CHAPTER 5

FUNDAMENTAL PLANNING TASKS

69. AREA ASSESSMENT

Establishment of an ID/D Plan requires a deliberate and detailed assessment of the area concerned. The area assessment is a means of bringing up-to-date the area and background studies of a nation and presenting those aspects of greatest pertinence to an internal security (or insurgent) problem. Once the area assessment is completed it is followed by the national intelligence estimate of the insurgent situation (see appendix III) and an estimate of the national ID/D situation (see appendix IV).

70. FEATURES OF AREA ASSESSMENT

The area assessment considers the features below in terms applicable to internal security:

a. **Geography.** Location, size, external relationships, significant characteristics, military or political regions, coasts, soils, water sources, vegetation, and geographic effects on population.

b. **Climate.** General weather conditions, meteorological services, weather with relation to military operations or government programs, and effects of weather on the population.
c. Economy. (Discussion of principal factors).

(1) General: General characteristics of the economy, its energy, and its raw material base; its development and the framework of the government policy within which it operates; gross national product; skills and distribution of the labor forces; trends and historic external influences; goals, programs, and fulfillment prospects; consumer interests; and foreign trade.

(2) Agriculture: Internal food supply; industrial crops; market system; influence of climate, terrain, and government policy; production methods; improvement programs; and strengths and weaknesses.

(3) Raw materials: Reserves, productions, processing, and distribution.

(4) Commerce and industry: Nature and capacity of industrial enterprises; power sources, government policy toward, degree of industry directed toward improving the internal economic situation, production incentives, trade balance, and practices.

(5) Finance: Finance structure and operation, government policies, tax structure, debts, and banking system.

(6) Transportation and telecommunications: Rail, highway, inland waterway, ports, merchant
marine, civil air, telecommunications, characteristics, development, administration and control, government policies, schools and training, and significance on the economy.

(7) Labor: Manpower resources, use of labor force, influence in government, planning and control, working conditions, management and labor relations, problems, and legislation.

(8) Recapitulation of factors in the economic situation significant to insurgent growth.

d. Sociology. Discussion of principal factors to include value judgements in the society.

(1) Population: Significant details; size; composition, distribution, structure, trends, and movement of ethnic groups; problems and government policies; physical and social characteristics; language; national outlook and attitude; social structure; social values and patterns; family and group relations; cultural homogeneity or complexity; areas of friction; and customs and traditions.

(2) Religion: Role in society and relation to government, principal faiths, and value judgements present in the society as a result of religious teachings.

(3) Public information: Media of mass communication and significant characteristics.
(4) Education: Main characteristics; state, church, and private involvement.

(5) Health and sanitation: Attitudes and environmental factors; diseases of man and animals; administration of public health; medical programs and organization; medical personnel, research, facilities, and training; supplies.

(6) Welfare: Levels of living and social welfare legislation, public and private aid and services, and social problems.

(7) Recapitulation of factors in the sociological situation significant to growth of insurgency.

e. Politics. (Discussion of principal factors):

(1) Present political system: Constitutional background, where applicable; regulation of the nation in theory and practice; pattern of government; civil and religious rights; constitutional provisions with relation to economic, social, and military matters; organizational systems regionally; judicial system; bureaucracy; administrative districts; dependencies and associated states; historical external political influences; public administration; nepotism; and corruption.

(2) Political dynamics: Salient features of the system, stability and social tensions, leadership, political awareness among populace, political parties,
electoral procedures, pressure groups, and external influences.

(3) Public order and safety: Police and penal systems; facilities; honesty and efficiency of police; criminal codes and procedures; civil defense; use of national police, constabulary, gendarmerie, and other police or paramilitary forces (with essentially a police mission), to include qualitative aspects; conscription or recruitment systems; international agreements; legal basis; economic basis (to include appropriations system); position of forces in national and local government structure; general organization, training, doctrine, and efficiency; rapport with population; and state of internal security and public order.

(4) Military forces: Qualitative aspects; conscription or recruitment systems; international agreements; legal basis; economic basis (to include appropriations system); position of forces in national and local government structure; general organization, training, doctrine and efficiency; rapport with population, and role in internal security.

(5) National policies: Government approach to national and international problems, trends, major issues, foreign relations, foreign investment, defense policy, and public support of national policies.

(6) Intelligence, security, and propaganda: Intelligence agencies; effectiveness and methods of operation; security practices; propaganda themes,
targets, and effectiveness; propaganda for foreign countries.

(7) Recapitulation of factors in the political situation significant to growth of insurgency.

f. Present External Influences and Interests in Country.

(1) United States: Organizations and resources of governmental agencies; programs; U.S. military programs, resources, and capabilities; commercial enterprises and their resources; factors limiting effectiveness of U.S. effort.

(2) Free world (except U.S.): Significant governmental aid programs, commercial interests, and extent to which they can and will support reform programs.

(3) International: Capabilities and efforts of international organization, religious missionary programs of private nonprofit organizations.

(4) Communist influences and programs: Party structure and other instruments for implementing policy; the extent of, and reasons for, their success; infiltration of government (especially police and armed forces); influence in economic planning; influence in labor and agrarian movements, and
infiltration and exploitation of other groups and movements.

71. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE OF THE INSURGENT SITUATION

Following the area assessment a primary responsibility of the national intelligence agency is the preparation of a timely and accurate estimate of the insurgent situation. This national intelligence estimate must be prepared early and is an ever constant and continuing action. It is subject for revision as long as the potential for an insurgency exists. This estimate should forewarn any government of impending danger and further identify the conditions which are the sources of, and which become the cause of, discontent. It should expose the insurgency in its formative stage and should estimate the insurgent’s power or magnitude and its most probable course of action. The earlier the potential for insurgency is discovered, the quicker the programs to prevent it can be planned and implemented. Once there is an active insurgency, the estimate is concerned with the insurgent’s progress toward his objective of taking over the government, and with the legal government’s progress toward winning the support of the people. It is, in fact, an estimate concerned with who is winning. A format of the national intelligence estimate of the insurgent situation may be found in appendix III.

72. ESTIMATE OF THE INTERNAL DEFENSE AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT SITUATION

The estimate of the national ID/D situation determines and analyzes those factors brought out in
the area assessment and the intelligence estimate of the insurgent situation which will influence the government's choice of counteraction as well as those which will affect the capabilities of the insurgents. All areas, to include geography, economy, sociology, and political, are analyzed. A complete and thorough analysis is also made of the insurgent's and the government's capabilities. Courses of action, which, if successful, will defeat the insurgent movement are formulated considering the main programs of counter-guerrilla operations, internal development, and P&RC. Each course of action is analyzed against the insurgent's capabilities, and the advantages and disadvantages of each is weighed with respect to the governing factors. The end result of the estimate is the decision as to which course of action for each major program the government will pursue in its effort to prevent or defeat an insurgency. See appendix IV for format.

73. INTERNAL DEFENSE PLAN

The internal defense plan is prepared by the U.S. country team. It describes in considerable detail the objectives and methods to be followed by the country team in assisting the host country. This plan is the primary planning tool upon which to base planning assistance and not only includes national development assistance, but also the internal defense aspects of U.S. assistance. Assistance in support of internal defense planning involves the development of internal security and intelligence campaign plans. (Refer to U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy Directive (Classified) for additional information and format.)
74. NATIONAL INTERNAL DEFENSE AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN

The national ID/D plan is developed by the government of the host country for preventing or defeating an insurgency and achieving internal stability. The plan contains the three main ID/D programs: internal development (national development and community development programs, including civic action), P&RC, and counterguerrilla operations.

75. NATIONAL INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN

The national internal development plan is originated by the host country government. It is the plan for attaining political, economic, sociological, and psychological objectives. In some nations, it is little more than a budget. In other nations it may be a detailed, long-range plan, and the prescribed responsibility of the various ministries, departments, or commissions. The policy of the United States is to stimulate and respond to sound national development originated by the host country government rather than to force a prepared U.S. plan on a reluctant government. In some nations, where there is a severe shortage of qualified professional personnel, host country officials may request U.S. civilian and military personnel to provide detailed assistance to the host country in preparing the national development plan.

76. NATIONAL POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL PLAN

Prepared at host country government level, the national P&RC plan establishes the need for controls,
the degree of intensity in application of the controls, the methods employed which may be most successful, and when they may be relaxed. It is vital to assess, influence, regulate, and control the activities, attitudes, customs, and habits of the people. Resources control requires the identification of critical commodities, their origin, and methods of distribution.

77. NATIONAL MILITARY PLAN

The national military plan is a primary area of planning for the host country with assistance from U.S. military personnel when required. The military plan is based on the knowledge of the insurgent threat, operational environment, national objectives, policy and strategy, organization for internal defense, and other national plans. No matter what degree the intensity of the threat, military plans must be projected to first prevent the escalation of the threat, and secondly to deal with the escalated threat. To be effective the planning cannot merely react to insurgent intensities but must anticipate them.

78. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PLAN

The national intelligence plan is the base upon which other ID/D plans are built. The utilization of all intelligence resources is the key to all ID/D efforts. An effective intelligence plan ensures that all intelligence and supporting resources are applied in a coordinated effort to the attainment of all national objectives.
A detailed national PSYOP plan is prepared at government level and phased to increase in intensity as the population begins to feel the effects of successful ID/D operations. The PSYOP plan ensures that the psychological information resources of the host country, the United States, and other free world nations are allocated properly and establishes priorities to support the national political, economic, and social development programs as well as internal security, intelligence, and military campaigns of the internal defense programs.
CHAPTER 6
DEVELOPMENT OF PLANS AND PROGRAMS

Section I. INTERNAL DEFENSE AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT PREVENTIVE PLANS

80. INTRODUCTION

A basic principle of ID/D doctrine is that an insurgency is best prevented rather than allowed to grow into a full-scale movement wherein drastically greater effort is required to restore security. In many developing nations, a state of latent or incipient insurgency exists within an environmental framework of real or marginally unsatisfactory political, economic, social, and psychological conditions. ID/D programs, to preclude or alleviate these conditions, stress those matters directly affecting the population with particular attention to progressive internal development and improvement of the environment.

81. PROGRAM FOR PREVENTION OF INSURGENCY

A preventive program, which should be carefully phased over an extended period, is a modification of the program required in a full-scale, active insurgent situation and generally contains the following factors:

a. Program Objectives.

   (1) Eliminate potential for insurgency.

   (2) Effect political, economic, sociological, and psychological improvement.
b. Measures to Prevent Insurgency Include:

1. Political reform to eliminate unrest.

2. Economic, psychological, and social actions to improve way of life.

3. Intelligence programs.

4. Psychological and information programs.

5. Strengthening of police and security services.

6. Identification and neutralization of insurgent underground apparatus.

7. Organization of CMAC.

8. Organization and training of paramilitary forces.

9. Reorientation of regular military forces for ID/D operations.

c. Planning Tasks.

1. General: An initial requirement is the establishment of a NIDCC or similar national agency designed to enhance ID/D capabilities and monitor the potential insurgent situation. Plans are also made to establish ACC's and CMAC's at all echelons.
(2) Populace and resources control: A program of overall control is devised and employed to root out and eliminate discontented elements of a militant character. Checks and restrictions are used to prevent traffic in weapons and other critical contraband and prevent supply buildup by discontented elements. Large-scale population movement is prevented, and meetings and gatherings are regulated. Intelligence efforts are intensified to ensure the early detection of the indicators denoting the development of an insurgent underground organization. Intelligence and communications systems are unified or closely coordinated among all forces and agencies. ACC's and CMAC's are established. Police agencies are unified and closely coordinated with the gendarmerie or other forces that provide the main reserve for large-scale police action. Military forces are used only in the event of an emergency.

(3) Program of internal development (IDEV):

(a) Phase I--preparatory (preparation phase):

1 Stage A: A NIDCC at national level is formed; overall objectives are determined; broad concept of program is devised.

2 Stage B. Planning groups are formed at national and regional levels; field surveys are initiated to determine detailed goals, targets, and projects; programs are published; priorities are established.

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Stage C: Organization and orientation of forces; delegation of missions; channels of coordination are established among government agencies and participating civil agencies; project boards are established for programming at various levels of operation; channels of communication and liaison are established at all levels; advance project information is published for benefit of population (see psychological operations, section VII, chapter 2).

(b) Phase II—establishment of field operations (offensive phase): Field (local) headquarters are established at the community level; community contacts are made; local procurement is affected; logistical buildup is completed; forces report for assignments; monitoring boards are appointed; and an efficient reports, review, and analysis system is implemented.

(c) Phase III—initiation of work (offensive phase): Action begins on projects; monitoring boards keep track of progress, recommending changes in program as required; initially, a brief period of short-range, high-impact projects are undertaken to gain the attention and good will of the population; however, main efforts are soon shifted to medium- and long-range projects with initial accent on those of direct benefit to the population.

(d) Phase IV—maximum program effort (development phase): Main emphasis is on medium- and long-range projects of direct benefit to population with final effort in this phase shifting, as required, to projects of indirect benefit to the population; all
capabilities used to maximum extent; full participation by the population.

(e) Phase V—establishment of routine operations (consolidation phase): Program concentrates on long-range projects of indirect, immediate benefit to the population but of increased value in the progressive building of sound national economic and sociological bases; some short-range projects are executed to maintain local good will as required; civil (government) agencies assume main responsibility for support of the program.

82. CONSIDERATIONS IN PLANNING FOR INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT

a. General. A program of IDEV provides a vehicle to improve economic, social, and psychological conditions and to promote political stability in the developing nations. Thus, the government gains and maintains the allegiance and loyalty of the people and the insurgents are deprived of population support.

b. Planning and Organization.

(1) General: The need for IDEV plans is widespread in the developing nations. The concept of national development planning is supported by the U.S. Government as being necessary for the proper and rapid development of these nations.

(2) Planning in mixed economies: Factors pertinent to planning in mixed economies are:

(a) Recognition of relationship between public and private sectors.
(b) Analysis of obligatory actions which will present guides for government decisions and voluntary actions which will give an estimate of the effect of private decision.

(c) Participation of nongovernmental personnel, organizations, and groups in the planning process.

(3) Components of IDEV planning:

(a) Defining purposes of development:

1 Objectives.

2 Goals.

3 Targets.

(b) Determination of actual and potential resources.

(c) Selection of means to mobilize resources so as to achieve goals and targets.

(d) Formulation of programs as components of the plan to include:

1 Organization.

2 Administrative relationships.

3 Responsibilities and roles of agencies.

4 Relationship to national budget.

5 Progress and evaluation reports.

6 Selection and training of personnel.
(4) Functions of IDEV planning: The major functions of IDEV planning are:

(a) Inventory: The collection, recording, and analysis of data on social and institutional forces and human and material resources.

(b) Assessment: A dynamic survey of the political, economic, social, cultural, and psychological forces stimulating or obstructing development.

(c) Projection: The projection of targets and trends and relationships, present and future, among the various problems, obstacles, and other factors and sectors of development.

(d) Strategy: The evaluation of alternative choices, the impact of each alternative on the many interrelated political, economic, and social factors, and the determination of clear statements of objectives.

(5) Illusions and misunderstandings: To correct popular illusions and misunderstandings about IDEV planning, it is emphasized that:

(a) Planning cannot be left exclusively to technicians.

(b) Centralizing planning in one agency or at one level of government is not always the most desirable method.

(c) Public planning cannot be divorced from private planning.
(d) Successful planning is not assured by major dependence upon outside consultants.

(e) Tighter public controls are not necessarily needed for successful planning.

(6) Organization considerations:

(a) The central planning function has been located in such places as: under the finance ministry, in separate advisory council, and in an agency in the office of the chief executive.

(b) The planning unit must have adequate authority, influence, prestige, and the support of the chief executive and other agencies.

(c) Government organizations. Experience indicates that governments, in order to promote an IDEV program, may have to create and operate public organizations such as:

2. Industrial Development Company.
3. Housing Corporation.
5. Ports Authority.
8. Transportation Authority.
a. **Introduction.** As was noted in section II, chapter 2, civic action can perform a useful role in national socioeconomic development as well as seeking to gain the loyalty of the people for their government and their active support of measures taken by the government to combat dissidence. It was pointed out by President Kennedy, in December 1961, that “In countries where subversion or external attack is less imminent, selected host country military forces can contribute substantially to economic and social development, and such contributions can be a major function of these forces.”

b. **Potential of Military for Civic Action.** The fields in which the military can most effectively aid in IDEV are enumerated in section I, chapter 2. The characteristics below are typical of the military in many developing nations. They suggest ways to make effective use of the military in IDEV.

(1) The officers in most cases exceed their civilian counterparts in administrative skill. In many nations, military officers are used to establish new government administrative agencies or to revamp inefficient organizations.

(2) The level of technical skill is usually greater among professional military personnel than among the population as a whole. They have been exposed to technology, logistics, and training in modern organizations. This training gives the military man a modern
outlook which is often not an outstanding characteristic of the civilian elite.

(3) The military, since it represents a force in being, is responsive to the direction of the national government and can be employed in remote areas where it would be extremely difficult to recruit a civilian organization.

(4) The military provides direct representation by the national government, and the use of uniformed military personnel portrays to the people the interest of the national government.


(1) As general guidance, civic action planners should: achieve a thorough knowledge of the nation or area of operations; coordinate with government agencies having responsibilities in the area; study available development plans and reports of past or present programs; interview people in the area to learn the customs of the people as well as their economic problems; be especially alert to note possible reasons for dissatisfaction with the government; and become familiar with the troop dispositions within the area and note civil-military relations.

(2) The information obtained in (1) above, will reveal areas in the economic and social structure that need improvement. These areas are analyzed to determine possible courses of corrective action that can
be undertaken as civic action projects. For instance, if the initial area assessment of a region revealed a literacy rate of 10-15 percent, it can be assumed that educational help is required. In order to determine necessary corrective action in this instance, the answers to the following or similar questions would be required:

(a) Are there compulsory attendance laws?
(b) Are there prescribed curricula?
(c) Is education a local or national effort?
(d) Is there a school budget?
(e) Are teachers available?
(f) Are teaching materials available?
(g) How many school-age children are there?
(h) What facilities exist?
(i) Is the area secure?
(j) What is the attitude of the populace toward education?
(k) What is the social structure?
(l) What are the immediate needs?
(m) What agencies are concerned?
(3) From the answers to questions such as those above, possible courses of action may be determined. These possible courses of action must be analyzed to determine their value. The sample civic action work sheet (see figure 1) demonstrates one method by which this may be accomplished. The left column of the work sheet includes the broad classification under consideration. The next column shows proposed courses of action. Succeeding columns to the right indicate questions that must be answered by yes or no and should indicate the desirability, feasibility, or justification for each course of action. This work sheet may be varied to fit local situations.

(4) Those courses of action which are determined to be feasible, desirable, and justified will form the basis for the civic action plan.

84. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

An intensive PSYOP program will be executed in conjunction with all phases of the preventive program. A detailed national PSYOP program is prepared. This program will be phased to increase in intensity as the population begins to feel the main effects of the national and community development and civic action programs.

85. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Intelligence capabilities are unified and coordinated to the maximum degree possible. If necessary, special action is taken to establish a centralized intelligence system for maximum efficiency. Special
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remarks</th>
<th>Feasibility</th>
<th>Desirability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Can the project be supported by local resources?</td>
<td>Will it solve the problem?</td>
<td>Will it improve relations between local and national?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there a satisfactory level of support?</td>
<td>Will it attract population support?</td>
<td>Will it create employment for local residents?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are there any potential risks or drawbacks?</td>
<td>Will it improve national security?</td>
<td>Will it be sustainable in the long term?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will other government agencies support the project?</td>
<td>Is it feasible within the budget constraints?</td>
<td>Will it promote local economic development?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will it have a positive impact on the local community?</td>
<td>Is it implementable within the timeframe?</td>
<td>Will it be easily adopted by the population?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will it conform to local customs and traditions?</td>
<td>Is it technically feasible?</td>
<td>Will it be adaptable to local conditions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will it avoid serious interference with other projects?</td>
<td>Is it cost-effective?</td>
<td>Will it be sustainable in the long term?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will it provide maximum return on investment and effort?</td>
<td>Is it environmentally friendly?</td>
<td>Will it contribute to the stabilization of society?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does it conform to local customs and traditions?</td>
<td>Is it politically feasible?</td>
<td>Will it be accepted by the population?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Complete by indicating affirmative or negative response with detailed explanatory notes attached.
counterintelligence operations are conducted to detect and neutralize any attempts to develop an insurgent underground organization.

86. MILITARY PREVENTIVE MEASURES

Military forces are employed to provide strength in depth to the police in P&RC activities. The military may assist in establishing frontier operations such as border control measures to prevent outside traffic in arms or supplies to potential insurgents. The military engages in civic action by providing administrative, manpower, and equipment assistance as required. Training, organization, and indoctrination of military forces are reoriented from conventional military operations to emphasize ID/D operations.

Section II. TACTICAL OPERATIONS

COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS PLANNING

87. GENERAL

a. The Military Plan is designed to provide long-range guidance to military units relative to the conduct of counterguerrilla operations. It should be broad in scope and avoid the issuance of detailed instructions that would prevent flexibility and the exercise of initiative at lower levels.

b. Counterguerrilla operations will be planned and coordinated through the NIDCC and ACC’s.
c. FM 105-5, Staff Officers Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure, July 1960, contains information useful to the ID/D planner. The formats contained in the appendixes of FM 101-5 are easily adapted for estimates, plans, and orders in a conventional situation. Some extensive modifications will be necessary, however, in order to make them effective as ID/D planning tools or as devices for the dissemination of instructions and information.

88. PLANNING TASKS

a. Define Objectives. Overall objectives of national military planning are: to neutralize guerrilla activity by placing pressure on him, keeping him on the move, and, as required, destroying his capability and effectiveness by subverting, capturing, or killing him.

b. Allocation of Forces. Forces available for counterguerrilla operations must be allocated to whatever commands or sectors of responsibility have been established. These commands and sectors of responsibility will usually be listed in the national ID/D plan.

c. Assign Areas of Responsibility and Priority. Some major considerations affecting assignment of areas and priorities of effort are:

(1) Nature (strength, etc.) and activities of the enemy.

(2) Tactical and political significance.

(3) ID/D capabilities available.

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(4) Nature and intensity of other ID/D programs.
(5) Attitude of the population.
(6) Terrain and climate.
(7) Location and importance of international political boundaries.

89. PHASING OF COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

Whether counterguerrilla operations are initiated in a phase I, II, or III insurgency, a deliberate phasing of operations is necessary to ensure coordination and integration of the total effort.

a. Phase I--Preparatory (Preparation Phase). Unification of forces; organization and combined training; reequipping as required; refinement of alert systems and establishment of security programs (physical and information); refinement and readjustment of logistical support capabilities and priorities; intensification of intelligence programs; and refinement of staff procedures at all levels.

b. Phase II--Initiation of Counteraction (Offensive Phase). Initiation of PSYOP program; further intensification of intelligence program; employment of reconnaissance forces to locate and harass the guerrilla enemy; positioning of reaction forces.

c. Phase III--Neutralization of the Guerrilla (Development Phase). Employment of all combat capabilities; employment of contact and reaction forces (on a
team basis) to locate, neutralize, and clear the area of guerrilla bands; constant pressure is maintained on the guerrilla.

d. Phase IV--Realignment of Effort (Consolidation Phase). Main military effort is shifted to civic action programs; PSYOP and intelligence efforts continue; armed surveillance of operational area is gradually shifted to police; frontier and border control measures continue.

Section III. POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL

90. PRINCIPLES

An effective program of P&RC coordinates matters of direct consequence to the populace and community and provides a broad base of security wherein counterguerrilla operations and national and community development (including civic action) programs can be executed. Principles that apply to the P&RC program are:

   a. Obtain an intimate degree of unification and coordination of all forces and assets within the community with special attention given to intelligence and PSYOP.

   b. Provisions must be made for immediate and aggressive response to requirements.

   c. Achieve maximum use of the program's many diverse capabilities.
d. Ensure a sensitive application and execution of the program (inasmuch as the area of operations is the community) and remain alert for the psychological effects of each act on the mind and will of the population.

91. TYPICAL PROGRAM

A typical program of P&RC includes:

a. Program Objectives.

(1) Identify and neutralize the insurgent underground organization.

(2) Sever the relationship between the populace and guerrilla.

(3) Create for the populace a secure physical and psychological environment.

b. Program and Phasing of Operations.

(1) Phase I: Obtain necessary legal authority; unify P&RC forces (police, military, civil guard elements); organize and combine training, re-equip as required; develop PSYOP program to begin winning the confidence of the populace and establish a base of political allegiance; refine and intensify intelligence and counterintelligence operations; establish ACC's and CMAC's; establish and refine alert and security systems; select and organize civic guards; plan and coordinate programs.
(2) Phase II: Establish general surveillance measures; establish block warden system; further intensify intelligence and counterintelligence operations with emphasis in this phase of the neutralization of the insurgent underground organization; establish systems of coordination with military forces in the area; and intensify psychological operations to win the political allegiance of the people.

(3) Phase III: Intensify restrictions and controls (surveillance, road blocks, curfews, pass systems, etc.); use relatively large elements in police raids, police ambushes, and area sweeps; use civil guard units; coordinate use of police and military units; effect amnesty and rehabilitation programs; increase intelligence and psychological operations activities during this phase; direct main effort toward preventing the population’s support of the guerrilla.

(4) Phase IV:

(a) Stage A: Reduce intensity of controls from phase III level, although general area coverage continues; reduce major operations (raids, ambushes, etc.); gradually phase out military forces, with primary responsibility for P&RC resting with the police and paramilitary units; continue intelligence activities at a high level and push PSYOP programs to the maximum level to prevent new growth of a “hard-core apparatus.”

(b) Stage B: Reduce controls to minimum, individual restrictions and a partial block warden
system; continue checks on movements of goods and personnel, reduce civil guard units to stand-by basis (although organization and training continues); continue intelligence and PSYOP with emphasis on programs designed to assist in providing a solid base of political allegiance.

Section IV. INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

92. OBJECTIVES

a. The program of internal development comprises a significant element of the ID/D effort. Such a program plays an important role in situations of latent, incipient, and active insurgency although program emphasis differs in each. Objectives, timeframe, and emphasis can be depicted as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Insurgent Activity</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Major Emphasis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latent</td>
<td>Development of the total Environment</td>
<td>Long-term Measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incipient</td>
<td>Prevent Active Insurgency</td>
<td>Short-term Measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Defeat Active Insurgency</td>
<td>Immediate Measures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b. What is a program of IDEV? We must analyze this question from three different points of view.

(1) First, in a broad sense, the objectives of an IDEV program is the achievement of balanced, political, economic, psychological, and social development for the sake of advancement per se in order to develop a modern, viable nation. The very process of internal development has implicit within it the potential for insurgency. The impact of economic, social, and technological changes serves to throw out of balance the traditional economy of a developing nation and impairs its social and cultural integrity. Plans should be consciously phased to forestall the possibility of significant dissatisfaction with progress in elimination of unsatisfactory conditions—and the possibility of the situation erupting into active insurgency.

(2) Second, in a broader sense, an IDEV program constitutes a preventive ID/D effort. In this case, its objective is the elimination of those political, economic, social, and psychological conditions which could cause an insurgency, if allowed to continue.

(3) Third, in a still narrower sense, a positive IDEV program constitutes the nonmilitary political, economic, social, and psychological actions taken in combination with the employment of military forces in an ID/D effort to defeat an active insurgency.

c. In latent, incipient, and active insurgent situations, the concept and principles of an IDEV program
are applied in the same way. The difference in the effort centers on the relative priority given to immediate measures and the short-, intermediate-, and long-term goals. For example where:

(1) The program is comprised solely of an IDEV or nation-building program, insurgency is not considered to be a conditioning factor. Priority is assigned to intermediate- and long-term goals. Short-term goals are also set but only as stepping stones toward the attainment of more distant goals. The objective of balanced development—not insurgency—conditions that determination and time-phasing of goals.

(2) The program constitutes a preventive insurgent effort, an incipient insurgency exists. Priority is assigned to short- and intermediate-term goals which contribute to the eventual attainment of the established long-term goals. Immediate measures are also taken as required by the degree or threat of insurgency. Where possible, these measures should contribute to the longer-term goals.

(3) An active insurgency exists, priority is assigned to immediate measures and short-term goals designed to complement and reinforce the military operations in defeating the insurgency. Actions and priorities are dictated by the existence of insurgency and the requirement to defeat it. Again, where possible, these shorter-term actions should contribute to the attainment of the longer-term goals.
d. Thus, we visualize a shifting of emphasis and priorities as required to achieve the primary objective under a particular set of circumstances. That is: (1) development per se, (2) insurgent preventive effort, or (3) essentially nonmilitary part of an active ID/D effort.

Section V. CIVIC ACTION PLANNING

93. OBJECTIVES

a. Objectives. The objectives of civic action are:

(1) Development of the social and economic environment.

(2) Winning of the support and loyalty of the people for the government.

(3) Improvement of civil-military relations.

b. The degree of emphasis that is placed on the different objectives of civic action varies with the intensity of the insurgency.

(1) In a situation of latent insurgency; that is, where the causes of insurgency are present, but where insurgency has not resulted in guerrilla warfare, civic action will concentrate on development of the socioeconomic environment. In the absence of guerrilla warfare, a large part of the military potential may be devoted to civic action developmental projects that provide long-range benefits. An example is the training
of conscripts so that they will return to their communities as skilled, literate citizens. The major road-building programs being carried out by Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia are also typical.

(2) In a situation where insurgency is incipient, where it is just beginning to manifest itself in guerrilla action or in a sharply increased crime rate, civic action should concentrate on projects designed to prevent the insurgency from growing. A program that registers obvious improvements within a comparatively short time (measured in months) is stressed. Projects such as assistance to communities on farm-to-market roads, bridges, short-range educational improvements, medical immunization programs, and assistance in the construction of simple irrigation work are typical.

(3) Where active insurgency, characterized by recurring guerrilla action, is evident, the primary effort is devoted to defeating the insurgency. Emphasis is on actions that will have the immediate effect of enlisting the active support of the people for the government and its ID/D program. Such actions must have a high, immediate, and favorable psychological impact. Simple actions like providing medical aid to civilians wounded during tactical operations have been highly effective.

c. In order to realize the maximum advantages from civic action, it should be planned to avoid duplication or inadvertant inequalities in the program.

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(1) Where the program concentrates on large, long-range projects, and a significant amount of the military manpower and other resources are committed, as may normally be the case in a situation of latent insurgency, civic action planning may well be controlled at the national level. This will tend to ensure the most efficient use of available resources.

(2) Where a situation of incipient or active insurgency exists, civic action planning must be closely coordinated with counterguerrilla operations and P&RC measures. Flexibility should be allowed to permit the exploitation of civic action "targets of opportunity." An example of such an action is immediate aid to communities that have suffered from natural disasters or insurgent depredations.

(3) It is to be noted that, even in situations of active insurgency, some military units may remain committed to civic action tasks that support the long-range development effort as well as the immediate mission of defeating the insurgency. The development of vital portions of the national road net, and a system of airfields are examples of works that can have such dual benefits.

Section VI. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PLANNING

94. GENERAL

a. Planning for ID/DPSYOP begins long before actual commitment.
b. It must begin, too, with an awareness on the part of U.S. personnel of just what function they are to fill in the host country. Americans must realize that they can conduct successful ID/D operations in a vulnerable nation only through host country personnel and institutions.

c. When preparing plans for the conduct of PSYOP at both the national and local levels, and in all phases of insurgency, it must be borne in mind that there are three principal target audiences: the armed forces of the host country, the civil population, and the insurgent. Further, within these subgroups, there are many other groups—foreign and friendly. The first two of these audiences must understand that the U.S. participation in the ID/D effort is both legal and necessary; that the United States is participating at the invitation of proper authority in the host country as an act of collective security; that actions of the United States are designed not to isolate or crush the host country; and that U.S. participation is temporary and advisory in nature without any desire for territorial annexation. The third principal audience, the insurgent, must, to the maximum extent possible, be induced to cease his activities. The insurgent propaganda campaign seeking to exploit the presence of U.S. forces must be countered in advance by the proper use of themes appropriate to the situation.

95. BACKGROUND PREPARATION

a. The first step for the planning and conduct of effective PSYOP is achieving a thorough familiarity
with the art and science of PSYOP, with insurgent operations, ID/D doctrine, and with the country environment. A basic knowledge of PSYOP can be obtained from FM 33-5, Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures, and from TM ORO T-214, The Nature of Psychological Warfare.

b. For study of the area, the operator should refer to appropriate National Intelligence Surveys, area studies, and handbooks (as developed by the Center for Research and Social Studies (CRESS), Department of the Army, and by the Human Relations Area Files.

c. Of special interest to U.S. PSYOP planners are references such as "propaganda infiltration studies" and "propaganda themes and symbols studies" developed by CRESS.

d. All available materials about the insurgent movement in the area of employment should be studied.

e. All existing ID/D plans and programs relative to the host country should be studied in detail.

96. IN-COUNTRY PREPARATION

a. The area assessment outline in chapter 5 of this guide or the "Research Guide for Country Handbooks," developed by CRESS, can be used as a guide in making this analysis of PSYOP requirements.

b. In particular, all formal PSYOP organizations, plans, programs, and activities of nonmilitary and military agencies must be carefully studied in order to understand the:
(1) Rationale of their development.

(2) Apparent modus operandi.

(3) Effects of these efforts.

c. A careful study should then be made of other governmental—especially military—actions to determine known or estimated psychological impact on insurgent elements, the population as a whole, and government forces.

d. PSYOP and the psychological impact of other actions taken by insurgent elements must next be studied carefully. These studies increase our understanding of both the insurgents and the host country's strengths and vulnerabilities and will often suggest appropriate courses of action.

e. Finally, the organization, personnel, training, equipment, and working relations with other agencies of the PSYOP units to which the U.S. operator is assigned or attached should be studied in detail.

97. CONSIDERATION

PSYOP planning must recognize that:

a. Successful ID/D operations are based upon the involvement and identification of the people with the plans and operations of the host country government.

b. People act, based upon what they believe, regardless of the facts.
c. People’s action to support the government will only come when people believe that they can best achieve their individual and collective goals through that government.

98. PLANNING

a. The sequence for planning a PSYOP campaign and other aspects of PSYOP planning are covered in chapter 7, FM 33-5.

b. See, also, appendix X of this guide for suggested format for a PSYOP plan.
# APPENDIX I

## REFERENCES

### 1. GENERAL

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APPENDIX II

DEFINITIONS

Terms marked by an asterisk (*) have been developed for use in resident and nonresident instruction at the United States Army Special Warfare School. Other terms and their definitions were taken from the Dictionary of United States Terms for Joint Usage, JCS Pub. 1.

*AREA ASSESSMENT: The in-country collection of specific information to confirm, correct, refute, or add to previous intelligence of an area acquired from area studies and other sources prior to infiltration. Area assessment is a continuous activity.

*AREA COORDINATION CENTER: A composite area headquarters at various political/military levels in which internal defense and development (ID/D) operations are planned, coordinated, and directed. Its members include the leaders of local military, para-military, and other governmental agencies and their U.S. counterparts. (To be included in AR 320-5.)

AREA ORIENTED: A term applied to personnel or units whose organization, mission, training, and equipping are based upon projected operational deployment to a specific geographical area. (To be included in AR 320-5.)
*AREA STUDY: A study of a political or geographical area including its history, geography, language, and general culture.

CIVIC ACTION: Any action performed by military forces of a country, using military manpower and skills, in cooperation with civil agencies, authorities or groups, that is designed to improve the economic or social betterment of that country. Civic action programs can enhance the stature of indigenous military forces and improve their relationship with the population. Such actions can be a major contributing factor to the elimination of insurgency.

*CIVIL GUARD: A paramilitary force or militia developed, organized, equipped, and trained to provide protection to the civil populace or to conduct operations against insurgent forces on a local basis; i.e., village or district.

*CIVIL-MILITARY ADVISORY COMMITTEE (CMAC): A group composed of local citizens and military/police representation which participates in the internal defense/development (counterinsurgency) planning activity of the area coordination center. Civilian membership consists of those individuals having significant influence over, or interest in, the welfare of the local population. In the planning operations, the CMAC, which meets on call, contributes advice and guidance to the area coordination center, particularly with regard to those matters directly affecting the local population (populace and resources control, civic actions, etc.).
CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS: Activities to accomplish intelligence, counterintelligence, and other similar activities sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies, in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. (AR 320-5) (See also Covert Operations.)

COLD WAR: A state of international tension, wherein political, economic, technological, sociological, psychological, paramilitary, and military measures short of overt armed conflict involving regular military forces are employed to achieve national objectives. (AR 320-5.)

*COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM: The program accomplished at, and primarily by, the local community in which the efforts of the people are united with those of governmental authorities to improve economic, social, and political conditions, integrating these communities into the life of the nation, and enabling them to contribute fully to national progress.

*Cordon AND SEARCH: A technique used in internal control operations to isolate a small population group or designated area (cordon) to permit a detailed search for personnel or material.

COUNTERESPIONAGE: A category of counterintelligence, the object of which is the detection and neutralization of foreign espionage. (AR 320-5.)
COUNTERGUERRILLA WARFARE: Operations and activities conducted by armed forces, paramilitary forces, or nonmilitary agencies of a government against guerrillas. (AR 320-5.)

*COUNTERINSURGENCY: Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency. (AR 320-5.) (Used interchangeably with the composite term "Internal Defense/Development" (ID/D.)

*COUNTERINTELLIGENCE: That aspect of intelligence activity which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and to the protection of information against espionage, individuals against subversion and intelligence, or material against sabotage. (AR 320-5.)

*COUNTERPART: The person to whom the advisor, as a matter of assigned duty, renders technical and operational advice and assistance (the advisee).

COUNTERSABOTAGE: Action designed to destroy the effectiveness of foreign sabotage activities through the process of identifying, penetrating and manipulating, neutralizing or repressing individuals, groups, or organizations conducting, or capable of conducting, such activities. (AR 320-5.)

COUNTERSUBVERSION: That part of counterintelligence which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness
of inimical subversive activities through detection, identification, exploitation, penetration, manipulation, deception, and repression of individuals, groups, or organizations conducting, or capable of conducting, such activities. (AR 320-5.)

COVERT OPERATIONS: Operations which are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. They differ from clandestine operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation. (AR 320-5.)

*DEVELOPING NATION: Any nation in transition from a condition of economic, social, and political dependency on other nations to a condition of internal development that allows freedom of action and self-determination within the context of the current world scene.

ECONOMIC ACTION: The planned use of economic measures designed to influence the policies or actions of another state, e.g., to impair the warmaking potential of a hostile power, or to generate economic stability within a friendly power. (AR 320-5.)

ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION: The process of preparing for and carrying out such changes in the organization and functioning of the national economy as are necessary to provide for the most effective use of resources in a national emergency. (AR 320-5)
ECONOMIC WARFARE: Intensified government direction of economic means to affect foreign economies. (To be included in AR 320-5.)

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT: See INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT.

EVASION AND ESCAPE (E&E): The procedures and operations whereby military personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from an enemy-held or hostile area to areas under friendly control. (AR 320-5.)

GUERRILLA WARFARE: Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory, by irregular predominately indigenous forces. (AR 320-5.)

*HOST COUNTRY: A nation which has requested and is receiving (or will receive) political, economic, social, military, intelligence and psychological assistance from a responsive nation.

INSURGENCY: A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war. In the current context, subversive insurgency is primarily Communist inspired, supported, or exploited. (AR 320-5.)

*INSURGENT INFRASTRUCTURE: That organization and developed support which is sufficiently effective
to allow effective operation of an insurgent underground. It may include but is not limited to organized cells, leadership, significant resources, and the capacity to operate with and support guerrilla forces.

INSURGENT WAR: A struggle between a constituted government and organized insurgents frequently supported from without, but acting violently from within, against the political, social, economic, military and civil vulnerabilities of the regime to bring about its internal destruction or overthrow. Such wars are distinguished from lesser insurgencies by the gravity of the threat to government and the insurgent object of eventual regional or national control. (AR 320-5.)

INTERNAL ATTACK: The full range of measures taken by organized insurgents to bring about the internal destruction and overthrow of a constituted government. (AR 320-5.)

INTERNAL DEFENSE: The full range of measures taken by a government to protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. (AR 320-5.)

INTERNAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE OPERATION: Any operation undertaken by the military, paramilitary, police, or other security agencies of an outside power to strengthen the host government politically, economically, psycho-socially, or militarily. (AR 320-5.)
INTERNAL DEFENSE OPERATION. Any operation conducted by host country or its allies—security establishment, military, paramilitary, policy or security organization—directly against armed insurgents, their underground organization, support system, external sanctuary, or outside supporting power. (AR 320-5.)

INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT: The strengthening of the roots, functions and capabilities of government, and viability of its national life toward the end of internal independence and freedom from conditions fostering insurgency. (AR 320-5.) (This term used to be called Environmental Improvement at the SWS which was defined as: (That element of the counterinsurgent effort designed to improve the economic, social, political, and psychological conditions of the host country and encompass national and community level development programs).)

INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE OPERATION: Any organized actions undertaken by government or nongovernment agencies of an outside power to support host government internal development efforts. (AR 320-5.)

INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT OPERATION: Any direct operation undertaken by host government or its allies to strengthen the local government politically, economically, socially or militarily, or make more viable its national life. (AR 320-5.)
INTERNAL SECURITY: The state of law and order prevailing within a nation. (AR 320-5.)

IRREGULAR FORCES: Armed individuals or groups who are not members of regular armed forces. (AR 320-5.)

MILITARY CIVIC ACTION: The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (U.S. forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) (AR 320-5.)

*NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM: That specific program undertaken by a nation to achieve balanced economic, sociological, and political progress. It contains objectives and goals to be achieved at the national and community level.

*NATIONAL INTERNAL DEFENSE COORDINATION CENTER: The highest level internal defense and internal development organization concerned with planning and coordinating the subject operations. It includes, as required, representatives of all national agencies involved in countering the threat of insurgency and is directed by a person selected by the chief executive—usually the head of the agency most deeply and intimately involved.
*OPERATIONAL ASSISTANCE: Necessary personnel and equipment which may be provided by the United States to a host country's internal defense/development (counterinsurgency) efforts.

PARAMILITARY FORCES: Forces or groups which are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. (AR 320-5.)

PARAMILITARY OPERATION: An operation undertaken by a paramilitary force. (AR 320-5.)

PARTISAN: A devoted adherent to a cause generally nationalistic in nature. A partisan may or may not be an armed combatent and is not normally a member of an organized military force.

*POLITICAL ACTION: A planned series of political activities undertaken by one government to influence key individuals, groups, or national elements of another government.

POLITICAL WARFARE: Intensified use of political means to achieve national objectives. (To be included in AR 320-5.)

POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL: Actions undertaken by a government to control the populace and its material resources or to deny access to those resources which would further hostile aims and objectives against that government. (To be included in AR 320-5.)
PROPAGANDA: Any form of communication designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor either directly or indirectly. (To be included in AR 320-5.)

*Black - Propaganda which purports to emanate from a source other than the true one.

*Gray - Propaganda which does not specifically identify any source.

*White - Propaganda disseminated and acknowledged by the sponsor or by an accredited agency thereof.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS: The planned use of propaganda and other measures to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile, neutral, or friendly groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives. (To be included in AR 320-5.)

RECEIVING STATE: A nation, party to an international agreement, which pursuant thereto accepts within its territory the presence of military personnel of another nation party to the agreement. (AR 320-5.)

*RESISTANCE FORCE: The guerrilla force and its civilian support consisting of an underground and auxiliary units.
RESISTANCE MOVEMENT: An organized effort by some portion of the population to resist the established government or occupying power.

SPECIAL WARFARE: Special warfare embraces all the military and paramilitary measures and activities related to unconventional warfare, internal defense/development (counterinsurgency), and psychological operations.

SUBVERSION: Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, morale, or political strength of a regime. (AR 320-5.)

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE: Includes the three interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversion. Unconventional warfare operations are conducted within enemy or enemy-controlled territory by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source. (AR 320-5.)

U.S. ARMY COUNTERINSURGENT FORCES: Those forces which are comprised of Special Action Forces and other U.S. Army units, elements, or personnel trained and designated for a counterinsurgent (ID/D) mission. These forces are capable of operating in vulnerable areas, when invited by a host government, to provide training and military advice and operational assistance to indigenous military and paramilitary forces engaged in maintaining or restoring internal security and defeating subversive insurgency.
UNITED STATES COUNTRY TEAM: The senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the Chief of the United States diplomatic mission, usually an ambassador, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency. (AR 329-5.) (The country team is a concept which was developed after World War II to facilitate coordination among U.S. Government agencies in foreign countries. There is no legal requirement for its existence or composition. When the Ambassador considers it desirable, he may form a country team of members of the U.S. Mission (to include the Military Mission) to assist him in developing U.S. programs or advising the host government. Usually the senior member of the principal U.S. Government agencies represented in that country participate in the team. The name given to the country team and the frequency with which it meets, varies according to the wishes of the Ambassador. It is not a majority vote committee. The Ambassador retains full authority and responsibility, though dissenting opinions may be submitted, through channels, to the cabinet level.)

*WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION: The propaganda term used by the Communists to dignify their efforts toward covert aggression.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE OF THE INSURGENT SITUATION

REFERENCE: Maps, Charts, or other Documents.

1. MISSION. (States the current ID/DMission).

2. THE AREA OF OPERATIONS. (This paragraph discusses characteristics of the area and their probable effect upon both insurgent and government courses of action.)

   a. Geography. (Includes climate and topography.)

      (1) Existing situation.

      (2) Effect on insurgent courses of action.

      (3) Effect on government courses of action.

   (Classification)
b. Politics. (Includes government organization and political parties.)

(1) Existing situation.
(2) Effect on insurgent courses of action.
(3) Effect on government courses of action.

c. Economy. (Includes private enterprise and public facilities.)

(1) Existing situation.
(2) Effect on insurgent courses of action.
(3) Effect on government courses of action.

d. Sociology. (Includes minority groups and social programs.)

(1) Existing situation.
(2) Effect on insurgent courses of action.
(3) Effect on government courses of action.

e. Psychology. (Includes behavior patterns and motivating factors.)
3. THE INSURGENT SITUATION. (This paragraph discusses the insurgent organization and its activities.)

a. **Organization and Leadership.** (Includes composition.)

   (1) Nonmilitary. (Includes the underground.)

   (2) Military. (Includes guerrilla units.)

b. **Strength and Disposition.**

   (1) Nonmilitary.

   (2) Military.

c. **Recent and Present Significant Activities.**

   (1) Nonviolent action. (Includes political, economic, sociological, and psychological action.)

   (2) Terrorist action. (Includes murder, torture, extortion, kidnapping, and sabotage.)
3. Guerrilla operations. (Includes harassment, destruction, interdiction, and dispersion.)

4. Standard tactical operations. (Includes attacks, defense, delay, and withdrawal.)

d. Strengths and Weaknesses.

(1) Recruitment and retention.

(2) Intelligence and security.

(3) Organization and training.

(4) Finance and logistics.

(5) Communications.

4. INSURGENT CAPABILITIES. (This paragraph lists current insurgent capabilities and discusses them in regard to probability of adoption.)

a. Enumeration. (Includes what, where, when, and how for each capability.)

(1) Basic capabilities:

(a) Nonviolent action.

(b) Terrorist action.
(Classification)

(c) Guerrilla operations.
(d) Standard tactical operations.

(2) Supporting capabilities.

(a) Intelligence and security.
(b) Recruitment and retention.
(c) Organization and training.
(d) Finance and logistics.

(3) Reinforcement capabilities.

b. Analysis and Discussion. (Includes all evidence supporting or rejecting the adoption of each capability.)

5. CONCLUSIONS. (This paragraph draws conclusions from the content of the preceding paragraphs and furnishes a basis for the estimate of the national ID/D situation.)

a. Effects of the Operational Environment. (States the total effect of the area of operations upon ID/D courses of action.)

(Classification)
b. Probable Insurgent Courses of Action. (Lists probable insurgent course of action in order of relative probability of adoption.)

c. Insurgent Vulnerabilities. Lists exploitable insurgent vulnerabilities.)

Annexes:

Distribution:

AUTHENTICATION:

/s/______________

/t/______________

(G2/S2 authenticates if commander does not sign estimate.)