. The inadequacy of conventional military tactics, techniques, and formations in combating revolutionary warfare has been amply demonstrated. The assumption that the solution of the problem is solely a military one has been proved erroneous.

The basic element for success of revolutionary warfare rests in the active support of a minority of the target population and the tacit support or neutrality of the great majority of the people. This neutrality is largely a result of confusion, apathy, disgust, or open hostility toward the government in power. The exploitable causes for dissatisfaction have been the elementary desires of the target population for national independence, relief from racial oppression, elimination of colonial or foreign exploitation, alleviation of economic destitution, elimination of corruption, and the stabilization and improvement of the political and social structure.

Revolutionary warfare has been defeated or turned back only in those areas where the government in power has taken steps to correct the deficiencies exploited by the Communists to include imaginative, positive action to ensure the support of the population for the government's program. In conjunction with these programs of internal development other ID/D operations can be initiated using specially-tailored organizations, tactics, techniques, and personnel suitably trained for this specific mission.
The failure of the nations to realize the nature and magnitude of the conflict and the lack of recognition of the need for adopting special measures to combat revolutionary warfare have resulted in defeats for governments or prolonged wars of attrition precipitating collapse of the civil administration and seizure of power by the insurgents. For example, military operations have been characterized by the employment of large conventional forces in short-duration sweeps and fruitless and frustrating pursuits of guerrilla/terrorists forces. These operations were often followed by withdrawal at the conclusion of the unsuccessful chase to defensive positions behind barbed wire and bunkers to suffer a war of attrition and the relinquishment of control of the countryside to the enemy.

Finally, these events have been characterized by a lack of appreciation by some governments of the need for a coordinated approach to ID/D. Coordinated programs designed to create a favorable political, social, and economical environment, populace and resources control, the establishment of a base of popular support and allegiance, as well as defeat of the guerrilla, have not been understood.

The primary responsibility for conducting ID/D must rest with the local government. Insurgent warfare, by its nature, is an intimate affair normally fought between antagonists of similar ethnic backgrounds. The application of force by an external power, unless carefully applied through the medium of the local government, can have a debilitating effect on the government's power to control the affairs of its own nation.
When the U.S. Government accepts the invitation of developing nations its avowed purpose is to encourage and assist vulnerable nations to develop balanced capabilities for the internal security of their societies. An adequate internal defense requires mobilization of national resources and support of the national goals. Helping people who keenly desire to help themselves is a key aspect of the U.S. role in countering subversion and insurgency in these nations. Within the framework of U.S. policy and when requested by the foreign government, it is the intent of the United States to provide resources and advice to augment host country efforts in a constructive and acceptable manner. Credit for successful accomplishments should be focused to the fullest possible degree on the host government.
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CHAPTER 1
BACKGROUND
Section I. SCOPE

1. GENERAL

This material is applicable to ID/D situations involving a "cold war" and insurgent environment. Background material is provided to acquaint you with the problem of insurgency, its causes, and the measures employed to prevent or defeat an insurgency. Procedures and techniques in applying ID/D doctrine are discussed. The efforts of the United States in assisting developing nations to prevent or to defeat an insurgency are discussed, together with the role of the U.S. governmental agencies. The remainder of this guide is devoted to concepts and planning considerations and offers guidance on the various formats used in planning.

Section II. NATURE OF INSURGENCY

2. THE INSURGENCY: BASIC CAUSES AND MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS

a. The societies of many nations are undergoing a traumatic and turbulent transition from traditional or archaic structures to various stages of modernization. It appears that three basic preconditions are necessary to breed and sustain widespread insurgency. The first precondition is the vulnerability of these societies to insurgent activity. The second is a broad base of popular discontent. There must also be a direction which
includes a leadership element, organization, control, support, and emotional focus. Emotional focus is obtained when a significant segment of the population has lost confidence in their government to correct intolerable conditions and they can be persuaded or given reason to hope that an insurgency will correct these conditions.

b. An initial and prime consideration in the development of an ID/D program is a study of the factors in the environment giving rise to discontent. Whether real or imagined, whether spontaneous or incited, the dissatisfaction of a portion of the population with prevailing social, economic, or political conditions provides the insurgency with an ideological base. This ideological base may be essentially positive in nature with such goals as national independence, economic, or social improvements, or the securing of individual rights. Oftentimes, however, particularly in the early stages of an insurgency, this base will be primarily negative in nature with such goals as relief from actual or alleged oppression or elimination of exploitation and corruption.

c. The following constitute some of the conditions which can be exploited in the development of insurgent ideological bases.

(1) Social.

(a) The breakdown of traditional social organizations and customs as a result of contact with other cultures.
(b) The expectation of radically improved living conditions within a short period of time.

(c) Pressure of a dense and rapidly expanding population in an agrarian society.

(d) Gaping rifts in the population stemming from class, ethnic, religious, or linguistic differences.

(e) Aspirations of the underprivileged for improvement in their social status and opportunities for expression and individual satisfaction.

(f) Widespread illiteracy and an inadequate educational system.

(g) The drift of unabsorbable numbers of rural people into metropolitan areas in hopes of finding jobs and reaching easy affluence, only to be disillusioned by the lack of employment and by the living conditions they must endure.

(h) Rigid class or caste systems which deny attainment of social position based on merit.

(2) Political.

(a) Present or recent domination by a colonial power; lack of experienced leaders and administrators.

(b) A government unresponsive to the aspirations of the people.
(c) Inability of the government to fulfill ideals of liberty, justice, and democratic voice in government, or misconception of the meaning of liberty and democracy by the populace.

(d) Tyrannical, repressive, corrupt, or inefficient government.

(e) Lack of communication between the government and the rural areas.

(f) Lack of governmental control over rural areas and the consequent breakdown of law and order.

(g) Political instability.

(h) Frustrated and articulate segments of the intelligentsia who advocate radical solutions to speed modernization.

(i) A small but growing middle class opposed by the extremes of "right" and "left" in a struggle for political and economic influence.

(3) Economic.

(a) Widespread poverty.

(b) Grossly inequitable distribution of wealth and income; concentration of wealth and economic power in one class or in a few individuals or families.
(c) Inadequate production of food to feed an expanding population.

(d) A system of land tenure, combined with usurious interest rates, resulting in a permanently indebted and unstable rural populace.

(e) An inadequate and unbalanced industry.

(f) Inept, naive, ultranationalistic leaders who ignore, discount, or are ignorant of economic realities.

(g) An inadequate or inequitable system of taxation and tax collection that provides insufficient revenue for necessary governmental functions.

(h) Dependence on foreign capital assistance and, at the same time, opposition to private foreign investment.

(i) Overdependence on export of raw materials or a single commodity.

(j) Large-scale underemployment, and unemployment, often including a segment of the educated elite.

(4) Military.

(a) Estrangement of the military forces from the people.
(b) Failure to achieve an effective balance between military and police components.

(c) Organization, equipment, and tactics that are obsolete or inappropriate for combating insurgencies.

(d) Inadequate intelligence training and intelligence organizations.

(e) Military elements that are unresponsive to higher authority.

(f) Factionalism within the military forces.

(g) Subversion and misdirection of initially patriotic motivations of the military establishment.

(h) Lack of competent, dedicated leaders.

(5) Psychological.

(a) A newly awakened, rampant nationalism in upper classes and intellectuals.

(b) Lack of national feeling or sense of national identity; persistence of local or tribal loyalties.

(c) Anti-colonialism.

(d) A psychological gap between the government and the people; lack of identification on the
part of the people with the goals and objectives of a
government sincerely interested in progress for the
nation and its people.

(e) A widespread sense of injustice; lack of
means of redressing individual injustices.

(f) Lack of faith in the government and in
the social and economic system; lack of a dynamic
ideology to oppose communism.

(g) Inability and ineptness on the part of the
government in using truth to counteract Communist
propaganda.

3. COMMUNISM AND INSURGENT MOVEMENTS

a. International communism pretends to be the
champion of the poor, the downtrodden, and the op­
pressed. In a colonial area, for example, communism
has proclaimed its anti-colonialism and its solidarity
with the peoples of the colonial areas; by contrast,
capitalism is often identified with imperialism.

b. Communism also attempts to identify itself with
aspirations of the developing nations. It identifies
itself with the spirit of change in general, with land
reform and industrialization, with the secular state,
with literacy, and with adjustment to modern technol­
ogy. In many “trouble” spots of the world, communism
has taken advantage of the local desire for change and
has used the nationalistic revolutionary period of the
developing nations to make gains by manipulating or
capturing insurgent movements and encouraging guer-
rilla warfare and subversion.

c. The leaders of international communism are
masters at exploiting political or economic vacuums
and are constantly probing for opportunities to exploit
the "inner contradictions" or conditions of upheaval and
unrest in transitional societies. These conditions fall
essentially within the political, economic, or sociologi-
cal spheres and form the basic environment wherein
insurgency thrives.

d. The methods used by Communist-dominated in-
surgent forces are especially designed to gain control
of the people and to weaken the government and its
forces. Leaders seek to gain support by persuasion,
organization, and coercion; by identifying their objec-
tives with the needs and aspirations of the people; and
by using selective terror against "enemies of the
people" and blackmail to enforce the cooperation of the
reluctant. They seek to weaken the government by
discrediting its aims, its leaders, and its supporters;
by eliminating key opposition personnel and demon-
strating the government's inability to preserve law and
order and protect its adherents; and by sabotaging the
government's programs and the national economy.
Their methods include acts of destruction against
public and private property, transportation, and com-
munications systems; raids and ambushes against mil-
itary and police installations, personnel, and equip-
ment; terrorism by assassination, bombing, arson,
armed robbery, kidnapping, torture, and mutilation; provocation of incidents; espionage; counterfeiting; and dissemination of propaganda and rumors.

4. PREREQUISITES FOR SUCCESSFUL INSURGENCY

a. **Population Support.** Insurgent forces must receive help from the local population. This help may be voluntary or may be forced through blackmail or terrorism. The population furnishes food, clothing, and other supplies; labor; hideouts; transportation; medical support to the guerrilla forces; and manpower for the movement. In addition, members of the civil community act as home guards and provide the basis for the insurgent intelligence and warning nets.

b. **Outside Assistance.** Assistance from an outside power, to include diplomatic aid, economic sabotage, and propaganda, will further bolster the support of the insurgent force. A sponsoring power can assist in the routine supply and training of the guerrilla force and furnish leaders, organizers, cademen, advisors, funds, barter goods, and sophisticated or scarce items of military supply.

c. **Favorable Terrain.** Terrain provides advantages to a guerrilla force in direct proportion to the disadvantages it gives to the regular force combating the guerrilla force. Terrain such as jungles, mountains, or swamps that restricts observation, fields of fire, communications, and mobility of the regular force facilitates guerrilla operations. Until a guerrilla force
has secured control of a large area or has a large population base in which to submerge, it must depend to a great degree on a difficult terrain for the security of its base of operations.

d. **Leadership.** Effective leadership establishes the meaningful direction and organization necessary for successful insurgency. This leadership is characterized by a high degree of centralization of planning and policy and maximum decentralization of operations.

e. **Unity of Effort.** The insurgent cannot tolerate strong, internal, rival factions. A unified system is vital for coordination and centralization of all functions of the movement.

f. **Discipline.** Discipline is established throughout the insurgent movement to ensure cohesive operations by diverse elements. It is maintained indirectly by identification with the common cause and directly, in various elements of the insurgency (guerrilla units, terrorist squads, subversive cells), by strict codes of laws and regulations which provide for extremely severe penalties, including death, for relatively minor infractions.

g. **Use of Propaganda.** An insurgent must use propaganda to defame the regime and system, to alienate the people from the regime, and to persuade both the people and his own forces of the inevitability of his ultimate victory.
h. **Intelligence Effort.** To a significant degree, the survival and success of an insurgency depends on a continual stream of accurate information about the enemy. The insurgent organization must operate extensive intelligence nets among the civilian population, social and professional organizations, government agencies, and military forces.

i. **Cause.** Above all else, the insurgent must have a reason to rebel. A devotion to the cause of insurgency will provide the sustaining strength of the force. The cause may be national liberation, personal gain or aggrandizement, a political ideology, or the defense of some individual right. It may be a program of desperation against conditions so intolerable that all is to be gained and nothing lost by insurrection.

5. LEVELS OF INTENSITY OF INSURGENCY

The military ID/D measures employed are known as stability operations and the degree of participation by U.S. forces will be largely determined by the intensity of insurgent activity. Levels of intensity may be portrayed in terms of three general phases:

a. **Phase I—** The initial phase of insurgency in which subversive activities are a potential threat, whether latent or incipient, to situations in which subversive incidents or activities occur with frequency. It includes recruiting, developing, and organizing an insurgent apparatus for use in subsequent phases. It involves no major outbreak or uncontrollable insurgent activity.
b. **Phase II**--This phase is reached when the subversive movement, having gained sufficient local or external support, initiates organized guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the established authority. Operations to hold terrain objectives and engagement in conventional warfare are avoided.

c. **Phase III**--This phase is reached when the overtly active insurgency becomes primarily a war of movement between all organized forces of the insurgents and those of the established authority.

6. **ORGANIZATION OF THE INSURGENT MILITARY FORCE**

   a. The insurgent military force may vary from small groups to large units of division size or larger with extensive support organizations. Large organizations normally include elements for combat intelligence and counterintelligence, populace control, and logistical support.

   b. The "main force" and the "regional force" insurgent units are usually full-time, uniformed, and paid soldiers divorced from normal civilian pursuits. When these forces are combined for employment, they are classed as regular forces. Members of the village militia may alternately be either guerrilla fighters or ostensibly peaceful civilians.

   c. In the advanced stages of an insurgency, the insurgent military forces may resemble a quasi-regular
army. The basic structure, however, consisting of the main forces, the regional forces, and the village militia will still exist. The distinctions in these forces stem from the distance in terms of time and space that they operate from their common origin in the population (except for the professional cadre). There are also some military differences in organization, training, equipment, and operational missions.

(1) The insurgent main force units are the elite battle forces and are not normally employed when the insurgents believe there is a risk of defeat. The main force units are kept free to engage in a war of movement and to select the time and place for combat. They possess the best equipment, weapons, and uniforms; receive the highest pay; and have the primary mission of defeating the conventional force opposing the insurgency. The main force units, although retaining much of a guerrilla character, are organized along conventional lines and may be well trained and led. They operate in close conjunction with the regional forces and the village militia. The best of the regional force troops form the manpower pool for the main force units.

(2) The regional force troops are not as well organized, trained, or equipped as the regular insurgent forces; and as the name implies, are usually restricted to operations in their own native districts, provinces, or regions. In the advanced stages, they are generally organized into battalions and regiments and constitute the “mature guerrillas” in the true sense. One of the primary duties of the regional forces
is to protect the main force units while they are training and preparing for future operations. Regional force units launch small attacks, harass the enemy, keep the enemy off balance, and ambush reinforcements. Its source for recruits and fillers is the village militia; and, like the village militia, it retains the capability of submerging in the population.

(3) The village militia is divided into three categories: a self-defense force, combat guerrilla units, and secret guerrilla units. The village militia is mainly responsible for collecting intelligence, making road repairs, building bases, fortifying villages, and acting as porters and guides for the main force units and regional force units. The members of the village militia receive limited military training and extensive political indoctrination. The village militia, besides conducting small-scale raids and ambushes, furnishes security for insurgent officials at village level. The best village militia members form the nucleus of new regional force units, and in the final analysis, are the manpower base for the entire insurgent military force.

7. CHARACTERISTICS OF GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

a. A guerrilla force employs surprise, mobility, and dispersion of forces in offensive actions to demoralize the enemy and upset his current and projected operations. It seeks mainly to paralyze the enemy force. Only in its latter stages of development, when it has achieved the status of a quasi-conventional force, will the insurgent force attempt to destroy the enemy in conventional combat.
b. Surprise is a major requirement of success in guerrilla operations. To offset the enemy’s superiority of forces and equipment, guerrillas strike where the enemy is weak and least expects an attack. Reliable and timely intelligence and counterintelligence enhance the surprise. Operations are conducted extensively during hours of darkness and periods of adverse weather conditions.

c. Mobility is another necessary requirement for the success of a guerrilla operation. Only when the guerrilla force has developed to the point of conducting conventional operations will it attempt to match or surpass the ground vehicular or serial mobility of its enemy. Quite conversely, in the earliest stages of development, it will gain its mobility differential by operating in terrain which cannot be easily traversed by the mobility of the enemy. Mobility for the guerrilla force results from extensive clandestine movement of small elements over large areas. A guerrilla force may assemble, strike, and be miles away from the scene of the action before the enemy has an opportunity to react. However, security is rarely sacrificed for mobility.

d. Quick-massing followed by rapid and pre-planned dispersion of forces are principal characteristics of guerrilla operations. Guerrilla warfare is a “war of detachment” rather than mass contact; a war of quick, paralyzing blows followed by swift withdrawals. Guerrilla forces avoid pitched battles and seldom defend static positions.
a. Historically, the condition called "insurgency" has international legal consequences, because before 1949, there was little that could be ascribed to a "status of insurgency" in international law. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 did give cognizance to an "armed conflict not of an international character," which is essentially the conditions of an insurgency. The Geneva Conventions are applicable to such conflicts by virtue of article three of each of the four conventions.

b. A quotation of article three follows:

"In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

"(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons."
“(a) violence to life and person, in particular, murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;

“(b) taking of hostages;

“(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;

“(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

“(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.

“The Parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.

“The application of the proceeding provisions shall not affect legal status of the Parties to the conflict.”
Section III. CONCEPT OF INTERNAL DEFENSE and INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS

9. CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO INTERNAL DEFENSE AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT

The problem of ID/D is an integral part of the larger problem of the emergence of the developing nations and their transition toward modernization. Some of these nations have only recently obtained political independence; others are just emerging into a new era of economic and social development; still others are ruled or controlled by oligarchies which, in order to maintain their own favored positions, resist popular social and political movements toward economic or social betterment and removal of frustrations. In the past, the problem of countering an insurgency, has been viewed primarily, if not entirely, as an internal security problem of the nation concerned and has been handled by military and police actions. Viewed as part of the larger problem of modernization, the prevention of subversive insurgency demands broad programs for political, economic, social, and psychological development. Military support of the modernization process through civic action can be a major prevention measure and a significant factor in defeating insurgency.

a. ID/D operations seek to create an environment of security and popular trust which will permit orderly progress toward achieving national and popular goals
and, therefore, consist essentially of constructive efforts while conventional conflicts are essentially destructive in character. The military cannot make a lasting contribution to preventing or defeating insurgency unless the people are persuaded that their government is taking every reasonable step to meet their just aspirations.

b. The insurgent forces will eventually win unless the legal government, through its internal development and information program, can promise the attainment of goals more appealing to the people than those proposed by the insurgents and can convince the people of its ability and resolve to implement these extensive changes.

c. The ID/D effort must aim at denying the insurgent his bases of popular support by a combination of political, social, psychological, and economic actions while at the same time concentrating offensive tactical counterguerrilla efforts toward neutralization of the guerrilla threat. The ID/D objective cannot be achieved solely by the elimination of the guerrilla element. All ID/D operations must be conducted within the framework of a national plan in which the objectives, forces, and methods of implementation are specified. Appropriate roles, missions, and tasks for the political, economic, military, police, social welfare, intelligence, and information services of the nation are necessary.

10. ORGANIZATION FOR ID/D OPERATIONS

As an initial step in the establishment of a nationwide ID/D organization, a "national internal defense
coordination center" (NIDCC) or other similar agency is organized at the national level to provide a coordinated approach to the planning and direction of the ID/D effort. At subordinate levels of operation (province and district levels) this coordination is effected through the "area coordination center" (ACC).

11. AREA COORDINATION CENTERS

a. In order to provide a means for coordinating the ID/D effort at various levels, particularly at the province and district levels, ACC's are established. These centers are comprised of representatives from all forces and agencies participating in the total ID/D effort. The ACC's are not substitutes for the normal operational command posts of the various ID/D agencies; for example, the police operations center, the military tactical operations center (TOC), etc.

b. Membership of the ACC varies with traditions and type of government control in a country, the extent of the insurgency, and the size and composition of the available ID/D forces, but may include:

(1) Head of the local civil administration.

(2) Senior military commander in the area.

(3) Senior police representative.

(4) Representatives of local and national intelligence organizations (police, military, civil, etc.).
(5) Public information and PSYOP representatives.

(6) Senior representatives of paramilitary organizations (local security units, self-defense units, etc.).

(7) Key communications representatives (military and civilian).

(8) Other local and national government representatives (to include, for example, project directors of the local internal development effort).

c. The chiefs (or chairman) of ACC’s may be military or political officials selected on the basis of leadership ability, reliability, intelligence, and freedom from conflicting partisan interests. Staffs are constituted of selected representatives of participating forces and agencies.

d. In an insurgency, the ACC will usually meet daily to make decisions and coordinate actions of the total ID/D effort in the area. The ACC will have its own operations center and communications center which operate on a 24-hour basis.

e. The ACC has two objectives: first, provide integrated planning, coordination, and overall direction of the entire ID/D effort in a given area of responsibility; second, ensure that provisions are made for immediate, coordinated responses to operational requirements. In coordination with its civil-military advisory
committee (CMAC), which it normally establishes, it ensures communication with the people and their participation in programs designed to improve their security and well-being.

12. CIVIL-MILITARY ADVISORY COMMITTEE

a. The CMAC participates in the ACC function primarily by providing advice and assisting in the planning and execution of ID/D operations. For example, it evaluates the effects of various projected actions affecting the civil population and so informs the ACC. It also provides popular "feedback" on ID/D operations currently in progress. Its chief will ordinarily be the appointed or elected civilian leader of the community or area (state governor, province chief, major, etc., or other political appointee) and may include the following members:

(1) Local police chief.
(2) Superintendent of schools or school principal.
(3) Priests, ministers, or other senior members of dominant religious faiths.
(4) Judge or other judiciary representative.
(5) Labor union president.
(6) Editors of influential publications and news media.
(7) Representatives of major business or commercial interests.
(8) Other influential publications and news media.

b. Like the ACC, the organization of the CMAC will vary depending on local requirements and must be flexible enough to meet changing situations. The CMAC will normally meet as necessary on call of the chief of the committee. It should be noted that some persons (such as the police chief) are members of both the ACC and the CMAC.

13. ESTABLISHING PRIORITIES FOR ID/D OPERATIONS

Seldom will there be enough manpower or material to meet the insurgent threat with equal strength in all areas at the same time. Consequently, the overall plan must designate a priority of effort so that available ID/D priorities are:

a. Configuration of the terrain.

b. Political, economic, social, psychological, and intelligence factors.

c. Likelihood of success.

d. Tactical or strategic importance of the sector to the government forces and to the insurgents.

e. Internal development and civic action requirements.

f. Insurgent and guerrilla strength.

g. ID/D forces available.
h. Location and significance of international boundaries.

i. Significance of outside (the country) interest and support of the insurgency.

j. Local attitudes of the population and other ethnic considerations.

k. Transportation and communications network.

14. INTERNAL DEFENSE AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

a. ID/D operations consist of three main programs.

(1) Internal development: to achieve improvement in the social, economic, psychological, and political environment from national to community level.

(2) Populace and resources control: to detect and neutralize the insurgent underground apparatus and operations in the community; sever population support of the guerrilla; and provide a secure physical and psychological environment for the population.

(3) Counterguerrilla tactical operations: to neutralize the guerrilla element of the insurgent movement.

b. Program Description. See sections I, III, and IV, chapter 2.
c. **Program Development.** See chapter 6.

d. Broad general direction and overall coordination of ID/D programs are exercised at the national level with maximum decentralization. Emphasis is placed on operational freedom and initiative at the regional and local levels. Local authority is vitally necessary to ensure successful and swift exploitation of local opportunities and rapidly changing circumstances.

e. The three ID/D programs are closely coordinated with one another in planning, development, and execution; in practice, one program is largely dependent on the success of the others to achieve overall progress. Intelligence and PSYOP form a vital part of all three programs; and, while varying in application, tenor, and intensity, depending upon the objectives of a particular program, they constitute an all-important support role for the entire ID/D program.

15. INTERNAL DEFENSE AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT FORCES

a. **Military.**

(1) The army performs the primary military tactical role of seeking out and neutralizing or eliminating the guerrilla military formations at all levels; provides units to serve under the direction of the NIDCC or ACC's at appropriate levels; and provides training, organizational, intelligence, psychological, and logistical support to other ID/D forces as required.
(2) Naval and air forces provide coastal, air, and border security as necessary; close air support and intelligence to ground forces; and perform logistical support, surveillance, and training missions as appropriate. Unit operations are coordinated by the NIDCC or the ACC's.

b. Police.

(1) The national police (to include gendarmerie, constabulary, and other internal defense forces) perform police and internal defense duties in urban or rural areas; exercise law enforcement, intelligence, and counterascriptive duties as directed by the ACC at appropriate levels; and relieve military units of internal defense duties in cleared or secured areas.

(2) Regional, state, provincial, municipal, and local police are armed, uniformed police whose main function is normal law enforcement in areas not under national police jurisdiction. They assist national police as required and support operations of the local ACC.

(3) Special police are recruited and trained for special tasks as required. These police are normally civil guards for factories, mines, plantations/ranches, and railroads. Combat police may man jungle outposts or police posts in isolated villages; they may also be involved in limited patrol actions or special operations such as raids, ambushes, or searches and local strike operations.
(4) Border police (guards) are police-type organizations responsible for the control regulation of the movements of persons and material across political or tactical boundaries. They may participate in frontier operations and border denial operations.

c. Paramilitary Forces Include:

(1) Self-defense units charged with responsibility for security of villages and hamlets (small populations groups) and guarding headquarters, bridges, and other vital, local installations. These units are made up of local volunteers organized into platoons or squads. They man outposts, patrol perimeters of the community, and are capable of limited offensive action. They are armed and may or may not be uniformed.

(2) Civil defense groups (hamlet militia) are similar to self-defense units in mission, organization, and capabilities. They are usually nonuniformed and unpaid and are usually a part-time, volunteer force. Armed militia are organized at the town, village, and hamlet level and trained by the army to combat overt insurgent activities within the community and to protect local inhabitants, provide guides, maintain surveillance, and otherwise support ID/D operations in the community.

(3) The role of well-trained and organized local civil self-defense forces is of considerable significance. The basis for a large proportion of offensive actions will be dependent on intelligence-gathering and
other services provided by these forces. The psychological effect of these local civilian inhabitants in a role of part-time soldiers, capable of preventing casual insurgent occupation of the outlying villages and localities, materially assists the government in securing the support of the population as a whole. Former military and police personnel should be used to form cadres for these units whenever feasible.

d. National intelligence/security agencies perform intelligence and counterintelligence operations against the insurgent organization and countersubversion within the government and civil population as coordinated with the NIDCC and ACC’s at each level.

e. National and military information and PSYOP organizations perform functions at all levels within a framework of broad nationwide information programs and PSYOP campaigns coordinated through the NIDCC and ACC’s.

f. Other Assets Include.

(1) Press, radio, and other public information media and organizations.

(2) Selected civilian organizations and agencies (youth groups, labor unions, civic, and industrial organizations).

16. NATIONAL CAMPAIGNS

Three primary national campaigns are conducted to attain ID/D objectives. The three major types are
known as consolidation campaign, strike campaign, and remote area campaign. Each one of these campaigns is integrated with the resources of both internal defense and internal development. The purpose, concept, operations, and organization of these campaigns are discussed in greater detail in chapter 4 of this guide.
CHAPTER 2

INTERNAL DEFENSE AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS

Section I. INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT

(NATIONAL AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT)

17. GENERAL

National development as a part of internal development provides for the balanced economic, sociological, psychological, and political improvement of a nation. The concept of national development includes broad development of a nation's capabilities internally with special emphasis on improving the status and role of the individual citizen. Community development, also a part of internal development, is discussed in the second portion of this section. The concepts and significant aspects of civic action and advisory assistance in contributing to the improvement of the host country environment are also discussed in this chapter.

18. CONCEPT

The concept of national development applies to stable, "peace-time" situations as well as to the conditions of an insurgency. Priorities and goals of the program depend upon the intensity of the insurgency.
19. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

a. Insurgent success depends upon population support. Gaining this support depends to a large extent upon the insurgent's exploitation of grievances that are fed by unremedied political, economic, and social ills in a vulnerable society. Therefore, the solution is to convince the people that political, economic, and social problems are being corrected. By informing the people of this progress, the insurgent force will be deprived of popular support.

b. Balanced political, economic, and social development is fundamental to achievement of the objectives of a national development program. These developmental areas are interrelated, for actions taken in one area affect the other areas.

20. FINANCING AND CAPITAL FORMATION

a. A basic economic weakness in most developing nations is that of basic capital. Considerable expansion must take place in physical capital before sustained growth is possible at rates which will substantially offset population increases.

b. Potential sources of capital in the developing nations are: surpluses in the hands of small social groups not committed to constructive investment; increased production resulting from the adaptation and employment of technology and techniques already available in the more developed nations; and employment of idle manpower in properly organized rural
industries and in voluntary work on community projects.

c. Methods of assembling capital in the developing nations include:

(1) Private savings and investments.

(2) Government taxation, borrowing, and earnings.

(3) Inflation resulting from government creation of money and credit.

(4) Bringing together available resources to build roads, schools, and dispensaries, and to make farm improvements.

(5) Special agencies of the United Nations.

(6) Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

(7) International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).

(8) Development Assistance Group (DAG).

(9) Developed nations and industries.

(10) Partnership of nations.

(11) Private foundations.
(12) Private investors.


d. External capital can serve as a catalyst to stimulate the process of domestic capital formation.

e. National development cannot be achieved without a sound and equitable tax structure. The national tax structure should be so constituted as to generate such revenues for the government as would result in a sound government fiscal structure and assist and encourage an orderly, balanced, national development. An equitable system of direct taxes should be used in conjunction with an equitable system of indirect taxes to include sales, transfer, and import duties. As a long-term policy, increased reliance on income taxes, as administration and compliance improve, should be a goal of most developing nations. Meanwhile, however, astute uses of indirect taxes are recommended. It is essential that an equitable distribution of the tax burden be achieved.

f. National development banks play an extremely important role in stimulating national progress. Some of their functions are to:

(1) Borrow funds for public institutions or functions.

(2) Provide medium- and long-range credit for private borrowers.
3. Advise the government on financial matters.

4. Assist in the promotion of sound development projects.

21. AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

a. General. Agricultural and industrial development are complementary. Each economic sector depends in some measure on the other. Concurrent, balanced development in both sectors (agriculture and industry) is necessary to achieve the objectives of an internal development program.

b. Agriculture. Agrarian reform embraces all matters that affect agriculture and is often recognized as a primary consideration in developing countries. Land distribution, in which a redistribution of agricultural assets is planned, is only one aspect of agrarian reform but perhaps the most vital and difficult to achieve. Agriculture in most developing countries is plagued by problems in the following areas:

1. Antiquated and unfair land tenure systems.

2. Large estates.

3. Quasi-feudalism.

4. Idle land.
(5) Fragmented holdings.

(6) High rents and interest rates.

(7) Low productivity.

(8) Low or no property taxes.

(9) Peasant discontent.

c. Agrarian Reforms. As a general concept, agrarian reform measures include:

(1) Improvement of landlord-tenant relations.

(2) Resettlement of population.

(3) Breaking up of large estates.

(4) Creation of optimum-sized farms.

(5) Establishment of agricultural credit programs.

(6) Establishment of equitable property taxation.

(7) Provision of technical advice to farmers.

(8) Improvement of transportation.

(9) Establishment of market facilities.
d. **Agricultural Development.**

(1) Viable agriculture is crucial for sustained and balanced development in the developing nations because: increased employment results in increased demands for, and consumption of, food; rapid population growth requires an increasingly adequate food supply; the large majority of a population often depends upon agriculture for a livelihood; and agricultural development often results in markets for industrial production and capital formation, with ultimate improvements in health, sanitation, education, and other areas of social and consequent political development.

(2) A primary requirement for overcoming resistance to changes in the agricultural situation is the development of a conviction that benefits will accrue from using new technology, skills, and management techniques. Benefits will be derived by shifting from subsistence farming to production of a surplus for sale. Such incentives will include storage areas, market facilities, and stable prices. Finally, the availability of things such as fertilizers, improved seeds, tools, credit, market facilities, storage areas, and technical advice will assist in overcoming resistance to agricultural change.

e. **Industrial Development.**

(1) Three factors are applicable to developing nations concerning industrial development: it can be
accelerated; it requires importing technology; and its value to a developing nation varies.

(2) The functions of industrial development are to:

(a) Improve the investment climate.

(b) Identify industrial opportunities.

(c) Evaluate feasibility of projects.

(d) Attract investment.

(e) Assist investors.

(f) Finance projects.

(g) Improve industrial productivity.

(h) Perform applied industrial research.

(i) Raise the per capita income.

22. DEVELOPMENT AND MOBILIZATION OF HUMAN RESOURCES

a. Social Development. The major areas of social development requiring attention are health, education, training, urbanization, population, leadership, status, citizen groups, land reforms, public administration, community development, and housing.
b. Mobilization of Human Resources. The chief agents of development are healthy, educated, and well-trained people; thus, the main aims of development are to improve the people's health, to increase the range and quality of human skills, and to instill a sense of involvement in a larger local and national purpose. The highest priority in human resources development must be attached to measures that increase health, sanitation, and nutrition; make better use of the labor force by creating higher levels of productive employment; improving the quality of the labor force through vocational education and training; enlisting popular support for development tasks; and attracting the participation of the various social groups. Finally it should be noted that goals must be set within the framework of an internal development plan for the use and development of human resources.

c. Education:

(1) Major problem areas in education are:

(a) Shortage of teachers and classrooms.

(b) Poorly educated and trained teachers and administrative personnel.

(c) Low teacher status and pay.

(d) High percentage of school-age population.
(e) Curriculums not designed to prepare people to deal with practical problems of development.

(f) Distance between schools in rural areas.

(g) Shortage of secondary schools in rural areas.

(h) High rate of illiteracy among people past school-age.

(i) Heavy demands for education in all areas.

(j) Lack of accurate data on current and projected educational needs.

(k) No laws, or unenforced laws, for compulsory attendance; consequently, a large drop-out rate.

(l) Large number of repeaters in classes.

(m) Relatively fewer girls than boys in school.

(2) A national education program must provide for a system of elementary and secondary schools; universities; vocational, technical, and professional schools; and an adult education program. There must
be schools for special purposes such as teacher training, health education, agricultural improvement, industrial training, and public administration. There should be a shift in educational emphasis to educate the people and to train leaders to deal with practical problems of development. A survey should be made to determine the educational requirements for supporting present and projected internal development.

d. Health.

(1) Major problem areas in health improvement are:

(a) Shortages of medical personnel—doctors, nurses, technicians, and administrators.

(b) Lack of adequate facilities—dispensaries, clinics, hospitals, medical schools, and research institutes.

(c) Inadequate data on communicable diseases and other ills; data that is needed to develop adequate health programs.

(d) Lack of understanding of health habits and practices, sanitation, and nutrition.

(e) Acute health problems in rural areas.

(f) Illiteracy.
(2) A national health improvement program must provide plans for the development of public health programs in coordination with other related plans. Such a plan should emphasize the education and training of a professional and auxiliary staff to strengthen health services, and specific, measurable goals should be set for expanding each category of the staff. An index must be established reflecting the current situation in order to provide a starting point from which progress can be measured. A national health program should provide increased resources for the control of disease, improvement of general health, and operation of an effective public health service.

e. Other Social Factors. Development of human resources to their fullest potential requires adequate housing, employment opportunities, and social services (water, electricity, public transportation, sewage, police, and fire protection, etc.).

22. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

a. Public administration is the conduct of governmental functions. It provides the machinery to develop and execute a national development program. Deficiencies in public administration in the developing countries extend beyond nepotism, corruption or inefficiency. Major problem areas in public administration in developing countries are:

(1) Administrative lag.
(2) Violent change.

(3) Political instability.

(4) Communications.

(5) Shortage of trained personnel and training facilities.

(6) Unattractiveness of public service careers.

(7) Tradition.

(8) Excessive centralization.

(9) Improper staffing of offices.

(10) People's demands.

(11) Public inertia.

(12) Public relations (attitudes of superiority).

b. To remedy many of these ills, action is indicated in such areas as: leadership, both at national and local government levels; personnel administration, to include sound and business-like procedures; and a civil service system, to include procedure for awarding merited ratings and creating incentives. Training is perhaps the most significant aspect of a remedial programs and schools are established to provide a
continual flow of knowledgeable people into various aspects of the public administration system. Finally, the corrective program must consider public relations, reorganization, and a system of constant reappraisal to ensure that remedial adjustments are made as necessary.

c. Success of a national development program depends on the effectiveness of the public administration system which must develop plans and programs at all levels, to include health, education, agriculture, industry, housing, budget, social welfare, monetary and fiscal, and credit. The public administration must also ensure that objectives, goals, targets, and priorities are established; a method of financing secured; all programs, tax, and land reforms administered; and a means established for operation of its own organization.

23. COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

a. A major part of internal development is community development. In community development, the efforts of the people, at community level, are united with those of governmental authorities to improve the political, economic, social, psychological, and cultural conditions at local or community levels and to integrate these communities into the life of the nation, enabling them to contribute fully to national progress.

b. Implications of this program are:
A two-sided program--governmental authorities and the local population both contributing.

A comprehensive character--aims and methods are broad.

Local initiative--people are encouraged to develop their own projects as well as to participate in government projects.

Voluntary methods--the process relies on freedom and tends to avoid compulsion, such as obligatory labor.

c. These basic elements in community development must be considered:

Projects which must fill the basic needs of the community. The first projects initiated should be in response to the expressed needs of the people. Local improvements may next be achieved through unrelated efforts in each substantive field; however, full and balanced community development requires concerted action and the establishment of multipurpose programs. Community development aimed at increasing and bettering the forms of local government, and transition toward effective local administration, where it is not yet functioning, is an important objective. The identification, encouragement, and training of local leaders must be considered. It should be noted that the participation of women and youth in
community projects invigorates development programs, establishes them on a wide basis, and secures long-range expansion. Implementation of a community development program on a national scale requires adoption of consistent policies, specific administrative arrangements, and recruitment of personnel. Self-help projects often require governmental assistance to be fully effective; however, the resources of voluntary, nongovernmental organizations should be used fully in community development programs at the local, national, and international level. Economic and social progress at the local level will necessitate parallel development on a wider, national scale.

(2) Contribution to internal development. Community development contributes to balanced political, economic, psychological, and social development by increasing food and raw materials; stimulating growth and decentralization of industry; fostering an exchange economy; promoting capital formation, rural and urban; creating facilities such as: wells, roads, houses, schools, and clinics; and developing people, outlooks, and institutions.

24. EXAMPLE OF INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

a. The Alliance for Progress came into being in August 1961, and its goals are expressed in the Charter of Punta del Este. The Alliance for Progress is designed to improve economic and social conditions and
to promote political stability in Latin American nations; hence, it is a regional program. The United States is a signatory to the Charter of Punta del Este and, as a national policy, the United States has pledged its full support to the alliance.

b. Fundamental goals of the Alliance for Progress are:

(1) Increase per capita income.

(2) Achieve more equitable distribution of national income.

(3) Diversify economic structure.

(4) Accelerate industrialization.

(5) Increase agricultural productivity.

(6) Effect agrarian reforms.

(7) Eliminate adult illiteracy.

(8) Increase life expectancy.

(9) Increase low-cost housing.

(10) Maintain stable prices.

(11) Strengthen regional economic exchange.
(12) Prevent harmful fluctuation in foreign exchange.

c. The nations concerned are required to develop long-range programs as well as undertake immediate internal development actions. The elements of internal development are mutually consistent goals and priorities; methods to achieve goals; measures to direct the public sector; measures to encourage the private sector; exploitation of available resources; determination of effects on financial support; establishment of fiscal and monetary policies; and development of the machinery for public administration.

d. The Alliance for Progress contains many ideas concerning internal development which would have equal applicability in other areas of the world and, in a sense, the Alliance for Progress could be looked upon as a massive ID/D effort as well as a highly desirable means of improving the well-being of the people.

Section II. CIVIC ACTION

25. PURPOSE

The purpose of a civic action program is to use developed national resources for constructive activities, such as assisting in health, welfare, and public works projects; improving living conditions; alleviating suffering; and improving the economic base of a nation. While some civic action operations entail a
major effort in physical and monetary resources, in
general the emphasis is on advice and guidance to the
community and the initiation of self-help programs to
the maximum degree within the scope of existing
community resources.

26. OPERATIONS

a. One of the means by which the military of a na­tion participates in internal development is through
military civic action. The overall civic action pro­
gram seeks to gain the support, loyalty, and respect
of the people for the government and to emphasize the
concept of initiative and worth of the individual. As a
rule, care must be exercised not to impair the mili­
tary effectiveness of the units participating in civic
action projects and to ensure that civic action projects
do not duplicate but rather supplement the activities of
other agencies. Teams of specialists with appropriate
technical skills may be formed to work directly with the
population and with civilian agencies. Military units
work with other agencies of the government, such as
public health, public welfare, education, agriculture,
and interior ministries. Individual members of agen­
cies and military units who possess special skills and
are motivated by humanitarian reasons, patriotism,
or a desire to pursue avocations, may engage in inde­
pendent civic action projects of significant benefit to a
community or some segment of it.

b. Civic action operations may be classed as na­tionally directed activities or voluntary effort on the
local level.
(1) Directed activities usually involve specific assignments, central government funding, and authorization to use indicated military resources.

(2) Voluntary activities should follow some general stimuli or guidelines from the national government, but they involve greater initiative and resourcefulness on the local level. Military equipment and facilities may be used in projects undertaken; however, major effort is directed toward encouraging, directing, and supporting self-help programs.

(3) Regardless of the approach and whether the civic action operations are directed or voluntary, activities must be coordinated closely among all agencies concerned to avoid duplication of effort and to secure maximum benefits from skills, labor, supplies, equipment, and funds involved.

(4) Ideally, civic action programs entail little or no cost to the United States, and projects should largely be those which can be financed by the developing nation. It is evident, however, that some nations simply have no funds available for civic action. The following funding formula provides for joint Department of Defense-Department of State financing of projects.

(a) The U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP) contains authorization to program and fund for equipment and maintenance of equipment used by military and paramilitary units for civic action and related training.
(b) The Agency for International Development (AID) is authorized to fund costs of material such as lumber, cement, steel, and other construction items.

(5) Civic action programming, funding, and technical assistance, in support of a friendly nation, require coordinated country team effort. It is determined at this level which portion of the funds for a project should come from AID and which from MAP; who will furnish required technical assistance; whether a civic action mobile training team is required; and, in general, what method of operation will best accomplish the objectives sought.

26. CHARACTERISTICS OF A CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM

A civic action program to be most effective should:

a. Meet Popular Aspirations. The program must be responsive to the desires of the people. A project conceived by the people will normally receive more support than one planned by outsiders.

b. Meet Greatest Need with Greatest Effort. If militarily feasible, the greatest effort should be made in areas most threatened by the insurgency. Areas recently freed from domination by guerrilla forces should be given a high priority in the civic action program. Often remote, isolated regions are breeding grounds for insurgency because the inhabitants have
little rapport with their government. The ability of the army to live and operate in this primitive environment makes it a particularly effective agency to demonstrate the government's concern for such remote communities.

c. Be Progressive. Initially short-term, high-impact projects will establish the credibility of the civic action program. Where possible, longer-range projects should be accomplished in stages to permit early partial use and to facilitate intermediate evaluation of the project's effectiveness. When necessary, the people must be taught to use new tools, new forms of energy, or new procedures introduced by the program to enable them to adopt these products of modernity without injuring themselves physically or psychologically.

d. Respect the Culture and Religion of the People. It has been pointed out that the change from traditionality to modernity, a requirement for the developing nations, is a difficult transition. During this period of evolution, it is important that a program to introduce benefits should not negate its value by running counter to the deeply held beliefs or engrained customs of the people. Many potentially valuable projects have failed due to lack of respect for this factor.

e. Create a Favorable Government Image. This is the dominant characteristic of a successful civic action program. The program must impress the people with the capability and determination of the
legitimate government to aid its citizens in attaining a better life. The program must not promise or imply progress that it cannot provide.

f. **Exhibit Government Unity.** The projects must be designed and executed as a joint venture with, or in support of, the ministry, or ministries, having jurisdiction over the end product or project activity. Projects should be initiated in the name of this responsible ministry or government agency. If misunderstandings or disputes occur between government agencies or representatives, they must be settled as quickly and unobtrusively as possible. The program must not provide examples of government disunity for agitators to exploit.

g. **Enlist the People's Participation.** The civic action program must be designed to help the people help themselves. The long-range success of such a program will be measured by the extent to which the people carry on with self-improvement once the military assistance is withdrawn. Only if the people are sufficiently motivated to participate actively in the program, and are permitted to do so, will they derive lasting benefit from it. Participation may be in the form of direct labor, monetary, or material contributions. Such contributions must be equitable, unoppressive, and must show a clear relation between cost and benefits. Subsequent maintenance for completed projects must also be provided.

h. **Encourage Private Enterprise.** The most valuable resource of a nation is the ability of its people.
Of the greatest importance to a developing nation is a rising class of entrepreneurs. Where a program or project can possibly be planned to encourage private business and give it a chance to grow, this should be done.

1. **Keep the Military Aspect in Mind.** Planned projects should be designed to retain a military advantage where possible; for example, roads should be located to afford the fewest possible ambush sites. Utility plants and other vital installations should be sited and planned to facilitate their defense and protection from sabotage.

### 27. CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS

Civic action projects undertaken by the military forces of a nation encompass everything from an individual act to organization of substantial forces for a large-scale improvement project. Representative examples of civic action projects and objectives are listed below, together with possible implementing agencies:

a. **Agriculture and Natural Resources.**

   (1) Increase or improve production of animals, grain, or vegetable food products (individuals with farming experience, unit transportation, veterinary personnel).

   (2) Execute insect and rodent control measures (troops or units with hand or aerial spraying...
devices, medical, veterinary, and certain chemical warfare personnel).

(3) Transport agricultural produce, seeds, and fertilizers (units with transportation capabilities).

(4) Construct simple irrigation and drainage systems (engineer units or units with equipment, tools, and troop labor).

(5) Clear areas (units with equipment, tools, or labor potential).

(6) Execute grading operations (engineer units).

(7) Undertake forestry activities such as planting, thinning, and harvesting (troop units with labor potential).

(8) Establish and operate saw mills (engineer units and troop labor).

(9) Devise and construct flood controls (engineer units and troop labor).

(10) Reclaim land and drain swamps (troop labor units).

(11) Harvest crops (all troop units).

Industry and Communication.
(1) Assess and develop acceptable sand and gravel resources for road work and general construction (engineer units).

(2) Install, operate, and maintain telephone, telegraph, and radio systems (signal or communications units).

(3) Construct housing and buildings (engineer units for designing and supervising, troop units for construction).

(4) Set up and operate emergency communication centers, especially in times of disaster (signal or communication units).

c. Transportation.

(1) Construct, repair, or improve roads and bridges (engineer and troop units with labor potential and trucks available).

(2) Construct, repair, or improve railway equipment (transportation, ordnance, engineer, and troop units with labor potential).

(3) Construct, repair, or improve inland waterways, wharves, and harbors (engineer, transportation, and navy units).

(4) Construct, repair, improve, or operate airfields (air force, transportation, engineer, army aviation, and troop units with labor potential).
(5) Remove individuals from disaster areas (all units with land, sea, or air transportation facilities and a capability for controlling movement of individuals).

d. Health and Sanitation.

(1) Improve sanitary standards (medical and engineer units).

(2) Set up and operate dispensary units for out-patient treatment or to give first aid.

(3) Devise acceptable methods of disposing of human waste (medical units and engineer units).

(4) Provide safe water supply system (engineer units).

(5) Eradicate malaria and other insect-transmitted disease (medical units and troop labor).

(6) Teach sanitation, personal hygiene, and first aid (medical units and military units that train and operate under field conditions).

e. Education.

(1) Provide basic education training (reading and writing) to military personnel (all military units).

(2) Provide technical training to military personnel which will be useful when individuals return to
civilian status (all military units, especially technical service units).

(3) Provide instructors for schools for basic education and technical training for youths and adults (all military units).

(4) Construct schools (all military units).

(5) Use military facilities for schools until schools can be constructed (all military units).

f. Public Administration.

(1) Provide guidance and assistance to public administrators in fields of organization, personnel selection, work procedures, etc. (civil affairs units and personnel, and qualified personnel from any military unit).

(2) Inspire confidence in and enthusiasm for the government that the army represents (psychological warfare units, public information units, military bands, and any organization with a capability for public demonstration of esprit de corps and military effectiveness).

(3) Provide guidance and assistance to public safety administrators in their police, fire protection, and civil defense activities, including disaster relief (civil affairs, military police, and engineer units and personnel, and qualified personnel from any military unit).
unit). Caution should be exercised in using agencies or functions carrying heritages of notoriety, such as reputations for arbitrary arrests, unethical or harassing investigations, or irresponsible property management.

g. Community Development, Social Welfare, and Housing.

(1) Prepare plans. Provide surveying, construction supervision, and assistance for housing and community buildings such as schools, civic centers, churches, orphanages, medical centers, etc. (engineer units particularly, and all military units generally).

(2) Sponsor worthy community projects such as orphanages, schools, and medical centers (all military units).

(3) Plan road and railroad projects, irrigation and land development, political subdivisions and geographical features, and land use (engineer units and individuals with ability in the fields of surveying, geodetics, and charting).

(4) Prepare nautical charts and coastal surveys (navy units).

h. Mass Communication. Provide advice and assistance on best methods of informing the people
through such devices as publications, film, or broadcasting (public information, intelligence, and psychological warfare units).

28. CONDUCT OF CIVIC ACTION

Depending on policy governing such matters, both U.S. and host country forces may engage in the conduct of civic action; however, the primary effort of U.S. individuals and units will usually be to advise, train, or assist host country forces. The objective of such advice, training, and assistance will be to increase the host country forces' capabilities and reduce their dependence on U.S. aid. Command and individual responsibilities described below are applicable to both U.S. and host country forces.

a. Command. The direct guidance and control of civic action is the responsibility of military commanders at all levels. The initiative and imagination of subordinate leaders should be exploited and encouraged. The fact that civic action is often the result of a natural impulse of free men to help other less fortunate men should be recognized and fostered. The guidance and control of an overall civic action program should allow for this natural impulse and encourage initiative and imagination of subordinates. The guidance given a commander should apprise him of the projects he may undertake on his own initiative as well as the projects, which, due to their requirement of additional funds, supplies, or equipment, must be approved by higher headquarters.
b. **Individual.** Military civic action includes individual actions that makes the soldier a brother of the people as well as their protector. The individual soldier must demonstrate a kinship to the people. Individual military civic action ranges from basic military courtesy and discipline to participation in formal projects. In every case, the fundamentals of correct conduct must be followed. For example, troops must be courteous to civilians at check points and road blocks, and still be prepared for action if required. A disproportionate amount of formal civic action projects are required to overcome the harm caused by bad troop behavior. The failure to pay a fair price for goods, a recklessly driven vehicle, or a thoughtless or deliberate discourtesy may be the act that makes villagers angry enough to refuse to cooperate or to withhold vital information. If, however, the troops have established a good relationship with the people, have created a mutual feeling of respect and confidence, and have demonstrated a sincere desire to help the people, then the active cooperation and support of the people in providing information about insurgent forces, agents, and supply caches greatly increase. Proper troop behavior supports the overall objective of civic action programs.

**Section III. ADVISORY ASSISTANCE**

29. **GENERAL**

Advisory assistance may include advice of a constructive nature for improvement of the entire host
country environment. It should include advice in those areas which are vulnerable to insurgent exploitation such as the political, economic, social, psychological, intelligence, and military sectors.

a. **Objective.** Advisory assistance should increase the capacity of the host country to organize and operate effectively.

b. **Concept.** Individuals, organizations, and nations possessing higher skills and resources assist, when asked, by imparting their knowledge to the functionality of the nation in need of assistance.

c. **Organization.** To be effective, advisory assistance should be administered through established organizations such as embassies, MAAG’s, Missions, MTT’s, USAID, USIS, CIA, Military Assistance Commands, or United Nations organizations. Within the host country the establishment of an NIDCC and ACC’s, or similar control centers, should be a prerequisite to advisory assistance of significant magnitude.

d. **Operations.** The types of advisory assistance are limited only by the requirements of a specific host country. Such assistance may include, but is not limited to: education, training, material, human resources, and financial assistance in all areas of political, social, economic intelligence, psychological, and military endeavor.