Section IV. POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL

30. POPULATION ATTITUDES

a. The vast majority of the populace in any given target area is initially unresponsive to the efforts of the incumbent government or the insurgents. In some societies, there may be a traditional distrust of the government, as well as dissatisfaction with social and economic conditions, although the population may have no inclination to revolt. In other societies, there may exist a distrust of any influence from "outside" sources. In most instances, much of the public desires to be left alone to earn a livelihood and to conduct its normal affairs.

b. The advocates of Communist revolutionary warfare constitute a small but capable and active segment of the population. Only a small minority of the total of any population has actively participated in or supported the initial efforts of the Communists in revolutionary warfare. The forces of the government and its adherents, by choice, necessity, or self-interest, generally represent a countering minority. Among these are government officials, civil servants, professional military and police units, leading politicians, the wealthy and landed class, and the management of industry, commerce, and banking firms.

c. Thus, the great majority of the populace is uncommitted and remains to be swayed, persuaded, or forced by the insurgents into active or tacit support
of their goals. It is estimated that the insurgents have achieved power in most instances with the active support of less than 20 percent of the population in the nation concerned, with only 1 to 2 percent bearing arms.

31. CONCEPT OF POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL

a. General. The populace and resources control (P&RC) program is designed to complement and support the other ID/D programs by providing secure environment in which these programs can be administered.

b. Objectives of P&RC Programs.

(1) Sever the supporting relationship between the population and the guerrilla.

(2) Detect and neutralize the insurgent's underground apparatus and activities in the community.

(3) Provide a secure physical and psychological environment for the population.

32. FORCES

Forces to be used in the P&RC program are primarily police and paramilitary forces. The regular military units are normally used as a backup force and as a source of specialists. The police system, if
one exists or can be established, should be used as the basis for the P&RC force wherever possible. Reasons for this are the close relationship between the police and the populace, the intimate knowledge of the populace by the police, and the need for the military to concentrate on the counterguerrilla task. The use of police as a basis for a P&RC force eliminates an eventual changeover from military to civilian direction with its inevitable psychological impact. A key to success in these operations is the proper balancing and coordination of various and diverse forces so that they work together as a team. In those cases where the military have, through military action, driven out the armed insurgent elements from the communities in the area, there should be a turnover of authority and responsibility to the police as quickly as possible. This releases the military for other tasks and facilitates the population's early return to a more normal way of life.

33. TECHNIQUES

a. Intelligence. Intelligence must provide sufficient information to permit the planners of the P&RC programs to determine the need for controls, the degree of intensity of application, the methods which may be most successful, and when the controls may be relaxed. It is also vital that intelligence provide current and continuous information on the activities, attitudes, customs, and habits of the people. Intelligence activities must be coordinated at all levels, down to and including the community.
b. **Counterintelligence.** As part of the P&RC program, counterintelligence has the responsibility for the identification and neutralization of the insurgent underground apparatus to include the command and control structure, the intelligence collection efforts, the willing and unwilling supporters, and the sympathizers. Counterintelligence makes identifications through investigation of individual suspects and by penetration of the underground organization. By penetration and investigation, sufficient evidence is produced to identify suspects as actual members of the underground, and they are then neutralized by arrest, trial, and conviction under legal statutes.

c. **Psychological Operations.** PSYOP should receive maximum emphasis. A major part of these operations should be directed within the framework of the P&RC program. For maximum effectiveness, a substantial propaganda effort should be directed toward the families and the popular support base of the insurgents. The PSYOP aspect of the P&RC program attempts to:

(1) Make the imposition of controls more palatable to the people by relating the necessity of controls to their safety and well-being.

(2) Create a favorable national or local government image.

(3) Counter the effects of the insurgent psychological effort.
d. Controls.

(1) Measures designed to establish and maintain physical control of the local populace are categorized as "surveillance" and "restrictions." Surveillance systems are used to maintain a watch over the populace, thus detecting insurgent operations. Restrictions are used to prevent guerrilla contact with the population and make insurgent activities more difficult. Violators of restrictions automatically become suspects of counterintelligence investigation and interrogation.

(2) An example of surveillance activities is the use of block wardens. This is a system using one person to report the daily activities of a group to the local police or military. Other, more simple, surveillance methods include the use of the police patrol and personnel identification systems.

(3) Restrictions may include:

(a) Movement control for both vehicles and personnel.

(b) Restricted residential areas such as the new life hamlet or resettlement concept.

(c) Sensitive items control (resources control) on critical supplies such as food, POL, and munitions.

(d) Censorship and press control.
(e) Activity restrictions which would apply to labor unions, political activities, assembly of groups, and the use of skills.

(4) Enforcement procedures in P&RC are those to be found under many public safety organizations. They include the establishment of road blocks and checkpoints; the conduct of raids, searches, and screening operations; and mob and riot control. A reaction force (of police or paramilitary personnel) should be established to execute these actions as necessary and to exploit insurgent contacts.

(5) All restrictions, controls, and enforcement measures must include consideration of the legality of these measures and their impact on the populace. In countries where wide latitude is not provided to governmental authorities in order to control the populace, special or emergency legislation must be enacted. This may include a form of martial law permitting government forces to search without warrant, detain without bringing formal charges, and execute other similar actions. Legislation to increase authority to search and seize, arrest and detain, or otherwise restrict the liberty of individuals must be kept to the necessary minimum, be justified by propagandizing the need, be accompanied by provisions for controlling overzealous application, and be promulgated as a temporary expedient to be lifted as soon as possible.

e. Amnesty, pardon, rehabilitation, re-education form a distinct and important part of the
P&RC program. A major aim of P&RC is to secure the support of the people. To accomplish this, provisions must be made to allow disaffected members of the populace to revert to the support of the government without undue fear of punishment for previous antigovernmental acts. A just, equitable, and scrupulously observed amnesty program will do much to aid the people in making this decision. Rehabilitation of former insurgent supporters can be accomplished through a program of progressive re-education.

f. Examples of some typical duties of forces engaged in P&RC are:

(1) Rural police (gendarmerie):

(a) Maintain area surveillance and control.

(b) Patrol entire area as show of force, to gain intelligence, to restrict the freedom of insurgent activity, and to provide the populace with a secure environment.

(c) Enforce movement controls.

(d) Reinforce and assist hamlet and village militia.

(2) Village and city police:

(a) Maintain law and order and protect the populace.
(b) Act as an intelligence gathering agency.

(c) Maintain surveillance and control over movement of persons and material.

(d) Assist in separating guerrilla elements from sources of logistical support.

(3) Civil defense groups (hamlet and village militia):

(a) Reinforce police.

(b) Provide local security.

(c) Act as intelligence gathering agencies.

Section V. COUNTERGUERRILLA TACTICAL OPERATIONS

34. OBJECTIVES

The objectives of tactical operations are to neutralize guerrilla activity and, together with P&RC measures, establish an environment in which political, social, and economic progress is possible. Tactical operations must be coordinated at all levels through the NIDCC and ACC's to provide for the necessary integration of civilian and military resources that will bring about a more rapid neutralization of the
guerrilla threat. The principal categories of tactical operations are:

a. **Harassing Operations.**

(1) Harassing operations are conducted for the purpose of locating and fixing the guerrilla. They restrict freedom of guerrilla force activity and thus cause the guerrilla to mass (in which case he can more easily be treated as a target), to disperse, or to cease operations. These will permit the attacker to inflict casualties, gain detailed knowledge of the area of operations, and cause the guerrilla to expend his limited resources.

(2) Harassing operations are defensive/offensive, economy-of-force operations conducted in low-priority areas to deny guerrilla forces freedom of operation.

(3) In harassing operations, special emphasis is placed on saturation patrolling. Other tactics that are classified as harassing operations are: reconnaissance patrolling, combat patrolling, raids, ambushes, aerial surveillance, "hunter-killer" operations, "eagle flights," mining probable guerrilla routes, artillery fires, tactical air strikes, "search and clear" operations, stay-behind patrols, "snooper flights," "lightning bug," "snipe hunt," chemical defoliation, crop destruction, and any other suitable tactic or technique that serves to harass the guerrilla.
b. Reaction Operations.

(1) Reaction operations are conducted in response to information and intelligence, when contact has been made by patrolling or aerial reconnaissance, or in response to guerrilla activity against civil or military installations and forces. Reaction operations are frequently initiated as a result of harassing operations.

(2) Reaction responses may be made by one or a number of selected and coordinated means. Among these means are: artillery fires, tactical air strikes, and ground forces. Ground forces may move to the objective area on foot, by vehicle, by water, by air, or a combination of means.

(3) The "keys to success" in reaction operations are secrecy and timeliness of deployment.

(4) When planning reaction operations, the counter-reaction capability of the guerrilla must always be considered.

c. Elimination Operations.

(1) Elimination operations are undertaken as rapidly as possible once a guerrilla force has been definitely located, can be fixed, and sufficient combat power is available and can be employed to isolate and destroy it. Normally such operations require that the counterguerrilla force be much larger than the guerrilla force. Operations such as the encirclement,
hammer and anvil, rabbit hunt, fire flush, raids, and ambushes may be used in elimination operations.

(2) The encirclement offers the greatest possibility for fixing the guerrilla force and achieving decisive results, providing the following conditions exist:

(a) Positive intelligence on location of guerrilla elements.

(b) Troops emplaced secretly and rapidly to maximize surprise.

(c) An effective counterintelligence system exists that will ensure security of plans and movement.

(d) Sufficient troops to achieve an effective encirclement.

(e) Ample time to adequately search the encircled area.

(f) Flexibility in plans to offset the advantages which darkness affords the entrapped guerrilla force.

35. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS.

a. Importance of Offensive Operations. Purely defensive measures allow the guerrilla force to grow
and become stronger. The maintenance of the offensive at all levels is vital to the success of a counterguerrilla campaign. Even limited offensive operations are preferable to a purely passive attitude. Counterguerrilla plans must provide for offensive actions during all phases of an insurgency.

b. Need for Constant Pressure on the Guerrilla. Since the guerrilla force will probably react to applied pressure by moving to another area or by remaining inactive until the vigor of current counteraction has lessened, commanders must be particularly cautious not to consider the force destroyed merely because opposition has ceased. Continuous pressure must be maintained throughout a campaign against guerrilla forces. If contact with the force is lost, aggressive efforts must be made to reestablish contact by exploiting timely and accurate intelligence and harassing actions using such means as covert agents, aerial surveillance, patrols, and hunter-killer teams. Periods of inactivity will permit the guerrilla force to rest, reorganize, and resume offensive operations.

c. Requirement for Secrecy and Surprise. The need for secrecy must be emphasized in all plans and operations. The guerrillas' well-organized intelligence system makes it difficult to deny him information concerning impending government operations. This makes it all the more important that every echelon of command within the counterguerrilla organization, to include platoons and squads, employ the
most ingenious and imaginative methods. Security will be enhanced and surprise more likely achieved when plans provide for:

(1) Effective and secure communications.

(2) Constant indoctrination of the individual soldier with the importance of security.

(3) Avoidance of established operational patterns by varying methods and techniques.

(4) Deception as well as denial measures.

d. Requirement for Mobility. Superior mobility is essential in counterguerrilla operations to achieve surprise and to successfully counter the mobility of the enemy force. Plans should consider the need to use all means of mobility, to include aircraft, tracked and wheeled vehicles, animals, and porters.

e. Importance of Intelligence. To be successful, any force engaged in counterguerrilla operations must have accurate and timely intelligence about the terrain, the weather, the guerrilla, and the population. The counterguerrilla program must provide for the collection and rapid dissemination of all available intelligence, particularly the present and immediate future location of the guerrilla, so that counterguerrilla forces can take immediate action to destroy the fast-moving enemy. Since the guerrilla depends on, and is in contact with, the population, the population becomes
the best source of information for counterguerrilla operations. However, since the guerrilla often lives among the population and will use persuasion or coercion to gain its support, this information is difficult to obtain.

36. METHODS OF OPERATION

   a. Concentrate on the guerrilla as a target, not on the terrain. Terrain, as a tactical objective, means little to the guerrilla until the size and organization of his force begins to parallel that of a conventional force. Commanders must orient their efforts continually on the neutralization of the enemy and not on the terrain which the guerrilla force can usually yield with little tactical loss.

   b. Consider that front or rear lines in an area threatened by insurgency do not exist. Units throughout the country must maintain the same alert and aggressive attitude as frontline combat troops in a conventional war. Priorities of effort must be designated by the planners to provide guidelines for the allocation of counterguerrilla forces.

   c. Assign areas of responsibility to military commanders. These will not be defined by straight, linear boundaries, but will usually encompass political subdivisions of the affected area. Such assignments are made to ensure maximum coordination and assistance from civil agencies and, thereby, release military personnel for the guerrilla-hunting task.
d. Do not dissipate the combat power of the counterguerrilla force by widespread assignment of small detachments to essentially defensive tasks such as garrison, rail, or road sentries. Such a policy will make these forces subject to piecemeal destruction by the guerrilla force.

e. Avoid the use of large (regiment- and division-sized) conventional units to destroy guerrillas unless the enemy is using similar formations. Expenditure of combat power in large-scale counterguerrilla sweeps or drives is to be avoided except when guerrilla forces are of sufficient size and available intelligence justifies such operations.

f. Do not waste combat power by simply garrisoning large military forces in an area of guerrilla activity in hopes that the physical presence of the government troops will deter enemy operations.

g. Move the military forces out of the garrisons, cities, and towns. Get them off the roads and trails and into the realm of the guerrilla. Keep them there in continuous operations in all kinds of weather. Planners should consider the use of both regular and special units for this activity.

37. COORDINATION

Counterguerrilla operations are coordinated through the NIDCC and ACC's. Intelligence and PSYOP for both the counterguerrilla and the P&RC programs are closely integrated within the ACC's.
Section VI. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

38. GENERAL

a. Accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence is vital to successful ID/D operations. This dependence on intelligence and counterintelligence is greater in ID/D operations than in conventional operations due to the following differences in the two concepts.

(1) In ID/D, the targets are elements of the population, either civilian supporters or members of the insurgency; and they are usually ill-defined and fleeting. A complete awareness and intimate knowledge of the environment is essential to the conduct of current intelligence operations. The basic nature of the internal security problem requires an intensive, initial intelligence effort to pinpoint the roots of subversion.

(2) In conventional military ground operations, a force may succeed in capturing a military objective by attacking with overwhelming strength. But this is not the case in ID/D operations: the insurgent seldom holds terrain and will not overtly commit himself except when cornered or when the odds favor his chances of winning. Most important, his base of operations is in the population itself. He, therefore, cannot be easily detected and overwhelmed but must be subjected to exhaustive scrutiny, delicate and discriminate analysis, and aggressive and accurate countermeasures.
b. A basic essential in any ID/D intelligence operation is a thorough understanding of the environment of the insurgency in all its aspects, supported by complete awareness of prevailing internal and external forces supporting or subverting that society. Effective ID/D intelligence operations must not only be based on such knowledge but must be an extension of previous efforts to counter dissidence and subversion, exploiting any friendly or allied intelligence assets developed before the emergence of insurgent activity.

c. The basic intelligence on a specific area and situation is derived from already developed strategic intelligence supplemented by recent intelligence collected with the internal security problem in mind. This data forms the basis of the estimate of the internal security situation and subsequent plans.

39. TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE

From the planning point of view, three general types of intelligence are emphasized in ID/D operations: counterintelligence, internal intelligence, and combat intelligence. Definitions of these terms contained in AR 320-5 have been modified as indicated below. Definitions of other intelligence terms are listed in appendix II.

a. Counterintelligence is that phase of intelligence covering all activity devoted to destroying the effectiveness of hostile intelligence activities and to
protecting information against espionage, personnel against subversion, and installations and material against sabotage.

b. Internal intelligence is that knowledge pertaining to the economic, political, and military situation within a country; and to the socio-psychological factors, to include the attitudes, predispositions, and characteristics of the people who inhabit it.

c. Combat intelligence is that knowledge of the enemy, the weather, and terrain used in the planning and conduct of tactical operations within a given area. In counterguerrilla warfare, it also includes all available information on the predispositions, affiliations, and characteristics of the population in the guerrilla area of operations.

40. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Intelligence activities must be conducted in such a manner as to detect the potential for, or the development of, an insurgency as early as possible. As soon as the existence of an insurgency is established, regardless of the phase, intelligence activities supporting ID/D operations must be intensified.

41. INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

a. Identify the conditions which are the sources of, and which become the causes of, discontent.
b. Identify the existence of an insurgency, the magnitude or power of the insurgent effort, the most probable courses of action, and the insurgent’s capability to expand his effort.

c. Identify and neutralize individuals and groups engaged in subversion, espionage, and sabotage.

d. Prevent insurgents from obtaining information and penetrating the government.

e. Provide intelligence for use in internal development and P&RC programs.

f. Provide intelligence in support of counterguerrilla operations.

42. ORGANIZATION

a. A unified or centralized intelligence service is essential to the coordination and efficient conduct of ID/D intelligence operations. Such an intelligence service should be centrally directed at the national level and should possess the following responsibilities and prerogatives:

(1) Freedom to operate throughout the nation.

(2) Maintain a central registry of intelligence information.

(3) Coordinate all intelligence and counterintelligence activities laterally and vertically at all levels.
(4) Collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence and counterintelligence information for the benefit of the entire intelligence community.

(5) Prepare an intelligence estimate of the insurgent situation and the intelligence plan.

(6) Coordinate intelligence and counterintelligence operations with similar operations of friendly foreign nations.

b. At national level the internal organization of the national intelligence service will be influenced by the available national resources, including qualified intelligence personnel, communications, transportation, and physical facilities and equipment. Nevertheless, the internal organizational structure must be such that it will provide for rapid and efficient collection of information, production of intelligence, and dissemination of intelligence information. The scope of intelligence activities at national level will dictate a functional organizational structure. As a minimum, the organizational structure should contain operational divisions charged with specific responsibilities for collection, production, and dissemination activities in such functional areas as: administration, interrogation, document exploitation, order of battle, intelligence, and counterintelligence.

c. Below national level, the field organization of the national intelligence service must be extensive, with field offices operated by resident national intelligence service personnel at all subordinate levels,
i.e., region, province, district, etc. The internal organization of the national intelligence service agencies below national level must generally parallel the national level organization. However, added emphasis will be required in such functional areas as captive interrogation, document exploitation, and liaison and coordination with a magnitude of intelligence collection agencies and other ID/D forces.

d. The national intelligence service should be controlled by the nation's chief executive; and should be responsive to the intelligence requirements of all national ID/D agencies and forces. The national intelligence service should be primarily a civilian rather than a military organization because of the extensive scope of its operational effort. However, the nation's military and police forces must have strong supporting roles in the national intelligence service organization to ensure successful intelligence operations.

43. OPERATIONS

a. Collection activities in ID/D operations are more diversified than in conventional operations. Collection agencies must operate with greater flexibility because of the quantity and variety of information sources. Collection techniques will range from open research to highly sophisticated collection performed by skilled intelligence specialists.

b. Production of intelligence for ID/D will involve wider, more diversified, and more frequent
interdepartmental coordination with intelligence collection agencies such as military and police.

c. Timely dissemination is perhaps the most critical aspect of the intelligence process. The frequent need for immediate reaction to vital intelligence dictates the establishment of communication systems for rapid processing and transmission of intelligence to military and police units at the level concerned.

d. Standing EEI to determine the existence of an insurgency are based on general and specific indicators.

e. General Indicators of Insurgency.

(1) Formation of a subversive underground organization.

(2) Subversion of the population by persuasion and PSYOP.

(3) Collection and storage of equipment and supplies for guerrilla warfare and sabotage.

(4) Increased espionage activity within the country, especially in the rural areas.

f. Specific Indicators of Insurgency.

(1) Formation of a subversive underground organization:
(a) An increase in the number of young, radical intellectuals traveling to Communist countries on student visas.

(b) Return, within a relatively short space of time, of numbers of students who have had extended stays in Communist countries.

(c) Disappearance of known or suspected Communists and dissidents from the cities and towns.

(d) New faces appearing in the villages and countryside.

(e) A disruption of the normal social pattern in the lives of some of the people.

(f) Small groups of people meeting in a secret fashion.

(g) Apartments and houses being rented but not lived in as homes.

(h) Reports that individuals are being approached to engage in subversive underground activity.

(2) Efforts to subvert the population by persuasion and PSYOP.

(a) New faces appearing in established organizations and societies and attempts to influence the direction of these groups.
(b) Creation of new organizations and societies especially when the announced aim is improvement of conditions in the country.

(c) Apparent spontaneous mass demonstrations against government policies and actions or lack of actions.

(d) The appearance of anti-government propaganda within the country.

(e) Communist countries' propaganda dissemination aimed at worldwide consumption, denouncing conditions and the regime in the country of concern.

(f) Communist countries beaming radio propaganda at the country of concern denouncing the established government for failure to satisfy the needs and desires of the people.

(g) The appearance of a slogan or slogans developed around some undesirable condition within the country.

(h) An increase in strikes, riots, and demonstrations in urban areas.

(i) Disappearance of young men from homes and jobs in both urban and rural areas.

(j) More open and more violent criticism of the government from people of all walks of life.
(k) Cessation of federal and state tax payments from remote rural areas.

(1) Closing of schools in rural areas.

(m) Emergence of “people’s” courts in remote areas of the country.

(n) Disappearance and replacement of local government officials.

(o) Increase in robberies, particularly bank robberies or holdups of similar institutions.

(p) Counterfeit money appearing in the country.

(q) Increase in smuggling of narcotics and gems into the country.

(r) An increase in the amount of narcotics and gems on the black market.

(3) Collection and storage of equipment for guerrilla warfare and sabotage.

(a) Unexplained disappearance of staple foodstuffs from warehouses.

(b) Increase in purchase of staple foodstuffs in the commercial market.
(c) Staple foodstuffs being sought and obtained in any manner from producers and consumers by individuals who are not brokers.

(d) Brokers not receiving normal supply of staple foodstuffs from producers.

(e) Unexplained overflights of aircraft or evidence of airdrops having been made in the country.

(f) Increase in the demand for small arms and ammunition on the open market.

(g) Theft of small arms and ammunition from police arms rooms and army arsenals.

(h) Unexplained attacks on police and military personnel carrying small arms and ammunition.

(i) Less than normal supply of critical drugs on the black market.

(j) An increase in the price of critical drugs on the black market.

(k) Theft of two-way radio equipment from military and police organizations.

(l) Abnormal purchases of amateur radio equipment on the open market.
(m) Unusual purchase, theft, smuggling, or air-dropping of ingredients necessary to manufacture homemade explosives.

(n) Unexplained explosions.

(o) Discovery of equipment and supplies in secret hiding places which could be used for guerrilla warfare and sabotage.

(4) Evidence of increased espionage activity within the country, particularly in the rural areas.

(a) Government patrols and outposts being ambushed and raided in such a manner as to indicate information being passed to attacking guerrillas.

(b) Discovery of rudimentary dead-letter drops in rural areas.

(c) Appearance of smoke signals and other crude devices which could be interpreted as a general signaling system.

(d) Reports from the population and from police and security personnel that intelligence recruitment "approaches" are being made to them.

(e) Police and informant nets failing to report normally.
(f) Disappearance of classified documents from government offices at the national level.

(g) Discovery in government offices of scribbled, incomprehensive notes of a suspicious nature.

(h) Unusual and unsatisfactorily explained absences of short duration of government employees from their offices.

g. The above list of indicators must not be considered as complete, nor should they be used in isolation. All indicators need not be present before a positive analysis of the development of existence of an insurgency can be made. Experience has indicated, however, that most of the indicators will present themselves as an insurgency develops.

Section VII. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

44. GENERAL

a. Military units employed in an ID/D situation must operate in an environment inherently sensitive, both politically and militarily. The scope and nature of missions assigned will frequently include political and administrative aspects and objectives not considered normal to military operations. It is in this environment that PSYOP must play its role—a role which seeks not only to reduce the effects of guerrilla and insurgent strength and activities, but one
seeking the furtherance of a nationbuilding program with all that it implies.

b. It is axiomatic that military action is an extension of political policy that has failed to assert itself through peaceful means. This is true for any military action but is more readily obvious in the case of ID/D operations. An insurgent movement is evidence per se that the social order, upon which political stability depends, has disintegrated. Further social order is dependent to a significant degree on public opinion; thus, it can be reasonably assumed that among the factors causing a breakdown of the social order in many societies is the manifestation of unfavorable public opinion. This unfavorable opinion is usually directed at the governing body and can be due to real or imagined grievances on the part of the populace.

45. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY

a. The commander must be aware of political, economic, and social roles of PSYOP as well as the political role. The military element is an agency of the governing body and, in many cases, a major factor in the formation of opinion toward the government. Every military plan must take into consideration the psychological impact of the planned activity. Such consideration does not necessarily mean that formal PSYOP must be included in every operation. In many cases, success hinges upon the leadership's awareness of the problem. In many situations, however, planned PSYOP are needed to produce desired end.
b. Experience has shown that many commanders tend to give little priority to the psychological aspect of military operations. Too often, long-range political objectives are sacrificed for temporary tactical gains. History clearly shows that this results in ineffective ID/D operations. PSYOP and the psychological effect of all other operations on the population, are not to be considered only by a PSYOP staff officer. They must be considered by every unit commander operating in the ID/D environment.

c. PSYOP play a vital role in both the tactical and nontactical activities of ID/D. In tactical situations, the PSYOP plan should include activities directed at the insurgent force and the civilian population in the immediate vicinity. As an example, the role of the civilians in the operation and the benefit they will derive from it should be amplified.

d. Nationbuilding or internal development is not only a matter of economic development. Of extreme importance in the nationbuilding process is the development of a bond of unity among the people of the country and the establishment of a bridge of understanding between the people and the government (whether national or local). The ID/D organization (whether it is military, police, or other force) is a critical determinant of the image the government creates in the minds of the people.

46. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

It must be kept in mind that ID/D situations vary widely from nation to nation. The role of the military
is more significant in some nations than in others, for many armies are not designed to function in the areas of information, civil affairs, PSYOP, and related activities. Thus, in many situations, special arrangements must be undertaken to ensure a proper degree of PSYOP effort.

a. PSYOP are planned and employed by all forces conducting ID/D operations to:

(1) Induce defection and dissatisfaction among the insurgents.

(2) Neutralize civilian support of guerrilla forces.

(3) Dissuade civilians from insurgent activities.

(4) Gain the confidence of the neutral, or so-called uncommitted elements of the population.

(5) Gain, preserve, and strengthen friendly civilian support.

(6) Build and maintain the morale of ID/D forces.

b. In conducting PSYOP, the population may be divided into six target groups:

(1) Guerrilla units.
(2) Underground elements.

(3) Civilians sympathetic to the insurgent movement.

(4) Civilians sympathetic to the government.

(5) Uncommitted (or "neutral") civilians.

(6) ID/D forces.

c. Other vital targets can be found in the regime and the population of the external sponsoring power and, more broadly, among the world forum where the sponsoring power has political assets that could be jeopardized by an effective, politico-psychological counter-attack.

d. Propaganda themes are based on both the recognizable cohesive aspects of the population and the potentially divisive characteristics of hostile target audiences.

(1) A sampling of possible factors which may aid in conducting cohesive propaganda are:

(a) Commonality of ultimate goals.

(b) Commonality of physical, economic, and material problems.

(c) Demonstrable inability of separate factions to solve important problems.
(d) Ethnic similarities and common origins.

(e) Religious and social similarities.

(f) Traditional or historical evidence of unity.

(g) Failure of traditional solutions accompanied by awareness of a need for new solutions.

(2) A sampling of possible factors which may aid in conducting divisive propaganda are:

(a) Political, social, economic, and ideological differences among elements of the insurgent movement.

(b) Leadership rivalries within the insurgent movement.

(c) Danger of betrayal from among the insurgents.

(d) Harsh living conditions of guerrilla forces.

(e) Scarcity of arms and other supplies.

(f) Selfish motivation of opportunist supporting the insurgent movement.
(g) Foreign domination of the movement.

e. PSYOP have an absolute necessity for timely, accurate, and detailed intelligence if they are to successfully support the three ID/D programs. PSYOP planners must have day-to-day information on the political, economic, social, and insurgent conditions of all areas of the nation. Of special importance, PSYOP planners need to know the attitudes, and changes of attitudes, of the population toward the insurgent, the government, the ID/D programs, and friendly and enemy propaganda.
CHAPTER 3
ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

Section I. UNITED STATES AND THE DEVELOPING NATIONS

47. GENERAL

Basic guidance for the employment of U.S. agencies, forces, and other resources to prevent or defeat subversive insurgency is contained in the Overseas Internal Defense Policy directive (classified) and the Joint Counterinsurgency (ID/D) Plans and Programs directive. The directives deal specifically with the responsibilities of the major departments of the U.S. Government and their overseas representatives. They establish functions, in this regard, of the Department of Defense (DOD), United States Information Agency (USIA), Department of State, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). They reaffirm the role of the chief of a U.S. diplomatic mission abroad, his relationship with other United States agencies and the U.S. National Country Team, and define his responsibilities for the development of the internal defense plan. The role of the Department of State in this area was strengthened by National Security Action Memorandum 341, dated 2 March 1966, which assigns to the Secretary of State authority and responsibility, to the full extent permitted by law, for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the U.S. Government overseas.
48. OBJECTIVES OF U.S. POLICY

A major objective of the U.S. policy is to thwart further Communist inroads into non-Communist areas by safeguarding and assisting the less developed nations in fulfilling their aspirations to remain free and to fashion ways of life independent from communism or other external domination or control.

49. PURPOSE OF UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE

The avowed purpose of the United States, in the field of ID/D, is to encourage and assist vulnerable nations to develop balanced capabilities for the internal security of their societies and provide, within policy guidance, the resources required to augment the constructive efforts of the developing host country.

50. UNITED STATES INTEREST AND INVOLVEMENT IN DEVELOPING NATIONS

It is U.S. policy to assist less developed societies to remain free and to develop independent of Communist or other external control. U.S. involvement in the developing countries takes place as part of the five basic goals of our foreign policy.

a. Security through Strength. To deter or defeat aggression at any level, whether of nuclear attack, limited war, or subversion and guerrilla tactics.

b. Progress through Participation. To bring about a closer association of the more industrialized
democracies of Western Europe, North America, and Asia—specifically Japan—in promoting the prosperity and security of the entire free world.

c. Revolution of Freedom. To help the less developed areas of the world carry through their revolution of modernization without sacrificing their independence or their pursuit of a form of government and a way of life that will enhance self-determination.

d. Community under Law. To assist in the gradual emergence of a genuine world community, based on cooperation and law, through the establishment and development of such organs as the United Nations, the World Court, the World Bank and Monetary Fund, and other global and regional institutions.

e. Peace through Perseverence. To strive tirelessly to end the arms race and reduce the risk of war, to narrow the areas of conflict with the Communist bloc, and to continue to spin the infinity of threads that bind peaceful nations together.

51. ADMINISTRATION OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

USAID administers the U.S. economic aid program in the developing nations. The following principles govern the administration of USAID's programs:

a. Long-Range Planning. The nation seeking aid should have specific goals as well as priorities on steps
necessary to attain those goals. Development plans should take into account all the factors that contribute to growth—capital formation, the development of sound public administration, modern credit and financial institutions, the contributions of private enterprise, skilled labor forces, managerial skills, and the creation of the necessary motivations and incentives.

b. Self-Help. A nation seeking U.S. economic assistance should demonstrate its intention to bear most of the burden of attaining its goals, be willing to mobilize its own resources, and accept sacrifice and discipline in order to achieve social and economic progress.

c. Free World Cooperation. U.S. foreign assistance programs are a component of free world aid—not an isolated effort—and must be coordinated with the assistance of other industrialized nations.

d. Transition of Self-Support. Foreign assistance to the less developed nations should not be endless. The goal of U.S. economic assistance is to help nations reach the point at which their own increased human and capital resources, combined with their improved ability to attract foreign investment and credit, are adequate to sustain satisfactory growth.

52. CATEGORIES OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

a. Except for special activities, the U.S. Foreign Assistance Program can be divided into three major
funding categories under which Congress authorizes and appropriates foreign assistance funds: development loans, technical assistance development grants, and supporting assistance.

(1) Development loans: Development loans, comprising more than 60 percent of the total Foreign Assistance Program, are generally used to help finance social and economic development projects or to finance general import programs in the private sector as a means for helping the development of the economy.

(a) Loans may be earmarked to establish or expand facilities such as manufacturing, irrigation, power, transportation, or communication; for development banks; for building schools, hospitals, or houses; to carry out programs in the fields of community development, adult education, or public health; or for research activities. Loans to finance general imports enable private business in these countries to purchase essential commodities, material, and equipment in support of development efforts.

(b) The loans may include funds for technical assistance to train key personnel, to pay for engineering and feasibility studies, or to cover the cost of purchasing necessary machinery and equipment in the United States.

(c) All development loans are repayable in dollars and may be made only where there is a reasonable prospect of repayment. Under legislation enacted
by the Congress in 1963, minimum terms are three-fourths of 1 percent service charge during the initial 10-year grace period when no principal payments are required and 2 percent thereafter. Some AID loans are made on harder terms.

(2) Technical assistance development grants:

(a) USAID’s Technical Assistance Development Grant Program is the “Point IV” program of the 1960’s, with projects in the field of health, education, public administration, community development, housing, industry, and agriculture.

(b) This activity emphasizes the development of human resources. It pays the salaries of the technicians serving in the USAID overseas missions, finances contracts for technical assistance, and helps to cover the costs of trainees who come to the United States.

(c) It can finance the provision of equipment and material to support the effort of U.S. specialists or underwrite the development of institutions abroad to make the training programs more effective.

(3) Supporting assistance:

(a) Is a funding category established by the Congress to authorize economic aid directed primarily toward immediate political and security objectives.

(b) Is used to help relieve the strain on a nation’s economy resulting from large defense
expenditures, to maintain access to U.S. bases, to maintain economic stability in countries in which the U.S. has strategic political interests, or to encourage independence from Communist dominance in sensitive areas.

(c) Can be either loans or grants to finance capital projects, commodity imports, emergency relief projects, and internal security activities. It is the one form of economic aid which may—in exceptional cases—involves direct dollar transfers.

(4) The foreign aid legislation also includes an appropriation for a contingency fund to meet urgent and unforeseen requirements of an emergency nature. Such funds, when used, are usually programmed for supporting assistance purposes.

b. The Peace Corps was created to help the people of interested nations to meet their needs for trained manpower, and to help promote a better understanding of the American people on the part of the people served and a better understanding of other people on the part of the American people.

c. The Export-Import Bank promotes U.S. sales abroad through loans, guarantees, and risk insurance.

d. Contributions are made to international organizations such as the United Nations Technical Assistance and Special Fund for Assistance programs of a multilateral character.
e. Military assistance strengthens the security of free nations around the world, nations that are prepared to join in defending their own freedom against Communist aggression, whether by open force or internal subversion.

f. Food for Peace. Another program which makes an important contribution to the economic development of the less developed nations is the Food for Peace Program involving the Department of Agriculture, other government departments and the Director of Food for Peace—a special assistant to the President. USAID has a major responsibility for administering the overseas operation of this program, including its integration with other economic assistance extended by the United States. USAID also supervises use of food for emergency and disaster relief and child feeding programs through foreign governments and voluntary agencies. The principal uses of U.S. food as part of the USAID program to developing countries are to:

1. Permit increases of employment to occur more rapidly than the capacity of the nation to produce food for the newly employed.

2. Improve both the quantity and quality of diets to increase worker’s productivity.

3. Provide a reserve of food in the receiving countries, to provide some relief during natural catastrophies.

4. Provide relief for the sick and aged.
In November 1961, the U.S. Foreign Assistance Program was reorganized and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was established. USAID, a semi-autonomous agency, is within the Department of State and headed by an Under Secretary of State. The Secretary of State has responsibility under Public Law 87-195 for the continuous supervision and general direction of foreign assistance programs, including the determination of whether or not there shall be a Military Assistance Program for a given country. Under the Secretary of State's supervision, the Administrator of USAID has primary responsibility for the administration of economic assistance and the Secretary of Defense exercises primary responsibility for the administration of military assistance.

54. MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (MAP)

The MAP supports those nations which can help the United States resist aggression in accordance with regional defense plans. MAP furnishes the material support required to resist aggression, maintain internal security, and participate in collective security arrangements. It also furnishes training assistance in the use and maintenance of materiel as well as in military tactics and operations. The United States normally shares the cost; however, material may be provided on a cost basis under the Mutual Security Military Sales Program. In this program, the United
States contracts for the procurement or transfer of materiel and services to other nations at their expense. Except in urgent cases, MAP discourages the buildup of forces beyond that level which the recipient nation could support after U.S. assistance ends.

55. RESPONSIBILITIES FOR MAP

Responsibilities for administration and implementation of MAP are:

a. Department of Defense. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs administers the program. His responsibilities include:

(1) Developing DOD positions, plans, and procedures.

(2) Determining requirements.

(3) Procuring, moving, and delivering military items.

(4) Supervising end-item use by recipients.

(5) Supervising the training of foreign military personnel.

(6) Budgeting.

(7) Planning, organizing, and monitoring the activities of Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG) and Missions.
b. **Director of Military Assistance.** The Director, Office of Military Assistance, reports directly to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs. He is charged with controlling and supervising the purely military aspects of the program.

c. **Joint Chiefs of Staff.** The Joint Chiefs of Staff advise the Secretary of Defense on military assistance matters. Such advice normally includes:

   (1) Recommending military objectives, the extent of equipment, and priorities for attainment.

   (2) Reviewing the consonance of military assistance with U.S. military strategy.

   (3) Recommending priorities of allocation among recipient nations.

   (4) Reviewing plans and programs submitted by the unified commands.

   (5) Reviewing manpower requirements for the MAAG's, to include nominations of individuals as chief, based upon the recommendations of the military departments.

d. **The Military Departments.** The principal responsibilities of the Army, Navy, and Air Force include:

   (1) Providing data required for the development of plans.
(2) Recommending changes to programs.

(3) Procuring and delivering items which are the supply responsibility of the service.

(4) Providing guidance and administrative support to the unified commands and the MAAG's in the appropriate areas.

e. Unified Commands. Unified commands have a major responsibility for military assistance planning in their respective areas. Within their geographical areas, the commanders of the unified commands:

(1) Correlate MAP plans with U.S. military plans.

(2) Supervise the development of recommended programs in accordance with the basic planning document for military assistance provided by the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs.

(3) Present and justify military assistance programs for their areas, under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, at all review levels, including the Congress.

(4) Perform normal supervisory and administrative support of the MAAG's in their areas.

56. COUNTRY TEAM

The U.S. country team is the informal title of a group of U.S. Government agencies which may be
established to help coordinate the activities of those agencies of a particular nation. The purpose of the country team is to provide the Ambassador with the combined knowledge and experience of all U.S. agencies, to coordinate U.S. programs, and to present a single U.S. position to the host country government.

a. **Supervision.** The Ambassador or senior diplomatic representative is in charge of the entire U.S. diplomatic mission and supervises all of its operations. The diplomatic mission includes representatives of all U.S. agencies, services, attaches, MAAG's, and other military components attached to it. The diplomatic mission does not include U.S. military forces operating in the field where such forces are under the command of a U.S. area military commander. In those cases where country teams have been established, they are under the authority of the Ambassador and he has the responsibility for decisions on matters considered by the country team.

b. **Composition.** The country team has no formal or fixed organization. It frequently includes the principal representatives of the various U.S. agencies operating in the nation. For example:

(1) The USAID Director who is responsible for the administration of economic aid programs.

(2) The USIA Director, who frequently has the title of Public Affairs Officer, is responsible for USIA activities.

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(3) The Chief of the MAAG. The MAAG is the military agency of the Department of Defense in-nation. The MAAG channel of authority usually runs from the MAAG chief to the Ambassador; although on purely military matters, channels from the MAAG to the commander of a unified command are used.

(4) Attaches:

(a) Military (may include Army, Navy, and Air Force, one of whom is designated defense attache).

(b) Representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission, Treasury Department, Coast and Geodetic Survey, etc.

(5) The Deputy Chief of Mission (who is the Ambassador's deputy) and the chief political and economic officers of the Embassy are also typically members of the country team.

57. MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS (MAAG)

MAAG denotes the U.S. military agency present in a host country which is responsible for MAP administration. Generally this agency is called a MAAG; however, it may be a Military Mission, a Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Military Assistance Command, or other designated agency, and in the absence of an agency, the military attache may accomplish the necessary functions.
a. Concept. The MAAG is a joint service group under the military command of a unified commander and representing the Secretary of Defense. In matters not strictly military, the U.S. Ambassador, as the President's personal representative, supervises the MAAG.

b. Authority for Establishment. MAAG's are established, upon request, after an agreement between the requesting nation and the United States has been mutually approved. The agreement is called "terms of agreement" and becomes the framework under which the MAAG operates. The terms of agreement contain such items as the primary mission of the MAAG, its general composition and size, and the responsibilities of the MAAG chief.

c. Mission. The overall mission of the MAAG is to administer U.S. military assistance programming and planning in the host country and to support the requirements of the country team. MAAG organizations will vary according to existing host country requirements.

(1) Logistical MAAG missions are:

(a) Programming receipt and distribution of MAP equipment, supplies, services, and training.

(b) Advising and monitoring the utilization, maintenance, and operation of equipment and supplies.
(2) Training MAAG missions are advising:

(a) An organization and training host country field troops.

(b) On establishment or reorganization of service and technical schools.

d. Organization. A MAAG normally includes Army, Navy, and Air Force elements, each having a chief who is responsible for that portion of the MAAG's mission involving his service. In a large MAAG, there are joint, general, and special staffs. If the MAAG has a training responsibility, it will also have an advisory group whose mission is to advise the host country military force on operational and training matters. The effectiveness of these advisors often determines the degree of success of the MAAG's mission.

e. Composition. The composition of the MAAG's vary with the size and composition of the host country's armed forces and are determined by the seriousness of the external or internal threats to the host government. The MAAG's are joint service agencies, and the chief of the MAAG may be a representative of any of the services represented.

58. MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS

Mobile training teams (MTT's) of U.S. personnel provide on-the-spot instruction in maintaining and operating specialized and complicated equipment
furnished under MAP; assist in establishing or improving administrative, maintenance, supply, and training systems; or provide advice and guidance in ID/D operations to include planning, civic action, populace and resources control, and other programs. Normally, these small-size teams (from 1 to 10 persons) provide initial instruction to selected groups of host country personnel who, in turn, train their fellow countrymen. The team, normally, may not be used as operating elements in the MAAG establishment or for operational equipment maintenance. They are dispatched on formal requests from a MAAG and are returned as soon as the training mission is accomplished. Their deployment, including travel, usually does not exceed 180 days.

59. CONTRACTOR TECHNICIANS

Contractor technicians, commonly called technical representatives, are specialists who are contracted from private industry by the U.S. Army. They provide instruction on standard and newly developed MAP-furnished equipment, train host country instructor cadres, and establish courses of instruction on specific equipment and systems. These technicians are usually assigned to host country installations where maintenance training is conducted.

60. MISSIONS OF MAAG IN ID/D OPERATIONS

Advisory assistance is rendered as appropriate during the establishment of host country intelligence organizations and in connection with their subsequent
operations. Host country military forces should be advised on and trained in their responsibilities and capabilities in the field of civil affairs, including military civic action. Advice concerning internal development is also provided to civil authorities by either military or civil agencies. MAAG and Mission advisors assist in establishing PSYOP capabilities within host country forces, augment the capabilities of USIS and other U.S. civil agencies, when needed, and assist in the development of national- and lower-level PSYOP programs. USAID and MAP assistance is provided to train, equip, and advise host country internal security forces. Advisory assistance is provided during the organizing and training of military forces and the planning and conducting of combat operations.

61. TRAINING PARAMILITARY FORCES

Assistance for organizing, equipping, and training paramilitary forces is provided through the MAP and USAID (for civil police). The MAAG or Mission in the host country provides and directs the advisory support effort involving MAP. Representatives of the USAID are responsible for supervising the assistance provided by USAID. Elements of a special action force (SAF) under the command of the MAAG, Mission, or other U.S. component furnish advisory personnel and MTT’s to advise, train, and provide operational assistance for paramilitary forces. In coordination with representatives of USAID, appropriate elements of the SAF are prepared to assist in the training of the civil police.
62. THE EMERGING INTERNAL DEFENSE AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT ROLE OF THE U.S. ARMY (STABILITY OPERATIONS)

   a. One of the most promising means of improving the effectiveness of the free world ID/D effort is through better planning, better coordination, and better control of the multiplicity of participating government, international, private, and religious agencies and groups. These agencies and groups, in pursuing their respective interests should take into consideration the interests of the United States and other free world nations. The United States and the free world nations can effectively marshal their forces for closer coordination of effort by realizing their common interests.

   b. It should not be inferred, however, that it is feasible or desirable to bring all of these diverse agencies and groups under the control of any one supra-national agency. Too much control can be frustrating, just as the lack of adequate direction and coordination can render well-meaning efforts ineffectual. The optimum balance between centralization and decentralization must be sought.

   c. The question arises as to the extent that U.S. Army personnel should participate in ID/D planning. The answer to this question will vary from country-to-country, depending primarily on U.S. interest and objectives and the extent to which a nation is threatened.
d. An additional factor that effects the degree of U.S. Army participation is the growing intensity of the "cold war" with the initiation and conduct of "wars of national liberation" as in the Republic of Vietnam. As this trend continues, the U.S. Government is required to use all of its resources more fully. The U.S. military forces not only represent a major segment of these resources, but they have capabilities and resources that civilian agencies lack. General Decker, while Army Chief of Staff, described these capabilities, saying:

"I believe that military units are most appropriate because they have the training, the necessary equipment, and above all, the self-contained ability to sustain themselves and to function in any environment, however primitive or dangerous. Moreover, in the many areas involved, there is currently an associated military problem of one kind or another."

e. Military personnel must be prepared to discharge not only present responsibilities of the military forces but also any new responsibilities likely to be assigned them in the foreseeable future. The implementation of U.S. and free world strategy should be a well-coordinated team effort with responsibilities being assigned to the agency best equipped and best qualified for each specific program or task.
f. In many situations, military personnel, as members of the coordinated country team effort, may find that they are expected to fully participate in proposing, planning, reviewing, and evaluating countrywide ID/D programs.

g. Secretary McNamara, on 18 May 1966, stated publicly what has become increasingly apparent to authoritative circles both within and outside of our government—in essence he said that the military services, in fact, all agencies of government can no longer be content with winning wars. They must become fully engaged in the process of preventing war. Most underdeveloped nations do not have the resources to defend themselves while developing. If they request assistance, the United States along with other “free world nations” respond to the request with two categories of assistance involving the military. The categories mentioned by Secretary McNamara were: first, the maintenance of a protective shield behind which development can go forward and the second was assistance through civic action. He said this meant assistance in all “fields of endeavor such as education, health, sanitation, agriculture, and public works—indeed anything connected with economic or social progress.”

h. Military personnel must be fully aware of the legal basis for and restrictions on military forces engaging in civil assistance. The following excerpts from the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 are quoted for guidance:
(1) Section 505 (b) establishes the basic authority for military forces to provide assistance:

"To the extent feasible and consistent with other purposes of this part, the use of military forces in less developed friendly countries in the construction of public works and other activities helpful to economic development shall be encouraged.

(2) Section 622 (b) defines the responsibilities of the chiefs of diplomatic missions (usually the Ambassadors):

"The President shall prescribe appropriate procedures to assure coordination among representatives of the United States Government in each country, under the leadership of the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission. The chief of the diplomatic mission shall make sure that recommendations of such representatives pertaining to military assistance are coordinated with political and economic considerations, and his comments shall accompany such recommendations if he so desires."

(3) Section 622 (c) established the responsibility of the Secretary of State for supervising and directing the assistance programs.
i. Military personnel must also be fully aware that other agencies share a great responsibility in helping to provide a "protective shield." The protective shield is evolved from political, economic, social, psychological, and military sources of power. When applied from within, or in behalf of, a host country, it is a joint and combined function shared by all agencies according to their authority, capability, and plans. The military shares similarly in the internal development function.

63. OTHER UNITED STATES INTERNAL DEFENSE/DEVELOPMENT PLANNING AGENCIES

a. Department of State (Diplomatic Mission). At the host country level, the U.S. Ambassador or the principal U.S. diplomatic officer is the chief of the diplomatic mission and of the U.S. country team. He is responsible for ensuring that all U.S. political, economic, and military assistance programs in the nation to which he is accredited are fully integrated and coordinated. Although not in the line of military command, he works closely with the military commander of the U.S. or specified command to ensure a full exchange of information. Coordination of all U.S. effort in the host country is accomplished through the country team.

b. The U.S. Agency for International Development. USAID missions are the operational elements of USAID deployed in foreign nations to provide economic assistance. Offices of USAID usually operate at, and from, the various population centers of the host country. The
activities of USAID missions are closely coordinated with those of the U.S. Information Service (USIS). The director of USAID is directly responsible to AID in Washington, D.C., but he is a member of the country team, and his activities in the host country are coordinated by the chief of the diplomatic mission. The USAID representative in the host country is responsible for all economic aid, and advising and assisting in civilian construction projects, improvement of agricultural techniques, currency stability, and all other nation-building functions. Additionally, USAID representatives are charged with overall responsibility for aiding and advising in development of the national police force. In this capacity they may require and be provided assistance from U.S. military personnel, especially when the police forces have paramilitary characteristics. The U.S. military assistance and advisory effort and the USAID effort must be closely coordinated and must complement one another. During the organization and training of host country paramilitary forces, for example, USAID might concurrently establish a village farm cooperative and furnish special assistance to the village in the absence of the male population. When planning the construction of roads, bridges, boat landing ramps, and other projects of an essentially military nature, consideration should be given to the functional design and construction to permit use by the civilian populace as well as the military. Coordination with USAID should be effected for the adequate care of refugees, aid to damaged villages, and provision of food supplies when shortages result from military operations. In each instance, maximum use should be
made of host country military and civilian leadership, with the U.S. representatives providing advice, assistance, and support.

c. **The U.S. Information Agency.** This agency is referred to, in-country, as USIS and operates in foreign countries in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives. Within the U.S. Government and in U.S. missions abroad, USIS personnel are the principal U.S. advisors on all aspects of communication with foreign mass audiences and with preselected target groups. Through the use of public media, personal contact, and cultural and educational exchanges, USIS attempts to ensure that U.S. actions and motivations will be better understood and supported. In the internal defense effort, USIS furnishes equipment and technical assistance to the host country government to facilitate and foster closer communication and understanding between the host country government and the people. In developing contested areas, it provides the information support for U.S. economic and military assistance programs. As an example of these operations USIS teams, equipped with mobile record playing and motion picture equipment and accompanied by representatives from the host country government, will frequently visit rural areas to provide entertainment and information services to farmers and tribesmen. When military PSYOP and civil affairs teams coordinate and combine with USIS on these missions, the chances for the attainment of the host country and U.S. objectives in that area are increased.
d. The U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy. The mission of the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy is to train, advise, and assist the air force and navy of the host country in consonance with the U.S. Military Assistance Program. The U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy elements are part of the U.S. MAAG and function under the chief of the MAAG in the same manner as other MAAG elements.

e. Relationships with Nonmilitary Agencies. The primary requirement for successful operations is unity of action at all echelons of U.S. civilian and military representation in the host country.

64. U.S. ARMY ROLE IN PLANNING STABILITY OPERATIONS

a. Preventing Insurgencies. All ID/D operations are conducted within the framework of the host country’s national ID/D plan which specifies the concepts, objectives, organization of forces, resources, and broad implementation methods. The province, state, district, local area, and community plans are based on the national ID/D plan and contain the specific tactics and techniques to be employed by all host country agencies in the conduct of operations within specific priority areas. Stability operations are the U.S. Army’s military responsibilities undertaken in support of the host country plans to provide for restoration of security in order that the other agencies may perform their functions in a secure environment. An example of such a military operation is the Organization of American
States Operation in the Dominican Republic in 1965. Military forces, as an instrument of civil authority, may also be required to perform other tasks associated with the three ID/D programs of counterguerrilla operations, P&RC, and internal development.

b. **Defeating Active Insurgency.**

(1) Once an insurgency is organized and implemented, conventional military forces may clear designated zones within the selected areas employing any or all of the three military campaigns: strike, consolidation, and remote area operations. Strike campaigns are aimed at the destruction of the insurgents' "strategic bases," forces, and resources. Consolidation campaigns (CONOP) are aimed at eliminating all insurgents from the area, restoring law and order, and developing the environment of the area being recovered. Remote area campaigns are conducted with the primary purpose of denying remote area human resources to the insurgent and interrupting his communications and supply lines from contiguous areas.

(2) As the strength of the insurgent force is reduced within a zone, the conventional military force may be deployed to another zone or continue with the security mission. If the conventional force is deployed to another zone, the paramilitary and police forces assume responsibility for security operations in the cleared zones. Eventually, the security situation should be within the capability of the normal police force.
(3) After a zone has been cleared, restoration of administrative and political elements and P&RC programs become the primary operations. For example, in Vietnam, revolutionary development teams along with police, military, and paramilitary forces are deployed into the cleared zones to perform these operations. Later, after the zone has been secured, internal development programs become the primary operation. Appropriate civic action projects are continued with varying degrees of intensity throughout all phases, with immediate- and high-impact projects undertaken early in the security phase, and the longer range projects in the developing phase.

c. As the three host country ID/D programs of internal development, P&RC, and counterguerrilla operations are implemented, the U.S. Army, when employed, will be involved, to varying degrees, in one or more of its six stability operations roles: intelligence, PSYOP, advisory assistance, P&RC, tactical operations, and civil affairs/civic action. Plans are required for effective coordinated participation in these roles.
CHAPTER 4

ROLE OF THE U.S. ARMY IN AN ACTIVE INSURGENCY

65. GENERAL

There are three major types of campaigns conducted to accomplish national objectives in programs of ID/D. They are consolidation, strike, and remote area operations. General guidance for planning these campaigns is produced at national level where priorities for support are established. Detailed planning and implementation is normally accomplished at district level.

66. CONSOLIDATION CAMPAIGN

a. Purpose. A combined military--civil ID/D effort in the consolidation campaign is concentrated in a high priority area experiencing overt insurgency and committed to the accomplishment of the following objectives:

(1) Create a secure environment in the area.

(2) Establish firm governmental control of the population and the area.

(3) Win the population's willing support of, and participation in, the government's programs.
b. Concept of the Operation.

(1) General.

(a) No area or territory of a nation which has once been subjected to the organizational efforts of a subversive insurgent movement can be really won back until:

1. The insurgents have been cleared from the area.

2. The insurgent's organization and its infrastructure of support have been neutralized or eliminated.

3. A governmental infrastructure of support, to which the local populace is committed, has been established to replace that of the insurgents.

(b) The commander responsible for the ID/D operation in a top priority area is allocated a military force clearly superior to any insurgent military forces known or suspected to be in the area or immediately available in an adjacent area.

(c) The operation can be considered in four or more general phases and as many stages as required in each phase.

1. Preparation: inventory, assessment, and planning.
2 Offensive: the establishment of the necessary degree of physical and psychological security to permit unobstructed and sustained progress towards the objectives of clear and hold, free from insurgent violence, and intimidation.

3 Developing: the (re-) establishment of governmental control.

4 Consolidation: consolidation, reconstruction, and rehabilitation.

(2) Phase I: Preparation. During this phase, the following major actions occur:

(a) Delineation of the area to undergo consolidation.

(b) Designation of chain of command.

(c) Formulation of concept of operation.

(d) Collection of data and information (inventory).

(e) Estimate of resource requirements (assessment).

(f) Preparation of ID/D operation plan. Examples of considerations to be found in this plan are:
1 Emergency legislation.

2 Key points for defense.

3 Police force and other paramilitary units.

4 Joint training with police, paramilitary, and civil administrative authorities.

5 Registration and identity cards.

6 Language and area specialists.

7 Government representation.

8 Fire fighting units.

9 Essential public services.

10 Legal aspects in using armed forces.

(3) Phase II: offensive operations.

(a) Objectives are to:

1 Deny the insurgent organization, including insurgent terrorists and military forces, the capability to function in the area.

2 Establish the physical presence of government military forces throughout the area.
forces; and the establishment of a communications system tying the area into a larger security communications network.

8 A progressively greater diversion of the effort of some of the government military forces to civic action.

9 Graduated effort to develop a national consciousness among the people of the area, and rapport between the government and the people.

10 Firm governmental control over the area and its people cannot mean repression. The objective must be willing identification of the people with the objectives of government. The means to this end are community development and self-defense through which the people are involved in working toward objectives that they themselves set, and then defending—with the firm support of government forces—their work against insurgent depredation.

11 Start building a "grass roots" political base by conducting elections at the local level with the ultimate objective of a political system that is responsible to the needs of the people.

12 Recruit covert and overt sources of information from among the population.

(5) Phase IV: consolidation operations.
combat action; but combat action can result in leaving it unprotected, thus making its identification and destruction possible by P&RC forces.

4 P&RC forces introduce surveillance and restrictive measures in a graduated program of government control over the population and the area in order to:

a Sever the relationship between the guerrilla forces and the insurgent supporting and directing organization.

b Identify and neutralize or eradicate the insurgent organization within the population.

c Provide a physical and psychological environment of security within the population free from fear of reprisal through guerrilla violence or insurgent terrorism.

(4) Phase III: developing operations:

(a) Objectives are to:

1 Establish firm governmental control over the area and the people of the area.

2 Develop local capability for area security.

3 Replace the insurgent political apparatus by one of the government's own.
(b) Concept.

1 Designation and allocation of area troops for continuous offensive counterguerrilla operations.

2 Introduction of elements of other agencies of government, as the area is made secure, and the resources to back up these agencies' work.

3 Thorough population screening to determine insurgent elements and to uncover local leadership.

4 Thorough area assessment or survey, in conjunction with local leadership, to determine precise and current needs, resources, etc., of the area.

5 Motivation of the population so that they come to the point of wanting to reconstruct their area and to defend the rehabilitated area against attack by insurgent forces.

6 As part of this motivation, the offer of governmental help, if the people show themselves willing to work on reconstruction, as they have planned it, and to defend what they have done.

7 The training of local self-defense forces to include arming them and involving them in one or more successful operations against insurgent
Establish firm security in the area under the protective shield of government troops.

(b) Concept.

1 Initial operations by counterguerrilla tactical forces will be a combination of offensive operations (saturation patrolling, area ambushes, area denial operations) and “reaction operations.”

2 These counterguerrilla operations must not be considered as “seizure of terrain,” “assaults,” or “man-hunts.” The movement of government forces into a populated area, and within the area once it is occupied, will be quiet and friendly unless intelligence indicates the presence of superior insurgent military forces.

3 Counterguerrilla forces clear the insurgent guerrilla forces from the area by driving them out or destroying them. As long as the insurgent politico-administrative apparatus for building, organizing, and directing local population support remains intact, however, it may be used—among other services it performs—to fill up or replace guerrilla units which have suffered losses or have been destroyed. This apparatus, or a substantial part of it, must remain in place and, therefore, constitutes a static or relatively fixed target. Accordingly, the dismantling or destruction of the apparatus of support should be a prime target of ID/D operations. It cannot be neutralized or destroyed by counterguerrilla forces.
(a) Objectives are to:

1. Turn primary responsibility for local security and government over to the local population.

2. Maintain an atmosphere of complete security.

3. Continue the local reconstruction effort.

4. Continue the development of national consciousness.

(b) Concept:

1. Redeployment of the bulk of governmental military forces for operations in an adjacent or other high priority area.

2. Maintenance of a firm capability by government military forces to support the local defense effort in the event of raids by insurgent forces.

3. Further development of the process of community development and the extension of national internal development programs into the area.

4. Continued emphasis on the development of rapport between the government and the
people of the area through the mechanism of popularly supported and responsive local self-government.

(6) Summary.

(a) The overall objective of a consolidation campaign (local ID/D operation) is to establish rapport between the national government and the people of the area and to establish government control over the area. The establishment of a protective shield of security in the area, as well as the military offensive operations that this may entail, is a necessary step toward this end.

(b) A consolidation operation is a long-term process for which no fixed number of days or months can be allocated for any single phase of the operation in any given area. A government facing an overt insurgency may have to think in terms of years in the application of the local ID/D technique to achieve a slow but sure expansion of control over the country.

67. THE STRIKE CAMPAIGN

a. Purpose. The strike campaign is conducted to find, fix, and destroy insurgent forces and their strategic area supply bases. It is characterized by highly mobile offensive tactical operations usually in areas beyond the capability of the provinces.

b. Concepts. Strike operations are conducted to destroy or harass the insurgent and are largely conducted in remote or contested areas. Strike forces will not normally remain in any area to hold terrain.

68. THE REMOTE AREA CAMPAIGN

a. Purpose. The remote area campaign is conducted to:

(1) Establish islands of resistance in insurgent-infected areas.

(2) Reclaim minority groups for the host country.

(3) Deny the insurgent human and material resources.

b. Concepts. Remote ethnic groups are contacted, operational bases established, recruitment conducted, training accomplished, units for resistance established, and control over the area ensured through local leadership.

c. Organization. Local operational units may be established through recruitment, training, indoctrination, and full use of total leadership. The forces organized should be incorporated into host country forces.

d. Operations. Remote area operations are similar to consolidation operations and the same concepts and principles of operation apply. U.S. Army Special Forces are particularly well suited for this role (FM 31-23, Stability Operations - U.S. Army Doctrine).