CHAPTER 1
GENERAL

1. Purpose and Scope

This manual discusses operational techniques in consonance with doctrine outlined in FM 31–21 which may be used by Special Forces. These methods are applicable to both nuclear and non-nuclear warfare in either unconventional warfare (UW) or counterinsurgency operations. This manual describes intelligence, psychological considerations, infiltration, air operations, amphibious operations, communications, logistics, demolitions, Special Forces field maneuvers, medical aspects and other techniques.

2. User Comments

Users of this manual are encouraged to complement the following chapters with appropriate field manuals and technical manuals listed in appendix I. Users are also encouraged to submit recommended changes or comments to improve this manual. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which changes are recommended. Reasons should be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be forwarded direct to the Commandant, United States Army Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, N. C. 28307.
CHAPTER 2
INTELLIGENCE

Section 1. GENERAL

3. Purpose

This chapter provides information and guidance to Special Forces detachments in the intelligence aspects of operational planning for unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency operations. This chapter will furnish detachment commanders guidelines for analyzing areas of operations through area study and area assessment. Additionally, the operational use of cameras, organic to Special Forces detachments, to improve security and intelligence gathering is included.

4. Intelligence Considerations in a Guerrilla Warfare Operational Area (GWOD)

A thorough knowledge of the enemy, weather, terrain, and resistance potential coupled with an intimate understanding of the population within the operational area is essential to the success of the unconventional warfare mission. Once deployed, the Special Forces detachment is ideally situated to contribute to the overall theater intelligence plan. By using indigenous agencies and sources subordinate to the area command it can assemble and relay to the Special Forces operational base (SFOB) intelligence information of value to the unified and component commanders; however, security of the Special Forces detachment and the resistance efforts restrict radio traffic, thus limiting the amount of intelligence information which can be relayed.

a. The area command is able to exploit sources generally unavailable to other theater forces. The Special Forces commander has available three primary elements to assist in gathering intelligence: the guerrilla force, the auxiliary, and the underground. For detailed information on the functions of these elements see FM's 31-20A and 31-21A.

b. Intelligence systems in the GWOA are primarily geared to support the Special Forces detachment and guerrilla forces in planning and conducting operations, securing bases, and preventing compromise by enemy forces. These systems also assist the auxiliary force in planning support functions and the underground in planning and conducting sabotage and other activities to disrupt enemy activities.

c. One of the basic functions of the area command is the establishment of a sound counterintelligence program. Such a program neutralizes the enemy's intelligence gathering systems and prevents penetration of the guerrilla force by enemy agents. Programs initiated to safeguard and secure the guerrilla's position are—

(1) Screening of guerrilla personnel and recruits.
(2) Deception operations.
(3) Surveillance of the local populace.
(4) Spreading false rumors and false information concerning guerrilla forces strength, location, organization, training, and equipment.
(5) Determining enemy capabilities and modus operandi.
(6) Penetration of enemy intelligence systems and counterintelligence organizations.

5. Intelligence Considerations in Counterinsurgency

a. In counterinsurgency operations, Special Forces detachments require accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence to successfully accomplish assigned missions. In tactical operations involving the employment of paramilitary forces, particularly in pursuit operations, it is essential that detachments know the present and future location and identification of the insurgent at hamlet, village, district, and province level. Since the nature of guerrilla warfare requires that insurgents have the support of the local population, the detachment commander concentrates his efforts on the population to determine the amount of support it affords the insurgent and its attitude toward the established government. There are several methods in which the Special Forces detachment commander may acquire the information needed.

b. It may not be possible for the Special Forces detachment commander to obtain sufficient information through overt means from the populace. The release of information to the Special Forces detachment by the people could result in retaliation by the insurgent, thereby destroying the usefulness of the people as informants. The detachment commander must consider the use of clandestine intelligence and counterintelligence operational techniques as primary methods for collection. For detailed information on intelligence nets and counterintelligence operations, see FM 31-21A, FM 31-21, FM 31-20A and FM 30-17.

Section II. AREA STUDY/AREA ASSESSMENT

6. Area Study

a. General. Special Forces detachments committed into operational areas to support unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency operations will find, in the majority of cases, that activities in the area are customarily supported and accompanied by extensive political and economic activities. These may be overt or clandestine, conducted by individuals or groups integrated or acting in concert with established resistance forces. In order to improve their chances for success, Special Forces detachments require a greater degree of preparation in predeployment intelligence than normal Army units of battalion or comparable size. To accomplish this, detachments prepare extensive area studies of assigned areas of operations. Although area studies are prepared and provided by special research agen-
cies, the studies prepared by the detachments are organized into a more appropriate format for operational use. There are two area study categories.

b. General Area Study. This is the detailed background knowledge of an area, region, or country. For a sample area study guide, see appendix V.

c. Operational Area Intelligence. This is detailed intelligence of a specific area of operations which includes information acquired from all sources to include—

(1) Selected personnel exfiltrated from objective area.
(2) Existing resistance elements.
(3) Conduct of operations.
(4) Intensive study of languages and customs.
(5) Active propaganda programs.
(6) Study of economic and social aspects of objective areas.
(7) Conduct of intelligence operations.
(8) Local law enforcement and intelligence functions (counterinsurgency only).
(9) Indigenous forces engaged in combat operations against insurgent forces (counterinsurgency only).
(10) Military civic action programs (counterinsurgency only).

7. Operational Use in Unconventional Warfare

a. Preparation. The Special Forces group S-2 procures the necessary intelligence documents from which the detachment’s general area studies are prepared. Coordination through prescribed channels is effected with all appropriate theater intelligence agencies for the continuous procurement of timely intelligence. Several methods of area study preparation are feasible.

(1) Preparation by operational detachment. This method is more advantageous since the detachment is intimately concerned with its mission and capabilities to accomplish this mission. One major disadvantage is that unit training requirements often limit the time available for detachments to prepare a detailed, comprehensive area study.

(2) Entire preparation by group S-2 on the basis of available information concerning areas of operation.

(3) Preparation by area specialist teams (AST).

(4) Preparation through a combination of these methods with revision by the group S-2 based upon the latest available intelligence.

b. Area Study Preparation Methods. If the detachment prepares its own study from information available to the S-2, the detachment commander has the advantage of assigning specific areas of interest to selected personnel in keeping with their particular specialty. For example, the detachment intelligence sergeant can conduct extensive research and study on the political
structure of the area of operations, groups in opposition to the recognized government, and order of battle of the enemy occupying the area. The combat engineer specialist can prepare studies on the major lines of communication and bridges throughout the country by gathering pictures and data on bridge construction, rail yards, major tunnels, and highway nets. This includes information on both primary and secondary roads; surfaces, gradients, and traffic capabilities during all sorts of weather.

A second method would be for two detachment members of different specialties to research a specific area of interest. An example of this is to have the medical specialist and the combat engineer supervisor research target data while the medical supervisor and combat engineer specialist research area health and medical facilities. This technique provides both cross-training in specialties and also greater dissemination of specific sections before completion of the entire area study. Once these studies have been completed and the detachment personnel responsible for specific sections have prepared their summaries, extensive briefings and orientations are conducted for the remainder of the detachment. These are continued daily until the detachment commander and responsible SFOB staff members are satisfied that each member of the detachment is intimately familiar with the assigned area and its peoples.

c. Operational Area Intelligence. When a detachment is selected for commitment into a specific GWOA, the detachment is placed in isolation in the briefing center of the SFOB and is then ready to receive the operational area intelligence. This is the detailed intelligence of the GWOA from which operational plans are formulated. During these intelligence briefings one source of information referred to as an “asset” may be introduced. The asset is normally a person native to the assigned area of operations who has recently been exfiltrated from that area, thoroughly interrogated for intelligence information, and who volunteered or was recruited to assist in the Special Forces mission. If possible, the asset should have a comprehensive background knowledge of the objective area; it is desirable that he be a member of the resistance movement. When considered necessary he is infiltrated back into the operational area with the detachment to assist on contacting members of the resistance movement.

d. Brief-Back. Once the detachment has completed its preparation for deployment and concluded its studies of the area in relation to its operational missions, the SFOB staff conducts a series of brief-bac ks. During this period, every member of the detachment is required to brief the group commander, the SFOB staff, and members of the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF) on all aspects of their assigned mission until the SFOB commander is satisfied that the detachment is ready for deployment.

8. Operational Use in Counterinsurgency

a. Preparation. Basically the same prepara-
tions are made for commitment into a counter-insurgency environment as into a GWOA. However, the Special Forces detachment is required, because of the nature of activities in counter-insurgency operations, to make extensive studies of local customs, religious beliefs, languages, cultural backgrounds, and personalities. Special Forces in counterinsurgency operations need to exploit to the maximum local law enforcement agencies; security and intelligence elements and organizations; and interpreters, guides, and trackers.

b. Study Methods. The detachment itself may desire to prepare the area studies; however, the basic difference in preparing the study for a counterinsurgency situation is that primary emphasis is placed on the study of propaganda appeals, symbols and their uses, and techniques of propaganda dissemination. Gaining attention, understanding, and credibility among the people of the selected area is another primary consideration. Additionally, area handbooks dealing with the sociological, political, economic, and military aspects of the area are researched thoroughly to increase the background knowledge of the detachment before commitment.

c. Operational Area Intelligence. This information normally is given to the detachment upon arrival in the receiving state by the U.S. military advisor's staff and other elements of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). Operational intelligence covers specific areas of operation, targets, missions, military operations, civic action, organization and training of paramilitary forces and their employment, border operations, air operations, and other missions designed to solidify host country programs to gain the support of the population in its fight against insurgency.

9. Area Assessment

a. Area assessment is the collection of specific information by the Special Forces detachment which commences immediately upon entering the area of operations. It is a continuous process which confirms, corrects, refutes, or adds to previous intelligence acquired before commitment. The area assessment is also the basis for changing detachment operational and logistical plans which were made before commitment into the area. Assessment may assume two degrees of urgency—immediate and subsequent. Matters of immediate urgency are included in the "initial" assessment; the "principal" assessment is a continuous collection of information conducted until exfiltration or evacuation from the operational area. An explanation and recommended format for initial and principal area assessments are presented in sections I and II of appendix VI.

b. Major changes in the area study indicated by area assessments will be furnished to the SFOB during the course of normal communications. These changes provide the latest intelligence information to the area specialist teams.

10. Psychological Intelligence Considerations

The area study provides detailed information
concerning the people, religion, customs, and other background information necessary for planning psychological operations in support of Special Forces activities. Additional details on psychological operations intelligence requirements can be found in paragraphs 14 through 17, and in FM 31–21, FM 31–21A, and FM 33–5.

Section III. PHOTOGRAPHY

11. General Uses

The preservation of unit records is one of the more important uses of the detachment camera. These records include such documents as the detachment journal, summaries of operations, intelligence reports, details of enemy atrocities, records of arms and equipment disposition, expenditures of funds, and information concerning indigenous personalities. Photographing these documents and subsequently caching or exfiltrating the negatives provides a method of records preservation and security not obtainable by other means. Special Forces operational detachments will find their organic photographic equipment important in making identification photographs for population control and for organization and control of paramilitary units. To avoid having a large amount of sensitive material on hand, the detachment normally photographs these items at frequent intervals. After processing the negative and determining its acceptability, the originals of unit records may be destroyed.

12. Intelligence Photography

Intelligence gathering activities are facilitated by using the camera, particularly in target reconnaissance. A good negative or print of a target installation gives the detachment an opportunity to make detailed and deliberate studies which often reveal information the casual observer would not have been able to report. This same negative or print also provides a valuable aid in briefing personnel about the installation. It is often reveal information the casual observer to the vicinity of the objective to obtain close-up photographs, and target installations may also be photographed from a distance by using telephoto techniques. Photography provides an excellent means of supplementing reports of captured enemy arms or equipment, because items too large or bulky to evacuate can be photographed in detail and the finished negative exfiltrated as the situation permits.

13. Equipment and Supplies

The camera equipment presently included in the TOE of the operational detachment is adequate for the job intended; however, the following additional accessories are suggested for more satisfactory photographs:

a. A 35-mm developing tank, preferably of the daylight loading kind.

b. Two unbreakable plastic bottles or flasks for chemicals.
c. A small thermometer.

d. A small exposure meter to insure proper settings.

CHAPTER 3
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Section 1. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND PERSUASION

14. Psychological Operations

One of the critical factors of Special Forces operations in unconventional warfare and in counterinsurgency is the psychological operations effort which supports various Special Forces programs. Basically, psychological operations is concerned with persuading people, or groups of people, to take certain actions favorable to one's interests. In an insurgent situation, psychological operations can be called upon to persuade the people of the area to actively and willingly cooperate with the local government, disrupt the efforts of the insurgent, and assist in separating the insurgent from other elements of the nation's population. In an unconventional warfare role, psychological operations are designed to achieve just the opposite effects: disassociation of the people with the government in power, creation of shared goals for the resistance movement and the population, and mutual help and cooperation between the guerrillas and the people to disrupt the efforts of the common enemy.
15. Persuasion

The fundamental key to a successful persuasion effort is the extent to which the persuader genuinely understands the group being addressed. Because successful persuasion depends on a thorough knowledge of environmental factors which influence the target, as well as a knowledge of what this target group thinks of itself and its environment, it is difficult to specify detailed suggestions because of the diverse areas in which Special Forces may operate. There are general guidelines, however, which will aid Special Forces personnel in a persuasive effort.

a. The first step is to develop an understanding of the situation that currently exists in the area and the reasons why this situation exists. Specifically, what factors present in the area influence the target group. These factors include outside forces and the accepted ways of meeting particular needs such as food or survival. In addition, awareness of the views of the target group regarding these various factors in its environment and the way the group reacts to items associated with these factors is mandatory as are the reasons why the group holds these particular attitudes. Once the group is understood, chances of success are improved.

b. There are a number of other methods which can be used to develop an understanding of the people to be persuaded. The best overall approach is to combine as many of these methods as possible.

(1) Area studies. If there are area studies or similar reports available dealing with the area or group of people with whom Special Forces is concerned, these documents will provide a good background on the subject. Many studies may be too general in nature to be accurate with regard to a particular group. Other studies may not be objective and thus present a biased picture of the group.

(2) Interviews. In dealings with the group of interests, Special Forces will be able to sound out some of the views that the group holds. This method can provide some indication of group attitudes. The area of interest will be disguised and any suggestion of “correct” answers to questions will be avoided. It is likely that the person being questioned will tend to give answers that he thinks are expected of him.

(3) Observation. Careful observation of the daily activities within the group will provide some confirmation of the conclusions reached as a result of analysis of available reports and of interviews with target group representatives. Attention is paid not only to the more obvious activities, but also to some of the more subtle ways members of the group demonstrate their views. Gestures, who is listened to most often and under what circumstances, and the location of items
connected with various aspects of daily life tend to indicate group attitude. In interpreting group activities an open mind is important so that previously conceived conclusions are not confirmed to the exclusion of other truths. The group will not be judged in terms of American values or an interpretation of attitudes made from an American point of view.

(4) **Previously assigned personnel.** It is desirable to discuss the situation with a predecessor, and this discussion can be very beneficial in providing a basic understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the people as well as persuasive methods that have worked well in the past. Evaluation of previous conclusions, however, will be made to discover errors. Under any circumstance, each Special Forces representative will make an evaluation of the groups with which he deals.

(5) **Validity of conclusions.** Conclusions previously made will be treated as tentative in nature. By doing this a constant reevaluation can be made in the light necessary because some conclusions may be based on tenuous, unconfirmed information.

c. There are a number of approaches to the problem of persuasion. The best one involves changing, if necessary, the predisposition of a target group to react in a particular way to things they sense in their environment—in other words, their attitudes. Having discovered the existing attitudes of the group an examination is made to define characteristics of the attitudes so that changes or modifications can be made.

d. In any given situation there are certain desirable actions for various groups to take. Understanding the overall situation as it applies to any particular group allows better preparation of potentially successful lines of persuasion. These lines of persuasion are based on the environmental factors currently influencing the target group and on current attitudes toward pertinent subjects. These lines of persuasion are then used to influence the group to adopt those desired actions.

16. **Guides for Persuasion**

Having established the goals of the persuasion effort (actions desired), the next step is to accomplish these goals. How these goals can be accomplished depends greatly on the nature of the situation and the characteristics of the target group. Nevertheless certain guidelines can be established, although they may not apply to all situations. The guidelines are—

a. **Use an Indirect Approach.** When modifying attitudes, first work on those which are relatively weak and less frequently aroused. In most cases these attitudes will offer less resistance to change than stronger, more frequently aroused attitudes.
Eventually, the stronger attitudes may have to be modified; but by changing the weaker attitudes first, the stronger attitudes may be made weaker.

b. *Use a Variety of Approaches.* As many lines of persuasion as possible which have a foundation in environmental factors influencing the target and in the attitudes of the target will be used. People possess current attitudes because these attitudes meet current needs. Even within a single target group, individual needs may differ. Consequently, by using as many supporting ideas as possible, there is a better chance of touching on a meaningful line of persuasion for all the members of the target group. The lines of persuasion will be consistent with established policy and the current situation, relate to something of contemporary interest, and be believable to the target group.

c. *Use Group Identification.* One of the most powerful forces that can be employed is group pressure. The use of group pressure must be carefully thought out to preclude its backfiring. Each situation is analyzed in this regard. The essential feature of this device, however, is that the target group is made aware that other groups, which it respects, favors the advocated action or perhaps that a significant element of the target group itself favors the action. It is important that any such assertion have some real basis so that the target group will believe the assertion.

17. Complexity

In highly complex situations, it is necessary to persuade several different groups before the real target is ready to take the desired action. In this case, it is necessary to decide which groups are to be persuaded first and by what means. It may be necessary to use certain methods, such as civic action in a contemporary situation, to support verbal lines of persuasion to induce the target to make the desired response.

Section II. PLANNING

18. Intelligence

a. Psychological operations intelligence is essential. Its acquisition and skillful use are a continuing necessity to psychological operations effectiveness. Psychological operations intelligence is concerned with the determination of receptiveness, vulnerabilities, and actual and potential behavior of target audiences before, during, and after psychological operations are directed toward them. It must provide the means to identify and analyze potential audiences, to determine effective message content, to select and employ suitable media and methods, and to assess effectiveness.

b. The requirements for psychological operations intelligence are formulated in detail. A collection plan is prepared and requests are made through appropriate channels immediately after the assignment of missions. Where feasible, information received is processed, employing a psychological operations journal, worksheet, and
situations map; and a psychological operations intelligence estimate is prepared.

c. Initial intelligence studies include historical, cultural, and biographical data and material relating to sociological, political, religious, economic, communications, transportation, and military aspects of the operational area. While such studies provide vital and useful background information they rarely provide sufficient detail to permit effective psychological operations in remote areas typical of Special Forces operations. Additional intelligence is necessary and it is often impossible to acquire it until after commitment of the Special Forces detachment into an area.

19. The Target Audience

a. The target audience is the population segment to which the psychological message is directed. Certain propaganda and information efforts are designed to maintain already existing favorable attitudes. Special Forces psychological operations efforts are aimed at producing specific, desirable actions and normally are conducted to overcome attitudes which condition target audiences against taking the desired actions.

b. Understanding the nature of the target audiences and their place in the sequence of psychological operations activities is essential to Special Forces success in remote area operations. The message, the media, and the method employed are built around and derived from the target audience.

c. In remote areas where Special Forces conduct operations, potential target audiences can be of a radically different cultural composition. Extremely small and separate population segments living in isolated villages in the same operational area can possess contradictory customs, different religions, and be dependent upon conflicting economic necessities. Several competing tribes can inhabit a single operational area, and diversity within the same tribe is not uncommon. Although communities are separated by only a few miles, they may have no common interests and no common, cultural orientation with adjoining villages or the major cities of their native countries. Completely different languages may be spoken. Propaganda which might be effective in metropolitan areas can be entirely inappropriate for dissemination in remote areas of the same country.

d. Psychological operations background intelligence in sufficient detail will rarely, if ever, be available before commencement of Special Forces operations in many areas. From the time an area is entered, an urgent requirement exists for psychological operations intelligence to define and analyze target audiences so that meaningful selections can be made. It is likely that the target audiences selected will be based upon information obtained by personal observations and discussions between members of the Special Forces detachment. Environmental conditions affecting potential target audiences and audience attitudes toward these conditions are charted and analyzed.
Based upon these analyses, estimates are made of target audience susceptibilities to psychological operations and of the abilities of target audience members to control and influence others.

e. This last requirement provides the key to many Special Forces psychological operations in operational areas. It is obvious that appeals by modern, mass communications media are ineffective in areas where no radios exist and the literacy rate is low. Population groups may be so organized as to preclude many types of mass appeal, unless a divisive response is sought. Where effective control and influences in villages or tribal units is vested by custom and mutual consent in one or several individuals, such persons may well constitute the one and only potential target audience for psychological operations designed to unify their population groups.

Section III. PROPAGANDA PRODUCTION AND USE

20. The Message

a. The message is the impulse or meaning the sender seeks to pass on to the receiver. While the message is literally received in the sense of being seen, heard, or read by the target audience, this literal reception is no guarantee of its effectiveness. At its terminus, the message competes for the attention of the recipient with numerous other stimuli and events. To produce the desired response, which is the objective of the psychological operations action, each message is created with a distinct purpose in mind and is skillfully designed to accomplish that purpose. In developing the message, assurance is made that it is not based on the social values and experiences of the writer, but on those of the target audience.

b. Messages have substances and form. Themes are the substantive content; the communicative intent of the message. Several different attitude changes are helpful in producing the same desired behavior or action; for example, a defection can be equally promoted by revulsion of the horror of war, distrust of leadership, or homesickness. Each psychological operations message seeks to evoke a specific response conducive to the desired action. A theme simply states the action being sought and the attitude change being promoted to produce the action. An example of a theme is the encouragement of defection by evoking nostalgia.

c. The message can take many forms: words, spoken or written; pictures; objects such as gifts; sounds such as music; movement in the form of pantomime and dance; or a combination of several of these forms.

21. Media

a. Media are the means by which messages are presented. Effective response, as well as literal reception of messages, depends upon their wise choice and employment. This choice is made after careful consideration of the target audience and the theme and form of the message. Mere convenience or availability does not justify and
should not influence the use of a particular media. Communication by media of proven effectiveness in the area of operations and to which the target audience is already accustomed and conditioned is likely to be the most effective. But the probable effectiveness of new innovations will not be overlooked.

b. The absence of an elaborate loudspeaker or printing apparatus need not be a handicap to psychological operations in remote areas because face-to-face communications may prove the most effective means, whether other media is available or not.

c. Forms of entertainment which are traditional or popular in the area of operations are excellent potential media. They usually draw full audience attention, are well received, and lend themselves to the communications of psychological operations messages. Such forms as pantomine, dance, and music employ universal sounds and symbols. When Special Forces detachments sponsor such performances the good will and favorable attitudes created can lead to desired actions. Cautions will be exercised to avoid having the audience identify with the Special Forces detachment and not the host government.

d. Gifts can be used to carry propaganda messages. Such items as soap, matches, salt, needles and thread, seeds, clothing, and other items of utilitarian value make suitable gifts which are acceptable for general distribution. These gifts should be printed on or be wrapped in a piece of paper containing a propaganda message or a symbol which conveys the meaning desired. In selecting gifts, be sure that the gifts are useful and that the use of symbols or messages upon them do not antagonize the receiver. For example, it may be in poor taste to have a piece of soap wrapped in a leaflet containing a copy of the recipient's national flag. The sender must be aware of countermeasures which the enemy may take, such as giving gifts of food which is poisonous and attributing the gifts to the friendly forces.

22. Media and Target Audience

It should be recognized that employment of sophisticated media in backward areas can be ineffective where target audiences are unaccustomed to their use, and that clear and intelligible messages can be misunderstood. Nevertheless, the mere possession and public use of modern communication devices can raise the prestige of the user in the eyes of remote area target audiences. In the use of any media, it is imperative that it be considered carefully so that it does not create an unintended effect on the target audience. There are certain rules for face-to-face communication which have been developed by experience.

a. Avoid dogmatism at all times. The ideas of others are respected in successful communication.

b. Stress accord and approval. A sincere approval of a people's values develops a strong basis for further communications.

c. Avoid minor disagreements if possible.
People like to win discussions, and it is often better to overlook minor disagreement in order to develop stronger rapport and a basis for friendship.

d. Follow and use the audience's line of reasoning at all times. Special Forces personnel, working with people of other cultures, must understand different values and experiences involved. People's concepts of time or right and wrong may differ from the outlook of Americans. They may not understand why U.S. personnel continue trying to accomplish a task against all odds.

e. Be reasonable.

f. Use symbols and language patterns understood by the target audience that will produce the desired behavior attitudes.

23. Assessment of Effectiveness

a. The effectiveness of psychological operations are necessary to determine results. In Special Forces operations, partial or complete estimates of psychological operations effectiveness can be based upon conferences, conversations, and personal observations conducted by Special Forces personnel themselves.

b. Where psychological operations missions require a series of actions over a long of time, the audience behavior desired normally will be extremely difficult to discern and estimate. In these instances, psychological operations intelligence requirements for assessing effectiveness are extensive and continuing. Assessments provide the basis for adjusting and improving methods, developing and revising plans, and setting new psychological operations objectives.

24. Propaganda Development

Themes (lines of persuasion) and symbols selected for use in propaganda are based upon results of target analysis. Themes will be consistent with policy, existing conditions, and other actions of the sponsor. Themes should be directed towards the underlying attitudes of the selected target rather than toward its overt behavior. Both themes and symbols will be meaningful to the target in terms of its view of reality rather than in terms of what the propagandist views as truth and reality.

25. Propaganda Production and Dissemination

The form and content of the actual propaganda product will depend largely upon the considerations discussed in the preceding paragraph. The communications media selected to carry these themes and symbols will depend again upon the target's frame of reference or field of experience as well as upon the resources and capabilities of the propagandists. The operational detachment commander will, in most cases, be forced to resort to his imagination and ingenuity in determining the most meaningful and effective means of communicating the propaganda message to the target audience. Some means and media that can be considered are—

(1) Graphic and visual materials. All forms of printed materials such as newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, posters, and leaflets; motion pictures and photographic slides.

(2) Loudspeakers and public address systems.

(3) Radio and television.

(4) Stage productions, rallies, and other forms of large gatherings.

(5) Smaller, formal and informal gatherings and meetings.

(6) In some situations, the considerations given in b below, may also apply.

b. Unconventional Warfare. Access to sophisticated media within the GWOA normally will be limited.

(1) Graphic and visual materials. These can be printed materials reproduced on mimeograph and similar lightweight reproduction equipment such as, jelly rolls and other field expedient, reproduction equipment (see app II) or by underground press facilities. Hand produced materials such as letters, posters, wall signs, markings, and symbolic devices such as displays or physical mockups of resistance symbols are used.

(2) Loudspeakers and other forms of public address systems. These may be brought into the GWOA from outside sources, locally procured, or fabricated. Bulk power requirements and security frequently restrict the use of this means.

(3) Radio, both clandestine and from outside the GWOA. The technical problems of establishing and operating a clandestine radio, as well as security, restricts the use of this means. If the target can receive radio broadcasts, the use of a clandestine radio broadcast system can be highly effective.

(4) Inter-personal communications. In view of the limited public communications media accessible within the GWOA, much of the communication of propaganda messages is through inter-personal exchange. In effect, all members of the Special Forces operational detachment and the resistance forces are used as active propagandists within the limits of security. Depending upon the situation and the target audience, inter-personal communications can be the most effective means of communicating propaganda messages.

(5) Psychological operations. Though the task is difficult, psychological operations communication is accomplished among semi-literate and illiterate target groups in varying degrees. The target audience interprets the message in terms
of previous experience and learned response; therefore, it is necessary to understand the experience of the target audience before the intended meaning is communicated. Lack of experience with Western forms of communication is overcome by techniques of presentation that fit their experiences. As an example, the photograph does not communicate meaning to many groups and yet through other approaches communication is accomplished. Drawing on the ground, cut-outs of paper and other materials, and scale models may assist in overcoming an inability to understand a photograph. The key to communicating at this level of literacy is the technique of presentation which uses the symbols, language, and experience of the target audience to express an idea in a way that they understand.

CHAPTER 4
INfiltration

Section I. INFILTRATION IN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONS

26. General

The success of Special Forces air and amphibious operations in support of unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency operations is primarily dependent upon detailed planning and preparation. This chapter is concerned with the planning preparation, and techniques employed for infiltration into Guerrilla Warfare Operational Areas (GWoA) (para 27-30) and counterinsurgency and counterguerrilla operational areas (para 31). Techniques to be discussed are air infiltration, including high altitude low opening (HALO) techniques and the “blind drop” technique; water infiltration, land infiltration; stay-behind operations. The techniques involved in training indigenous personnel are generally the same as those for any other personnel and are outlined in detail in TM 57-220.

27. Air

a. Air delivery by parachute is one of the principal means available for the infiltration of
Special Forces detachments. In preparing a detachment for infiltration by parachute, consider these factors—

1. **Aircraft capabilities.** The maximum number of personnel and amount of equipment that can be delivered, together with the method of dropping, depend upon the capabilities and limitations of the particular aircraft used. Dimensions and other data on U.S. Army and USAF aircraft are presented in FM 101-10, part I, and in FM 31-73.

2. **Reception committee.** The presence of a reception committee on the drop zone (DZ) influences the amount of accompanying equipment and supplies as well as the initial actions of the detachment. When a reception committee is available, sterilization of the DZ and disposal of parachute equipment is a lesser problem than when a blind infiltration is conducted. When a reception committee is present, additional equipment and supplies, beyond immediate requirements, may be dropped with the detachment.

3. **Equipment and supplies.** The detachment must have in its possession the equipment with which to accomplish initial tasks. These items normally consist of radios, individual arms, and operational TOE equipment which may include medical kits, photographic equipment, binoculars, compasses, TA clothing and equipment in keeping with climatic conditions in the operational area, and food and survival equipment. The equipment and supplies to accompany the detachment may be dropped using one of the following techniques:

   a. **Air delivery containers.** All detachment equipment and supplies are rigged in air delivery containers. They may be dropped as door bundles or by some mechanical means. This technique permits the individual parachutist to jump unencumbered by excess equipment; however, it may result in the loss of valuable items of equipment if the containers are not recovered. This technique should be used only when an adequate reception committee is assured, or in low level drops (500-700 ft) where dispersion is less of a problem and there is little time to release a rucksack.

   b. **Air delivery containers/individual loads.** Essential items such as radios are "jumped" on detachment members while less important items are rigged in air delivery containers and dropped as outlined in (a) above. Detailed information on containers sizes and aircraft dimensions are listed in TM 57-210 and in FM 101-10.

   c. **Individual loads.** Detachment equipment and supplies may be "jumped"
as individual loads. This restricts the amount that can be dropped but precludes the loss of essential items through failure to recover containers. This technique is best suited for blind infiltration or when the availability of an adequate reception committee is doubtful. The present method of dropping individual loads consists of packing all items in a rucksack to be released and suspended a safe distance below the jumper; the rucksack landing before the jumper.

(4) Control. The detachment commander places himself in the optimum position in the stick to control his detachment. Rehearsals, if necessary, should be conducted to insure the detachment’s proper assembly on or off the DZ. Team recognition signals must be clearly understood. Such signals should not be confused with those prearranged with the reception party.

(5) Ground assembly. Each member of the detachment is thoroughly briefed on assembly procedures. This includes actions of the individual when approached by guerrillas, i.e., exchange of recognition signals, the location of an assembly point to be used, and the location of primary and alternate assembly points should individual jumpers fail to make contact with the reception committee.

The primary assembly point should be referenced to an easily recognized terrain feature and provide sufficient concealment to allow individuals to remain undetected until such time as they can be recovered. It should be located 100 to 200 meters off the drop zone. An alternate assembly point must satisfy the same criteria as the primary as regards recognition and concealment; but in addition, it should be located 5 to 10 kilometers from the DZ. In addition, each detachment member is carefully instructed concerning disposal of individual parachute equipment and the techniques of erasing signs of the drop.

(6) Emergency plans. Consideration is given to the possibility of inflight emergencies, particularly in deep penetration flights. The detachment receives a pre-flight briefing on the route to be flown and is informed periodically of flight progress. Before enplaning, simple ground assembly plans for such contingencies are established. Should such an emergency arise, the detachment commander, considering the instructions contained in his operation plan and the relative distances to both the infiltration DZ and friendly territory, decides either to continue to the original destination or attempt exfiltration. An emergency plan
should also be provided for use in case of enemy contact on the drop zone.

do HALO Operations. When enemy air defense discourages normal infiltration by air, parachute entry from very high altitudes may be necessary. Whenever this type of operation is planned in denied areas protected by enemy radar and other detection devices, a system of jamming or disrupting these systems should be established. An important consideration is the availability of aircrews trained in working under arduous conditions in depressurized aircraft at jump altitudes in excess of 33,000 feet. Once HALO parachutists have exited the aircraft, a system for freefall assembly in the air before opening the parachutes must be devised. This is particularly important at night or when conditions preclude visual contact with DZ markings. Assembly aids include special marking devices and materials, visible at night, applied to pack trays, backpacks, and other designated equipment. Other operational characteristics of the HALO technique are presented in paragraphs 67 through 71.

c. Blind Drop.

(1) Selected U.S. and indigenous personnel (commonly called assets) may be air dropped during the initial infiltration phase on drop zones devoid of reception personnel. This technique is referred to as a “blind drop,” and may be employed when a resistance element of sufficient size and nature to warrant exploitation is known to be in the area. In all probability, the force will be small, passive in nature, untrained, but receptive to outside support. Other interested government agencies were either unable or did not have the time and means to train the resistance element in DZ operations. Additionally, the enemy situation might preclude normal DZ markings and recognition signals.

(2) Once the DZ is selected within the operational area, the Air Force has responsibility for flight planning, IP selection, and crew procedures throughout the flight. Normally the drop will be made on a computed air release point or on a visible, selected impact point. If HALO techniques are employed and the ground is not visible, the high altitude freefall release system is used. The dropping personnel employ “tracking” procedures to glide into and select their impact point. (TM 57-220).

(3) Once on the ground, personnel move to a selected assembly area and establish security. The unit commander, along with his asset, then attempts to make contact with the local resistance elements. On the basis of the detachment commander’s assessment of the area after contact has been made, he is then in a position to recommend to the SFOB and the JUWTF the feasibility of or-
ganizing the area and committing additional Special Forces units.

28. Water

a. Water offers another practical means for infiltration into operational areas having exposed coastlines. Considerations for water infiltration include—

(1) **Craft limitations.** The characteristics and limitations of the craft largely determine the landing techniques (ch 8).

(2) **Reception committee.** The presence of a reception committee influences the actions of the detachment after landing and the amount of equipment and supplies that may be taken.

(3) **Equipment and supplies.** Adequate waterproofing should be provided to protect supplies and equipment from the effects of salt water. If no reception committee is expected, the amount of equipment and supplies to accompany the detachment is restricted to those quantities that the detachment can transport unassisted. When fleet-type submarines are used, all items are packaged in size and configuration to be passed through the narrow access openings (64 centimeters in diameter) into the pressure hull.

(4) **Ship-to-shore movement.** Assignment of boat teams, distribution of equipment and supplies, methods of debarkation, and means of navigation to the landing beach are carefully planned. In addition, consideration is given to methods of recognizing the reception committee and disposing of the landing craft.

b. Water infiltration operations normally terminate in a land movement phase.

c. Infiltration by means of a sea plane landing on large lakes, rivers, or coastal waters may be possible. In such a case, infiltration planning by the detachment considers the ship-to-shore and subsequent land movement characteristics of water infiltration operations.

29. Land

Land infiltration is conducted similar to that of a long-range patrol into enemy territory. Generally, guides are required. If guides are not available, the detachment must have detailed intelligence of the route, particularly if borders are to be crossed. Routes are selected to take maximum advantage of cover and concealment and to avoid enemy outposts, patrols, and installations. The location and means of contacting selected individuals who will furnish assistance are provided to the detachment. These individuals may be used as local guides and sources of information, food, and shelter. Equipment and supplies to be carried will necessarily be restricted to individual arms and equipment and communications equipment.
30. Stay-Behind

Special Forces detachments may be preplaced in proposed operational areas before these areas are occupied by the enemy, providing the opportunity to organize the nucleus of a guerrilla force. Stringent precautions are taken to preserve security, particularly that of the refuge areas or other safe sites to be used during the initial period of occupation. Information concerning locations and identities within the organization are kept on a need-to-know basis. Contacts between various elements use clandestine communications. Dispersed caches, to include radio equipment, are pre-positioned when possible. Due to the inadvisability of Special Forces detachment members to function as intelligence agents in urban areas, stay-behind operations normally have a better chance of success in rural areas. When stay-behind operations are attempted in areas of heavy population the detachment will be completely dependent upon the indigenous organization for security, the contacts required for expansion, and the buildup of the effort.

Section II. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

31. General

Infiltration techniques employed in counterinsurgency operations will depend upon assigned missions, number of personnel committed, and availability of suitable transportation. Consideration will be given to air infiltration and will include rappelling from helicopters, HALO operations, and the employment of both fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft of the aviation company. Special Forces group water infiltration in areas contiguous to coastal areas, land infiltration, including long-range patrol actions; and stay-behind operations.

a. Air. Air delivery of equipment and personnel by parachute use the same techniques as those used in unconventional warfare operations. Other operational techniques may be employed effectively because counterinsurgency operations include short-range penetrations to objective areas; lack of sophisticated enemy air defenses; and penetrations in remote, inaccessible, insurgent controlled areas.

(1) In areas inaccessible to normal entry, rappelling from a helicopter can provide access in many cases and enhance the commander's freedom of action in assigned tactical missions in support of counterinsurgency operations. Examples—

(a) Conducting raids against enemy camps and strongpoints.

(b) Establishing blocking positions at designated points while conducting encirclement operations.

(c) Augmenting strike force units in pursuit of insurgent forces.

(d) Infiltrating selected key personnel,
e.g., medical specialist, forward air controller.

(e) Assisting in distressed areas where normal approaches are denied.

(f) Conducting military civic action in very remote isolated areas.

(2) The number of personnel to be infiltrated into an area using helicopter rappelling techniques is limited by—

(a) Allowance cargo of the helicopter.

(b) Hovering ability of aircraft.

(c) Wind conditions and other weather factors.

(3) HALO infiltration may be desirable when a limited impact area is available. The HALO parachutists, using the techniques of “tracking” combined with the maneuverability of the parachute, selects and lands in relatively small areas. HALO operations may be successfully used in deep penetrations for reconnaissance and intelligence missions, locating and firing enemy redoubts and sanctuaries, and locating and establishing suitable DZ's and LZ's for receiving larger attack forces.

(4) Army aviation supporting Special Forces infiltration and other operations may employ airplanes or helicopters to conduct aerial delivery of personnel and equipment by parachute, to conduct air landings, parachute resupply, and low level extractions. Infiltration of Special Forces elements into insurgent-controlled areas may also be accomplished by low flying helicopters using various ruses and landing techniques which confuse the enemy as to the true location of the drop. This technique is employed when dropping selected, intelligence reconnaissance teams in designated areas to locate secret bases, fix locations of supply depots, and to locate and destroy communications centers or other key installations (ch 5 and 6).

b. Water. Water infiltration techniques used by Special Forces units in support of counterinsurgency operations are the same as those employed in unconventional warfare operations (ch. 8). Since Special Forces operations in support of counterinsurgency will involve limited unconventional warfare operations, with only limited contact and support by local resistance forces, certain operational techniques will vary. A basic difference will be in the lack of any reception committee on the beaches to receive the Special Forces detachment. Therefore, selected naval units will reconnoiter, select, and mark landing sites and direct the loading and unloading of infiltration personnel. The lack of sophisticated beach defenses and radar facilities will permit greater freedom of operations by naval support craft and personnel. A wider variety of missions, not normally associated with Special Forces detachments, may be assigned and carried
out with support by other naval forces. These missions may include—

1. Psychological activities against selected targets.
2. Operations to destroy enemy forces and facilities in conjunction with paramilitary forces.
3. Reconnaissance to locate bases and supply depots.
4. Gathering intelligence to locate and fix insurgent forces.
5. Water operations involving the employment of small boats on rivers, inland waterways, estuaries, and lakes (see ch 8).

c. Land. Land infiltration techniques will be the same as those employed by Special Forces in unconventional warfare operations and long-range patrol actions. Depending upon mission requirements, the Special Forces detachments will be deployed with larger, more heavily armed units such as strike forces, to infiltrate insurgent controlled areas. This technique will differ from a regular unconventional warfare infiltration mission in that the detachment will—

1. Not be deployed as a complete detachment.
2. Attempt deep penetrations for raids and operations against selected targets.
3. Conduct behind the lines operations against targets of opportunity for designated periods of time.
4. Capture and hold key terrain for the establishment of blocking positions in support of an overall counterguerrilla operations.
5. Conduct deep penetrations into denied areas and return to friendly areas after dropping selected intelligence and reconnaissance teams for stay-behind operations.

d. Stay-Behind Operations. Special Forces detachments employed in support of counterinsurgency operations and psychological operations in remote areas, working with minority and tribal groups, have a distinct advantage and opportunity to establish and prepare guerrilla operational areas. Detachments employed to organize and train paramilitary units, such as civil defense forces, can prepare this force as the nucleus of a cadre for conversion to a guerrilla organization in the event the enemy overruns and controls the area. The detachment, through prior planning will locate likely DZ and LZ sites, organize and train selected personnel for auxiliary and underground functions, establish supply caches, establish communications facilities, and establish safe areas.
CHAPTER 5
PLANNING AND OPERATIONS

Section I. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

32. Planning for Guerrilla Warfare

Organizational concepts, resistance force relations, psychological operations, intelligence production, logistical support administration, and establishment of training programs in support of guerrilla warfare are explained in chapter 8, FM 31-21. Operational techniques in planning, organizing, training, and conducting operations in support of guerrilla warfare are discussed below.

33. Command and Control

a. Unconventional Environment. Operational detachments are selected for commitment by the Special Forces group commander on the basis of mission assignment and operational readiness. Once committed into the GWOA, operational detachments may have the use of one channel of communication for both operational direction and logistical support or, if deemed advisable and in accordance with local SOP’s, have two channels of communications: one for logistical support and one for operational direction. Several methods may be used for control and support of detachments committed into GWOA’s:

1. Operational detachments committed individually are directly responsible to the SFOB for all operations. The detachment contacts the logistical support element direct to request necessary supplies and materials.

2. When two or more detachments are infiltrated into the operational area and one detachment is a command and control (B or C) detachment with the responsibility of establishing the area command, then operational control is normally established in one of two ways:
   (a) Both detachments are in direct contact with the SFOB for operational control; or both detachments have separate supply channels.
   (b) The command and control (B or C) detachment exercises operational control over the subordinate detachments, receiving orders from the SFOB and relaying them to the subordinate units. In this case, however, detachments, for security and rapid action, will maintain individual logistical channels for supply requests.

3. Because of the operations and the distances involved, control measures are not as effective within an area command as they are in a conventional military
organization. Certain criteria are established to increase effective control.

(a) Operation order. Sufficient guidance to subordinate units is outlined in the operation order to cover extended periods of time. This is especially true when operations preclude frequent and regular radio contact. Operation orders for Special Forces will include long-term guidance on such matters as psychological operations, (time phasing of interdiction operations), intelligence, air support, external logistical support, evasion and escape, and political and military relationships with the resistance.

(b) Standing operating procedures (SOP). SOP's standardize recurring procedures and allow the detachment and the SFOB to anticipate prescribed actions when communications have been interrupted, such as putting into effect emergency resupply operations.

b. Command and Control. Command and control of operational detachments and established guerrilla units in operational areas during and after link-up operations with conventional forces are covered in paragraphs 95 and 96, FM 31-21.

34. Selection of Operational Detachments

When the GWOA has been designated by the unified commander, any of the Special Forces operational detachments (A, B, or C) may be selected to infiltrate first. One or more may be chosen, and some of the factors influencing the selection of the type and number required are—

a. Character of the Resistance Movement Within the Area. The size and composition of the resistance movement may not be known; or it may be known to be extremely small and unorganized but with a potential for expansion under proper guidance and logistical support. In either event, the immediate infiltration of an A detachment to begin the initial organization and development of the resistance movement may be in order. In another situation, the resistance movement may be highly organized and, except for logistical support and coordination of guerrilla force activities, will require little additional assistance from Special Forces units. Situations may develop where the known leader of the resistance movement is of such importance or caliber that a senior Special Forces officer and a more complex staff will be required to effect the necessary coordination and future development of the force. At this time a B or C detachment may be chosen for infiltration.

b. Existing Situations. The terrain, the enemy situation, complex political problems, or the ethnic groupings within the resistance movement may require two or more detachments to be infiltrated simultaneously. If the GWOA is relatively large and compartmented for security, it
is preferable to have several detachments placed into the area initially in order to organize, develop, train, equip, and direct the efforts of the guerrilla force. Regardless of the number of detachments initially infiltrated into a specified area, infiltration of additional operational detachments may be necessary because of increased operations, expansion of the existing guerrilla force, political reasons, or special operations against selected targets.

35. Preparation for Deployment

a. The detachment's thorough, extensive area studies of the operational area provide political, social, economic, and military knowledge of the area and an understanding of the ethnic grouping, customs, taboos, religions, and other local mores. These considerations affect the unit organization, command and control, area of operation, discipline, and the selection of leaders within the guerrilla force.

b. Although maximum use of improvisation must be made, in all phases of operations, the following items accompanying deployed detachments may prove useful in conducting rudimentary training as discussed later in this chapter:

1. Grease pencils and colored chalk.
2. Target cloth (blackboard substitute).
3. Basic manuals on weapons generally found in the area.
4. Lesson plans for such basic subjects as field sanitation, first aid, map reading, marking of LZ’s and DZ’s, establishment of security zones, camouflage, dispersion, and simple communication.
5. GTA’s improvised from parachute silk or other such material.
6. Other similar items of particular value in training the indigenous force. See appendix VII and ATP 31-105.

36. The Guerrilla Warfare Operational Area (GWOA)

A well organized GWOA insures close coordination between operational detachments and resistance elements. After infiltration, the major task facing the operational detachments will be to develop all resistance elements into an effective force. There are several techniques which will facilitate this development. They are completed concurrently as the organization and development of the area progress.

a. General. Establishment of a working and command relationship between the Special Forces detachments and the resistance elements in the area is the initial requirement. A sound working and command relationship helps to develop a high degree of cooperation and some degree of control over the resistance. Control over the resistance force is insured when resistance leaders are receptive to orders and requirements necessary to accomplish the theater mission.

b. Establishment of Security, Intelligence, and
Communications Systems. The detachment stresses that proper organization and development can only be assured through a strong security system. Effective intelligence systems, initially small, must provide timely intelligence in order for the resistance force to react when under pressure from the enemy. Communications systems will be small and quite unsophisticated, but they must be effective and secure. See FM 31-21, FM 31-21A, and FM 31-20A.

c. Establishment of Administrative Systems. Administrative systems should be simple and effective and established early in the stages of development. Administrative systems should include, as a minimum—(1) supply accountability (serial numbered items); (2) personnel rosters; (3) registers of sick, wounded, and deceased; (4) awards and decorations; and (5) a daily journal. Records that can compromise the detachment if they fall into enemy hands may require photographing and caching for safe keeping. Written operations orders and reports will be kept to a minimum and issued on a need-to-know basis.

d. Establishment of Training Programs and Facilities. Training will require a maximum and continuous effort on the part of the detachment. The level of resistance force training must be determined, and training programs must be designed to provide and improve common levels of training. Training programs should be simple but effective with training areas secure from enemy observation and action.

e. Plan and Execute Combat Operations. The selection, planning, and execution of combat should insure maximum success with a minimum of casualties to the guerrillas. Combat operations should be commensurate with the status of training and equipment available to the resistance force. As training is completed and units are organized, more complex and larger operations are planned and executed.

f. Expand the Resistance Force. Initially, the force may be quite small. The area command constantly analyzes and reviews all previous objectives and develops the area as the resistance force capabilities improve and expand. The expansion program is enhanced by sound logistical support systems and successful training programs.

g. Establish Logistical Support Systems. Logistical support systems are categorized as internal and internal logistics. The detachment commander is responsible for an effective, internal supply system which will encompass organization, acquisition, control of supplies, battlefield recovery systems, bartering, emergency caches, and accountability procedures. External supplies are requested from the SFOB by the detachment. These supplies are provided by the sponsoring power and the detachment commander should request only those items that are necessary. The judicious use and control of these supplies is a means of exerting some control over the resistance elements to gain their cooperation and support U.S. objectives.
37. Area Organization

The command structure and the physical organization of the area is a priority task of the Special Forces commander. In some situations the organization of the area may be well established; but in others, organization is lacking or is incomplete. In all cases some improvement in physical dispositions is probably necessary. Organization of the GWOA is dictated by a number of requirements, but it depends more upon local conditions than upon any fixed set of rules. Factors to be considered are effectiveness of guerrilla organization, extent of cooperation between resistance forces and local civilians, enemy activity, and topography.

a. Area Complex. After his initial assessment, the detachment commander may organize his operational elements into an area complex to achieve dispersion and control.

   (1) Definition. An area complex consists of guerrillas bases and various supporting elements and facilities. Normally included in the area complex are security and intelligence systems, communications systems, mission support sites (MSS), reception sites, supply installations, training areas, DZ's, and LZ's.

   (2) Characteristics. The complex is not a continuous pattern of tangible installations but a series of intangible lines of communications emanating from guerrilla bases connecting all other resistance elements. The main guerrilla base is the hub of a spiderweb-like complex which is never static but constantly changing.

b. The Guerrilla Base. The basic establishment within the GWOA is the guerrilla base.

   (1) Definition. A guerrilla base is a temporary site where headquarters, installations, and units are located. There is usually more than one guerrilla base within an area complex.

   (2) Characteristics. From one base, lines of communication connect other bases and various elements of the area complex. Installations normally found at a guerrilla base are command posts, training areas, supply caches, communications, and medical facilities.

c. Locations. By virtue of their knowledge of terrain, guerrillas can recommend the best areas for locating various installations. Remote or inaccessible areas are ideal for the physical location of guerrilla camps; however, the lack of these remote areas does not prevent guerrilla operations. Approaches to the base, well guarded and concealed, are revealed only on a need-to-know basis. Alternate base areas must always be established for mobility and flexibility dictate the location of guerrilla installations.

38. Civilian Support

For complete details on the organization, missions, capabilities, and role of civilian support
39. Intelligence and Security

For complete details on intelligence requirements within the GWOA and the security required to conduct successful operations, refer to FM 31–21, FM 31–21A, and chapter 2 of this manual.

40. Operations

a. Major emphasis is placed upon interdiction operations—denying use of selected areas to the enemy, and destroying facilities, military installations, and equipment. Interdiction may be the destruction of one vehicle by one individual, or attacks by larger groups or forces against strategic industrial areas or sites. When properly coordinated and conducted with other activities in the enemy’s rear areas, interdiction operations can make significant contributions to the destruction of enemy combat power and his will to fight. Although tactical in execution, interdiction operations have a strategic objective and have both long-range and immediate effect upon the enemy, his military force, and ultimate population support. Ultimate goals of directed guerrilla actions are to—

(1) Destroy or damage vital installations, equipment, and supplies.

(2) Capture supplies, equipment, and key enemy personnel.

(3) Divert enemy forces from other operations.

(4) Create confusion and weaken enemy morale.

41. Target Analysis in Interdiction Operations

In interdiction operations targets are not attacked indiscriminately but are a part of an overall scheme or plan to destroy an enemy complex. A target complex is a series of interrelated or dependent target elements which together serve a common function. For example, an industrial complex consists of the source of the raw materials (farms, mines, rubber plantations); the rail, highway, waterway, or airway systems over which these materials are transported; the source of power and its means of transmission for the plants; the factory complex itself; and the means by which the finished product is transported to the user. A railroad system is a complex within itself containing bridges, tunnels, miles of both main and secondary track, sidings, rail yards, control signals and towers, stations, water towers for steam engines, and an electrical system for electric engines.

a. In selecting targets for attack in a particular target complex, the five factors of selection: criticality, vulnerability, accessibility, recuperability and effect on the local population (as discussed in FM 31–21) will be considered.

b. To analyze a target complex and select targets for attack that offer maximum timeliness
and effect, diagrams, photographs, and other intelligence can be studied at length. Some of the simplest operations can cause great damage to the enemy: for example, 50 squad-sized teams removing the rails of a railroad complex over a 100-mile stretch of track.

c. In interdiction operations against a target complex, use all elements of the area command (guerrilla force, underground and auxiliary) and coordinate their activities to produce maximum timely effects.

42. Preparations for Enemy Offensives

a. Guerrilla units normally are inferior in strength and firepower to organized enemy forces; therefore, their operations are primarily offensive. On this basis, Special Forces detachment commanders, when planning operations and security within the operational area, should not undertake defensive operations unless forced to do so or when ordered to support special operations conducted by theater forces. When the enemy attacks, guerrillas defend themselves by movement, dispersion, withdrawal, or diversions. Whenever possible, defensive operations are accompanied by offensive actions against the enemy’s flanks and rear.

b. Guerrilla intelligence measures normally provide advance warning of impending, large-scale, counterguerrilla operations. Guerrilla commanders must be knowledgeable of the activities and conditions which might indicate impending enemy offensives in their operational areas. Some of these indicators are—

(1) Weather conditions that permit extensive field operations.

(2) Arrival of new enemy commanders.

(3) Any change in the conventional battle situation which releases additional troops for counterguerrilla operations. Such changes include enemy victories over allied conventional forces, a lull in active operations, and a reduction of the size of the battle area.

(4) Increase in the size of local garrisons or the arrival of new units in the area, particularly combat troops or troops with special counter guerrilla capabilities such as radio direction finding, CBR, or rotary-wing aircraft, units, or mountain, airborne, or reconnaissance troops.

(5) Extension of enemy outposts, increased patrolling, and aerial reconnaissance.

(6) Increased enemy intelligence effort against the guerrillas.

c. Upon receiving information that indicates the enemy is planning a counter guerrilla campaign, the commander should increase his own intelligence effort, determine the disposition and preparedness of his subordinate units, and review plans to meet the anticipated enemy action.

d. To divert the enemy’s attention, the commander may direct diversionary activities to be
initiated in other areas. He may also intensify his operations against enemy lines of communications and installations. Full use of underground and auxiliary capabilities assists diversionary measures and tactics.

e. In preparing to meet enemy offensive action, key installations within a guerrilla base are moved to an alternate base and essential records and supplies are transferred to new locations while less essential items are destroyed or cached in dispersed locations. If the commander receives positive intelligence about the enemy’s plans for a major, counterguerrilla operation, he may decide to evacuate his main base without delay.

f. The commander may decide to delay and harass the advancing enemy, making any attack so expensive that the enemy will terminate operations and be content with their original dispositions. Security activities on the periphery, as well as within a base, are accelerated and maximum use is made of the defensive characteristics of the terrain. Ambushes are positioned to inflict casualties and delays and antipersonnel mines are employed extensively to harass the enemy. If the enemy overruns various strong points, the guerrillas withdraw to successive defensive positions to delay and harass; and, when the situation permits, they may disperse, pass through the line of encirclement, and initiate attacks on the enemy’s flanks, rear and supply lines. If the enemy is determined to continue his offensive, the guerrilla forces should disengage and evacuate the area for

under no circumstance does the guerrilla force allow itself to become so engaged that it loses its freedom of action and allows enemy forces to encircle and destroy it.

g. When faced with an enemy offensive of overwhelming strength, the commander may disperse his force, either in small units or as individuals, to avoid destruction. This course of action should not be taken unless absolutely necessary for it renders the guerrilla organization ineffective for an undetermined period of time.

Section II. CONSIDERATIONS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY

43. General

In counterinsurgency operations, U.S. supported forces operate in less restrictive environments than in unconventional warfare, and their efforts are directed towards countering insurgent movements by denying them the support of the population and by destroying them by combat actions.

44. Missions

Missions assigned TOE Special Forces detachments committed into counterinsurgency operational areas are broad in scope. Once in-country, these missions are further broken down into detailed requirements dictated by the local situation and the counterinsurgency plan for that area. Missions may be to—
a. Train, advise, and provide operational assistance to indigenous Special Forces detachments, ranger-type units, paramilitary forces, and other military forces.

b. Perform limited, military civic action and environmental improvement programs to support the overall counterinsurgency plan. For additional information on civic action see FM 31–78 and FM 41–10.

c. Organize, train, advise, and direct tribal, village, and other remote area groups in counterinsurgency operations. This may include establishment of external defenses and internal security, border operations, and surveillance tasks.


45. Application of UW Techniques

Unconventional warfare techniques, in establishing intelligence nets; evasion and escape mechanisms on a limited scale; the use of psychological methods to gain support of the local population; and raids, ambushes, and air operations all have application in counterinsurgency. Techniques employed will depend largely upon the assigned tasks and the support required. The organization and presence of effective local defense units can neutralize the insurgents' efforts to gain support from the people. Special Forces detachments must carefully analyze each mission assigned and evaluate them in the light of unconventional warfare techniques and their application to counterinsurgency operations. For additional information refer to FM 31–21, FM 31–21A, and FM 31–20A.

a. Civil Guards. Special Forces detachments will find that civil guard units are primarily charged with the mission of internal security. The civil guard is normally trained in individual weapons, light machine guns, and small mortars. The civil guard, in its security role, performs limited tactical missions such as raids, ambushes, and the pursuit of insurgent forces. The civil guard usually is organized into companies and battalion-size units. The tactics and techniques that Special Forces units use in support of guerrilla operations have the same application as when training civil guards. The Special Forces detachment commander can receive support in counterinsurgency not normally available in guerrilla operations. This support includes artillery fire support; armed light aviation support; close air support; extensive communications; and effective medical evaluation.

b. Self-Defense Units. These units normally are responsible for the security of villages and hamlets; guarding major headquarters, bridges, key intersections, and local airstrips; and for conducting limited, offensive operations. They may be organized into platoons or squads, and members normally are from the villages and hamlets within the area. With proper training they can conduct
around the clock patrols, raids, and ambushes. In nonmilitary missions they can assist in emergency relief and be the principle support of environmental improvement, self-help programs set up by Special Forces units.

c. Civil Defense Groups. These groups are more likely to be identified with primitive tribes in remote areas, not readily accessible to regular forces. Among those included in this group are people from rural areas, ethnic minorities, and other miscellaneous groups such as workmen's militia, youth organizations, and female auxiliaries. They can provide local and internal security of their villages and hamlets when properly trained and armed with adequate weapons. Training emphasis is on defensive tactics. Special Forces detachments assigned to these groups, especially in remote and border areas, will conduct extensive training in guerrilla operations.

This includes training in—

(1) Hunter-killer team techniques.
(2) Trail watching.
(3) Border surveillance.
(4) Ambush of supply routes.
(5) Raids on insurgent camps.
(6) Intelligence gathering penetrations of insurgent controlled areas.

46. Selection of Operational Detachments

The same general criteria applies in selecting detachments for counterinsurgency operations as for unconventional warfare operations. The same preparations are made for infiltrating counterinsurgency areas except that logistical support is more rapid and secure, lessening the amount of equipment accompanying the detachment. For general guidance on the training and advisory capabilities of Special Forces detachments, see chapter II, FM 31-21.

47. Operations

a. Major emphasis is placed on operations to interdict and harass insurgent guerrilla units, training areas, and logistical installations and to deny insurgent forces access to local supply sources. These operations can be most successful and effective when Special Forces detachment personnel accompany long-range patrols and host country Special Forces units on deep penetrations into insurgent controlled territory. When properly coordinated with other receiving state activities conducted by regular forces (air strikes and major offensives against strongholds) these interdiction operations can make a significant contribution to the destruction of the insurgent threat. Major goals are to—

(1) Destroy and damage supply routes and depots.
(2) Capture equipment and key personnel.
(3) Create confusion and weaken insurgent morale.
(4) Force the insurgent to keep on the move.
(5) Fragment the insurgent force.
(6) Relieve villages of the insurgent threat.
(7) Deny the insurgent the support of the local population.

b. Types of missions assigned paramilitary forces are basically the same as those conducted in guerrilla warfare operations; however, additional missions not normally associated with interdiction operations may include—
(1) Border operations (surveillance and denial).
(2) Reaction force operations.
(3) Reconnaissance and combat patrols.
(4) Long-range patrols into insurgent controlled areas.
(5) Psychological operations.
(6) Military civic actions.

c. Paramilitary forces, directed by Special Forces, conducting offensive and defensive operations against an insurgent force have certain advantages that are denied the guerrilla force in limited or general war. Some of these are—
(1) Artillery support from guns outside insurgent-controlled areas.
(2) Immediately available, close air and other air support.
(3) Reinforcements particularly from mobile airborne and ranger units.
(4) Evacuation from the operational area if necessary. Paramilitary forces, because of their location, organization, and support, can conduct extensive defensive operations in support of their villages and hamlets. Defensive tactics employed by paramilitary forces are similar to those of conventional forces with the exception of more primitive techniques for securing areas. These techniques include such defense measures as moats, palisade fences, man-traps, and terrain stripped of concealment and cover for an attacking force.

48. Border Operations

a. General. In a majority of cases where a subversive insurgency has been successful against an established government, support from sources outside the country has been a key factor in its success. A contributing factor to success in counterinsurgency is a denial of this external support which includes the use of adjacent countries as a sanctuary.

b. Border Control. Indigenous forces may be given missions of accomplishing varied border control operations concurrently with other military operations. There are two basic concepts of control—
(1) Border denial. These measures are taken to physically separate the insurgent force from external support provided from an adjacent country (see FM 31–10).
(2) Border surveillance. This consists of an extensive network of observation posts and watchers, augmented by intensive patrolling activity to detect, ambush, and
destroy small groups of infiltrators. Normally, only border surveillance is especially applicable to Special Forces-directed indigenous forces, operating in rugged terrain where construction of physical barriers is unfeasible. For a discussion of border control in counter-guerrilla operations, see FM 31-16.

e. Organization for Operations. The primary organization for border control operations is based on the insurgent situation and the terrain in the area. Special Forces commanders develop a force capable of sustained operations in remote areas for given periods of time. As a guide, a company of approximately 150 men can effectively control up to 10 kilometers of terrain of rugged hill masses and forests or jungles. Organizations are developed to insure adequate communications, fire support, and a highly trained reaction force as reserve.

d. Bases of Operation. The Special Forces detachment commander in planning border control operations must consider—

(1) Range of fire support weapons. If fire support from bases are provided by 105-mm and 155-mm howitzers, their respective ranges will permit location and deployment of base camps up to 30 kilometers apart. Shorter range weapons will not permit as much distance. A larger organization will be required to effectively control the assigned area.

(2) Mobility of reaction force (reaction time). Maximum use of civilian transportation should be exploited; however, lack of fuel and other necessary POL may negate the use of civilian vehicles. Sufficient helicopter support must be available on a continuing basis in those areas which are most active.

(3) Communications requirements. The detachment commander must determine his communications needs and coordinate with the Special Forces group signal officer for procurement of additional signal equipment and of needed technical advice. Communications systems must be designed to tie in with existing systems and must include connection with local, intelligence gathering agencies and reaction and back-up forces. Indigenous personnel are trained in the use of any system established.

(4) Effective span of control. This is effected by an adequate communications system and strong, well-trained leaders. Conscientious advisory support from Special Forces personnel will insure maximum effort. Patrols and outposts will be given explicit directions to cover most contingencies that may arise and constant patrolling and periodic inspections of outposts and observation posts will further insure compliance with issued orders.
Logistical support of operational units. The Special Forces commander and his counterpart, in committing long-range patrols into insurgent controlled areas or in pursuit of insurgent forces, must plan for a sound logistical resupply system. Lack of adequate supplies shortens the range capability of these patrols and render them ineffective. The detachment commander may consider using the area drop zone system for resupply. Procedures used will serve as a technique of control through the establishment of phases lines, so that he knows exactly where his patrols are at all times. Supplies also may be delivered to fixed outposts periodically. Changes of personnel and constant relocation of other than fixed outposts may negate such resupply; however, sufficient rations must be taken in to last for a given period of time. Consideration will be given to the use of pack animals where they are locally available, particularly in areas where predictable periods of poor flying weather, such as a monsoon season, is experienced.

e. Intelligence. The Special Forces operational detachment plans for the development of intelligence nets in the operational area to supply him a constant flow of intelligence. Military intelligence personnel, trained in agent recruiting and net organization are infiltrated into the operational area to develop the intelligence potential, and agents native to the area may be brought in.

(1) Preparing cover stories (i.e., merchants, farmers) for entry into populated areas.

(2) Their assignment to paramilitary forces and local law enforcement agencies with freedom of movement throughout the area.

f. Operational Techniques. The techniques involved in border control operations are many and varied. They are limited only by the planning given to the operation by the detachment commander and his support elements. Techniques can include—

(1) Saturation patrolling, to the maximum extent possible, with no fixed patterns and times.

(2) Small-unit operations of squad size or below.

(3) Surveillance of insurgent activities from fixed locations by day, with active operations against targets of opportunity during periods of darkness.

(4) Deceptive measures taken when moving forces through the area of deceive the insurgent forces in their surveillance activities.

(a) Use of civilian clothing to hide uniforms and identity, e.g., dress patrols as farmers or workers so that they...
can move freely through an area without suspicion.

(b) Use of enemy clothing when traveling over trails normally used by the insurgent.

(5) Penetration of the insurgent force and their support elements, by selecting and training local indigenous personnel.

(6) Infiltration of homing devices into the enemy organization by allowing them to capture arms, ammunition, radios, or other equipment essential to their activities.

(7) Gathering intelligence by using—
   (a) A centralized system for maintaining records on prisoners, suspects, or criminals, who, through the promise of parole or pardon, may be used to solicit information or act as agents or informers. The inherent risk, of course, is the possibility of double agents. Also, the detachment commander can successfully employ deception operations by implanting false information, or other means.
   
   (b) Intelligence maps which indicate routes, movement times, and primary and alternate base locations, which, when cross-referenced with other files, will indicate the tentative activities of the insurgent in the area, substantiation by surveillance of the population, and attitudes and reaction to curfew and other restrictions. For additional information, FM 31-10, FM 31-16, FM 31-21, FM 31-21A, and FM 31-73.

Section III. TRAINING OF INDIGENOUS FORCES

General

Before commitment into operational areas, Special Forces detachments simplify their task by training the indigenous forces by developing a tentative training program. Guided by area studies and intelligence, the detachment prepares and collects training aids and other equipment that may be required in the operational area. Then committed into a GWOA, these items are delivered with the detachment's automatic supply drop.

Considerations

The following factors dictate whether a centralized, decentralized, or a combination of these training systems will be the most effective method of training an indigenous force:

a. Mission assigned.

b. Enemy or insurgent capability.

c. Level of training and operational readiness of the indigenous force.

d. Time available.

e. Facilities and equipment available.

f. Climate and terrain in the area.
51. The Training Program

After the detachment has entered the area, several factors are considered in developing the training program for the indigenous forces—

a. Selection of Essential Subjects. These are determined by evaluating the operational mission, the training and equipment status of the indigenous forces, the enemy or insurgent situation, and the population’s attitude and logical support.

b. Organization and Training. In each situation, the detachment commander decides which of the following training system will be the most beneficial to the indigenous force:

1) Individual or on-the-job training.
2) Centralized or decentralized training.
3) Specialized schools for selected personnel.

Examples of a master training program for a leadership school and a 30-day master training program for preparing individual training are shown in appendix VIII. Time for each training phase is established by the detachment’s mission.

c. Preparation of training aids and facilities. Each member of the detachment contributes his ideas and thoughts in the preparation of training aids and facilities. Improvisations and use of local craftsmen aid materially in the production of training aids and facilities.

d. Administration. Training is planned, supervised, and inspected by detachment members and their counterparts. Each area of training is supervised by detachment members while indigenous personnel conduct training.

6. Training Operations

a. Unconventional Warfare. Throughout the organization, development, and training phases of guerrilla activities, combat operations are conducted. With the aid of prior and concurrent psychological operations, the goals of these are to—

1) Succeed in attracting additional recruits to the guerrilla force.
2) Assist in gaining support of civilian population.
3) Give the area command an opportunity to evaluate the training conducted.
4) Increase the morale and esprit of the guerrilla force.

b. Counterinsurgency Operations. Primary consideration is given to training local defense units in defensive operations and in using weapons and equipment for security. Throughout the training program constant attention is given to psychological preparation of the people to accept government support in construction programs, and in establishing sound local government. During the training programs, combat operations are conducted on a limited scale as required to rid the area of insurgent threats and activities. These operations are controlled and directed by Special Forces personnel.
CHAPTER 6
AIR OPERATIONS

Section I. GENERAL

53. Responsibilities in Unconventional Warfare/Counterinsurgency Operations

In conventional military operations the selection of DZ's or LZ's is a joint responsibility of both the Air Force and the Army. The marking of these sites for identification purposes is the responsibility of the Air Force. The nature of Special Forces in guerrilla warfare and their capabilities for extended operations in remote areas in support of counterinsurgency operations requires Special Forces to assume the responsibility for these functions. Special Forces personnel are trained in procedures for selecting, reporting, and marking DZ's and LZ's and for organizing and conducting reception operations.

a. Before Infiltration. Special Forces operational detachments should select DZ's and LZ's before infiltration by using all available intelligence sources and available maps. The DZ and LZ data are then filed at the SFOB. After infiltration and upon completion of ground reconnaissance, the detachment then either confirms

kes line changes to the data on file thereby reducing the volume of radio traffic pertaining to support information. Final approval of insertion DZ's and LZ's is a joint decision of the commanders of the SFOB and the air support

After Infiltration. Following commitment of Special Forces detachments are responsible for selecting, reporting, marking DZ's and LZ's. Final acceptability of the DZ rests with the air unit performing the insertion.

Air Delivery Operations

Characteristics. Air delivery operations in support of Special Forces units are characterized by—

(1) Single aircraft missions.

(2) Penetration flights into denied areas under conditions of limited visibility and at varying flight levels (to include low level flying at 500 feet or below, and high altitude flights in excess of 33,000 feet for HALO operations).

(3) Frequent changes of course enroute to the initial point (IP).

(4) Departure from IP on a predetermined track.

(5) Arrival over DZ within a specified time block.

(6) Execution of the drop directly over the DZ ground release point markings.
(7) Drops conducted at altitudes between 400–800 feet. Cargo drops in selected areas, supporting counterinsurgency operations, may be conducted successfully at altitudes of 250 to 350 feet.

(8) A single pass over the DZ.

(9) Maintaining drop course, altitude, and speed until at least 47 kilometers away from the DZ.

(10) The use of alternate DZ's.

(11) The use of blind-drop procedures when reception committees are unavailable.

b. Air Operations in Operational Areas. Successful air delivery operations depend upon careful coordination between the operational detachment and the air support unit and compliance with SOP's. Coordination is accomplished through the SFOB (fig. 1). A typical air resupply mission involves the following sequence of events:

(1) Operational detachment.
   (a) Selects DZ's and LZ's.
   (b) Transmits DZ or LZ data and resupply requests to SFOB.

(2) SFOB.
   (a) Processes DZ, LZ, data, and resupply requests.
   (b) Coordinates mission with air support unit.
   (c) Transmits mission confirmation message to operational detachment.

(3) Air support unit.
   (a) Prepares mission confirmation data for SFOB.
   (b) Receives and loads supplies and personnel to be delivered.
   (c) Executes mission.

(4) Operational detachment.
   (a) Organizes and receives personnel and supplies.
   (b) Distributes incoming supplies.

Packaging. Supplies are packed and rigged in delivery containers which have a capacity of 230 kg or less. To facilitate rapid clearance of the DZ, the contents of each container are further packaged in man-portable increments. Detailed information on types and uses of various containers are found in TM 57–210 and special texts published by the U.S. Army Quartermaster School, Fort Lee, Va. 23801; also see Supply System, appendix IV, and chapter 10.

Preplanned Resupply

a. Automatic Resupply. Before infiltration, plans and coordination are made for an automatic resupply mission to be flown for the operational detachment on a specific date following infiltration. Delivery is made on a DZ selected
through map reconnaissance and available intelligence. Primary and alternate DZ's are selected (ch. 10). Before arrival of the automatic resupply, this mission may be modified or canceled. Automatic resupply operations are also adaptable to support counterinsurgency and counterguerrilla operations. DZ's previously selected may be used as phase lines and resupply for extended operations of strike forces and elements in pursuit of an insurgent force.

b. Emergency Resupply. Following infiltration, a detachment selects a DZ for emergency uses and reports to the SFOB as soon as feasible. The location of the DZ will not be known to the guerrillas. It will be located away from anticipated enemy and guerrilla activities. The SOI/SSI indicates procedures to be followed to put the emergency resupply operations into effect. As an example the SOI/SSI may indicate that if the detachment fails to make a prescribed number of scheduled radio contacts, then after a specified number of days following the last scheduled contact, the emergency resupply will be flown. The marking pattern for the emergency resupply mission is coordinated before infiltration, but the mission is flown, and the supplies dropped on the DZ even though no markings are visible. This blind drop technique is used in the event the detachment, or surviving individuals, are under such enemy pressure that arrival at the DZ in time to receive the drop or to risk identification of the DZ is precluded (ch 10).

Section II. DZ SELECTION AND REPORTING

Criteria

The selection of a DZ must satisfy the requirements of both the aircrew and the reception committee. The aircrew must be able to locate and identify the DZ. The reception committee selects a site that is accessible, reasonably secure, and safe for delivery of incoming personnel or supplies.

a. Air Considerations.

(1) Terrain.

(a) The general area surrounding the site must be relatively free from obstacles which may interfere with safe flight.

(b) Flat or rolling terrain is desirable; however, in mountainous or hilly country, sites selected at higher elevations such as broad ridges and level plateaus can be used.
Small valleys or pockets completely surrounded by hills are difficult to locate and normally should not be used.

In order to afford the air support unit flexibility in selecting an IP it is desirable that the aircraft be able to approach the center of the DZ from any direction. It is desirable that there be an open approach quadrant of at least 90° to allow the aircrew a choice when determining their approach track.

DZ's having a single clear line of approach are acceptable, provided there is a level turning radius of 5 kilometers on each side of the site (1.5 kilometers for light aircraft (fig 2).

Rising ground or hills of more than 305 meters of elevation above the surface of the site normally should be at least 16 kilometers from the DZ for night operations. In exceptionally mountainous areas deviations from this requirement may be made. Any deviation will be noted in the DZ report.

Deviations from recommended minimums may cause the aircraft to fly at altitudes higher than desirable when executing the drop, resulting in excessive wind drift.

Weather. The prevailing weather conditions in the drop area must be considered. Ground fog, mists, haze, smoke, and low-hanging cloud conditions may interfere with visual signals and DZ markings. Excessive winds also hinder operations.

Obstacles. Due to the low altitudes at which optional drops are conducted, consideration must be given to navigational obstacles in excess of 90 meters above the level of the DZ and within a radius of 8 kilometers. When operational drops
are scheduled for altitudes less than 400 feet, specific considerations should be given to navigational obstacles in excess of 30 meters. If such obstacles exist and are not shown on the issued maps, they must be reported.

(4) **Enemy Concentration.**

(a) Because of aircraft vulnerability in guerrilla warfare operational areas, drop site locations should preclude the aircraft's flying over or near enemy air installations or known concentrations in the final approach to the DZ as well as the departing track.

(b) In counterinsurgency operations outer security should conduct constant surveillance and patrolling to prohibit the enemy from positioning automatic small arms in the area surrounding the DZ. During its landing roll and take-off run, the aircraft should be flanked and paced by machinegun vehicles prepared to deliver saturation fires to either flank of the runway.

**b. Ground Considerations.**

(1) **Shape and Size.**

(a) The most desirable shapes for a DZ square or round. This permits a wider choice for the aircraft approach track.

(b) The required length of a DZ depends primarily on the number of units to be dropped and the length of their dispersal pattern.

1. Dispersion occurs when two or more personnel or containers are released consecutively from an aircraft in flight. The long axis of the landing pattern generally parallels the direction of the flight (fig. 3).

2. Dispersion is computed using this rule-of-thumb formula—$\frac{1}{2}$ speed of aircraft (knots) x exit time (seconds) = dispersion (meters). Exit time is the elapsed time between the exits of the first and last items.

3. The length of the dispersion pattern represents the absolute minimum length required for DZ's. If personnel are to be dropped, a safety factor of at least 100 meters is added to each end of the dispersion pattern to ascertain minimum DZ length required.

(c) The width of rectangular-shaped DZ's should allow for minor errors in computation of wind drift.

(d) The size of a DZ will be dictated by its use. For personnel drops the dispersion pattern, wind drift, and the cleared area required for the display of the DZ markers will be considered. When dropping personnel, use a DZ measuring at least 300 by 300 meters.
(2) Surface.

(a) The surface of the DZ should be reasonably level and free from obstructions such as rocks, trees, fences, and powerlines. Tundra and pastures are ideal types of terrain for both personnel and cargo reception.

(b) Personnel DZ's located at comparatively high elevations (1,840 meters or higher) will, where possible, use soft snow or grasslands. Because of the increased rate of parachute descent at these altitudes, such drops are less desirable than those at or near sea level.

(c) Swamps, paddies, and marshy ground are marginally suitable for personnel and bundles in the wet season and for bundles when frozen or dry. The presence of water compounds the recovery problems and is hazardous for personnel. Frozen paddies present a rough, hard surface, marginally suitable for personnel drops.

(d) Personnel and cargo can be received on water DZ's.

1. In dropping personnel on a water DZ, the depth will not be less than 1.2 meters and arrangement must be made for rapid pickup.

2. The surface of the water will be clear of floating debris or moored craft;
and there will be no protruding boulders, ledges, or pilings.

3. The water will also be clear of underwater obstructions to a depth of 1.2 meters.

4. Water reception points will not be near shallows or where currents are swift.

5. Minimum safe water temperature is +50 degrees F (+10 C).

(e) The following ground surfaces can be used for supply drop zones.

1. Gravel or small stones no larger than a man’s fist.

2. Agricultural ground; however, if post mission secrecy is a factor, it is advisable to use cultivated fields.

3. Brush or tall trees; however, marking of the DZ and the recovery of containers is more difficult.

4. Marsh, swamp, or water provided the depth of water or growth of vegetation will not result in loss of containers.

(3) Security. Special Forces operations makes security a matter of prime importance. The basic considerations for security in the selection of DZ’s are—

(a) Location to permit maximum freedom from enemy ground interference.

(b) Accessibility to the reception committee by routes that are concealed from enemy observation or which can be secured against interdiction or ambush.

(c) Nearness to areas suitable for the cahcing of supplies and disposal of air delivery equipment.

Reporting Drop Zones

Drop Zone Data. The minimum required drop data includes—

(1) Code name extracted from the operational detachment SOI. Also indicate if DZ is primary, alternate, or water.

(2) Location complete with military grid coordinates of the center of the DZ.

(3) Open quadrants measured from the center of the DZ, reported as a series of magnetic azimuths clockwise from the north. The open quadrant delineates acceptable aircraft approaches (fig. 4).

(4) Track with magnetic azimuth of recommended aircraft approach (fig. 4). If a specific aircraft course is required it will be reported as “required track.” Only exceptional circumstances will cause the detachment to require a specific track to be flown.

(b) Obstacles to flight over 90 meters in elevation above the level of the DZ, within a radius of 8 kilometers, not shown on the issued maps of the area. Obstacles are reported by description, magnetic azimuth, and distance from the center of the DZ (fig. 5).
(6) Reference point such as a landmark that can be located on issued maps by name alone; e.g., a lake, town, or mountain. It is reported by name, magnetic azimuth, and distance from the center of the DZ to the center of the reference. It is used with (2) above in verifying the DZ location and it should not be confused with the initial point (IP) selected by the aircrew.

(7) See appendix III for sample drop zone report.

b. Additional Items.

(1) **Concurrent mission request.** The basic drop zone report may become a mission request by the addition of two items.

   (a) Date/time group that indicates the actual time that the aircraft is desired over the DZ. Use Greenwich Mean Time (ZULU).

   (b) Items or services desired. Requests for supplies are normally extracted from the Catalog Supply System (CSS) established in the unit SOP.

(2) **Designation of alternate DZ.** When a concurrent mission request is submitted with the DZ report, an alternate DZ should be designated. The code name of the alternate DZ is the last item of the mission request, if a DZ has been previously reported. If the alternate DZ has not been previously reported, then the

---

*Figure 4. Computation of open quadrant and desired heading.*