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*This manual supersedes FM 41-10, 14, 1962.
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CHAPTER 1
BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

Section I. INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose and Scope
   a. This manual is for use by all elements of the Army in conduct of civil affairs operations. It is for use in conjunction with FM 41-5 and contains doctrine and procedure to be employed by commanders, staff sections, units, and other elements of the Army in furthering U.S. national policies in political, economic, and sociological activities; in fulfilling international obligations; and in providing maximum support for tactical and logistical operations by the planning, conduct, and supervision of civil affairs operations and activities. Except as otherwise noted, the material contained herein is equally applicable to nuclear or nonnuclear, general, limited, or cold war, as well as to operations of the Army conducted during peacetime.

   b. Users are encouraged to submit recommended changes or comments to improve this manual. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which the change is recommended. Reasons should be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be forwarded direct to the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, Civil Affairs Agency, Fort Gordon, Ga. 30905.

2. Civil-Military Relationships
   a. The Army lives in an environment of people. On the domestic scene as well as abroad, the Army's presence requires real estate, equipment, food and supplies, housing, recreational facilities, personal services, transportation facilities, labor, and a myriad of other things for which it competes in the local economy. Its presence frequently congests the area, overtaxes the capacity of utilities, inflates prices, and crowds schools. Although it also creates business opportunities and expands the local economy, it draws new population to the area, and these newcomers are not always wanted by the earlier residents.

   b. When the Army moves or maneuvers it may trespass, destroy or damage property, and cause injury to persons and livestock. Although the Army compensates for such damage, these occurrences are likely to irritate and alienate local people, or to invite exploitation by them.

   c. The presence of a military force causes the social and cultural atmosphere of a community to change, and makes political and governmental problems more acute and numerous. The daily lives of the local people are affected, sometimes seriously disrupted. Local mores, respected customs, and valued traditions are infringed upon—often never to be restored. These changes are likely to be resented by many local people, and strong, negative attitudes and emotions may be generated. Although there are advantages as well as disadvantages to the local people in having a military unit in their area, benefits are quickly accepted and soon taken for granted, whereas irritations build up, rankle, and breed antagonisms. An accumulation of these irritations can result in acts of violence or persist as latent or expressed opposition.

   d. Civil-military relations are inescapable, and the resultant civil affairs problems consume much of the time of responsible military officers on the local level and of military and civilian officials at higher echelons. Antagonisms generated at local levels are often carried up through governmental channels, often to the embarrassment of the Department of the Army and civil authorities, and could have serious impacts on the capability of the Army to perform its missions.

   e. Civil affairs problems are continuous, important, and acute, and to deal with them as of secondary import is to invite difficulties and disrupt-
tion of orderly functioning. The Army must keep ahead of public opinion and create conditions that build civilian respect and confidence in the military as well as appreciation of the presence of the military unit or installation in the locality. Good relations with the civilian population facilitate accomplishment of the Army's missions, and this principle is true whether the military organization is on U.S. or foreign soil.

3. Command Responsibilities

a. The conduct of civil affairs is as much a responsibility of command at every echelon as the planning for and conduct of combat operations. The Army, as an instrument of national policy, not only must fight when required to achieve national objectives, but must serve the ultimate goal of maintaining or restoring government, under law, within a climate of order:

b. Each commander of a military unit, regardless of its size or organizational position, must comply with the applicable provisions of international law with respect to the inhabitants, governments, and economies of occupied, liberated, or host territories. He also must comply with the provisions of any treaty or agreement between the United States and the government concerned.

c. The civil affairs objective assigned to a command will depend upon national policy. Although the development of policy is primarily the responsibility of nonmilitary agencies, its implementation is frequently made a responsibility of the military. Commanders must take those measures necessary for the accomplishment of their general missions, and may, under some circumstances, determine that the nature of the overall mission will necessitate primary command emphasis on civil affairs. Generally, there are three sets of circumstances where this condition will prevail—

1. Cold war operations, including stability operations, necessitating military support of the civil power outside of CONUS.
2. Military support of the civil power in CONUS as a result of domestic disturbances, disaster or hostile attack.
3. Military government of occupied territory after the conclusion of hostilities.

d. In the case of a hostile area which is occupied, the commander normally directs and controls officials of the government and has the power to remove them from office or relieve them of authority. In the case of friendly governments, the commander may only be concerned with liaison and measures for providing advice, assistance, or support. He may have no jurisdiction outside the physical bounds of his installation and may even share, to some degree, internal jurisdiction over his own installation with civilian authorities.

e. A commander may have specialist Civil Affairs (CA) units and personnel assigned or attached to conduct relations with local civilians and governmental agencies. In order to utilize fully the capabilities of CA units the military commander must provide adequate direction to them to insure that they are effectively employed, adequately supported, and properly supervised. In the absence of specialist personnel, he must accomplish his civil affairs mission utilizing other members of his command. For this and other reasons, it is important that the commander inculcate in all of his personnel a sense of responsibility for civil affairs, and simultaneously attempt to develop reserves of civilian goodwill. The extent of a command's participation in the affairs of the civilian community is as diverse as the varied situations of locale, mission, and political climate (para 26).

f. Prior to commitment, major commanders engaged in cold war or limited war operations should endeavor to obtain a signed agreement with host governments covering relationships between military forces and the civilian authorities and population. These agreements normally are negotiated for the United States by the Department of State at national government level, but where long-range agreements have not been reached prior to commitment, or in circumstances where initial agreement details are left to major commanders, draft agreements covering command requirements should be prepared in advance as a recommended basis of negotiation. Prompt conclusion of such written agreements will facilitate prevention of operational handicaps, provide a basis for troop education and orientation, and fix the position of host governments in areas of possible friction. Regardless of whether a government-to-government agreement has been reached, however, it is mandatory that commanders develop necessary functional working arrangements to establish coordination and harmony between military forces and local governments.

4. Civil-Military Coordination

a. The Army, by the nature of its operational
environment and because of its widespread deployment, has a major concern with civil-military relations and the proper coordination of those relations. Moreover, the designation of the Army as the executive agency for civil affairs in the U.S. defense establishment places a special responsibility on the Army to organize and develop capabilities to function in this field. Coordination within the military organization, and coordination between the military organization and U.S. diplomatic, economic, and other organizations is a requirement accomplished by CA personnel.

b. In international relations the Army is fulfilling responsibilities in connection with treaty organizations and mutual defense pacts. In all these matters the Army must work in coordination with the Department of State including the Agency for International Development (AID), the United States Information Agency (USIA), and other U.S. agencies.

c. The assistance of a number of U.S., allied or international governmental and private agencies may be available in the area of operations. The activities of these organizations directly affect the conduct of civil affairs. Federal departments and agencies may furnish technical advice and assistance to the Army as requested by appropriate authority. Public and private agencies from allied nations or international organizations may be authorized to work in an area in which military units have primary responsibility. Organizations of a charitable, religious, or fraternal nature, engaged in emergency relief activities, may assist the CA organization with trained personnel and supplies. Personnel of all of these agencies may operate under the direct supervision of CA units to assist in the accomplishment of command objectives. It is essential, therefore, that the work of these agencies and U.S. Army Civil Affairs activities be coordinated and that close liaison be maintained.

d. It is at the national level that treaties and agreements must be negotiated, and it is through Department of State channels that such negotiations are conducted. The commander should, in his own interest, maintain liaison with the ambassador and, also with the ambassador's concurrence, with certain officers of the host government, particularly at working levels.

e. Within each host country the military commander faces civil affairs problems at the various levels of government and military forces, and with the civilian population of that country. These problems are serious matters, for they affect the U.S. national interest, enhance or hamper U.S. national policy, and advance or retard the security of the United States and of the free world. Such matters as conduct of military personnel, movement of forces, maneuver rights, positioning of military defenses, storage of nuclear weapons, and transportation and placement of weapons such as missiles, are examples of mutual concern of the host civil authorities and military commanders. Some mechanism for dealing with such civil-military problems must be established. The embassy may or may not be in a position to serve as the liaison and coordinating agency at the subnational government level. In any event a civil-military contact office should be maintained for working-level liaison between the military command and the host government and its subnational echelons within established policy sanctioned by the ambassador.

5. Civil Affairs

The term "civil affairs" has three common usages: civil affairs concept; civil affairs operations; and Civil affairs organization.

a. The civil affairs concept embraces the totality of the relationships of a military commander with his civilian environment.

b. Civil affairs operations obtain for a military commander essential civilian support or reduce civilian interference and assist in the attainment of his political-military objectives. They affect the relationship between his military forces and the civil authorities and people in his area of operations and may involve the performance by military forces of some or all of the functions normally performed by civil government.

c. Civil affairs organization, consisting of staffs and units particularly designed and trained to supervise and conduct civil affairs operations, is an integral component of the military force. It supports military forces in the conduct of tactical operations. It assists in fulfilling the military commander's legal obligations with respect to the inhabitants, government and economy of the area. Within the Department of Defense establishment, it may serve as the military agency with primary concern for the attainment of the U.S. national objectives beyond the war and provide for the future transfer of most civil affairs activities to designated agencies of civil government. Civil affairs
general staff interest will always be present and in oversea areas may be paramount in all civil-military relations, even though many of the activities such as the normal liaison and procurement functions are performed by organizations other than CA staff sections or units.

6. Objectives

The basic mission of all civil affairs operations is to support the accomplishment of the military commander's assigned mission by—

a. Implementing those aspects of U.S. national policy as pertains to a particular area for which the military commander is responsible. Support of the commander's political-military mission may involve participation in coordinated activities with other U.S., allied, or international military components or civil agencies.

b. Discharging the commander's responsibilities pertaining to the civil population, government and economy of the area. It is U.S. policy to observe faithfully all international obligations (FM 27–10).

c. Assisting in the accomplishment of military missions through support or control of local agencies in implementing measures to—

(1) Create, restore, and maintain public order.
(2) Safeguard, mobilize, and utilize local resources such as labor, supplies, and facilities for tactical or logistical purposes.
(3) Control disease and epidemic conditions that might endanger the military force.
(4) Prevent civilian interference with military operations.

d. Conducting operations to assist in civil emergency situations resulting from natural disaster, unrest, or enemy attack.

7. Civil Affairs Activities

a. To achieve his civil affairs objectives the military commander engages in various civil affairs activities which affect the relationships between military forces and the civil authorities and people in any area (including U.S. home territory) in which those forces are present. Civil affairs from the point of view of the commander's interest can be broken down into seven major activities—

(1) Provision of civilian support for and prevention of civilian interference with tactical and logistical operations.
(2) Provision of or support for the functions of government for a civilian population.
(3) Community relations of the military forces.
(4) Military civic action as part of internal development operations.
(5) Military participation in a populace and resources control program as part of internal defense operations.
(6) Military support of civil defense.
(7) Psychological operations.

b. Priority of command effort goes to that major civil affairs activity most directly related to the mission of the military command. Normally, psychological operations will be in support of the other six activities, and will not itself be the priority activity.

8. Impact of Civil Affairs

The civilian population must be considered in all military efforts. Problems generated by the presence of civilians must be considered and their resolution planned, to avoid hindrance to, or preclusion of the accomplishment of the military mission. Improvised solutions usually will be short term in nature; be more costly in funds, manpower, and effort; and will not facilitate restoration of peace. Therefore, the following general conditions should be considered as a basis for planning:

a. Peacetime situations, when laws and agreements concerning military-civil relations generally are more restrictive than under the more flexible wartime conditions, impose problems of coordination, liaison, and negotiation of great difficulty and delicacy.

b. Internal defense operations, to include environmental improvement and populace and resources control measures, will be necessary to provide the framework for a viable government, as part of the overall internal defense and internal development program.

c. When an insurgency reaches the stage of armed conflict, or during limited and general wars, the government of the area concerned frequently is unable or unwilling to assume full responsibility for its administration. In order to prevent chaos and anarchy, supporting or reestablishing this administration becomes a matter of concern for the military commander operating in the area.
9. Concept of Employment

a. CA staff elements and units serve as agencies of the military commander to assist in the accomplishment of his assigned mission. In addition to assisting the commander in combating enemy economic, political, and sociological action, they might train indigenous forces in civil affairs activities; assist indigenous governmental agencies; support civilian authorities in the United States in emergencies; support activities of field representatives of the Department of State in negotiating and implementing provisions of civil affairs agreements, and develop supplemental agreements between U.S. forces and friendly foreign countries.

b. CA organizations can be tailored to fit any specific civil affairs task. A command can be formed from a CA headquarters unit and subordinate units and teams selected for the specific mission involved.

c. The military organization diverts only those resources and takes only those measures in its dealings with civil authorities and populations essential to its mission and the dictates of national policy. As hostilities cease or an emergency is terminated and the elements of civilian government and administration are reconstituted, responsibility for those CA functions pertaining to the provision and support of government is transferred to civilian authorities and agencies. This entails a shift in responsibility for proponenty and liaison in matters of policy and functional relationships from the military to the Department of State or other governmental agencies.

d. The CA organization must assist the commander in the implementation of the Army’s portion of the political and economic warfare programs of the United States. It is responsible for recommending changes or modifications to policies and providing substantiation for such recommendations through the observation of results in the field.

10. Civil Affairs Operations

a. Any project or activity of a military unit involving contact with civilians outside the military establishment or designed to influence or control civilian activities and civil organizations can be classified as a civil affairs operation regardless of the location of the activity or the size or type of the participating military unit.

b. The legal aspects of civil affairs operations may be governed by a provision of U.S. law, including the laws of a state, territory, possession, or other political subdivision of the United States; a provision of the law of a foreign state made relevant by a provision of U.S. law; a bilateral or multilateral agreement, including an agreement concluded without the formalities required of treaties; a rule of law established by custom; or a rule of international law.

c. The scope of civil affairs operations may extend from measures of liaison and coordination with appropriate local civilian agencies, to the furnishing of assistance and support to local officials and populations, or even to the assumption of responsibility for the exercise of some or all of the functions of government in the locality in question. The degree of civil affairs authority or control necessary to assure the success of operations should be consistent with law and agreements to which the United States is a party.

11. Principles of Civil Affairs Operations

The general principles in a through i below, apply to civil affairs operations and must be considered in planning.

a. Civil affairs operations must be characterized by continuity and consistency in policy. It is fundamental that comprehensive policy be developed at governmental or top command levels and transmitted through normal command channels for implementation.

b. Responsibility and authority for the conduct of these activities is vested in the senior commander to insure uniform implementation. The commander is guided by directives from higher authority, national policies, applicable agreements, and international law. The commander may delegate authority to subordinate commanders to the degree required for the accomplishment of his missions. Command over civil affairs units may be centralized or decentralized depending on the type operation being conducted.

c. All civil affairs operations must support the commander’s political-military mission.

d. The commander’s political-military mission must be accomplished effectively with minimum personnel. Whenever possible, civil affairs operations are conducted through and with existing or reestablished civilian authorities utilizing the
minimum number of military personnel required for advice or supervision.

e. In combined operations an integration of effort is achieved by exercising civil affairs operations through a combined command.

f. Civilian inhabitants have a right to freedom from unnecessary interference with their individual liberties and their property rights.

g. Members of U.S. Armed Forces are individually and collectively responsible for compliance with all requirements of law and regulation affecting their relations with civil authorities and populations.

h. A military commander must consider whether a proposed course of action will result in inhumane treatment of civilians, even though the proposed course of action is not specifically prohibited by international law.

i. The scope of civil affairs authority is varied with the locale and the situation. Three general categories of civil affairs authority are—

- Occupied Territory (AR 320–5). The commander of an occupying force has the right, within limits set by international law, to demand and enforce such obedience from inhabitants of an occupied area as may be necessary for the accomplishment of his mission and the proper administration of an area.

- Combat Zone (AR 320–5). The law of war places limits on the exercise of a belligerent’s power in the interest of protecting combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering and safeguarding certain fundamental human rights. Commanders are required to refrain from employing any kind of violence not actually necessary for military purposes and to give due regard to the principles of humanity.

- Other Areas. The terms of international agreements, regulations, and national policy as promulgated or interpreted by higher authority dictate the scope of military authority in all other areas.

12. Factors Influencing Civil Affairs Operations

- The pattern and objectives of civil affairs operations in any place, or with reference to any sphere of activity, depend primarily on U.S. foreign and domestic policies. For example, while a commander’s first task may be destruction of an enemy’s forces, he may have a subsequent major responsibility to help create internal stability through civil affairs operations.

- A military command may be operational under any condition extending from peace through general war. Within this spectrum civil affairs operations may be subject to a wide variety of conditions, as—

  1. Developmental Factors. Control or assistance measures pertinent to the exercise of governmental functions in a highly developed area, with complex political, economic, and social systems, compared to like measures in a developing area.

  2. Duration. From protracted assistance or control measures extending over several years or decades, pending resolution of major political, economic, or military problems, to operations prompted by transitory emergency situations and lasting but a short time.

  3. Location. Control or assistance measures undertaken in foreign territory as differentiated from measures instituted in domestic territory.

  4. Popular Response. From operations involving a hostile population to measures receiving the enthusiastic support of a loyal and cooperative population.

  5. Military Factors.

    a. The unlimited use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons to the employment of conventional weapons only.

    b. The use of field armies in a general war to the use of small task forces in stability or IDD assistance operations.

  6. Legal Bases. Control or assistance measures may be authorized or required by express provision of law, such as an Act of Congress or an international agreement, or in extreme situations they may undertaken under the principle of necessity.

- Civil affairs operations are influenced by the fact that diplomatic relations between the United States and the government of the area may or may not be in existence.

  1. In peacetime and under conditions of cold war, by the terms of an Executive order, all agencies of the U.S. Govern-
ment operating in a foreign country, except U.S. military forces in the field, are subject to the authority of the American ambassador to that country. Coordination is usually accomplished by the formation of a “country team.” The ambassador presides over activities of this team and the MAAG or mission chief is usually the Department of Defense representative, although a senior military commander stationed in the country may also be a member. Other members include the in-country directors of the Agency for International Development (AID) and the U.S. Information Service (USIS), embassy staff members, such as military attaches, chiefs of political and economic sections, and others whose duties or affiliations make membership appropriate.

(2) Under conditions of limited or general war, however, supreme authority over all U.S. agencies in-country normally will be delegated to a military commander. The senior commander may be assigned a political advisor (POLAD) from the State Department to assist him in his relations with allied and neutral governments and to advise him of the point of view of the State Department on political questions.

d. The above environmental factors will require maximum flexibility and capabilities in CA organization to assist commanders. Implementation will require broad area and contingency planning and training in the entire range of civil affairs activities as outlined in paragraph 7, including—

(1) The conduct of civil affairs operations such as civic action and other support of IDD.

(2) Action to maintain public order or to provide for the welfare of the population, when requested by appropriate civil authority or directed by the President, in civil emergencies resulting from enemy attack, disaster, epidemic, disorder, or under other conditions threatening the successful functioning of duly constituted authority.

(3) Maintenance of liaison between the military commander and the government of an area as prescribed by treaty or other agreement and the supervision of the entire gamut of other civil-military relationships of the command.

(4) Assumption of full or partial executive, legislative, and judicial authority over a country or area.

13. Application of International Obligations

a. International law usually is regarded as having two branches; one dealing with the peaceful relations between states and the other concerned with armed hostilities between states. This division is not, however, absolute, and there are many facets of international relations that are difficult to regard as belonging to the “law of peace” or the “law of war.”

b. The law of peace deals with such matters as recognition of states and governments, jurisdiction, nationality, diplomatic protocol, the prerequisites for and construction of international agreements, and, generally, the practices and standards observed by friendly states in their mutual relations. The law of peace is to be found in treaties, the decisions of international and regional judicial bodies, the writings of jurists, diplomatic correspondence, and other documentary material concerning the customary practice of sovereign states. The law of peace is particularly relevant to defining the rights and obligations of a military force that is deployed in the territory of an allied state where there is no applicable agreement, or with respect to matters on which an existing agreement is silent.

c. The law of war governs such matters as the conduct of hostilities on land, on the sea, and in the air; the status and treatment of persons affected by hostilities; the occupation of enemy territory; flags of truce; armistices and surrender agreements; neutrality; and war crimes. The law of war is derived from two principal sources: treaties, such as the Hague and Geneva Conventions; and custom, a body of unwritten law that is firmly established by the practice of nations and well-defined by recognized authorities on international law. The law of war is inspired by the desire to diminish the evils of war by—

(1) Protecting both combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering.

(2) Safeguarding certain fundamental human rights of persons who fall into the hands of an enemy, particularly prisoners of war, wounded, sick, and civilians.
(3) Facilitating the restoration of peace.

d. In furtherance of these objectives, the law of war imposes limitations on the exercise of a belligerent's power and requires that belligerents refrain from employing any kind or degree of violence which is not actually necessary for military purposes and that they conduct hostilities with regard to the principles of humanity. The law of war is binding not only upon states as such, but also upon individuals and, in particular, the members of the armed forces. The law of war is particularly relevant to civil affairs operations affecting an enemy population, not only during a period of hostilities and an enduring occupation, but also in situations in which an occupation of territory is not an objective of the conflict.

e. The most important treaties and agreements to which the United States is a party and which are applicable to civil affairs operations, include—

(1) The law of peace.


(b) The various Status of Forces Agreements.

(2) The law of war.


(b) The 1949 Geneva Conventions (Wounded and Sick—GWS) (TIAS 3362); (Wounded and Sick at Sea—GWF Sea) (TIAS 3363); (Prisoners of War—GPW) (TIAS 3364); Civilians Persons—GC (TIAS 3365).

f. For an interpretation of the above and other pertinent lawmaking treaties, as well as an explanation of United States practice, see FM 27–10 and FM 19–40. For the text of the more important agreements see DA Pam 27–1.

g. Of these agreements, the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (4 UST 1974; TIAS 2846) is particularly significant because of the precedent it has established concerning the law applicable to visiting military forces when they are in the territory of any friendly state. The Hague Regulations are important because they are regarded as declaratory of law applicable between belligerents. The 1949 Conventions supplement the Hague Regulations—which by their literal terms applied only to a “war” between parties signatory thereto—by broadening the scope of the Treaty law to cover not only “war” but also “any other armed conflict” and “any partial or total occupation,” involving their signatories (FM 27–10).

Section III. PERSONNEL AND TRAINING

14. Qualifications

a. Personnel assigned to CA duties act as representatives of the United States in the political, economic, and sociological aspects of military operations. It is essential that personnel selected for these duties be familiar with the political and philosophical foundations of democracy in the United States, as well as the functioning of our governmental institutions. The extent of authority exercised by personnel performing CA functions, the far-reaching consequences of their routine decisions, and the lack of close supervision that is inherent in their activity necessitate that CA personnel be able to act with sound judgment and discernment in confused and unfamiliar situations and be able to analyze intelligently the various elements of a complex civilian situation, to foresee the long-range effects of taking various courses of action, and to make sound recommendations. CA personnel may also have to make decisions on matters of an urgent nature that cannot await referral to higher headquarters.

b. Sensitivity to local values and a creative imagination is necessary to accomplish the civil affairs mission. CA personnel must have a ready comprehension that what is best in the United States is not necessarily always best in other social, political, and economic circumstances and must also understand that the United States is less concerned with making over other nations in its own image than in helping countries to help themselves.

15. Assignment

Chiefs of CA staff sections and their deputies assigned to the headquarters of major commands and officers assigned as commanders and executive officers of CA units should have a thorough knowledge of military operations in the field, army administration, and should be specifically trained in
civil affairs principles, doctrines, policies, techniques, and procedures. Other CA unit officers not assigned to the various functional teams, must be trained or experienced in general military subjects and in the conduct of civil affairs operations and be qualified by military occupational specialty to perform their principal duties.

16. Civil Affairs Functional Area Specialists

a. It is contemplated that specialist personnel will have had prior professional or technical training appropriate to the specialty for which they are selected. Such specialist personnel and teams receive additional specialized instruction and training in their various functions at appropriate Army installations and civilian institutions. They should have current knowledge of local conditions that might affect operations in their functional areas.

b. Upon mobilization of the USAR, this principle can be followed with little difficulty since USAR personnel assigned to CA USAR units are normally individuals who work in their CA specialty in civilian life. Under circumstances where all CA requirements must be met from the resources of the active Army it becomes necessary to use personnel with MOS most closely related to the various CA specialist positions. These individuals should receive CA training designed to enable them to use their military occupational specialty skills in the fulfillment of the civil affairs mission. For certain CA, specialist skills which have no MOS counterpart, it may be necessary to send active Army personnel with CA generalist training to civilian institutions for specialized training.

c. For optimum use of U.S. civilian personnel living abroad to augment CA staff sections, their recruitment and training as USAR personnel should be a constant concern of the senior U.S. Army headquarters which has responsibility for reserve component matters for the country concerned. These individuals, after screening and selection, should be nominated as mobilization designees for specific U.S. headquarters and their USAR training should be designed to provide maximum proficiency for such assignment. Such individuals are especially useful for work in countries where the United States does not have large forces stationed but where contingency plans or alliance requirements may demand the introduction of large forces with little advance warning.

18. Armywide Training in Civil Affairs

a. All Army personnel will be given a basic orientation in civil affairs matters. Instruction will be given on the following subjects:

(1) The mission of civil affairs.

(2) The individual soldier's key role in civil affairs in that civil affairs is the concern of all military personnel.

(3) Rules and conventions governing war, with emphasis on the enforcement of law, preservation of order, and the prevention of wanton destruction of civilian property.

(4) Organization and functions of civil affairs staffs and units.

b. Additional basic instruction will be given to all Army officers to impart a knowledge of civil affairs organization and operations. This instruction should be included in branch level basic and career courses. Advanced instruction will be given in the higher level Army colleges and should include comparison of systems of government, use of
civil affairs units in all levels of conflict, planning considerations, combined and interallied aspects of civil affairs operations, and methods of including civil affairs in training of personnel and units.

c. Maneuvers and other training exercises will, when practicable, include problems requiring civil affairs play to train all members of the Army.

d. Instruction on civil affairs organization and operations will include principles contained in STANAG and SOLOG Agreements on these subjects (app L).

e. Officer personnel assigned or selected for assignment to CA staff sections or units will be given additional training at the U.S. Army Civil Affairs School.

f. All enlisted personnel assigned to CA units must have some training in the civil affairs principles, policies, organization, operations, and procedures. The additional training of enlisted men varies with their assignments:

(1) Administrative and service personnel are qualified by MOS acquired through attendance at appropriate military schools or on-the-job training.

(2) Enlisted CA functional area specialists, selected by reason of military and civilian background and experience, are given additional training in their functional specialties at appropriate military schools and training centers.

19. Unit Training.

Among the objectives of unit CA training are the following:

a. Prepare the CA unit for the accomplishment of its assigned mission in all seven major areas of civil affairs activity (para 7a).

b. Stress the importance of the CA activity in assisting military operations.

c. Develop an understanding of the principles of area study.

d. Promote knowledge and skill in influencing, controlling, or governing the inhabitants of an area.

e. Provide a working knowledge of the drafting, promulgation, and enforcement of proclamations, laws, ordinances, and orders.

f. Develop an understanding of the factors involved in the restoration of civil government and the cessation of the civil affairs operation.

g. Provide practice in coordinating procedures for the effective administration of CA functions.
CHAPTER 2

STAFF ORGANIZATION FOR THE CONDUCT OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Section I. GENERAL

20. Introduction
Command responsibility for civil affairs requires coordination at the appropriate operating level within the military, with the indigenous civil government, with other agencies of the U.S. Government, and frequently with private agencies. Organizationally, there should be a single focus of responsibility at the staff level to insure centralized direction of a cohesive civil affairs program, and to provide a point of contact for civil affairs activities within and outside of the military.

21. Organizational Placement
a. Standardization agreements provide that armies of NATO and SEATO countries will accept responsibility for appropriate civil affairs administration and support, and will have CA staffs and units (app L).
b. In a large command, or where civil affairs has become a major or primary mission of the command, the commander should consider appointing a deputy for CA operations.
c. The ACofS, Civil Affairs (G5), is established as a general staff officer at all echelons down to and including the division and comparable units and will be provided in all support command headquarters where appropriate.
d. A Civil Affairs Officer (S5) with appropriate augmentation is established in each separate combat brigade or comparable unit and in each battalion size unit deployed to combat insurgency, or for other cold war missions. In separate combat brigades and comparable units the Civil Affairs staff section should be established at least 3 months prior to deployment.
e. Commanders of all installations, whether in CONUS or overseas, should designate an officer to be responsible for civil affairs activities.

Section II. CA STAFF SECTIONS AND PROCEDURES

22. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs (G5)
The G5 is the principal staff assistant on matters pertaining to the civil population, its government, economy, and institutions. He is assigned primary general staff responsibility for the timely preparation and execution of civil affairs policies, plans, orders and directives, and for staff supervision of the seven major civil affairs activities, and is charged with keeping the commander and members of the staff informed on all matters of civil affairs interest.

23. CA Staff Supervision
Staff supervision is accomplished by visits and by study and analysis of special and routine reports of subordinate units. G5 staff section officers, in their inspections and visits, determine whether policies and directives of the commander are being followed and advise subordinate units and their staff sections on actions they should take. Staff supervision of civil affairs units is of particular importance to insure proper conduct and effective coordination of effort in the various CA functional specialty areas.

24. Command and Staff Relationships
Personnel of G5 sections are advisors, planners, coordinators, and supervisors. As members of the coordinating staff, they should not allow themselves to become too engrossed with the details of
administration and operation. General staff officers have no authority to command subordinate elements of the command, but conduct staff supervision of those activities for which they have primary general staff responsibility.

25. Representative Civil Affairs Processes

Since, from a conceptual standpoint, civil affairs is the total of all civil-military relationships, no attempt will be made in this manual to enumerate every conceivable operational aspect of these relationships. As a guide for planning and training purposes, however, the following processes are typically representative of civil affairs and constitute the means by which the functions are performed by all elements of a military command:

a. Liaison.
   (1) With other military units in the command to which assigned or attached, and with units in contiguous civil affairs zones.
   (2) With other U.S., allied, and international governmental agencies in the area.
   (3) With representatives in the apparatus of the indigenous government.
   (4) With representatives of private agencies.

b. Negotiation.
   (1) With appropriate agencies of civilian governments over such matters as police authority, legal jurisdiction, licensing, taxation, use of public facilities, registrations, applicability of laws and regulations, customs, religious practices, restrictions, and other similar phases of both personal and official relationships.
   (2) With private civilian individuals and organizations concerning purchases, claims, contracts, rentals, memberships, personal relationships between individuals, and other related matters.

c. Participation.
   (1) In joint civil-military councils and committees.
   (2) In community relations and civic action type activities.
   (3) In uniservice, joint, and combined exercises and training programs so far as civil affairs instruction and emphasis are concerned.

d. Coordination.
   (1) Among functional civil affairs specialists and between civilian counterparts and staff sections with related interests.
   (2) Between all military and civil agencies in areas of mutual concern.
   (3) With representatives of other U.S. governmental, allied, and international agencies.

e. Support.
   (1) For military forces from civilian labor and material resources.
   (2) For civilians from military personnel, equipment, facilities, and supplies.

f. Advice.
   (1) To the commander on—
      (a) Relationships with civil authorities and population.
      (b) Effects of operations or activities, or contemplated operations or activities, on civilian welfare and morale.
      (c) Effects of civilian governmental and administrative processes, habits, activities, needs, and capabilities on his operations and missions.
      (d) Relationships with U.S. and allied agencies in civilian governmental capacities.
      (e) Procedures for handling non-U.S. labor.
      (f) Treatment for civilians coming under his jurisdiction or control.
      (g) All other matters concerned with affairs of his command in respect to civilian relationships.
   (2) To civil authorities on—
      (a) Needs and requirements of the military forces.
      (b) Capabilities of military forces in cooperative ventures.
      (c) Rehabilitation procedures and processes.
      (d) Civil defense and disaster measures.
      (e) Technical methods calculated to improve civilian economies and social structure.
   (3) To other staff sections and to subordinate units of the command on civil affairs matters.

g. Control (when required) of—
   (1) The circulation of civilians.
   (2) Agencies of government.
   (3) Economic processes and civilian activi-
ties or conditions which may affect operations.

26. Conduct of the Major Activities of Civil-Military Relations

a. The representative civil affairs processes outlined in the preceding paragraph operate in support of one or more of the seven major activities of the civil-military relations of a military commander. Command priority will be given to those civil affairs activities which are most closely related to the command mission.

b. Under some circumstances, the primary mission of the command may be such that management of civil-military relationships becomes the major command activity. This is likely to be the case in situations involving cold war, stability, or IDID assistance missions. It is equally true if the primary command mission is the provision of military support for civil defense, or the establishment of a military government in occupied enemy territory after the cessation of hostilities. Conversely, if the primary mission of the command is the destruction of hostile armed forces in a limited or general war situation then the management of the various civil-military relations activities is a supporting command function to assist the tactical forces and their logistical system. In this situation, the civil affairs activity which deals with the provision of civilian support for and the prevention of civilian interference with tactical and logistical operations must have priority in the overall civil affairs efforts of the command. Whatever the command mission may be, measures taken to accomplish this mission should avoid alienation of the populace to improve the possibilities for winning the peace after cessation of hostilities.

c. The conduct of the seven major activities of civil-military relations may be varied to insure maximum support to the commander in the accomplishment of his mission.

(1) Provision of civilian support for and prevention of civilian interference with tactical and logistical operation.

(a) Civil affairs operations conducted primarily for this purpose are described in detail in chapters 6 and 8.

(b) In addition to their own operations, CA staffs (and units) are able to render support to other agencies in this effort by providing them with detailed area surveys portraying institutions, popula-

lation groups, commercial establishments, and industrial developments susceptible to attack or constituting a hazard to friendly operations; surveys of attitudes and reactions to friendly programs aimed at political or economic targets; surveys of substantive effects of operations designed to disrupt or destroy governmental administration, economic production, commerce or trade; and intelligence on significant personalities or industrial capabilities.

(2) Provision of or support for the functions of government for a civilian population.

(a) CA units or personnel may be assigned to provide liaison between a military command and civilian governmental agencies. In this situation the civil affairs mission may be merely to insure mutual performance of requirements laid down in an actual or implied bilateral agreement.

(b) CA units or personnel may be required to provide for the total performance of all governmental functions in either a military government situation in occupied territory (ch 13) or in a major civil defense emergency in CONUS (ch 11), or in an intermediate state between these two extremes, such as the reinforcement or extension of governmental services by military personnel and units when the government has been weakened or disrupted by insurgency, hostile attack, or natural disaster. (Even well-established governments in highly developed nations may require this type of military assistance. In the United States this was necessary for the establishment and initial functioning of the Civilian Conservation Corps during the depression and today it has been found necessary to support the work abroad of civilian agencies such as AID and USIA with military personnel and units. Detailed doctrine for this activity of civil-military relationships is set forth in ch 5, 6, 7, 10, and 11.)

(3) Community relations of the military forces.
(a) Any military organization that is stationed on foreign soil or whose personnel are present on such soil (naval personnel on shore leave, for example) exerts some degree of influence on the local community. The influence contributes or detracts from the attainment of U.S. goals in the area involved in almost direct proportion to the success or failure of the community relations program.

(b) Good community relations promote better understanding between civil and military elements and encourage cooperation between the two groups far beyond the immediate locality in which they are initiated. Poor community relations may trigger reactions in the rest of the world. Following are some of the programs, projects, and activities in which military units may participate to promote good community relations in CONUS or overseas:

1. Information activities. Normally the Information Officer is charged with developing a good public image of the Army and insuring fair and impartial news coverage. Normally the Army has no censorship over media of public expression in the United States, its possessions, or in friendly foreign countries, therefore, cooperation obtained usually reflects cooperation extended.

2. Open houses, exhibits, and demonstrations. Within limitations imposed by security and operational considerations, goodwill and community understanding are stimulated by opening military facilities to visitors, showing informative and educational exhibits, and giving demonstrations which simultaneously provide entertainment and emphasize the posture of U.S. military strength. An extension of the same general program can be conducted off-post by participation in parades, providing concerts by military bands, demonstrations by drill teams at public functions, and furnishing speakers for appearances before selected opinion-influencing groups.

3. Participation in athletic leagues or events. Joint civil-military participation in athletic contests or leagues, if properly handled, can engender goodwill, but undue partisanship will destroy any advantages accrued.

4. Orientation of personnel going abroad. Orientation programs vary in scope from passing out circulars containing helpful hints and short orientation lectures to more sophisticated orientation programs such as the instruction given at the Military Assistance Institute for personnel assigned to MAAGs and missions. The institute provides concentrated briefings on the area and country to be visited supplemented by kits of material for individual reference and study. In many cases, further orientation of personnel is conducted on the ground during the first days after arrival in a foreign country.

5. Joint civil programs. Military participation in such programs as support for orphanages or similar indigent groups, cooperation in the sponsorship of youth organizations, and participation in fund drives develops warmth and approbation. In general, it can be said that making personnel, facilities, and equipment available in programs of general or specific welfare within limitations imposed by capabilities and policy directives promotes friendly attitudes worth many times the effort expended.

6. Counterpart cooperation. Many general and special staff officers in military units, including CA functional specialists, have counterparts in the civilian community. Close liaison and cooperation in programs of mutual interest to military and civilian agencies are advantageous to both.

7. Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Boards. Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Boards are established under AR 15–3 with membership normally composed of the surgeons and provost
marshals from military installations in a designated area. In meeting with invited civilian representatives from nearby communities they make a major contribution toward improving the health and moral climate of the civilian community in the vicinity of the military installation to the advantage of both military personnel and the community.

8. U.S. Information Service. The USIS, operating under direction of the U.S. embassy and conducting a broad program of information, cultural, and educational services for the population of a foreign country, usually will have an activity located in the vicinity of large U.S. military installations abroad. Where such activities are located in the vicinity of a military headquarters, the military units normally have representation on planning committees for liaison purposes and to provide support from the military for the USIS program. The USIS frequently will have literature or movies that can be utilized by military units in their community relations program.

9. Binational association. In most oversea areas there are organizations, associations, or committees with military and civilian membership, some of which are organized primarily to improve relationships. Meetings may be held in which mutual problems are discussed, and support for various charitable, patriotic, cultural, educational, and recreational programs, events, and facilities may be made matters of joint sponsorship.

10. Unit and individual projects. In conformance with command civil affairs policy, individual military units may support an orphanage, school, hospital, or similar facility on a continuing basis or in connection with specific events or holiday periods. Individual personnel may be encouraged to accept invitations to visit with local families and to reciprocate with invitations to meals in unit messes on special occasions. Military equipment and volunteer manpower may be used to assist civilian communities in the development of playgrounds, athletic fields, or other community facilities. Families may be encouraged to accept children as guests in their homes for extended periods, particularly during summer school vacation. Many military personnel and members of their families are well qualified to lend assistance with local education programs in English and in other subjects. Assistance with local USIS programs and other educational and social welfare activities is one of the most important individual means of building goodwill in lands where people are still thirsting for knowledge and where social needs are frequently great. Care must be exercised in these programs to insure that they do not violate customs or appear as charity and therefore create resentment rather than rapport.

11. Advisory councils. Frequently community relations councils are established which may include as members the commander, selected members of his staff, and representatives from national or regional (depending on the locale) governmental and civic organizations (AR 360-55). These councils, which may be set up either in CONUS or oversea areas, can serve any or all of the following purposes:

(a) Medium of official liaison.
(b) Action agency for joint programs.
(c) Sounding board for reactions to specific incidents and conditions.
(d) Agency through which diverse requirements can be weighed and compromises reached.
(e) Policy group for the allocation of aid and assistance.

(c) The CA officer has a definite staff interest in the community relations program. CA staff participation should emphasize the programming and coordinating aspects rather than the oper-
ating responsibilities. The community relations program remains the operating responsibility of the information officer in a command, but with coordinating staff responsibility assigned to CA officer for advice and coordination.

(4) **Military civic action as part of internal development program.**

(a) The use of military personnel and resources to support or implement a national internal development program is military civic action. In a Phase I insurgency situation, particularly in the absence of a real external threat to a nation, military civic action (augmented by psychological operations) normally should be a primary mission of the military forces of that nation since the internal development program represents the best hope for the prevention of an active insurgency. U.S. military personnel assigned to advise and support indigenous forces must be prepared to assist in staff planning and supervision of this program. In other phases of insurgency, military civic action continues as part of the total IDD program to the maximum feasible extent. Detailed doctrine is contained in chapters 5, 6, and 7.

(b) Military civic action is also of significance in limited and general war situations but demands more emphasis in postcombat situations. Doctrine for the employment of military civic action in these circumstances is contained in chapters 12 and 13.

(5) **Military participation in a populace and resources control portions of Internal Defense Operations.**

(a) Control of the populace and resources of a country is a responsibility of its civilian governmental agencies. There are circumstances, however, in which civilian agencies may be unable to meet this responsibility. For example, a country threatened with, or weakened by insurgency, disaster, or hostile attack, may require the services of its military forces to impose effective control. Under any set of circumstances, when military forces are used to execute or support a program for the control of the civil populace and its resources, this program becomes a major activity of civil affairs.

(b) In IDID, a populace and resources control program as part of the total internal security effort is of prime importance. Doctrine for the implementation of this program by indigenous and U.S. forces is contained in chapters 5, 6, and 7.

(c) Doctrine for the employment of a populace and resources control program in military government situations is contained in chapter 13.

(6) **Military support of civil defense.**

(a) Military personnel, resources, and units may be committed to provide support, training, or supervision for civil defense activities in CONUS or overseas to mitigate the effects of disaster or hostile attack. When a military unit is so committed, civil affairs generally, and civil defense in particular, becomes a primary matter of the commander's concern, and he will use those resources necessary to support this activity. However, in most situations, the provision of military support for civil defense is a secondary mission of the military unit, and planning and training for the accomplishment of this mission must be accomplished to the same degree as planning and training for the accomplishment of any other contingency mission. CA staff sections, in conjunction with other members of the general or coordinating staff, should insure that this planning and training is effectively accomplished.

(b) Doctrine for military support of civil defense in CONUS is contained in chapter 11.

(c) Doctrine for military support of civil defense abroad in an insurgency environment is contained in chapters 5 and 6.

(d) Doctrine for military support of civil defense abroad under conditions of limited or general war, and the interface between this civil affairs activity and rear area damage control and security
operations is contained in chapters 6 through 9.

(7) Consolidation psychological operations.
(a) Civil affairs is aimed at the intelligent handling of military contacts with civilians to produce a result that will best assist the commander in the accomplishment of his mission. Civil affairs activities can best be performed with the appropriate support of consolidation psychological operations, that is, psychological operations directed towards influencing civilians who are located in areas for which the military commander has responsibility or in which his troops are operating. Overall staff responsibility for psychological operations is vested in the G3 and staff responsibility for consolidation psychological operations is vested in the G5. The G5 coordinates with the G3 on assignment and use of psychological units and with G2 on intelligence support requirements for consolidation psychological operations. Psychological operations staffs and units provide advice regarding the psychological implications of proposed courses of action and utilize organic and indigenous personnel and equipment in the production and dissemination of propaganda in support of selected courses of action.

(b) The commander should utilize his consolidation psychological operations to insure attainment of his civil affairs objectives in much the same way as he uses his firepower to support his plan of maneuver. Detailed doctrine for the support of civil affairs activities by psychological operations is contained in chapter 5 for cold war, in chapter 11 for CONUS, in chapters 12 and 13 for postcombat operations, and in chapters 6, 7, and 8, for limited and general war. Psychological operations doctrine and techniques are contained respectively in FM 33-1 and FM 33-5.

Section III. OTHER STAFF SECTION SUPPORT OF CA OPERATIONS

27. General

While the G5 has primary general staff responsibility for the coordination of matters involving civil-military relationships, this in no way subordinates the specialized interest and activities of other elements of a command. Examples can be cited in every area of staff interest—e.g., the responsibilities of the provost marshal with respect to mutual problems of military and civilian law and order, traffic control, and the circulation of individuals, and the responsibilities of the transportation officer in operations and allocations of the means of public transport used for the movement of military personnel, supplies, and equipment. Primary responsibility for those staff activities affecting civil-military relations remains with the appropriate staff section which normally has that function, but the exercise of staff supervision will require close coordination with the G5, because these activities have a major impact on the civil military relationships of a command.

28. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Personnel (G1)

a. Among the activities for which the G1 has primary staff responsibility are three which have a direct and significant impact on civil affairs—

(1) Personnel management of all types of civilian employees.

(2) Personnel services including housing, and rest and recreational facilities.

(3) Medical service.

b. While the G1 has primary responsibility for establishing conditions of employment, pay scales and benefits for indigenous laborers, the G5 is interested in prevention of disruption to the local economy as a result of U.S. military employment practices. G1 in his personnel management function must see to it that U.S. employment policies and standards meet those of the host nation (if operating in a friendly country) as determined for him by the G5. Similar considerations guide the use of local real estate and other resources used for housing (troop and dependent), headquarters locations, and rest, recreational and other special service facilities. In the management of all of these functions the G1 should provide the G5 with adequate information about these activities to serve as a basis for consolidation psychological operations which will explain U.S. activities to
the local populace and elicit voluntary cooperation wherever possible.

c. The G1 also has responsibility for the Army Medical Service. As part of this responsibility he may be required to provide Army Medical Service units, personnel, and materiel to supplement inadequate civilian medical facilities and supplies within the scope of U.S. policy and international law; and to augment the civilian capacity for the control of disease.

29. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (G2)

a. Civil affairs activities both require and produce intelligence information. The areas of mutual interest between civil affairs and intelligence are extensive and vital. They are treated in detail in chapter 4 and appendix F.

b. The G2 must coordinate his intelligence collection effort with civilian intelligence agencies. The G5 should be generally informed of such relationships and should assist the G2, where necessary, by negotiation (or direction) with responsible civilian governmental agencies. Detailed coordination and liaison between U.S. military intelligence personnel and civilian intelligence personnel will be direct but the G5 should be informed of and help prepare the general command policies governing such relationships, and should be informed promptly whenever intelligence activities threaten to, or do, impair the overall civil-military relationships of the command. Many of these potentially embarrassing problems can be avoided by proper command policies dealing with such matters as methods and techniques of interrogation of civilians, the use of U.S. or indigenous interrogators, and binational intelligence and counterintelligence operations.

30. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations (G3)

a. Except for military operations conducted in unpopulated areas, all military operations have a direct impact upon the civilian populace. Fire and maneuver, barriers, and the use of special weapons, are all likely to bring about collateral damage and casualties to civilians. G3 must obtain from G5 the information about population densities and configurations, which will enable him to plan for the successful accomplishment of military missions while inflicting minimum collateral damage upon the civilian populace and the civilian economy. In certain circumstances civil affairs considerations may be a factor which can affect the choice of fire support systems and plans of maneuver. While this is usually the case in internal defense operations, where the loyalty of the people is a primary consideration, it may also affect tactical operations in limited or general war. In the consideration of alternate routes of approach for an offensive operation, or of beachheads for amphibious operations the loyalties and sympathies of key segments of the population in such areas may be a deciding factor. The provision of information and professional judgment to the G3 on such matters is a responsibility of the G5. Conversely, the G3 furnishes the G5 with operational plans so that the G5 may plan civil affairs activities which will best support the command effort.

b. G3 is responsible for unconventional warfare (UW) operations. Doctrine pertaining to civil affairs support for those operations is contained in chapter 10.

c. G3 is responsible for rear area security operations. Doctrine pertaining to the interface between rear area security and civil affairs in limited and general war is contained in appendix J.

d. G3 is responsible for psychological operations directed against hostile forces and the people in enemy-held territory but G5 has primary staff responsibility for consolidation psychological operations. Obviously, close coordination of propaganda themes and policy on the use of media for each aspect of psychological operations is essential. G5 will look to the G3 for the provision of psychological operations units and resources to support civil affairs activities, and to the psychological operations member of the G3 section for guidance on the psychological implications of proposed courses of action.

31. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics (G4)

a. The mission of the G4 includes the provision of supply and service support for the civil affairs activities of the command. This may range from the provision of a specified minimum calorie food supply under emergency conditions of limited or general war, to the provision of an entire range of standard and nonstandard items to support a military civic action program in an internal development effort.
b. In procuring local items, G4 and G5 must insure that consideration is given to the effects of such procurement on the local population and economy of the area, and the U.S. balance of payments situation. The CA function of civilian supply is a two-directional operation involving the mobilization and use of resources of the civilian economy, within the bounds of national policy, international agreement, and international law, in support of U.S. military forces; and conversely, the satisfaction of essential civilian needs through military supply sources. Except in emergency situations local procurement will be avoided when subsequent importation of similar items for civilian consumption will be necessary.

c. The interface between area damage control and military support of civil defense outside of CONUS under conditions of limited or general war is covered in chapters 6 through 8. Military support of civil defense in CONUS is covered in chapter 11. The G4 supports the G5 in this activity in CONUS or abroad by assisting in the provision of various supplies and services, as follows:

(1) Receipt, storage, and transportation of supplies for civilian relief and economic aid.

(2) Provision of assistance or technical advice to the maximum extent consistent with requirements for the support of military operations in such activities as—
   (a) Removal or neutralization of mines, boobytraps, demolitions, and CBR contamination.
   (b) Rehabilitation of water supply facilities and public utilities for military or essential civilian use when such rehabilitation is beyond the capabilities of local agencies of government.
   (c) Rehabilitation of port, transportation, and communication facilities, as may be directed.
   (d) Clearance of debris structures.
   (e) Emergency care of civilian casualties.
   (f) Provision of supplies for refugees and displaced persons beyond the capabilities of local authorities and the CA organization.

d. As a coordinating staff officer the G4 has supervisory responsibility for construction and transportation services. Activities in these fields affect the civil affairs activities of the command and can have a major impact on civil-military relations in connection with the following requirements:

   (1) **Engineer units, personnel, and materiel to—**
      (a) Construct camps and billets for civilians, particularly refugees and displaced persons.
      (b) Make necessary repairs or to construct essential public utilities, such as water reservoirs or filtering plants, essential bridges, dams, locks, and similar structures.
      (c) Maintain or construct essential public transportation facilities such as roads and railways.
      (d) Support rehabilitation projects as the situation permits and as directed by higher authority.

   (2) **Transportation units, personnel, and materiel to—**
      (a) Assist in procurement, installation, maintenance, and operation of civilian transportation equipment.
      (b) Supplement civilian transportation facilities for movement of civilian supplies, commodities, or personnel, as the military situation permits.

e. These activities may be performed under any condition of warfare and in postcombat situations. In internal defense assistance situations they are especially important. Engineer and transportation training, advice and support for indigenous military forces in the conduct of military civic action projects is vital (ch 5, 6, and 7).

32. The Staff Judge Advocate

   a. As the legal advisor to the commander and to all members of the staff, the SJA has an especially important role to play in support of all civil affairs activities. The G5 looks to him for advice on matters of U.S., international, and local law as they pertain to and affect civil-military relationships.

   b. The SJA will also directly affect the civil-military relationships of a command by his own activities in three fields, in each of which he must also take into account the civil affairs policy of his
command. These are—

(1) Claims service matters.
(2) Procurement law matters.
(3) Jurisdiction of local courts over U.S. personnel and activities.

a. In situations where CA legal personnel are not available to create or supervise the operation of CA tribunals the SJA has staff responsibility for the creation and supervision of military commissions or other military tribunals as required for the trial of civilians under the laws of war.

33. The Provost Marshal/Military Police

a. The maintenance of discipline, law, and order among U.S. military personnel always has a bearing upon the relationships of the command to civilian authorities and people.

b. Command policy with regard to the relationships of the U.S. military police and the civil police is a matter of common interest to the PM and the G5. While the G5 has primary staff responsibility for such command policy, its execution and day-to-day operations thereunder are primarily matters for PM concern. This relationship is analogous to that of the G2 and the G5, but the impact of police operations upon the community as a whole is likely to be greater than that of intelligence operations, and for this reason the G5 will be more intimately and directly concerned in the relationships of the military with the civil police. Under certain circumstances such as the grant of authority by a host nation, or in military government operations, the military police may be authorized to hire civilian personnel for police operations or to train and supervise indigenous paramilitary or civil police.

c. Depending upon the degree of civil affairs authority granted to the military commander, the PM may assist civil affairs operations by providing military police to—

(1) Secure and protect such critical supplies, equipment, and facilities as may be determined by the responsible commander.
(2) Protect records, archives, historical and cultural structures, and shrines.
(3) Enforce circulation restrictions and curfews.
(4) Maintain order and quell frays or disturbances.
(5) Control traffic.
(6) Control movements of displaced persons, evacuees, and refugees.
(7) Investigate serious crimes committed by civilians.

34. The Information Officer

a. The role of the Information Officer in community relations activities has been covered in paragraph 26c(3).

b. The impact on civil-military relations of the Information Officer is not limited to his participation in community relations matters. The command information program for military personnel and for the civilian employees must be coordinated with the consolidation psychological operations program if one is being conducted. Information intended only for the education of U.S. military personnel often will reach civilian audiences and must be in consonance with U.S. released information directed at such civilian audiences or released to the world at large. In today's world the mobility of individuals and the profusion of mass communications is such that neither the Information Officer nor the Psychological Operations Officer can hope to address an audience isolated unto itself. Further, news released abroad to U.S. and international news media and intended for audiences outside the theater of operations will also return to the locale of such operations and influence civilian audiences. Under many circumstances it is likely that host or occupied country audiences will give less credence to information they believe to have been released and intended for their own consumption.

35. The Staff Chaplain

The staff chaplain has frequent contact with the clergy, religious groups and organizations and other leaders in the communities near U.S. military installations, both in CONUS and overseas areas. The fostering of cordial relationships with local religious representatives and leaders of allied activities and civic organizations can open the way to opportunities for religious, social, and cultural rapport between military personnel and the local civilian populace. In overseas areas in particular, good relations between the military and nationals of occupied or allied territories may be promoted through liaison with the local clergy and by encouraging military personnel in respectful attitudes toward the various faiths, sacred rites, and places of worship. These activities will, of course, require CA staff coordination.
36. Additional Details on Other Staff Relationships

a. In directorate type and support command staffs the titles or designations of members of the coordinating staff may vary but the doctrinal principles enunciated in the preceding paragraphs usually will be valid.

b. Matters which require a flow of information and support from the G5 to other staff sections are listed in appendix D.
37. Concept of CA Operations

a. The scope of operations conducted by CA units varies according to the specific mission assigned by higher headquarters. CA units provide command support or area support to tactical or administrative units, respectively. Whenever possible, civil affairs operations are conducted through and with existing or reestablished civilian authorities utilizing the minimum number of military personnel required for advice or supervision. Trained CA officers or small well-qualified CA units working through and with civil authorities and population can accomplish what might be difficult (or even impossible) for a company or battalion of troops. As local governmental agencies become increasingly able to function with decreasing support or control, the number of CA units required can be reduced. Disposition of units made surplus by consolidation is accomplished in accordance with the theater plan.

b. CA command support units are those provided for the operational support of field armies and subordinate commands. These units perform recurring civil affairs operations and move with the unit being supported. In a fluid or moving situation, a command support unit normally initiates only limited emergency activities in an area. The continuance or extension of these activities is carried out by designated area support units. In a static situation, a command support unit may perform many or all of those activities normally conducted by an area support unit.

c. CA area support units may be provided for either the combat zone or the communications zone as required for predesignated missions. They normally do not move from their planned area or locale of employment as do command support units. Area support units can be tailored for specific areas such as cities, provinces, or states. These units perform CA functions and operations of a more permanent nature with the objective of re-establishing the civil government and economy as soon as possible. These units are allocated and deployed in accordance with a plan normally developed in advance of commitment and serve as backup to command support units in the combat zone.

d. The shift from command support civil affairs operations to area support civil affairs operations usually is accomplished by having a CA unit specifically tailored and prepared for the city, province, or state to relieve an in-place CA unit that has been operating in the command support role. Area support units shift the emphasis on activities. Certain activities, such as the restoration of public order and safety, control of refugees and displaced persons, and furnishing of emergency relief, which may have received primary attention during a fluid situation, will share importance with such functional activities of government as public works and utilities, public transportation, and civil information once an area support unit has taken over. When one CA unit is directed to relieve another, the commander and principal members of the staff of the relieving unit make a personal reconnaissance of the area and confer with the staff of the headquarters to which the unit will be assigned. The commander of the unit being relieved insures that necessary actions are taken to—

(1) Acquaint the commander and staff of the relieving unit with designations, locations and commanders of higher, subordinate, adjacent and supporting units in the area, and with the characteristics and peculiarities of the area.

(2) Furnish copies of current operational directives, standing operating procedures, policy checklists, reports, and records summarizing previous activities in the area of the unit being relieved.
(3) Describe activities in progress, their relative importance, and point out additional measures that must be taken.

(4) Document commitments made to civilians or civilian officials.

(5) Furnish a list of individuals, not appointed as officials, but of value to the CA unit.

(6) Furnish information and recommendations on other items outlined in the periodic CA report shown in FM 101-5.

e. In a static situation primary attention of both command and area support units may be given to long-range policies for the restoration of local institutions. Consideration may be given to reformation of institutions and the adoption of more liberal policies in the control of the inhabitants, depending on the provisions of applicable treaties or agreements and U.S. objectives. It is essential to establish a stable government and to confirm its exercise of authority.

38. Uniformity and Continuity

a. CA units must initiate activities in the combat zone as soon as an area comes within the control of the military force. Since uniformity and continuity of policies and operations are essential to success, all tactical commanders exercising civil affairs authority require civil affairs guidance from higher authority.

b. The CA organizational structure must be planned for employment at specific echelons of command or levels of government. CA channels of communication normally will be established between CA staff sections and commands to insure uniform implementation of plans and policies and maximum coordination of overall CA operations.

d. The CA platoon is the smallest control element. Although the platoon headquarters is not self-sufficient, it is designed to control a maximum of six cellular teams.

e. CA company, battalion, group and brigade headquarters consist of a command and administrative headquarters element in which are included the appropriate staff officers and to which functional elements are added as the situation requires.

(1) These CA companies, battalions, groups, and brigades normally command a number of subordinate CA units. There are exceptions. For example, when a political subdivision is of such complexity and magnitude as to require the rank, experience, and diversity of special and professional skills that are not feasible for a CA platoon, a higher level CA unit may be given the operational role. In many cases it may become necessary to augment this unit with the full range of functional teams to counterpart all the activities of a government. This specially tailored unit should then be concerned with only that political subdivision for which it was tailored. The commander and staff of this type of CA unit would serve as counterparts to the indigenous officials while subordinate team groupings would be concerned with administering the lower levels of government (e.g., boroughs, wards, districts, suburbs).

(2) The cellular concept of organization lends itself to the flexibility for assignment, attachment, organization, or reorganization of CA elements required to deal with the wide variety of CA tasks and missions.

d. The CA brigade headquarters are designed to serve primarily as command elements of CA units responsible for a major area of a nation. This headquarters consists of a command element, a complete CA functional staff, and administrative elements for self-sufficiency.

e. Details concerning the capabilities and the organizational structure of these and other civil affairs units are contained in appendix B.

39. CA Organization

a. CA functional teams are cellular and vary in size and capabilities. These teams are made up of individuals who are technically qualified either to advise or supervise each of the various functions which comprise the normal range of governmental activities.

b. A CA platoon is the smallest control element. Although the platoon headquarters is not self-sufficient, it is designed to control a maximum of six cellular teams.

c. CA company, battalion, group and brigade headquarters consist of a command and administrative headquarters element in which are included

40. Tailoring of CA Units for Operations

a. CA organization is based on the nature and ultimate size of the area of operations and the political mission of the parent military command rather than the size or composition of the troop force operating in the area. Flexibility in CA organization is obtained by the assignment of appropriate CA headquarters units and the attachment of functional teams required for the mission.
b. As a basis for estimating the number and type of functional teams required for an operation, the following should be considered:

1. The type of civil affairs operation.
2. Degree of control required.
3. Number and size of population centers.
5. Attitude of the population.
6. Nature of economy (agricultural or industrial area).
7. Degree of economic development.
8. Governmental structure and availability of officials.
9. History of the area.
10. Estimated population movements.
11. Accustomed standard of living and dietary habits.
12. Health conditions.
13. Labor potential.
14. Civilian supplies available.
15. Monetary stability.
16. Languages of the area.
17. Religious entities.

The CA planner must estimate the type and number of CA units which will be required in the entire area of operations to accomplish the commander's political-military mission. Due to the cellular nature of CA units, this estimate must include the type and number of functional teams each unit will have assigned or attached. The estimate must include both command support and area support unit requirements.

1. Estimates for command support units normally are based on the number of committed brigades and divisions to be supported in the ratio of one platoon per committed brigade and one company per committed division. The types and numbers of functional teams assigned or attached to these units will vary with the situation and the characteristics of the area of operations. Public Safety, Public Health, Displaced Persons, Refugees and Evacuees, Labor, Civilian Supply, and Public Welfare functional teams are those most frequently required to augment command support units during combat.

2. Estimates for area support units required are based on the factors listed in b above, rather than the size of the military force in the area. Since area support units are designed to perform civil affairs operations in specific geographic or political subdivisions, it would be desirable to tailor each unit precisely for the specific area in which it will be committed. In large operations, such precise preplanning is generally not feasible due to limitations in time and precise area information as well as such imponderables as the attitude of the population and the extent of combat damage the area will suffer.

(a) In an area support situation, one approach for the CA planner is to examine the existing political and administrative structure in the area of operations and, considering the nature of the civil affairs operation to be conducted, determine the levels of government at which CA units must be deployed or civil affairs controls exercised. This amounts to a stratification of the area, grouping similar political and administrative subdivisions which will have essentially the same CA unit requirements. A country might be stratified as follows:

1. Small towns and rural areas.
2. Municipalities up to 50,000 population.
3. Municipalities 50,000 to 100,000 population.
4. Municipalities 100,000 to 250,000 population.
5. Municipalities over 250,000 population.
6. Districts.
7. Provinces.
8. Regions.

The appropriate stratification will vary widely from area to area. The example given would be appropriate for a highly urbanized society. In many of the underdeveloped areas of the world, the typical pattern is one large capital city which is the seat of government and the hub of commercial and transportation activity, a few medium-sized cities which are largely marketing and distribution centers, with the remainder of the country comprised of villages and rural areas. In such cases, the stratification can be greatly simplified.
In any event, the next step is to develop a “type” CA unit (i.e., a head­quarters unit and suitable functional teams) to perform the civil affairs tasks at each stratum which has been delineated. Guidelines for selecting appropriate headquarters units are provided in appendix B. Functional team requirements may be determined by examining the list of CA functional team duties set forth in appendix C, and determining the degree to which these duties must be performed at each stratum. For example, the guidelines provided in appendix B, indicate that a CA platoon is the suitable headquarters unit for both of the first two localities listed in the stratification given above. However, the functional team requirements for each of these two may vary considerably. For the small towns and rural areas, the platoon headquarters itself augmented by a language team with occasional advice and assistance from functional specialists assigned or attached to higher headquarters should be sufficient to carry out the required CA functions. Thus, the unit for this level of stratification could be an 8-man platoon. On the other hand, the platoon assigned to the small city of up to 50,000 normally would require that certain functional teams be assigned or attached on a full-time basis, making the size of this platoon several times the size of the 8-man platoon needed in a small town or rural area. However, at this echelon, many of the functional teams could be expected to perform multiple functions. For example, the public administration team could oversee most of the governmental functions, the economics and commerce team could oversee most of the economic functions, the public works and utilities team could oversee all public facilities functions and so on. Thus, a “type” unit for the small city might be a platoon headquarters, a language team, a public administration team, an economics and commerce team, a public works and utilities team, and possibly, public health, public safety, civilian supply, and displaced persons, refugee and evacuee teams depending upon the situation. The same reasoning is applied and type units are developed for each level of stratification which has been delineated. Generally, the spread and level of functional teams required increases with successive strata. However, this is not a hard and fast rule which should be applied blindly. A district government, for example, may not perform as many functions as the government of a large city. In addition, in many small countries such functions as public finance and public communications may be almost totally controlled at the national level. Definitive judgments can only be based on a detailed study of the area concerned.

Once type units for each echelon have been devised, the next step is a simple mathematical determination of the numbers of each type unit required to provide complete area coverage. Then, finally, the units are put together in a suitable organizational structure. Normally, this will conform to the existing administrative structure. However, if it is found that the span of control is extended excessively at any echelon, additional headquarters units may be introduced to reduce this span of control. For example, in a country with 30 provinces all directly subordinate to a national government, it may be desirable to group these provinces regionally and introduce additional headquarters units to command each regional grouping. Since these additional units would have no indigenous counterpart echelon, they would not normally have functional teams assigned or attached.

41. Selection of Command Structure for Civil Affairs Operations

a. The senior commander delegated civil affairs authority is responsible for the conduct of civil affairs operations. His subordinate commanders may be delegated civil affairs authority, but they must also fulfill certain civil affairs responsibilities by virtue of international law, treaties, or
agreements. Command over CA units may be centralized or decentralized depending on the type of operation.

b. The decision as to the method of conducting civil affairs operations, and the organization to support that method, rests with the senior commander. Basically, he has three choices—

(1) To attach CA units as required to each major element (division, its equivalent, or higher) in the field army(s) and COMMZ.

(2) To form a separate CA command at the highest level and have all subordinate CA units attached to that command.

(3) Some combination of (1) and (2) above.

c. The most responsive civil affairs operational and organizational concept envisioned for most situations is that which provides for centralized direction and decentralized operation of civil affairs. Consequently, the attachment of CA units, as required, to each major command element having civil affairs authority will be the normal arrangement. This concept will require for effective implementation—

(1) Proper CA staff representation at all command echelons including joint and combined staffs.

(2) Provision of adequate CA units to all commands having civil affairs authority, tailored to meet the commander’s specific needs.

d. The creation of a separate command may be appropriate, however, under some circumstances. It is envisioned, for example, that in a highly stabilized rear area situation where nearly normal functioning of civil authority has been restored, a command may provide a more appropriate and responsive method of supervision of, or assistance to, civil authority. Under these circumstances, a CA command would be easily adapted to organizational arrangements coinciding with national political boundaries and paralleling the national political organizational structure. It is further envisioned that, as combat draws to a close, and a military government situation develops, with concomitant increased command emphasis on civil affairs, a separate CA command may be the desirable method of administering the occupied or liberated areas, dependent, of course, on applicable international agreements and international law.

e. It may be desirable to have a CA command structure for centralized direction and execution in the COMMZ with decentralized direction and execution in the combat zone.

f. The military commander and his CA staff should consider the desirability of an orderly transition from a wholly decentralized civil affairs operation, to a centralized operation in a stabilized rear area and continued decentralization in the combat zone, finally arriving at a wholly centralized operation in a posthostility environment. Items to be considered include—

(1) Mission responsiveness.

(2) Efficient command and control.

(3) Utilization of improved technology.

(4) Flexibility, with associated economy of personnel.

(5) Pooling of critical specialist personnel at the highest echelon.

(6) Orderly transition to U.S. or other civilian authority.

42. Functional Teams

a. CA is administered on a functional basis, with areas of specialization arranged into categories generally adaptable to the diverse social-political-economic ramifications of civilian government functions. Each function is related to a certain extent to every other function, and their interlocking relationships do not permit assignment of exclusive interest to any one functional area. Extensive liaison and coordination are also required with other military units, particularly intelligence, military police, medical, psychological operations, and those engaged in communications, construction, and supply activities.

b. In applying these functions in any foreign land, commanders must be constantly alert to avoid the blind projection of an organizational concept from the United States or a state or locality previously encountered. By way of illustration, in many foreign countries functions other than mail-carrying commonly are assigned to postal ministries. These may include telephone and telegraph service, radio and television, bus transportation, and banking. There is seldom a valid reason for reassigning these functions. The fact that U.S. Post Offices do not handle this is not a justification for reorganization.

c. Teams are capable of assisting, supervising, or directing civilian offices performing the same or related functions at the level of government at which their parent headquarters operates. Func-
tional teams are attached or assigned to units on the basis of organization and need, and the size of the unit and the nature of its mission determine to a large degree the employment of the teams. Teams attached to an area or brigade headquarters, for instance, may be employed more generally in advisory, planning, and supervisory roles, whereas teams attached to groups and companies are more likely to be engaged directly in field operations. For a description of the teams and their functions, see appendixes B and C. For purposes of training and operational control, the functional teams may be grouped into general categories. This separation does not necessarily reflect essential functional relationship, since each function is related to some extent to every other function.

d. Functional teams may, when authorized by their commander, represent him in direct contact with civilian officials of their corresponding function. The teams give technical advice and assistance as needed and evaluate the results. If the commander is authorized to exercise control over civilian officials, the teams supervise and coordinate the execution of orders and instructions issued. All official communications are made in the name of the commander.

e. Teams maintain close liaison with military agencies having corresponding functions; for example, public safety with the provost marshal and military police, public health with the surgeon, and tribunal with the judge advocate.

f. In order to maintain flexibility and to make full use of the capabilities of functional teams usually it is preferable to assign teams to the highest CA unit and to attach them to lower units or assign team missions in support of specified objectives.

g. Functional teams of different sizes are organized to deal with every facet of economic-political-sociological life of the civilian community. These teams are—

- (1) Arts, monuments, and archives.
- (2) Civil defense.
- (3) Civil information.
- (4) Civilian supply.
- (5) Displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees.
- (6) Economics and commerce.
- (7) Food and agriculture.
- (8) Labor.
- (9) Property control.
- (10) Public administration.
- (11) Public communications.
- (12) Public education.
- (13) Public finance.
- (14) Public health.
- (15) Public safety.
- (16) Public transportation.
- (17) Public welfare.
- (18) Public works and utilities.
- (19) Religious relations.
- (20) Tribunals.
- (21) Language.
CHAPTER 4
INTELLIGENCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Section I. CIVIL AFFAIRS REQUIREMENT FOR INTELLIGENCE

43. General

a. Civil affairs intelligence activities are concerned with the collection and processing of information, and the utilization or dissemination of the resultant intelligence concerning the people and the area of present or potential operations.

b. The details of intelligence structure, functions, and operations conducted under the general staff supervision of G2 are set forth in FM 100-5, and the FM 30-series. Additional information is contained in the AR 380-series.

44. Purpose

a. Accurate, complete, and timely civil affairs intelligence enables the commander and his staff to estimate in advance of operations the influence of civil affairs factors on the accomplishment of the mission or on the contemplated course of action of the command, to develop CA annexes to plans, and to determine in accordance with policy guidance those measures which will be necessary to control the local population or to relieve or adjust to political, economic, and sociological conditions in the area of operations.

b. Intelligence concerning immobilized, isolated, or bypassed enemy forces, hostile underground movements, and the activities of partisans and guerrillas, permits the planning for and employment of such friendly countermeasures as the prevention of infiltration, use of local civilians to report guerrilla activities, and the separation of guerrillas from civilian support.

c. On the basis of intelligence, continuous and long-range estimates are made of the effect which military operations will have on the inhabitants and the effect which the civilian reaction will have on military operations.

45. Civil Affairs Intelligence Planning

a. Prior to moving into any area of operations, intelligence collection plans (app F) must be drafted and implemented by CA staff sections and units. Civil affairs intelligence requirements include but are not limited to—

(1) Topography, hydrography, climate, weather, and terrain including land formation, drainage, vegetation, and soils.

(2) Population census, location, ethnic composition, dietary habits, and health factors.

(3) Attitude of the population including ideological, religious, and cultural aspects.

(4) Governmental structure including forms, personalities, laws in being, and political heritage.

(5) Sociological factors including real power structure in area.

(6) Educational standards and facilities, and important cultural activities and repositories.

(7) Communications, transportation, utilities, power, and natural resources.

(8) Labor potential including availability by type and skill, practices, and organizations.

(9) Economic development including principal industries, scientific and technical capabilities, commercial processes, banking structure, monetary system, price and commodity controls, and extent and nature of agriculture production.

(10) Effects of war damage on preceding items.

(11) Cores of resistance movements.
(12) Organization and operation of guerrilla forces in rear areas and the extent and degree of volition involved in local support.

(13) Hostile civilian activities including espionage, sabotage, and other factors of subversion and disaffection.

(14) Structure, orientation, capabilities, and reliability of indigenous public safety and enforcement organizations including paramilitary forces.

b. Sources of classified intelligence prior to movement are primarily strategic in nature and represent the positive collection efforts of the Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense Intelligence agencies, and other governmental agencies such as the State Department and various international mission and assistance groups. Among unclassified sources, particularly productive with respect to civil affairs interest are libraries, periodicals, newspapers, departments of leading universities specializing in language and area fields of interest, travel agencies, and commercial enterprises with holdings or representation in target regions. The Area Handbooks (DA Pam 550-series) are especially valuable and these frequently have classified supplements.

c. The G5 recommends to the commander, through the G2, those items of civil affairs intelligence which should be considered EEI. In appropriate situations an intelligence collection plan may be prepared by the intelligence officer of a CA unit and when completed, submitted to G2 for integration into the overall plan for the command. For detailed guidance on the preparation of a collection plan see FM 30-5 and appendix F.

46. Area Studies and Surveys

a. Area studies covering the gamut of civil affairs intelligence should be prepared on each country in which operations are possible or are projected. These studies supplement the published Area Handbooks (DA Pam 550-series) and are usually coordinated projects involving the G2 and the G5 with the supplementary assistance of G3, G4, Surgeon, Engineer, Provost Marshal, and other members of the staff. Studies are a continuing requirement for any G5 or CA unit commander for each area for which his unit has contingency plans. They should be started while the unit is still in CONUS and modified and amplified during the course of military movements and operations to provide a ready source of information upon which to base plans and actions. Preferably CA units should send representatives or special study groups with advance command and control elements of the supported force to perform the requisite area study revision and to secure essential facts for operational planning. National objectives, theater policies, and future plans will provide guidance in the preparation of studies, but they must generally include—

(1) Current political developments.
(2) Dossiers on important personalities.
(3) Availability, location, and cost of essential civilian supplies.
(4) Statistical data on diseases.
(5) Up-to-date material on manpower resources, skills, and employment.
(6) Housing, public utilities and services, production and merchandising facilities.
(7) Monetary stability.
(8) Vital statistics broken down into workable data groups covering age, sex, employment, location, and support requirements.

b. Area surveys are conducted on the ground, through physical reconnaissance and the exploitation of all available local sources of information, to verify and update the information previously obtained from area studies. Local sources may include the personnel and records of governmental agencies, banks, business firms, public utilities, and medical facilities, libraries, archives, mail, publications, and other communications media. During combat, initial surveys concentrate on conditions and activities which may have an immediate effect on military operations. More detailed surveys follow and are kept current as a basis for reevaluation of policies and new planning. Survey items include—

(1) Numbers and movements of refugees and displaced persons.
(2) Health conditions particularly with respect to contagious diseases.
(3) Adequacy of essential items of civilian supplies.
(4) Availability and potential of governmental officials.
(5) Possibilities of hostile activities by individuals or groups.
(6) General attitude of the civilian population.
47. Civil Censorship

The objectives of civil censorship are to prevent the passage of information which may assist an enemy or adversely affect any current policy of the United States or any of its allies, and to obtain and disseminate information which assists the United States and its allies in the attainment of their objectives. G2 exercises policy control over all types of civil censorship and both policy and operational control over all types of communications except public information media. Included are civil censorship of the postal services, domestic and international telecommunications, and area travelers. G5 in coordination with G2 plans and coordinates censorship of all public information media over which he has jurisdiction such as radio, television, cinema, stage, and the press, including periodicals and books. In a situation where CA units may operate or control the operation of other communication media, arrangements for security review will be coordinated with G2. Detailed doctrine on civil censorship is contained in FM 45–20.

Section II. CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

48. General

The nature of CA assignments and the necessity for CA personnel to develop and maintain a close relationship with the civilian population and to acquire a depth of information and understanding with respect to the activities of indigenous populations put CA personnel in a favorable position to collect information of vital importance to other staff sections and agencies and to lend support to the overall intelligence effort. Among supporting activities where CA personnel may make significant contributions are—

a. Collection of intelligence information.

b. Procurement and recruitment.

c. Assistance to counterintelligence personnel in the following activities:

   (1) Screening civilian officials.

   (2) Locating and apprehending war criminals and enemy military personnel masquerading as civilians.

   (3) Detecting and preventing sabotage.

   (4) Detecting and preventing the transmission of information and supplies to enemy forces, unfriendly partisans, or guerrillas.

49. Collection Potential of CA Personnel

Civil affairs personnel in their day-by-day operations deal with people, equipment, and documentary matter, all of which are primary sources of raw information of intelligence value. Normally when persons with information of possible value are discovered they are referred promptly to appropriate intelligence personnel for exploitation. Among sources CA personnel are likely to locate—

a. Refugees, evacuees, and displaced persons who may be interned or otherwise may come under civil affairs control or sponsorship.

b. Civilians who were associated with enemy personnel.

c. Political enemies of the hostile regime.

d. Leaders of fraternal, civic, religious, or patriotic organizations.

e. Governmental documents, libraries, or archives.

f. Files of newspapers or periodicals.

g. Industrial and commercial records.

h. Persons employed in recreational areas and occupations.

i. Political prisoners.

j. Technical equipment, blueprints, plans, or information of interest to technical intelligence personnel especially in transportaion, signal, ordnance, engineer, chemical, and medical fields.

k. Personal mail or messages.

50. Archives

With respect to archives containing materials of intelligence value concerned with governmental, administrative or cultural matters, command policy will determine whether or not documentary matter will be removed for intelligence processing or will remain in designated repositories and be copied for intelligence purposes. In either case it is a CA responsibility to maintain and document the chain of custody.

51. Procurement and Recruitment

Direct support of intelligence collection agencies may be provided by CA units in the procurement of essential facilities and equipment and the recruitment of personnel.

a. Procurement. Aside from normal civil affairs procurement, CA personnel may also procure—

   (1) Biographical data on key persons in the civilian community or other information essential to clandestine operations.
(2) Civilian clothing and items of normal personal possession.
(3) Maps.
(4) Civilian equipment such as binoculars, cameras, recording devices, radios, or weapons.
(5) Documentary matter including passports, visas, vehicle operator licenses, birth and marriage records.
(6) Indigenous funds.
(7) Foodstuffs, tobacco products, or alcoholic beverages peculiar to the area.
(8) Barter items.
(9) Civilian motor vehicles, bicycles, or domestic animals.

b. Recruitment. Through contacts with civilian organizations, leaders, and political enemies of hostile governments, CA personnel may assist in the development of rosters of personnel for screening by intelligence, or psychological operations personnel as—
(1) Recruits for clandestine operations.
(2) Interpreters.
(3) Other specialized craftsmen, technicians, or laborers.

52. Civil Security

a. Maximum support is provided intelligence personnel in the detection and prevention of espionage, sabotage, subversion, aid to guerrillas, or others similar activities. Examples of areas in which CA units may provide assistance are—
(1) Identification of known or suspected agents, collaborators, or sympathizers.
(2) Search of public buildings for documents of intelligence value.

Section III. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF CIVIL AFFAIRS

53. Support of Civil Affairs Operations

a. Consolidation psychological operations, in support and reinforcement of civil information and public education activities, form an integral part of civil affairs operations. PSYOP units, under the operational control of the CA commander, provide trained personnel and equipment to render direct assistance in gaining the cooperation of the civilian populace, and in facilitating its control and reorganization for the former or intended friendly government. Through close coordination between CA and PSYOP staffs, psychological operations which explain U.S. policies and objectives, can be directed to populations in areas still under enemy control, thus laying a foundation for U.S. or allied control when the enemy has been eliminated.

b. As areas come under U.S. military control, the immediate objective is to support the accomplishment of the tactical mission. As order and control are established, PSYOP units, by means of persuasion and psychological direction, support civil affairs activities designed to implement U.S. policies and attain national objectives. PSYOP staffs and units accomplish this function in much the same manner as they do in all other military
operations; i.e., by providing advice regarding the psychological implications of proposed courses of action and employing various propaganda media in support of selected courses of action. For an elaboration of the doctrinal aspects of PSYOP in support of civil affairs operations see FM 33–1, concerning consolidation psychological operations.

54. Capabilities of PSYOP Units

The capabilities of consolidation activities for support of civil affairs operations vary according to the number and composition of psychological operations units available for employment in the area. In general, psychological operational teams in conjunction with CA civil information teams can—

a. Plan and implement programs to gain the cooperation of the population toward achievement of U.S. short-range and long-range objectives in the area, and in the liberated or occupied country as a whole.

b. Provide for the operational control of newspaper and other publication and distribution facilities.

c. Provide for the operational control of fixed radio broadcasting stations.

d. Conduct mobile audio and visual operations.

e. Provide for the operation of motion picture installations and for their supervision when operated by local personnel.

f. Provide for the operational control of photographic, art, poster, and instructional displays.

g. Provide printing and processing facilities for leaflets and news sheets.

h. Conduct opinion surveys.

i. Disseminate information, directives, and instructions employing any or all of the above media.
55. The World Situation

a. The possibility of mutual annihilation so far has deterred the great powers from the use of their full destructive capacities as a means of achieving national objectives. This restraint, however, has not basically changed those objectives, and conflict ensues where those objectives clash. One form of this conflict, known as the cold war, occurs in a state of national tension in which political, economic, technological, psychological, and paramilitary measures short of overt armed conflict involving regular military forces are employed to achieve national objectives. This type of conflict may assume forms many of which are hardly recognizable as military. It can nevertheless produce defeat for one side or the other as complete as has ever been achieved in open battle between identified armed forces.

b. In the cold war environment, the United States and its allies are faced with the threat of widespread subversive activity directed against them and many other smaller but independent nations. Subversion takes many forms and is manifested in covert activities designed to influence, manipulate, or replace governments which are, or may become, allied with or friendly to the United States. In the developing nations of the world these efforts are characterized by covert aggression, or as the Communist nations and parties call them: “wars of national liberation.”

56. The National Objectives and Policy of the United States

a. The United States is determined to forestall any further encroachment of communism upon the free world. The U.S. policy is dedicated to assuring that developing nations are able to go forward in independence, with increasing degrees of human freedom and greater political and economic stability within the sociological fabric and cultural heritage and aspirations peculiar to each political sovereignty or coalition. To this end, economic aid, technical assistance, and military assistance programs are negotiated and implemented. This mutual security program is a major instrument of U.S. foreign policy. It reflects the fundamental fact that the security and prosperity of this nation cannot be separated from that of other nations.

b. A major part of the U.S. mutual security program is military assistance. Current U.S. military assistance legislation and directives provide that, in addition to material and tactical training improvements, military assistance programs should encourage military-civil cooperation in developing countries through the use of local military and paramilitary forces on projects helpful to economic and social development, provided such activities do not detract from capabilities to perform primary military missions. It is a basic point that Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) or Military Missions in these countries must assure that host military forces realize the importance of good military-civil relationships.

57. The Country Team

a. In every foreign country where U.S. troops are stationed, other U.S. governmental departments and bureaus, international agencies, church groups, and private institutions may be working toward common ends in at least some aspects of providing assistance and stimulating cooperative and harmonious development in the host country. The number of U.S. Government agencies alone is impressive, and close cooperation and cordial liaison are essential if optimum results are to be achieved. Coordination, not only on the policy level but also at operating levels, will reduce costs, prevent duplication of effort, lessen the friction potential, and increase tangible results. Generally,
in peacetime the ambassador is the coordinating authority for civil assistance programs. Country teams usually are established consisting of representatives of various national agencies, including the Chief of MAAG or Mission or senior military commander as the Department of Defense member, and with the ambassador functioning as head of the team (fig. 1).

b. The country team is a mechanism developed to coordinate this community of U.S. interests in relations with the host government. The country team facilitates understanding of mutual concerns and resolution of conflicts and interests in various policies, programs, projects, procedures, and problems of U.S. and host country agencies.

c. Some of the problems that spread across all U.S. agencies in the host country are the inflationary impact of U.S. operations, blackmarket activities, observance of host country holidays, vehicle operation, indigenous labor-employment practices, housing for personnel and office space. These problems, if not solved, can materially hamper U.S. cold war efforts.

58. MAAGs and Missions

a. Military personnel and their families, assigned to MAAGs and missions have significant capabilities, disproportionate to the relatively small size of units concerned, to promote understanding, cooperation, and kinship not only between their own personnel and the civilian population, but also (through example, demonstration, and guidance) between the civilians and the military forces of the host country. In many countries there is an unsatisfied demand for education and development in various vocational and technical skills, and in every military unit and their associated families there are reservoirs of knowledge and skills which can be channeled through voluntary efforts into programs of education and assistance. The very nature of the MAAG or mission member's role—his daily and intimate contacts with host unit personnel, participating in their daily activities, sharing in their ceremonies, bringing them a better understanding of the United States, and showing a sincere interest in their language, culture, and welfare—goes far toward producing good military-civil relations.

b. Much of the effectiveness of the individual and informal efforts of personnel in missions and advisory groups stems from their spontaneity, but no program can attain maximum results without some degree of fixed responsibility within a unit. To that end, a section should be established, even if it consists of only one officer, to coordinate military-civil relationships in each MAAG or mission, and to assist in the development of similar programs in the military forces of the host country. The requirement for promoting an awareness in the host country forces, the necessity for civilian-military affinity, and furnishing guidance in this effort, is at least as important as military instruction in training procedures, techniques of warfare, and the handling of military equipment.

c. MAAGs in developing nations may have more extensive duties than those in developed countries

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**Diagram:**

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    CHIEF OF US DIPLOMATIC MISSION
       /   \
      /     \   
 US Military Representation  USAID  USIS  OTHER

Figure 1. U.S. country team.
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where education, industry, and technical skills are relatively well-advanced and trained personnel are more numerous. MAAGs in new countries may have expanded duties in assisting in the training of indigenous officials who are taking over the reins of governmental functions for the first time.

Section II. U.S. ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS

PARTICIPATION IN THE COLD WAR

59. General

a. U.S. Army units are deployed abroad for a variety of reasons. Most of these deployments have a relationship to the requirements of the cold war as well as to serve as a deterrent to the outbreak of limited or general war. Even those troop units deployed primarily for their deterrent role generally are engaged in cold war activities (AR 515-1). Troop units deployed outside the United States primarily for cold war purposes, while they may be engaged in a show of force or in a mission to safeguard the lives and property of citizens of the United States and its allies, most frequently will have been dispatched to assist in internal defense activities of a friendly nation which has requested such aid. The Army's dual responsibility in cold war is to maintain operational readiness for limited or general war, and to facilitate and implement the national objectives and advance the national interest through appropriate activities in cold war. The role of civil affairs in cold war is to support this dual responsibility.

b. In planning for civil affairs cold war operations, provisions should be made for a draft civil affairs agreement which considers the political as well as the military aspects of the planned operation. Thus, as the need for such an agreement arises, it can be negotiated rapidly with such modifications as may be required. When U.S. diplomatic representatives are present and functioning in a country, an executive order should be issued which delineates the authority and responsibilities of the military commander and the diplomatic representatives.

60. Cold War Activities

a. Mutual security programs have necessitated the stationing of U.S. troops on the soil of other sovereign powers under the authority of bilateral and multilateral agreements, either as security forces or to provide training assistance for foreign military units. The terms of the agreements involved and the scope of missions assigned are diverse; but, as is true with MAAG personnel, U.S. commanders and their personnel have significant capabilities for furthering U.S. foreign policy and fostering a deeper appreciation in host countries for the need for mutual civil-military understanding, cooperation and support.

b. U.S. military units have a dual capability of directly participating in military civic action projects or aiding host country military personnel with planning, technical assistance, and available resources in the development of their own civic action programs. U.S. military units possess equipment, facilities, supplies, technicians, and labor resources. Within the limitations of the military mission and U.S. national policy, these assets may be applied to achieve the local cold war objectives of the United States.

c. Personnel in the units and their dependents, as individuals, have an even greater potential for favorable influence by their personal conduct, courtesy, and attitude of friendly cooperation toward citizens of the host country. Particularly worthy of exploitation is participation by U.S. and host nation individuals in jointly organized activities and programs; e.g., scouting, fraternal organizations, and women's clubs. However, except in those cases where relatively large security forces are involved, the greatest contribution which can be made by U.S. military organizations abroad is in the nature of guidance, advice, and planning assistance for host country forces in the promotion of civil-military rapport. Results will be measured in strengthened economic and political bases, divorcement of the general population from dissident elements, and reduction in under-privilege and tension.

d. In advisory and training responsibilities MAAG and military mission officers usually deal with the key commanders of military forces and units. These officers are also frequently involved with the civil officials of the host government: the Minister of Defense and sometimes with the Prime Minister, the titular head of state, and almost certainly with other high civil authorities in the host government. Relations of this type are particularly important when political power has a military base. If it is possible for U.S. official representatives to establish close rapport with these officials on an informal friendly basis, official relations are likely to be facilitated.
e. Governmental administration and authority generally is delegated or divided among several levels, with certain prerogatives held at the higher levels. The precise pattern differs widely among nations, but almost all resort to some system of layering of government so that matters of local interest can be dealt with by officials close to the people without burdening higher levels with unnecessary detail. U.S. military forces and units stationed in foreign countries have civil-military relations at almost all levels. Although higher U.S. commands may be in contact with military and civilian officials of the national government, scattered subordinate elements usually are located in the hinterland. These subordinate elements normally are more closely associated with local units of government than with national levels and may be, knowingly or unknowingly, influential in local government.

f. The problems that arise in these more remote localities are likely to include off-post activities of U.S. personnel, property rights, jurisdictional disputes, the initiation of civic action projects, and community relations. All U.S. military units and installations abroad must establish a good rapport with local governmental authorities. Care must always be exercised that such local arrangements conform to U.S. national and theater policy. A single point of contact or coordination should be established in such situation, but ordinarily it will not require a mechanism more elaborate than a normal CA staff section. This staff section is actively involved in all the major civil-military activities of the command including the submission of plans and recommendations to the commander and other staff sections.

g. Cold war operations of U.S. CA organizations develop good working relationships between U.S. military forces and the local population, but concentrate on relations between host military forces and their own people. Individual CA functional specialists and teams are available for assignment to assist in the development and implementation of a definite program for the conduct of relationships with the people. The objective of their activities should be to develop proper attitudes, programs, and methods of operations in the host country military forces which provide for the rights and welfare of the population. This will not only generate confidence and cooperation on the part of the population but also have the effect of bringing together the military and the people into an effective working team. To accomplish this, civil affairs personnel must analyze and solve problems deriving from the political impact of military forces in the area; the use by military forces of local areas, facilities, goods, and manpower; the application of local laws and customs to the military forces; and the social relations between military forces and civilians.

61. U.S. Civil Affairs in IDD Assistance Operations

a. The civil-military relationships of a U.S. military command specifically committed to IDD assistance operations can be broken down into two categories—

(1) Those incident to personnel advising indigenous military and civilian officials (para 129-131).

(2) Those which are incident to the indigenous and U.S. forces conducting military operations in the midst of civilian populations (para 132-135).

b. U.S. Army involvement in IDD Assistance Operations includes three of the major civil affairs activities—

(1) Military participation in the Internal Development Program which is known as Military Civic Action.

(2) Military participation in the Populace and Resources Control portion of Internal Security Operations as part of the Internal Defense Program.

(3) Provision or support of the functions of government where the normal government is at least temporarily unable to act.

c. For optimum results, planning for each of these civil affairs activities must be based upon adequate, accurate, and timely intelligence information, and each must be properly supported by Psychological Operations.

d. A description of the application of these major civil affairs activities by host nations and doctrine for U.S. assistance to a host country is provided in chapters 6 and 7.
CHAPTER 6
INTERNAL DEFENSE OF A NATION

Section I. THE INSURGENT THREAT

62. Introduction

a. As described in paragraph 55, a major threat to the security of the United States is posed by covert aggression against the freedom and well-being of many of the developing nations. International communism has publicly and repeatedly declared that it supports these aggressive acts which it refers to as “wars of national liberation.”

b. To understand the full nature of this threat, and the means of meeting and defeating it, it is first necessary to understand the actual conditions which exist in these countries. Most of the developing nations are in the process of transition from traditional to modern societies. This transition proceeds at an uneven pace and provokes dislocation and disruption of the traditional social and political controls, and of the economic base of the country. Modern mass communications has had its impact by facilitating the penetration of new ideas and generating new aspirations and desires among the peoples of the developing nations.

c. Although the problems of these nations would be acute even in the absence of an organized subversive insurgency effort, they are intensified and made into a direct threat to free world security by a well-planned and organized campaign directed by a hard core of dedicated, professional activists. The work of these insurgents is manifested over a relatively long period of time and can be classified in the three general phases of insurgency described in detail in FM 100-20.

(1) Phase I: From circumstances in which subversive activity is only a potential threat—latent or incipient—to situations in which subversive incidents and activities occur with frequency and in an organized pattern.

(2) Phase II: The subversive movement, having gained sufficient local or external support, initiates organized guerrilla warfare, or other forms of violence against the established authority.

(3) Phase III: Guerrilla warfare operations are transformed primarily to an open war between regularly organized forces of the insurgents, and those of the established authority.

d. Paragraphs 63 and 64 outline those aspects of the development of an insurgency of primary concern to CA personnel.

63. Insurgent Objectives

a. An initial attack of the insurgent movement is directed toward the administrative, cultural, and communications gap found in most developing countries between intermediate level governmental echelons and the cities, towns, and villages they are supposed to administer. Control of any area in a country faced with insurgency can be evaluated largely in terms of control of the cities, towns, and villages.

b. The ultimate objective of the insurgent movement is to gain complete control of the political apparatus of the nation, for political control is the central issue. Complete political control makes possible control of all the other institutions of a society, such as the economy, military forces, judicial and police systems, and the educational processes. If the insurgency obtains this degree of control it has taken over the nation.

64. The Development of an Insurgency

a. Phase I, Latent and Incipient Insurgency. This phase involves no major outbreaks of violence or periods of uncontrollable insurgent activity. It covers situations where the actual conditions are such as to provide real or imagined grievances and actual or potential disaffection of significant elements of the population from their govern-
ment. It is during this phase, which may last for decades, that the insurgent movement will develop its underground organization, its infrastructure, and its front groups, and will start subversion. As the insurgency and the insurgent organization develop, this phase will be marked by some overt activities which may include demonstrations, presentation of an overt “legal” opposition, strikes, and other manifestations of popular dissatisfaction. Generally, there will be little or no military activity unless subversion in the military and police forces has succeeded in laying the groundwork for a potentially successful coup d’etat. Persuasion is tried on local political officials and police to convert them to the insurgent cause or at least to get them to look the other way in the face of subversive organizational activities. If persuasion fails, threats follow. If both threats and persuasion fail, officials are eliminated.

b. Phase II, Organized Guerrilla Warfare. In Phase II the insurgents consolidate the organization for the struggle to come. Many party members may go into hiding, establishing and proliferating underground cells—the backbone of the movement. Agitators and front-controlled news media spread antigovernment propaganda and front groups recruit sympathizers. Weapons are collected and underground communications and supply lines are established. Government agencies are infiltrated at all levels. Insurgent progress is often unwittingly encouraged by political leaders who are reluctant to admit that a revolution against their power is in being. Mob and riot actions discredit the government and demonstrate to sympathetic but passive followers that resistance to the government is possible. The objective is to gain control of towns and villages, often by taking advantage of existing disaffection toward national government and the poor communications between the government and the people. Control of villages is consolidated when “shadow governments” can operate without betrayal to the government forces. Small armed groups spring up. All these moves serve to develop insurgent channels of information concerning national government plans and activities and to assure that little or no information about insurgent activities reaches the national government.

c. Phase III, War of Movement. The situation moves from Phase II to Phase III when insurgency becomes primarily a war of movement and the insurgent expands his military forces. These forces still draw their support from well-organized undergrounds but require heavier weapons and supplies which cannot be furnished locally. By this stage the insurgent has, or is building, three types of military forces. Regional forces are the first to be formed—the regional militia. Next are village militia which are usually a part of the village underground and are normally under the direction of the village political head. Finally, there are the main military forces which may be uniformed. Regional and main forces provide cadre for their own expansion. Intelligence from village posts and from warning nets along roadways insures that training areas are relatively safe. Arms are procured in greater numbers; larger military units are trained to operate in unison; and the staff and technical facilities necessary to such operations are developed. Authoritarian political control is brought to local government in the controlled areas; political heads are nominated; and civic services are provided along with legal and taxation systems. On the edges of controlled areas the insurgents continue to extend their control, using Phase II tactics. By these means insurgents may be able to attain political and military control of as much as 95 percent of the landmass of the country, with government forces bottled up in military fortresses and around the national capital.

d. Summary. The description of insurgency in three phases, while convenient, does not mean that there is any sharp break or dividing line to mark the passage from one phase to another. Areas within the same nation may be involved in different phases of insurgency. The insurgent organization grows and develops with variances from one area of a country to another. Insurgent activities progress within the limits of the capabilities of the insurgent organization of a particular area. The actual attempt to seize national power by the insurgent movement can occur during any phase. Successful resistance to an insurgency can cause the insurgent organization to revert to an earlier phase; and, if the acute conditions of the nation have not been bettered, an insurgent organization can again begin a Phase I development no matter how severe a defeat it has suffered from its earlier attempt to seize power.
Section II. COUNTERING THE INSURGENCY

65. Political-Military Considerations

A country beset by subversive insurgency where the political existence of the government itself is threatened must insure that every military act at all levels of command is designed to accomplish a political end. The political objective is the establishment, maintenance, or preservation of a government which can operate effectively under law to meet the needs and aspirations of its people. Military objectives and the tactical operations conducted to achieve them must be compatible with and support the political objective; that is, they must be conducted in such a manner as to gain the support of the populace for the government. Tactical operations which cause unnecessary civilian casualties and damage may well provide a net advantage to the insurgents by creating sympathy for their cause and adding to popular grievances against the government. For this reason the indiscriminate use of force and especially of area weapons must be avoided.

66. Internal Defense and Development (IDD) Operations

The basic IDD effort of a government faced with subversive insurgency must be carefully planned, fully coordinated, and intensively executed if it is to be effective. Where the insurgency proceeds at an uneven pace in different areas of the nation, as may be normally expected, area priorities may vary from that of the nation as a whole. Priority of effort of the host country armed forces, while generally supporting the national priorities, may vary depending upon the situation in the given areas. These priorities may vary also depending on the IDD missions assigned to the armed forces by the government. The armed forces may be required to undertake all or any part of the functions of government in the entire nation or in parts thereof. Application of priorities of overall IDD operations are shown schematically in figure 2. This internal defense and development effort has two major programs—

a. Internal development operations are designed to alleviate the basic cause of disaffection and to provide a better life for the people. Internal development operations are discussed in detail in paragraphs 71 through 77.

b. Internal defense operations are designed to provide a climate of law and order, in which internal development can take place. Internal defense operations initially include three operational areas—

   (1) Intelligence/counterintelligence operations; the production of positive intelligence and the detection, prevention, and neutralization of espionage, sabotage, and subversion by insurgent elements. For further guidance, see FM 30-5, FM 30-17, and FM 30-28.

   (2) Tactical operations; military and paramilitary tactical operations conducted to destroy insurgent forces. For further guidance, see FM 31-16 and FM 31-22.

   (3) Internal security operations; operations conducted for the maintenance of law and order within the nation.

c. In internal security operations the primary responsibility of civil affairs is in the field of populace and resources control which mobilizes for the government and denies to the insurgents the essential human and material resources of the country. Populace and resources control is discussed in detail in paragraphs 79 through 90.

d. A type pattern of the application of priority objectives and counteractions is shown in figure 3. The role played by U.S. forces, acting in either an advisory or an operational role in the nontactical aspects of IDD, is covered in chapter 7.

67. National Organization for IDD

a. In order to mount a planned and coordinated IDD program, a nation faced with insurgency must carefully reexamine its total governmental structure and staffing. This will pose serious difficulties for a developing nation which is frequently hampered by an extreme shortage of competent personnel for governmental administration. Nevertheless, from the top level of the national government to the lowest level of local administration there should be clear lines of authority and responsibility for the conduct of all government activities and especially for the major programs. While the national organizational structure will vary from nation-to-nation some means of centralized planning and control must be established. This may be accomplished by—

   (1) Forming a national level interministerial coordinating committee such as a national internal security coordination committee (NISC).
INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT | INTERNAL DEFENSE
---|---
Military Civic Action | Populace and Resources Control (Part of Internal Security Operations) | Tactical Operations Against Insurgent Forces
Planning Coordination Implementation | Planning, Coordination, Beginning Of Implementation by Police & Military Intelligence Operations | Planning, Training, Organization of Armed Forces and Paramilitary Organizations

Phase of Insurgency

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<td>III</td>
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Priority of National Effort

Figure 2. Priorities to be applied in the overall internal defense development effort.

(2) The head of state or head of government taking this responsibility into his own office, or
(3) Delegating responsibility for the entire internal defense effort to one department of government. Regardless of the solution adopted, military personnel probably will be involved in planning and implementation to some degree.

b. Successful implementation of the IDD program requires, in addition to a high degree of centralized planning and control, a high degree of decentralized execution. Normally, the existing staff organization of the political, administrative, or military subdivisions of a nation will be used in the execution of the IDD effort.

68. Subnational Organization for IDD

a. The normal organizational structure for IDD operations at the subnational level is formed by the creation of "operational areas" for those areas of the country threatened by insurgency. The term "operational area" means a specific geographical area within which political and military (or paramilitary) functionaries are assigned to direct the IDD effort. The operational areas should coincide with existing subnational political divisions and function as political and administrative organs of the subdivisions. The operational area should also coincide with a subarea of the national military chain of command.

b. Situations may arise where the use of existing subnational divisions for delineation of operational areas will not meet the needs of IDD. Geographical, ethnic, religious, and other factors may make it more feasible to disregard established subnational boundaries and to create more homogeneous entities specifically for the internal defense and development program. Under these circumstances, adjustments in coordination and relationships between national subdivision and operational area organizations will be required, as operational
### Level of Insurgent Activity

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<th>Phase</th>
<th>Priority Objectives for each Phase</th>
<th>Priority Counteractions for each Phase</th>
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Figure 3. Pattern of counteractions to phases of development of insurgency.

Areas will probably involve two or more national subdivisions in whole or in part.

c. The number of government personnel and forces assigned to an operational area, and to some extent the size of the operational area, will depend on the priority assigned to that area. Assignment of priority is based on the following factors:

1) Configuration of the terrain.
2) Political factors.
3) Likelihood of success of the IDD operation.
4) Tactical importance of the sector to the countering force and to the insurgents.
5) National IDD program and civic action requirements.
6) Insurgency and guerrilla strength.
7) Internal defense forces available.
8) Location and significance of international boundaries.
9) Significance of external support of the insurgency.
10) Attitudes of the population and other ethnic considerations.
11) Religious factors.
12) Transportation and communications networks.

d. Government of an operational area may be in the hands of a civilian or military official, who may or may not also be the CO of the troops assigned to the area. However, one designated official in the area should have complete authority for all IDD operations. He should establish, as early as possible, an Area Coordination Center (ACC) for the coordination of these activities, to be staffed by the senior officials of each principal civilian governmental agency, the military, police, and paramilitary forces. The ACC is the key element in the planning, coordination, and supervision of all IDD activities in its operational area. A Civil Military Action Committee (CMAC)
should be established as a subelement of the ACC and include key or influential nonofficial elements of the civil populace as well as representatives of the ACC. Examples of these nonofficial elements include religious leaders, industrialists, labor leaders, large landowners, news media representatives, and school officials. The CMAC assists in nonsensitive areas of internal defense and development planning and provides a feedback on the effects of these programs on the local populace. Community relations of all forces in the area should be a principal activity of the CMAC. When forces not assigned to the area are committed for operations therein, these forces should coordinate their efforts with those of local forces through the CMAC.

69. The Operational Area Situation and Mission

a. In most developing countries political, military, and institutional leadership of the operational area and the people of the villages operate in different spheres, with little compatibility of attitudes and with inadequate physical means of communication. This is a gap which communists exploit and which must be denied to them. The operational area command must close the gap in communication and understanding between area policymakers and the villagers.

b. Operational area commanders are confronted with two key problems—tapping village information reservoirs and bringing an effective administration to the village level. The solution of these problems, coupled with adequate security measures, will lead to a bridging of the gap between policymakers and the villagers.

c. The plans to combat insurgency must begin with the gaining of all possible information from the people of the villages. Typically, the chief political figure of a village is the "headman," nominated by a council of village elders or possibly appointed by the area governor. The village may have one or more policemen, usually untrained, poorly equipped, and poorly paid. A few families will exercise political control. Local society has often been relatively static for decades and most villagers have lived their entire lives in the village area. The rural citizen will, because of these circumstances, have detailed and intimate knowledge and awareness of his immediate surroundings. Within this context, knowledge of the activities of outsiders, such as organizers for the insurgent movement who enter the village and villagers who advocate cooperation with them, is certain to be available throughout the village. It is the acquisition of this information that will form the basis for understanding the villagers and their problems and for determining the extent of insurgent activity and the best methods of combating it.

d. Area leaders, while eliciting all obtainable information, must also set about the establishment of an effective village administration keyed to the solution of village problems and satisfaction of the villager's wants and needs. Area leaders normally will have only a small administrative apparatus designed to perform a few civic services and to collect taxes. Existing civic and political groups must be forged into instruments suitable for waging the fight against the insurgents. Much of the area commander's work will require the use of local volunteers, as his own resources will not be adequate.

e. The above factors are intended primarily for the organization of IDD and for initial diagnosis of an insurgency situation. To implement broad national strategy, operational area commands, tactics, and directives must be adapted to local conditions. The means and techniques of winning support and gaining intelligence must be based on the local situation. Only that command whose subordinate echelons are fully aware of local conditions can be expected to perform these tasks effectively and efficiently.

70. Control Requirements and Limitations

a. In the implementation of the total internal defense effort, the operational area command must solve the fundamental problem of establishing political, economic, social, and military control over the area and its people. Control is here defined as the ability to modify, regulate, restrain, or direct the behavior of people and their institutions. Means of control include education, persuasion, coercion, reward, and punishment, exercisable concurrently and sequentially.

b. The behavior of the population, measured in terms of their cultural values, motivations, and desires, will influence the direction of their affairs. It is essential to diagnose the self-perceived desires and motivations of the people and to formulate policies that are not contradictory, but are compatible with them. Those motivations which tend to place the people on the side of the government should be fully exploited.
There are a number of inherent limitations on the effectiveness of control by a political or military system. For example, the operation of the economy may be relatively free or it may be constrained by numerous government controls. Legal systems and customs will usually recognize certain individual rights. The ability of the leadership to exercise control is always limited by time and space factors. Requirements for security usually increase the limitations inherent in a communications system. All of these limitations may affect the ability of insurgents and governments alike to maintain control. Indoctrination, propaganda, and training are designed, in large measure, to avoid these limitations; but no system, however authoritarian, completely controls the workings of a society.

Notwithstanding the difficulties and limitations, the operational area commander must influence the situation in ways compatible with his assigned objectives if the IDD effort is to have a chance for success. Area forces are the command instrumentality. The control tasks of the operational area command are interpretation of objectives; evaluation of area resources; planning and initiation of actions; building of an organization; allocation of forces; and the supervision and re-evaluation of the progress of programs, projects, and tasks. Each such task is designed to have some measurable impact on the area situation.

Section III. INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT

71. General Nature of the Problem

a. The world is now involved in a relatively new and massive process, that of bringing about deliberately planned changes designed to improve the environment of peoples living in what were once remote areas. There is pressure for fast, dramatic, and effective results that can be seen in a relatively short time. In the past, environment has been subject to change through invention or borrowing ideas from other cultures and it has only been recently that there has been a broad base of voluntary participation.

b. Environment constitutes the aggregate of all the external conditions affecting the life and development of society. Culture is the total of what human beings have learned in common with other members of the group to which they belong, and is man's way of adapting to his environment. Technicians involved in improving environment not only must be specialists in their fields; e.g., engineering, education, agriculture, public health, but must be able to make their efforts acceptable to persons of different customs and beliefs. Some knowledge and understanding of the social sciences such as cultural anthropology, sociology, social psychology, economics, political science, and history is important in attaining this objective.

c. Nations attempt to preserve their culture because of a belief that their ways are superior to others. Many of the developing nations, on achieving independence, realized their competitive position is poor and could be bettered through modernization and industrialization. Generally they are willing to borrow from the culture of others when it is beneficial for them to do so, but technological ideas are more acceptable than are social or religious ones. The imbalance between technical progress and sociological and political improvements often only increases the probability of insurgency.

d. While cultures differ, there are some characteristics that are shared by almost all underdeveloped areas—

(1) Colonial Past—conditions attitude of the people toward innovators.

(2) Nationalism—stressing of own traditions sometimes to point of danger to their self-interest.

(3) Plurality of Society—nation contains more than one people, language, religion, or cultural heritage.

(4) Urban Elite—a large gulf exists between educated classes and villagers emphasized by different habits and attitudes.

(5) The Rural Peasant—peasants are tradition-oriented. The educated urban elite have difficulty in establishing good contacts with the peasant who has strong class ties to religion and kin, and is accustomed to living under the patronage system.

(6) The Economy—developing nations have a lack of industry and an inefficient agriculture. The existing industry cannot meet expectations of the people. There is a co-existence of old and new economies which sometimes operate completely independently from one another.

(7) Rising Expectations—desires for improvement are at fever pitch.
72. Principles of Internal Development

a. The needs that people are aware of should be utilized in first introducing change. This is necessary in order for new ideas and methods to win the acceptance of the people and, in turn, to receive their cooperation. Participation by local people in projects involving them is essential if the change is to be accepted in the long run. There is a tendency for technicians to place too much emphasis on the technical aspect of their jobs and not enough on the human aspect. The level of technical precision and knowledge should be realistically scaled to that which can be assimilated locally. Complex innovations take more time and instruction and run a greater risk of failure. Technicians wanting to introduce change should rework or adapt these changes to fit the local environment. This frequently will require technicians to step backward from complex to relatively simple, unspecialized technologies.

b. The technician or innovator will have his initial actions judged supercritically. Since peasants and urban poor are suspicious of officials and those associated with them, unkept promises, ill-planned projects, or unexplained behavior on the part of the technician will cause the people to lose confidence in him and harden their resistance to change.

c. Most people in developing nations are pragmatic and changes that bring dramatic results that can be visualized easily are more readily acceptable. Once successful there is a tendency for the change to snowball.

d. People whose standard of living is at a bare subsistence level are reluctant to experiment with new techniques which would endanger their very existence if they failed. Experiments should not, therefore, involve risk to the livelihood of local people.

e. In introducing change, timing is important. There is need to be aware of the daily and seasonal work patterns of people and to use this knowledge in timing the start of projects. This is particularly important in agricultural areas.

f. Continuity of projects is essential. Provisions for maintenance of equipment and training in its use are vital and require that technicians follow through. If the people do not really accept projects, they will drop the projects when the technicians depart.

g. Communication between the technician and the recipients of change is essential. This must be a two-way communication, so that objections to innovations can be voiced. Understanding the people's languages is an important tool for understanding their cultures and developing rapport and confidence with them.

h. The technician must determine with whom to work. The representatives of government (appointed officials) may not be the real leaders. There is usually another power structure—perhaps religious—which will be influential in determining if changes will be accepted by the people.

73. Military Participation in the Internal Development Program

a. Military participation and support of economic, social, and political programs aimed at improving the well-being and environment of the population are an essential part of IDD operations. Through these actions underlying causes of conflict and insurgency may be resolved and developing nations progress toward goals of economic self-sufficiency and ultimate modernization while maintaining their independence. The activities of armed forces in internal development generally fall into what is termed military civic action.

b. At the operating level, skills that are needed to perform military duties can also be effectively employed in internal development. In areas where there are problems of hardship, health, or security, military or paramilitary forces may be the only effective agents to carry forward the programs of economic, social, and political development upon which stability depends.

c. IDD operations involve counterguerrilla warfare, but they can be successfully prosecuted only by developing an appreciation of societal microcosms in order to eliminate the insurgent movement at its roots. Therefore, the application of a country's military potential must be accompanied by an orientation of its military leadership at all echelons of command in this direction. The greatest potential single barrier to the proper use of military forces in internal development is the bias of some military personnel that matters such as the basic development of their nation is outside their proper sphere of activity. This reluctance to engage in the mundane tasks such as performing work which traditionally has been done by persons considered socially inferior to the professional military man and teaching by personal example, must be overcome if the country's military forces are to be
employed in a manner calculated to realize their full IDD potential.

d. Military forces conducting civic action are but one of many elements, governmental and private, that are engaged in planning and bringing about change designed to meet the rising expectations of the people in developing nations. Even though the developing nation’s armed forces frequently have a very high percentage of the country’s total skills and resources, the general nature of the problem facing those concerned with the internal development indicates clearly that to accomplish the myriad tasks involved will require more than just the efforts of a nation’s armed forces.

e. It is usually necessary to have a joint civil-military effort. This has bonus effects in political-sociological progress in the country. Military participation in public projects with the civilians not only contributes materially toward technical progress in the area but builds up cumulative civilian goodwill for the military unit. By strengthening the social-economic posture of the country, the military forces are able to reduce sources of civilian discontent and add materially to political stability.

f. Many of the individual projects undertaken in a military civic action program will have a superficial resemblance to community relations activities (ch 2). While improved community relations of the military is an important byproduct of the military civic action effort these relations are not, at least during Phase I of insurgency, the primary product. Military civic action should be designed to make real, lasting improvements to the social, economic, and political environment. For example, if a military unit were to build, maintain, or staff a needed school this would be true military civic action whether or not it also produced a greater civilian respect for the military. On the other hand the activity of a military unit in sponsoring an occasional outing or a meal for the children of that school would be primarily in the nature of a community relations project. As such, it would build up goodwill and a better relationship between the military forces and the people, but may be a misapplication of resources which should be devoted to true military civic action.

74. Criteria for Military Participation

a. Criteria for the propriety of military participation in civic action projects during any phase of insurgency might include—

(1) Is it an important need, locally wanted, and beyond unaided local capabilities?
(2) Can military participation be so managed that it does not compromise civilian authority and responsibility?
(3) Does the activity support the commander’s political-military mission, or at least avoid jeopardizing it?
(4) Is the activity in consonance with the country’s national objectives and interests?
(5) Will participation by the military avoid wasteful or needless duplication of functions and services of other agencies?
(6) Does the activity support, supplement, or substitute for the available services of other agencies?
(7) Does the project lend itself to the participation of local people?

b. If the nation is in a Phase II or III insurgency situation additional criteria might include—

(1) Will the project stimulate the flow of needed information from the people of the area?
(2) Will the project serve to gain civilian cooperation with the populace and resources control and counterguerrilla programs?
(3) Is the project in an area which the government may reasonably expect to hold? If not, will the project improve facilities and provide a net gain in other ways to offset a possible insurgent advantage?

75. Relation of Military Civic Action to Other Programs

a. The criteria shown in paragraph 74 clearly indicate the interface between military civic action and other governmental programs. These criteria also indicate that the relative desirability of a given project may depend on the phase of insurgency involved in a given area of the country. Frequently a nation is faced with a Phase II insurgency in some areas while in other areas the situation remains in Phase I. Military forces stationed in the latter areas would normally continue to concentrate on long term improvements, unless intelligence reports indicated an imminent appearance of organized guerrilla activity. Military civic action is dependent for its proper planning on basic intelligence (ch 4 and app F).

b. Generally in Phase I, military civic action will be the priority program of the military forces
since it supports the national priority, internal development. While attention must be paid to proper psychological exploitation of the program (para 76), decisions on project participation and priorities will be based primarily upon basic needs of the nation and of the particular area. In Phases II and III, the priority accorded to the internal defense programs may require that military civic action projects provide prompt positive civilian reaction of a kind that will help in the successful accomplishment of the priority program; e.g., suppressing the insurgency by military action.

c. Military civic action cannot by itself produce a satisfied populace in areas where basic discontent centers around long standing political, economic, or social grievances. An economically oppressed sharecropper or a member of a neglected or mistreated religious minority will not become an enthusiastic supporter of the government overnight, just because a military unit built a school in his neighborhood. Nevertheless, the building of the school may symbolize for him the government's desire and determination to better his lot and thus dissuade him from supporting dissident movements, at least for a time. If that time is properly used to meet the basic causes of his discontent, then military civic action, as part of the total governmental effort will have served its purpose.

76. Psychological Exploitation

a. For optimum results in any phase of insurgency, military civic action (and other internal development programs) must be exploited by well planned psychological operations to explain to the people what is going to be done, what is being done, and what has been done for them. Care must be taken to insure that the propagandist does not promise more than can be delivered in the time stated.

b. The rural citizen may not associate local political functionaries with national government. Frequently, he has little concept of a national government at all. The government's information program must convey to the people a concept of their nation, their government, and its accomplishments for them. The locally visible representatives of government must be shown to be a part of the whole, and these representatives must be trained to assist in the psychological operations program by bringing and applying integrity and judicious concern to the affairs of the rural citizen. The psychological operator must assist in the planning of the military civic action effort if he is expected to exploit it fully.

77. Military Civic Action Planning

a. While some military civic action operations entail a major effort and funding, the emphasis is on assistance, guidance, and the initiation of self-help programs within the scope of existing resources. Teams of military specialists with appropriate technical skills are established and work directly with the population and with other agencies of their government, such as public health, public welfare, education, agriculture, and interior ministries. Individual members of a unit or their dependents may engage in independent civic action projects of significant benefit to a community.

b. Civic action operations involve two avenues of approach, directed national activities and voluntary efforts on the local level. Both have generally similar goals.

(1) Directed activities usually involve specific assignments, central government funding, and authorization to use military resources.

(2) Voluntary activities should follow general stimuli and guidelines from the national government, but they involve greater initiative and resourcefulness on the local level. Unit equipment and facilities may be utilized in these projects; however, major effort is directed toward encouraging, directing, and supporting self-help programs. Directives to military units should encourage such activities, provide program guidelines, and authorize the use of equipment and facilities for these purposes.

(3) Whether the civic action operations are directed or are voluntary, activities must be coordinated closely among all action agencies to avoid duplication of effort, to rechannel misdirected idealism, and to secure maximum benefits from skills, labor, supplies, equipment, and funds involved.

78. Military Civic Action Projects

The civic action program by the military forces of a nation can encompass everything from one individual imparting his particular technical skill
to another, to the organization and functioning of a quasi-military organization for settling remote areas by providing security and aid to settlers. Ex-

Section IV. POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL

79. Introduction

Some of the material and human resources required by insurgents may come from sources external to the country but most of their support must be derived from internal resources, particularly from the indigenous population. A successful IDD program requires not only that internal material and human resources be mobilized in behalf of the government, but that they be denied to the insurgents. The populace and resources control program, part of the internal security portion of the IDD effort, is designed to accomplish the following objectives:

a. Mobilize the material and human resources on behalf of the government.

b. Detect and neutralize the insurgent apparatus and activities in the community.

c. Sever the supporting relationship between the population and the guerrillas.

d. Assist in the provision of a secure physical and psychological environment for the population.

80. Populace Control

a. An insurgency exploits the desires and grievances of the populace. The insurgent leaders do not have to provide any specific program to nurture their cause but can simply be against what the government is doing and promise satisfaction of the desires for alleviation of the grievances. In addition, the people of developing countries usually want modernization and its material benefits without recognizing that such refinements require an industrial base and time. The populace control program, coordinated with the IDD program, must recognize the desires and grievances of the populace, take action where possible to alleviate them, and explain through information media what is being done, any limiting factors, and future plans to solve the problems. The first function of populace control is to mobilize human resources for the government.

b. A country subject to insurgency will normally have an unsettled population because of ethnic divisions, prior revolutions or coups, natural disasters, famine or pestilence, nomadic customs, recent independence, or modernization. Under any of these conditions, normal individual indentification and control measures break down and individuals so inclined can become active insurgents or sympathizers with little fear of recognition and reprisal. The second function of the populace control program is to identify these people and to deny the insurgents their use.

81. Resources Control

Although insurgent leaders attempt to attain their goals by the easiest method possible, they are always prepared to use force as the ultimate weapon. Regardless of the method used, they must employ material resources to achieve their objectives. Assets of potential use to insurgents include military, financial, agricultural, manufacturing, chemical, transportation, communications, fuel, power, and other resources. The resources control program must identify those items required by the insurgents and provide specific controls to deny their diversion to, or acquisition by, the insurgents. For this purpose close coordination at national and subnational levels is required with the internal defense program. Certain internal defense and internal development activities may be undertaken primarily for resources control purposes, such as the provision of military protection and assistance in harvesting, collection, and storage of crops in areas subject to insurgent threat.

82. Centralized Planning

A populace and resources control program must be initiated and planned at the national level, preferably in the NISC to insure cohesiveness, completeness, and realism. The plan should be prepared by representatives of all ministries and include a determination of critical material assets, enforceable restrictions to be instituted, positive reporting and analysis procedures, supervision techniques, and an information plan to explain the program to the populace.

83. Decentralized Execution

Execution of the populace and resources control program must be decentralized in order to take advantage of the more detailed knowledge avail-
able to local officials and to achieve greatest effectiveness. In addition, decentralization contributes to a prime objective of an IDD program, namely, strengthening of the government. Supervision of local officials is required to insure compliance, fair and equitable enforcement, and honest administration. As the program develops, those local officials who have demonstrated their capabilities and loyalty should be given more latitude to exploit opportunities in their area.

84. Governmental Organization for Populace and Resources Control

a. As governmental ministerial or department organization will vary by country, and within country by subordinate and local level, the organization must be closely examined to fix responsibility at all levels for implementing the populace and resources control plan. Police organizations, if adequately staffed, trained, and equipped, are ideally suited to supervise the implementation of a populace and resources control program for they provide an organized control force in being that is—(1) knowledgeable about local conditions; (2) accepted by the populace as a governmental organization with enforcement prerogatives; (3) capable of security operations; (4) able to use, and have recourse to, recorded factual data; and (5) capable of controlling transportation arteries.

b. The regular military is normally used as a backup force and as a source of personnel for administrative, intelligence, and psychological operations and other specialties. In some cases, however, military units or members may be the sole representatives of the government at the district, local, or village level. Where the military has forcibly driven the armed insurgent from an area, there should be a turnover of authority and responsibility for the populace and resources control program to the police as quickly as reliable police forces are available. This releases the military for other tasks and facilitates the population's early return to a more normal way of life.

c. To provide for immediate augmentation of existing police forces, other organizations whose duties call for contact with the people should be used. These may include postal employees, internal revenue agents, forest rangers, conservation officials, and customs officials. Another source of manpower for the populace and resources control program is the paramilitary force. In many countries such organizations are already in being and available for immediate employment in support of the program. Sometimes, however, these forces will have already become integrated with the regular military forces, or are occupied elsewhere, and cannot be spared for populace and resources control. The recruitment of a civil guard force may then become desirable. Generally, this task must be approached very carefully as, in an area where much of the population is suspect, arms and ammunition cannot be distributed indiscriminately. It is necessary to select, indoctrinate, and train the most reliable elements of the population. Training must be conducted carefully and systematically in order to gain and then retain the enthusiasm of this force. This force, in addition to assisting the police in the accomplishment of their assigned mission, provides a means by which the local population can participate in the government's effort to defeat the insurgent threat.

d. Government financial agencies must counter specific insurgent financial activities to maintain or better the soundness of the currency of their country's international credit. Insurgents have a great interest in finance. They will seek to secure funds for their own use, undermine public faith in banks or financial institutions, or destroy confidence in the monetary system.

e. Each of the ministries or departments involved in supervision of production and services establish controls and procedures which will maintain them for the people, and at the same time deny their use to the insurgents. A sound economic structure demands a firm base in the fields of agriculture, commerce, industry, and service. Care must be exercised to avoid establishment of overly optimistic production goals which, if they fail of attainment, can be used as a psychological and propaganda weapon against the government and which encourage submission of falsified reports from lower echelons.

f. The public health plan should provide safeguards to insure that medical supplies are not diverted to insurgent use or control, and that adequate steps are taken to prevent the manufacture or introduction of illicit drugs, medical supplies, and narcotics. Medical aid is one of the most effective weapons available to government as well as to insurgent forces, and the control of medicine and drugs is mandatory in populace and resources control.

g. All governments maintain some form of records on their citizens and national achievements.
Available official data can be supplemented by family, tribal, religious, trade, or professional records. Regardless of the source, all available data must be gathered, correlated, kept current, supplemented as required, and used to make a populace and resources control plan effective. It is preferable that the statistical functions be centralized nationally to avoid duplication, facilitate objective assessment, and detect weaknesses for subsequent planning.

85. Military Structure

a. During Phase I insurgency, the populace and resources control program emphasizes nonmilitary actions; however, indigenous military forces will participate in all phases and probably will be extensively employed during Phase II in areas where the civil government is weak or nonexistent. In addition to active participation, they can provide security for the populace and counter the threats and terrorism employed by insurgents. Military forces normally will have a subordinate or supporting role in the populace and resources control program during Phases I and II of an insurgency, but must be prepared to assume a primary role if the insurgency escalates to Phase III. Under conditions of insurgency, the civil-military relationships of the command assume more importance than usual. Civil affairs officers must be conversant with the populace and resources control plan, maintain close and continuing liaison with civil authorities, supervise execution of their command’s portion of the plan, and be prepared to assume all essential functions of the government in the event of martial rule.

b. Military intelligence personnel can make a material contribution to successful populace and resources controls. They are not restricted to political subdivisions as are many civil police; they frequently will possess more sophisticated equipment; and they are less subject to family, tribal, or similar ties. Internal security functions including personnel security investigations, complaint investigations, security surveys and inspections, and technical inspections frequently will disclose civilian affiliations that are suspect and provide investigative leads for other agencies. Other intelligence and counterintelligence activities including penetration operations, counterespionage, countersubversion, and countersabotage may detect or neutralize insurgent activity. Certain intelligence operations may be conducted specifically in support of the populace and resources control program, such as a penetration operation directed primarily against the insurgent’s clandestine supply program.

c. Military police by virtue of their basic police training may be assigned to support enforcement of the populace and resources control program. They may require special instruction in identifying contraband or controlled items such as chemicals, drugs, machinery, textiles, and other goods. Their efficiency usually can be improved by teaming them with local civil or paramilitary police who understand the distinctive dialects, dress, and customs of the populace.

d. The training and equipment of psychological operations units make them well-suited to publicize the necessity and purpose of populace resources controls. The themes used in such operations must be in consonance with national information and propaganda programs.

e. The wide deployment of combat units, particularly into disputed areas, frequently makes them the sole representative of government in such areas. As such, they will not only be charged with providing security of the area and its populace, but also with implementing the populace and resources control plan. Positive community relationship, troop conduct, and military civic action must be emphasized to foster popular support for the government, and facilitate implementation and execution of the populace and resources control program.

f. Supply and service units possess and use military commodities and equipment desirable to the local economy. They also frequently utilize local labor and materials. These circumstances afford these units the opportunity to identify items in short supply locally, and to identify personnel who attempt to pilfer or otherwise put items to unauthorized use. No resources control program can be effective if the handling of military supplies, including those used in military civic action projects, is not closely controlled.

86. Legal Framework

A basic responsibility of any government is to define the rights of the government in defending itself on the one side, and the rights of individuals on the other. As part of its effort to combat insurgency, the government may suspend normal liberties. This may be accompanied or followed by a declaration of martial law or state of siege.
Under these conditions, situations may develop where expediency in the immediate situation suggests to government officials that they should exceed their authority. To reduce the temptation for government officials to exceed their authority in their zeal to combat the insurgency, and as a necessary part of the overall IDD effort, the state of existing law pertaining to populace and resources control must be carefully examined. It may prove necessary to promulgate additional legislation for the period of the emergency to endow officials with the right and the duty to act vigorously and effectively. Such emergency legislation should state precisely the preconditions necessary for its application. Arrest and search laws, in particular, should receive public and precise dissemination. Otherwise, rather than supporting the populace and resources control program, they will be a source of further disaffection and resentment.

87. Preparatory Planning and Actions

a. Measures designed to establish and maintain physical control of the local populace are categorized as surveillance and restrictions. These controls vary from simple identification of members of the population to absolute restriction and control of all personal life. Surveillance systems are used as an aid in detecting illegal or undesirable activities of the population. Restrictions are used to prevent guerrilla contact with the population and thereby eliminate his support by the population. These restrictions reduce or confine the activities of the people.

b. The preparatory phase includes: obtaining necessary legal authority; unifying the populace and resources control forces (police-military-civil guard elements); organizing, training, and equipping the control force; developing a psychological operations program; preparing intelligence operations; establishing Area Coordination Centers; establishing Civil-Military Coordination Committees; and establishing and refining alert and security measures.

c. The initial period of activity requires the establishing of general surveillance measures; the intensifying of the intelligence effort; the identifying of the insurgent control apparatus; the establishing of coordination procedures with military forces in the area; and the intensifying of psychological operations to win the political allegiance of the people.

88. General Control Principles

a. Control of Individuals. These measures include such controls as may be necessary to insure identification, govern travel, determine residence and employment, and control distribution of commodities. Positive identification of individuals and family groups is essential to control; however, overly harsh controls must be avoided in order to prevent the population from turning to the insurgents. The ID card system, despite the obvious drawbacks of counterfeiting, alteration, and insurgent confiscation remains the most effective basic system. All other control systems can be tied in with the identification card.

b. Control of Movement. The government must be able to impose effective controls on the movement of persons and material to prevent reinforcement of the insurgent potential. No area can be considered secure if the insurgents are able to impose their own control measures. Control of movement is, however, potentially harmful to the economy and a balance between economic and security requirements must be maintained. Movement controls must be applied with regard to local conditions and will differ, for example, in application to a fishing village and an agricultural community since the pattern and timing of movement involved in harvesting and marketing fish and produce are basically different.

c. Control of Areas. Authorities should designate and publicize areas where unauthorized personnel are not allowed. Personnel may be denied access to certain areas at all times or denied entry into certain areas only during designated periods of time. Resettlement, which is the movement of individual families, groups of households, or even entire communities by the government to newly constructed villages or towns, is a means of controlling and defending the population within the contested areas.

d. Control of Activities. A variety of innocent appearing activities often provides cover for clandestine activities. The value of restricting some of these activities may at times not be sufficient to justify the price of completely hampering public expression. Some of the activities that might be restricted are political meetings, rallies and demonstrations, social and religious gatherings, labor meetings, and adult education groups. However, most of these activities should at least be brought under observation to determine if grounds exist for restricting them. Insurgents will attempt to infl-
trate, subvert, and control virtually every facet of life.

e. Control of Materials. Measures for the control of materials should be designed to shut off supplies to the insurgents to the maximum degree possible and at the same time leave maximum freedom of commerce for the loyal population in the area. A variety of controls may be employed. Source controls are effective for completelyregistered populations or for commodities not in wide-spread production. Import controls and licensing regulations governing flow and use of materials can be very effective in many areas of the economy. Controls on internal movement of commodities, and consumption and utilization controls through rationing and distribution regulations should also be utilized as needed. Techniques for use of these controls will vary with the security of the area, availability of supplies, and the temper of the local populace. Judicious use of material controls will require detailed intelligence data.

f. Financial Controls. Insurgent movements, as well as government activities, require financial resources, and insurgent forces depend largely upon the indigenous population for their financial support. A deliberate reduction in the supply of liquid cash may be necessary to hamper insurgent "taxation" and lessen insurgent purchasing power. It may be necessary to limit the amount of cash which merchants can accept for merchandise, thus forcing large transactions to proceed through banking channels for greater ease of control. Government loans, capitalization, and encouragement may permit the formation of cooperatives, corporations, and other commerical organizations which can be required to maintain accurate records, thereby becoming less susceptible to insurgent blackmail than are individual or family activities. In developing nations, and in communities which have been subjected to serious stress, monetary exchange may have given away to a barter economy as a basis of exchange. While a barter economy is more difficult to control, basic control measures will be required to prevent insurgent manipulation. The trade base might be gold, gems, food, tobacco, drugs, or units of labor. The critical items must be determined, and realistic, enforceable controls imposed.

g. Control of Communications. The control and restriction of communications is accomplished by censorship of communications media, licensing of operators of communications equipment; control of sales and ownership of communications equipment; and monitoring of broadcasts.

89. Relinquishment of Controls

With the increased success of the IDD operation the intensity of control measures is reduced and gradual phasing out of regular military forces is possible. Police and paramilitary units continue supervision of the populace and resources control program. Intelligence and psychological operations programs continue with emphasis upon those themes that will assist in developing a solid base of political allegiance among the citizenry.

90. Civil Information Activities and Psychological Operations

a. Each of the component programs which make up the total IDD effort require the support of a coordinated civil information campaign. The populace and resources control program needs a particularly strong support effort since a weak government cannot maintain itself by force alone. Support from the populace is needed to deprive the insurgent enemy of aid. The IDD program and its military civic action component, as well as the community relations program of the military forces demonstrate to the military and civilian parts of the community that they have much in common and that the government is genuinely concerned with the welfare and progress of all lawabiding elements of the population. Tactical military successes and progress in internal development must be exploited by all information media to reinforce the populace and resources control effort by making the restraints and hardships appear worthwhile for the achievement of security, stability, and progress.

b. Most armed forces have a system to provide information to outside news media as well as to their own members, employees, and dependents. In support of the populace and resources control effort, both of these information channels must be considered. Coordinated information programs must be achieved if the government is to retain credibility. The armed forces cannot give a story to the world press and radio and expect to keep their own civilian or military population in ignorance of what has been said. Armed forces public information personnel must consider news of the
populace and resources control program as an essential element of the entire civil information program and not as an independent activity. In any IDD effort the part played by the people is crucial and they must be kept adequately informed.

a. The use of information to motivate the populace is an integral part of the IDD effort since the population is the primary target of the conflict. Media and themes will depend upon the environment and the conditions of the particular nation as well as on the stage of the insurgency. Generally, overall propaganda objectives in support of the populace and resources control program should include the following ideas:

(1) The government acts for the long-range benefit of the people.

(2) The activities of the insurgents are harmful to the people and it is these activities which necessitate the imposition of the populace and resources control program.

(3) Insurgent leaders, activists, and guerrillas are the enemies of the people who must be denied support and supplies.

(4) Citizens of honor must declare themselves, their families, and their communities on the side of the government by full and voluntary compliance with the populace and resources control program.

(5) Populace and resources control programs will be reduced and ultimately removed as the insurgent threat is reduced and eliminated.
CHAPTER 7
U.S. CIVIL AFFAIRS ASSISTANCE IN INTERNAL DEFENSE AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT

Section I. INTRODUCTION

91. U.S. National Objectives in Internal Defense/Development (IDD)

Within the context of the overall national objectives of the United States in the cold war, there is included assistance to the developing nations to preserve their independence from covert as well as from overt aggression. Defense against insurgency involves more than military preparedness. For this reason, as well as for humanitarian reasons, the United States desires to provide assistance to the developing nations to meet the legitimate aspirations of their people for a better life through political, economic, and social improvement. These measures, military, political, economic, and social are intertwined, for without a successful effort in all of these fields there can be no successful IDD program. In IDD, there is no clear line of demarcation between military and nonmilitary measures.

92. U.S. Organization for IDD

a. Description of and doctrine for the U.S. national organization for IDD is provided in FM 100-20.

b. Description of U.S. national level in-country organization is provided in chapter 5.

c. Doctrine and procedures for employment of U.S. Army elements having civil affairs duties and responsibilities operating in-country in support of the U.S. national objectives in oversea IDD is provided in the remainder of this chapter.

93. Commitment of U.S. Forces to Assist in IDD

a. Ideally, a country would recognize very early in Phase I insurgency that it was faced with a serious problem and would request U.S. support and assistance. Frequently, however, either the nation concerned does not recognize the full extent and implications of the problem or, for various reasons, does not wish to request external support, or does not desire to have support from a foreign army. At other times, the United States may be unable or unwilling to assist the government in power. Thus, there is no assurance that U.S. Army personnel will be committed at the time when they could achieve the most favorable results with a minimum of personnel. The situation most likely to be encountered is one where a host nation does not request or receive U.S. Army support until its condition has deteriorated to the point that Phase II activity is already manifest in at least some areas of the country. At times, U.S. support may not be provided until Phase III has been reached, or until there is an overt attempt to seize power. In this case, U.S. Army personnel may be first introduced as part of a relatively large increment of U.S. Armed Forces dispatched to stabilize the situation, and gain time for the implementation of necessary reforms and internal development activities.

b. Other circumstances which must be considered include—

(1) Situations in which third powers have attempted to assist the host nation in earlier phases, but where for some particular reason the United States subsequently enters to reinforce or replace the earlier assistance effort.

(2) Situations in which the United States provides military assistance to the host nation as part of an international effort. This situation may occur at any stage but usually does not occur until Phase II or Phase III has been reached.
(3) Situations in which U.S. or international civilian agencies have provided some nation building or community development assistance to the host country, but U.S. Armed Forces personnel have not been committed until Phase II or III has been reached.

d. When U.S. Army personnel are committed to an IDD operation they must recognize that their mission is political as well as military. All of their actions will have civil-military implications and they will be engaged in civil affairs activities. They must study what has gone before, attempt to continue and build on successful efforts, and to learn from and avoid earlier mistakes.

d. The remainder of this chapter will outline doctrine for U.S. Army personnel with civil affairs duties beginning with those which should be undertaken in Phase I. If such personnel enter the country in a later phase, they must insure that the measures which should have been taken earlier are accomplished as quickly and as fully as possible, and continue on with the other measures described.

94. The Role of the MAAG or Mission in Civil Affairs Activities

a. The U.S. MAAG or Military Mission is an instrument provided to assist the U.S. Ambassador in the fulfillment of his assigned tasks. Where these tasks include advice and support to the host country for the planning, coordination, and execution of IDD, the Chief of the MAAG or Mission is deeply committed to a variety of civil affairs activities. Prime among his concerns will be the problem of using military resources for the provision and support of governmental functions, for military civic action as part of internal development, for military participation in populace and resources control, and for consolidation psychological operations. While the military forces so involved are those of the host country, the Chief of the MAAG or Mission must orient his advice and assistance effort to provide maximum support to the host country forces in these civil affairs activities. Regardless of how these functions are labeled by the host country, for U.S. commanders they are civil affairs problems, which if neglected or inadequately handled, can cause the loss of the whole military and economic investment poured into the undecided and contested countries of the world. Such neglect can even facilitate Communist seizure and contribute to turning a U.S.-trained army against the United States. It is in the developing countries that the problem is most acute.

b. The military forces in developing countries often performs functions over and above their constitutional duties of national defense and internal security. The civil affairs activities of these forces may include national resources development, cultural affairs, relief activities, reconstruction, labor assistance to civilian farmers and industries, supplementary income and self-support activities of military units and personnel, support of dependents, and civil defense. Although the civil affairs activities of the U.S. Army cover some aspects of these, it is probable that they will have to be broadly interpreted to embrace certain features necessary in developing nations. This difference will pose problems of proper "interface" between the MAAG/Mission and the forces which it is supporting. Problems of this type may occur at every political-military command level of the two nations. Contributing difficulties may be lack of identity between the national objectives of the United States and those of the indigenous government, differing national concepts of government and public service, and cultural and linguistic differences between U.S. advisers and indigenous personnel. These problems can seriously interfere with full implementation of desirable IDD programs.

95. The MAAG or Mission CA Staff Element

a. The nature and character of subversive insurgency and the threat that it poses to most developing nations; the broad role which the host country's armed forces must be prepared to assume in the execution of internal defense operations; and the involvement of the civil populace with all military elements and operations lead to the conclusion that, within the MAAG or Mission, there should be a full-time staff element for civil affairs. This element will have primary staff responsibility for all the major activities of civil-military relations of the MAAG or Mission, and for staff supervision of the civil affairs advisory and support effort by U.S. military advisory personnel serving with host country military units and governmental agencies.

b. A schematic representation of U.S. IDD civil affairs activities depicting the development of this staff section's role and mission, as well as those of other in-country civil affairs elements, is provided in figure 4.
**Table: Initiation of Phase II Insurgency**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Inciipient Insurgency Identified (Phase I)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Initiation of Phase II Insurgency</strong></th>
<th><strong>Initiation of Phase III Insurgency</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country CI team established.</td>
<td>Continue CA intelligence collection.</td>
<td>Continue CA intelligence collection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA Officer assigned to MAAG or Attache office.</td>
<td>Assist continuation of military civic action.</td>
<td>Assist continuation of military civic action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collection of CA Intelligence.</td>
<td>Insure orientation of unit supporting contingency plan (LNO from unit to country team).</td>
<td>Introduction of US forces, including CA units, teams and staff section sections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation of CA estimate (to include extent and analysis of on-going civilian agency operations for continuation, reduction or elimination).</td>
<td>Recommend establishment of ASCC.</td>
<td>Phased turn-over to military forces of certain civilian agency operations (field operations only in some cases).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation of CA annex to country internal defense development plan.</td>
<td>Recommendations for tailoring CA unit to be employed with or without other US forces.</td>
<td>Advising on or performance of Government functions as required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Encourage start of military civic action program.</em></td>
<td>Phase-in of certain CA functional specialists in support of US and host country civilian agencies.</td>
<td>*CA operations in support of tactical &amp; logistical units as required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate plan for phase-in of CA personnel with other US agencies.</td>
<td>Continue development of indigenous CA capability.</td>
<td>Continue P&amp;RC operational advice and assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commence introduction of US CA MTT’s.</td>
<td>Buildup of full scale CA staff section in senior in-country command.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Priority Effort in Each Phase.*

**Figure 4. Internal defense/development assistance U.S. civil affairs activities.**

c. The CA staff element of the MAAG, Mission, or other senior U.S. in-country military headquarters has certain recurring staff responsibilities which must be monitored carefully regardless of the phase of insurgency involved. These include:

1. That each basic U.S. in-country program which involves military personnel or support is promulgated by a policy directive, in the name of the Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission. This directive would be binding upon all members of the country team, should specifically outline the objectives of the program, and should recite the responsibilities and contributing support expected to be assumed by or provided to each U.S. agency involved at each applicable level of the host nation government.

2. That stress is placed on the concept of military civic action, as a part of the overall internal development program, and as a means of internal defense, rather than simply as the provision of amenities to civilians; and that U.S. military and civilian officials are trained in the planning and conducting of civic action so that credit is reflected on indigenous forces or officials.

3. That civil affairs, psychological operations, and public information are given staff representation throughout the command and advisory structures, in order to assure that what is said, to the enemy and the indigenous population is coordinated with what is done to both these groups, and with what must be factually reported to the world in the press.

4. That all information personnel are given full training in IDD and military participation in its noncombat aspects.

5. That indigenous forces are encouraged...
to keep staff civil affairs and psychological operations officers at lower levels free of other duties so that they can put the proper emphasis on the civil populace and the insurgent movement.

(6) That staff functions vital to IDD operations are allocated to separate U.S. advisory positions with no major additional duties or responsibilities to detract from full emphasis on each such field.

(7) That advisors at subnational levels are given a well-rounded course in all of the noncombat aspects of IDD, the basics of local government administration, and a familiarization with rural life in their areas.

Section II. PHASE I ACTIVITIES

96. Priority of Effort

a. Since the host country national priority of effort in Phase I is given to internal development, the MAAG or Mission priority of civil affairs activity in this phase will normally assist the indigenous armed forces in the planning, staff supervision, and execution of a military civic action program. This will frequently require additional supervision, and execution of a military civic action program. This will frequently require additional civil affairs qualified U.S. personnel, at least temporarily.

b. A primary means of obtaining temporary additional help for a MAAG or Mission is by request for a Mobile Training Team (MTT) (AR 551-50). The introduction of an MTT in-country frequently will be more acceptable to the host country, especially in Phase I, than would be an increase of strength in the MAAG on a permanent basis. Host countries are also frequently more willing to allow MTT's to work with civilian and military officials at subnational levels than to allow the introduction of longer term advisory personnel. Further, the presence of a few foreign military personnel to instruct in positive nation building or developmental techniques is less likely to arouse fears, either in the country or among its neighbors, than a proportionate increase in the number of combat advisors. For these reasons, the CA staff element of a MAAG or Mission should strive to have the Chief, MAAG or Mission, request the services of one or more MTT's to provide required instruction in civil affairs activities. Whenever an MTT is in-country the CA staff element of the MAAG or Mission will have primary staff responsibility for its direction and support.

c. Paragraphs 97 through 99 describe the Military Civic Action MTT, which is the most common, but the same principles would be applicable to any civil affairs MTT in any phase of insurgency. Military Civic Action as part of the host country's internal development program is described in chapter 6. The role of the CA MTT is necessary to evaluate relative needs, stimulate participation, and add vitality to the program.

97. Military Civic Action Mobile Training Teams—General

a. U.S. Military Civic Action Mobile Training Teams have been formed for specialized assistance to other nations (AR 551-50). When deployed, these teams become a part of, and work through, the MAAGs and Missions. The work of a team may include—

(1) Orientation of the MAAG or Mission staffs and other members of the Country Team, as appropriate, on the military civic action concept, and the role of the MAAGs and Missions in the program.

(2) A survey of the country for needs which can be met through military civic action.

(3) Development of a military civic action program for the specific country.

(4) Training and guidance of local forces, and technical assistance on specific projects.

b. Military Civic Action Mobile Training Teams normally will consist of from one to five people. The teams may be composed of military officers, enlisted personnel, civilians from one of the service departments or civilians from any other governmental agency. One person, usually the senior military man or civilian, will be designated as chief of the team and will be responsible for seeing that proper procedures are followed, necessary contacts are made, reports are prepared and forwarded, and that the team functions as a unit. Thorough area orientation and knowledge of the local language will greatly aid the team chief in his contacts with the local populace. Team composition is determined by the needs of the area requesting the team, and members of a team should be qualified in the fields of activity for which the team is to be dispatched. The following fields are
examples of areas of activity in which MTT's may be employed:

(1) Government (Political-Economic Affairs).
(2) Civil-Military Relations.
(3) Engineering.
(4) Sanitation.
(5) Medicine or Public Health.
(6) Community Development.
(7) Commerce and Industry.
(8) Agriculture.
(9) Education.
(10) Psychological Operations.
(11) Public Relations.

a. Major assignment considerations are—

(1) The team is considered for all purposes of jurisdiction and responsibility to be a part of the MAAG or Mission. Team activities are carried out under the supervision of the Chief, in coordination with representatives of the other U.S. agencies making up the country team, and are subject to all regulations concerning conduct and duty of official U.S. personnel stationed in that country.

(2) Unless time or other circumstances prevent, the team is assembled prior to departure for briefing and orientation by the appropriate service departments, Defense, State, AID, USIA, and other governmental agencies. Briefings will cover current political, social, and economic conditions prevailing in the country to which the team is assigned.

98. Military Civic Action Mobile Training Teams—Procedures

a. While en route to the country where it will work, the team normally visits the headquarters of the unified command which supervises the MAAG or Mission of that country. The team briefs the unified commander and his staff on its mission and receives instructions, guidance, and information concerning the country. The unified command staff briefs the team and provides essential information on the latest political, economic and military situations.

b. On arrival in the country, the team reports at once to the MAAG or Mission Chief for administrative and policy orientation. As early as possible the MAAG or Mission Chief is briefed on the proposed plan for accomplishing the civic action mission. Local situations and conditions govern procedures in each case. A suggested sequence of procedure, not intended to be all-inclusive is—

(1) Determine what is being done or has been done by local forces in the military civic action field. It is necessary to know the attitude of the local military forces toward the people, how the people feel about the military forces, and what projects and programs, if any, have been undertaken by the military forces to gain the respect and confidence of the people.

(2) Understand the organization and capabilities of the military forces to perform military civic action projects.

(3) Become acquainted with key military and other governmental officials.

(4) Learn the basic economic needs of the country. Each team member can concentrate on the needs in his specific field.

(5) Visit all possible sections of the country to observe social and economic conditions.

(6) Prepare the portion of a program pertaining to the activities which each specialist on the team is qualified to judge and analyze. Some of the things which should be considered in preparing such a program are—

(a) Whether the military has a tradition of participating in public affairs that brings the military and civilians to a closer understanding of each other.

(b) The basic needs of the local areas with which the military can assist.

(c) The training required for accomplishment of missions or prepare personnel for useful roles in civilian life.

(d) Specific projects in specific areas which the military forces can undertake with little or no additional funds. (Primary responsibility for funding military civic action programs in a country rests with the host government. Military civic action projects which require major funding should be carefully evaluated.)

(e) Whether local community councils of military and civilian representatives are used, and, if not, the desirability of instituting them.
(7) Discuss and coordinate the program or plan of action with the MAAG or Mission staff and other elements of the country team staff members.

(8) Present the completed program or plan to the MAAG or Mission Chief and recommend its presentation to the country team for approval and implementation of those projects which may be undertaken at the country team level. Projects which require funding are presented to the country team for consideration and funding in accordance with current MAP procedures.

a. Reports which must be rendered include—

(1) MTT Chief reports are submitted by the MTT Chief, monthly or more often as indicated by progress, through the Chief of MAAG or Mission to the Director of Civil Affairs, ODCSOPS, Department of the Army, with a copy to Commandant, U.S. Army Civil Affairs School.

(2) A final report is prepared by the team as prescribed in AR 551-50.

d. Debriefing procedures should provide for—

(1) Return to home station by way of the unified command headquarters, where the staff is briefed on results of the team efforts.

(2) If the team has been provided from CONUS, return to CONUS and report to the Director of Civil Affairs, ODCSOPS, Department of the Army, Defense, State, AID, USIA, and other interested agencies.

99. Problems to be Overcome in U.S. Sponsored Military Civic Action Programs

a. The U.S. technician not only needs to be a specialist in his field but must also develop the ability to teach these specialties to persons with different customs and viewpoints. Technicians who have had little or no training that will help them follow this principle will often frustrate the indigenous personnel and themselves by continuing to seek a level of technical perfection that is actually beyond the environmental limitations of the area in which they are working. Therefore, thorough indoctrination in methods of introducing modern science and techniques into new areas is imperative. The object must be to help the people improve what they already have. Insistence upon technical precision beyond the environmental tolerances of the country may accomplish the short-range goal of completing a given project, but fail in the long-range goal of improving the capability of the indigenous personnel to respond to the needs of their own country. To obtain the long-range goal, the technician frequently may have to lower his own standards enough for the indigenous technicians to reach them before he can start thinking about raising indigenous standards to modern levels.

b. Communist propaganda preys on emotions and skilfully foments antagonisms to U.S. programs. Therefore, U.S. military and civilian assistance programs are more successful when conducted in such a way as to—

(1) Reach the masses of the people.

(2) Yield some tangible and prompt benefits.

(3) Involve active and constructive participation of the people.

(4) Develop pride of the people in their own achievement or status.

100. Other Phase I Civil Affairs Activities

a. The CA staff element of MAAG will initiate collection of civil affairs intelligence upon which to base the civil affairs estimate of the situation. Civil affairs intelligence requirements and collection capabilities are described in chapter 4. An outline of a civil affairs Intelligence Collection Plan is shown in appendix F, and with minor modifications will serve as a basis for this work in any phase of insurgency.

b. The CA staff element of MAAG will prepare the Civil Affairs Estimate of the Situation (FM 101–5 and app E). The initial Civil Affairs Estimate of Situation must cover the work of civilian agencies whose activities relate to any civil affairs major activity in the country in order to avoid duplication of effort and provide for the continuation of programs and approaches which have proven successful in the country concerned.

c. The civil affairs annex to the Country IDD Plan (FM 101–5) should cover as a minimum—

(1) Military civic action by indigenous forces and required U.S. support.

(2) Need for and type of MTT's to be requested.

(3) Need for and type of CA permanent party personnel required to work with other U.S. agencies and host country subnational governmental structure.
levels. Emphasis probably will be this purpose. The principles set forth below, while applicable to indigenous forces and required U.S. support. Civil affairs effort required of indigenous forces to provide for or support the functions of government that are weak or nonexistent in certain areas of the country.

**Section III. PHASE II ACTIVITIES**

101. **Priority of Effort**

Phase II insurgency requires that the host country governmental structure be strengthened at all levels. Emphasis probably will be placed on the use of indigenous and U.S. military personnel for this purpose. The principles set forth below, while applicable to advisors in any phase of insurgency, are especially applicable to Phase II. Frequently the U.S. Armed Forces will not have had the opportunity to provide advisors at subnational levels in an earlier phase; and the Phase II situation represents the last hope of defeating the insurgency short of a war of movement, which might require a much greater U.S. commitment. The provision of U.S. military advisory personnel at this stage of an insurgency is an application of the principle of economy of force.

102. **U.S. Military Influence in Civil-Military Relations**

For both the host country military commander, and the U.S. MAAG or Mission Chief, the relationships between the host country military forces and the civilian population of the nation are a matter of overriding importance to the entire IDD effort. By virtue of common interest, common schooling, and similar military problem areas, the most effective point of contact between two countries may be through military channels. When such is the case the improvement of civil military relations can best be accomplished by the Chief of MAAG or Mission. This may also be the most effective channel for suggesting the provision of U.S. military personnel as advisors at the various echelons of government.

103. **Basic Principles for the Selection, Training and Use of Military Advisors in IDD Assistance Operations**

a. These principles are applicable to all advisory roles in IDD operations. They are particularly important for those positions at the subnational level where the advisor is working with a military or civilian counterpart who has responsibility for some or all of the nontactical aspects of the IDD effort. Key positions, particularly in the field, must be identified and the best qualified and trained people must be placed systematically in these jobs. The U.S. officer assigned as an advisor must have some knowledge or training in every responsibility of his counterpart so that he can avoid giving military advice that would detract from some other activity of his counterpart. He will frequently find his counterpart involved in almost every function of local government because the primary mission may be an attempt to establish government in a particular area.

b. U.S. military officers selected as advisors must be trained in all U.S. country team programs. Prior to commitment, an advisor should be told specifically what portion of the country he is going to and should be area-oriented for it in detail. This will extend his productive period without lengthening his in-country time.

c. The advisor must convince his counterpart that he understands the problems involved, is technically qualified to help solve the problems, and lastly, that he is willing to help solve the problems. The modus operandi of a successful advisor may well include a policy of allowing his counterpart some “freedom from advice” during work hours, but on the other hand, spending considerable off-duty time with him and developing close working relationships through common interests, both in work and off-duty activities. Where possible, key U.S. advisors should be quartered where they can entertain indigenous officials. U.S. advisors generally should stay in the background, letting attention focus on the indigenous official rather than on the American. The effective advisor must look at his job in a broad perspective. He must be curious and knowledgeable about the people in the area in which he works and not limit himself to those functional matters within a job description. Finally, the effective advisor must have a real understanding of the political reality under which his counterpart works.

d. The military subnational level advisor often may be the best means through which to present advice from U.S. civilian as well as military agencies. Frequently indigenous provincial officials
may be military officers, and as such, they may tend to accept advice more readily from a military advisor than from a civilian. In almost every case, however, the military advisor is in a position to at least reinforce civilian agency advice on political, economic, and sociological matters.

e. In those situations where indigenous military officers also act in a civilian capacity it is essential that all elements of the U.S. country team understand the dual military and civilian roles occupied by such officers and their total impact on the IDD effort. A province or district chief may at the same time be a civilian official governing civilians, and a military commander affecting civilians. All U.S. advisors must avoid pressures that will result in the counterpart’s attention being focused on either role to the detriment of the other.

104. Support of Host Nation Governmental Activities

a. The subnational level U.S. military advisor must be prepared to assist in subnational level planning and execution of the overall IDD effort as outlined in chapter 5. This will include advice and assistance to his counterpart in security matters and all other internal defense matters. He should place emphasis on public administration, and the total function of government, appropriate to the extent that his counterpart is so responsible.

b. To accomplish these activities the U.S. military advisor will frequently serve as liaison between his counterpart and various U.S. in-country agencies. These may include both civilian and military agencies. One of the primary ways he can assist his counterpart is in helping him to make his own governmental system work. It will do little good if the U.S. advisor accomplishes all action by means of U.S. channels and U.S. resources if, in the process, his counterpart does not learn how to establish procedural and functional channels for his administration and logistics within the framework of his own government. While the unilateral use of U.S. channels and resources may be necessary in emergency situations, or as an initial means of establishing influence, continued unilateral action by the U.S. advisor will be self-defeating. Misuse of the dual channel concept can also destroy rapport if the U.S. advisor continually goes over the head of his counterpart by using U.S. channels. The dual channel concept properly applied, however, can be most productive. At each echelon of the indigenous government above his own there are likely to be other U.S. advisors. While making parallel reports through U.S. advisory channels, the advisor should encourage his counterpart to submit his own requisitions and correspondence through his own channels. Thus the advisor at the next higher echelon will be made aware of the situation and can influence his counterpart to take the necessary action. Similarly, dual channels can be used for requests for action directed to any lower governmental echelon where there is a U.S. advisor.

c. The U.S. subnational advisor in assessing the situation in his area should use (and encourage his counterpart to use) the survey list set forth in paragraph 97. While this survey list was prepared primarily for use by civil affairs MTT’s, it can also give the U.S. advisor a method for obtaining a reasonably complete picture of the situation in his area and a basis upon which he can advise his counterpart. Unless he is the first one to be assigned to the area, the advisor should also learn what his predecessor has done, or failed to do, and what other agencies are doing, and build upon that foundation.

105. Operations by Subnational Level Advisors in Coordination With and in Extension of the Work of U.S. Government Civilian Agencies

a. Subnational level advisors contribute to the administration of USAID and other U.S. agency programs in the areas where they are located by supporting their activities. Many advisors can expect to spend more than half of their time in the civil support area. In functions such as civil affairs and psychological operations, a major subnational level U.S. advisor’s staff should have an officer devoting full time to each of these activities. Generally the support rendered by subnational level advisors in these fields may include—

(1) Assistance in the creation, management, and utilization of an ACC for each operational area as a primary means of obtaining requisite coordination of all IDD activities.

(2) Total or partial administration of certain specialized programs such as returnees or refugees.

(3) Relief assistance to refugees and the civil population.
(4) Technical support such as providing engineer officers to inspect self-help projects or to work with indigenous public works staffs.

(5) Influencing the indigenous military and paramilitary forces to participate in military civic action projects that bear upon the overall USAID effort.

(6) Providing security and administrative support in messing, transportation, communication, and billeting for personnel of USAID, USIS and other U.S. agencies.

(7) Joint activities, including reporting, sitting together on local councils, and advising the same indigenous governmental officials.

b. It can be expected that USAID, USIS, and other U.S. agencies will use subnational level advisors in some of the following ways:

(1) Reinforcing advice to indigenous governmental officials as the opportunity arises in planning self-help projects, procurement of materials, rapid payment of relocation funds and indemnification monies, and similar matters that affect the civil population.

(2) Monitoring projects in progress.

(3) Periodically providing materials for the local economy and overseeing receipt and disposition of materials and supplies.

(4) Managing USAID originated imprest funds for use in short-range and stopgap actions.

(5) Reporting information concerning the status of projects in his district.

(6) Monitoring the general status of the civil populations, functioning of cadres, and receipt of returning or defecting guerrillas or refugees from guerrilla areas.

(7) Acting as a continuous observer, evaluator, and reporter on the civil scene within his district.

c. The military advisor at the lowest levels will probably not have a U.S. civilian counterpart. Therefore, he must receive directions from all of the U.S. country team elements and will represent the entire United States effort between the periodic visits of specific representatives of various U.S. agencies.

106. Other Phase II Activities

The numerous civil affairs activities of the subnational level U.S. military advisory personnel require the establishment of a full CA staff section in the senior U.S. in-country headquarters (MAAG or Military Assistance Command). This staff section, in addition to continuation and expansion of Phase I activities and the supervision of those described in paragraphs 97 and 105, must prepare plans for the possible introduction of U.S. Army CA units into the country as the situation may require.

Section IV. PHASE III ACTIVITIES

107. Priority of Effort

a. When an insurgency has reached Phase III, the government of the country is literally fighting for its existence, and the U.S. military element assisting that government must emphasize that part of the internal defense involving tactical operations against insurgent forces. For U.S. civil affairs advisors and CA units of supporting U.S. forces this means that, at least in those areas where serious combat actions are underway, priority of civil affairs activity must emphasize provision of civilian support for and prevention of civilian interference with tactical and logistical operations. Of all internal defense civil affairs operations, this phase of insurgency brings into play civil affairs activities most closely akin to those of limited war (ch 5 and 6).

b. From the point of view of civil-military relations, however, a war of movement in an insurgency environment basically is different from a situation of equal combat intensity in a war between nations. The difference is that even in Phase III of an insurgency, the ultimate goal for all military operations remains the gaining of the loyalty of the people for their government. Without the support of at least a majority of the people, no government can hope to survive a Phase III insurgency. Thus while the civil affairs activities may be basically similar, and involve the same techniques as those in limited war, the emphasis which must be placed on civil affairs in defense
against insurgency is much higher than it would be in a situation where the people were patriotically supporting their government in a war against a clearly foreign enemy.

c. Psychological operations in support of civil affairs activities in a Phase III insurgency are of paramount importance. The people must be persuaded toward loyalty to their government while that government and its allies appear to be causing great damage and death all around them. These persuasive efforts must be made by all civilian and military elements of the government and of those of its allies, and, for the U.S. elements, is a delicate task. U.S. forces have a sophisticated psychological operations capability at their disposal and access to considerable material goods that can be distributed among the people. Both must be handled in such a manner that they reinforce the indigenous government's efforts to win over the people, and do not complicate the problem by injecting and magnifying the U.S. image between the people and their government. The U.S. advisor does this by remaining as much as possible in the background while the indigenous military unit or official he is advising reaches out to the people. As a member of a U.S. military unit conducting operations among the people, he must constantly seek to bring the indigenous official onto the scene to make it obvious that the American unit is assisting the indigenous government and is acting only in its behalf.

d. Therefore, civil affairs and psychological operations support to the combat units of both the indigenous and U.S. forces must be provided in much greater depth and breadth than normally is required in limited or general war. Indigenous units down to and including battalions will require skillful advice and assistance in maintaining the balance between the influence of U.S. and their own civil affairs and psychological operations efforts. If the indigenous forces do not have adequate CA and PSYOP units, similar U.S. units may have to be provided for such support down to and including brigade level to assist the indigenous forces in extending the government to the people through persuasion and good administration. In a Phase III insurgency the lack of stability and viability of the government may well reach into the middle echelons of administration; and the military forces, U.S. or host country, must in the interest of their own operations, as well as for political reasons, provide at least minimal governmental services in the territory which they hold or seize.

108. Community Relations

a. Unless the U.S. forces (and their host country allies) understand the requirement for good community relations and proper conduct, the best planned civil affairs effort by CA staff elements and units will be of little value. The rules of troop behavior required in a counterinsurgency situation are complicated. U.S. personnel must not only conduct themselves to the best advantage; but, by their example as well as by their advice encourage the indigenous military to improve its conduct. Mere generosity on the part of U.S. troops is not enough, particularly when that generosity is practiced with an unconscious show of wealth, a disregard for local custom, or is accompanied by loud or unusual behavior.

b. In addition to the normal civil affairs training requirements for U.S. Army personnel (ch 1), at least three additional training requirements must be added for U.S. troops committed in an internal defense operation—

(1) Pre-embarkation training for all personnel to include detailed and specific treatment of conduct among civilians in the area of operations.

(2) Training for all officers, and senior non-commissioned officers, destined for duty in internal defense operations or other service in developing countries in using community relations techniques to the advantage of the host nation.

(3) In-country orientation courses for all military personnel.

c. These same rules apply to official U.S. behavior. Great care must be taken in local procurement of labor, real estate, and supplies, to avoid unnecessary disruption of the economy by pricing local civilians out of the market for things they must have in order to live.

109. U.S. and Combined CA Units Operations

a. US CA units should be attached to U.S. tactical commands for civil affairs support of the commander's mission. Indigenous military civil affairs personnel must be trained for similar use with their own tactical commands and for the formation of combined U.S.-indigenous force civil affairs units that will provide U.S. tactical com-
mands civil affairs support with built-in language, economic, political, and cultural knowledge.

b. When a U.S. troop buildup occurs, in-country coordination of the United States effort at subnational level becomes exceedingly important. If there are to be elements of a U.S. tactical unit operating in a subnational governmental area, the U.S. military advisor to the chief of that area needs to know their plans and operations. Without such coordination, there is likely to be confusion of action among indigenous officials followed by protests through separate U.S. and indigenous channels. The best method of avoiding such problems and obtaining requisite support for U.S. units operating in the area is to have the CA staff element or unit of the U.S. military command establish and maintain liaison with the U.S. military advisor to the local governmental area chief. The U.S. military advisor should be the point of contact with the local government, and operations in the area should be coordinated with him. In the event of a serious emergency which requires immediate action affecting the local government or people, or if the U.S. military advisor is not available, direct liaison may be established with the local government by the command support CA element. The U.S. military advisor should be fully informed as soon as he can be contacted.

c. The U.S. military advisor to a host country operational area generally will provide the U.S. forces operating in that area with liaison to indigenous officials which normally is provided by USCA area support units. However, U.S. troop units should not rely upon the U.S. military advisor to local governments to provide liaison for them to U.S. civilian agencies. This liaison should be performed by their own CA elements, although the U.S. advisor should also be kept informed.

110. Military Civic Action by U.S. Forces

a. The principles of military civic action described in chapter 6 apply with equal validity to programs undertaken by U.S. forces.

b. A U.S. unit preparing for a military civic action mission must inventory its goods and skills in coordination with other elements of the U.S. country team against the needs of the locality in which it is located, and establish programs that will fit into the environment and will help the people toward a better life.

c. CA units, when available, are well qualified to plan, supervise and provide specialized assistance in the performance of military civic action projects of U.S. forces. Overall planning and coordination of such projects with other developmental activities of U.S. and host country agencies is a matter of primary interest to the CA element of the staff. This element should monitor the program to insure that—

1. Military civic action by U.S. forces is supplemental to and does not detract from the area of major emphasis, that is, the conduct of civic action by indigenous forces.

2. A proper balance is maintained between the provision of treatment and environmental health improvement measures. Joint policy directives outlining the USAID public health program provide specific guidance for all U.S. advisory and operational personnel for the training and integration of health workers into the indigenous system.

3. Recognition is given to the varying relationships between U.S. tactical units and the people. U.S. military civic action plans are phased so that unilateral U.S. action, required initially to break insurgent control and gain intelligence, is accomplished, but that subsequent steps in the U.S. military civic action program in a given area are designed to transfer credit to indigenous government agencies.

d. Military civic action is an important subsidiary task of tactical units committed in search and destroy, or in clear and hold operations. The length of time a unit is committed to an area will dictate the type projects undertaken, but the importance of military civic action to the overall success of the operation must not be overlooked. The civil affairs staff officer of the committed tactical unit should contact the U.S. operational area advisors so that military civic action can be coordinated with the indigenous government, and other U.S. agencies. Such coordination may be difficult in case of rapid commitment. In search and destroy operations it is particularly difficult to anticipate specific military civic action requirements. Two steps may be taken to cope with this problem; first, the development of a list of materials for stockage and support of military civic action in rapid commitment; secondly, advance coordination with USAID representatives to prepare
lists of civic action projects which are desired for possible areas of commitment. These lists should be compared, priorities established, and then given to the tactical units as a basis for selection of military civic action projects on commitment to any of these areas.

e. USIS and Psychological Operations units should exploit military civic action but must be careful not to focus attention on U.S. units at the expense of the indigenous government in this effort.

111. Populace and Resources Control by U.S. Forces

a. The requirement for psychological operations support prior to, during and after populace and resources control operations is even greater than for military civic action since the latter program speaks for itself, whereas the former almost always needs careful explanation and justification.

b. The basic principles of populace and resources control are described in chapter 6 and these apply with equal validity to populace and resources control actions by U.S. forces.

c. In the operation of a populace and resources control program, paramilitary forces may be the most essential element. One means of providing for better coordination with these units in areas where U.S. forces are committed, is through the conduct of integrated populace and resources control operations; that is, operations conducted by a combined force of paramilitary personnel and U.S. military personnel. If this is successfully accomplished, the paramilitary organization will not only increase in overall effectiveness, but the U.S. military forces involved will have extended their own capabilities to secure an area, gain intelligence, and effectively impose populace and resources control.

112. Other Phase III Activities

a. The same situation which applies to indigenous military units taking over areas previously under insurgent control will also frequently apply to the U.S. units in the same role. Until the civil branch of the indigenous government can respond to them, the people taken under control are a military civil affairs problem. The answer to the U.S. commander's problems in this respect is combined civil affairs operations that will allow authority and assistance that reaches the indigenous people even though the indigenous organization is backed, supported, advised, and trained by U.S. or other allied personnel.

b. In Phase III, many U.S. Government civilian agency's operations are impaired or even stopped altogether because of the security situation. In such cases, U.S. military personnel, with appropriate skills, may be used to take over this work in contested areas. USAID units may be of particular assistance to USAID in this by providing personnel to maintain the USAID operation wherever possible, or by assuming USAID missions and functions in the areas of combat operations.
CHAPTER 8
CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS IN THE THEATER

Section I. THEATER LEVEL CONSIDERATIONS

113. Theater Commander (Commander of Unified Command)

a. The conduct of relationships between foreign national governments and the theater commander in a theater of operations depends upon the degree of civil affairs authority delegated to him. The policies governing his authority will be decided at the highest level.

b. When U.S. diplomatic representatives are in the area and functioning, relations between them and the theater commander will usually be delineated by Executive Order and may be based on the organization of a U.S. country team (ch. 1).

c. When U.S. diplomatic representatives are not in the area, the theater commander normally is given full authority within national policy, to contact foreign governments in his area of operations and to advise, assist, coordinate, or exercise controls, as required. The extent of such authority will vary.

d. The theater commander must accomplish his military-political mission and comply with the applicable provisions of international law, treaties, and agreements with respect to the inhabitants, governments, and economies of occupied, liberated, or host territories. He is responsible for the provision of civil affairs guidance and policy directives to all forces under his command. He is authorized, but not required, to delegate civil affairs authority to subordinate commanders as appropriate. Since Army forces have the unique capability of providing control of land areas and the population therein, implementation of civil affairs portions of the theater plan normally is delegated to Army elements of the unified command in the operational command chain. In the event civil affairs authority is not delegated, the theater commander retains the responsibility for planning, determination or organization and procedures, and implementation as discussed in paragraphs 118 through 137.

e. In the conduct of his relations with the civil government(s) in the area, the theater commander, within the designated limitations of his authority, establishes and delineates policies which are to be implemented, and assigns missions to major subordinate commands. However, he does not normally furnish detailed instructions on the manner of execution. The theater commander utilizes G5 staff sections and CA units within the theater of operations at the various levels of civil government as the points of contact with local officials.

f. The scope of the theater commander’s civil affairs activities will vary dependent on the degree of control, if any, maintained by the host government over its populace and resources. Civil affairs activities may also be circumscribed by the provisions of any international agreement to which the United States and the host countries are parties (see subsequent paragraphs). In general, the following sets of circumstances may be extant:

1) Where an adequate civil administration is in existence, civil affairs activities may be limited to the conduct of proper relations between U.S. forces and the civilian population, and such procurement or utilization of local resources or facilities in support of military operations as may be authorized.

2) Where the civil administration is inadequate, unwilling, or unable to function in all areas of normal governmental activity, the civil affairs activities of the theater commander may include exercising some of the normal functions of civil administration, as authorized by international agreement or national policy.
(3) Where civil administration is wholly inoperative, it may be incumbent upon the theater commander to perform all functions of civil government, again as authorized by international agreement or national policy. In this event, as well as under the circumstances indicated in paragraph 112, control of governmental functions should be restored to the recognized civil government at the earliest possible time.

114. Political Advisor

a. The Department of State, as the agency within the U.S. Government primarily charged with the development and implementation of foreign policy, may furnish a political advisor to the theater commander.

b. The duties of the political advisor are to advise the commander on established policies in such matters as governmental affairs and relations with other allied and neutral countries, and to furnish informal contact with the Department of State.

c. Contact between personnel of the theater CA staff section and of the office of the political advisor should be habitual, informal, and characterized by mutual confidence.

115. Fundamental Considerations

a. The conduct of civil affairs operations within a theater is influenced by two critical variables which have a determining influence upon both the concept of civil affairs operations and the command structure required to execute that concept.

(1) The legal basis for the entry of U.S. forces into a country in which operations are to be conducted is the first of these variables. U.S. forces may be present within the territory of another sovereign nation either on the basis of an invitation from the government which it recognizes, or may enter the territory of a hostile power by force of arms against the will of the government of that nation. In the first situation, U.S. civil affairs operations will be directed primarily towards establishing effective liaison with the recognized governmental authority and providing advice and support to that government. In the second situation, U.S. civil affairs operations may involve the establishment of a military government of the occupied territory. The basic principles of military government operations are described in chapter 13.

(2) The second critical variable involves the nature of the operation; i.e., U.S. unilateral as compared to U.S. participation in combined operations. In U.S. unilateral operations the theater commander has far greater freedom of decision in determining his concept of civil affairs operations and his command structure. In combined operations both the concept of civil affairs operations and the civil affairs command structure will be greatly influenced by international agreements to which the United States is a party. Those currently in force generally provide for integrated civil affairs operations to be achieved through a combined command as opposed to establishing separate areas of national civil affairs responsibility. When the United States engages in a war as an ally of a nation or nations with which it has concluded such an agreement, or, if, in the absence of such an agreement, U.S. national policy is opposed to the establishment of separate areas of national responsibility for civil affairs operations, the theater commander will be called upon to provide the U.S. element of a combined staff section. Generally the actual conduct of CA unit operations, in either the command support or area support role, is not materially modified and the principles set forth elsewhere in this manual are applicable to U.S. civil affairs operations in either unilateral or combined operations. The difference between the two involves primarily the chain of command which controls civil affairs operations in the theater. (For detailed treatment of this subject see para 129 through 131.)

b. The impact of the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons on civil affairs operations is discussed in chapter 9.

c. Civil affairs operations generally are characterized by the fundamental concept of centralized direction at the highest practical level and decentralized execution, coupled with the integration of the military and civilian effort at the low-
est echelon. Such operations require intensive planning, flexibility, and maximum adaptation to, and utilization of, local political-social structures and resources.

116. Plans and Orders

a. The attainment of national objectives in military operations in which U.S. forces participate depends in a large part on recognition of the necessity for prior planning at the theater level for conduct of civil affairs operations. Detailed prior planning is essential at all echelons of command; however, the theater commander must provide an overall civil affairs plan for guidance of his subordinate commanders in order to prescribe the objectives of operations and insure continuity of policies and uniformity of their application. Such guidance must relate not only to ultimate objectives but must also be pertinent to operational phases and functional specialties.

b. Planning procedures to include the formulation of plans, coordination in the preparation of plans, assignment of planning tasks, determination of planning phases and programs, and the preparation of outline plans are fully described in FM 101-5. Planning for the conduct of civil affairs operations is a continuous process, but consists primarily of three basic steps—

(1) Compilation of essential information and data relative to missions of the major commands concerned and the actions they propose to accomplish those missions.

(2) Analysis and evaluation of assembled information to determine feasibility and capability of the various methods for accomplishing the civil affairs objectives as provided by higher authority.

(3) Preparation and dissemination of plans, directives, orders, and instructions necessary for subordinate units to plan for and execute the functions involved in their civil affairs operations.

c. At all echelons of command planning considerations include, but are not limited to the—

(1) Manner in which civil affairs operations may best contribute to the overall mission of the command.

(2) Coordination of operations with other operations.

(3) Requirements for unit and administrative support for civil affairs operations.

(4) Capability of the command to support civil affairs operations.

d. The military force serves primarily as an instrument of national policy in the attainment of political objectives. Accordingly, the theater commander insures that primary attention is given in the preparation of his plan to the political-military objectives which he has been directed to attain and to limitations which may be imposed on his operations by international law, terms of treaties or agreements, and policy guidance received from higher authority. A detailed study must be made of area intelligence to include geographic and economic features; the density and composition of the population; forms and levels of government; and attitudes, customs, and traditions of the people.

e. The overall theater civil affairs plan prescribes the objectives of the operation, provides information on the anticipated phasing of the operation, and assigns civil affairs missions and furnishes guidance on the delegation of civil affairs authority to commanders of major tactical and administrative commands. Plans of major subordinate commanders to whom civil affairs authority is delegated establish the CA organization and requirements for units, and include directions on deployment of command and area support units. The overall theater plan furnishes general instructions on relationships with national or local civilian authorities, including the degree of advice or assistance to be rendered, or the degree of control, influence, or supervision to be used. Plans of subordinate commanders set forth policies pertaining to conduct of the various functions, and the levels of government at which they will be conducted. Guidance is also included on the extent of procurement of local supplies, equipment, and services for military use; and the furnishing of civilian relief, economic aid, and other matters essential to the conduct of civil affairs operations.

f. When projected operations are to extend into the territories of two or more nations, variations of objectives and policies with respect to each nation may necessitate clear differentiation in plans. Planning for deployment of units should stress simplicity and flexibility so that unforeseen requirements can be met readily with minimum disruption of the planned organization. Each civil affairs plan involving operations in countries with which suitable civil affairs agreements have not been negotiated should include drafts of agree-
ments, covering those matters essential to the accomplishment of the plan, as a basis for agreement negotiations.

g. The theater civil affairs plan is put into effect by issuance of appropriate orders and instructions. Determination of whether civil affairs instructions are to be included in the operations or administrative order, or both, is based on the nature of the operation and necessity for direction of subordinate elements on such matters as objectives, delegation of civil affairs authority, and general policy guidance.

h. The theater civil affairs officer is responsible for primary staff supervision of civil affairs matters within theater. Based on directives and guidance of the theater commander, civil affairs plans and operations are coordinated at all echelons between major army subordinate commands by exchange of liaison officers, command and staff liaison, or both. Lateral commands are mutually responsible for exchange of information, requests for supporting action, and coordination in areas of mutual concern.

117. Handbooks

Civil affairs handbooks may be published by the U.S. theater headquarters, or, in combined operations, by the senior allied headquarters, to serve as a basis for the training of personnel assigned to civil affairs duties and to provide information and guidance on applicable policy directives for the planning and conduct of civil affairs operations. Due to variations in treaties and civil affairs agreements, as well as in objectives and policies, it is normally desirable to provide separate handbooks for each country in which civil affairs operations are to be conducted. Handbooks of a general nature, setting forth basic policies pertaining to the organization and conduct of civil affairs operations and containing basic documents such as initial proclamations, laws, and ordinances, or the provisions of civil affairs and other agreements, are of particular value to nonspecialist officers. Such handbooks may be supplemented with other technical handbooks containing detailed procedural guidance on the various functional specialities, primarily for the use of specialist personnel. Although handbooks must include sufficient information on the political, sociological and economic structure of the area of concern to permit an understanding of the actions which are to be taken, they do not constitute a primary source of area intelligence. Handbooks should be prepared in the form of ready reference guides and may contain information on the historical background and social and economic development of the country; governmental structure at national, provincial, and local levels; organization of political parties; police, security, and legal systems; banking and monetary systems; civil service system; treatment of civilians; establishment of courts, as appropriate; anticipated problems in the area; and measures for the protection of U.S. and allied elements of the military force. These handbooks should be prepared in looseleaf form to facilitate revision.

Section II. U.S. UNILATERAL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND ORGANIZATION

118. Delegation of Civil Affairs Authority

a. The theater (unified) commander normally will reserve certain major civil affairs activities to himself, such as national government level liaison and, as appropriate, negotiation of international agreements. He will, however, normally delegate the major part of his civil affairs authority to subordinate commanders in the operational chain of command.

b. In some intensities of conflict, particularly in the mid- and low-intensities, the environmental situation will be such that the theater (unified) commander will have created a subordinate unified command for the direction of actual combat operations. Under these circumstances, the delegation of civil affairs authority will be made to the commander of the subordinate unified command. This commander may, in turn, further delegate some civil affairs authority, normally to the senior Army commander in the operational chain of command in the combat zone and in the communications zone.

c. In high-intensity warfare and, in some environmental circumstances, in mid-intensity, the theater (unified) commander may assume direct control of combat operations without creating a subordinate unified command. Under these circumstances, the theater (unified) commander normally will delegate civil affairs authority directly to the senior Army commander in the operational chain of command in the combat zone and the communications zone.
d. Within the combat zone and the communications zone, the senior Army commanders to whom civil affairs authority has been delegated, may further delegate this authority to subordinate commanders in the operational chain of command subject to any restrictions on delegation imposed by higher authority.

e. Except as indicated in paragraph 125, civil affairs authority will not normally be delegated to theater army, as theater army will not usually be in the operational chain of command.

f. In all circumstances, delegation of civil affairs authority will be limited to those command echelons in both the combat zone and the communications zone which have proper civil affairs staff representation.

119. Principles of Civil Affairs Operations

Civil affairs operations in the combat zone and in the communications zone, within the framework of U.S. unilateral concepts of operations and organization, should be conducted in accordance with certain principles of general application. These principles are discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

a. Civil affairs operations normally should be conducted within a framework of centralized direction and decentralized execution.

b. Civil affairs operations should be sufficiently flexible in concept to permit a transition from decentralized direction and execution to a framework of centralized direction and execution, depending on the type of operation being conducted.

c. Civil affairs activities should be characterized by a continuity of operational concept and guidance at all appropriate levels of command.

d. Civil affairs staff representation is required at all levels of command where civil affairs authority is established.

e. Civil affairs activities should, whenever possible, be conducted on a politico-geographic basis with areas of civil affairs authority delineated along political boundaries. (It is recognized that tactical military boundaries must be employed for this purpose under some circumstances; however, transition to political boundaries should be accomplished as soon as practicable.)

f. Commanders having civil affairs authority should be furnished supporting civil affairs units tailored with regard to the commander's mission, the environmental situation, the civil affairs problems, and the complement of the supported U.S. force.

g. Civil affairs, in the last analysis, is a command responsibility and is the concern of all elements and members of a command. CA staffs and supporting civil affairs organizations have primary and supervisory responsibility; however, the success of civil affairs activities depends on the concern and attention of all individuals and units.

120. Civil Affairs Authority in the Combat Zone

a. Civil affairs authority normally will be delegated to the commander of the highest Army tactical command in the combat zone. Depending on the size of the Army force involved, this delegation of authority from the commander of the unified or subordinate unified command could be to a field army, corps, or division commander. Normally, civil affairs authority will not be delegated to an Army component less than a division in size. Civil affairs support for a unified commander or subordinate unified commander with an Army tactical element of less than division size must be tailored specifically to meet the circumstances involved.

b. The field army commander normally will delegate civil affairs authority to corps commanders for the engaged areas, and to the Field Army Support Command (FASCOM) commander for the field army support area. The corps commanders normally will further delegate civil affairs authority to division commanders. However, the FASCOM commander normally will not further delegate his civil affairs authority.

c. If the highest Army tactical unit is a corps, the corps commander normally will delegate civil affairs authority to division commanders in the engaged areas and to the Corps Support Command (COSCOM) commander for the corps support area. Normally, there will be no further delegation of civil affairs authority.

d. If the highest Army tactical unit is a division, the division commander normally will retain all civil affairs authority that has been delegated to him.

e. Neither the absence of CA authority nor the relinquishment of civil affairs authority once delegated relieves any commander of his responsibilities for compliance with legal requirements with respect to the inhabitants, government, and economy within his area of concern and for the observance of humanitarian principles by his troops. Further, a commander of a major unit not dele-
gated civil affairs authority, supports and assists the CA units operating in his area, and, in turn, is supported and assisted by them.

f. Normal civil affairs activities of commanders not delegated civil affairs authority include—

(1) Community relations of the forces under his command to include appropriate directives for troop conduct.

(2) Recommendations as to priorities for the provision of civil affairs support to subordinate units of his command.

(3) Provision of augmentation elements to include PSYOP support to civil affairs units within his area to meet requirements for technical personnel which exceed the capabilities of the CA units and are essential for civil affairs operations.

(4) Provision of logistic support to civil affairs units operating in their areas, as required.

121. The Civil Affairs Brigade in the Combat Zone

a. The civil affairs brigade is a major subordinate unit which may be attached to the field army or the field army support command (FASCOM). Depending on its attachment, it operates under the staff supervision of the field army or FASCOM G5 and is capable of exercising command over a maximum of six civil affairs battalions. Normally, the civil affairs brigade will remain attached to field army or FASCOM and will attach appropriate civil affairs units to subordinate unit commanders to whom civil affairs authority has been delegated. The civil affairs brigade commander retains command of all civil affairs units of the brigade, but relinquishes operational command to the supported division commander.

b. Normally, the civil affairs battalion will provide civil affairs support on the basis of one civil affairs company to each division in the corps area. The battalion headquarters with attached functional teams is capable of performing corps civil affairs support functions for the corps area from division rear boundary to the corps rear boundary.

122. The Civil Affairs Company in the Combat Zone

a. The civil affairs company, while under the command of the civil affairs battalion, is under the operational command of the supported division commander. The company operates under the staff supervision of the division G5 and is capable of exercising command over a maximum of ten civil affairs platoons.

b. Each company is composed of cellular teams to include a company headquarters, platoon headquarters, civil affairs functional teams, and administrative teams. The company normally has only essential organic specialists for support of platoon operations, but may be augmented with additional specialists from the civil affairs battalion as required for specific missions.

123. The Civil Affairs Platoon in the Combat Zone

a. The civil affairs platoon will normally remain under the command (including operational command) of the civil affairs company attached to the supported division. It may, however, be attached to an organic brigade of this division for direct support of brigade operations when the division’s operational environment makes such attachment desirable; or it may be attached to an independent brigade for direct civil affairs support of independent brigade operations. In both of the latter circumstances, the civil affairs platoon will remain under the command of the civil affairs company, but will come under the operational command of the brigade commander.

b. The civil affairs platoon is capable of exercising control over a maximum of ten civil affairs teams. The platoon normally consists of only es-
sentinal organic specialists for support of team operations, and must depend on the civil affairs company for required administrative and logistic support, or upon the combat brigade when attached.

125. Civil Affairs Authority in the Communications Zone

a. Depending on the environmental situation and other organizational implications, the highest Army echelon in the communications zone in the operational chain of command may be Theater Army, Theater Army Support Command (TASCOM), or some combined form of both. Whatever designation this headquarters takes, the commander normally will receive a delegation of civil affairs authority from the commander of the unified or subordinate unified command.

b. The senior COMMZ commander will normally delegate civil affairs authority to major subordinate commands in the COMMZ. These subordinate commands may take the form of area support commands (ASCOM), area commands, or similar organizational arrangements. Further delegation of civil affairs authority by these subordinate commanders normally will not be made.

c. CA units in the COMMZ provide both area support for the COMMZ and backup support to field army civil affairs units. They can provide a complete functional capability in the COMMZ as well as specialties not found in the field army civil affairs units. A minimum capability is initially provided, but may be expanded by the assignment of additional civil affairs teams or units as the situation requires.

126. The Civil Affairs Brigade in the Communications Zone

a. In normal employment, the civil affairs brigade has attached to it three or more civil affairs groups as its major operating units. The number of groups may be adjusted as required; however, when more than six groups are required, an additional brigade should be organized for each four groups. The brigade operates under the staff supervision of the G5 or Assistant Chief of Staff/Civil Affairs of the command to which it is assigned.

b. When a TASCOM is established in the COMMZ, the Civil Affairs Brigade is normally assigned to the Area Support Command (ASCOM), a major subordinate command of the TASCOM. Should there be a requirement a Civil Affairs Command could be established as one of the mission commands of the TASCOM. This can be accomplished by the TASCOM commander assuming command and operational control of the Civil Affairs Brigade and its attached units.

c. In those situations when a TASCOM is not established in the COMMZ, the Civil Affairs Brigade normally will be assigned to the senior COMMZ headquarters in the operational chain of command.

d. Regardless of its assignment the Civil Affairs Brigade normally will attach appropriate civil affairs units to subordinate commanders to whom civil affairs authority has been delegated. The civil affairs brigade commander retains command of all civil affairs units of the brigade, but relinquishes operational command to the supported commanders.

e. The civil affairs brigade will normally provide civil affairs support to subordinate commanders who have been delegated civil affairs authority by attaching a civil affairs group, battalion, or company to them as appropriate. The type of unit will be determined with regard to the mission of the supported command, the nature of the area of responsibility, population densities, economic conditions, and, if possible, existing geographic and political boundaries. In each instance, the attached civil affairs group, battalion, or company will operate under the staff supervision of the G5 or ACS/CA of the supported command.

127. The Civil Affairs Group, Battalion and Company in the Communications Zone

a. The civil affairs group is an operational element and is also capable of exercising command over a maximum of six civil affairs battalions. It may be attached to a supported commander for an operational mission without battalion components or it may be employed as a command element, as required.

b. The civil affairs battalion is an operational element and is also capable of exercising command over a maximum of six civil affairs companies. It may be attached to a supported commander for an operational mission without company components or it may be employed as a command element as required.

c. The civil affairs company is an operational element and is also capable of exercising command over a maximum of ten civil affairs platoons. It
may be attached to a supported commander for an operational mission without attached platoons or may be employed as a command element as required.

128. Civil Affairs Command

a. Although civil affairs operations normally will be conducted on a basis of centralized direction and decentralized execution, conditions of environment, mission, or operational facility may make it advisable that civil affairs operations be wholly centralized. This can be accomplished by the creation of a civil affairs command.

b. The civil affairs brigade structure is easily adaptable to a civil affairs command either in the COMMZ or the combat zone. The commander of the field army, or the commander of the senior Army headquarters in the COMMZ withholds civil affairs authority from subordinate elements and, through his G5, or ACS/Civil Affairs directs civil affairs operations on an areawide basis. The commander of the civil affairs brigade retains operational command of all brigade assets and conducts and controls civil affairs operations throughout the area in support of tactical or area commands. The civil affairs brigade is responsive directly to the field army or COMMZ commander and all civil affairs units are responsive, in a civil affairs command channel, to the brigade. Support of subordinate commanders in the area by civil affairs units is accomplished by lateral liaison and coordination.

c. In the event the theater (unified) commander, or commander of a subordinate unified command, desires to centralize all theater civil affairs operations, civil affairs authority will be withdrawn from subordinate commands. The brigade structures in both the combat area and COMMZ will become operational command structures responsive in civil affairs channels to the unified or subordinate unified command. This will necessitate creation of a civil affairs command headquarters at unified or subordinate unified command level and this can be accomplished by employing the headquarters elements of a civil affairs brigade. The civil affairs command would function under the staff supervision of the theater Civil Affairs Officer. Support of subordinate commanders by CA units in the civil affairs command structure is accomplished by lateral liaison and coordination.

d. It is envisioned that the requirement for a civil affairs command in unilateral U.S. operations is most likely to arise in high- or mid-intensity warfare in densely populated, highly developed areas, and in posthostility military government situations.

e. Low-intensity conflict and fluid conditions of combat may require decentralized control.

Section III. U.S. PARTICIPATION IN COMBINED OPERATIONS

129. Combined Operations

a. When U.S. forces operate in conjunction with allied forces, the responsibility for conduct of civil affairs operations probably will be assigned to a combined civil affairs command. Directives covering broad aims and policies for conduct of civil affairs operations by combined commands are promulgated normally at interallied governmental or command levels. The commander of a combined command complies with these civil affairs operational instructions. He insures adequate coverage in his operation plans and makes an equitable allocation of responsibilities for the implementation of civil affairs plans, to include, when appropriate, provisions for CA units and personnel. He normally delegates authority for the conduct of civil affairs to the senior commander of each national force involved. National integrity of forces is normally preserved in the organization of a combined command.

b. In the conduct of combined operations, intergovernmental agreements which have been concluded for the purpose of standardizing civil affairs operations, organization, training, procedures, and methods will, as applicable, receive full compliance of all U.S. elements (FM 101-5 and FM 41-5).

130. Concept of Civil Affairs Operations for U.S. Participation in Combined Operations

a. For civil affairs in the combined command environment, it will be mandatory that combined civil affairs staffs be provided at all combined command levels involved in the centralized direction
of civil affairs operations. This will provide a suitable structure for centralized policy direction and control of civil affairs operations, as well as liaison and coordination among the nations represented.

b. Decentralized execution of civil affairs operations will be the normal mode of operation and can be accomplished by adaptation of the same principles applicable to U.S. unilateral civil affairs operations. This can be accomplished through a delegation of civil affairs authority to the commander of the U.S. national component of the combined command for execution in those areas of the theater of operations for which the United States is responsible, subject to overall policy direction and supervision of the combined command.

c. Further delegation of civil affairs authority within the U.S. national component line, and CA staff organization and unit support, will then follow the normal principles discussed in relation to U.S. unilateral operations (para 118–128).

d. The general principles of command and area support civil affairs operations set forth in paragraphs 132 through 137 are applicable in both U.S. unilateral and combined command environments.

131. Civil Affairs Command in Combined Operations

a. Centralized direction and execution of civil affairs operations may become desirable in the combined command environment, as in the unilateral U.S. environment. It is, in fact, more likely to develop in the combined command atmosphere to support combined operations, coordinate with national governments, and assist allied nations in rehabilitation efforts. In the event of a military occupation and concomitant military government under combined command direction the need for a civil affairs command probably will be manifest.

b. When the need arises, a civil affairs command responsive either to the U.S. national component commander of the combined command, or directly to the combined force commander, can be created in much the same manner as described with regard to U.S. unilateral operations. The major difference lies in the need for increased combined CA staffs at all appropriate combined force levels for centralized direction, and for extensive lateral coordination at all civil affairs operational levels with civil affairs elements of other national force components.

Section IV. COMMAND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

132. Civil Affairs Command Support

a. Civil affairs command support activities are directed toward the support of the military mission of the tactical commander and the fulfillment of his legal obligations. The complexity of command support operations will vary with such factors as the mission of the tactical unit, fluidity of the tactical situation, density and attitude of the population, amount of partial or complete disruption of normal law and order, extent of interference with military operations by refugees, and use of mass casualty and destruction weapons.

b. Civil affairs command support units can provide direct civil affairs support to tactical combat units from brigade through field army in the combat zone. These civil affairs units move with the supporting combat units (ch 3).

c. Planning by the army, corps, or division G5 for the conduct of civil affairs activities in the combat zone must be coordinated with other interested staff officers and adjacent units. Planning should provide for a determination of requirements for both command and area support units, regulation of the phasing forward of these units, and measures necessary for the control of the local populace upon entry into the area.

d. Major tactical unit orders will specify and establish responsibility for civil affairs tasks to be performed by subordinate tactical commanders.

e. Additional CA units and/or functional teams may be requested and attached to the army, corps, or division to supplement the operations of the command support CA unit for specific tasks.

133. Civil Affairs Activities in Support of Major Tactical Units in the Combat Zone

a. The commander of a CA command support unit is responsible for performing the certain recurring tasks and functions, which include—

(1) Furnishing the supported unit commander and staff with information, estimates, and recommendations pertaining to civil affairs activities.

(2) Planning and supervising the training of
his own unit and of other CA units attached to it.

3) Exercising command (including operational command) over attached CA units that have not been further attached to tactical units.

4) Receiving, holding, and orienting CA area support units to be deployed in the area of the supported unit.

5) Recommending employment of CA units designated to provide area support.

b. The CA command support unit conducts essential reconnaissance and surveys of the area of operations and furnishes advice and assistance necessary for the initiation and continuation of actions required to control the civilian populace and essential civilian resources.

c. The CA unit commander makes frequent inspections to insure that civil affairs operations are being conducted in furtherance of tactical operations and in accordance with established policies and applicable provisions of law. The commander insures that all essential measures are taken to maintain law and order and to prevent disease and unrest. He insures that local officials, agencies, and installations are functioning in compliance with CA directives.

d. The location of the CA headquarters is determined from prior reconnaissance and is coordinated with the tactical unit headquarters. Both military personnel and civilians must be able to locate and identify the CA headquarters; therefore, the approaches to and the headquarters itself must be clearly marked by signs in English and the language of the area. In determining the exact location, consideration is given to—

1) Command and control situation in the area of the supported tactical unit.

2) Availability of necessary space and facilities.

3) Locations of governmental offices.

4) Local security available from troops in the area.

5) Proximity to designated transportation routes.

6) Availability of communications facilities.

7) Location of higher headquarters.

e. The civil affairs functions that will require particular emphasis by the commander of a civil affairs command support unit are public health, public safety, public welfare, public administration, labor, civil information and displaced persons, refugees and evacuees.

134. Retrograde Movement

CA tasks during a retrograde movement include control of the local inhabitants to prevent interference with military operations and evacuation of designated civilian personnel and essential resources, supplies and equipment. Prior to a retrograde movement, flow of civilian supplies to forward areas is reduced and rearward evacuation of supplies that may be of use to the enemy is accomplished, with civilian transportation being used to the maximum. In order to neutralize the value of the area to the enemy it may be desirable to destroy resources, supplies, equipment, and local facilities that may be of use to his forces. However, this destruction is accomplished only in accordance with international law and upon the authorization of a commander directing the retrograde operation. Detailed civil affairs plans for a retrograde movement must be made in accordance with the overall plan. Effective liaison between the CA unit and higher headquarters, adjacent, and supporting units is essential to the control and movement of civilians, including establishment of checkpoints, emergency medical care, emergency rations, the prevention of interference with tactical operations, and the utilization of all available roads.

135. Airborne, Amphibious, and Armored Operations

Although the conduct of these operations normally requires specially trained troops; special techniques, tactics, material; or an emphasis upon certain considerations, the civil affairs principles, concepts, and techniques described in this manual generally apply. The flexibility of CA units permits the addition or deletion of specified functional teams to meet the requirements of particular operations.

a. Airborne Operations.

1) In the planning for and conduct of civil affairs activities in support of airborne operations, the commander must provide as a minimum—the establishment of public safety; the discharge of his legal responsibilities; and such additional activities, which may be undertaken after the airhead is secure. It also may include the local procurement of motor and other forms of transportation to increase the
mobility of airborne units; the utilization of local labor, supplies, and equipment; and the protection of local resources.

(2) Civil affairs planning, which is based on the tactical plan of operations, necessitates accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence of objective areas on such matters as the attitude of the local population; movement by the enemy of inhabitants from the landing area; extent of disease, privation, and unrest among the inhabitants which may necessitate the use of civilian relief supplies from military stocks; availability of local labor for military use; and availability of local supplies and equipment for military procurement.

(3) In airborne operations, essential command elements of the CA command support unit, augmented as necessary with functional teams, move to the objective area with the assault echelons. Since the CA units normally will not be able to assure control over civilians in the airhead until some degree of stability is established, personnel of the unit act in advisory capacities to the commanders who are responsible for the control of civilians in their respective areas. As specified in tactical directives, initial actions may include measures to freeze the civilian population in place in order to prevent interference with military operations; to assist in establishing law and order and preventing sabotage; and to provide shelter, rations, clothing, and medical care for civilians.

(4) Following an airborne operation and when linkup with friendly forces has been accomplished, authority for the conduct of CA operations may be transferred to the commanders of those major tactical units making the linkup. To assure continuity of operations, particular attention must be given to providing information and making records available to other commanders who subsequently will enter the area.

b. Amphibious Operations. In amphibious operations, personnel of the CA command support unit, augmented as required, are attached to the landing teams to advise and assist the commanders in initiating CA operations. The CA command group accompanies the amphibious task force command group. In planning for amphibious operations, particular consideration is given to the vulnerability of beachhead operations; to activities by local inhabitants which may cause congestion or confusion; to the need for absolute control over civilian circulation so that movement from and to the beachhead areas will not be impeded; and to problems which may be created by refugees. Since economy of force is a vital consideration, maximum permissible use is made of local resources. To the extent authorized by international law and when security considerations permit, it is desirable to employ local inhabitants for cargo handling, storing, and related activities.

c. Armored Operations. In armored and mechanized operations, it may be necessary to accord priority to public safety measures at the expense of other civil affairs activities because of the longer lines of communication and the extent of the area in which operations may be conducted. When an armored division is employed in pursuit or exploitation missions and is supported by an infantry division, coordination must be accomplished by tactical and CA commanders concerned on the conduct of civil affairs activities to include the assurance of public safety in order not to delay the advance of the armor. When an armored division is in a static situation or occupies a defensive sector, its civil affairs activities are conducted in the same general manner as those of an infantry division.

Section V. AREA SUPPORT OPERATIONS

136. Civil Affairs Area Support

a. CA area support units are deployed for operations in designated areas in accordance with the overall theater civil affairs plan. These units normally replace CA command support units previously deployed in the area of operations in support of tactical forces.

b. CA area support units normally base their activities in centers of population, cities that are seats of government, or control points of industrial com-
plexes. To the maximum extent practicable, CA area support units are informed in advance of their deployment regarding the specific areas where they are to be employed to permit their making detailed analyses of pertinent area intelligence. When area training is not provided prior to the departure of these units from the continental United States, it should be furnished upon their arrival in the theater.

c. Upon entry into his assigned area, the commander of an area support unit confers with personnel of the CA command support unit in the area, the commanders of tactical units remaining in the area, and with local officials in order to obtain information that will enable the unit to continue effectively any CA functions initiated prior to arrival. Area surveys are reviewed or conducted promptly with assistance from personnel of the command support unit in order to verify information previously received and to provide a basis for adjustment of requirements. An attached CA area support unit remains under the operational command of the supported tactical commander until the tactical command rear boundary is moved forward of the area in which the CA area support unit is employed or until the tactical commander is relieved of CA authority in the area.

d. When a CA area support unit is initially deployed in a city during a moving or fluid situation, the jurisdiction may include surrounding rural areas. As the unit comes successively under the control of higher echelons, the extent of area over which the unit exercises jurisdiction is adjusted in accordance with the overall civil affairs plan. The extent of area over which a CA area support unit may effectively exercise control or supervision varies according to such factors as the size and geographical nature of the area; locations of political boundaries; attitude of the local population and amount of guerrilla activity; extent of agricultural and industrial employment; condition of routes of transportation; existence of communications facilities; and other pertinent considerations.

137. Civil Affairs Area Support Activities

a. The CA area support unit upon arrival in an area or city will assume, continue, and refine the performance of those civil affairs functions initiated by the CA command support unit it relieves. CA area support units will, in addition, initiate the performance of other civil affairs functions necessary to the performance of the area support mission.

b. CA area support operations will vary in complexity and required degree of functional specialization depending on a number of factors. CA operations at provincial or comparable level of government, for example, will involve a higher degree of specialization than operations at a municipal or lower level.

c. CA area support activities also will vary in accordance with the total social and economic environment of the area of responsibility.

(1) Activities of CA area support units in urban areas will require emphasis on measures concerned with industrial rehabilitation, development and support; economics and commerce; public finance; and other essential aspects of urban life. Civil defense will be of a greater significance than in rural areas.

(2) Activities of CA area support units in rural agricultural areas will require emphasis on many aspects of the food and agriculture function. They will include, for example, location of food surplus and deficit areas; study of agricultural methods; reclamation and conservation of land; food processing and marketing; and study of forestry and fishery operations.

d. The commander of a CA area support unit must plan for the conduct of area support operations in his assigned area of responsibility based on the total environment; must take those measures required to insure orderly transition from command to area support civil affairs operations; and must continue and expand civil affairs operations as required to support the supported commander's mission.
CHAPTER 9
IMPACT ON CIVIL AFFAIRS OF EMPLOYMENT OF CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, OR RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Section 1. FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

138. Introduction

a. The variety of possible situations which could result from the use of chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) weapons in warfare, makes it difficult to provide doctrine for all eventualities. The civil affairs planner and operator must insure the attainment of U.S. political objectives regardless of the environment or the level of conflict. Civil affairs planning principles remain unchanged, but the task is complicated by an absence of experience factors concerning the impact the use of such weapons will have upon a civilian government, its economy and social controls. This chapter provides doctrinal guidance based upon available information, assessed against the historical experience of mankind in warfare, and tempered by the traditional adherence of the United States to the standards of international law concerning the responsibilities and duties of military commanders to civilian populations, and by the basic principles of humanity.

b. For general information concerning the chemical, biological, and radiological threat to civilian populations and institutions (as well as to military forces) see FM 3-10, FM 3-12, and FM 101-40.

c. Modern mass destruction and mass casualty weapons systems possess capabilities that pose special hazards to civilian populations. Each type of high lethality weapon, whether used alone, in combination with one or more of the others, or with conventional weapons, has the inherent capacity to devastate civilian populations. While both friendly and enemy forces may observe varying levels and degrees of mutual or unilateral constraints in the employment of chemical, biological, or radiological weapons, observance of such constraints by the enemy cannot be assumed, nor would such observance eliminate all major civil affairs problems. It is, therefore, essential that civil affairs staffs, units, and specialists be capable of undertaking civil affairs operations that will lessen the impact of such warfare on a civilian populace and thereby facilitate the successful completion of the commander’s mission.

139. Legal Aspects

a. Treaties governing land warfare are contained in DA Pam 27–1. A comprehensive discussion of international law is published in DA Pam 27–161–2, chapter 2 of which deals with the uses of weapons, including poisons, contamination of water, fire, toxic chemical agents, and nuclear weapons. FM 27–10 contains doctrine concerning the rules of land warfare.

b. The United States is not a party to any treaty or agreement precluding use of CBR weapons.

140. Impact on the Civil Affairs Responsibilities of the Commander

a. A military commander is concerned with the impact on his mission of mass destruction and mass casualties in the civilian community resulting from disasters, internal unrest, or effects of combat. Liaison with civil authorities is needed to assure advance warning of probable interference with the commander’s communications, transportation, local procurement, quartering of troops, or his supply of indigenous labor.

b. In the event of a breakdown of civil authority, the military commander may have to assume authority over the civil population and the resources of an area. A breakdown of civil authority may be accompanied by a mandate or a request to the commander to assume control; or a bilateral or
multilateral agreement may authorize such assumption of temporary authority. This action may suspend the rights of the civil authorities, but it does not establish sovereignty and does not absolve the commander of his responsibilities under international law.

c. The fact that hostilities may commence and proceed for a period of time without the use of mass destruction or mass casualty weapons does not relieve a commander of his responsibilities toward the civil population. The possibility of the sudden use of special weapons by the enemy is always present, and the commander must take adequate precautions to prepare the civilians around him for such an eventuality. In either developed or underdeveloped areas, military forces can demonstrate their concern for the welfare of the population by providing them the needed support for civil defense efforts. U.S. military support for civil defense may vary from liaison and training to the actual provision of the equipment, depending upon theater policy directives and agreements with the host country. Generally, the U.S. military commander in the area will provide technical assistance and support, usually in coordination and cooperation with the military and paramilitary forces of the host nation. The commander usually will be held responsible for civil defense of the indigenous labor force operating within his base areas. In order to insure cooperation of this indigenous labor force, he may also be required to provide protective masks, food, clothing, shelter, and emergency medical care for the families of the people working for him, or even for the entire surrounding population. It must be recognized that a U.S. military installation in an area makes the area a more likely target for enemy attack, a factor which will lead to certain natural resentment against the forces. This resentment can be alleviated, if not eliminated, by coordination and correlation of plans with the host country military force as well as adequate U.S. military support for civil defense activities. In any event this gives the commander a level with which to obtain maximum civilian cooperation.

141. Possible Constraints

a. The use of mass casualty and mass destruction weapons may be limited by constraints contained in agreements between the parties to the conflict. The existence or nonexistence of such constraints will be of importance to all military planners and critical to the civil affairs planner. Listed in b through f below are some of the possible constraints and the favorable and unfavorable results of each on civil affairs plans and operations.

b. One set of constraints might involve refraining from use of certain types of weapons, such as lethal chemical or lethal biological weapons. Civil affairs planners in this situation would have fewer problems in the way of providing protective masks and clothing for civilians, and the public health problems, other than those pertaining to treatment of mass casualties from the use of nuclear and conventional weapons, would also be lessened. If this constraint were to result in increased use of nuclear weapons, however, the problem of maintenance and restoration of essential public facilities might become much greater.

c. Another constraint might involve limitations on deliberate attacks against major population centers with any of these weapons, which would in effect turn population centers of certain sizes into sanctuaries. Concomitantly, there might also be agreement not to use cities of these sizes for military purposes. If this were to be adopted, there might develop serious problems in the provision of civilian labor for the support of military operations. Such a constraint could also lead to many other problems including—

1. Possible increased devastation of rural areas with partial or total loss of food production for fairly prolonged periods of time.
2. The necessity for the large scale importation of food for the people in the city sanctuaries and the resultant delivery and distribution problems.
3. Overtaxing of housing, public health, and all other vital facilities in population centers where rural and small town populations took refuge.
4. These sanctuaries could at any time become major disaster areas if the enemy should suddenly abandon the constraints or threats of such action. Rumors of such action could also cause mass panic and precipitous flight. On the other hand, if the sanctuaries were respected, this might provide a means for survival of the major part of the civilian populace and greatly ease the burden of caring for mass casualties. It would also provide at least a partial means of enforcing a stay-put or
standfast policy (para 146) and would reduce the problems inherent in prehostilities evacuation (para 145).

d. Even if all categories of CBR weapons were to be used there might be constraints upon the weapons effects sought or upon the type of target. For example there might be agreement to use only the nonlethal types of chemical agents (such as riot control or incapacitating agents) or the nonlethal biological agents (such as anticrop agents or those capable of producing only incapacitating diseases in man). The use of such weapons under these circumstances while obviously reducing some civil affairs problems would materially increase the civil affairs tasks in other areas.

(1) Successful attacks on agricultural production would bring increased civilian supply problems concerning the importation and distribution of foodstuffs.

(2) Incapacitating agents used against population centers would also affect, at least temporarily, all the public health, public safety, and public utilities services. For example, a small, easily controlled fire could become a major disaster if it were to occur when the bulk of the local fire department was too ill to respond.

e. A major constraint on nuclear weapons might limit such weapons in ways to avoid the deliberate use of large scale fallout. Since fallout attacks people rather than physical structures, the problems of caring for civilian casualties might well be greatly increased while the problems of the restoration of essential facilities could at the same time be reduced.

f. Restraints upon the use of mass destruction and mass casualty weapons is thus not a panacea for all civil affairs problems. The net impact of constraints on the use of such weapons would probably ease many civil affairs problems but each of these constraints could well cause or magnify others. In any event, the commander must plan for civil affairs operations under any possible set of constraints in the same way and to the same degree that he must plan for tactical and logistical operations under the same conditions.

Section II. CIVIL AFFAIRS PLANNING AND ORGANIZATION

142. General

a. Based on the foregoing considerations, CA organizations must be formed, and civil affairs operational plans must be prepared and coordinated with friendly governments concerned. Modern warfare conducted by an alliance requires extensive international coordination of civil affairs activities, and the potential threat of mass destruction and mass casualty weapons increases the requirement for coordination to the same extent that it increases the overall civil affairs problems.

b. Planning for civil affairs operations in this environment requires consideration of essential differences between such warfare and that waged solely with conventional weapons.

(1) Nuclear weapons probably would create the greatest civil affairs problems, as these weapons destroy both people and property. In this they are akin to conventional warfare in which saturation bombing techniques are used against large population centers. The major difference is that greater warning time is available to the population in conventional warfare, as saturation techniques require relatively long periods to achieve the same level of destruction caused by one nuclear weapon.

(2) Chemical and biological weapons can cause massive personnel losses but materiel and installations are left intact. On the other hand these weapons can cause great fear and panic because they are unseen, largely unknown, and people have not been conditioned to their possible use. Chemical and biological agents that incapacitate a large percentage of the population for long periods of time could require massive medical treatment facilities and numbers of personnel. Chemical agents that cause irrational behavior would require additional police support.

143. Critical Variables

The possible effects of chemical, biological, and radiological weapons upon civil affairs operations require that the civil affairs planner consider the critical variables which are inherent in the use of such weapons. The civil affairs planner must assess the probable impact upon such operations and design a civil affairs organizational structure which can cope with these problems in a way best designed to support the political-military mission.
of the command. He must, at least, provide an organization which can continue civil affairs operations under the impact of any level of violence in which a military line of command could continue to operate. Among the critical variables which the civil affairs planner must consider are—

a. Attack frequencies.

b. Timing of attacks in relation to seasonal weather variations, topographical configurations, population dispersal and activity patterns, hours of day or night, stage of agricultural cycles, and time-phasing of multiple attacks.

c. Method of attack (overt or covert) and mode of delivery.

d. Attack "mixes," i.e., the various combination options which the enemy could utilize against friendly targets.

e. U.S., allied, and enemy strategic and tactical objectives.

f. Civil defense planning capabilities and limitations, including organization, training, and protective shelters available (para 144).

g. Numbers and types of CA units available.

h. Status of military operations.

144. Civil Defense Plans and Organization

a. A major critical variable which faces the civil affairs planner is a consideration of the status of local civil defense planning and organization in the area of operation. Generally, the impact of the use of mass casualty and destruction weapons upon U.S. Army civil affairs operations will be in inverse proportion to the extent and effectiveness of the civil defense plans and organization in affected areas. To the extent that civil government can control and care for its people, the potential civil affairs problems of the Army are reduced.

b. The civil affairs planner must obtain and study all available information about the status of civil defense planning and organization in a projected or actual theater of operations to determine if it is adequate to meet the needs likely to arise. He must then make appropriate recommendations to his commander for civil affairs operations and for the requisite civil affairs organizational structure which appears to be required.

c. The initial concerns of the civil affairs planner, after finding that there is a civil defense plan for the area of operations, are to determine if it is a coordinated plan, and if the plan covers the essential requirements to meet anticipated combat conditions. The planner also needs to know whether the civil defense organization is a military, paramilitary or purely civilian organization, its relationships with the military forces and other governmental agencies of the country concerned, sources of manpower and the state of training and discipline, and the degree of authority it has over the population. Finally, he must know the general attitude of the population toward civil defense, and the general level of knowledge about and preparation for individual and family protective measures.

d. For planning purposes, civil defense can be divided into three time phases of action after attack—

(1) The first phase is the Emergency Phase. It lasts from the time of the attack to several days or weeks afterward, depending upon the sizes and locations of the attack(s), the nature of the area, and the effectiveness of the defense organization. The object of the Emergency Phase is survival. The effectiveness of operations conducted during this phase is largely dependent upon careful pre-attack planning and training.

(2) Following the Emergency Phase, the Operational Recovery Phase begins at the earliest time possible. During this phase a civil defense organization must restore the essential functions of the area as quickly as possible. The main objective of this phase is to sustain survival. Proper pre-attack planning and training for operational restoration are absolutely essential. If this planning and training are delayed until after the attack, the capability for early recovery may be critically hampered. In addition, the number of casualties caused by radiation and by secondary effects of chemical weapons will be greatly increased.

(3) At the completion of the Operational Recovery Phase, the Final Recovery Phase begins. The objective of this phase is total restoration of the normal functions in the area.

e. In addition to the factors indicated in d above, the civil affairs planner will need to know what has been planned and done to provide for continuity of government, the continuity of operations of business and industry generally, and
of the public utilities particularly and what is the status of public health planning and organization for emergency situations.

f. Formulation of an adequate civil defense plan is complex. Coordinated planning requires correlation of the essentials of survival in each community with the anticipated effects of specific types and levels of attacks. The planner must recognize that any catastrophic event is certain to hit more than one domestic activity simultaneously. Each separate action must complement all others because quick restoration comes only from a coordinated program of tasks.

145. Prehostilities Evacuation Planning

Military plans for prehostilities evacuation of civil populations from probable combat areas and from the vicinity of rear area target complexes should consider the following factors:

a. Probable reaction of hostile power(s).
b. Loss of protective capabilities of fixed civil defense facilities.
c. Impact on logistical and civilian labor requirements.
d. Availability of suitable sanctuaries with adequate means of protecting the civil population.
e. Time, distance, and transportation factors.
f. Effects of possible surprise attack during movement.
g. Disruption of the economic, political, and social orders.
h. Emergency provision for mass subsistence support.
i. Capabilities and limitations of civilian authorities.
j. Civil affairs organizational and operational capabilities.

146. Stay-Put Planning

a. Stay-put policies require strong enforcement capabilities. While enforcement should be the responsibility of civil officials, military plans must provide for emergency enforcement measures if civil authorities fail.
b. In a nuclear warfare environment where cities are targets, the civil defense posture is inadequate, and chemical or biological attacks are not anticipated, a stay-put policy may not be valid, especially when time permits evacuation. On the other hand, if a surprise enemy attack with chemical or biological weapons is practicable during the evacuation period, casualties inflicted during the movement could offset the advantages sought.
c. Where chemical and biological attacks are delivered against population centers and nuclear weapons are not being employed, a stay-put policy may be advantageous. Remaining indoors, or in properly equipped shelters, sealing windows and doors, adopting strict sanitary measures, and other expedients may reduce civilian casualties during and after such attacks.
d. A basic advantage of a stay-put policy is that maximum utilization of existing fixed civil defense organization and facilities can be made, especially where the population participates in the program as a routine part of community life.
e. When belligerents have agreed to exclude all population centers, or those above certain size, from attack, a stay-put policy could be valid. Such places would become sanctuaries. Nevertheless, the existence of such sanctuaries would, particularly when swollen with refugees, provide the enemy with an important target to attack in the event he abandoned constraints.
f. Stay-put advantages and limitations for the battle area should be carefully evaluated prior to decision. Military necessity may compel complete, partial, or selective evacuation from the battle area and contiguous communities. Such evacuations could, depending on the size of the battle area, involve as many as several million people.
g. A stay-put policy will serve to facilitate permanent rehabilitation activities after combat operations have moved elsewhere, or following cessation of hostilities.

147. Public Health

a. CA public health planning should incorporate operating procedures based upon—

(1) Theater policy.
(2) Area studies and surveys of indigenous medical facilities, personnel, and supplies.
(3) Medical logistical support requirements.
(4) Comprehensive staff coordination.
(5) Evaluation of the specific effects of particular types of weapons systems. For example, where certain nonlethal chemical or biological agents are utilized for the purposes of temporarily incapacitating a civil populace, hospital requirements may be minimal.
b. Existing civilian public health facilities, personnel, equipment, and supplies of all types, gen-
erally can be regarded as inadequate in varying degrees, for handling the variety of emergency requirements which would be caused by attacks using mass destruction or mass casualty weapons. Initial casualties may exceed surviving treatment capabilities in situations where attacks are of high or medium intensity. Rural casualties will require evacuation in many cases to medical facilities in urban areas unless mobile or temporary hospitals have been prepositioned in rural areas. Provision of medical facilities outside of urban areas for potential use by urban populations may exceed the production and economic capabilities of the government concerned. Biological attacks may go undetected or overcome the protection afforded by immunization, resulting in a sudden and massive outbreak of disease.

148. Civilian Supply Planning

a. If possible, CA civilian supply planning should be based on detailed coordination with the civilian government, prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Emergency stockpiles established in the prehostilities phase should be positioned so as to minimize the probability of destruction in initial attacks. Plans should provide for emergency stockpile levels commensurate with anticipated operational requirements and replenishment times.

b. Civilian supply plans for civil affairs operations after a CBR attack should anticipate that unusually large quantities of rodenticides and insecticides may be needed. Seeds, fertilizer, and domestic animals may be required in some cases. Other needs could include extraordinary amounts of—

1. Engineer tools and equipment.
2. Power generators.
3. Food.
5. Public safety equipment and supplies.
6. Communications equipment.
7. Protective masks and clothing.
8. Decontaminating equipment and supplies.
11. Water purification equipment.

c. Types and quantities of supplies actually required will depend upon evaluation of each anticipated attack environment. For example, CBR weapons can be employed to leave buildings, docks, railyards, streets, vehicles, and other facilities intact while killing human beings, animals, and plants. Conversely, nuclear attacks could demolish an entire city or a number of cities.

149. Continuity of Government

Lines of succession that apply to national, provincial (regional), or local levels should be clearly established in the emergency plans of the indigenous government. Such plans should provide for alternate seats of government, preservation of essential records, and lines of succession within the civil defense structure. The civil affairs planner must be aware of these plans and take them into account in his operational planning. Civil affairs plans must include alternate solutions for the government of the area if civil government collapses, or is unable to meet the situation without military aid.

150. Continuity of Commerce and Industry

The procedures contained in paragraph 149 are also applicable to commerce and industry. Where appropriate, civil affairs plans should include key facilities lists and the requisite special procedures for emergency operation. This factor becomes of especial importance in situations where U.S. military forces are dependent upon local procurement of supplies for support of military operations.

151. Public Utilities

Basic criteria useful in preparing plans for restoration of water, electric power, natural gas, and communication services are—

a. The present and projected extent and condition of the physical facilities of the system.

b. The inherent vulnerability and durability of the systems during and following attacks.

152. CA Organizational Considerations

a. Based upon the problems which have been set forth in preceding paragraphs the civil affairs planner must develop an organization which can cope with the civil affairs problems generated by the use of these weapons. It is essential that the civil affairs portion of a theater of operations troop list provide for adequate and continuing input of civil affairs units and personnel to the theater from CONUS. CA needs would be magnified many times. The theater troop basis must also reflect the greater need of the Civil Affairs organization for communications equipment; CBR teams; medical laboratory services as well as other medical unit support; and for augmentation by military police,
engineer, quartermaster, signal and transportation units.

b. CBR weapons effects can be anticipated to cross political boundaries as well as military boundaries, thereby requiring especially close coordination of civil affairs operations. Depending on the level of destruction and disruption, the conversion of the civil affairs organizational structure from decentralized operations to centralized operations under a civil affairs command may be desirable in the nuclear environment. In addition, the probable involvement of a number of national populations, their governments, and their military forces—whether cobelligerent with the United States or neutral—will create complex requirements for—

(1) Civil affairs plans and operations of international character.
(2) Coordination of civil defense and other civil affairs activities at international and national political and military levels.
(3) Possible movements of civilian populations, or sizable segments of such populations, across national borders, to escape the initial or subsequent effects of CBR operations.
(4) Negotiation and implementation of civil affairs agreements pertaining to multinational civil affairs operations. These agreements must provide detailed arrangements to implement STANAG, SEASTAG, and SOLOG where such documents are in force. Among matters to be covered are—
   (a) Migration of nationals from one country to another for the purpose of establishing permanent residence.
   (b) Temporary movements of refugees or displaced persons across international boundaries.
   (c) Mutually supporting civil defense plans and operational procedures to provide unity throughout a theater of operations and adjacent areas.
   (d) Mutually supporting logistical plans and operational procedures insuring each civil population a reservoir of emergency supplies and equipment.
   (e) Unity of effort in the civil affairs operations in each allied nation to assure—
   1. Adherence to the requirements of international law, including SOFA, Hague and Geneva Conventions, the United Nations Charter, and those procedures and policies having the force and effect of international law by custom and usage.

2. Effective support of the war effort by each participating nation through integration of allied civil affairs operations, mutual assistance, and controlled usage of national resources by civil populations.

c. Due to the increased complexities of civil affairs operations in the CBR environments, effective CA staff representation is of particular importance. Such staff representation should be a normal part of TOE and TD, providing CA staff officers on the coordinating staff level in all headquarters having general or directorate staffs. Provisional capability is inadequate for planning or operational purposes in a special weapons environment. Properly qualified CA officers are needed to facilitate the development of civil affairs portions of military plans during the prehostilities phase and to assure their effective execution during hostilities.

d. To be more effective in the potential environment of CBR operations, civil affairs units should be included in the prehostilities forward deployment posture of the Army. Criteria for determining the numbers and types of civil affairs units prepositioned in overseas areas is not limited to the size of the overall force alone. On the contrary, the size of the overall force may be of only incidental concern. The factors shown in (1) through (5) below must be considered.

(1) Political, social, and economic conditions prevailing in the areas of deployment.
(2) The level of development of indigenous civil defense programs and the resulting capabilities and limitations.
(3) Requirements of international law relating to civilian populations.
(4) Evaluation of intentions of the enemy relating to adherence to constraints in employing CBR weapons against civilian populations.
(5) Accomplishment of maximum actions prior to the outbreak of hostilities for the protection of civilian populations in order to lessen the dangers of civilian interference with military operations when war occurs. Otherwise, the diversion
of large numbers of tactical and support troops to civil affairs operations may be required.

e. CA units deployed for use in a possible CBR weapons environment require augmentation in at least two ways.

1. Communications. CA units depend upon existing military or civilian communications systems for command, control, and liaison activities. In view of the threat posed by special weapons, this may be inadequate for civil affairs operational requirements. Therefore, in this environment adequate communications equipment must be supplied.

2. Laboratory services. Laboratory services and facilities commensurate with the spectrum of potential CBR operational requirements must be available and accessible to all units engaged in civil affairs operations. Mobile laboratories will be especially useful to support civil affairs operations under the following circumstances:

(a) When indigenous laboratory facilities are inadequate.

(b) When time and space factors preclude use of fixed U.S. laboratory facilities.

(c) When civil affairs laboratory support requirements cannot be contracted to indigenous commercial or academic laboratories because of security considerations.

Section III. CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

153. Civil Affairs Support Activities

In a CBR weapons warfare environment the CA organization must continue to provide both command support to the combat divisions and area support to the remaining U.S. forces in the theater. Succeeding paragraphs describe the minimum essential civil affairs operational considerations of particular importance for the continuance of tactical and logistical operations.

154. Civil Affairs Command Support Operations

Command support CA units operating in the CBR environment may find their capabilities seriously strained or exceeded. Plans must provide for timely and properly tailored augmentation. In some cases, depending on the area of operations, large numbers of sick, injured, or dead enemy civilians, soldiers, and animals will be encountered. Social controls may have ceased to exist. Contamination may be widespread. The impact of these conditions on continuance of the tactical mission will require rapid augmentation of command support CA units and very close support from area support units earmarked and trained for specific localities.

155. CA Area Support

a. CA area support units in supervision of, or coordination with, a civil defense program must consider such matters as circulation of traffic; movement of individuals; handling of mass casualties; construction of shelters; differences in effects of CBR attacks; warning systems; labor; firefighting and decontamination equipment and procedures. The civil defense plan must be correlated with the military commander's corresponding area damage control plan to minimize interference with military operations. Some of the same personnel and equipment may be employed dually in alerting civil defense and area damage control agencies. In postattack recovery operations, location of the boundaries of contaminated areas, and completion of decontamination processes will benefit both military personnel and civilians. It may be advantageous to pool remaining civilian and military firefighting equipment, medical facilities, supplies and services, and labor potentials. In repair and reconstruction activities, equipment, technicians, labor, and material of troop units concerned and similar civilian assets should be coordinated to provide maximum recovery capability.

b. The military commander should assign the overall responsibility for civil defense operations and measures for the control of the civilian population to his CA commander. The CA unit commander coordinates his plans with appropriate command staff officers in their respective fields of interest. In his assigned area of jurisdiction, the CA unit commander is responsible for implementation of plans for military support of civil defense and for coordination of control measures with appropriate agencies of government. To the maxi-
mum extent practicable, local officials are held responsible for organization and conduct of local civil defense activities.

a. Planning is a continuing process with respect to civil defense and disaster relief since emergency methods may supplant routine measures. Patterns of official authority may change. Although emergencies can originate in any of the CA functions, the most urgent expression of emergency problems is usually in three functional areas—public health; public works and utilities; and public safety. The latter function is of broadest implication in an emergency situation. CA civil defense and public safety personnel are responsible for reporting the effectiveness of control measures and estimating public reaction to proposed solutions of emergency problems. CA civil defense and public safety personnel, in collaboration with civil government, usually assume a major part in planning for emergencies, but this does not relieve CA personnel assigned to other functions of their technical responsibilities. The possibility of breakdown of usual political and economic processes is inherent in emergencies; therefore, consideration of extraordinary actions should anticipate most breakdowns.

156. Postattack Operations

a. The immediate problems of survival include locating and marking boundaries of contaminated areas, firefighting, rescue, debris removal, radiation protection, and all the other required supporting functions. As time passes, new problems arise to replace the early ones. These problems mainly involve sustaining the survivors over a period of time. Food, medical, fuel, and equipment supplies must be replenished and people should be returned to their normal environment. Operations must continue to clear areas of debris, repair and decontaminate essential facilities and materiel, and to control the rate of radiation dose accumulation in the population. Social problems become increasingly important and law and order must be maintained. Water pollution and the spread of disease must be controlled by the reestablishment of health and sanitation practices. Eventually, these problems are replaced by the long-range requirements, such as reestablishment of the food growing and processing industry, and reestablishment of industries to replenish and increase the stockpiles of supplies.

b. The immediate problems will be of concern to both the command support and the area support CA units. The command support units generally are concerned only with Emergency Phase Operations while the area support units will be concerned not only with Emergency Phase Operations in their areas of responsibility but also with the Operation Recovery Phase and the Final Recovery Phase. Operations in the latter two phases of postattack recovery will be based largely upon postattack resources evaluation, and examination of the status of essential facilities.

c. Resources evaluation requires estimates of the available service or product at each critical facility by time intervals after an attack, and estimates of requirements for such resources at the same time intervals. Resources requirements may arise from military needs, civilian use, or other production or recovery operations. The operation of production facilities, for example, will generate requirements for other resources such as manpower, transportation, water, power, and various raw materials.
CHAPTER 10
CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONS

157. General
   a. Unconventional warfare (UW) is the general term used to describe operations conducted for military, political, or economic purposes within an area controlled by the enemy. It is an offensive weapon in all intensities of warfare, encompassing the employment of the entire range of military, political, economic and psychological attack techniques. UW includes three interrelated fields—guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversion. It makes use of local inhabitants and resources, and usually is supported and directed in varying degrees from an external location (FM 31–21).

   b. Political objectives are important to the success of unconventional warfare. Accordingly, the civil affairs activities of UW elements must be closely integrated with other activities which cultivate indigenous guerrilla forces, the people, and the institutions of an area.

158. Objectives

The objectives of civil affairs operations in support of UW are to assist in—
   a. Obtaining maximum civilian material and moral support of guerrilla operations.
   b. Providing civilian support of evasion and escape and subversive operations.
   c. Denying civilian support to the enemy as much as possible.
   d. Preparing for establishment of control of the civilian populace by a friendly military or civil government.

159. Preparatory Measures

   a. Planning. UW operations feature long-range centralized planning and decentralized execution. The civil affairs aspects of UW operations are an important and continuing consideration from the inception of planning. Since Special Forces and guerrilla commanders are more dependent upon civilian support than are commanders of conventional forces, much of the planning is concerned with obtaining support. As appropriate, the theater CA elements contribute to that planning designed to influence or obtain control over civilians and their resources. Civil affairs planning for all fields of UW must be based upon the following considerations:

      (1) Analysis and determination of the politico-military mission.
      (2) Organization and support of guerrilla forces, auxiliary, and the underground.
      (3) Civil affairs training required for Special Forces personnel and units prior to infiltration into operational areas.
      (4) Number and type of civil affairs units and personnel needed to support the operation.
      (5) Civil affairs intelligence pertaining to the target area (ch 4).
      (6) The civil-military relations aspects of local purchase, requisition, or confiscation in support of operations.
      (7) Probable impact of proposed operations on the population and the economy.
      (8) Means of denying civilian support to the enemy.
      (9) Indigenous leadership problems.
         (a) Assessment of loyalty and capabilities of incumbent leaders.
         (b) Determination of potential leaders.
         (c) Decisions as to removal and replacement of incumbents.
         (d) Measures designed to support and strengthen selected leaders.
      (10) Liaison with U.S.-recognized government-in-exile.
      (11) Eventual transfer of controls to a friendly government.
      (12) Demobilization or utilization of guerrilla forces after linkup.
Development of civic action programs for the target areas with emphasis on those that can be continued and expanded during demobilization phase.

Coordination with psychological operations directed toward the civilian population in the target area.

b. Training of CA Personnel for UW Operations.

(1) Training at all levels. Training of CA personnel for employment at all levels of UW operations must include a basic indoctrination in UW and an explanation of the interrelationships between UW and civil affairs activities; and additional training for CA personnel assigned to theater activities to include—

(a) UW operations and their correlation to the overall politico-economic warfare program of the United States and its allies.

(b) The interrelationships between civil affairs and intelligence activities in support of UW operations.

(c) Working with Psychological Operations (PSYOP) personnel to insure that PSYOP support in an area is in accord with the psychological preparation phase of UW operations.

(2) Civil affairs training for UW personnel.

(a) The enemy will exercise utmost pressure to prevent civilian support of guerrillas. It is therefore necessary that both U.S. Special Forces and indigenous guerrillas receive training in how to win and retain civilian support for their operations. Although coercion may gain support under some circumstances, a guerrilla movement is dependent primarily upon voluntary assistance from the people. Training in civil affairs techniques for obtaining voluntary support is essential. Simple civic action programs can be most effective.

(b) The civil affairs staff section responsible for staff supervision of civil affairs activities in UW forces, assists in the accomplishment of this training by providing appropriate training material and qualified instructor personnel, as required. It also provides guidance on

special civil affairs problems likely to be encountered in the target area.

(c) Under exceptional circumstances civil affairs personnel may be assigned to work with Special Forces operational detachments, particularly during the latter phases of operations prior to the linkup. These personnel, in addition to receiving the specialized civil affairs training described above, must also be Special Forces qualified and capable of full participation in the Special Forces effort.

160. Civil Affairs Support

a. Theater Civil Affairs Support.

(1) The most significant civil affairs contribution during the early phases of UW operations is performed in areas under friendly control. Civil affairs units can assist in the recruitment of expatriates who volunteer to return to the denied area to carry on UW activities or to assist in the training of others at the Special Forces Operations Base (SFOB).

(2) The theater CA staff element is responsible for the provision of overall civil affairs policy guidance for the theater UW effort and for the provision of CA personnel and units required for support of UW elements. It exercises primary staff supervision over civil affairs activities of theater UW elements.

(3) CA staff representation is provided to the UW task force for—

(a) Advice on obtaining civilian support and techniques of controlling the civilian populace.

(b) Civil affairs training assistance.

(c) Insuring that operational detachments are briefed on such matters as the political leadership, governmental organizations, and the economy and culture of the specific area of operation.

(4) CA elements should be attached to the SFOB as needed, to assist in the civil affairs aspects of planning, training, and operations.

b. Coordination of Civil Affairs Support With Other Agencies.

(1) CA elements assist intelligence elements in the preparation of intelligence and area
surveys in support of the UW effort. Prior to commitment of UW personnel into any area of operations, an intelligence collection plan is made which includes those essential elements of information (EEI) necessary for civil affairs operations. Because of the type of operations inherent in their mission, civil affairs staffs and units are able to render extensive support to other agencies in political, economic, and sociological matters of interest.

(2) CA elements assist PSYOP elements in the determination of propaganda themes which support U.S. political objectives. They also assist PSYOP personnel in the location and recruitment of key civilian assets from target areas who can assist the PSYOP program.

(3) Civil affairs responsibilities may include liaison with a government-in-exile. Recognition of a government-in-exile is a serious and delicate diplomatic act. Recognition in itself does not necessarily imply that the United States will render assistance to the government. If U.S. national policy includes assistance to a government-in-exile, this assistance might be restricted to advice and liaison necessary for preparing officials to perform duties of the officers to which they aspire. Civil affairs staffs and teams are especially qualified for assignment to the task of advising and assisting a government-in-exile. The responsibility may be given to a single liaison officer or to a CA unit, depending on the degree and detail of guidance required and the complexities involved. The United States may also provide assistance and support to a guerrilla movement which is responsive to a U.S.-recognized government-in-exile. In this way an indigenous chain of command can be established, providing to some extent a headquarters for the guerrillas.

b. Civil Affairs Planning Support for Evasion and Escape and Subversion Operations.

(1) Clandestine operations, that is, evasion and escape and subversion, have a direct bearing on future civil affairs operations. Theater CA elements have a continuing interest in the long-range political and economic effects of these operations and have responsibility for providing support to personnel committed to these activities.

(2) Through contacts with civilians and civilian organizations in friendly areas, civil affairs personnel may assist in the development of rosters of civilians to be used as—

(a) Organizers, leaders, or agents for clandestine activities in the denied area.
(b) Informants in hostile organizations which have contacts in denied areas.
(c) Craftsmen or technicians for special tasks.

(3) Direct support of clandestine operations may be provided by civil affairs personnel in friendly areas in the procurement of essential supplies and equipment such as—

(a) Civilian clothing and items of normal personal possession.
(b) Civilian equipment (e.g., binoculars, cameras, recording devices, radios, weapons, vehicles).
(c) Maps.
(d) Documentary matter including passports, visas, vehicle operator's licenses, birth or marriage records, or other similar documentation.
(e) Foodstuffs, tobacco products, or alcoholic beverages peculiar to the area.
(f) Barter items or local money.

(4) CA staff officers and units recommend the establishment of priorities in the evasion and escape nets for the exfiltration of selected persons from denied areas. These persons are identified through liaison with the government-in-exile and by obtaining information from other sources, such as refugees and allied government civilian agencies. Through its area research activities, the CA organization becomes an excellent source of information on matters such as geography, weather, wildlife, vegetation, agricultural produce, cover, transportation, language, customs, evaluation of deception measures, and identification of potentially safe contacts in the denied area.
161. Civil Affairs Support in Denied Areas

This support refers to support of the guerrilla forces, the auxiliary, and the underground. Special Forces units operating with the guerrilla forces are involved in civil affairs as soon as the first civilian contact is made. Because of political implications and the wide latitude of discretion allowed the Special Forces operational detachment commander in executing UW missions, it is of utmost importance that some officer in the detachment receive civil affairs training and act as a civil affairs advisor. After the guerrilla area of control has been expanded, civil affairs personnel or units, as required, can be attached to Special Forces operational detachments within the guerrilla warfare operational area to assume the political and other civil affairs responsibilities. These responsibilities in support of the combat mission include—

a. Advice to the commander on the political factors involved in proposed military operations. For example, an attack on an enemy installation may be possible, but may alienate the local inhabitants or expose them to reprisals to such an extent that the consequent political loss would far outweigh any possible military gain.

b. Advice on the organization of civilians into administrative units.

c. Advice on the recruitment of guerrillas and specialists.

d. Advice on the maintenance of favorable relations between the guerrillas and the populace and among area command factions.

e. Plans for the establishment or replacement of the governmental structure.

f. Advice on populace and resources controls to be used in guerrilla dominated areas.

162. Civil Affairs Operations After Linkup With Conventional Forces

a. As the conventional U.S. forces approach linkup with the guerrillas, the civil affairs plans for future operations should provide for—

(1) Recommendations for the utilization of the uncovered guerrilla forces no longer required for UW operations.

(2) Assisting in the indoctrination, retraining, and demobilization of former guerrillas before reintegration into normal society.

(3) Analyzing the social-political-economic significance of hidden arms and supplies, and other special intelligence.

b. The Theater Commander takes action to utilize or demobilize the guerrilla forces. The nature of guerrilla activities and the personality characteristics of the many individuals attracted to the guerrilla forces present a serious problem in regard to their acceptability in the community. In many cases where deep-rooted animosities and political frictions have developed, relocation may be the only solution. When guerrilla forces are demobilized there are administrative problems of records, final pay, decorations, collections of equipment, claims, investigations of alleged atrocities, and protection of individuals. Plans for the eventual disposition of the force are prepared at theater level, at the inception of guerrilla operations, and are kept current with the changes in the tactical and political situations.