(12) Providing safe water supply systems.
(13) Providing technical training to indigenous military personnel which will be useful to them upon their return to a civilian status.
(14) Preparation of necessary maps and charts as required for planning: road, railroad, and airfield projects; irrigation and land development; political subdivisions and geographical features; and land use.
(15) Construction, repair, and operation of utility systems.

68. Engineer Counterinsurgency Techniques

The discussion of the following techniques may be beneficial to engineering personnel.

a. Field Fortifications. Defenses around fixed installations such as supply points, and secure villages and communications centers will be required. Field construction as provided for in FM 5-15 is generally applicable to counterinsurgency operations, but the protection needed will be more from direct fire and infiltration rather than from the blast caused by large explosives. This will minimize the requirement for overhead construction and wide dispersion. Subject to local conditions, consideration should be given to interconnected trench-type fortifications around small field installations. Local materials can be used for revetments to reduce the requirement for sand bags or other items. Areas for observation and fields of fire should be cleared. The use of impenetrable brush and nuisance items such as sharpened stakes around a position may be effective. Improvised booby traps, man traps, camouflage pits and snare-type traps can be used as warning devices for local security or in areas frequented by guerrillas. Extreme caution must be used to prevent local inhabitants from being injured by these devices. Construction of watch towers and moats at fortified areas may prove valuable.

b. Roads, Railways and Airfields. The construction of good transportation facilities not only assists in combatting the guerrilla, but also helps the economy of the country. Heavy reliance must be placed on local labor and materials. Since unusual soil conditions may prevail, the use of expedient type road surfaces such as bamboo mats, planks, corduroy, and log tread roads should be explored, but other more permanent type surfacing should be used whenever possible. Surfacing will normally consist of natural or processed materials such as crushed rock, coral, caliche and tuff; or stabilized soil surface. Soil cement can be used as a wearing course for roads and other hardstands. If proper types of mixing machinery are available, such hardstands are simple and easy to construct and do not require excessive amounts of cement. It can also be used for lining ditches and canals for bank stabilization. In the construction of helicopter landing areas in rugged terrain it may be necessary to construct elevated or raised platforms.

c. Bridges, Ferries and Rafts.

(1) Bridges may be constructed of steel, concrete, lumber or logs, or even rope. Depending on the time and materials available, bridges may vary from a permanent multilane bridge to the very crude expedient type (TM 5-258). Construction equipment may be in very limited supply, and maximum use must be made of hand labor and such techniques as gin poles, tripods, shears, boom derricks, cable runs and expedient pile drivers.

(2) Expedient ferry systems include flying ferries using cable and bicycle traveler, hand operated ferries, and river ferries using dugouts and bamboo outriggers.

(3) Raft construction will often be of locally available materials, and improvised. These include a framework covered with canvas, a brush raft, wrapping vehicles with tarpaulins, bamboo rafts, and a combination of dugout canoes.

d. Building Construction. Construction of office buildings, barracks, mess halls, community buildings and homes for relocated families or displaced persons may be required. The construction should be simple, durable, economical and easy to maintain. Standard plans may have to be modified to meet local conditions. Often it will be necessary and advisable to fabricate or manufacture the needed construction materials. Some examples are—
duroy, and 

rodents and other pests can be a major problem. Types of control measures are construction and maintenance to build up and keep out severe pest problems, proper drainage, filling, rodent proofing, ease of termite inspection and use of treated lumber. Biological control, to include protection of beneficial parasites and predators, use of traps and barriers for the prevention of infiltration and use of pesticide chemicals should be considered (TM 5-632).

f. Area Damage Control Operations. To minimize danger and to expedite recovery operations, engineers help organize area damage control teams to engage in recovery operations after natural or other disaster. Further, engineers can train paramilitary forces to include SDU’s in fire fighting, fire prevention, and other repair and rehabilitation work in the event of natural disaster.

g. Assistance to Agriculture. Engineers can provide valuable assistance to local farmers. A few examples are soil erosion control by means of check dams and terracing; maximum utilization of available forest resources by proper selection, grading, classifying and controlled cutting; mechanization of the grain grinding process; movement of water for irrigation purposes; and clearing of land and building of homes to open up new areas for farming.

h. Power Production. In most undeveloped areas, work is almost exclusively done by hand labor. Engineers can introduce such power production by harnessing devices as the windmill, the water wheel and the gasoline, steam or diesel engines. The production and limited distribution of electrical power might also be explored.

i. Construction, Planning and Management. In planning work, the engineer must take proper cognizance of the skills, prejudices and customs of the local work force. He must also know the amount, type and condition of equipment available for the project. In order to plan construction projects special experience factors must be compiled and then adjusted to meet varying conditions. The less developed countries are characterized by limited resources and
operate on severely restricted budgets; available money must be stretched to the utmost. This requires the best in engineering, planning and management.

69. U.S. Army Artillery

U.S. Army Artillery units may be required to provide tactical support to indigenous forces. Normally the commitment of these artillery units will not occur until the intensity level of insurgency has reached phase III. The role of artillery in counterinsurgency operations, its advantages and limitations, techniques of employment and various types of artillery fire, and some special capabilities which artillery units possess for performing civic action programs are explained in paragraphs 70 through 74. Additionally, the information accumulated in the succeeding paragraphs can be used in the advice and assistance to indigenous artillery units.

70. Role of Artillery

a. The role of artillery in support of counterinsurgency operations is not materially different from its role in conventional warfare; however, the tactics and employment of artillery must be modified to meet the specialized requirements of these operations.

b. In counterinsurgency operations, artillery fire support will be of great value. Plans must be coordinated and executed in such a manner that the resulting artillery fires will not cause ill effects or perhaps alienate the population and cause them to support the insurgents.

c. The psychological impact of artillery in support of counterguerrilla operations will probably be out of proportion to the damage that the fire has actually accomplished. Constant harassing fires directed against guerrilla safe havens may cause the guerrillas to keep moving and thus induce serious morale problems. Timely and accurate artillery fire delivered on a guerrilla force is a two-prong morale factor; it is both devastating to the guerrilla and reassuring to the counterguerrilla.

d. Artillery units contain personnel with specialized skills developed through artillery training. In addition, artillery units contain various types of specialized equipment which might profitably be applied in civic action programs. Imagination must be given free play, however, to cope with nontraditional situations. Some of the artillery skills and equipment available to aid in counterinsurgency are discussed in this section.

71. Advantages and Limitations

a. The advantages gained through the use of artillery fire in counterinsurgency are essentially the same as in conventional situations but with the added advantage of possibly a greater psychological impact on the enemy forces (guerrillas). Some of these advantages are as follows:

(1) All-weather and all terrain capability.
(2) Continuous operations.
(3) Flexibility.
(4) Surprise.
(5) Accuracy and mass.
(6) Psychological impact.
(7) Show of force.

b. The limitations in the use of artillery fire in counterinsurgency operations are essentially the same as in conventional situations. Some of the more pronounced limitations are—

(1) Difficulties in identification of the guerrilla.
(2) Difficulties in observation of artillery fire.
(3) Difficulties in the movement of artillery weapons.
(4) Lack of survey control.
(5) Restrictions placed on the use of artillery fire.

72. Employment

In addition to the basic principles used when employing artillery under conventional conditions, the following will generally apply when supporting counterinsurgency operations.

a. The necessity for movement of artillery weapons by air, boat, pack-mule, and often perhaps by hand-tow.

b. Observation of artillery fire in difficult terrain will often require the employment of aerial observers.

c. Surviving guerrillas may breach man-made or natural barriers to escape in the night or make their way out when time permits. This barrier will be neutralized for the night.

d. Fire may be used to have a psychological impact or to neutralize areas.

73. Fire

In addition to the basic principles used in conventional situations, certain fire tactics used in counterguerrilla operations are innovated or utilized in counterinsurgency situations—

a. Flux of fire is support covering the movement of the guerrillas, or the employment in the destruction of vegetation. These are used to:

b. Harass movement to deny the guerrillas safe areas and in counterguerrilla operations. These are employed in conjunction with controlled fires.

c. Neutralization is used for guerrilla camps.

d. Block operations are planned to the countering guerrilla operations. These are used to enforce effective control over the area.

e. Illumination plan is used, to increase the orient from fire.

f. Reorientation by fire is used in counterguerrilla operations. It is accomplished by the location in areas in
In action programs, action programs, in free play, situations, situations, equipment are dis-...
sistance in aiding civic actions by laying out unsophisticated roadways, bridges, building sites, airstrips, and other installations.

c. **Transportation.** Transportation available in most artillery units can be of great assistance to the local government and the populace.

d. **Motor Maintenance.** Although the number of mechanics within an artillery unit is limited, some instruction and supervision can be offered to indigenous personnel.

e. **Electronics Maintenance.** After a short transition period, maintenance personnel can be used as radio mechanics and repairmen to aid the local populace.

f. **Administration.** Administrative assistance can be provided local governments from organic sources. Although this capability is limited, instructors and supervisors can be supplied in this field.

75. **Army Armor and Armored Cavalry**

The circumstances under which U.S. Army Armor and Armored Cavalry units may be committed to support indigenous forces are the same as for artillery units discussed in paragraph 69. The assumption is that the commitment of these types of units will not normally occur until the intensity level of insurgency has reached phase III. For additional guidance on the employment of armor/armored cavalry units, see FM 31-16.

76. **Armor in Limited Field Offensive Operations**

The types of offensive actions in which armored units may participate successfully are—raid, pursuit, ambush, and counterattack. With the exception of ambush, these operations involve the movement of forces which must have greater mobility, fire power, and staying power than the insurgents. Additionally, armored units may support infantry attacks against insurgents. This role may become the more common during the latter phases of insurgency.

a. **Raid.** The most important characteristics of a raid are secrecy and speed. Raiding elements must be able to move rapidly to an objective area, and attack simultaneously before the target disappears. Armored cavalry platoons and air cavalry elements are especially suitable to this type operation. Ground armored cavalry is limited to objective areas that can be approached by vehicles. Armored units are capable of moving at high speed and attacking promptly. They can carry sufficient riflemen to root out hidden insurgents and have sufficient fire power to overcome any of the usual targets. Armored personnel carriers should habitually overrun the objective area so as to gain maximum shock action. This technique should be applied vigorously until such time as insurgent forces gain a repressive anti-tank capability.

b. **Pursuit.** In every possible instance, fleeing insurgents should be relentlessly pursued, pinned down, and killed or captured. Since dispersing guerrillas usually use preplanned routes of withdrawal, or if pressed, simply scatter to rally later at a predesignated point, any pursuit must be undertaken immediately both on the ground and in the air. Infantrymen are necessary to conduct the ground pursuit. Armored personnel carriers possess a distinct capability for ground pursuit in high grass, small brush and any terrain the vehicle is capable of negotiating. The speed, armored protection, fire power and elevated position of an observer in the vehicle hatches make this a particularly effective technique when flushing insurgents from positions.

c. **Ambush.** Indigenous infantry are best suited for this mission since they are not limited by terrain conditions. Air cavalry and dismounted armored cavalry troops are also well organized and equipped for this type action. Since insurgent tactics consistently call for withdrawal into areas relatively inaccessible to vehicles, the successful employment of mounted armored cavalry units in an ambush role is doubtful. Air cavalry units may be employed to establish impromptu ambushes to cut off withdrawing insurgents.

d. **Counterattack.** To be effective, the countering force must be able to move swiftly into the battle area and assault the insurgents in the face of a large volume of automatic weapons fire. They must close with the enemy to destroy or disperse them. If the insurgents withdraw, they are relentlessly pursued. Armor protection and great numbers of automatic and large bore weapons are useful in assaulting an enemy and overrunning it. A mobile, indigenous force may be available to fill the required role. Counterattacks by armored and dismounted armored units are effective.

e. **Support.** The employment of armored forces in support operations may be available for vehicle support to indigenous forces, jungles, to assist in pacification, or to execute these operations. Local government troops possessing armored personnel carriers can be used as radio mechanics and repairmen to aid the local populace. Although this capability is limited, instructors and supervisors can be supplied in this field. The assumption is that the commitment of these types of units will not normally occur until the intensity level of insurgency has reached phase III. For additional guidance on the employment of armor/armored cavalry units, see FM 31-16.

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enemy and overcoming his heavy automatic fire. A mobile, indirect fire support capability should be available to the counterattacking force. All the required characteristics for a successful counterattack force are available in an augmented armored cavalry squadron.

e. Support of Infantry Operations. The employment of infantry in counterinsurgency operations may take place in terrain not suitable for vehicles. The infantry can move into forests, jungles, and mountains to search out and destroy the insurgents. The infantry will execute these types of operations by constant deep patrolling, raids and ambushes. There will be instances, however, when infantry will be fighting in open terrain, especially during phase III conditions when large insurgent forces take to the field in force to engage government troops. At such times, armor/armed cavalry elements can play a decisive role by providing armor support to the infantry. During phase III, the insurgents can be expected to have antitank weapons, such as rocket launchers and recoilless rifles. Generally their anti-tank capability will be limited and their troops vulnerable to armored attack. Armored cavalry can be employed as a maneuvering element, provide direct and indirect fire support, or provide other support that will assist the infantry to complete its mission.

77. Armor Operations in Developed Areas

The types of developed areas are villages, towns and cities. Villages usually consist of poorly fabricated huts clustered in a disorderly arrangement convenient to the local industry. In many countries, houses provide no cover for weapons crews, but are often used for concealment of insurgent supply caches, especially for food and ammunition. In some areas, there may be permanent structures in towns and cities, such as factories, major stores, warehouses, temples, schools, and government facilities. Combat against insurgents in these highly developed areas will be conducted in the same manner as against hostile troops. In the attack of rural villages consisting of the bamboo and thatched hut construction, armored vehicles can operate in the same manner as outlined in paragraph 76b. In the absence of an enemy antitank capability the inherent shock action can be exploited to the fullest by aggressively overrunning and destroying the objective area.

a. Armored vehicles are employed to move through and control streets, destroy barricades and reduce strong points. To prevent insurgent snipers from killing crew members who man automatic weapons, and to keep insurgents from throwing grenades into open hatches, it is desirable to have armored vehicles which can button up and still employ machineguns. This applies to scout vehicles and armored personnel carriers, as well as tanks. Armored vehicles are especially effective in riot control.

b. Air cavalry can play an important role in developed areas. Armed helicopters can hover developed areas will be conducted in the same manner as against hostile troops. In the attack of rural villages consisting of the bamboo and thatched hut construction, armored vehicles can operate in the same manner as outlined in paragraph 76b. In the absence of an enemy antitank capability the inherent shock action can be exploited to the fullest by aggressively overrunning and destroying the objective area.

78. Security Force

One of the first steps in counterinsurgency operations is to convince and show the people that the established government will protect the people, and appropriate whatever supplies they need. It is necessary, therefore, to outpost villages with small, powerful elements which can be promptly reinforced by highly mobile forces from adjacent troop bases. An armored cavalry platoon reinforced with indigenous infantry would be useful in this role. The vehicles are effective in moving quickly under fire to different parts of the village as required. The village defense is undertaken in the same way as the organization of a strong
point, explained in FM 17–36. To place an armored cavalry platoon in all villages, however, would require far more units than are normally available. Even a massive program of resettling the populace in secure village complexes may be insufficient, and leave a large number of villages undefended. Once a village is apparently progovernment, has organized a self-defense system, and has participated in some actions against the insurgents, it can be outposted by an indigenous infantry element or left with only its own self-defense forces and thus relieve armored vehicles for other missions. Armored cavalry units may remain in major towns, however, to free troops for a more active counterinsurgency mission.

79. Security of Routes of Communication

This mission involves keeping the roads, trails, and waterways open for traffic. Securing land routes requires constant reconnaissance and surveillance to discover and eliminate mines, roadblocks, and ambushes. It is mandatory that units performing route security have a high probability of surviving ambushes. They must be able to destroy or disperse ambushing elements and inflict casualties on the insurgents with minimum casualties to themselves. Since ambushes are frequently conducted by insurgents, continuous employment of properly equipped armored cavalry units can be an effective instrument in the defeat of the insurgents. Actions are similar to standard route reconnaissance and passage through defile techniques described in FM 17–36, and follow the tactics specified for meeting engagements. See appendix IV for details on transportation security.

80. Reconnaissance and Surveillance

a. Reconnaissance, other than route reconnaissance discussed in paragraph 79, will be conducted primarily by aerial and dismounted elements. Finding specific insurgent bases or camps will be extremely difficult because of the lack of adequate intelligence. In pinpointing suspected insurgency forces, reconnaissance should be made by aircraft since speed is essential. Air cavalry aircraft and crews are well suited for this type mission. To avoid operational intentions, reconnaissance aircraft should not hover over or appear to show unusual interest in any particular area. Periodic flights over suspected areas will accustom the insurgents to such reconnaissance and tend to make them less cautious when a specific objective is searched. This will also permit continuous photographic coverage for comparative checks.

b. Dismounted armored cavalry elements usually conduct zone reconnaissance and often patrol selected areas. This area reconnaissance mission has a three-fold purpose—it permits the troops to become thoroughly familiar with the trails, cul-de-sacs, and habitations in the local terrain; it threatens the insurgents with the loss of supply caches and hidden cultivated food plots; and it forces the insurgents to keep constantly on the move or to stay dispersed. Caution must govern the scheduling, size and routes of such patrols, however, since they are vulnerable to ambush.

81. General

This chapter discusses support units to assist the country to suppress insurgency, and for the employment of an army in a country, plan and effectively accomplish such a force in a designated system. Participating frequently, patrol station areas, although they may be more properly considered as commissary or depot. It is for the purposes of the part or all indigenous nation to the country. An army time to organize and train types and units required, the host country. Troops support these troops in their strength requirement. Support required. The nation may be the combat support need, the combat support requirement. The command to the combat support need. The nation can also provide support. Troops may also be need. Troops also may also be need support.
See append. for security.


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route reconnaissances, will be dismounted from their element bases or because of the unpinpointing needed is essential. These bases are well established to avoid operations aircraft should make them less obvious. Flights over insurgents to make them less recognized is searched.

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ary elements and often need reconnaissances —it permits familiarity with operations in the area. Insurgents with trained men cultivated to keep them as they are dispersed. Training, size and capacity are

CHAPTER 6

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS

81. General

This chapter covers those combat service support units which may be required in a host country to support U.S. and indigenous counterinsurgency forces. Concurrently with planning for the employment of a SAF in a disturbed country, planning for the provision of adequate and effective combat service support also must be accomplished. Normally the size of a U.S. force in a disturbed country is small, and logistical systems are tailored from all in-country participating services. The system may frequently parallel a U.S. Army post, camp, and station arrangement in the CONUS, even though the troops are widely dispersed. It may be more practical, for example, to establish a commissary rather than a class I supply point or depot. It may be necessary under some conditions for the U.S. Army to provide and operate all or part of the combat service support for indigenous forces which have had insufficient time to organize and train their own units. The types and numbers of combat service support units required for support of U.S. forces in a host country will depend on the number of troops supported and the type units to which these troops are assigned. If the U.S. troop strength reaches a high figure, or indigenous support requirements are extensive, consideration may be given to introducing a logistical command to command, control, plan and operate the combat service support organization. It is normal practice to provide military medical service support for U.S. personnel deployed overseas. In addition, appropriate supply support and some form of maintenance support will be needed. Certain ancillary support activities such as post exchange, postal, finance, and chaplain services should be considered. There also may be a requirement for judge advocate support.

82. Medical Service

a. General. Medical service units are described fully in FM 8-5. Units which are considered especially suitable for support of U.S. and indigenous military forces engaged in counterinsurgency operations are briefly described below. All of these units can make vital contributions to civic action programs. All medical service units should utilize indigenous personnel to the maximum extent possible, providing them on-the-job training, classes, and assignment to positions of responsibility commensurate with their training and capabilities.

b. Medical and General Dispensaries (TOE 8-500). The mission of medical and general dispensaries is to provide outpatient service for units or personnel stationed in areas not provided with their own unit dispensaries. Support capabilities: Team MA—2,000 to 5,000 population, Team MB—5,000 to 10,000 population, and Team MC—1,500 to 3,000 population. Because of the wide dispersion of U.S. units and personnel in a host country it may be necessary to employ a greater number of these teams than would be required normally. However, this will permit a much greater participation in medical civic action. Each of the teams is commanded by an officer of the medical corps and each can perform dental, surgical, internal medicine and pharmacy functions. Team MA also has an EENT section; Team MB has an EENT section and also a laboratory section. Team MC has 10 beds available for overnight care and observation.

c. Medical Detachment (Team OA). The primary mission of the detachment is to provide dispensary service for troops not otherwise provided unit medical service. It is capable of providing service for approximately 1,000 troops.
d. Dental Operating Detachment (Team KI). The detachment is capable of providing emergency dental treatment and a limited scope of routine dental care to 1,000 troops in isolated areas.

e. Helicopter Ambulance Medical Detachment (Team RA). The principal mission of this unit is to furnish organization or field medical evacuation service by air for patients requiring immediate and definitive medical treatment and services. The detachment may be attached to one of the major medical service installations for operational control. However, the low density of troops, great distances involved, unusual and difficult terrain, and inadequacy of road nets, may dictate that some of the five helicopters be dispersed to support local dispensaries or other established evacuation systems. Added to these factors which may require unusual methods of employment is the very austere medical service support provided in a host country.

f. Field Hospital (TOE 8–510). The field hospital is designed to provide a single hospital facility of 400-bed capacity, or 3 separate, independently operating, hospitalization units of 100 beds each. This flexibility in organization permits commitment of one or more of its 100-bed units to meet requirements as they occur. The hospital is capable of providing station hospital type support on an area basis and operating a specialized treatment facility when augmented by professional service teams. Included in its responsibilities are provisions for medical-surgical care and treatment for patients normally requiring a limited period of hospitalization and preparing patients for further evacuation. Each of the separate 100-bed hospitalization units can provide support for troop concentrations of up to 4,000. In computing requirements consideration should be given to the allocation of a number of beds for emergency treatment of indigenous civilians.

g. Station Hospital, Communications Zone (TOE 8–563–8–567). There are five types of station hospitals: 100-, 200-, 300-, 500-, and 750-bed. These units may be increased in multiples of 20 beds. The organization of each includes three major components—the hospital headquarters, an administrative complement, and a professional complement. Each station hospital unit is staffed and equipped to provide medical and surgical treatment of all types of cases; however, it prepares patients for evacuation who cannot be returned to duty within prescribed limitations.

h. Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (TOE 8–571). Units of this type may be required to support U.S. or indigenous forces if the level of intensity of insurgency reaches phase III.

i. Evacuation Hospital, Semimobile (TOE 8–581). The primary mission of the evacuation hospital is to provide hospitalization for all classes of patients within the combat zone and to prepare patients for further evacuation as necessary. The normal basis for allocation is one per U.S. division in a limited or general war situation. It may be advantageous to employ a unit of this type for treatment and evacuation of U.S. troops when other permanent facilities are available within the theater to treat cases beyond its capability and it would not be feasible to establish adequate treatment facilities within the host country.

j. Medical supply, optical, and equipment maintenance detachments are also provided by TOE 8–500. A Veterinary Food Inspection Detachment Team JA (TOE 8–500) may be required.

83. Medical Service for the Indigenous Population

In coordination with the U.S. AID mission and appropriate agencies of the host country, U.S. Army medical service units and personnel should provide support and assistance to the maximum extent possible to the indigenous population. Probably in no other area of military civic action can so much good will be gained. In consonance with the availability of indigenous personnel, all U.S. Army medical service units, facilities, and personnel should be encouraged to utilize and train indigenous personnel to the limit of their abilities. In connection with medical training, English language training should be given to facilitate learning. Other medical services which may be provided are—

a. The establishment of outpatient clinics, operated by indigenous personnel, with scheduled visits by a U.S. Army medical officer.

b. Medical supplies.
c. The use of aircraft for evacuation of emergency cases, especially those resulting from insurgency action.

d. Advice and assistance on sanitation.

e. Emergency dental service.

84. Military Police Services

a. General. Military police units, having the capability of providing training, advice, and assistance to indigenous forces, and complementing MAAG/Mission or U.S. Army forces, are deployed as a part of the forces in counterinsurgency operations. The indigenous police forces will be in the first line of defense organized by the established government against subversion and insurgency. Subversion and insurgency activities are illegal, and participants are considered criminals. It has historically followed that police forces and police operating methods have been employed with success by different governments in counterinsurgency operations. This fact, coupled with the police-type function of most paramilitary forces, ideally indicates the use of military police during all phases of counterinsurgency operations.

b. Support of Military Civic Action. The indigenous police force is usually the only governmental agency that reaches down to the grass roots level since in the emergent nations very few public services other than police are supplied to the citizenry. The police, having in most cases unlimited authority over the individual, create the father image of the state. The image and support of the indigenous government is correlated to the efficiency and effectiveness of the police in the performance of these duties. Any civic activities connected with the operating police will have an immediate effect on the local populace. Some specific areas of police civic action are—

(1) Training of the local citizens as auxiliary police.
(2) Assisting the development of police—community relations.
(3) Developing police youth activity programs.
(4) Developing a correctional and rehabilitation system.
(5) Developing an effective physical and community security program.

c. Support of Indigenous Police and Paramilitary Police. During phases I and II, the principal function of the military police is to assist the development and the improvement of the indigenous police and paramilitary police. The following are some of the areas of military police activity:

(1) Organization of the national police to meet the police, security, and safety needs of the country. Emphasis is placed on the creation of a police organization that will support the social structure of the nation.
(2) Organization of the paramilitary forces to serve as a defense force, yet complement and support the national police.
(3) Provide plans, training, advice, and assistance for the military police and paramilitary police, which will insure their effectiveness in the fields of police, administrative, and military activities to include tactics and techniques in counterinsurgency operations.
(4) Development of equipment needs, equipment utilization, and local resources to support the mission of such forces.
(5) Provide guidance for indigenous police civic action.
(6) Provide advice in the handling of insurgency prisoners.

d. Psychological Aspects. Police type activity by nature is restrictive and may, by the layman, be considered negative. Without a positive public relations program based on impartial and just police operations, the public will easily form an unfavorable image of the police. Such an image is a weapon in the insurgent psychological war. The military police, working in cooperation with the psychological operations team, are a vital link in the war for men's minds. As with other army units it is a continuing mission of the military police to develop among the indigenous population an appreciation of the American way of life.

e. Military Police Role in Counterguerrilla Operations.

(1) Military police units, having roles in all phases of counterinsurgency, may
be used as a basis for expansion into
counterguerrilla operations.

(2) In close cooperation with intelligence
and counterintelligence personnel, mil-
itary police have the capability of de-
veloping a police intelligence net to
provide information that will enhance
the overall intelligence effort.

(3) Military police patrols can, when re-
quired, serve as small fighting forces
capable of overcoming small independ­
ent roadblocks and other small guer­
rilla activities. The constant route and
reconnaissance activities performed by
the military police complement all
other U.S. surveillance programs.
These patrols help to maintain open
lines of communication while hamper­
ing the guerrilla movement.

(4) With the augmentation of automatic
weapons the military police have the
ability for conducting fast raids
or patrols into guerrilla operational
areas. Mobility, communications, and
training provide the base that allows
the military police unit to effectively
perform this task. The posture of the
military police performing this role is
improved with knowledge of the area
gained from patrolling and coopera­
tion with the local police.

(5) A major role in any counterguerrilla
operation is the control of individuals,
a normal police function. The control
of individuals is, in part, within the
area of police intelligence. This may
be extended to include operation of
checkpoints, inspection of identifica­
tion cards and travel permits, enforce­
ment of curfew regulations, and in­
vestigation of movements. Also in­
cluded in the control of movements of
weapons, food, medicine, and other
items beneficial to the guerrilla.
Prompt police action in the control of
individuals reduces the possibility of
civilian support reaching the guerrilla
and of mob action and riots taking
place. If a riot occurs, the military
police are trained in mob and riot con­trol.

(6) Another common military police task
is providing physical security to indi­
viduals and installations, to include
towns and villages. While performing
this security the military police unit is
offensively oriented to defeat possible
guerrilla activity.

f. Police Intelligence. The development of a
police intelligence operation by the indigenous
police and the military police complements the
overall intelligence program by suppying infor­
mation. Police intelligence includes—

(1) An identification program with finger­
print, photograph, and description
activities.
(2) Establishment of police files, a part of
which will be central information file,
modus operandi file, and police records
section.
(3) It may be necessary to organize a spe­
cial information section which would
maintain contacts to furnish informa­
tion which could assist in the control
of individuals, prevention of crime,
and the processing of valuable informa­
tion.

85. Transportation Services

In accordance with the country plan, U.S.
Army Transportation Corps units may be re­
quired to support U.S. and indigenous forces in
the host country. Usually high priority require­
ments will exist for general purpose aviation
units and transportation aircraft maintenance
detachments. There may also be requirements
for motor transport units, although, as a gen­
eral rule, host countries possessing good routes
of communication will usually have adequate
ground transport. When the U.S. Army com­
ponent of a MAAG/Mission or other command
has the responsibility for terminal operations,
some motor transportation may be required.
Additionally, much of the U.S. force structure
lacks organic vehicular transportation which
could be provided by transportation light truck
companies. Other U.S. Army transportation
corps units which may be employed in a host
country are transportation boat companies,
floating craft maintenance teams, terminal serv­
ice teams, and railway service units. When re­
quired, all transportation units can make valua­
ble contributions to counterguerrilla operations
for good

86. Supply

a. Indigenous receiving and disburse­
ance Progranose

b. Support
63

can be expected that it of POL at local or user storage sites troops in a host country imposes a of the teams and detachments do not which should be appropriately marked insurgency effort, generators for small perishables and some staple items of have a capability to receive and store to insure that they are always used for transport. Most shipments will be in may cause larger than usual stockpiles the necessary components to supple­ ing facilities to prepare meals from issue rations. In a long range counter­...distribution problem for rations. Many issued which will enable refrigerators...sent local perishables. Order and ac­ ment local perishables. Order and ac­... adequacy of routes of communication,...able contributions to the host country's civic improve­ ment programs by providing transportation for goods and services. Back haul should be planned and exploited for this purpose.

86. Supply and Maintenance

a. Indigenous Forces. Normally a host country receiving support under the Military Assistance Program will have and operate its own logistics system. When such is not the case, it may be necessary to provide U.S. Army units to operate supply points and depots and direct and general support units to perform various ech­ els of maintenance. U.S. Army supply and maintenance units should integrate indigenous personnel into their own organizations, when qualified by training, as rapidly as possible.

b. Support for U.S. Forces. The size and degree of dispersion of the in-country U.S. force will largely determine the type supply and maintenance organizations required. Experience has shown that even though units and personnel are widely dispersed, garrison type support is the most practical. Unless the host country requests a large combat task force, or requires extensive U.S. combat service support, there is no requirement for a logistical command or comparable organization. Elements of the military services, each with its own capa­ bilities, may share in providing common sup­ port items and services. It will be the usual practice to provide general support from estab­ lished logistical installations in the overseas theater or from CONUS as required. However, there are certain areas in supply and maintenance which present unusual requirements.

(1) The nature and employment of U.S. Army aviation units may require an increase above the normal for aircraft maintenance support. This is brought about by the requirement for detach­ ing subordinate aviation companies or elements to support indigenous units and thereby separating them from their normal supply and maintenance support. Additional transportation aircraft maintenance detachments and teams should be provided to support detached units. These detachments and teams can be further organized into small mobile maintenance teams to repair deadlined aircraft on the spot. Organic and supporting aircraft maintenance units should be prepared to carry a large quantity of slower moving repair parts. Accurate records and data on consumption factors must be maintained.

(2) Normally class III and IIIA (POL) requirements will involve the largest tonnages to be handled within a host country to support U.S. counterin­ surgency forces. Due to the usual inadequacy of routes of communication, POL bulk reduction points must be established to facilitate movement to the user. These bulk reduction points should be located as close to the users as possible. It can be expected that large quantities of packaged POL will be moved by both fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Weather considerations may cause larger than usual stockpiles of POL at local or user storage sites when movement is dependent on air transport. Most shipments will be in 55-gallon drums and five-gallon cans which should be appropriately marked to insure that they are always used for the same type fuel. Planners should make provisions for testing of petroleum products.

(3) The probable wide dispersion of U.S. troops in a host country imposes a distribution problem for rations. Many of the teams and detachments do not have a capability to receive and store perishables and some staple items of food, nor do they have adequate mess­ ing facilities to prepare meals from issue rations. In a long range counter­insurgency effort, generators for small detachments power supply may be issued which will enable refrigerators and freezers to be utilized. Usually, a centrally located commissary, operated by the embassy or MAAG, can provide the necessary components to supple­ment local perishables. Order and ac­ countability procedures should be suffi­ ciently flexible to accommodate remotely located field detachments and
an austere transportation system. Deliveries frequently can be accomplished only once or twice a week, and often only by air. In some situations, it may be necessary to resort to parachute delivery. The commissary or other established ration point should be prepared to package class I items to fit the method of delivery and to prevent spoilage before consumption. U.S. personnel working with indigenous units should make every possible effort to exist on the indigenous diet. The attendant physical difficulties that will accompany the adjustment in dietary habits must often be accepted if the U.S. Advisor is to be effective.

4. Requirements for clothing and individual equipment are minimal because the tour of duty in the host country is usually short. Special items of clothing and equipment required may be issued to individuals on arrival at a staging or processing center.

5. The provision of ordnance maintenance support will depend on the amount of ordnance equipment to be supported. Deployed operational units which have considerable organic ordnance equipment should be authorized additional maintenance personnel and tools to allow a partial third echelon maintenance capability. Ordnance direct support maintenance units may be required to support U.S. Army units within a host country which lacks a sound maintenance capability. Such maintenance units should be authorized a maintenance float or excess stockage to permit exchange of equipment to the user and the evacuation of deadline equipment which requires higher echelons of maintenance. The employment and training of indigenous labor in ordnance maintenance units will contribute to the civic action program and reduce the number of U.S. military personnel required in a host country.

87. Morale Services

a. General. Counterinsurgency forces may be deployed to a host country in which provisions have not been made for certain ancillary support activities. These include postal, finance, army exchange, and chaplain services.

b. Postal. U.S. mail service to a particular country will always be available. Frequent delivery of mail to the many dispersed elements and personnel of a U.S. Army counterinsurgency force can assist in maintaining high morale. Procedures should be established to coordinate delivery of mail with air courier and transport service.

c. Finance. Procedures established for payment of MAAG/Mission personnel are usually adequate for U.S. Army counterinsurgency forces. Troops operating in remote areas should be afforded the opportunity to secure U.S. Treasury checks payable to a designated recipient. Provisions should also be made for cashing personal checks. Any of the U.S. military services may be charged with providing finance services for all U.S. military elements within a host country.

d. Exchange Service. Post exchange facilities are normally located only where there are troop concentrations. The responsibility for exchange operations may be charged to any one of the military services. Provisions should be made for delivery to troops who do not have access to an exchange with attendant flexible mail order and credit procedures. Small mobile exchange units containing fast moving items and mounted on vehicles or aircraft may make scheduled visits to outlying areas. Establishment of delivery service to remote areas can be coordinated with other agencies having movement requirements.

e. Chaplain. As with the other ancillary support activities, it is not feasible to provide complete chaplain coverage for all the widely dispersed troops. It should be a standard practice to station chaplains in the headquarters area and/or areas of troop density with these chaplains conducting services at outlying detachments on a circuit rider basis. A chaplain should be ready to go anywhere in the country when troops cannot come to him. Minimal but
essential chaplain support may be provided by special forces chaplains, or U.S. Armed Forces chaplains assigned to MAAG's or other agencies. In exceptional circumstances American or foreign missionaries and selected indigenous clergy may be requested to provide for U.S. personnel the opportunity to worship, the administration of sacraments, certain other religious activities and, in some cases, limited counseling.

f. Legal Assistance. During planning for force requirements, the provisions of legal assistance service for U.S. military personnel should be considered. In countries where only a small contingent is deployed, the U.S. Embassy may be requested to provide minimal support. It may not be feasible, however, to provide full legal assistance to all dispersed personnel at all times. For emergency cases procedures should be established which authorize personnel to travel to the nearest contact point for legal assistance.
PART THREE
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
CHAPTER 7
INTELLIGENCE

88. General

a. An adequate and timely intelligence effort in support of U.S. policies and actions is vital to the achievement of U.S. overseas internal defense objectives.

b. See FM 31-22A.

c. See FM 31-22A.

d. In broadest terms, intelligence can be used in counterinsurgency to determine the causes of popular discontent, to obtain information about the enemy, weather, terrain, and indigenous people as a whole, to deny information to the enemy and to identify subversive elements in the country suffering the insurgency.

e. The purpose of this chapter is to isolate the problem, examine the requirements, and provide guidance for the solution to intelligence and counterintelligence requirements peculiar to counterinsurgency at all levels, but particularly those that confront the SAF.

89. The Role of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency

a. See FM 31-22A.

b. See FM 31-22A.

c. Phase II insurgency will be marked by additional requirements for intelligence. Combat intelligence efforts to find and identify the insurgent who now, overtly, is conducting harassing and interdiction operations, increase in importance. The nature of guerrilla warfare, characterized by sudden attacks against targets of the guerrillas' own choosing and followed by rapid dispersion, make heavy demands on intelligence to find the enemy. All activities of intelligence agencies in phase I continue and are intensified in phase II; additional assets and resources may have to be developed. The liaison, training, and advisory roles of counterinsurgency forces are intensified. Intelligence training programs are initiated after requirements have been assessed. There is a constant revision of intelligence and counterintelligence estimates, collection efforts are coordinated, the dissemination and use of intelligence is assessed.

d. Phase III insurgency intelligence activities resemble those conducted under conditions of prolonged combat.

90. The Responsibilities of the Force Intelligence Officer

a. The desired qualifications of the key intelligence officer of a U.S. Army counterinsurgency force are manifold. Ideally, the force intelligence officer should possess as many of the below listed qualifications as possible. He should be a qualified combat arms officer. He must be thoroughly schooled and experienced in military intelligence procedures including all those activities and products associated with combat intelligence, strategic intelligence, counterintelligence, intelligence collection, and technical, communications and electronics intelligence. Ideally, he should be a specialist on the area in which he is to operate and be language qualified.

b. The responsibilities of the intelligence officer include but are not limited to those delineated in FM 101-5 and FM 30-5. He must be capable of employing expedients and exercising initiative and ingenuity, based on experience, in very sensitive areas of endeavor.
c. In the beginning, the intelligence officer contributes most to the commander and other staff officers by making detailed intelligence and counterintelligence estimates of the situation. The assembly of all available intelligence bearing on the area facilitates the start of an area study, if required. FM 31-21 contains an area study outline for special forces personnel. While this study outline is oriented toward guerrilla warfare, rather than to counterinsurgency, the basic elements to be studied are much the same. FM 30-5 and FM 33-5 give further guidance on area analysis. The necessity for adequate map and air photo coverage for planning and preparation of estimates by all staff sections places this requirement early on the intelligence officer. He must have appropriate map indices not only for his own use but for the convenience of other planners. See FM 101-10 and FM 30-5.

d. In the discharge of his responsibilities the intelligence officer must plan for, direct, and supervise the activities of the SAF intelligence augmentation detachment. This detachment as presently composed has the capability of preparing operational plans, determining the intelligence training requirements for the host country's armed forces, preparing a complete intelligence training program, and either supervising, training, or assisting the indigenous intelligence units in the conduct of their operations. Doctrinal guidance for utilization of intelligence specialists is contained in the pertinent DOD publications, Army Regulations, Field Manuals, Pamphlets, and 30-series TOE. Basic individual training in collecting and reporting military information is contained in DA Pam 21-81. The specialists constitute the school trained, skilled and experienced cells that will conduct most of the specialized activities in the intelligence effort. Decision making rests on their efforts. The intelligence officer must make full and correct use of these assets. All personnel involved in advising on intelligence matters within a host country must be conscious of the sensitive manner in which such subjects are dealt with by their indigenous counterparts.

e. See FM 31-22A.

91. Intelligence Requirements and Special Considerations
a. Basic Intelligence. See FM 31-22A.
b. Phase I. See FM 31-22A.
c. Phase II. See FM 31-22A.
d. Phase III. See FM 31-22A.
e. Special Considerations.

(1) Intelligence agencies at all levels supporting counterinsurgency may expect many factors limiting their overall efficiency. Planning in advance may lessen the impact of these factors. The following are general categories:
(a) Insurgent penetration of the host country governmental structure.
(b) Lack of a national registry or census data.
(c) Apathy and/or lack of a spirit of cooperation.
(d) Lack of an adequate governmental structure to receive the preferred military or economic aid.
(e) Language difficulties; inability to communicate.
(f) Personality conflicts.
(g) Lack of trained personnel.
(h) Lack of adequate funds and materiel support.
(i) Lack of proper and timely guidance.
(j) Personality of chief executive of host country, his cabinet and advisors.
(k) Political factionalism in-country.
(l) Excessive centralization of authority.

(2) Formal agreements between the U.S. and the host country, status-of-forces agreements, and other jurisdictional arrangements must be thoroughly understood and complied with for effective bilateral operations. For these reasons, close liaison and coordination must be maintained with the Judge Advocate providing legal support for the command.

(3) The degree of control the government exercises over means of communications has a bearing on intelligence operations.
operations. If censorship is in effect, for example, it may provide support for certain security operations.

(4) The degree of control the host country exercises over telecommunications media, including internal and external cable service, has considerable bearing on the overall efficiency that may be expected for certain operations.

(5) Basic intelligence principles and techniques can be utilized but must be changed to fit the peculiar needs of counterinsurgency. Additionally, the entire intelligence cycle must be speeded up in order to provide the quick response which is necessary. The preparation of elaborate reports, routine dissemination, and like procedures may not be practicable, and if emphasis is placed on such practices the inherent delay will seriously hamper intelligence operations.

(6) There must be a recognition of the difficulties that will be encountered in initiating a sound military intelligence operation. There is often an inherent reluctance on the part of people to accept training or advice in this field. Similarly, political bias or jealousies at the local level often precludes the exchange of vital intelligence information. Maximum efforts are needed to develop the confidence of persons or units being advised and a full appreciation of social and political factors must be developed.

92. The Scope of Intelligence Activities in Counterinsurgency
See FM 31-22A.

93. Relationships, Coordination, and/or Collaboration Within the Intelligence Community
See FM 31-22A.
CHAPTER 8
LOGISTICS PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

94. General

This chapter covers those aspects of logistics peculiar to counterinsurgency operations. Logistics systems are designed to provide adequate support for all types of counterinsurgency operations; however, techniques for logistical support in areas separated from or organic service support must be geared to unique operational requirements and may vary considerably from conventional operations. These principles and techniques for logistical support of counterinsurgency forces are applicable to both U.S. and indigenous forces. Flexibility, responsiveness and improvisation are key factors in supporting counterinsurgency forces, and can be accomplished by:

a. Advance planning, so that units are equipped with minimum essential supplies and equipment consistent with contemplated operations. This is particularly important for operations in remote areas and where adverse weather conditions may be encountered.

b. Stocking supplies at echelons below those at which stockage is normally maintained in order to expedite supply; for example, at regimental bases of operations in populated areas and at battalion bases of operations in remote areas.

c. Making counterinsurgency forces as self-sufficient as is practicable, to include living off the land. Food, supplies, equipment, materials, and facilities requisitioned for military use must be paid for to avoid undesirable psychological effects. In areas where food or other supplies are scarce, local purchase or requisitioning should be prohibited.

d. Accomplishing logistic support by air or water when land transportation cannot provide timely support.

95. Supply and Maintenance

a. Planning for logistic support must be detailed and accomplished as far in advance of operations as is possible. Counterinsurgency forces should be provided with only those supplies and equipment essential to the accomplishment of assigned missions. Unessential items should be left at a base camp or home station so as not to encumber the individual soldier or available transportation. Accompanying supplies and equipment should be of such nature and quantity that they can be man-packed or transported by any means available. Supply procedures and support requirements, especially at the small unit level, should be standardized as much as possible and included in unit SOP's. For example, a one-day requirement for individual, company, battalion and regimental/brigade basic loads of rations, ammunition, medical, signal and other selected essential supplies can be computed using experience factors gained in actual operations. Using this one-day requirement as a standard, supply levels can then be planned based on the length and type of anticipated operations. To facilitate timely support of given operations, standard requirements for companies, battalions and regiments/brigades can be packaged, rigged for air drop or helicopter delivery, and positioned in base areas, ready for immediate delivery.

b. Required quantities of selected expendable and combat essential items should be stocked at secure locations, such as security posts or combat bases, and should be sufficient to support the unit for the number of days of the planned operation. To preclude giving any indication of imminent operations in a given area, it is essential to establish stock levels of all types of supply (to include aviation gasoline in many instances) at outposts and combat bases throughout the tactical area. This action should be taken far in advance of the execution date for operations approach and to confound and to confuse the enemy when of a logistical nature but time, material, and transportation are not available. Under these conditions, using units or other supporting assets that are available may be advisable on a case by case basis, or immediate resupply by air, considering the capability of units, the departure of the department of the resupply through beneficiary. When point in these points are frequently during the movement of the rapid response to confuse the operations, the units should be to preclude and preclude; stock and supplies should be established before call at other

c. Dispersal of combat supplies in nature of this nature should be placed, as well as this does not the attention of the enemy. Assassin will not suffer. Under these conditions, using units or other supporting assets that are available may be advisable on a case by case basis, or immediate resupply by air, considerations the capability of units, the departure of the department of the resupply through beneficiary. When point in these points are frequently during the movement of the rapid response to confuse the operations, the units should be to preclude and preclude; stock and supplies should be established before call at other
c. Dispersed stockage will facilitate support of combat patrols and larger elements operating in relatively inaccessible areas. Stocks of this nature can be quickly supplemented or replaced, as used, by aerial resupply, provided this does not endanger security by focusing attention on the operation and if there is reasonable assurance that the supplies and equipment will not fall into the hands of the enemy. Under these conditions, resupply requests from using units should be handled by the fastest available means, primarily radio, but also relying on runners and prearranged signals when the situation requires. Supporting units should respond with expedited supply action, accomplishing required administrative accountability at a subsequent time.

d. Tactical units should normally receive support from the closest combat operations base or other supply base in or near the area in which they are working. In those instances where resupply of the tactical units must be made by air, consideration should be given to the desirability of using stocks from supply points near the departure airfield. This action may preclude an unnecessary handling of supplies to resupply the forward operations/supply base. When points of contact are used for resupply, these points of contact will be changed frequently during the operation to accommodate the movement of the operation, to insure more rapid response to resupply requirements, and to confuse the enemy. In planning for operations, the combat bases or supply bases which are to provide support should be designated, and prearranged rendezvous points for resupply established. Supply requirements can therefore be called for by code name on a phased basis, or if the situation dictates, delivered on call at other prearranged points.

e. The principle of self-sufficiency should be followed to the maximum practicable extent when units are operating in hostile areas for extended periods and when timely resupply cannot be effected. In carrying out this concept, only essential supplies should be obtained from the local economy. Rapport must be established between the government and the population in operational areas, to ensure that support is readily available and that on-the-spot payment will be made in a satisfactory manner. In areas where food is available, commanders should be provided with funds to purchase food. This will tend to deny food to the enemy. In remote areas where food is normally in short supply, and in order to assist in establishing a feeling of mutual confidence and support, operational forces should consider using food and other needed civilian supplies as payment for services rendered by the civilian community, rather than monetary payment. These supplies should be requested from nearby consolidated supply areas and distributed by the commander in the name of the government.

f. In consideration of the concept of minimum essential supplies and equipment for operating units, it is imperative that the individual soldier be taught the importance of conserving and maintaining his limited supplies and equipment. Mobile maintenance and maintenance of his limited supplies is important in those areas where adverse weather and terrain conditions necessitate more than normal maintenance and where indigenious forces are not fully familiar with the importance of maintenance to the efficient usefulness of weapons and equipment. Preventive maintenance must be continually emphasized. This is of prime importance in those areas where adverse weather and terrain conditions necessitate more than normal maintenance and where indigenious forces are not fully familiar with the importance of maintenance to the efficient usefulness of weapons and equipment. Mobile maintenance teams from combat service support units should be available to use units to assist in preparation for operations and in rapid recovery from completed operations. In those operations where maintenance services cannot accompany combat units, direct exchange of unserviceable items, such as weapons and radios, must be provided for in the selected stockage which is positioned at security posts or combat bases.

g. Personnel are instructed to destroy discarded supplies and equipment to prevent conversion by the insurgents into vital food needs, weapons or other items. Procedures should be established to safeguard against the loss of equipment by individual soldiers. Such proce-
dures might include an educational program indicating the danger to the unit and to the individual through failure to safeguard equipment, payment by the soldier for lost items, disciplinary measures where circumstances indicate negligence or carelessness, frequent equipment checks by patrol leaders and commanders, and, in a positive light, reward or commendation for those who continually accept responsibility for the security of their individual equipment.

96. Hospitalization and Evacuation

a. Direct medical support of counterinsurgency operations may be as unconventional as the combat operation itself. Since these operations normally involve small, mobile combat units with few or no organic medical personnel, initial emergency medical treatment will be by attached aidmen, by the buddy system, or by self-aid. Because of the shortage of sufficient numbers of qualified medical personnel, training of all combat soldiers should emphasize the practical application of emergency treatment, i.e., pressure bandages, tourniquets, splints, recognition of shock, and so forth, to insure essential initial treatment. Medical personnel must be trained and qualified to accompany airborne units on operations, or to parachute into isolated areas to provide additional medical support to operational units.

b. Units operating in remote areas may be required to hold casualties for extended periods of time before evacuation can be effected. When the combat situation allows, medical evacuation should be accomplished expeditiously to the nearest medical facility, using the best available means of transportation. Emphasis should be placed on air evacuation of wounded, supplemented by porters and pack animals. Evacuation procedures should be reflected in unit SOP’s, and be flexible enough to facilitate use of various modes of transportation appropriate to the terrain and operational conditions. The commander and staff of the indigenous force must be advised of the necessity for including medical evacuation in their operational planning. Knowledge of an existing plan for medical evacuation will improve the morale, and consequently, combat effectiveness, of the counterinsurgency force.

c. When operational conditions permit, medical personnel accompanying counterinsurgency units should provide all possible medical treatment, equipment, and supplies to the civilian sick and injured. Excess depot stocks or medicines approaching unserviceable dates could be specifically provided for this purpose.

97. Transportation

a. The objective of transportation planning for counterinsurgency operations is to provide a reliable transportation system responsive to the requirements of tactics and logistics, capable of operating over varied and difficult terrain, and employing the various modes of conventional transportation and those unconventional means not organic to units. Control of transportation should pass to the appropriate commander during operations, reverting to the parent unit upon completion of the mission.

b. Certain unique transportation problems must be considered in providing transportation support to counterinsurgency operations. Support must be provided under all conditions. Minimum essential items required in support of unit operations, which cannot be man-packed by the soldier or carried by organic vehicles because of terrain conditions, must be transported by other modes of transportation, such as bicycles, indigenous porters, pack animals and rafts and sampans. Such modes of transportation should be planned far in advance, and SOP’s and control organizations developed to control their use. These procedural guides should be flexible enough to enable the various modes of transportation to be selected based on terrain, environmental and operational conditions. Unconventional modes of transportation will back up aerial logistic support to forward isolated areas as necessary to accomplish the mission.

c. SOP’s should include provisions for security of the resupply element, not only on its way to the unit concerned, but on its return trip. Based on availability and the nature of operations, tracked and/or armored vehicles may be effectively employed for security of convoys and as logistical carriers.
98. Construction

Construction performed by tactical units operating in hostile areas will normally be limited to pioneer activities. This includes provision of shelters, the clearing of trails and drop zones by machete, and construction of access roads, bridges and ferries.
CHAPTER 9
COMMUNICATIONS

99. General

This chapter will cover basic communications requirements in support of counterinsurgency operations. It covers not only the communications systems required in support of the Special Action Force operations within a disturbed country, but also the general civilian and military communications of the indigenous forces within the country. Throughout it should be remembered that military civic action in provision of better indigenous communication facilities, to include training for indigenous personnel, not only serves the normal purposes of military civic action, but also provides additional active communications support and facilities for the tactical aspects of counterguerrilla warfare.

100. The Communications Problem in Counterinsurgency

For protection against attack by counterinsurgency forces, insurgent elements generally attempt to operate in terrain which is rugged and inaccessible to large, conventionally equipped military forces. These areas generally are mountainous, swampy, or jungle in nature. Within these areas it is difficult to obtain reliable, secure, and rapid communication for both the insurgents and the counterinsurgency forces alike. The various communications methods which may be used to support counterinsurgency operations are the following:

a. Radio. The most flexible, reliable, and rapid method of communication in rugged terrain is radio. The ability to communicate by radio over mountains, through swamps and to a lesser extent, through jungle makes radio an extremely valuable means of communications in the hands of counterinsurgency forces. However, the use of radio under these conditions requires prior planning, good training, communications security and thorough maintenance.

b. Wire. The establishment of wire lines in rugged terrain is generally impractical, primarily because of the difficulties in laying wire through areas with marginal roads. While it is possible to fly wire by aircraft where there are no roads, such wire lines are easy prey for destruction by either insurgent forces or the weather. In countries or areas faced with problems of insurgency, wire communications are not considered as a major method of communication except in those areas which are well-populated and controlled by security forces.

c. Other Methods of Communications. Other traditional means of communication, such as use of messengers, visual signals, and sound signals also play a role in providing communications. However, their use and effectiveness in support of counterinsurgency operations is generally limited by time and distance.

101. Communications Resources

The civilian and military communications systems within a disturbed country or area are generally primitive and inadequate by modern standards. In most cases, they will pose a serious problem to counterinsurgency forces.

a. Civilian communications facilities will usually be limited. Equipment will likely be obsolescent, unreliable and located only in heavily populated urban areas. Major cities usually will have some form of a local telephone system, but in rural areas, telephone systems will be marginal or nonexistent and radio or messenger service will likely provide the only links in communications.

b. As a rule, military communications in disturbed countries or areas generally will be better and more dependable than their counter-
part civilian communications. Indigenous military units situated in designated areas or zones usually will be linked together by radio. However, much of their equipment will probably be of World War II vintage and may often be of other than US manufacture. While better than the civilian radio systems, military radio communications still will probably not meet modern standards and probably will not adequately meet counterinsurgency communication needs.

c. When communications are poor or marginal in quality, counterinsurgency forces are at a disadvantage. Consequently, one of the major requirements in the support of counterinsurgency operations is the improvement of existing communication. A village radio system for both security and administration is vital to the operation of an effective counterinsurgency operation. The hardware for this radio system will frequently be developed and funded through USOM channels and resources.

102. Communications Requirements

The requirement for improving communications in a country faced with insurgency may be fulfilled in two ways. New communications equipment may be introduced into the country and/or the already existing communications facilities and methods may be improved. In either case, the first step in any program of communications improvement is the development by the SAF/MAAG planner of a comprehensive and thorough survey of the communications systems as they exist. The survey should be as complete as time permits and should give a complete picture of the various communications systems in the country. These include the military communications system, the civilian system, the police system, and any other special system which might exist. The survey should include but not be limited to the following:

a. Communications general background.
b. Wire.
c. Radio.
d. Other methods of communications.
e. Radio broadcasting stations and television.
f. Communication training.
g. Electric power.
h. Special factors.
i. Sources of information for survey.
j. Recommendations.

103. Measures to Improve Communications

Measures which may be taken to improve existing communications in a country faced with insurgency, in addition to the introduction of new equipment, are as follows:

a. Establishment of better and more thorough maintenance procedures to include special maintenance shops and/or techniques.
b. Modification of existing equipment for increased effectiveness.
c. More effective use of equipment and personnel.
d. Modification of the communications system. However, modification of the existing communication system is generally a major undertaking which requires the full support of the host government.
e. Establishment of a training program to increase the number and raise the caliber of communications personnel. The program may include the establishment of schools, special courses, and supervised on-the-job training. Overall training should stress the practical aspects of communications, rather than concentrating on theory. One manner in which maximum effectiveness can be obtained, particularly with limited numbers of personnel, is to cross-train personnel in equipment and procedures.

104. Tactical Considerations

When insurgency reaches phase II or III intensities, more emphasis must be placed on tactical communications. The success of counter-guerrilla operations, both defensive and offensive, depends now more than ever directly upon reliable and rapid communications. Even though all methods and means of communication are used, the method of primary importance is radio. Through radio, effective and rapid control may be established and maintained over widely scattered and dispersed units, particularly those operating in rugged and adverse terrain. In addition, radio can be used by villages and hamlets to provide rapid
and early warning of guerrilla attacks and for the dissemination of timely information regarding insurgent activities. With regard to the use of radio in counterguerrilla operations, consideration should be given to the following:

a. Radio intercept serves as a means by which well-organized insurgent forces may learn of impending counterguerrilla operations in time to escape or evade an attack. Communications therefore should stress security even though specific operations may often be designed to be accomplished so rapidly that guerrilla elements will not be able to take advantage of their intercepted information. The following are a few of the standard communications techniques which can be applied to assist in maintaining security:

1. Stations can use different frequencies for transmission and reception.
2. Transmission sites can be changed frequently; transmissions can be made just prior to moving to a new location.
3. Transmissions can be made at scheduled but irregular intervals.
4. Brevity codes to reduce the length of transmission should be used as often as possible.
5. Keep transmission to a minimum.
6. Encrypt all transmissions.
7. Avoid predictable operations in communications.

b. It is important that counterinsurgency forces at all levels be able to rapidly and effectively communicate with one another. This communications capability does not have to be direct, but the systems used should insure that there is a minimum of delay involved.

c. Although transistorized, modularized and single-sideband (SSB) radios are in use for our own forces it is likely that the standard radios of World War II will comprise for some time the principal types available for counterguerrilla communications.

105. U.S. Army and Special Action Force (SAF) Communications

a. U.S. Army communications channels into a disturbed country or area will be provided by one or more terminal stations of the Defense Communication Agency Network, an integrated world-wide U.S. military communications system. This system, providing immediate voice and teletype circuits, has the capability for linking terminal commands as well as with CONUS.

b. Within the Special Action Force (SAF), integral special forces communications elements will provide communications for subordinate units of the SAF and, if required, provide a link between an operational base and elements of the SAF operating in remote areas of the country.

c. The special forces operational base communication complex, described in FM 31–21 can, with little modification, support the SAF in counterinsurgency operations.

106. General

a. Field reports to a threat of actual, actual, and psychological activities, in foreign areas of the local government, must understand that the insurgent must understand the nature of the invitation to participate in the grandiose nature, in the maximum, an invitation to cap
CHAPTER 10
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

106. General

a. Fields in which the U.S. can provide support to a developing nation in countering the threat of insurgency, whether potential or actual, are—civic action, community development, social projects, health and sanitation, education, agriculture, transportation, communications, labor and youth activities, police, and military activities. Inherent in each and overlapping all fields of activity is the politico-psychological field. This field, interwoven with each of the other programs, is of extreme importance and may very well be the final determining factor in the success or failure of all areas of endeavor. Every action or inaction of the local government, and all aspects of the support provided by the U.S. have both political and psychological implications. As such, psychological operations programs are part of all activities in countering subversive insurgency and are indispensable to the overall U.S. effort.

b. When preparing plans for the conduct of psychological operations at both the national level and the local level, and in all phases of insurgency, it must be borne in mind that there are three major target audiences—the armed forces of the host country, the civil population, and the insurgent. The first two of these audiences must understand that U.S. participation in the counterinsurgency effort is both legal and necessary; that the U.S. is participating at the invitation of proper authority in the host country as an act of collective security; that actions of the United States are designed not to isolate or crush the host nation; and that United States participation is temporary and is advisory in nature, without any desire for territorial aggrandizement. The third audience, the insurgent, must be induced to cease his activities to the maximum extent possible, and as a minimum, an insurgent propaganda campaign seeking to capitalize on the presence of U.S. forces must be countered in advance by the proper use of the above-mentioned themes apropos to the situation.

107. U.S. Army Psychological Operations Responsibilities

Psychological operations are the responsibility of many governmental agencies and departments as well as the services. While each military service has responsibilities for psychological operations in support of its own activities, the U.S. Army is the only service which always operates in the close environment of people. Psychological operations take place mainly in the environment of armies and of soldiers, of guerrillas and local defense forces, and of the people who live on the land. The Army, therefore, has responsibility for maintaining organized units with the primary mission of providing psychological operations support, and is capable of conducting these operations in a primitive and hostile ground environment, or advising and assisting indigenous military forces in conducting such operations. The Army is also responsible for the formal training of officers and men in psychological operations, and is the only service that maintains school facilities for instruction and professional training in psychological operations.

108. U.S. Army Psychological Operations Capabilities

a. The Army has resources, in both individuals and units, for the conduct of psychological operations in counterinsurgency. The employment of these capabilities in specific psychological operations must be coordinated with other government agencies responsible for associated or parallel functions and be in consonance with host country’s objectives and desires. Radio, press, and audio visual means are
and assistance through the employment of individual advisors or mobile training teams. In addition, U.S. forces provide training advice and assistance to friendly foreign governments in counterinsurgency operations, and conduct or assist in the conduct of psychological operations. The terms of reference for MAAG’s and Missions provide for qualified U.S. psychological operations officers on their advisory staffs, who evaluate the requirements for adequate indigenous psychological operations forces and training. The MAAG/Mission advisory effort includes—

(a) Advice in organizing psychological operations units.

(b) Providing necessary mass communications equipment for supported psychological operations units.

(c) Establishing psychological operations schools.

(d) Augment the capabilities of USIS and support other U.S. civil agencies.

(e) Advise in the preparation of propaganda programs, materials and the conduct of psychological operations.

(2) The type and capabilities of psychological operations forces organized in friendly foreign nations through the military aid program are evaluated in the context of cold war and hot war requirements. In those countries where potential or incipient insurgency exists, the emphasis is placed on the development of psychological operations forces to provide an internal counterinsurgency operational capability. The type of units organized and the training provided emphasize psychological activities at the local level among the civilian population. These requirements are supported by a more sophisticated military psychological planning and production capability at the national level to support field requirements.

c. Advice and Assistance to Indigenous Forces.

(1) In those foreign countries supported by the U.S., the normal activity of army psychological operations personnel is to provide advice in the conduct of psychological operations by the indigenous forces. Planning is directed to insure adequate coverage of the whole country. Only in cases where local psychological operations forces are nonexistent or inadequate should it be necessary to provide operational assistance. It is normally not politically acceptable or prudent to have U.S. military personnel actually conducting psychological operations for the indigenous government. The use of military psychological operations in counterinsurgency operations augments activities of the civilian information agencies and is closely coordinated with them. This is required because the target audiences of both agencies overlap and are often identical, particularly in those cases where U.S. advisors are working directly with paramilitary forces, self-defense forces and tribal groups.

(2) The Role of the Individual.

(a) The purpose of psychological operations in combating subversive insurgency is to gain and maintain the loyalty of the people towards the government and specifically to win back the support of those elements of the population which are supporting the insurgent force. Every representative of the government, including the personnel of indigenous military forces, is a reflection of the character, vitality, progressiveness and attitude of the government. In many areas of the country, the only members of the national government with whom the people come in contact are military personnel. The manner in which these military personnel act in their association with the people has a definite effect upon their attitude to-
Indigenous forces supported in psychological operations personnel must maintain the conduct of positive psychological operations by the indigenous forces directed in support of the local government. Arrogance on the part of officers and enlisted men towards civilians will turn them away from the government. Recklessly driven and speeding military vehicles have adverse effects on the people. On the other hand, if the soldier treats his fellow citizens with respect, assists them as occasions arise, and maintains a friendly attitude at all times, he is doing a great part in winning support of the population. He is performing his task in the conduct of positive psychological operations. The role of the individual soldier cannot be overemphasized. His face-to-face contact with the people, a reflection of the government he represents, is a powerful force in the psychological battle between the opposing forces. While this is a normal command responsibility, the psychological operations advisor can do much to emphasize its importance to the overall psychological operations program.

(b) Similarly, the role of the U.S. officer and enlisted man is of great importance in psychological operations. Personnel on duty in foreign countries, particularly in the countryside, have a profound effect on the image the civilian has of the United States. The importance of being a "grass roots ambassador" is apparent in order to offset the image of the United States projected by the communists. All personnel must be imbued with a spirit of helpfulness and understanding of the local people and their problems.

d. Support to U.S. Civil Agencies.

(1) As the official U.S. overseas information and propaganda agency, USIA, through its overseas service (USIS), conducts operations on a world-wide basis. In some areas operations in support of Country Team requirements have been so extensive that they strain the capabilities and resources of USIS, especially in emergency situations requiring immediate action. In this regard, the personnel and materiel assets of army psychological operations organizations are often called upon to augment existing USIS facilities. In most cases these army resources would be deployed to provincial/village level where they are capable of operating effectively under hostile or primitive conditions.

(2) The range of support which army psychological operations are capable of furnishing U.S. civil agencies includes propaganda research, analysis, intelligence, content development, news collection, broadcast monitoring, and the hardware of mass communications media, together with pertinent skills. These elements may be in direct support of the PAO, and under the administrative control of the MAAG, Mission or Army Attaché. While use of army psychological operations assets to augment USIS occurs primarily in potential subversive insurgent areas, it may be necessary to continue such support during periods of higher intensity insurgent activity.

(3) Support requirements for other agencies are provided as directed.

(4) It is reiterated that psychological operations, particularly at the local level, must be conducted by indigenous personnel and attributed wholly to the host government.

(5) It is vital that the key communicators in the host country be employed and that face-to-face communications be utilized wherever possible.

(6) The lack of radios and movie theaters, and the high illiteracy rate, etc., will preclude the use of sophisticated communication media and the operator must seek other means of disseminating propaganda based on local facilities and patterns of behavior, e.g., use of itinerant troubadours and puppet shows.
CHAPTER 11
INDIGENOUS PARAMILITARY FORCES

111. General

a. Paramilitary forces are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resemble them in organization, equipment and mission.

b. The size and organization of paramilitary forces will vary considerably in countries which are likely targets for subversive insurgency. In some countries, paramilitary units provide the major source for both internal and external security. In other countries, paramilitary forces are relatively small, being comprised primarily of police organizations concerned with law, order, and internal security.

c. This chapter describes some of the types of indigenous paramilitary units which might exist in some countries, the necessity for these forces, their capabilities, and some problems which may be encountered in screening, organizing, equipping, supplying, training, and paying them.

112. Paramilitary Organizations

There are numerous titles for the various paramilitary organizations located in the different parts of the world, such as civil or home guard units, constabulary police, volunteer defense corps, gendarmerie and many others; however, this chapter will be limited to a discussion of only four general types: civil police, civil guard, self defense units, and civil defense groups.

a. Civil Police. Most governments depend primarily on a police force to constitute the first line of defense against subversion and insurgency. Police are normally trained and equipped to deal with conspiracy, subversion, and minor forms of violence. Police are also a sensitive point of contact between the government and its citizenry, close to focal points of unrest, and recognized as keepers of law and order over a long period of time. Generally, police are armed and wear a uniform. They perform police and internal security duties throughout the country. They exercise law enforcement, intelligence and countersubversive duties as directed by appropriate authority. They also support indigenous army units in punitive actions and relieve military units of internal security duties in pacified areas. If the insurgency escalates into a phase II situation, the organizational capabilities of the police force in the affected area may rapidly deteriorate and be eliminated as an effective law enforcement agency. In a phase III situation, where areas change hands frequently, police may lose their identity completely. In most countries, civil police may be divided into three types—national police, municipal police and rural police. In some countries rural police functions may be performed by the national police.

(1) National police are comprised of both uniformed and nonuniformed personnel and are directed and supervised by an agency of the national government. This agency, usually headed by a civilian, may also be responsible for administering the nation's armed forces. National police perform police functions that relate to law enforcement and security measures which are promulgated at the national level. National police are organized along military lines and their authority transcends all political boundaries within the country.

(2) Municipal police are uniformed civilian police who perform law enforcement missions in urban areas. They are usually under control of the town or city authorities. These police are armed and may possess limited quantities of short range radios. Their au-
Although these forces are usually comprised of both uniformed and non-uniformed volunteers, they are organized and trained to provide local and internal security within a given political subdivision. The organization of these units, however, may be similar to regular army units. They are frequently constituted from volunteers indigenous to the area, whose knowledge of the terrain and people is equal to that of the insurgents. Civil guard units are composed of uniformed and armed personnel and have the primary mission of relieving the national army of internal security duties. Armament for civil guards will consist primarily of individual weapons, light machine guns, and small mortars. Communications equipment, at best, will be provided on an austere basis. Civil guard units are usually of battalion and company size and may be trained to perform limited combat tactical missions. More often they are charged with enforcing the law and maintaining public order and security in rural areas. In its security role, civil guard units conduct raids, ambushes, and limited objective attacks, either alone or with self defense units, regular army units, or with both. Civil guard units may be called upon to reinforce security posts under insurgency attack or to pursue the insurgents after their withdrawal.

c. Self Defense Units. The self defense units are normally found to be the primary paramilitary force charged with the responsibility for the security of the villages and hamlets, guarding headquarters, bridges, and key intersections, local airstrips, and conducting limited offensive missions. These units are made up of local volunteers and organized into platoons or squads. They are prepared to defend their villages at all times. These units man local outposts in villages and towns, engage in periodic around-the-clock perimeter patrols of the community and maintain local alert forces available for defense missions. In limited offensive missions, self defensive units employ patrols, ambushes and raids. To a lesser extent, they participate in large scale attacks with the civil guard, regular army, or both. Additionally, they may assist emergency relief missions in local areas struck by fire, flood, storms, or other natural disasters. Self defense units are armed and, often, wear a uniform which identifies them as belonging to the self defense organization.

d. Civil Defense Groups. Although these groups are somewhat similar to self defense units in mission, organization, capabilities, and functions, they are treated separately because of their origin, status, and method of management and support. Also, the requirement for these forces is generated only after an escalation of the insurgency to a phase II situation. Civil defense groups are more likely to be identified with primitive tribes in distant and remote areas, people in rural areas, minority ethnic groups, and miscellaneous groups such as workmen's militia, youth organizations and female auxiliaries. They are usually a non-uniformed, unpaid, part-time volunteer force. Normally, the civil guard is organized and trained for a limited counterinsurgency role as hunter-killer teams, trail watchers, and for border surveillance, and to a lesser extent in the ambush and raid of insurgent forces.

113. Necessity for Paramilitary Forces

a. In countering insurgency, it is dangerous for the national government to utilize all its
regular military forces on static security duty throughout the country. It is essential that paramilitary forces be organized to perform static security missions in order that the national army may be relieved of these tasks to concentrate on offensive operations. Additionally, paramilitary units can support the national army in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations when the latter are being conducted in their own province or political subdivision.

b. The organization of paramilitary units and the maintenance of these units at the local level, not only gives the local population a feeling of security and increases their morale, but it makes them a part of the national effort.

c. The organization and presence of effective local defense units can neutralize the insurgents' efforts to gain support from the people; the insurgent must face the realization that it may now be necessary to fight for support, whereas before, persuasion or threats were sufficient.

114. Responsibilities of the Indigenous Government

a. When civilians cooperate or join the paramilitary units in campaigning against the insurgents, it must be remembered that they do so at a certain sacrifice and risk to themselves. This fact is often forgotten or ignored. In soliciting civilian cooperation, the government, particularly the armed forces, must be ready to assume some responsibilities. Most important of these responsibilities is the protection of the lives and property of the civilians who run the risk of being listed for reprisal by the insurgents. The government should also provide funds for families of those members who are killed in action. Additionally, financial aid should be provided for the support of the families of paramilitary force personnel whose military duties prevent them from pursuing their regular occupations.

b. Being aware of these responsibilities is not enough. It is important that the government assure the people that it stands ready to reward citizens who demonstrate their loyalty by cooperating with the armed forces.

115. Training Paramilitary Forces

a. Requirements.

(1) The paramilitary force training program should insure the development of basic military skills and, at the same time, promote long-term benefits by providing citizenship training.

(2) Instruction given to paramilitary forces should be based on local geographic considerations and emphasize those tactics and techniques which are most applicable to the particular unit and its respective mission.

(3) Paramilitary training programs should insure that behind all counterinsurgency actions stands the operative governmental authority for which the paramilitary force acts only as an agent. Throughout the conduct of military training programs, attention should be focused on the government's plans and policies which must be implemented.

(4) Training programs should emphasize instruction for positive political behavior, protection of the population under combat conditions, and rendering military civic action in both secure and crisis areas.

(5) The control of available training centers or areas should be centralized to assure maximum utilization of all facilities.

b. Type Training Programs. Suggested training programs for paramilitary units are contained in appendix VII.

117. Pay of civilians

a. A stanza of the paramilitary force insures civilizational morale protection.

(1) The employment of the paramilitary force is a cooperative effort with the government. The employment of the paramilitary force, however, is under the authority of the government.

(2) Citizens who cooperate in the paramilitary force should be provided with financial assistance from the government.

116. U.S. Assistance

Assistance for organizing, equipping, and training paramilitary forces may be provided through the Military Assistance Program, the U.S. AID Mission (for civil police), or other elements of the Country Team. The MAAG/Mission in the host country provides and directs the advisory support effort involving the MAP. Representatives of U.S. AID Mission are responsible for supervising the assistance provided by that agency. The Special Action Force, under command of the MAAG/Mission or other...
U.S. component provides advisory personnel and mobile training teams to advise, train and provide operational assistance for paramilitary forces. In coordination with representatives of U.S. AID Mission, the military police detachment and other appropriate elements of the Special Action Force may be required to assist in the training of the civil police.

117. Pay and Benefits

a. A standard prescribed pay scale for paramilitary forces favorable to that of the indigenous civilians should be established to alleviate morale problems.

(1) Monetary payments for self defense type personnel should be based on that of the local economy. In certain circumstances it may be advisable or appropriate to provide part or all of the compensation for self defense personnel in the form of commodities in kind, particularly foodstuffs, provided from U.S. surplus stocks under PL 480.

(2) Civil guard units should be paid on a standard which is in consonance with operational requirements.

b. Paramilitary personnel should be paid in proportion to the time devoted to the cause.

c. A survival benefits program should be established for dependents of paramilitary personnel.

d. Payments should be timely and accurate. From past experience this has proven to be one of the most critical factors.

118. Supply and Equipment

Equipment and supplies for the various indigenous paramilitary forces may be provided through the national government's military logistics system. Advantages which might accrue from such a support arrangement are—

a. Accounting and control.


c. Cooperation between military and paramilitary units.

d. Economy in administration and overhead.
PART FOUR
TRAINING
CHAPTER 12
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR U.S. ARMY COUNTERINSURGENCY FORCES

119. General
a. Training of U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces stresses the development of skills, concepts, and procedures that must be taught to host country forces and the learning and teaching techniques required to impart these skills to individuals whose cultural background differs from that of the U.S. soldier. Training emphasis on what and how to teach indigenous forces will vary, according to the country requirements, force composition, and U.S. programs. However, U.S. standards of training for combat, combat support, and combat service support units provide the basic guides for preparing U.S. forces to advise host military authorities in the organization and methods of employment of indigenous forces combatting insurgents. Individual training for U.S. personnel should include development of proficiency in basic MOS skills, area orientation, varying degrees of language skill, and physical conditioning. When feasible, maximum cross training should be given to members of mobile training teams. Training of MTT's should emphasize instructor skills to include techniques for teaching by demonstration with minimum use of language (voice) and proper techniques for use of interpreters. Consult FM 3–10 for guidance and information concerning training in the use of chemical weapons.

b. Courses of instruction are given by the U.S. Army Special Warfare School and the U.S. Army Civil Affairs School to provide selected officers and noncommissioned officers with a working knowledge of counterinsurgency operations including civic action programs and activities. For course lengths and POI see the current school catalogue published by USCONARC.

120. Special Action Forces
The commander of the special forces group is responsible for the training of all assigned and attached units in the SAF. Normally, those professional skills contained in the various augmentation detachments are MOS-qualified prior to assignment to a SAF. However, the commander must make provisions for service school training of selected personnel in specialized courses such as civil affairs, engineer, medical, psychological operations and intelligence. Area orientation and language training requirements for each SAF differ. The base SAF in CONUS, however, can provide limited predeployment training for detachments in consonance with assignment requirements. Training missions within the SAF are assigned consistent with the availability of instructors, training facilities, and the type training required. Training supervision is centralized and accomplished through the normal chain of command.

121. Special Forces Training
a. Training Objectives. The highly developed capability of special forces to organize, equip, train, and direct indigenous forces, together with their knowledge of guerrilla warfare tactics and techniques makes them effective in counterinsurgency support operations. Special forces predeployment training should also include, as a minimum, the academic subjects listed below. This additional training presumes that Army Training Program requirements have already been satisfied.
b. Area Study. Scope: Geography; population and ethnic groups; communications and transport; industry and agriculture; history; general character of the society; sociology and nationalism; attitudes and reactions; customs and taboos; social values and patterns of living; religion, education, sects and cults; structure of the family; current domestic political situation in the country; national and tactical organization for counterinsurgency operations; U.S. assistance programs; armed forces; paramilitary forces; insurgent forces; civilian defense group concept; physical security; evasion and escape; intelligence situation briefing; public order and safety; returnee briefing; and current intelligence.

c. Democracy vs Communism. Scope: American democracy and political theory; American foreign policy; communist philosophy and objectives; country criticism of the U.S.; and comparison of the democratic and communist systems.

d. Language Study. Scope: Subfluency level of attainment and concentration on military terms and most commonly used words and phrases.

e. Counterinsurgency Operations. Scope: Background; patrolling; intelligence; psychological operations and civic actions; immediate action drills; small unit counterinsurgency tactics; search and seizure techniques; host country air operations to include airmobile operations; methods of instruction in the host country; and tactical deficiencies of host country troops.

f. MOS Training. This training is provided on the basis of MOS requirements.

(1) Weapons and operations. Scope: Organization of the village; development of training and operations programs; records, orders, and reports; familiarization in basic psychological operations; preparation of field expedient ranges, training areas, and conduct of training; a wide variety of rifle and hand grenades, rocket launchers, mines, mortars, and recoilless rifles; and indigenous weapons.

(2) Engineering and Demolitions. Scope: Village construction and defense; construction planning; engineer tools and construction techniques; concrete construction techniques; water supply and waste disposal systems; defensive works construction; military airfields and heliports; gasoline and diesel engine maintenance and repair; and use and maintenance of mine detectors.

(3) Medical. Scope: Village health program; physical diagnosis; drugs; helminthic diseases; gastro-intestinal diseases; respiratory diseases; hepatitis; malaria; dermatology; nutritional diseases; dental procedures; potable water supply, waste disposal, night soil; animal (rodent) and insect-borne disease control; treatment of eye and ear infections; emergency child birth; shock and hemorrhage; burns, wound management and soft tissue injury; venereal disease; chemical and physical agents; medical intelligence; immunization procedures; training in organizing and equipping a 25-bed field hospital and supporting it logistically.

(4) Communications. Scope: Organization of village communication system; preparation of a communications training program and conduct of instruction; visual and audio communications means; radio sets; operational maintenance; public address systems; electrical lighting systems and generators; telephones and switchboards; preparation of expedient codes and review of code systems; field expedient antennas; fundamentals of electronic equipment repair; reduced distance nets; and increased distance nets; and indigenous equipment.

g. MOS Cross Training. In addition to specific MOS training, the special forces operational detachment personnel are cross trained in the other MOS skills to include—

(1) Weapons.

(2) Engineering and demolitions.

(3) Medical.

(4) Communications.

h. General environment is not assigned personnel in the detachment. An example requirement for the detachment.

i. Special field training detachment. The detachment should establish command and coordinate detachment realistically provided logistics. Communications

122. August

a. General training detachment shall establish the special forces detachment to include area orientation of subjects, and study of anticipated training programs.

b. Civil personnel area orientation of subjects, at the special forces detachment included training in both communications subject to include logistical training and study of anticipated training programs.

c. Medical training. The special forces detachment personnel are cross trained in the other MOS skills to include—

(1) Weapons.

(2) Engineering and demolitions.

(3) Medical.

(4) Communications.

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h. General Subject Selected Personnel. The environment in which a special force detachment is normally employed may require skills not assigned to the detachment. Selected personnel in the detachment will require specialized training or a specialist may be attached to the detachment to provide the skills required. An example that has been most common is a requirement for a vehicle mechanic within the detachment.

t. Special Forces Operational Base. During field training exercises the SF operational detachment C, with appropriate augmentation should establish and operate an SFOB. Subordinate detachments and MTT's should be realistically dispersed over a wide area and be provided logistics and administrative support. Communications procedures should be thoroughly tested.

122. Augmentation Units

a. General. Training for augmentation detachments of the SAF should be integrated into the special forces group training program for area orientation, language training, common subjects, and field training exercises. Physical conditioning should be stressed in order to develop an ability to function under adverse climatic and sanitary conditions. Positions requiring professional skills should be filled by personnel who are already trained.

b. Civil Affairs Detachment. Training for personnel assigned to the Civil Affairs Detachment in a SAF should include a detailed review and study of the functional areas of civil affairs to include civil affairs programs. The scope of training should include all levels of civic action programs.

c. Medical Detachment. In addition to MOS training, members of the medical detachment should receive instruction in the treatment of diseases indigenous to the area of anticipated deployment. The medical and preventive medicine specialist should be given extensive on-the-job training in local hospitals and dispensaries.

d. Engineer Detachment. Members of the engineer detachment should receive instruction in both combat support and civic action subjects. Training should emphasize field expedients and the use of locally available materials. The following subjects should be covered in the program of instruction:

(1) Field fortifications.
(2) Construction and repair of roads, railroads, and airfields.
(3) Bridges, ferries, and rafts.
(4) Waterways.
(5) Building construction.
(6) Sanitation and water supply.
(7) Area damage control.
(8) Assistance to agriculture.
(9) Power production.
(10) Use and maintenance of engineer-type equipment.
(11) Engineering and design.
(12) Construction planning and management.

e. Military Police Detachment. As a part of area orientation, members of the detachment should receive detailed instruction in subjects relating to civil and military law of the anticipated area of deployment. This orientation should emphasize authority and jurisdiction. The program of instruction should include, as a minimum, the following subjects:

(1) Military and paramilitary police in riot control to include riot control formations, use of chemical agents and equipment, and mob psychology.
(2) Area control operations to include police patrolling; operation of checkpoints; road blocks and strong points; personnel identification systems; civil defense; police security investigations; and customs enforcement control.
(3) Police public relations to include rescue squad operations, safety planning, fire protection measures, sponsorship of civic actions, schoolboy patrols, athletic leagues, and town "clean up."
(4) Physical security operations to include physical security surveys; security of ports, airports, railroads, oilfields, and terminals; security of critical public utilities, industrial facilities, and mili-

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tary installations; and security of critical and sensitive materials.

(5) General investigation and police subjects to include circulation control of individuals, traffic control, training and supervision; military and civilian prisoners, prisoners of war; law and order, criminal investigation, crime prevention; weapons instruction; and communications.

(6) Development of a police intelligence system which will complement criminal investigation and military intelligence efforts.

(7) Military police combat patrols, striking force operations, route and area reconnaissance, and airmobile operations.

f. Military Intelligence Detachment. Members of the MI detachment should receive detailed instruction on the organization and functions of U.S. and indigenous intelligence systems in the anticipated areas of deployment. As a minimum, the program of instruction should include—

(1) Intelligence and counterintelligence functions in counterinsurgency operations to include support for civic action programs, psychological operations, and military and paramilitary operations.

(2) Clandestine intelligence operations and techniques for selected personnel.

(3) Combat intelligence operations for anticipated area of employment.

g. Psychological Operations Detachment. The members of the unit should receive detailed instruction in the various communication media being utilized in the anticipated area of deployment. They should also receive instructions on agreed activities between both U.S. and indigenous agencies having psychological activities responsibilities. Special emphasis should be placed on training of all assigned personnel in psychological operations in support of—

(1) Area orientation (detailed).

(2) Counterinsurgency operations.

(3) Intelligence, police and related counterintelligence operations.

(4) Civic action programs.

(5) SAF operations in remote areas.

(6) Preparation of psychological operations programs.

h. ASA Special Operations Detachment (SOD). Initially the SOD will be trained as directed by the chief of USASA. In addition to technical training, the SOD's pre-assignment instruction in languages, airborne, ranger and similar subjects. Other training will be in accordance with the training programs established by the commander of the SAF to which the detachment is assigned.

123. Brigade Size Backup Forces

a. General. Backup forces, like the SAF's, are specifically oriented for deployment to particular areas of the world. Accordingly, each U.S. Army division designated is required to develop training programs for the brigade and its subordinate elements selected for deployment to areas in which the capabilities of MAAG's and SAF's have been exceeded. Unit training programs must be modified to accommodate counterinsurgency training for the brigade as a tactical unit but with primary emphasis being placed on the use of brigade elements organized as mobile training teams (MTT). Personnel assigned to MTT's should be thoroughly trained in their respective MOS skills and personnel within each MTT should be given MOS cross-training to the extent practicable. FM 31-16 provides information and guidance for training of the brigade and its subordinate elements in its tactical counterinsurgency role.

b. Training Objectives. The backup forces training objectives are—

(1) To be proficient in MOS skills.

(2) To be highly proficient in counterinsurgency operations.

(3) To understand the role of backup forces in the Army Special Warfare Program.

(4) To be familiar with the designated area.

(5) To maintain language skill levels through refresher training.
c. Area/Country Orientation. This program will closely parallel the area study program conducted by the SAF. When the backup force orientation is directed to a region with several nations, country priorities may be established based on the best available intelligence. Brigade commanders may elect to assign each battalion and its augmentation a particular country. A typical subject schedule would include the following:

1. Geography.
2. Communications media and transportation systems.
3. History.
4. Religion, cults and sects.
5. Industry and agriculture.
6. Nationalism, customs and taboos.
8. Armed forces.
9. Insurgent forces.
10. U.S. Assistant Program.
12. Intelligence Briefing.

d. Language Study. Language proficiency for personnel assigned to the backup force will be in accordance with standards prescribed by appropriate headquarters. Each division might maintain a pool of native-speaking or school-trained linguists to support the brigade. It is important that personnel assigned to MTT’s learn to speak and read words and phrases which are pertinent to their duty position. For example, the machine gunner in the infantry MTT should learn words and phrases which will enhance machine gun instruction to indigenous troops. The language training program should provide for maximum use of existing laboratory equipment, training facilities and assigned instructors. Professional civilian instructors may be provided on approval of Department of Army. Backup force personnel should be encouraged to enroll in appropriate language courses available through the general educational development program. Additionally, quotas can be obtained to send selected individuals to the U.S. Army Language School. Since linguistic skill deteriorates rapidly through disuse, backup force language proficiency instruc-
tion should include minimum refresher training of one hour per week of supervised practice. For this purpose each division should maintain a minimum of one qualified instructor per assigned language. Normally the very limited number of instructors and language facilities available will require that language instruction be centralized, for control and scheduling, at brigade or higher level.

e. Guerrilla Tactics and Techniques. In addition to instruction contained in the area orientation study program, backup force personnel should receive instruction in the tactics and techniques employed by guerrillas. A method by which this training may be accomplished is by participation as guerrillas in the regularly conducted special forces training exercises.

f. Engineering/Demolitions. Personnel assigned to backup force MTT’s should receive training in antipersonnel mines, antitank mines, hand grenades, trip flares, and those engineering subjects likely to be of use.

g. Medical. Instruction in sanitation, severe weather hygiene, and subjects in first aid applicable to the designated area of operations should be provided all personnel in the backup force.

h. Communications. All personnel in the MTT’s should be provided familiarization instruction in the use and operation of portable radio sets, to include selected international morse code emergency formats.

i. Civic Action. The U.S. Army Civil Affairs School provides a course of instruction for officers scheduled for a counterinsurgency assignment. This course is described in section V below. Civic action training for MTT personnel should emphasize the role and conduct of the individual soldier and techniques for accomplishment of simple projects at the “grass root” level.

j. Survival, Evasion and Escape. All members of the provisional brigade backup force should be provided instruction in survival and evasion and escape with emphasis on techniques applicable to the designated area of operations.

k. Physical Conditioning. All personnel must be physically conditioned to perform and endure adverse climatic and dangerous sanitary conditions.
124. Training Requirements

_a. Combat Units._ The deployment of combat units to support a host country will be made only under exceptional circumstances, and then as a show of force or to conduct counterinsurgency operations in phase III. Except for those infantry, armored, and artillery units organic to the designated brigade backup forces, only minimal additional training is required. Usually an abbreviated area/country orientation program will suffice. In this respect area orientation should emphasize those subjects which will enhance military operations, such as terrain studies, indigenous military force organizations, tactics and techniques, and the enemy.

_b. Combat Support Units._ These type units may be required for deployment in an early phase of insurgency to provide both military and civic action operational assistance to the indigenous military forces or agencies of the host country. Predeployment training should include as a minimum area/country orientation, organization, tactics and techniques of indigenous forces to be supported, and language instruction for selected personnel. The program of instruction should include civic action functions and practical work on projects which can be executed within the units’ capabilities. Special instruction should be provided in the care of equipment and supplies in preparation for anticipated deployment to countries possessing unusual climatic conditions.

c. Combat Service Support Units. Training requirements for combat service support units will be as indicated for combat support units. Commanders, staffs, and selected personnel should become thoroughly familiar with and be trained to support both U.S. and indigenous forces in the host country. Medical service units should be trained to treat diseases and recognize health and sanitary hazards which are indigenous to the anticipated country of deployment.
.orientation, speakers of indigenous language are assigned to the program which can possess such capabilities. Specific courses in the care of indigenous diseases and the administration of training support units and personnel for indigenous medical service units, which can possess some knowledge of the country of origin.

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2. U.S. Marine Corps

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APPENDIX II
EXAMPLES OF CIVIC ACTION

Examples of military civic action that may be performed in one or more parts of a country faced with insurgency are indicated below.

1. Use of individual talents or knowledge, acquired in the military service or prior to military service, by soldiers to provide advice and assistance in helping to solve problems of the people. This includes farmers, mechanics, teachers, medical personnel, administrative personnel, engineers, fishermen, electricians, carpenters, lawyers, or any other special talent possessed by the individual soldier.

2. Provision of troop labor for construction projects, harvesting crops, or preparation of ground for planting.

3. Provision of safe water supply by providing advice, assistance, and material for digging wells or installing simple pumps and filtration systems.

4. Supervision, advice, and assistance in construction of simple access roads from hamlets to villages and to main roads, to include construction of simple bridges and culverts.

5. Supervision, advice, and assistance in construction of community development projects to include markets, schools, community buildings, nurseries, dispensaries, canals, and houses.

6. Provision of emergency medical treatment and evacuation of civilians by armed forces facilities.

7. Provision of ambulance service to civilians when not required for army personnel.

8. Assistance by military doctors or aidmen in civilian medical facilities.

9. Supervision, advice, and assistance in instituting public hygiene and insect and rodent control programs.

10. Provision on a temporary basis of facilities or equipment not locally available, such as a portable generator for lighting the village school one or two nights a week to permit adult education classes, providing heavy equipment for assistance in construction or repair work being accomplished by civilians, or providing transportation of heavy or bulky materials for civilians for construction projects.

11. Provision of escort for convoys of critical products to markets where they are badly needed.

12. Establishment of military-civilian councils at village and hamlet levels to promote better relations, discuss mutual problems and provide for mutual assistance.

13. Provision of teachers for primary level and adult literacy schools, until public education organizations can assume this task.

14. Sponsorship, organization, and training of youth and women's groups until this can be assumed by the government.

15. Provision of a means of communication between hamlet, village, and district offices by using existing military means and tying in with civilian community facilities where available, or using spare army equipment until civilian facilities can be established.

16. Provision of emergency food, clothing, medical support, and shelter for civilians in the event of insurgent attack, fire, flood, crop failures, or other disaster.

17. Provision of advice and assistance to civilian agencies, both private and governmental, to enable them to accomplish their mission more effectively. This may range from pure technical advice to provision of personnel, supplies, and equipment on a temporary basis.

18. Provision of assistance and advice to the local paramilitary units in the training of hamlet and village defense forces.
19. Provision of technical advice and supervision of hamlet and village administrations until this can be assumed by civilian agencies.

20. Operation of local administrations where they are inoperative or nonexistent, until appropriate civilian agencies can take over.

21. Provision of security for hamlets and villages until this can be accomplished by other means.

22. Provision of surplus or salvage items. For example, salvage generators given to technical or vocational schools to provide cutaway models, salvage or surplus medical equipment given to welfare agencies for distribution to needy installations, and turning over to public health officials medical supplies which will shortly become salvage due to expiration date of effectiveness and which are not required by the army.

23. Construction of public buildings, defense works, and public facilities of secure hamlets, model villages, or relocated villages to reduce the time required to establish the hamlet or village, and provide assistance to villages in construction of homes and preparation of ground.

24. Conduct open house activities at military installations, and participate in civil ceremonies when the security situation permits.

25. Coordinate the establishment of military dependent communities, or integrate military dependents into the community, with local officials to provide maximum assistance and cause the least disruption of normal activity.

26. Contribute to local welfare agencies at every opportunity, either by providing funds or by providing personnel or equipment.

27. Supervision, advice, and assistance in establishing indigenous public services to include police, paramilitary police, civil defense unit, fire protection, disaster relief, and physical security.
APPENDIX III
SECURE POPULATION CENTERS

1. General

In addition to military and paramilitary actions undertaken to defeat insurgency, the civilian population can and must play a decisive role if the insurgency is to be defeated. This appendix presents the principles of a concept for the organization of villages or hamlets into mutually supporting complexes. This concept envisions all members of a village being organized for their own mutual support into a village complex. This mutual support not only includes defense, but also will include other activities, such as the general economic improvement of the village, public health, village sanitation, and extensions of democratic principles and procedures through such things as the formation of village and hamlet committees. Thus, by organizing villages or hamlets into complexes, there will be derived not only the initial advantage of security of the complex from outside insurgent attack, but also the following secondary advantages:

a. Insurgent forces will be prevented from establishing and maintaining contact with local inhabitants.

b. Identification of insurgent elements living outside the complex will be made easier.

c. With civilians grouped together, general civilian control measures will be made easier.

2. Establishment of Village Complexes

a. The establishment of village complexes is a serious course of action in the counterinsurgency battle. Since the establishment of village complexes usually will involve at least some degree of resettlement of inhabitants, such a step will have deep and far-reaching effects amongst the populace. Without very careful planning, the establishment of village complexes may hurt, rather than help, the counterinsurgency program. Therefore, it is important that a thorough study of the counterinsurgency situation be made before a program of establishing village complexes begins. Such a study should answer the following questions:

(1) Does the situation actually warrant the establishment of village complexes?

(2) Is the development of village complexes within the capability of counterinsurgency forces?

(3) Does the terrain or area favor the establishment of village complexes?

(4) How will the inhabitants react to the establishment of village complexes? If reaction is unfavorable, how can this be changed?

(5) Will the advantages accrued by the establishment of village complexes outweigh the disadvantages?

b. Plans, though varying for each province or subarea of the country, should consider—

(1) Establishment of priorities for development of complexes in each province or subarea.

(2) Selection of village complex sites.

(3) Methods by which villagers will be induced or motivated to enter into the village complex program voluntarily.

(4) Procurement of materials for construction of village complex defense systems.

(5) Engineer assistance to help prepare the defense system.

(6) Training of villagers so that they can defend themselves.

(7) Organization of the village complex administration system, to include appointment and duties of the village council, committees, and other agencies.

3. Security

The concept of the complex is to create, through the village complex, an area of security which is also an area of development, for the village complex is

a. A security area for the protection of all the inhabitants of the village and hamlet complexes. The concept of the village complex as an area which is continually under control is a decisive factor in defeating the insurgents.

b. Division of the village complex into separate and distinct segments which are closely interrelated and co-ordinated for the purpose of defeating the insurgents. Each village complex is an integral part of the overall strategy to defeat the insurgency.

c. Establishment of village complexes on major roads and routes on which the insurgents are likely to travel. The concept of the complex is to prevent the insurgents from reaching or escaping from regular forces.

d. Establishment of village complexes on major roads and routes on which the insurgents are likely to travel. The concept of the complex is to prevent the insurgents from reaching or escaping from regular forces.

e. Establishment of village complexes on major roads and routes on which the insurgents are likely to travel. The concept of the complex is to prevent the insurgents from reaching or escaping from regular forces.

4. Organization

In view of the importance of the establishment of village complexes, the organization of the forces by the administrator of the complex will be—

a. Provisions for the establishment of the complex by the administrator of the complex.
3. Security Concept of the Village Complex

The concept of the security of the village complex is not only that of a static defense, but through the use of patrols and mobile reserves is also an offensive defense. The security of the village complex includes—

a. A secure zone around the entire perimeter of the village complex in which village security forces, organized into paramilitary units, are continually on patrol, particularly during the hours of darkness.

b. Division of the village complex for defensive purposes into areas of responsibility with each village or area generally patrolled by security forces of that village or area.

c. Establishment of a limited number of routes on which all traffic is checked in and out of the village complex. A minimum number of routes will be utilized at night. During the day, additional routes may be used for miscellaneous reasons, such as reducing the distance farmers must travel to and from their fields.

d. Maintenance of a mobile reserve at village level to move rapidly to the assistance of any one village in the complex which might be under attack. This reserve will generally be made up of paramilitary units. The village complex concept envisions outside military assistance from regular military forces in case of large scale guerrilla attacks.

e. Establishment of an intelligence network in the community for the purpose of developing information about guerrillas in the area and to insure the prompt exposure of any undercover insurgent sympathizers in the community.

4. Organization and Training for Village Security Forces

In view of the importance of village security forces, special emphasis must be given to the organization, equipment, and training of these forces. The military commander of the counterinsurgency forces assists in this program of organizing and training these village security forces by—

a. Providing initial training cadres and training facilities.

b. Providing training aids where possible.

c. Organizing and providing facilities for communicating between the village complex and regular counterinsurgency forces. Through these communication facilities there will be passed not only information concerning the guerrillas, but also word of any guerrilla attack against the complex.

d. Providing reconnaissance patrols of regular counterinsurgency forces which will further contribute to the security of the village complex.

5. Economic Improvement

Activities to improve the economic situation within the village complex will include such military-civic actions as are listed in appendix II.

6. Extension of Democratic Procedures

These activities consist of the normal administration by village officials, and also include committees within each village who act as advisory groups to village officials. The military, political, psychological and economic leaders of the village complex are a part of the overall control committee.

7. Summary

The initial aim of the village complex concept is to locate traffic between guerrilla sympathizers physically located among the population and the guerrilla forces, regular and militia-type, which live in the open country. Within the villages are political, propaganda, economic, intelligence and terrorist elements which support the guerrilla forces. When this support has been effectively stopped, the guerrilla, in order to exist, is forced to smash the established barriers surrounding the village complex. A concurrent aim of the village complex concept is the total participation by all members of the community in providing for their own defense. This is accomplished by the integration of military, political, economic and sociological activities into one operation.
APPENDIX IV  
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

1. General

In areas where insurgent forces are known or suspected to be operating, the security of all forms of transportation is a serious problem. Good security and safety from insurgent attack requires careful prior planning, detailed training, responsive movement procedures and, particularly, a complete awareness of the seriousness of the problem. This appendix describes certain procedures that may be used to improve the security of road, rail, and inland waterway movements. In addition, certain counterambush techniques will be considered as far as they affect friendly mounted forces.

2. Preventing and/or Minimizing Ambushes

The only effective method to prevent an ambush is to avoid it. However, since avoidance is not always possible, other methods for minimizing ambushes must be found. Some of these other methods are as follows:

a. Timely, accurate intelligence is an effective means for reducing the effectiveness of guerrilla ambushes. Such intelligence can be developed by a variety of methods. One particularly important source of intelligence is the loyal population. The security and well-being of local civilians should be established and maintained.

b. In guerrilla infested areas where jungle growth is particularly thick, programs may be undertaken to clear the road sides of jungle growth, either manually or through the use of defoliants.

c. For the protection of particularly important convoys or routes, troop units may be positioned along the route and/or used to conduct route or area reconnaissance.

d. The known patterns of insurgent activities may provide planning factors for countering future ambushes.

e. The use of air cover as convoy support is important. When aircraft are employed in this role they help prevent and/or minimize the effect of ambushes.

3. Military Classification of Roads

In an insurgent area, highway or road systems may be identified according to estimated risks from insurgent activities. One system, using a color code, is as follows:

a. Green Roads. These roads generally are within the limits of major cities and secure areas. Normally, military personnel are permitted to travel unarmed in any type vehicle on these roads.

b. Yellow Roads. These are roads upon which there is limited risk of insurgent ambush. Along these roads, the pattern of insurgent activity will take the form of sniping at odd vehicles and/or minor hit-and-run attacks. In an insurgent area the majority of roads will be yellow. In considering a specific route, however, various degrees of risk may be encountered. The following procedures should be applied to movement of military, police or civilian vehicles on Yellow Roads:

(1) All military personnel traveling in vehicles should be armed.

(2) Each military vehicle should carry at least two men.

(3) Convoys should be responsible for their own protection.

(4) Whenever possible, air cover will be provided.

(5) Whenever possible, armed escort vehicles will be provided with a desirable ratio of one armed escort vehicle to every five "soft" vehicles.

(6) Vehicles should be close enough to each other to render mutual assistance.

4. Standing

Every user of transportation should be familiar with the comprehensive safety rules established by roads. The following rules are:

(a) Maintain speed limits at all times.

(b) Keep to the right of the road.

(c) Avoid all side streets.

(d) Use overtaking signals only when necessary.

(e) Do not use the phone while driving.

(f) Obey all traffic signals, including stop signs and stop lights.

(g) Avoid all side streets.

(h) Do not use the phone while driving.

(i) Obey all traffic signals, including stop signs and stop lights.

(j) Avoid all side streets.
Convoy support is employed in this way to minimize the risk of sniping and road sniping. One system, generally are good and secure tunnels are permanent type vehicle on roads upon which high ambient and small ambushes will catch several vehicles.

(7) Travel at night should be restricted to cases of operational necessity.

(8) Irregularity of movement should be practiced to make guerrilla planning more difficult.

(9) Additional precautions may be specified for certain sectors of the road. Examples of these additional precautionary measures are as follows:

(a) Mounted and dismounted patrols should reconnoiter and patrol ahead if possible, and to the flanks of the convoy.

(b) Check points should be established and single vehicles required to halt and wait until a "provisional" convoy of four or five vehicles can be formed. When a single vehicle must travel alone, reconnaissance by fire may flush small ambushes. Extreme caution must be exercised on return leg of round trip when an alternate route is not available.

c. Red Roads. These are roads lying within active combat areas. Convoys traveling on Red Roads can expect to be ambushed at any point, and all movements of vehicles on Red Roads will be of a tactical nature. In addition to the measures outlined for Yellow Roads, the following measures should be implemented:

(1) Convoys will always be escorted by armored vehicles and supporting troops.

(2) Travel at night will be limited to operational necessity.

(3) Whenever possible, armed aircraft or observation aircraft should be assigned for reconnaissance and to assist in control of the convoy.

4. Standing Operating Procedures (SOP)

Every unit should have complete and comprehensive orders or plans covering movement by roads. These should cover in detail the following points:

a. Appointment and Duties of Convoy and Vehicle Commanders.

(1) A commander must be detailed for each convoy. The convoy commander will position himself where, according to the circumstances, he can best accomplish his mission. This will not necessarily be in the first or last vehicle. An armored vehicle or an armored soft vehicle, such as the ¼ ton truck with LMG mounted, should be used as the commander's vehicle. Radio communications must be provided for movement control of convoys and notification to alert forces of an ambush. In addition, provision must be made for passage of command in the event the commander becomes a casualty.

(2) A vehicle commander must be detailed by name for each vehicle. The vehicle commander's primary mission is to command the troops in his vehicle and control the vehicle should the convoy be ambushed.

b. Organization of the Convoy.

(1) Reconnaissance elements will travel ahead of the convoy. These elements will attempt to trigger prematurely any potential ambush.

(2) Vehicles in convoys should not be overloaded with personnel or equipment. If vehicles are loaded to their maximum, troops will be unable to effectively use their weapons. In a 2½ ton truck, for example, 16 or 18 individuals should be the maximum carried. Similarly, the number of men carried in other types of vehicles must be restricted to ensure freedom of movement.

(3) Personnel in troop-carrying vehicles must be constantly on the alert and be prepared for immediate action. Selected individuals should be posted as lookout-men or guards. In large vehicles it is usual that four men are posted, two at the front and two at the rear of each vehicle, with each assigned an area of observation covering 90° from the center of the road.
troops which have not yet entered the killing zone should launch the counterattack.

b. Armored Vehicle Tactics. Armored vehicles can assist in counterattack actions by driving into the ambush and engaging the guerrillas at very short range. In this way the armored vehicle will be able to—

(1) Reduce the pressure on friendly troops which might be caught in the killing zone.
(2) Provide direct fire support for the counterattack.

c. Training. The counterambush techniques outlined above should be practiced in varying situations until the natural reaction to a guerrilla ambush is the application of immediate action procedures followed by the counterattack procedures described.

6. Briefing

All personnel traveling in the convoy will be thoroughly briefed prior to movement. This briefing will include—

a. Details of route, speed, check points, order of march and maintenance of intervals and contact between vehicles.

b. Personnel loading of vehicles.

c. Distribution of weapons.

d. Appointment and duties of vehicle commanders and vehicle guards.

e. Immediate action to be taken in the event of guerrilla ambush.

f. Counterattack plans.

7. Security

Maximum precautions should be taken to prevent guerrillas from gaining information concerning vehicle movements. Points to consider are—

a. Telephone systems may not be secure.

b. Radio messages may be intercepted.

c. Loyalty of civilians cannot be guaranteed.

d. Fixed regularity or pattern in the movement of convoys invite ambush.

e. Information concerning the timing, route, and composition of a convoy should be disseminated on a need-to-know basis and as close to departure time as possible.

f. Plans should be formulated for alternate routes and deceptive measures.

g. Convoys should be assembled at the latest possible time before departure.

8. Communications

Provision must be made for communications in the movement of all convoys. Requirements will exist for communications for the convoy commander to control his convoy. In addition, there will be a requirement for a means of communication whereby other forces with a support capability may monitor the progress of the convoy or establish two-way communications.

a. The principal means of communication within a convoy will be radio. The convoy commander in particular must be able to communicate at all times with the leading element as well as the rear element of his convoy. In addition to radio, various visual and audio signals, such as smoke grenades and whistles may often be employed.

b. When helicopters and/or other aircraft accompany the convoy as escort, it is essential that the convoy commander be able to communicate with these aircraft. It is desirable that escort aircraft be able to monitor frequencies within the convoy. While other friendly forces in the area may monitor the convoy frequencies, it is more likely that in the event of an ambush on the convoy, they will be alerted on an established emergency frequency.

9. Protection of Railroads and Trains

Railroads are particularly vulnerable to guerrilla attack because the movement of a train is directly determined by the condition of the rails. The cutting of rails can produce effects comparable to direct attacks on trains, particularly when the guerrilla objective is to stop a train or prevent the delivery of critical goods. Even when friendly forces dominate the area, there is always a potential for deliberate sabotage and overt attack against railroad lines. General protective measures may include—

a. Security precautions should be taken to prevent guerrillas from gaining information concerning vehicle movements. Points to consider are—

(1) Telephone systems may not be secure.
(2) Radio messages may be intercepted.
(3) Loyalty of civilians cannot be guaranteed.
(4) Fixed regularity or pattern in the movement of convoys invite ambush.
(5) Information concerning the timing, route, and composition of a convoy should be disseminated on a need-to-know basis and as close to departure time as possible.

b. Plans should be formulated for alternate routes and deceptive measures.

c. Convoys should be assembled at the latest possible time before departure.

9. Communications

Provision must be made for communications in the movement of all convoys. Requirements will exist for communications for the convoy commander to control his convoy. In addition, there will be a requirement for a means of communication whereby other forces with a support capability may monitor the progress of the convoy or establish two-way communications.

a. The principal means of communication within a convoy will be radio. The convoy commander in particular must be able to communicate at all times with the leading element as well as the rear element of his convoy. In addition to radio, various visual and audio signals, such as smoke grenades and whistles may often be employed.

b. When helicopters and/or other aircraft accompany the convoy as escort, it is essential that the convoy commander be able to communicate with these aircraft. It is desirable that escort aircraft be able to monitor frequencies within the convoy. While other friendly forces in the area may monitor the convoy frequencies, it is more likely that in the event of an ambush on the convoy, they will be alerted on an established emergency frequency.
a. Security Measures. Measures which may be taken to protect rail movements include but are not limited to the following:

(1) Trains should run on irregular schedules.

(2) Railroad security elements should both precede and follow individual trains.

(3) Flat cars loaded with sand may be pushed in front of each train to guard against derailment by mines or cuts in the tracks.

(4) Automatic weapons should be mounted to deliver fire along the right-of-way as well as into adjacent areas.

(5) A right-of-way may be cleared on each side of the rail line to the range of small arms fire and the cleared area declared a restricted zone. Should clearance of the entire right-of-way be impractical, areas around critical locations, such as defiles, tunnels, and bridges may be cleared.

(6) Air cover of train and reconnaissance along the right-of-way may be made at unscheduled intervals.

(7) Guard posts may be established at critical installations and rail facilities such as tunnels, bridges, and stations.

b. Train Guards.

(1) Train guards may be assigned from civil police, military police or other troop units specially qualified for security duty. Economic use of personnel and greater efficiency will result if units are attached to a particular railroad organization or division for the specific purpose of providing security for railroad operations.

(2) The guard force on a cargo train should be concentrated in one or two positions and should have radio communications with friendly units in the area that can provide support in the event of ambush.

10. Protection of Inland Waterways

Critical points such as bridges, locks, dams, and restricted areas along rivers and waterways should be guarded continuously. Points offering favorable ambush sites should be cleared of vegetation to the range of effective small arms fire. Security measures may include—

a. Irregular schedules for movement.

b. Mounting automatic weapons on all craft.

c. Adequate communication means for each craft.

d. Establishment of waterway patrols in fast, heavily armed craft.

e. Patrol of waterways from the air.

11. Conclusion

Guerrillas should know that every ambush they execute may result in rapid, violent, and relentless pursuit by friendly forces. Such action, executed automatically as a matter of first priority, is most important to the overall effort to reduce the effectiveness and frequency of guerrilla ambushes. First, it ensures an early relief of the ambushed unit; second, it increases the possibility of friendly forces making contact with the guerrilla ambush party before it disperses; third, it reduces the time available to the guerrillas to destroy the ambushed forces and to loot vehicles; and, finally, successful pursuit operations will improve the morale of friendly units while having a corresponding opposite effect upon the guerrilla forces. An air cavalry unit or helicopter or parachute alert force, positioned with aircraft ready for instant employment, provides an excellent relief and pursuit capability. Armored personnel carriers and/or armored reconnaissance vehicles may also be used in the pursuit role since they have the mobility means required. Pursuit of guerrilla ambush forces must be initiated with the least possible delay, with only that degree of caution required to prevent falling into a larger and perhaps the primary guerrilla ambush.
APPENDIX V
SPECIAL COUNTERINSURGENCY MEASURES

1. General
Successful pacification of subversive insurgency requires the isolation of the insurgent from internal and external support. Measures described in the succeeding paragraphs are addressed to this problem.

2. Population Control Measures
The nature and scope of measures necessary to defeat the enemy in a designated area may require actions by military commanders which impinge on the liberty and property rights of the citizens of the affected area. Such actions would normally be preceded by an announcement of a declaration of emergency by the head of the government. Application of the strictest of population controls may be required. Martial law would be declared only as a last resort. Initially, all travel is controlled, including trade entering or leaving the area. The leaders of the community, including the business men, are made to realize that they have no choice other than to support the government forces with information of the insurgents. Even during this drastic phase of control, however, the military must continually emphasize positive measures to win over the people. Civil affairs programs must ensure that essentials such as fuel, food, and medicines are brought into the area under military control. Special control measures may be taken to control the population and to minimize its ability to collaborate with the guerrillas. Some control measures which may be completely or partially instituted are—

a. Confiscation of weapons and ammunition to reduce availability to insurgents, with an associated licensing and accountability system for those who may be authorized possession. It is important that the authorities maintain control in this area to ascertain that authorized weapons are not being used to assist insurgents.

b. Registration of all civilians, and establishment of an identity system which cannot easily be altered or duplicated. This will include registration of all non-residents and aliens entering the area.

c. Establishment of a curfew, with due consideration of civilian needs, to reduce the opportunity for contact with the enemy. This must be effective in controlling the population elements who may want to contact the guerrillas, and yet must not cause undue hardship on those persons who have a legitimate requirement for moving about within the area or departing from the area. Examples of these persons are fishermen whose activities are related to the tides, farmers who must transport perishables to market at some distant point, medical personnel and clergy.

d. In the imposition of travel restrictions, care should be exercised to insure that persons are able to perform legitimate and necessary travel. Such travel, for example, includes authorization of farmers to go to and from their fields, to transport their produce to market, etc. In addition, medical personnel and clergy are often required to perform considerable travel in accomplishing their services. The activities of each person who has special travel permission should be carefully observed. Patrols, road blocks, and the frequent changing of check points are some of the methods employed in the enforcement of travel restrictions and curfews.

e. Establishment of restricted areas, from which civilians are prohibited, to reduce the opportunity for sabotage, espionage, and terrorism.

f. Suspension of civil rights to permit search of persons, property, and houses, and arrest and confinement on suspicion. These are drastic measures from the civilian point of view, and enforcement should be accomplished in a very careful and circumspect manner.

g. Evacuation of the collaborating population, or entire hamlets or exchange, to unfamiliar locations or from insurgents.

h. Control of medicines and medicines guerrillas. This includes persons who lose their normal activities.

i. Establishment of a registry whereby a list of names would be made of personnel who lose their civil rights.

j. Establishment of a security point where persons could be checked and registered.

k. Control of textiles and materials which may be exchanged for such as nitroglycerine and explosives.

l. Establishment of a registry of all who lose their civil rights.

m. Establishment of an identification system whereby the individuals are known to the authorities.

n. Control of personnel, of the population, of collaboration.

o. Importance of the need to deny unescorted travel to the population.

p. Denial of travel to areas which can be reached by roads.

q. Census and identification.

r. Prohibiting devices for those expressing intentions to leave.

s. Licensing of all transports to the area.

t. Require all persons to secure areas.
g. Evacuation of areas to forestall acts of collaboration, or for the protection of the civil population. This may entail the relocation of entire hamlets or villages, or the relocation or exchange of suspected individuals or families to unfamiliar neighborhoods, away from relatives or friends who may be serving with the insurgents. See appendix III.

h. Controlled possession of drugs and medicines to reduce availability to the guerrillas. This entails limiting possession to persons who logically need drugs and medicines in the normal treatment of the civil population.

i. Establishment of a reporting system whereby administration of selected drugs, treatment of specific wounds or injuries, and medical aid must be reported.

j. Establishment of a reporting system whereby absentee employees are immediately reported for investigation.

k. Controlled licensing of those raw materials which may be of value to the insurgents, such as nitrates and other chemicals, building materials, and fuel.

l. Registration of all livestock, and establishment of a system of accountability to reduce their availability to the guerrilla.

m. Establishment of a price control and rationing system on essential food, fuel, clothing, and medical supplies to minimize diversion to the insurgents.

n. Confiscation of property, real and personal, of those individuals adjudged guilty of collaboration.

o. Imposition of stringent monetary controls to deny use of guerrilla funds to the civil population.

p. Denial of public utilities beyond areas which can be controlled by the government.

q. Censorship.

r. Prohibiting possession of radio transmitting devices and printing machinery, except those expressly authorized and controlled.

s. Licensing and control of all forms of transportation.

t. Requiring the population to live within secure areas to deny contact with the enemy.

u. Establishment of a system of awards, citations, rewards, and other public recognition for those civilians actively contributing to counterinsurgency operations. Public recognition will be given only when the government can furnish protection. Publicity does not apply to persons who are working clandestinely for the government.

v. Publication of appropriate proclamations, edicts, orders, notices, and other official declarations, informing the civil population of the measures taken and the punishments that may be given for noncompliance.

w. Immediate publicity for any acts on the part of army or civilian authorities in aiding or assisting the civilian population in any way. This is important in offsetting the harassment of the added restrictions placed upon the population.

x. Establishment of an information program directed at the civil population and designed to explain, justify, and publicize measures taken. This should be supported by psychological operations designed to influence the attitude and behavior of the civilian population in favor of operations against the insurgents.

y. Exemplary conduct on the part of Army and civil personnel and agencies in the enforcement of control measures. Prompt disciplinary action at the place of commission, with attendant publicity, must be taken for any misuse of authority or undue harassment by military and civil personnel in the enforcement of established control measures.

3. Area Organization and Control

a. In order to isolate guerrillas from the people, control of an area must be established so that the actions necessary to identify and eliminate hard core, willing supporters can be implemented, and those who are apathetic or neutral in attitude can be persuaded to support the government. This control of an area must be accomplished by seizing the initiative according to a cohesive, coordinated plan to regain the freedom to act, rather than react.

b. Upon dividing or selecting an area for pacification operations, the following specific actions are required: