| UNCLASSIFIED |
| AD NUMBER |
| AD386041 |
| CLASSIFICATION CHANGES |
| TO: | unclassified |
| FROM: | confidential |
| LIMITATION CHANGES |
| TO: | Approved for public release, distribution unlimited |
| FROM: | Controlling DoD Organization: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310. |
| AUTHORITY | 31 Oct 1979 per Group-4 document marking; Adjutant General’s Office [Army] ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980 |

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
SECURITY MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U. S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.
IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (26 Sep 67) FOR OT RD-67X047

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation Malheur, conducted by 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

Forwarded as inclosure is a Combat After Action Report for Operation Malheur. Operation Malheur was conducted by the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division during the period 11 May - 2 August 1967. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
Commanding Generals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command
Commandants
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army War College
US Army Air Defense School
US Army Armor School
US Army Artillery and Missile School
US Army Aviation School
US Army Chemical School
US Army Civil Affairs School
US Army Engineer School
US Army Infantry School
US Army Intelligence School
US Army Medical Field Service School
US Army Military Police School
US Army Ordnance School
US Army Quartermaster School
US Army Security Agency School

INFORMATION HEREWITH IS CLASSIFIED AS CONFIDENTIAL AND IS PROTECTED PURSUANT TO 18 USC 793 AND 794. REPRODUCTION OR DISCLOSURE IS PROHIBITED WITHOUT WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMED FORCES.

OR OT RD 67X047

JAN 2

CONFIDENTIAL
DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)
US Army Signal School
US Army Special Warfare School
US Army Transportation School

Copies furnished:
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
The Surgeon General
Chief of Communications-Electronics
The Provost Marshal General

Commanding Generals
101st Airborne Division (-)
11th Infantry Brigade (Sep)
1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division

Commanding Officers
198th Infantry Brigade
3d Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry

Army Attache, London, England (Thru ACSI)
Weapons System Evaluation Group
OSD (SA), Southeast Asia Forces (Dr. Bailey)
Documents Control Officer (Mr. Smith) Bell Aero Systems Company
US Army Weapons Command
Joint Action Control Office
National Aeronautics & Space Administration
ODDR&E, OSD (SEAM)
Joint Chiefs of Staff (SASM)
Research Analysis Corporation (Library)

Security Officers
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (Dr. Agnew)
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (Mr. Freyman)
Sandia Corporation (Mr. Smith)
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 96347

2 September 1967


THRU: Commanding General
Task Force OREGON
APO 96374

Commanding General
III Marine Amphibious Force
APO 96602

TO: Commanding General
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J343
APO 96222

1. (U) Name of Operation: Operation MALHEUR.

(Phase I: 11 July 1967 through 8 June 1967; Phase II: 8 June 1967 through 2 August 1967).

3. (U) Location: QUANG NGOAI Province.


5. (U) Reporting Officer: Brigadier General Salvo H. Matheson, Commanding General, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

6. (U) Task Organization:

   a. The task organization of the Brigade at the initiation of Operation MALHEUR was as shown below:

   1-327 Inf
   Engr LZ Clearing Tms
   3 Set Dog Tms
   FAC Tm

   2-327 Inf
   Engr LZ Clearing Tms
   3 Set Dog Tms
   FAC Tm

   2-502 Inf
   Engr LZ Clearing Tms
   3 Set Dog Tms
   FAC Tm

   2-320 Arty (DS)

   1/3-101 Cav
   A/326 Engr (-)
   IRRP Plat
   MP Plat
   1-101 Avn Sec
   245th Cal Det
   245th Payops Co
   406 RRD
   181 MI Det
   TACP (-)
   420 Inf Plat, Set Dog (-)
   D/Spt Bn

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR DT RD File

67X047
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MAHEUR (MACV/RC5/13/32)

b. The task organization was changed during Phase I by the addition of one CIDG Platoon (direct support) from BA TO Special Forces Camp to both the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry. One platoon Company C, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor also became OPCON to Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry.

c. During Phase II, two CIDG Companies (minus) from MINH LONG Special Forces Camp assisted the Brigade in operations in the SONG VE Valley with one company in direct support of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry and one platoon each in direct support of the 1st and 2d Battalions (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

7. (C) Supporting Forces:

a. 2-320 Artillery: Employed in a direct support role.

b. C/2-11 Artillery: Provided general support reinforcing fires.

c. 176th Helicopter Assault Company: Provided troop lift and flew combat support and resupply missions.

d. 178th Aviation Company: Provided four flyable CH-47 aircraft on a mission support basis for use in displacing and resupplying artillery units.

e. 9th Air Commando Squadron: Provide air lift support for Psychological Operations.

f. 245th Psychological Operations Company: Provided one loudspeaker and leaflet dissemination team in direct support of operations in Phase I.

g. 246th Psychological Operations Company: Provided one loudspeaker and leaflet dissemination team in direct support of the operation.

h. 7th US Air Force: Flew 462 tactical fighter missions totaling 1055 sorties. One hundred and eighty-seven of these sorties were immediate requests which were processed through the Air Force Tactical Air Request Net with an average reaction time of 50 minutes. In addition, 108 Combat Skyspot sorties, 10 flare-chip (AC-47) sorties, and 471 transport sorties were flown in support of the Brigade. Twenty-seven B-52 sorties were flown in support of the Brigade. FAC's flew 452 sorties in forward air control, artillery adjustment and visual reconnaissance missions.

i. US 7th Fleet: Provided on call fires and assisted in firing LZ preparatory fires during Phase I of the operation.

j. BA TO CIDG Camp: Provided CIDG Companies in direct support of Brigade operations in NORMANDY, BASTOCNE, and ZON AO's.

k. MINH LONG CIDG Camp: Provided CIDG Companies in direct support of Brigade operations in BASTOCNE and ZON AO's.

8. (U) Intelligence: See Inclosure 1, Intelligence.

9. (C) Mission: Headquarters, USAV directed that 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division become OPCON to Task Force OREGON and move from vicinity of KHANH DUONG to DUC PHO. The Brigade closed into CARENTAN Base (the Brigade forward base camp) on 8 May 1967. Task Force OREGON directed the brigade to conduct search and destroy operations to find, fix and destroy VC/WIA forces and to neutralize VC/WIA base camps in the areas west and northwest of DUC PHO commencing 11 May 1967. The mission was later expanded to include areas southwest of DUC PHO as well. Inclosure 2, Operations Schematics.

10. (C) Concept of Operation: Operation MAHEUR was conducted in two Phases. Phase I commenced on 11 May with air mobile assaults by two battalions acting on
intelligence placing the 2d VC Regiment in Base Area 124 in the high ground immediately west of DUC PHO. The 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry, and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry assaulted to the west of the base area followed a day later by the airmobile assault of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry to the east. (Inclosure 2 - Tab A). The majority of the month was spent in operations against the 2d VC Regiment in this area. The 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry was extracted to CARENTAN Base on 30 May. Intelligence indicated that the remnants of the 2d VC Regiment had moved northwest toward Base Area 123 in an attempt to evade the Brigade. As a result, the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conduct an airmobile assault, preceded by a B-52 strike on 3 June to the northwest of Base Area 124 and south of Base Area 123 (Inclosure 2 - Tab B). The other two battalions were extracted to CARENTAN Base on 3 and 4 June where they prepared for the second phase of the operation. Phase II commenced on 8 June with an airmobile assault by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry into Base Area 123 (Inclosure 2 - Tab C). The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry conducted an airmobile assault on 9 June into the area west of the SONK VE Valley. Operations revealed the presence of elements of both the 1st and 2d VC Regiments. The number of enemy contacts, initially high, declined over a period of days and intelligence indicated that the 2d VC Regiment had withdrawn to the west while the 1st VC Regiment was reported to have withdrawn to the northwest. At the request of Province officials the Brigade turned its attention to the evacuation of the civilian population from the SONK VE Valleys which are the rice growing areas from which the VC had been extracting food and taxes for many years. The valley clearing operation commenced on 15 June with the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducting cordon and search operations and evacuating the population of the SONK TRA CAU and southern SONK VE Valleys to a refugee center at NHIHA HANH. The following day the battalion conducted an airmobile assault to the northern end of the SONK VE Valley to act as a blocking force for a sweep of the valley from the south by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (Inclosure 2 - Tab D). During the course of the valley sweep, which terminated on 22 June, the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry contacted what was believed to be elements of the 1st VC Regiment in the high ground north of the valley mouth. At the conclusion of the clearing operation, attention was focused to the suspected location of the 2d VC Regiment vicinity of the SONK VE Valley to the southwest. On 25 June the 1st and 2d Battalions (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted airmobile assaults, the 1st Battalion to the west after elements of the 1st VC Regiment and the 2d Battalion to the southwest after the 2d VC Regiment (Inclosure 2 - Tab E). The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry commenced search and destroy operations toward the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry assisting in the hunt for the 2d VC Regiment. After a fruitless search for the 1st VC Regiment to the north the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted an airmobile assault to the southwest on 29 June to assist the other battalions in their hunt for the 2d VC Regiment. On 3 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry returned to CARENTAN Base to conduct Operation LAKE (6 - 12 July). The remaining two battalions continued their search for the 2d VC Regiment and evacuated the population of the SONK VE Valley to NHIHA HANH, once again at the request of Province officials. At the conclusion of the valley clearing operation, agent reports and other intelligence indicated that the 2d VC Regiment had returned to Base Area 124. Since the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry was more familiar with the area in which the Regiment was reported to have received the mission and conducted an airmobile assault into the area on 10 July. (Inclosure 2 - Tab F). The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry conducted an airmobile assault to the northwest of Base Area 124 on 11 July and the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry to an adjacent area on 14 July in an effort to block enemy egress routes used previously by the 2d VC Regiment. Agent reports, information gained from captured VC and other intelligence indicated that the 1st and 2d VC Regiments were at less than 50% strength and that both were attempting to meet in Base Area 123 in order to form an effective regiment. Responding to this information the Brigade scheduled a B-52 strike in Base Area 123 followed by an airmobile assault into the area by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry on 17 July (Inclosure 2 - Tab G). The 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry moved to blocking positions north of the Base Area while the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry blocked to the west and south.
CONFIDENTIAL


On 23 July the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry conducted airmobile extractions to CARENTAN Base where they commenced preparation for Operation HOOD RIVER. The 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry continued search and destroy operations in its assigned sector, north of Base Area 123 and extending considerably to the west until the termination of Operation MALHEUR on 2 August 1967. The battalion was left in the field in preparation for its part as a southern screening force and Brigade reserve for Operation HOOD RIVER.

11. (C) Execution

a. Operation MALHEUR was characterised by small unit contacts. Initially the enemy defended his position in platoon and larger size force. Contacts with large forces, however, gradually declined as did the enemy's will to stand and fight. Soon contacts with a squad size enemy force became rare and the Brigade made most contact with groups of two or three men who attempted to withdraw on contact. The search and destroy tactics utilized consisted of saturation patrolling, night movement, night ambushes, raids and the use of small unit stay behind forces. The terrain over which operations were conducted included mountainous jungle, rolling hills, sandy scrub forest and flat, cultivated lowlands.

b. Operation MALHEUR was initiated 12 days after the termination of Operation SUMGERALL in KHANH NOI, PHU YEN and DARBAC Provinces. On 1 May 1967, the Brigade began movement to DUC PHO with one battalion combat team conducting convoy movement from KHANH DUONG to NHA TRANG and then sea movement from NHA TRANG to DUC PHO. On 5 and 6 May, the remainder of the Brigade conducted similar movements from KHANH DUONG to DUC PHO. The Brigade completed closure at DUC PHO when the last Infantry battalion combat team arrived on 8 May. Operation MALHEUR commenced on 110000 May 1967.

c. Phase II The three maneuver battalions of the Brigade were located at the Brigade base camp, CARENTAN Base, vicinity DUC PHO. On 110000 May 1967 the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted airmobile assaults from CARENTAN Base into the northwestern portion of NORMANDY AO and commenced search and destroy operations to the east, followed by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry which conducted airmobile assaults from CARENTAN Base into the southwestern portion of NORMANDY AO and commenced search and destroy operations to the east. In conjunction with the assaults, massive artillery fires and tactical air strikes prepared the assault LZ's; fires were then placed on known or suspected enemy positions, routes from enemy positions to LZ's, and enemy egress routes. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry remained in reserve vicinity CARENTAN Base. Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry remained vicinity CARENTAN Base and secured the beach logistical site, established OP's vicinity CARENTAN Base and assisted the Military Police Platoon, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division escort logistical convoys on the MSR between the beach and the airfield complex. The BA TO Special Forces/CIDG Camp provided two CIDG Platoons, one each in direct support of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry, and one CIDG Company which screened to the west of NORMANDY AO. The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Platoon, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division conducted airmobile insertions into the northwest portion of NORMANDY AO and commenced surveillance of the area. On 11 May, 10 light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 7 VC KIA (C), 1 NVA KIA (C), 1 VC KIA (F), 1 NVC, 1 detainee and 3 individual weapons captured. One platoon of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry encountered 40 gravel mines and punji stakes in one area resulting in 1 US WIA. On 120022 May 1967, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted airmobile assaults from CARENTAN Base into the east portion of NORMANDY AO to establish blocking positions and to commence search and destroy operations to the west. One platoon of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry remained vicinity CARENTAN Base under operational control of Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry. Eight light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 US KIA, 2 US WIA, 2 VC KIA (C), 2 VC KIA (F), 6 detainees and 5 individual weapons and one refrigerator (GE) captured. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry detained 9 personnel including 2 male, military aged ralliers and captured 10 pounds of military documents and 1 individual weapon. Three light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 2 VC KIA (C) and 1 detainee.
On 13 May one company of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry was engaged by an estimated VC company size force resulting in 1 US KIA, 5 US WIA, loss of 2 M-16 rifles, 13 VC KIA (C), and 2 individual weapons and 12 Chicoms hand grenades captured. Eleven other light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 2 US WIA, 16 VC KIA (C), 16 detainees and 5 individual weapons, including 2 M-16 rifles, captured. Three light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 6 VC KIA (C), 1 detainee, 10 individual weapons, including 1 M-79, captured and the discovery of a weapon cache containing 34 individual weapons and 1 12.7mm Chicom machine gun. Five light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 302d Infantry resulted in 5 VC KIA (C), 1 detainee, and 2 individual weapons captured. Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry conducted an airborne cordon and search operation in a hamlet to the south of CARETAN Base resulting in 2 detainees. On 14 May one company of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry contacted an enemy force of unknown size in well fortified, dug-in positions, resulting in 8 US KHA and 36 WHA. Seven other light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 8 VC KIA (C) and 2 individual weapons captured. Two light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 3 VC KIA (C). Eight light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 302d Infantry resulted in 14 VC KIA (C) and 6 individual weapons captured. On 15 May one platoon of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry contacted an estimated VC battalion size force with automatic weapons and mortars in fortified positions. Continuous artillery and tactical air strikes were called in on the enemy force and mortar positions. Upon the insertion of an airborne company, 1 UH-1D helicopter sustained a direct mortar round and was destroyed. Results of the contact were 3 US KHA, 34 US WIA, 1 UH-1D destroyed, 7 UH-1D damaged, 5 UH-1B damaged and 20 VC KIA (C). Five other light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 2 US WHA, 5 VC KIA (C) and 2 individual weapons captured. One platoon of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry contacted an estimated VC platoon size force resulting in 4 US WHA, 6 VC KIA (C) and 5 VC KIA (P). Four other contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 6 VC KIA (C), and 1 VC KIA (P). Seven light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 302d Infantry resulted in 2 US WHA, 9 VC KIA (C), 1 detainee, and 2 individual weapons, 1 82mm mortar tube and 23 82mm mortar rounds captured. On 16 May eight light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 US KHA, 9 VC KIA (C), 6 detainees and 4 individual weapons, 1 rocket launcher, 2 rockets and 2 grenades captured. A light contact by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 individual weapon captured. Fourteen light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 302d Infantry resulted in 6 US WHA, 14 VC KIA (C), 4 detainees, and 8 individual weapons captured. On 17 May a light contact by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 US WHA and 12 detainees. Two light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 individual weapon captured. Eleven light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 302d Infantry resulted in 6 US WHA, 7 VC KIA (C), 1 detainee and 5 individual weapons captured. On 18 May three light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 2 VC KIA (C), 1 VC KIA (P), 3 detainees and 1 individual weapon captured. Three light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 2 VC KIA (C), and 2 individual weapons captured. On 18 May the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 302d Infantry contacted an estimated 100 man VC force armed with numerous automatic weapons and machine guns. The contact was characterized by many small engagements in a two-square kilometer area with friendly and enemy personnel intermingled. The enemy defended from numerous spider holes and fortified positions scattered throughout the area of contact. Artillery and TG Air supported. Contact lasted six hours and resulted in 12 US KHA, 41 US WHA, 31 VC KIA (C) and 12 individual weapons, 1 machine gun and 1 flamethrower captured. On 19 May a light contact by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 VC KIA (C). Four light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 3 US WHA and 3 VC KIA (C). Four light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 302d Infantry resulted in 2 US WHA, 2 VC KIA (C) and 1 individual weapon captured. On 19 May by the Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division resulted in 1 US KHA and 5 US WHA. On 20 May two contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 3 VC KIA (C) and 9 VC KIA (P). A light contact by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 VC KIA (C). Two light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 302d Infantry resulted in 1 VC KIA (C).
and 1 individual weapon captured. On 21 May two light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 3 VC KIA (C), and 1 individual weapon and 1 machine gun captured. Three light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 4 VC KIA (C) and 1 individual weapon captured. On 22 May the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry apprehended 6\detaines. In three different locations the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry discovered the bodies of 8 VC, killed by gunfire and fragments. One light contact by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 1 VC KIA (C). On 23 May four light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 6 VC KIA (C), 49 detainees and 1 individual weapon, 5 rounds 57mm recoilless rifle, 25mm KIA (C), and 5 .50cal mortar rounds captured. One light contact by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 2 VC KIA (C). On 24 May eight light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 4 US WIA, 3 VC KIA (C), 14 detainees and 1 individual weapon captured. Three light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 6 VC KIA (C). Companies A and C, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted airmobile extractions to CARENTAN Base. Two light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 2 VC KIA (C) and 1 individual weapon captured. A grave was found, and 5 VC were apprehended. Two light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 2 US WIA. On 25 May the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had two significant contacts with enemy forces. One company contacted an estimated 50 man VC force in well fortified positions with automatic weapons and N-791s resulting in 1 US KIA, 11 US WIA, 1 CIDG KIA, 1 CIDG WIA and 11 VC KIA (C). Another company contacted an unknown size VC force in well fortified positions resulting in 8 US WIA, 5 VC KIA (C), and 3 individual weapons captured. Company A, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted a non-illuminated, airmobile assault at 0645H into LZ's in the southeastern portion of NORMANDY AO from CARENTAN Base. Company C, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry commenced operational control of the 3d Brigade, 29th Infantry Division at 1200H. Two light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) resulted in 2 VC KIA (C) and 1 individual weapon captured. Five light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 2 US WIA and 30 VC WIA. On 26 May two light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 VC KIA (C). On 27 May three light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 3 VC KIA (C). Two light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 1 VC KIA (C). Two light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 2 VC KIA (C), and 2 VC KIA (P). The 176th Assault Helicopter Company observed and took 8 VC under fire resulting in 5 VC KIA (C) and 3 KIA (P). On 29 May the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry contacted an unknown sized enemy force in fortified positions resulting in 8 US KIA, 14 US WIA, 6 VC KIA (C), 2 VC KIA (P) and 4 individual weapons and 1 machine gun captured. Ten other light contacts resulted in 3 US KIA, 5 US WIA, 2 VC KIA (C), 3 VC KIA (P), 31 detainees and 3 individual weapons. 1 rocket launcher, 1 tele- phone and 1500 WIA uniforms captured. One light contact by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 individual weapon captured. Four light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 1 US WIA, 12 VC KIA (C), and 3 individual weapons captured. Company C, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry terminated operational control to the 3d Brigade, 29th Infantry Division and returned to CARENTAN Base to prepare for future employment in NORMANDY AO. On 30 May the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry suspended operations in NORMANDY AO and extracted to CARENTAN Base to prepare for future employment in BASTOGNE AO. One light contact by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 2 VC KIA (C) and 2 individual weapons captured. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry reoriented and conducted airmobile assault into the north portion of the adjusted NORMANDY AO. One light contact resulted in 2 VC KIA (C). Two light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 3 VC KIA (C) and 1 individual weapon captured. On 31 May the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry contacted an unknown size VC force in fortified positions with automatic weapons and N-791s. Two companies were maneuvered around the enemy force. Results were 15 US WIA, 1 UN-1D damaged, 13 VC KIA (C), 1 VC KIA (P) and 14 individual weapons.
CONFIDENTIAL

AWGII-C
SUSPECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR (MACV/HC/33/32)

1 M-79 and 1 M-60 machine gun captured. On 1 June the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry, employed an air strike against a suspected enemy position, a follow-up sweep of the area resulted in 1 US WHA, 5 VC KIA (C), and 6 individual weapons captured. Four light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 5 VC KIA (C) and 1 individual weapon captured. A booby trapped grenade activated by 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 1 US WHA. On 3 June the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted airborne assault from CARENTAN Base into LZ's in the north portion of NORMANDY AO to exploit a B-52 strike. Two subsequent light contacts resulted in 2 VC KIA (C) and 1 detainee. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) terminated operations in the NORMANDY AO and conducted airborne extractions to CARENTAN Base. Prior to the extraction, 24 detainees were apprehended. Two light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 2 VC KIA (C). On 4 June the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry discovered the graves of 6 VC KIA (C). The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (minus) terminated operations in NORMANDY AO and conducted airborne extractions to CARENTAN Base. A gravel mine detonated by a member of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery resulted in 1 US WHA. On 5 June one light contact by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 3 CEDO WHA. On 6 June five light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 CEDO WHA, 1 VC KIA (C); 2 VC and 1 individual weapon captured. On 7 June an artillery fire base consisting of one battery of 155's and a battery of 105's was inserted into the western portion of BASTOGNE AO in preparation for the second major phase of the operation. The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Platoon conducted an airborne raid to apprehend detainees to provide current intelligence concerning BASTOGNE AO which resulted in 1 VC KIA (C), apprehension of 15 detainees and capture of 2 hand grenades. The 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry apprehended 4 detainees in 2 contacts.

d. Phase II: At 0000 on June 1967 the 3d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry reoriented and commenced search and destroy operations to the north in the southern portion of BASTOGNE AO. Three light contacts resulted in 3 VC KIA (C) and 7 detainees captured. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted airborne assaults from CARENTAN Base into the northeastern portion of BASTOGNE AO and commenced search and destroy operations to the southwest. The assault LZ's were preceded by the coordinated fires of artillery, tactical air and gunships. Following the LZ preparations, fires were shifted to suspected enemy locations, routes of enemy egress and routes from enemy positions to the LZ's. One company contacted an unknown size enemy force in heavily fortified positions, artillery, helicopter gunships and nine sorts of VCA air supported. The contact resulted in 3 US KHA; 9 US WHA, 7 VC KIA (C) and capture of 2 individual weapons. Eight other contacts resulted in 3 US KHA, 16 US WHA; 12 VC KIA (C) and capture of 1 detainee, 12 individual and 1 crew served weapon. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry rendezvous CARENTAN Base and assumed the mission of Brigade Reserve. Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry continued to provide security for the beach logistical site, to operate GF's from the high ground in vicinity of CARENTAN Base and to assist the Military Police Platoon, 1st Brigade. 101st Airborne Division in providing route security and convoy escort for logistical convoys moving between the beach and the airfield complex along the MSR. On 9 June the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry was released as Brigade Reserve, conducted airborne assaults from CARENTAN Base into the western portion of BASTOGNE AO and commenced search and destroy operations to the south. Two light contacts resulted in 1 US KHA, 1 US WHA; 3 VC KIA (C), 2 detainees and 1 small arm captured. The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Platoon (minus) conducted an airborne insertion into the southern portion of BASTOGNE AO and commenced a surveillance mission. Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry conducted a reconnaissance patrol vicinity of CARENTAN Base which resulted in 1 VC KIA (C), 1 WCA, 1 detainee and capture of 2 individual weapons. On 10 June, one light contact by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 2 VC KIA (C) and apprehension of 3 detainees. Two light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 VC KIA (C), 1 individual weapon and 1 grenade captured. One company of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 520d Infantry discovered 11 VC KIA (C) and one individual weapon as a result of one of the enemy contacts on 9 June. In addition, 4 detainees were apprehended from a cave where they had been hiding. A second company contacted an estimated VC Company size force armed with at least one
heavy machine gun. The unit pulled back and called in heavy artillery fire and
gunships. Results of the contact were 4 US KHA, 32 US WHA; 1 US M1A and lose of 1
4-60 machine gun and 1 M-97. Two other light contacts resulted in 1 VC KIA (C) and
1 detainee apprehended. One IRRP Team conducted an airmobile infiltration into the
area north of BASTOGNE AO and commenced a surveillance mission. On 12 June one
company of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry contacted an unknown size
VC force. The 2d Battalion (Airborne) conducted an infiltration to search and block the
egress routes north, of the valley. Results of the contact were 3 US KHA, 4
US WHA, 1 M-416 and 1 KIA-LIA lost; 3 VC KIA (C) and 1 PAR captured. Seven light
contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 1 US KHA; 2 VC
KIA (C), capture of 1 individual weapon and apprehension of 152 detainees (refugees)
and 120 tons rice.

CONFIDENTIAL
327th Infantry resulted in 3 US WHA, 10 VC KIA (C), 1 detainee and 1 individual weapon captured. Five light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 US WHA, 1 VC KIA (C), and 54 detainees. Six light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 6 VC KIA (C) and capture of 3 individual and 1 crew served weapon. 1285 refugees and 4 tons of rice were relocated to the NGOHIA HANH Refugee Center. On 19 June the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had eleven light contacts resulting in 1 US WHA, 6 VC KIA (C), 35 detainees and 1 82mm mortar captured. Six light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 US WHA, 3 VC KIA (C), 2 detainees, 1 individual and 1 crew served weapon captured. Two light contacts by the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Platoon resulted in 2 VC KIA (C) and 1 detainee captured. One contact vicinity CARENTAN Base by Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry resulted in 1 VC KIA (C), 1 VC KIA (P) and 1 individual weapon captured. A total of 1030 refugees were relocated from the SONG VE Valley to the Refugee Center at NGOHIA HANH. On 20 June nine light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 4 VC KIA (C) and 24 detainees captured. Four light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 30 detainees and 1 individual weapon captured. Four light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 5 VC KIA (C) and 2 detainees captured. In refugee operations, 1363 refugees and 3 tons of rice were relocated to NGOHIA HANH. In the mid-afternoon an explosion of undetermined origin at the 1st Logistical Command's Forward Support Area beach site, adjacent to the Brigade base at CARENTAN Base, caused secondary explosions in the Ammunition Supply Point destroying 90% of all the ammunition located in the FSP. The secondary explosions and fire continued into the early evening preventing attempts to salvage ammunition and supplies. Major equipment losses which resulted from the fire were the destruction of an Engineer Front Loader, 1 5 ton dump truck, and 1 M511A1 tank from Company "A" 2d Battalion, 34th Armor which was under the operational control of Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry and served a portion of the beach security. A sufficient amount of ammunition was located with the combat elements in the field to meet operational needs for a period of 24 hours. Emergency resupply operations commenced immediately. As a result no restrictions were placed on usage of ammunition and combat operations continued normally. On 21 June the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry apprehended 4 detainees in one light contact. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry received 7 US WHA in a mortar attack on one company. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry had seven light contacts resulting in 4 VC KIA (C) and 5 detainees captured. Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry had 1 light contact near CARENTAN Base resulting in 1 KIA (C). 65 refugees were relocated to NGOHIA HANH and 468 refugees were relocated to MO Duc District Headquarters from the SONG VE Valley. On 22 June the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had light contacts resulting in 3 US WHA; 5 VC KIA (C) and capture of 2 detainees and 1 individual weapon. The battalion also discovered and extracted a total of 13 tons of rice from two locations. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry apprehended 12 detainees in four light contacts and found 2 individual weapons following the directions of one of the detainees. Six light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 3 VC KIA (C) and capture of 8 detainees. The refugee relocation operations for the day resulted in movement of 42 refugees and 4.5 tons of rice to NGOHIA HANH. In addition, 1196 head of cattle were turned over to the NGOHIA HANH District officials. Final results of the carden and search operations and civilian population evacuation of the SONG VE Valley were 5737 refugees, 30 tons of rice and 1196 head of cattle relocated to NGOHIA HANH District. On 23 June the three battalions resumed search and destroy operations in BASTOGNE AO. The 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry discovered a weapon cache of 5 individual weapons. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had one light contact resulting in 1 VC KIA (C). The battalion also discovered a weapon cache containing 3 Chico 82mm rockets and 1 individual weapon. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry captured 2 detainees in two light contacts. The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Platoon captured 19 detainees, 5 motor scooters and 5 bicycles in three light contacts. On 24 June one light contact by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 1 VC KIA (C). The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Platoon captured 4 detainees and .25 tons of salt in two light contacts. The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Platoon conducted an airborne extraction to CARENTAN Base.
On 25 June, the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted an airmobile assault to the west of their positions into the northeastern portion of ZON AO and commenced search and destroy operations to the southwest in ZON AO. The battalion suffered 1 US WIA in one light contact. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted an airmobile assault into the southwestern portion of ZON AO and commenced search and destroy operations to the northeast in ZON AO. One light contact resulted in 1 VC KIA (C). The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry commenced search and destroy operations to the southwest in ZON AO. Seven light contacts resulted in 7 VC KIA (C), 1 detainee and capture of 1 individual weapon and 20 tons of salt. Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry conducted an ambush in the CARENTAN area in which considerable enemy activity had been taking place as reported by the LRMP Platoon. The unit made 6 contacts resulting in 1 US WIA, 2 VC KIA (C), 2 detainees, 2 individual weapons and 20 tons of rice captured and 1 ton of rice destroyed. The unit then conducted an airmobile extraction to their assigned portion of ZON AO. On 25 June the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted an airmobile insertion into the northeastern portion of ZON AO and commenced a surveillance mission. On 27 June, 327th Infantry had three light contacts resulting in 1 US WIA, 2 VC KIA (C) and capture of 1 detainee and 1 individual weapon. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry had four light contacts resulting in 1 VC KIA (C), 2 detainees and capture of 1 individual weapon, 10 tons of salt and 2 tons of rice. The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Platoon made three observations of enemy movement and called in artillery fire resulting in 1 VC KIA (C). On 26 June the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had two light contacts resulting in 4 VC KIA (C), 1 detainee and 1 individual weapon captured. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had three light contacts resulting in 2 VC KIA (C) and 1 detainee captured. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry had four light contacts resulting in 3 US WIA, 3 VC KIA (C). The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Platoon made four observations of enemy movement and called in artillery fire resulting in 16 VC KIA (C). At CARENTAN Base, Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry conducted an ambush resulting in 1 VC KIA (C) and 2 detainees. On 26 June the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted an airmobile assault into the southwestern portion of ZON AO and commenced search and destroy operations to the south. Four light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 US WIA, 4 VC KIA (C) and capture of 1 individual weapon, 1 crew served weapon and 150 hand grenades. Four light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 1 US WIA, 1 VC WIA and 2 VC KIA (C). The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Platoon terminated its surveillance mission and conducted an airmobile extraction to CARENTAN Base. On 30 June, one company of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry conducted an airmobile raid into an area in which considerable enemy activity had been taking place as reported by the LRMP Platoon. The unit made 6 contacts resulting in 1 US WIA, 2 VC KIA (C), 6 detainees, 1 individual weapon captured and 1 ton of rice destroyed. The unit then conducted an airmobile extraction to their assigned portion of ZON AO. On 1 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had six light contacts resulting in 7 VC KIA (C), 1 detainee, 2 individual weapons and 7 tons of rice captured, 1 ton of rice destroyed. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry had five light contacts resulting in 1 VC KIA (C), at CARENTAN Base, Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry had one light contact resulting in 1 VC KIA (C). The LRMP Platoon conducted an airmobile insertion into the northeastern portion of ZON AO and commenced a surveillance mission. On 2 July three light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 US WIA, 1 VC KIA (C), capture of 2 individuals respectively, and destruction of 2 tons of rice. Five light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 7 VC KIA (C) and capture of 1 detainee and 1 individual weapon. On 3 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had one light contact resulting in 1 VC WIA. The battalion conducted an airmobile extraction to CARENTAN Base where training, maintenance and prepared for future combat operations. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had one light contact resulting in 1 US WIA. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry had four light contacts resulting in 2 VC KIA (C) and capture of 3 detainees. On 4 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry received 2 US WIA from booby traps and captured 1 individual weapon in a company size base camp. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry had one light contact resulting in 1 VC KIA (C). On 5 July one
company of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry assumed the CARENTAN Base security missions from Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry. The Cavalry Troop then came under the operational control of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had two light contacts resulting in 2 VC KIA (C) and capture of 2 individual weapons. In addition, the battalion discovered a total of 20 tons of salt in two locations. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry had 6 US WIA as a result of three light contacts. On 6 July, the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) (reinforced) commenced Operation LAKE (See Combat After Action Report, Operation LAKE). The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had two 100ft contacts resulting in 2 VC KIA (C) and 1 VC KIA (F). Eight light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 1 CIV WIA, 14 VC KIA (C) and capture of 3 individual weapons. At CARENTAN Base, 13 US personnel were injured and a dump truck damaged as a result of a VC mine on the MSR. On 7 July three light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 3 VC KIA (C) and 1 NVAC captured. One light contact by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 2 VC KIA (C) and 1 individual weapon captured. On 8 July the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry commenced cordon and search and evacuation operations in the SONG NE Valley. Two Light contacts by the battalion resulted in 1 US KIA, 5 VC KIA (C), 7 detainees and 2 individual weapons captured. One light contact by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 1 VC KIA (C). On 9 July the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry extracted 254 refugees from the SONG NE Valley to KHAI HAM. Three Light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 3 US WIA; 2 VC KIA (C), 11 detainees and 1 individual weapon captured. At CARENTAN Base, the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Platoon apprehended 4 detainees while on reconnaissance patrols outside the perimeter. On 10 July the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry completed cordon and search operations and evacuation operations in its assigned portion of ZON AO and commenced search and destroy operations in Base Area 12L. 10 tons of rice were discovered and extracted. Seven Light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) resulted in 7 VC KIA (C) and capture of 3 detainees and 1 individual weapon. On 11 July the Reconnaissance Platoon of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) engaged an estimated VC company armed with mortars, 90mm recoilless rifles and small arms. Artillery, flareships and gunships supported the operation and one other company was maneuvered to reinforce. Results were 2 US KIA, 18 US WIA; 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 VC KIA (F) captured. Five other light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry resulted in 8 VC KIA (C) and 1 individual weapon captured. Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry terminated Operation LAKE and returned to CARENTAN Base. On 12 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) terminated Operation LAKE and returned to CARENTAN Base to prepare for future operations. Five light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) resulted in 7 VC KIA (C) and capture of 1 detainee and 2 individual weapons. One Light contact by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) resulted in 6 VC KIA (C), 12 detainees and capture of 1 individual weapon. Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry resumed the CARENTAN base security mission. On 13 July four light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) resulted in 4 VC KIA (C) and capture of 2 detainees. Four Light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) resulted in 3 VC KIA (C) and capture of 2 detainees. One company of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted an air mobile displacement and assumed the security mission of CHAMPS Fire Base under operational control of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced). On 14 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) conducted air mobile assaults into the northern portion of extended ZON AO and commenced search and destroy operations in Base Area 12L. Two Light contacts by the battalion resulted in 3 VC KIA (C) and capture of 1 detainee and 1 individual weapon. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry regained operational control of the company that had been working with the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced). One Light contact by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 VC KIA (C). Five Light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) resulted in 5 VC KIA (C) and capture of 1 individual weapon. On 15 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) had four light...
contacts resulting in 2 VC KIA (C), 2 VC KIA (F), and capture of 6 detainees. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had one light contact resulting in 2 VC KIA (C), The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) had three light contacts resulting in 1 VC KIA (C) and capture of 3 detainees. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had one light contact near CAREFULAN Base resulting in 1 VC KIA (C). On 16 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) had three light contacts resulting in 1 US WIA, 2 VC KIA (C) and capture of 1 individual weapon. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) had two light contacts resulting in 5 VC KIA (C). On 17 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) had four light contacts resulting in 2 VC KIA (C), 1 VC KIA (F), and 11 detainees captured. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted an airmobile assault into Base area 125 following a B-52 strike. One contact resulted in 1 VC KIA (C). The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) had one contact resulting in the capture of 1 individual weapon. On 18 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) had six light contacts resulting in 7 VC KIA (C) and capture of 7 individual weapons, and apprehension of 3 detainees. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had five light contacts resulting in 1 US WIA, 3 VC KIA (C), capture of 3 detainees and 3 individual weapons. Three light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) resulted in 3 VC KIA (C) and capture of 11 detainees. Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry captured 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 VC KIA (F) as the result of one contact near CAREFULAN Base. On 19 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) had four light contacts resulting in 2 VC KIA (C) and apprehension of 11 detainees. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had one contact resulting in 1 VC KIA (C). The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) had three light contacts resulting in 3 VC KIA (C) and capture of 1 individual weapon. Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry apprehended 7 detainees in one contact near CAREFULAN Base. On 20 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) had four light contacts resulting in 2 VC KIA (C) and capture of 34 detainees. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had three light contacts resulting in 2 VC KIA (C) and capture of 17 detainees. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) had one light contact resulting in 1 VC KIA (C). On 21 July one light contact by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) resulted in 1 VC KIA (C). The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had four light contacts resulting in 3 VC KIA (C) and capture of 1 detainee and 2 individual weapons. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) had three light contacts resulting in 2 VC KIA (C) and capture of 3 detainees and 1 individual weapon. On 22 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) had five light contacts resulting in 1 VC KIA (C) and capture of 8 detainees and 2 individual weapons. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had two contacts resulting in capture of 9 detainees and 1 individual weapon. Two light contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) resulted in 5 VC KIA (C) and capture of 3 individual weapons. On 23 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) had four contacts resulting in 4 VC KIA (C) and capture of 4 detainees and 1 individual weapon. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had one light contact resulting in 2 VC KIA (C). The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) had five light contacts resulting in 2 US WIA, 1 VC KIA (C) and capture of 1 detainee and 1 individual weapon. Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry apprehended 2 detainees in two contacts vicinity CAREFULAN Base. On 24 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) had five contacts resulting in 1 US WIA, 5 VC KIA (C) and capture of 1 detainee. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 2 VC KIA (C). The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) had two contacts resulting in the capture of 2 detainees and 1 individual weapon. Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry apprehended 3 detainees in one contact vicinity CAREFULAN Base. On 25 July three light contacts by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) resulted in 6 VC KIA (C) and capture of 3 detainees and 1 individual weapon. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had five light contacts resulting in 2 VC KIA (C) and capture of 3 detainees and 3 individual weapons. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) had eight light contacts resulting in 9 VC KIA (C) and capture of 12 detainees and 2 individual weapons. Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry captured 3 individual vicinities CAREFULAN Base. On 27 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) had two contacts resulting in 1 VC KIA (C) and capture of 1 detainee. Seven contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry resulted in 1 US WIA, capture of 13 detainees and 3
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR
(WVC/RCS/JJ/JJ)

individual weapons. One contact by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry
(reinforced) resulted in capture of 1 detainee. On 27 July nine light contacts
by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (minus) resulted in 1 US KIA, 6 US
KIA, 5 CIDG KIA, 13 VC KIA (C) and capture of 15 detainees and 3 individual weapons.
One element of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry observed 6 VC moving
along a valley floor and engaged with artillery. When the area was swept the unit
observed and engaged an unknown number of VC. Additional artillery was called in
and the element maneuvered forcing the enemy to break contact. The results of the
contact was 10 VC KIA (C). One other contact resulted in 1 VC KIA (C). Six light
contacts by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry (reinforced) resulted in 1
US KIA, 8 VC KIA (C) and capture of 3 detainees, 2 crew served and 1 individual
weapon. On 28 July 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had four light contacts
resulting in 1 US KIA, 2 US KIA, and capture of 7 detainees and 1 small arms. The
2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry captured 7 detainees in two contacts before
it and the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted airmobile extraction
to CARETAN Base where the two battalions conducted preparation for future operations
at CARETAN Base. Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry apprehended
4 detainees in one contact. On 29 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry
had four light contacts resulting in 10 VC KIA (C) and capture of 1 individual
weapon. On 30 July the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry had three light
contacts resulting in 3 VC KIA (C) and capture of 2 detainees. Troop A, 2d Squad­
ron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry apprehended 5 detainees in two contacts. One battery
from the 3d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery conducted an overland displace­
ment to QUANG MAI. C Battery, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery providing general
support reinforcing fire at CHAMPS Fire Base, conducted an airmobile displacement
to HA THANH CIDG Camp. On 1 August, one contact by the 1st Battalion (Airborne),
327th Infantry resulted in 2 VC KIA (C). The Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol
Platoon killed 1 VC KIA (C) in an ambush vicinity CARETAN Base. A second battery
of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery conducted an overland move to
QUANG MAI. During the move a Military Police Platoon vehicle detonated a mine
resulting in 1 US KIA and 2 US KIA. 1 detainee was apprehended in the vicinity
of the mining incident. At G2000N August 1967, Operation MALHEUR terminated
and Operation WOOD RIVER commenced. At the time of termination of Operation MALHEUR,
the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d
Infantry were initiating airmobile assaults west of QUANG MAI while the 1st
Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry continued search and destroy operations in
its area of operations in the northern portion of ZON AO.

12. (C) Results:

a. The 1st Brigade, 11th Airborne Division accomplished its mission
of conducting search and destroy operations to find, fix and destroy VC/NVA forces
and neutralize VC/NVA base camps in NOHANU, BANTOCO and ZON AO's.

b. The following losses were inflicted on the enemy during the operations:
269 VC/NVA KIA (C), 105 VC/NVA KIA (P), 62 WOC, 133 VC/NVA, 771 detainees, 295 in­
dividual weapons, 19 crew served weapons, 133 tons salt and 260,65 tons rice.

13. (C) Administration Matters:


14. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. At the beginning of Phase II the Brigade established Fire Base CHAMPS
containing one battery each of 105's and 155's in the AO. The Fire Base remained

CONFIDENTIAL
in place for the remainder of the operation. It was used as a refueling and rearming point during one airmobile assault. Since CHAMPS was located generally centered in the AO, the maneuver elements had continuous use of its fire support. Sufficient ammunition was stockpiled to provide a reserve against large contacts.

b. During Phase II, the Brigade organized its own air cavalry platoon from organic resources. Two armed LCH, two UH-1 gunships and six UH-1D troop carrier helicopters carrying one cavalry or infantry platoon comprised the force. This "Eagle Eye" force provides an organic capability to conduct rapid reconnaissance over large areas and to develop and exploit enemy situations encountered utilizing minimum friendly forces.

15. (C) Commanders Analysis:

a. Lessons Learned:

(1) Operations conducted against NVA forces in terrain lacking landing zones require that units (Company and Platoon) remain close enough together to permit rapid overload reinforcement of a unit which makes contact with a large size enemy force.

(2) A study of the location and organization of VC/NVA defensive positions and base areas encountered will result in the identification of a defensive pattern. When coupled with a detailed study, this pattern can be used to identify those locations throughout the area of operations where enemy positions can be expected.

(3) Well trained VC/NVA units will generally establish well camouflaged defensive positions on ridge lines and hills. Searching forces should always attempt to conduct their operations from higher to lower ground in order to retain as much tactical advantage as possible should one of these positions be encountered.

(4) Artillery should be fired forward of advancing elements particularly when an enemy defensive position is thought to exist to the front.

(5) The VC and NVA attempted to delay engagement with Brigade elements until the distance between forces was too small for effective use of artillery, FAC Air, and gunships.

(6) A unit in contact with an enemy force occupying fortified defensive positions should make maximum use of artillery, FAC Air and gunships to soften the enemy before attempting to assault. The use of non-persistent CS will often drive the enemy from his protected positions and maximize the effects of indirect fire support without impairing the assault of the enemy positions by the friendly forces.

(7) Training in identification of VC mines and booby traps must be continuously stressed despite the fact that enemy mines and booby traps may appear to be absent in the current area of operations. These devices are almost always present.

(8) Detainee screening should incorporate the services of district agency representatives and officials. Being more familiar with the area and the people, they will identify VC and NVA who might otherwise escape detection.

(9) Maximum use should be made of preplanned air strikes and Combat Skycopos in landing zone preparation for advancing troops in areas lacking natural landing zones to insure that emergency pickup zones are available to the units on the ground should they be needed.

(10) Trenches could be effectively contaminated with bags of persistent CS by placing the bags 7 meters apart within the tunnel complex and blasting all entrances closed.

(11) The most effective method for destruction of bunkers with overhead cover was to seed the bunker from the ground with persistent CS and collapse the overhead covering.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONBAT Operations After Action Report, Operation MAULIEUR (MOV/RCS/JJ/32)

(12) VC base camps and defensive positions containing numerous two and three man firing holes could be effectively contaminated from using persistent CS. The CS concentration remained effective for 4 to 6 weeks.

(13) A lack of helicopter landing zones causes the consumption of expendable 5 gallon water cans to increase by 300%. The cans are lowered to the troops by rope or dropped through the jungle canopy and are not easily recovered after use.

(14) Continued airlift of M60 Howitzers causes the life of the Panoramic telescope sight to be greatly reduced. Extreme care must be taken in handling howitzers as the sights and repair parts are not readily available.

(15) Where possible during valley clearing operations indigenous forces or members of the population should be used to herd livestock as the presence of US troops and helicopters will often cause cattle and buffalo to stampede.

b. Commanders Notes:

(1) During a lengthy operation of this nature, malaria, fever and fatigue can be expected to increase. A general loss of troop resistance to these infections can be expected when units operate in low valley floors which are or have been inhabited by the local population and their animals.

(2) Contacts initially were with company and battalion sized enemy forces who stood their ground and fought. Over the period of three months, the size of the enemy forces contacted became smaller until the majority of contacts involved two to five enemy. At the close of the operation the enemy appeared to be avoiding contact completely.

(3) CIDG forces operating in support of the Brigade provided assistance to companies and platoons through their knowledge of the terrain over which Brigade forces were operating. The Brigade assisted the CIDG by providing the fire support and reaction force capability necessary for them to conduct operations in areas not previously penetrated by them.

(4) Once again the enemy appeared to return to an area within 48 hours after US troops had passed through. At a minimum, reconnaissance elements should be employed to maintain surveillance over old AO's and to call fire on enemy re-entering the area.

(5) One ship landing zones prepared by preplanned Tactical Air or Combat Skydive normally require additional clearing by a ground force before they are suitable to accept a landing helicopter.

S. H. MATTHEWSON
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

10 Incls
1 - Intelligence
2 - Operations Schematics
3 - Personnel and Administration
4 - Logistics
5 - Chemical
6 - Civil Affairs
7 - Communications
8 - Psychological Operations
9 - Engineer
10 - Artillery

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Unnumbered (Intelligence) to Combat Operation After Action Report (Operations NALEUR 1 & II) (U)

1. (C) TERRAIN: The area of operation is predominantly mountainous terrain with the SONO VE VALLEY bisecting the area. The heavy vegetation afforded good cover and concealment but poor observation and fields of fire. The major contacts were made in the SONO VE VALLEY and MUI NON VI (WILL 464, BS 6453) areas. The main avenues of approach are Route 516 (H-G) and the SONO VE (H-G) and the SONO BA TO (H-G). Route 515 and numerous small rivers constitute the avenues east and west to the coast.

2. (U) WEATHER: The weather during Operation NALEUR was generally favorable for military operations. Under the influence of the southwest monsoon, the weather was characterized by weekly winds of 10-15 knots, scattered thunderstorms over the mountains, clear skies over the coastal plain. In May and June there were often large patches of ground fog in mountain valleys during the morning hours. Temperature ranged from the upper 90's during the day to the 70's at night. Relative humidity was generally in the range of 60 - 90%. Except for an occasional airstrike cancellation due to thunderstorms, the weather had no ill effect on the mission during Operation NALEUR.

3. (C) ANALYSIS:

(a) Intelligence Analysis

(1) The operation was conducted against the 2d VC Regiment, 34 IDA Division and 1st VC Regiment, 2d IDA Division. Local units were also contacted throughout the operation. Base area IZG was found not to contain significant facilities and should be deleted from active lists.

(2) The first phase of the operation was conducted in Base Area IZG, the SONO THU GIU VALLEY and western BA TO District. All three battalions of the 2d VC Regiment were contacted. Interrogation of prisoners and translations of documents revealed that the battalion commanders of the 93rd, 95th and 97th Battalions were killed. The enemy was found to be well fed and supplied with ammunition. The enemy fought well from prepared positions to protect his base areas, and when he felt he had the advantage, Western BA TO District appeared to be a rear area. Supplies of new clothing and equipment were captured. Prisoners taken here identified the 102nd Anti-aircraft battalion (a new identification) to be in the area. No direct contact was made with the 102nd Anti-aircraft battalion. The enemy units were fragmented during this phase.

(b) In the second phase the Brigade continued to pursue to 1st VC Regiment and 2d VC Regiment. The enemy moved from base area to base area in an attempt to evade contact and regroup. The SONO VE VALLEY was cleared of civilians and cattle to deny their use to the enemy. Several large caches of rice and salt were discovered and either destroyed or evacuated. The Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon conducted raids in the SONO VE VALLEY to bring out people who could give information regarding conditions there. The raids revealed considerable intelligence information and resulted in the capture of a local Viet Cong political cadre leader. The enemy was believed to be concentrating in Base Area IZG and that area was again penetrated forcing the enemy to flee from the hills out onto the coastal plain. Prisoners revealed the 97th Battalion was low on food and ammunition and morale was poor. In the BA BU District, the local Viet Cong Lead Quarters was attacked resulting in the District Chief and his secretary being killed, his replacement, a courier, and the production chief captured. The files of the BA BU District were also captured.
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclusion I (Intelligence) to Combat Operation After Action Report (Operations BALSER I & II) (U) cont'd

A VC prison camp was found based on information received from a refugee and agent reports. Twenty two prisoners were freed, all of whom were Vietnamese nationals.

b. Communication Security

(1) During the operation a total of 108,261 radio transmissions and 6,364 conventional telephone transmissions were monitored.

(2) A total of twenty two (22) transmission security violations were noted over the Brigade FM radio nets and 19 over the Strike switchboard.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Disclosures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency Allocations</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Places &amp; Operations</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage or Discussion of Callsign/Callword</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDY Personal Activities</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit Strength</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop Movement</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locations</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classified Information</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unauthorized Codes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Counterintelligence

(1) The Counterintelligence section screened detained persons at the Nghai Main detention center. This screening resulted in locating 15 VC personnel, 6 weapons, 6 rice caches and 2 tunnels. Approximately 95,000 $VN was expended for information at Nghai Main.

(2) The section established a program to recover munitions dispersed by the ammunition dump fire on 26 June 1967, by offering monetary payment to local nationals for surrendering munitions. This program resulted in the recovery of 401 rounds of ammunition at an expense of approximately 39,000 $VN.

(3) A program has been started which will aid in the control of Vietnamese laborers within the Brigade Base Camp area. A list of all Vietnamese authorized to work within the Brigade area was obtained from the DDC PRO District Chief. Photographs are being taken of these persons. Daily spot checks of the laborers will enable this section to detect any unauthorized Vietnamese within the Brigade area.

4. (C) Lessons Learned

a. Red Haze: The effect of Red Haze was reduced considerably because the natives burn their fields during the dry season. It was also learned through captured documents that the VC have implemented countermeasures against Red Haze in the form of fire discipline which resulted in a drastic use of Red Haze during Operation BALSER. Red Haze was not available on a responsive basis in any case.

b. Aerial Photography: Excellent support was provided in the way of photographic coverage including trail, landing and drop zones overlays throughout the entire operation. There were a few instances where we had short notice to procure photo coverage of new areas; however, because of direct telephone request to TASK FORCE CRESCENT, D-2, we were able to get the photography on time.

c. Visual Reconnaissance: The overall effect of Visual Reconnaissance was good throughout the operation. However, we only had one aircraft available, some areas could not be covered because of the requirement to have two ships in the area.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operation After Action Report (Operation MAIHEUR I & II) (b) cont'd

d. Use of Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon.

(1) On two occasions the Brigade Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon was utilized to conduct raids in the SONG VE Valley. Their mission was to secure individuals knowledgeable about conditions in the valley. The first raid was highly successful in that it caught the enemy by surprise and resulted in capturing a Viet Cong Political Officer and several cooperative civilians. The second raid netted additional civilians who confirmed information obtained previously.

(2) The Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon was utilized to maintain surveillance on the SONG VE Valley, while the Brigade was operating to the West. Gunships and artillery were used to engage groups of the enemy seen in the valley.

(3) The Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon established observation over routes south of Base Area 102. Artillery was utilized to engage enemy forces trying to flee south.

(4) An intensive training program was initiated to qualify new members of the Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon. Night ambushes and patrols were utilized outside the base camp perimeter for familiarization in night operations resulting in several small enemy contacts.

e. Base Area and Fortification Study:

(1) A study was undertaken to determine if patterns existed for the establishment of enemy base camps and defensive fortifications. It was found during early operations that the enemy invariably established his bases in the upper reaches of draws where water was available and dense foliage precluded aerial observation. Fortifications were found on the "fingers" covering the base camps and were mutually supporting. A comparison with information obtained from other sources such as agent reports, trail studies, etc., indicated a pattern did exist and potential base areas and bunkered positions could be predicted.

(2) Information obtained from CICV, photos, Red Haze, Visual Reconnaissance Special Agent Report was placed on overlays and the density of activity plotted. The activity generally fell into terrain favored by the enemy for his camps. The information was then placed on maps using red to represent probable base camp locations. A careful study of surrounding terrain was made to determine likely defensive positions and these entered in blue on the map. Thus commanders were presented with a clear indication of most likely areas of interest. Exploitation using this method of locating base camps has proved to be accurate and this method of prediction will continue to be utilized where enemy activity appears to fit this pattern.

5. (C) ENEMY LOSSES: The following losses were sustained by the enemy during MAIHEUR I & II.

a. Personnel:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAIHEUR I</th>
<th>MAIHEUR II</th>
<th>TOTAL IN COUNTRY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA (C)</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA Estimated</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POC VC/PA</td>
<td>10/2</td>
<td>52/15</td>
<td>67/20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drowned</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*VC POW</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*POW POW</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operation After Action Report
(Operations MALEUR I & II) (U) cont'd

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALEUR I</th>
<th>MALEUR II</th>
<th>TOTAL IN COUNTRY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Defendant</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innocent Civilian</td>
<td>171</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unprocessed</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60mm Mortar</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Body/Weapons Ratio</td>
<td>3:1:1</td>
<td>4:5:1</td>
<td>3.5:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kill Ratio</td>
<td>7:2:1</td>
<td>10:3:1</td>
<td>8:8:1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*included in POW figures
**unsual data due to Medical Evacuation or the like reason

b. Weapons:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALEUR I</th>
<th>MALEUR II</th>
<th>TOTAL IN COUNTRY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AK-47</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1 Carbine</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMG</td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-90</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bren Model MKI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M19-44</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rk</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicom Carbine</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicom Type 50</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62 SMG</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 58 Assault</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thompson SGE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 Cal Pistol</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Cal Pistol</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 Cal SM7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flare Pistol</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60mm Mortar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82mm Mortar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field-charger</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pyrotech-char</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALEUR I</th>
<th>MALEUR II</th>
<th>TOTAL IN COUNTRY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms</td>
<td>16895</td>
<td>19701</td>
<td>36606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60mm Mortar</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82mm Mortar</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40mm Mortar (M-79) 2 rds</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5 in Rocket</td>
<td>3 rds</td>
<td>3 rds</td>
<td>6 rds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claymore Mines</td>
<td>4 rds</td>
<td></td>
<td>4 rds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Food Stuffs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALEUR I</th>
<th>MALEUR II</th>
<th>TOTAL IN COUNTRY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>3043</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>1331</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish Oil</td>
<td>85 gal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corn</td>
<td>65-55 gal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Installations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALEUR I</th>
<th>MALEUR II</th>
<th>TOTAL IN COUNTRY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fortified bunkers - Hut complexes</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Camp</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A total of 140 installations (bunker, Base Camps, Trench, Hospitals, Caves, and huts) were encountered during the operation.

c. Miscellaneous:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALEUR I</th>
<th>MALEUR II</th>
<th>TOTAL IN COUNTRY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field Phones</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric circuit tester</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilde Talkie radio's</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switch board</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

(Intelligence) to Combat Operation After Action Report

MS PUBS 1 & II (U) cont'd

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tape recorders</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transistor radio's</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eagle</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRC 10 radios</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas Mask</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refrigerator</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Scooters</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Cylinder Engine</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handsets</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coax Wire</td>
<td>2 miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switch Board Jacks</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicycles</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speakers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batteries Bt 30</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rolls Cloth</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Large amounts of medical supplies

**Notes:**

A - Order of Battle

B - Organisation and Strength to OB
CONFIDENTIAL

TABC (Order of Battle) to Inelosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operation
After Action Report (Operations MAJUER I & II) (U)

1. (C) VC/NVA Initial Order of Battle

a. NVA Units

(1) The 2nd NVA Division composed of the 1st VC Regiment, 3rd
NVA Regiment, and the 21st NVA Regiment, and supporting
units, was continued to be operating in QUANG NAM Province.
3rd NVA and 21st NVA Regiments were believed to be
operating north of the initial area of operations. The
1st VC Regiment composed of four VC battalions was located
in the vicinity of BS 550570. The subordinate battalions
were believed to be located at the following positions:
404th Battalion (BS 6655), 68th Battalion (BS 5848), 70th
Battalion outside the area of operations, and 33th Battalion
(BS 7043).

(2) The 3rd NVA Division composed of the 22d VC Regiment, 18th NVA
Regiment, and the 224 NVA Regiment, and supporting units,
was believed to be operating in the southern portion of the
initial area of operations with the division headquarters in
the vicinity of BS 750200. The 22d VC Regiment, within its
headquarters in the vicinity of BS 600360, was believed to be
operating with the 1st VC Battalion, 2d VC Battalion, and
3rd VC Battalion in the area of operations. The 22d NVA
Regiment, in the vicinity of BS 790230, was believed to be
deploying the 8th NVA Division was expected to influence
the area of operations in a reinforcing role only.

b. VC Units:

(1) The 31st Viet Cong Local Force Battalion was believed to be oper-
ating in the NO BIC District (BS 7836) within Base Area 123.

(2) The 48th Viet Cong Local Force Battalion was reported to be in
the vicinity of BS 6130.

(3) The 409th Sapper Battalion was believed to be in the same area
of operations but its location was unknown.

(4) There were nine VC District Force (Guerrilla) companies within
QUANG NAM Province. The locations for these companies were
unconfirmed.

c. Base Areas: There were four base camp areas reported within the
area of operations. Base Area 122 Binh Du, vicinity of BS 5049
Base Area 123 Binh Xuyen, vicinity of BS 6165, Base Area 124, Nui Phu,
vicinity of BS 7825. A base area is considered a safe and secure
area in which to train, rest, and regroup for combat.

2. (C) Order of Battle Findings and Summary in the Operational Area

a. Units not Contacted

(1) Elements of the 3rd and 21st NVA Regiment, 2nd NVA Division
were not contacted during operation MAJUER I & II, and are
currently located in QUANG BINH and QUANG NAM Provinces
respectively.

(2) Elements of the 18th and 22nd NVA Regiment, 3rd NVA
Division were not contacted during the operation. The
1st Cavalry Division Air Mobile had contact to the south
with the 18th and 22nd NVA Regiments. The 3rd Brigade,
29th Division had contact with 79th NVA Regiment south
east of the 1st Brigade area. The 22nd NVA Regiment
operated in the north in the MURJU-QUANG NAM Province
Border Area. The 18th NVA Regiment continues to operate
south of the MAJUER area of operations.

CONFIDENTIAL
(3) Elements of the 409th MP Battalion were not contacted during Operation MAJESTY I & II. Although numerous reports prior to the Brigade arrival place this unit in the operational area, no contact was made with the unit, and it was consequently dropped from Order of Battle holdings. Agent reports from III HU, Sector Intelligence in QUANG NGAI, and from Task Force Oregon placed this unit north of our area in the vicinity BS 6176. It is probably broken into small elements which are attached to other units.

b. Units with light contact

(1) Elements of the 38th & 48th WILP Battalions were not contacted in force during MAJESTY I & II. Based on numerous Agent Reports from higher and adjacent units, these units were probably contacted in small units. As a result of the size of the contacts, Intelligence results were insignificant. These units have as their primary interest the coastal plains area. During the operation they did not deviate from this, and are currently located north of our area, vicinity BS 6175 and BS 7382 respectively.

(2) Small resistance groups (normally 5 to 10 personnel) which are elements of the seven district and local force units, were contacted periodically throughout the Tactical Area of Responsibility with insignificant Intelligence results.

c. Units Contacted

(1) Element of the 1st VC Regiment, and 2nd NVA Division were contacted in force during these operations. On the 15th of May 1967, Reconnaissance element of 1st Battalion (abn) 327th Infantry encountered a Battalion size force at BS 676421 which was confirmed to be a portion of the 1st VC Regiment. The result of the engagement was 20 enemy KIA (C). On 12 June Company A 1st Battalion (abn) 327th Infantry amassed 9 enemy with documents showing them to have been members of the 60th Battalion, 1st NVA Regiment. On 15 June Company A 1st Battalion (abn) 327th Infantry recorded 1 enemy KIA with documents that revealed he was a member of the 60th Battalion 1st NVA Regiment. On 11 July, Reconnaissance Platoon 2nd Battalion (abn) 502d Infantry engaged an estimated company size unit. The enemy returned fire with mortars, 57mm RR and small arms. The enemy broke contact when friendly reinforcements arrived. One enemy KIA (C) and one AK-47 were found. A search of the area at daylight revealed 25 newly dug positions, and numerous bloody trails, bandages and bloody clothing. A Prisoner of War captured the following day revealed that the contact had been made with elements of the 90th Battalion, 1st VC Regiment. On 26 June 1967, a Ho Chi Minh revealed that the strength of the 1st VC Regiment was approximately 700 men. The Regimental Headquarters and support elements had 200 men together, the 50th Battalion had approximately 160 men, the 40th Battalion had approximately 140, and the 90th Battalion had approximately 170 men. The Ho Chi Minh also stated that the Battalions were so understrength due to losses that they were referred to as reinforced companies. Other casualties have been assessed due to the lack of reliable prisoners and documents captured during contact. The 1st VC Regimental is believed to be located northwest of our Tactical Area of Responsibility, vicinity BS 6570.
CONFIDENTIAL

TAB 1 (Order of Battle) to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operation After Action Report (Operations MALEHUR I & II) (5) cont'd

(2) Element of the 2nd VC Regiment, 3rd NVA Division, were contacted in force during this operation. On 13 May, Company B, 1st Battalion (Abn) 327th Infantry engaged a company size unit believed to be subordinate to the 2nd VC Regiment. The results of the contact was 13 enemy KIA (C). On 18 May, Company A, 2nd Battalion (Abn) 502d Infantry contacted an estimated Battalion size force vicinity BS 710310 with a results of 25 enemy KIA (C). Based on the continued contacts with this Regiment, Regimental strength is probably about 500-900 personnel, with Battalions at a strength of approximately 100. The 2nd VC Regiment is believed to be located southeast of our Tactical area of Responsibility, vicinity BS 7728 and BS 8044.

(3) Final Disposition of the 1st & 2nd VC Regiments:
(a) 1st NVA Regiment Headquarters vicinity BS 5269
   1 40th Battalion, 1st NVA - vicinity BS 6547
   2 60th Battalion, 1st NVA - vicinity BS 4707
   2 70th Battalion, 1st NVA - vicinity TIZHN PHUC/C TAM KI
   4 90th Battalion, 1st NVA - vicinity BS 4566
(b) 2nd NVA Regiment Headquarters - vicinity BS 629347
   1 3rd Battalion, 2nd NVA - vicinity BS 7728
   2 95th Battalion, 2nd NVA - vicinity BS 6254
(c) 7th Battalion, 2nd NVA - vicinity BS 8044

(4) The friendly operations initiated during Operations MALEHUR I & II have reduced the enemy's combat effectiveness. Interrogation of Prisoners of War and returnees reports indicate that the enemy's combat effectiveness has further been reduced due to illness, desertions, friendly air strikes and ground operations. The VC units have been forced to split into small groups to avoid contact with friendly ground forces, while attempting to regroup in safer areas to the northwest and southeast. Morale has been another factor which influenced the combat effectiveness of the enemy units, as reported from Interrogation of Prisoners of War and returnees, morale is poor among the low echelon cadre for many of the above reasons. The enemy units have the capability of regrouping and becoming a limited threat when the terrain and defensive posture is to their advantage, and they should be viewed accordingly.

(5) See TAB B Order of Battle Information pertaining to Organization and strength of the 1st and 2nd NVN Regiments.

d. New Units Contacted: 107 Anti Aircraft Battalion (also Known as 270th Battalion)

(1) History

Infiltration: In December 66, the 270th Battalion (also Known as 107th) moved to Lai Halet, NGO QUAN District, NHO BINH Province, where the member of the Battalion moved in with the local populace, in an
effort to avoid being bombed. After one month, everyone was given a 10 day leave, to report back to IA M.N.L. Not later than 17 January 67, the Battalion began its infiltration march, which took four months, and it was all by foot. The unit crossed the Demilitarized Zone, entered Luong and then worked down through THU. THIEN, QUANG TIN, and into QUANG NOI Province. The unit stopped for one day of rest every fifth day. The Battalion finally set up, for the first time on 26 May 67, after arriving in QUANG NOI Province. They set up in a valley approximately a two day walk south or southeast of BN 503433.

(2) Training and Tactics

(a) The battalion was formed and training began in late April 1966. The officers and Non Commissioned Officers for the Battalion were drawn from the 42nd and 50th Regiments, 350th Division. This division is responsible for the defense of HAI PHONG. The battalion first had to build its camp, which was located in the mountains of VU BAN (District), HOA BINH (Province). The first two days of training were devoted to basic infantry training, with the SKS rifle. Each man fired five rounds at a 50 meter target. They also received instructions in grenades and the use of the bayonet. For the following six months, all training was devoted to the 12.7mm Heavy Machine Gun.

1. First Month: Disassembling, assembling, cleaning and care of the weapon.

2. Second Month: Carrying the weapon and preparations for battle. When the unit is moving, the weapon is broken down, for carrying, as follows: The assistant Squad Leader carries an extra barrel, if available. The Battalion currently has an extra barrel for each of its nine (9) Heavy Machine Guns. The Squad Leader carries the sights. One man carries the tripod, one the wheels, all nine weapons in the 107th Battalion are complete, with wheels. Three men carry the firing mechanism and barrel. The rest of the personnel carry ammunition. The 107th Battalion currently has 200 rounds per weapon. During the infiltration march, an unknown amount was lost. Soon after their arrival in QUANG NOI (Province), they were resupplied to bring the supply to its present level.

3. Third thru Sixth Month: Setting up positions, use of field of fire, support of infantry in both defense and attack, employment against armored Personnel Carrier and convoys. Each man fired 28 rounds, during training, on a 200 meter range, at an opening in a wooden board, the opening being 25mm x 75mm. They fired once during daylight and once at night, each time firing one burst of five rounds and one of nine rounds.

CONFIDENTIAL
(b) Employment:

1. The 107th Battalion constructs its positions as follows: There is no room in the middle to set the gun on. The walls of the bunkers are 1.60 meters high and 0.80 meters thick. The inside diameter is 3.00 meters. In bivouac, the three companies set up in triangular pattern, with the Battalion Command Post in the center. Each unit is about three minutes walk apart.

2. Within each company, the three weapons are also set up in a triangular pattern, with three positions prepared for each weapon. Distance between each of these positions is approximately 500 meters. The primary and alternate positions are well camouflaged. None of the positions are occupied. The gun team waits a safe distance from the primary position. If the positions are bombed, they feel sure a heliborne attack will follow. After the bombing, they then occupy the primary position and commence fire when the helicopters come within range. Before the helicopters land, however, the gun teams withdraw to the alternate positions.

(c) Communications:

In the North Viet Nam, the Battalion used field phones for communication between the company, and the battalion; however they did not bring any to South Viet Nam and must rely on messengers.

3. (c) COMPOSITION:

a. In North Viet Nam, the 320B Division is part of the III Corps. Unknown number of Division make up the Corps.

b. The 320B Division has three Regiments, however the 3rd Regiment is the only one about which information is known.

c. The 3rd Regiment consists of 10 battalions.

(1) The 301st, 302d Infantry Battalions.

(2) The 269th, 270th, 271st and 272d Anti-Aircraft Battalions.

(3) The 270th (also Known as 107th) Anti-Aircraft Battalion has three companies numbered 1, 2 and 3.

(4) Each company has two Platoons, numbered 1 and 2.

(5) Each platoon has three squads. The squad in the 1st platoon are numbered 1, 2 and 3. Those in the 2d platoon are numbered 4, 5 and 6.

(6) Each squad has three cells.

4. (c) STRENGTH (Weapons):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>In North Viet Nam</th>
<th>In South Viet Nam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Aircraft Battalion</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Aircraft Company</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platoon</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>45-47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squad</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10-12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

T.O.B. (Order of Battle) to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operation Action Report (Operations KALMUR I & II) (U) cont'd

2. STRENGTH (Weapons):

a. Every two squads in the Battalion 1 x 12.7 Heavy machine Gun, total of 9.

b. Company level officers and above have K-45 pistols.

c. Platoon leaders, assistant platoon leaders and squad leaders have M-58s.

d. Other personnel do not have small arms because they must carry parts of the Heavy machine Guns when unit is moving.
CONFIDENTIAL

1st VC Regiment, 2nd NVA Division

ALSO KNOWN AS:

WORKSITE I
Gong Truong 1
Stone Worksite
Night Dragon
Cuu Long
Southwind

PERSONALITIES

CONFIDENCE

Trieu Chu Dinh
Tran Duc Tung

EXECUTIVE OFFICERS

Chou
Chou An Tan

HEADQUARTERS LOCATION

Confirmed Location vicinity BS 5368, 1 August 1967 Task Force Oregon
Accepted Location vicinity Base Area 122

HQ STRENGTH

200 men, 1st Brigade, 101 Airborne Division, 15 August 1967.

NOTE: Evaluation based on enemy casualties, interrogation prisoners of war reports and captured documents.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Tab B (Organization and Strength) to Inclosure I (Intelligence) to
After Action Report (Operation MALEEUR I and II) (U) Cont'd

40th VC Bn, 1st VC Regiment

ALSO KNOWN AS:

80th Bn
Tham Hai
Nam Hai
3rd Bn
Phi Doi 2007
Song Ma

1st Co/40th
C1

2nd Co/40th
C2

3rd Co/40th
C3

4th Co/40th
C4

PERSONALITIES

CONDUCTORS

Tien
Nang
Miang
Ha Dong Loi

EXECUTIVE OFFICERS

Tan
Vu

POLITICAL OFFICER

Miang
Xuang

WEAPONS

8 81mm RL & nT guns
3 81mm mortars
5 60mm mortars
3 88mm HE

7 30 cal. MG
4 50 cal. MG
14 CCKS (SKS)
12 MGs

LOCATION

Confirmed: Vicinity BS 6547, TPO 1 August 1967
Accepted: Vicinity BS 6547, B. 123

STRENGTH

150 men, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, 15 August 1967

NOTE: Evaluation based on enemy casualties, Interrogation prisoners
of war reports and captured documents.
CONFIDENTIAL

Tab B (Organization and Strength) to Enclosure 1 (Intelligence) to
Situation Report (Operation NAMJUER I and II) (U) Cont'd

60th VC Bn, 1st VC Regiment

ALSO NAMJUER:

1st Bn Ap Bac 120 1st Co/60th Thanh Ha 601
T.112 X 60 2nd Co/60th Thanh Ha 602
Thanh Ha 470 3rd Co/60th Thanh Ha 603
Ap Bac 2006 Thong Ha 4th Co/60th Thanh Ha 604
Thanh Ha 470

PERSONALITIES

CON-JUNKS EXECUTIVE OFFICERS POLITICAL OFFICER

Houng Thong VQ Duc
Do Cong Hai Sinh Lich

WEAPONS

2 81mm mortars
3 37mm weapons (cal unk)
2 3.40 mortars
6 60mm mortars
4 30mm mortars
1 57mm FR

LOCATION

Confirmed location: vicinity BS 4764, 1 August Task Force Oregon
Accepted location: vicinity Base Area 122

STRENGTH

3udo men, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, 15 August 1967
NOTE: Evaluation based on enemy casualties, interrogation prisoners of war reports and captured documents.
CONFIDENTIAL

70th VC Bn, 1st VC Regiment

ALSO KNOWN AS:

P-67
Tiger Bn
Truong Son 70
Chu Song
Phi Del 2009
Chu Long
35th Bn

1st Co/70th
2nd Co/70th
3rd Co/70th
4th Co/70th

PERSONALITIES

EXECUTIVE OFFICERS  POLITICAL OFFICER

Trinh Thiet Hong  Vu Thanh Nam  Thua  Duan Cong Thanh
Nguyen Doc Cong  Tran Doc Thang
Hoang Ngo  Hoang
Nguyen an  Tin
Tran Van Chua

WEAPONS

6 60mm mortars
12 82mm mortars (French)
12 1.25 Rockets Launcher
3 81mm mortars
4 57mm BR
12 Placethrowers

LOCATION

Confirmed: vicinity Tien Phuoc/Tam Ky, 1 August 67
Accepted: vicinity Tien Phuoc/Tam Ky, 1 August 67

STRENGTH

300 men, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division 15 August 1967

NOTE: Evaluation based on enemy casualties, Interrogation prisoners of war reports and captured documents.
CONFIDENTIAL

Tab D (Organization and Strength) to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to After Action Report (Operation KIANGU 1 and 2) (U) Cont'd

90th VC Bn, 1st VC Regiment

Also Known As:

51st Bn
Song Hong
Truong Son 214
Thach Tri
Xuyen Son 216
33rd Bn
1st Dec 2008
X.90

1st Co/90th
Son Hong 1
Truong Son 211

2nd Co/90th
Son Hong 2
Truong Son 212

3rd Co/90th
Son Hong 3
Truong Son 213

4th Co/90th
Son Hong 4
Truong Son 214

PERSONALITIES

EXECUTIVE OFFICERS

Vo Ngoc Can

POLITICAL OFFICER

Phong

WEAPONS

2 81mm mortars
1 57mm BAR
3 30 cal MG's
3 LMG's

LOCATION

Confirmed: vicinity BS 4566 TPO 1, August 1967
accepted: vicinity Base Area 221, August 1967

STRENGTH

170 men, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, August 1967

NOTE: Evaluation based on enemy casualties, interrogation prisoners of war reports and captured documents.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Tab 9 (Organization and Strength) to Enclosure 1 (Intelligence) to
After Action Report (Operation MAJEUR I and II) (U)

2nd VC Regiment, 3rd NVA Division

Also Known As:

Norksite II
Thien Phuoc 600
Quyet Chan
Le Loi
Province 2
Anh Hai
Group 120
Black Tiger

Song Ba
Tanh 2
8th Regiment
Lien Gia 2
11th Regiment
Song Hong
Inter-Family 2
Hong Ha

EXECUTIVE OFFICERS

Nguyen Thanh Hao
Trong
Ngat
Tri

POLITICAL OFFICER

Ly Trong Hung

HEADQUARTERS LOCATION

Confirmed Location
Vic BS 60C310 - 18 June, Task Force Oregon

Accepted Location
Vic BS 609364 - 25 June, III Marine Amphibious Force

STRENGTH

250 men, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, 15 August 1967

Note: Evaluation based on enemy casualties, interrogation prisoners of
war reports and captured documents.
CONFIDENTIAL

Tab 1 (Organization and Strength) to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to After Action Report (Operation NAHEUR I and II) (U) Cont'd

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Letter Box Number</th>
<th>2nd VC Regiment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6200</td>
<td>Unknown Unit 2nd VC Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6210</td>
<td>93rd Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6241</td>
<td>Possible 1st Company 93rd Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6242</td>
<td>2nd Company 93rd Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.100GM</td>
<td>2nd Regiment Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.101GM</td>
<td>Military Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.102GM</td>
<td>Political Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.103GM</td>
<td>Rear Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.104GM</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.105GM</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.106GM</td>
<td>75mm HR Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.107GM</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.108GM</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.110GM</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.111GM</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.112GM</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.113GM</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.114GM</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.116GM</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.117GM</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.118GM</td>
<td>93rd Battalion Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.119GM</td>
<td>4th Battalion Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.122GM</td>
<td>1st Infantry Company, 93rd Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.123GM</td>
<td>2nd Infantry Company, 93rd Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.124GM</td>
<td>3rd Infantry Company, 93rd Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.130GM</td>
<td>95th Battalion Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.131GM</td>
<td>1st Infantry Company, 95th Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.132GM</td>
<td>2nd Infantry Company, 95th Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.133GM</td>
<td>3rd Infantry Company, 95th Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.134GM</td>
<td>4th Heavy Weapons Company, 95th Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.142GM</td>
<td>97th Battalion Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.144GM</td>
<td>1st Infantry Company, 97th Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.145GM</td>
<td>2nd Infantry Company, 97th Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.146GM</td>
<td>2nd Infantry Company, 97th Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.147GM</td>
<td>4th Heavy Weapons Company, 97th Battalion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Tab D (Organization and Strength) to Enclosure 1 (Intelligence) to After Action Report (Operations BALJSET 1 and II) (U) Cont'd

93rd VC Battalion, 2nd VC Regiment

ALSO KNOWN AS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>VC Regiment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N-21</td>
<td>X-93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-102</td>
<td>INTER UNIT 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba</td>
<td>GROUP 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 21</td>
<td>LIEN CL 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCT Group</td>
<td>93rd Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNT Ba</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PERSONALITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPANY COMMANDERS</th>
<th>EXECUTIVE OFFICERS</th>
<th>POLITICAL OFFICERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DAOT DOAN</td>
<td>NGUYEN DUY TAN</td>
<td>NGUYEN VAN SANG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUY</td>
<td>NGUYEN TUNH</td>
<td>CAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-H</td>
<td>CAO BONG LIEN</td>
<td>DUYEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XD QUANG</td>
<td>NGUYEN TUNH</td>
<td>BUNG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHIEP</td>
<td>NGUYEN TUNH</td>
<td>THU MINH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

WEAPONS

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 82mm Mortars</td>
<td>4 7.62s machine Guns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 7.62s AR</td>
<td>2 .50in Anti-Aircraft Guns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 82mm Mortars</td>
<td>2 RPG Light Machine Gun</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 81mm Rocket Launcher</td>
<td>7 Carbines and Rifles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 107mm Machine Guns</td>
<td>4 37mm Recoilless Rifles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 81mm Mortars</td>
<td>4 30 Caliber Machine gun</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LOCATION

Confirmed: vicinity BS 7630 1 August
Accepted vicinity BS 7630 1 August Task Force Oregon

STRENGTH

200 men, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, 15 August 1967
NOTE: Evaluation based on enemy casualties, interrogation prisoners of war reports and captured documents.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Tab B (Organization and Strength) to Enclosure 1 (Intelligence) to
After Action Report (Operations PHU DEU I and II) (U) Cont'd

95th VC Battalion, 2nd VC Regiment

ALSO KNOWN AS

BL NINH
CHI KIM
H22
DON D3 515
LEEN DOI 2
THONG BANG 260
XUONG 95
XUONG 95
THONG SANG 260
HUY
District 22

Inter-Unit 2
THON BANG 63
5th Battalion
CHI KIM 64
XOM 2
K22
H52
BL MINH
X95
Unit 511

PERSONALITIES

COMMANDERS

TU
LE PHO
M. I VANCHEN
TU
NOO AN

EXECUTIVE OFFICER

DUONG
MINH
MINH
VINH

POLITICAL OFFICER

CHI MINH
PHIST
VINH

WEAPONS

1st Company

2 Light Machine Guns
2 XK-17
3 K-50
6 SKS
16 Grenades

9 60mm Mortars
6 30 Caliber Machine Guns
9 .50's
72 Sub Machine Guns
8 81mm Mortars
4 57mm RR

Total

8 50 Caliber Machine Guns
27 B.R's
6 Bazooka's
16 XK-17
8 SKS

LOCATION

Confirmed vicinity BS 6354 1 August 1967
Accepted vicinity BS 6354 1 August 1967

STRENGTH

200 men, 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division, 1 August 1967

NOTE: Evaluation based on enemy casualties, interrogation prisoners of war reports and captured documents.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Tab B (Organization and Strength) to Enclosure 1 (Intelligence) to After Action Report (Operation LAMEK I and II) (U)

97th VC Battalion, 2nd VC Regiment

ALSO KNOWN AS

703 Battalion
Chi Ray
Huyen 2
District 23rd Battalion
Chi Bo
Hong Ha 1
6th District

PERSONALITIES

EXECUTIVE OFFICERS

POLITICAL OFFICERS

General Tran Dai
Chi Binh
Ly
Jin

Trong Vinh
Truc Binh

WEAPONS

4 81mm mortars
2 75mm BR
2 50 caliber machine gun
2 60mm mortars
6 Sub-machine gun, K50, K44 & Carbines
4 57mm BR
1 Chicago Heavy machine gun
4 Pistols

LOCATION

Confirmed vicinity BS 8043 1 August
Accepted vicinity BS 8043 3 July Task Force Oregon

STRENGTH

200 men, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, 15 August 1967

NOTE: Evaluation based on enemy casualties, interrogation prisoners of war reports and captured documents.

CONFIDENTIAL
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CONFIRMED</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1st VC Regiment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters Support</td>
<td>BS 5268</td>
<td>1 August Task Force Oregon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40th Battalion</td>
<td>BS 6447</td>
<td>1 August Task Force Oregon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66th Battalion</td>
<td>BS 4767</td>
<td>1 August Task Force Oregon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70th Battalion</td>
<td>TIEN PHOC/T.M KY</td>
<td>1 August Task Force Oregon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93th Battalion</td>
<td>BS 4566</td>
<td>1 August Task Force Oregon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>22nd NVA Regiment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters Support</td>
<td>BS 6236</td>
<td>1 August Task Force Oregon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd Battalion</td>
<td>BS 7728</td>
<td>1 August Task Force Oregon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th Battalion</td>
<td>BS 6254</td>
<td>1 August Task Force Oregon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48th Battalion</td>
<td>BS 8044</td>
<td>1 August Task Force Oregon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2nd VC Regiment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters Support</td>
<td>BS 7623</td>
<td>23 May 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th Battalion</td>
<td>BS 7524</td>
<td>16 May 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Battalion</td>
<td>BS 6013</td>
<td>19 May 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>409th Sapper Battalion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th Battalion</td>
<td>BS 4981</td>
<td>1 August 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th Battalion</td>
<td>BS 5360</td>
<td>1 August 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th Battalion</td>
<td>BS 4980</td>
<td>1 August 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>21 VCLF Battalion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th Battalion</td>
<td>BS 7463</td>
<td>18 June 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Battalion</td>
<td>BS 7555</td>
<td>18 June 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22nd Battalion</td>
<td>BS 7056</td>
<td>18 June 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>212 VCLF Company</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Battalion</td>
<td>BS 7462</td>
<td>18 June 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>219 VCLF Company</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Battalion</td>
<td>BS 5636</td>
<td>18 June 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22nd Battalion</td>
<td>BS 7552</td>
<td>18 June 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>506 A Sapper Company</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Battalion</td>
<td>BS 7556</td>
<td>1 August 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>506 B Sapper Company</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Battalion</td>
<td>BS 5665</td>
<td>1 August 67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

Tab B (Schematic) to Inclosure 2 to Combat After Action Report, "Opération (MALHEUR)(U)"
CONFIDENTIAL

Tab C (Schematic) to Inclosure 2 (Operations Schematic) to Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR
CONFIDENTIAL

Tab D (Schematic) to Inclusion 2 (Operation Schematic) to Combat Operations: After Action Report, Operation MALHEIR
Tab E (Schematic) to Inclosure 2 to Combat After Action Report, Operation (MAJUER)(U)
Confidential

Tab V (Schematic) to Enclosure 2 to Combat After Action Report, Operation (NAMUR) (U)
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclusion 3 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR (1)

1. (G) UNIT STRENGTHS:

a. Beginning of Phase I of Operation MALHEUR.

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of Phase I of Operation MALHEUR were as follows:

- Authorized Augmented (MTOE) 4,510
- Assigned 4,548
- Present for Duty 4,386
- Airhead - DUC PHO 3642
- Base Camp - PHAN RANG 854
- Not Present for Duty 391

(2) The assigned strength was 102% of the authorized augmented strength. The present for duty strength was 96% of the authorized augmented strength.

b. Conclusion of Phase I of Operation MALHEUR.

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Phase I of Operation MALHEUR were as follows:

- Authorized Augmented (MTOE) 4,510
- Assigned 4,626
- Present for Duty 4,396
- Airhead - DUC PHO 3648
- Base Camp - PHAN RANG 818
- Not Present for Duty 310

(2) The assigned strength was 104% of the authorized augmented strength. The present for duty strength was 95% of the authorized augmented strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength: 28 were hospitalized, 34 were intransit, 137 were on TDY/SD status, 17 on leave, 15 in confinement, and 6 AWOL.

c. Beginning of Phase II of Operation MALHEUR.

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of Phase II of Operation MALHEUR were as follows:

- Authorized Augmented (MTOE) 4,510
- Assigned 4,626
- Present for Duty 4,396
- Airhead - DUC PHO 3648
- Base Camp - PHAN RANG 818
- Not Present for Duty 310

(2) The assigned strength was 102% of the authorized augmented strength. The present for duty strength was 95% of the authorized augmented strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength: 24 were hospitalized, 44 were intransit, 118 were on TDY/SD status, 110 on leave, 18 in confinement, and 6 AWOL.

d. Conclusion of Phase II of Operation MALHEUR.

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Phase II of Operation MALHEUR were as follows:

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

In: 4 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized Augmented (KTO)</th>
<th>4510</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>5087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present for Duty</td>
<td>4736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airhead - DUC PBO</td>
<td>3906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Camp - PHN RAND</td>
<td>830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Present for Duty</td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The assigned strength was 112% of the augmented authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 104% of the augmented authorized strength.

(3) Of the not present for duty strength; 21 were hospitalized, 54 were in transit, 123 were on TOG/SD status, 137 on leave, 10 in confinement, and 6 NJOL.

e. Replacements received during Phase I of the operation were assigned to subordinate units as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFF KM</th>
<th>OFF KM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-327</td>
<td>2 75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-327</td>
<td>4 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-502</td>
<td>4 89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-127</td>
<td>2 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-327</td>
<td>6 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-502</td>
<td>1 30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. Replacements received during Phase II of the operation were assigned to subordinate units as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFF KM</th>
<th>OFF KM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-327</td>
<td>2 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-327</td>
<td>5 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-502</td>
<td>2 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-327</td>
<td>6 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-502</td>
<td>6 41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| g. Total replacements received for Operation MALHEUR were: 703.

2. (C) CASUALTIES:

a. Casualties for Phase I of the operation were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC LARP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-327</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-327</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-502</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-320</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/2-17 Cav</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/326 Engr</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42 Inf (SD)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Casualties for Phase II of the operation were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC LARP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-327</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-327</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-502</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-320</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/2-17 Cav</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/326 Engr</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42 Inf (CD)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 3 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MAIHEUR (U)

1. Total casualties for Operation MAIHEUR were:

   
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NKA</th>
<th>MHA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Total casualties to date:

   
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NKA</th>
<th>MHA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>473</td>
<td>2562</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. (U) PERSONNEL PROGRAMS:

   a. The Red Cross Recreational Units from PHAN RANG and CHU LAI continued their visits to forward units during the operation.

   b. A Red Cross representative was located in the Brigade Forward Echelon during Operation MAIHEUR.

   c. Records checks were conducted by AG in the forward area during the operation.

   d. During this period one USO show visited the forward area to entertain the troops. There were two performances by the show.

4. (U) PERSONNEL PLANNING: Planning during the period involved the following areas:

   a. During the months of May, June and July, the Brigade rotated approximately 1583 personnel to CONUS receiving 2777 replacements. At this time the Brigade rotational hump is over and the personnel posture of the Brigade is excellent.

   b. Assistant Brigade S-1 initiated a system of monthly visits to USARV Headquarters to deliver requisition and discuss and plan officer replacements.
CONFIDENTIAL

Incl 4 (Logistical) to After Action Report, Operation MAULIN I and II

1. (C) Organization for Support:

a. Supporting Forces

(1) Task Force Gallagher, US Army Command, Qui Nhon coordinated and controlled all supply and services provided in the Carentan Base area by the following activities:

(a) Forward Support Area which provided issue points for all classes of supply except JP-4.

(b) Graves Registration Team, 19th STS Company.

(c) Laundry and bath service.

(2) 176th Avn Co & 178th Avn Co (-), 11th Avn Bn provided UH1D, UH1H, CH54 aircraft in support of tactical logistical operations.

(3) 3/163 Light Truck Co provided wheeled vehicle support (2½ ton trucks).

(l) 563rd Medical Clearing Company provided general medical support.

b. Support Bns: Provided a Forward Support Element (FSE) at Carentan Base that included the following elements:

(1) Detachment HE which controlled and commanded the FSE. The HE was organized into command operations, communications, movement control and food service elements.

(2) Supply Detachment which receipted, stored and issued all classes of supply. A limited rigger capability was also provided.

(3) 80th Maintenance Co (-) which repaired small arms, artillery, engine, automotive, signal, quartermaster and a limited amount of fire control instruments.

(4) Administrative Detachment which provided AG, Personnel, APO and Finance services.

(5) Company D, 326 Mod Bn (ASM) which provided clearing station, surgical, dental, emergency treatment and holding facilities.

(6) Forward Supply Point Team which controlled the issue of limited types of all classes of supply to maneuver elements from a forward point when the lines of communication from Carentan Base became too long. The team was provided from existing manpower within the FSE.

2. (C) Material and Services

a. Supply: Accomplished by point distribution and (during MAULIN II) a Forward Supply Point.

(1) Class I: Meal Combat Individual, formed the bulk of all Class I consumed during the operation. 14° rations and condiment supplements, to include ice cream, were served whenever possible. Fresh vegetables, potable ice and limited amounts of ice cream were available throughout the operation. Excellent support from Task Force Gallagher was received during "stand down" periods when it was possible to serve 100% 14° rations. Double issues of ice and ice cream were made available by FM at "stand down" time. Condiments were available in limited amounts and limited types. A total of 875.2 short tons of class I were issued during the operation.

(2) Class II and IV: The majority of Class II and IV items were drawn through the Phan Rang Sub Area Command of US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay. An exception to this was made at the stand down in preparation
CONFIDENTIAL

for operation Hood River. Paraflage barriers, camouflage balloon covers and
also small regular fatigue were not available through Casualty By or
Task Force Gallagher, Task Force (TFR) Command. "Placing" located sufficient
quantities of these items to direct exchange or issue all that were
required. No other uncorrected Class II or IV shortages were experienced.
Periodic Logistics Report (PLR) continued to be an effective tool for
bringing shortages of Combat Essential items to the attention of Logistics
Command. Commanders and Staff. Corrective actions were invariably forth-
coming following the petition of needed items on a "PLR".

(3) Class III: JP-4 accounted for the majority of KU con-
sumption as no convoy moves were made during the operation. All M16A3
consumption was a result of normal base operations in and around the
Cashtenat and Montestua (3/25 Inf) areas. A total of 591.6 short tons of
class III were issued.

(h) Class V: All types of munitions continued to be avail-
able. Temporary shortages were experienced with cratering charges, C-4
explosive compound and on one occasion 105mm HE ammunition. The
artillery ammunition was made available within 12 hours. At no time were
the Artillery Batteries below a basic load as the shortages was identified
at the ASP level. Substitute items were available for issue in lieu of C-4
and cratering charges. The standard items were available within 16 hours
after being requested. Again the shortage was confined initially to the
ASP. The RAC class V yard was able to maintain a basic load of C-4 at all
times. Cratering charges are not an item of stockage in the basic load.
A total of 1,267.3 short tons of Class V items were issued during the
operation.

(5) Water: Potable water was supplied initially by the 19th
Engineer BN (US) and the Co 4, 116 Eng BN (LAF). On May 11, 1/165 Eng
assigned the total water supply mission for the Brigade. The active load oper-
ing a 1500 and a 600 gal per hour generator. The 1500 gal per hour generator
was moved to the FSB at Minh Long during MAUPER II to provide water for
the maneuver elements of 3 Infantry Battalions and one artillery Battalion.
Potable, potable water was available throughout the operation except
during the 6-8 July 67 period when the water sources became saline.
Shifting the water points to primary water sources was not satisfactory.
On 12 July the water point was again moved. Potable water was available
from that point on.

b. (8) Maintenance: The Support Battalion's Support Maintenance
Company received and repaired the following items:

(1) Rear

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Received</th>
<th>Repaired</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Forward

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Received</th>
<th>Repaired</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>1,065</td>
<td>953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, contact teams were provided from Spt Bn to all units to
aid in field maintenance.

c. Transportation:

(1) Vehicular: The 3rd platoon of the 163rd Light Truck Co
Chu Lai was in direct support during the operation.

(2) Air: HELI-GT, CI23, CI30, US Army C130 and Marine C130
aircraft provided airlift support for the airlift cargo from Phu Bai to
Tan Phu to include passengers, mail and limited amounts of all classes

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

of supplies. C130s were also used to move the FSB teams, quartering parties and the Medical Clearing Station from Duc Pho to Quang Ngai at the close of MAIHEM II in preparation for Hood River. C123 aircraft supplemented the C130 airlift. C7A, C130 and C141 aircraft were used exclusively to resupply the FSB at Minh Long for the period of 31 July to 31 July 1967. On 15 July C123s assumed the primary Phan Rang to Duc Pho daily airlift mission with two round trip sorties per day.

3. See: One LOH was used to move Brigade vehicles over "F" configuration from Duc Pho to Phan Rang via Cam Ranh Bay.

d. Other Services:

(1) Graves Registration service was available at Cam Ranh Base during the entire operation.

(2) One Quartermaster Laundry and Shower unit provided services at Cam Ranh Base during the entire operation.

3. (C) Medical:

a. Organization: During MAIHEM I and II, Company D, 326th Medical BN, was operational with all assigned personnel at Duc Pho RW in support of the 1st Brigade.

b. Medical Service Support:

(1) General: The medical company admitted, treated and evacuated the highest number of casualties since arriving in Viet Nam during the operation. The company experienced no major difficulties in achieving this goal. The medical company was able to meet the needs of the unit and its personnel within the limitations of the available resources.

(2) Patient Treatment and Care: After arriving in the Duc Pho area of operation the company was confronted with a large number of patients with eye problems. During the initial phase of the operation it was necessary to evacuate the more serious patients to Qui Nhon and Phan Rang to receive eye refractions because neither the company nor the 563rd Medical Clearing Company, which was in general support of the brigade, had organic capabilities to perform eye refractions. This problem continued until 18 July, at which time the company was able to obtain the services of an ophthalmologist. This service is now available in the brigade forward area on a bi-monthly basis and also for unit stand-downs. With this increased capability, the company has been able to reduce the time individual soldier is lost from his unit from 5 to 10 days to two to four hours. Also during the months of May and June the company had access to the services of a Social Work Officer attached to Task Force Oregon. This service helped eliminate two potential psychological problems in the brigade.

(3) Patient Evacuation: During the operation the company's ambulance platoon maintained responsibility for evacuation coordination of the brigade casualties in the forward area. Approximately 1900 patients were evacuated through the company's evacuation facilities. This figure includes patient evacuation from the brigade area of operations, forward base camp area and patients subsequently evacuated to supporting medical facilities in Chu Lai and Qui Nhon. The division of labor within the platoon to successfully evacuate the number of personnel was affected as follows: the NCO's received and transmitted Med-Desc request to the Air Ambulance (Dust-Off) crews from the 2nd Platoon L59th Air Ambulance Company supporting the brigade. In addition, when air ambulance capabilities were strained or limited because of tactical situations the NCO's affected Med-Desc coordination through the brigade aviation section. Routine evacuation to the rear area hospitals was coordinated with the Air Force Casualty Staging Unit personnel located at the Duc Pho airfield.

c. Medical Statistics

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MALANIA</th>
<th>FEVER</th>
<th>BOWS</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NUMLUR I</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1776</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAULUR II</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>2777</td>
<td>3907</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Significant Items

1. Brigade Medical Supply: Upon moving into the Dak Pho area, the Brigade Medical Supply Section experienced difficulty in the timely receipt of medical resupplies through normal resupply channels from the 32nd Medical Depot at Can Khan Bay. This problem was created by the long and indirect route of travel. In order to resolve this problem, the Brigade Medical Supply Officer established an account with the Forward 21stion of the 32nd Medical Depot located in Qui Nhon. To insure that an adequate level of supplies are constantly available in the brigade forward area, the Brigade Medical Officer has established a revised requisition system requiring all units to request in writing. This practice provides the Brigade Medical Supply Officer a usage for maintaining an adequate level of medical supplies.

2. MEDCAP Operations: During the quarter the company continued to provide personnel in support of the brigade MEDCAP Operations. The most significant results from these operations were the Dental Services provided by the company's Dental Officer, who treated 229 Vietnamese and Montagnards.

4. Conclusions:

a. Problem areas encountered were minor and were resolved within existing capabilities.

b. The Support Battalion has the ability to establish a limited Forward Supply Point from existing assets.

c. The logistical support concept adequately provided for the Brigade needs.

5. Recommendations:

a. That the present system of support be continued.

b. That no more than one Forward Supply Point be established at a time.
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclusion 5 (Chemical Operations) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR (U)

1. (C) MISSION: To conduct Chemical ground and air assault operation against VC/NVA forces operating within 20K AO and to employ riot control agents to harass and demoralize civilians under VC/NVA influence in conjunction with psychological warfare operations.

2. (C) OPERATIONS:

   a. General: Chemical operations during Operation MALHEUR consisted of area denial, tunnel flushing/denial, CS gas grenade drops, and rice and salt contamination. All operations were conducted by the 20th Chemical Detachment under the supervision of the Brigade Chemical Officer.

   b. Area denial operations: During Operation MALHEUR a total of 10 area denial operations were conducted, utilizing 1200 lbs of bulk CS-1. A brief resume of each operation is as follows:

      (1) On the morning of 7 June A Company 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry discovered a VC base camp concealed in dense jungle vicinity BS677392. This target was hit by the 20th Chemical Detachment 0712JUN June 1967, 480 lbs of bulk CS-1 was delivered over a circular area with a 200 meter radius from target center. All CS bugs detonated properly placing a heavy concentration within the target area.

      (2) 071530H June 1967 vicinity BS660838 a VC base camp was attacked with bulk CS-1. A total of 480 lbs of CS-1 was delivered on the target covering a circular area with a 200 meter radius from target center. Supported unit: A Company 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

      (3) 091500H June 1967 vicinity BS67937C an enemy defensive network consisting of numerous 2 and 3-man fighting holes and several bunkers was attacked. 800 lbs of CS-1 was delivered on the target covered with a 200 meter radius from target center. Supported unit: A Company 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

      (4) 161539H June 1967 vicinity BS681100 a VC base camp was attacked with 240 lbs of bulk CS-1, containing a circular area 150 meters from target center. Supported unit: B Company 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

      (5) 191400H June 1967 vicinity BS683143 a VC base camp surrounded by trenches and numerous 2 and 3-man fighting holes was attacked. 800 lbs of CS-1 was dropped, placing a heavy concentration of CS in the target area. Supported unit: C Company 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

      (6) 201630H June 1967 vicinity BS688493 240 lbs of CS-1 was delivered in a VC base camp, containing a circular area on the ground in a 150 meter radius from target center. Supported unit: C Company 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

      (7) 200630H June 1967 a VC base camp and bunker complex extending from BS596577 to BS582614 was discovered. 800 lbs of CS-1 was delivered on this target. A new type of plastic container for the 8 lb package of CS-1 was dropped to ascertain effect of det cord and ground impact on containers. A minimum of 1 turn of det cord will disrupt the container. Containers will rupture upon impact with the ground when dropped from 1500 feet.

      (8) The CS, 1-101, directed that a frequently used approach route north from SONG VE Valley be attacked with bulk CS-1 on 5 July. On the morning of 5 July the route was reconnoitered and a section of 250 meters through the MC DUC Pass was selected. East of this section of the route was a 50-100 feet drop into a deep gully, while to the west the ground sharply rose to a height of approximately 1200 feet. 800 lbs of CS-1 were dropped on this section of the road. The area was placed under observation for two (2) days. A total of 17 people were observed approaching the contaminated area. 3 individuals riding bicycles traversed the area. All others turned back. It could not be determined if personnel riding bicycles were some type of protective mask. Supported unit: 1-101.
CONFIDENTIAL

5 (Chemical Operations) to Combat Operation After Action Report,
Operation NOMEUR (1)

9. 29JUL67 July 1967 vicinity 15614L95 - 16682L80, a valley containing
a VC base camp and trails along a river bank was attacked, 200 lbs of CS-1
was dropped on the trail along the river bank and VC base camp. Supported unit:
l-16C.

10. 30JUL67 July 1967 valley vicinity 15616L44, frequently used by VC
was attacked. 400 lbs of CS-1 was used on the target area. The mouth of the
valley was contaminated with a high concentration of CS; the valley was needed
for a distance of 660 meters north from coordinates 15616L44.

c. CS Gas Grenades Drops:

1. The initial CS grenades drop during Operation KANEUR occurred
06JUL67 June 1967 vicinity 15614L27. The target was an unknown number of snipers
in a trench, and the mission was flown at the request of D Company 1st Battali-
on (Airborne), 327th Infantry. Three passes were made upwind of the target area,
producing a line source up to 100 meters each pass. A dense CS cloud drifted
over the target area, remaining in the area for 20-30 minutes. The CS strike was immediately followed by TAC Air. A total of 330 M74 grenades
were dropped during this strike.

2. On 15OCT67 June 1967, 3 Company 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d
Infantry encountered an unknown size enemy force in fortified positions along
a steep ridge line vicinity coordinates 15609L65. At 11000H June 1967 the
enemy was attacked with CS gas grenades. The initial drop at 1500 hours showed
lapse conditions which caused the CS cloud to rise. Subsequent passes were made
further down the sides of the ridge to allow the CS cloud to drift up the ridge.
The target was covered and the enemy abandoned their positions. Total amount
of M74 CS grenades used were 400.

3. 16JUL67 June 1967 of Company 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infan-
try received intense automatic weapon fire from vicinity 15583L57. An immediate
airstrike was requested, however the airstrike would be preceded by a CS gas
grenade drop to cause the enemy to flee his fortified positions, thereby making
him more vulnerable to the airstrike. To insure also dropped CS concentration
would remain in the target area, 30 8 lb CS bags were also dropped on the target.
The first drop was the CS grenades, which commenced 161700H June 1967. They
were dropped in three passes from 15581L72 to 15584L72, producing a dense con-
centration upwind of the target. The agent drifted up slope over the target area.
305 M74 CS grenades were dropped on the target. The CS bags were dispersed in
a stream bed from 15584L75 to 15585L75 in three passes. The CS bag drop was
immediately followed by an airstrike.

4. Early in the morning of 30 June 1967, C Company 2d Battalion
(Airborne), 502d Infantry received sniping fire from a well concealed enemy
vicinity 15591L45. A CS gas grenade drop was requested. The CS gas grenade
drop commenced 300700H June 1967, with a total of 650 M74 CS grenades being
dropped on the target. The grenades were dropped in two series and 15 low level
(100-200 feet) passes. Strike was directed by unit on the ground and Command
and Control helicopter. 252 grenades were dropped on likely routes of with-
drawal, while the remaining 378 were dropped on the sniper position. A very
heavy concentration was produced in the vicinity of each drop but calm wind
conditions allowed agent cloud to rise instead of producing desired downwind
coverage. C Company 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry assaulted the enemy
positions following the strike.

5. The Brigade Long Range Reconnaissance Platoons observed several VC
in a village vicinity 15615L32 and called for an artillery strike. The Artillery
strike was preceded by a CS gas grenade drop at 301100H July 1967. 225 M74
CS grenades were dropped on the village in three passes. A heavy concentration
covered the target area. 1 VC ran from the village and was engaged with gun-
ships providing cover for the gas ship. Immediately following the strike the
Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon called in Artillery on the village.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclusion 5 (Chemical Operations) to Combat operations After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR U

(6) A Company 1st Battalion (Airborne, 327th Infantry received small arms fire from a village vicinity B564,478 at 211321 July 1967. To get to the village required the unit to cross an open area approximately 100 meters wide surrounding the village. Artillery was called in, but the small arms fire continued. At 211430 July 1967 a CS gas drop was requested. The target was attacked at 211453 July 1967 utilizing 378 M2A3 CS grenades. Gunships were fired on the village continuously to suppress the enemy fire during the strike. After the first pass over the target with CS, all firing on the gas ship ceased. Two additional passes were made. A Company 1st Battalion (Airborne) 327th InfantryMasok assaulted across the open area and engaged the enemy.

d. Tunnel flushing/denial operations: During Operation MALHEUR 8 tunnel flushing/denial operations were conducted. Data on each operation is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Unit Support/Type</th>
<th>Effects or CS 1 Used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 Jun 67</td>
<td>A/2-17 Cav</td>
<td>16 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Jun 67</td>
<td>A/2-17 Cav</td>
<td>64 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Jun 67</td>
<td>A/2-17 Cav</td>
<td>40 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jul 67</td>
<td>A/1-327th Inf</td>
<td>80 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Jul 67</td>
<td>A/2-177th Cav</td>
<td>240 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Jul 67</td>
<td>A/2-327th Inf</td>
<td>80 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Jul 67</td>
<td>A/2-327th Inf</td>
<td>80 lbs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. Destruction of Salt Caches: An 80 ton rock salt cache was discovered on 28 June 1967 by a Company 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry vicinity B532A2A. It was not tactically feasible to extract the salt and it was decided upon to destroy the salt in place. 20 4 lb bags of CS were dispersed throughout the cache and blown simultaneously with a cratering charge spreading the salt and CS throughout the area. On 291400H June 1967 an additional 480 lbs of CS was dropped on the cache from the air. A low level flight was made over the area on 8 August 1967. The CS concentration was still heavy and there were no signs of activity in the area or that any of the salt had been removed.

3. (C) Results: Tunnel flushing/denial, CS gas grenade drops, and Salt/Rice Cache Contamination/Destruction operations were considered satisfactory. An evaluation of the effectiveness of area denial operations continued to be a major problem. This is due to the fact we do not place the area under observation after the strikes. We do not enter the area to determine the intensity of the CS concentration. Tactical units have come upon areas three to four weeks after their contamination with CS-1 and found the concentration too strong to operate without protective masks which is indirect proof that the desired results are probably being attained.

4. (C) Lessons Learned:

a. Rice/Salt Caches can be effectively destroyed with bulk CS-1 powder.

b. Sniper fire from villages and concealed positions in woodlines can be suppressed with non-persistent CS gas.
Inclosure 6 (Civil Affairs) to Combat Operations After Action Report, 
Operation MAUDEUR (U)

1. (U) Phase I

a. General: Two significant Civil Affairs operations were conducted during Phase I of Operation MAUDEUR.

(1) The first operation involved the resettlement of Vietnamese civilians within the CARENTAN Base perimeter to a hamlet at the Southern portion of the Brigade Area. The villagers were allowed to take their personal belongings with them. This movement required 109 2½ ton truck loads. Roofing tin was supplied by CORDS. Food was supplied to the people during the movement period. An access road to the new hamlet was constructed by Brigade Engineers who also laid out roads in the hamlet. MEDCAP's were conducted for the people and veterinary services provided for their animals. The project took three weeks to complete. Upon its completion security within the perimeter was enhanced.

(2) The second operation involved the return of 24 cattle and 25 water buffalo to DUC PHO District. These animals had been sighted in the area of operations by the ground combat elements. Since the area was located in Viet Cong territory, a decision was made to return the livestock to the refugees that had previously departed. One platoon of DUC PHO Popular Forces was airlifted into the Area of Operations and subsequently herded the cattle to District Headquarters.

b. Summary of Phase I Operations:

(1) 420 Refugees relocated within CARENTAN Base.
(2) 114 Innocent Civilians, apprehended in combat operations, were returned to their homes.
(3) 305 persons Medically Treated.
(4) 30 tons of Unpolished Rice returned to government control.
(5) 24 Cattle returned to government control.
(6) 25 Water Buffalo returned to government control.

2. (U) Phase II:

a. General: During Phase II Civil Affairs operations centered on Refugee Movement and Control, Food Extraction, Livestock Evacuation, and MEDCAP Operations.

b. Refugee Movement and Control: During Phase II a total of 846 refugees were evacuated from the Area of Operations. The majority of refugees went to a Refugee Center at NGHIA HANI while the remainder were divided among Refugee Centers at MINH LONG, BA TO, and MO DUC. At the request of the Province Chief the Brigade evacuated the populations of the SONG VE, SONO NE, and MO DUC Valleys. The people were evacuated by helicopter and were allowed to take only the personal possessions they could carry with them. Province officials and CORDS insured that adequate space and building materials were on hand in each refugee center to satisfy the needs of the people. Following the evacuation of the refugees all structures were burned to deny their use to Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army forces in the area. This also discouraged refugees from returning to their homes after having been evacuated.

c. Food Extraction: During Phase II, 79.5 tons of unpolished rice and 27.5 tons of salt were extracted from the Area of Operations and returned to government control. In most extraction operations a labor force was provided by District officials while the Brigade supplied security and airlift.

d. Livestock Evacuation: Concurrent with the evacuation of the population from the SONG VE VALLEY the tactical units herded a total of 1189 cattle and 192 water buffalo out of the valley. These livestock were turned over to the NGHIA HANI and MINH LONG District Chiefs for redistribution to the evacuated refugees.
UNCLASSIFIED

o. MEDICAL: During Phase II, 1974 persons were treated in MEDCAP operations. While directly benefiting the people these operations also helped build the GVN image and provided our forces with a limited intelligence source.

f. Resume of Phase II Operations:
   1. 6465 Refugees evacuated.
   2. 399 Innocent Civilians returned to their homes.
   3. 1974 persons Medically Treated.
   4. 79.5 tons of Unpolished Rice returned to government control.
   5. 27.5 tons of Salt returned to government control.
   6. 1149 Cattle returned to government control.
   7. 192 Water Buffalo returned to government control.
   8. 163 Chickens returned to government control.
   9. 88 Ducks returned to government control.
  10. 66 Pigs returned to government control.
  11. 156 Animals treated.

3. (U) Conclusions:
   a. No problems were encountered which required major outside support to solve.
   b. Prior coordination with Sub-Sector, Sector and CORDS representatives is essential to a smooth running Civil Affairs/Civic Action Program.

4. (U) Total Operation MALHEUR Statistics:
   a. 8885 Refugees evacuated.
   b. 513 Innocent Civilians returned to their homes.
   c. 2279 persons Medically Treated.
   d. 109.5 tons of Unpolished Rice returned to government control.
   e. 27.5 tons of Salt returned to government control.
   f. 1173 Cattle returned to government control.
   g. 217 Water Buffalo returned to government control.
   h. 183 Chickens returned to government control.
   i. 88 Ducks returned to government control.
   j. 66 Pigs returned to government control.
   k. 156 Animals treated.
1. (a) Mission: The First Forward Area Signal Center Platoon, Company B, 501st Signal Battalion and the Communication Platoon, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division had the joint mission of providing signal support for the brigade.

2. (c) Operations:

   a. General: The 1st Forward Area Signal Center Platoon, Company B, 501st Signal Battalion and the Communication Platoon, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division provided signal support during Operation MALHEUR I and II by establishing the Brigade Command Post and Communications Systems at DUC PHO.

   b. The brigade VHF Section was not used during Operation MALHEUR I and II.

   c. Communications Center Section terminated two secure teletype circuits at DUC PHO.

   d. Switchboard/Wire Section established the Brigade Command Post at DUC PHO terminating 120 circuits and installed approximately 55 miles of wire.

   e. FH Radio Section provided FM Radio, Secure and Radio Wire Integration Stations at DUC PHO. An automatic retransmission and relay station was employed at BS64448. The NARS Station was established to provide phone patch service to the United States.

   f. AM Radio Section operated secure radio teletype circuits between DUC PHO and PHAN RANG. A secure teletype circuit between the Forward Support Element at DUC PHO and the Forward Support Platoon at MINH LONG was established to assist the Support Battalion.

   g. Maintenance Section continued to provide maintenance support for the Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company and attachments.

   h. Task Force Oregon Signal Support: Company A, 36th Signal Battalion provided circuits into the in-country system, secure radio teletype between Task Force Oregon and Brigade Forward and Brigade Rear.

CONFIDENTIAL

7-1
CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosure 6 (Psychological Operations) to Combat After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR (b)

1. (C) Mission: To assist the ground commander in the accomplishment of his tactical mission by the employment of Psychological Operations targeted against the VC/NVA combat forces, VC political cadre and the Vietnamese and Montagnard population within and adjacent to the area of operations.

2. (C) Operations:

a. General: During Operation MALHEUR (23,912,000 leaflets were distributed and 330,255 hours of loudspeaker broadcasts logged.

b. Program:

(1) Phase I: During Phase I of Operation MALHEUR two simultaneous programs were conducted.

(a) The first centered around CANHAN Base in conjunction with the establishment of the Brigade base camp. The central purpose of this program was population control complemented by CHIEU NOI appeals targeted against VC infrastructure and small units of local VC known to be conducting both political and suppressive operations in the area. Themes used in this program were:

1. Americans are your friends.
2. Americans are here at the request of the SVN.
3. Curfew instructions.
4. Do not run from US troops.
5. Do not run from helicopters.
6. Off limit areas.
7. CHIEU NOI appeals.

In addition, loudspeaker broadcasts were made in conjunction with the resettlement of all local civilians to the southern portion of the Brigade Base Camp.

(b) The second program centered on the tactical operations being conducted in NAMHUY AO. Themes employed in this AO were:

1. Exploitation of B-52 strikes.
2. Refugee instructions.
3. CHIEU NOI appeals.
5. VC/NVA demoralization.
6. Curfew instructions.

(2) Phase II: During Phase II of Operation MALHEUR two programs were also conducted.

(a) The first program supported the tactical combat operations.

Themes used during this phase consisted of:

1. VC/NVA demoralization.
2. CHIEU NOI.

CONFIDENTIAL
Inclosure 8 (Psychological Operations) to Combat After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR (U)

2 National F - induce Passes.
3 Weapons boxed.
4 Exploitation of B-52 strikes.
5 Com. & power.
6 Air & sea.

(b) The second program supported the valley clearing operations in the SONG VE and SONG NE Valleys. Themes utilized were:

1 Population control.
2 Refugee instructions.
3 Curfew instructions.
4 Allies are your friends.
5 VC/NVA do not have the best interests of the people at heart.

(c) Special Operations:

(1) Immediately following the destruction of the FSA ASP an intensive weapon reward campaign was launched vicinity of CAHONAN Base. The funds for the campaign were supplied by the 161st Military Intelligence Detachment. The campaign was launched in an effort to recover ammunition which was known to have been hurled out of the FSP by explosions but had not detonated. The result of the campaign was the return of 655 assorted artillery and small arms rounds by the population living in the resettlement area south of the base camp.

(2) Following the discovery of the VC POW camp and liberation of twenty-two Vietnamese a special leaflet exploiting VC atrocities was developed and distributed throughout the central lowlands of QUANG NGOI Province.

(3) A special leaflet was also developed exploiting the payment of 121,000 $VN to an NVA HOI CHANH who had turned himself over to the Brigade and subsequently led friendly elements to a weapon cache containing a .30 cal. MG and 10cm mortar in addition to other miscellaneous equipment and ammunition. This leaflet also was given wide distribution in the Province lowlands.

3. (C) Results: Four HOI CHANH, two VC and two NVA, turned themselves over to elements of the Brigade during Operation MALHEUR. Additionally, 357 HOI CHANH returned to the GVN by way of GVN agencies in QUANG NGOI Province, a marked increase over past province achievements.

4. (C) Supporting Forces:

a. During Phase I of Operation MALHEUR, the Brigade received direct support from a loudspeaker team from the 244th Payops Company in NHA TRANG. Leaflets and aerial loudspeaker broadcasts during this period were provided by the 244th Payops Company in DA NANG.

b. During that latter portion of Phase I and all of Phase II, the 244th Payops Company provided the ground loudspeaker team support.

c. Special Operations: The ground loudspeaker teams are equipped with a 4 bank man portable speaker set, tape recorder and microphone. Equipment organic to the Brigade included a 16 bank, 1000 watt loudspeaker set and 7 bullhorns. The bullhorns were distributed to the battalions giving each a limited organic capability to conduct face-to-face PSTDPS's in conjunction with ground operations.
6. (C) Problem Areas:

a. The lack of availability of complete, detailed and accurate psyops intelligence covering an area of operations continues to be the single biggest problem area. The results achieved by the Brigade Psyops program in this and past operations (indicated by increased defections primarily to GVN agencies) is impressive. However, results could be greatly increased if greater amounts of detailed intelligence were available.

b. Coordination of Psyops programs requires more emphasis. During Operation MALHEUR six different agencies were concerned with Psychological Operations in the Brigade AP: Special Forces, Province, District, CORDS, J USPAO and Brigade. Quite frequently leaflet drops or loudspeaker broadcasts would be scheduled by one of the civilian agencies responsible for Psyops in the area. The Brigade would receive notice of the mission when leaflets began falling or the loudspeaker O-2 began broadcasting. While it is doubtful that any adverse effect to the psyops resulted, the broadcast and leaflet drops did interfere with tactical operations. Considerably more coordination is necessary than has been conducted in the past to insure that no confusion results from similar incidents in the future.

c. The USAF minimum altitude for loudspeaker ships must be lowered. High winds and thick vegetation make broadcast conducted over 1500 feet ineffective.

7. (C) Lessons Learned:

a. The ammunition reward program conducted vicinity of CARENTAN Base proves that an intensive campaign properly conducted over a limited area will achieve the results desired. Care must be taken to insure that all parties participating in the program are aware of what the people are being told and that promises are made good immediately upon the audiences accomplishment of the desired result.

b. Conducting search and destroy operations while promising good treatment to defection (HOI CHANN) is not credible to the VC or NVA soldier. CHIEU HOI appeals should constantly stress the GVN. The prospective HOI CHANN should be encouraged to rally to the government as an alternative to hardship and death which the search and destroy force is serving.
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 9 (Engineer) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR (U)

1. (U) General:

a. Combat engineer support for maneuver battalions and the brigade (-) was provided by Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion (Airborne).

b. Operation MALHEUR consisted of Phase I from 11 May - 7 June and Phase II from 8 June - 3 August 1967.

c. Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion was commanded by Captain B.P. Schlapak during the period of Operation MALHEUR.

2. (C) Mission:

a. To provide teams to each maneuver battalion which would accomplish landing zone clearing, demolition of bunkers and tunnels, and mine clearing.

b. To provide general engineer support in the Brigade (-) area.

c. To fight as infantry as required.

3. (C) Concept of Operations:

a. One Platoon (-) was attached to each maneuver battalion. These units provided an LZ clearing/demolition/mine clearing team to each infantry line company and provided a stand-by team which remained at each battalion tactical command post until needed.

b. General engineer support in the Brigade (-) area included:

(1) Operation of 1500 GPH water point.

(2) Daily mine sweep on road from beach to a point halfway to MONTECUMA.

(3) Heliport maintenance to include dust control.

(4) Heliport and road construction.

(5) EOD operations.

(6) Tunnel destruction/denial.

(7) Perimeter security and ambush patrols.

4. (C) Notable accomplishments and actions:

a. Landing Zone/demolition/mine clearing teams with each infantry line company cut an average of two landing zones per week. A small amount of CHICON mines and booby traps were encountered and destroyed. Occasionally, bunkers and tunnels were destroyed/denied by the combined use of CS gas and explosives. The teams at the Battalion TAC CP's destroyed captured enemy mines, booby traps and mortar rounds, blasted holes for bunkers and positions, and were occasionally called upon to cut helicopter landing zones. In one instance, a platoon leader rappelled from a UH-1D with a team to clear a landing zone. The majority of the time of the engineers continues to be spent as riflemen.

b. Organic engineer bulldozers were used to clear approximately 1.5 square kilometers of area of all vegetation to insure good fields of fire and secure roads in the vicinity of CARENTAN Base.

c. The unit operated a water point near CARENTAN Base which averaged 15,000 gallons purified per day. Lack of rain and tide changes necessitated the construction of dams to prevent salt water intrusion into the fresh water. The location of the water point was changed once to a better source of raw water.
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 9 (Engineer) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR (U)

d. Dust control on the helipad of the 176th Aviation Company and all brigade utility and hookpads was accomplished using pentaprime and diesel fuel. Approximately 100,000 gallons of pentaprime and/or diesel fuel was dispensed.

e. Fire base CHAMPS was built using a D6B Bulldozer which had been lifted into the area. The D6B had to be broken down into 2 groups for transport. One CH-47 lifted the blade and tracks in while one CH-54 lifted in the dozer body. The dozer dug firing positions for 105 and 155 artillery pieces, bunkers for the FDC and CP locations and constructed a road.

f. The ammunition storage area on the Task Force GALLAGHER beach exploded throwing rounds as far away as one kilometer. Some 1420 rounds, beyond the perimeter fence, were recovered by the Engineer Company (--) and were destroyed. These rounds were of all sizes from 40mm to 175mm.

g. Three tunnel complexes were destroyed while testing the new acetylene tunnel destruction kit. The tunnels had been dug into hillsides and a combination of explosive devices was needed to close the entrances.

h. On the second Phase of Operation MALHEUR, it was necessary to operate a 600 GPH water purification unit at MINH LONG. The unit produced an average of 1000 gallons per day for use of the maneuver battalions. An additional supply of chain saws, mine detectors and explosives was also located there.

i. The nine clearing teams which swept half of the road from CAIENAN Base to CONCEZUMA daily detected two bamboo pressure type mines and three command rigged artillery shells. One bamboo mine was disarmed and extracted while all other were destroyed in place.

j. A 500' x 200' hook helipad was constructed which provides room for 4 to 6 CH-47 helicopters. Four revetments were also constructed.

k. 1.5 kilometers of road was cut to an outpost on the hill to the west of CAIENAN Base. A interior borrow pit was opened at the base of that hill.

5. (C) Lessons Learned:

a. The acetylene generator tunnel destruction kit, XM69 works well on shallow tunnels which have 1 - 2 meters of overburden but is ineffective when hillsides tunnels are encountered. Hillside tunnel must still be denied using a combination of CS gas and conventional explosives.

b. The 600 GPH water purification unit can handle the daily water needs of 3 committed maneuver battalions.

c. The D6B Bulldozer can be broken down and lifted to otherwise inaccessible areas to perform engineer work. The unit can be reassembled and working 30 minutes after the CH-54 has placed the body of the tractor on the tracks which are brought in first along with the blade by a CH-47.

d. In EOD operations, considerable care must be taken in destroying 40mm, 60mm, and 105mm rounds which are duds or have been separated from the round base. These rounds must be destroyed in place. Their internal spin setback system makes them extremely sensitive.
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 10 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR (2)

1. (U) The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery provided direct support to the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division during Operations MALHEUR I and II. General support was provided by elements of 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery and 3rd Battalion, 18th Artillery.

2. (C) Summary of Operations:

   a. In the conduct of Operations MALHEUR I and II, the same techniques of artillery support that have proven successful in the past were employed. Terrain did permit the use of radar outside the base camp and the radar was successfully helicopter on two occasions, once during Operation LAKE and once during MALHEUR II.

   b. In view of the great distances between firing batteries and base camp, the battalion Fire Direction Center functioned as a control/coordination agency only and conducted no technical fire direction. A Liaison Section was provided by the 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery to coordinate all general support fires of that unit and Battery C (81/180), 3rd Battalion, 18th Artillery. The Battalion FDC was positioned at CARENTAN Base Camp and continuous communications were maintained with all elements without the use of a relay.

   c. A fire base, (Fire Base CHAMPS), was established during MALHEUR II to provide light and medium fire support throughout the major portion of the area of operations. Battery B, 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery and Battery C, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery occupied the base by helicopter on 7 June 1967 and remained until 27 July 1967. During the period Battery B supported 2d Battalion, 502d Infantry and Battery C reinforced fires of the 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery. Security of the base was provided by one company of 2d Battalion, 502d Infantry, and later replaced by a company of 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry. A collocated Fire Direction Center was successfully used and facilitated fire coordination.

   d. Additional forward observer requirements were imposed with the attachment of CIDG companies to maneuver battalions. These parties were provided from organic sections and the battalion headquarters. Two additional liaison personnel were required by Task Force OREGON at the UATO and MINH LONG Special Forces Camp. Personnel were taken from battalion FDC to fill this commitment, however, radios could not be provided in all cases.

3. (U) Execution:

   a. A/2-320th displacements:

   (1) On 110830 Key, a Btry displaced by air to BS62093700. Unit closed at 1223 hrs. Priority of fires to 1/327th Infantry.

   (2) On 190800 Key, a Btry displaced by air to BS33637999. Unit closed at 1128 hrs. Priority of fires to 1/327th Infantry, and 2/327th Infantry.

   (3) On 160935 Jun, a Btry displaced by air to BS613583. Unit closed at 15:55 hrs. Priority of fires to 1/327th Infantry.

   (4) On 290930 Jun, a Btry displaced by air to BS688367. Unit closed at 1420 hrs. Priority of fires to 1/327th Infantry.

   (5) On 031000 Jul, a Btry displaced by air to CARENTAN Base at BS84063715. Unit closed at 1520 hrs. Priority of fires to 1/327th Infantry.

   (6) On 140900 Jul, a Btry displaced by air to BS68265805. Unit closed at 1620 hrs. Priority of fires to 1/327th Infantry.

b. B/2-320th displacements:

   (1) On 120730 Key, a Btry displaced by air to BS730328. Unit closed at 1200 hrs. Priority of fires to 2/327th Infantry.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 10 (artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MAINEUR (U)

(2) On 290700 May, B Btry displaced by air to BS791355. Unit closed at 1140 hrs. Priority of fires to 2/327th Infantry.

(3) On 300730 May, B Btry displaced by air to CARENTAN Base Camp vic BS84073700. Unit closed at 1220 hrs. Mission to support security of base defense.


(5) On 280800 July, B Btry displaced by air to CARENTAN Base Camp vic of grid BS24073799. Unit closed 1212 hrs. Mission to support security of base defense.

c. 3/2-320th displacements:

(1) On 110700 May, C Btry displaced by air to BS61783120. Unit closed 1157 hrs. Priority of fires to 2/502d Infantry.

(2) On 200730 May, C Btry displaced by air to BS62043005. Unit closed 1426 hrs. Priority of fires to 2/502d Infantry.

(3) On 311120 May, C Btry displaced by air to BS731328, Unit closed 1820 hrs. Priority of fires to 2/502d Infantry.

(4) On 041300 Jun, C Btry displaced by air to BS645539. Unit closed 1315 hrs. Priority of fires to 2/327th Infantry.

(5) On 080910 June, C Btry displaced by air to BS645539. Unit closed 1315 hrs. Priority of fires to 2/327th Infantry.

(6) On 250900 June, C Btry displaced by air to BS511576. Unit closed 1425 hrs. Priority of fires to 2/327th Infantry.

(7) On 260920 June, C Btry displaced by air to BS477476. Unit closed 1340 hrs. Priority of fires to 2/327th Infantry.

(8) On 100900 July, C Btry displaced by air to BS588327. Unit closed 1330 hrs. Priority of fires to 2/327th Infantry.

(9) On 171000 July, C Btry displaced by air to grid BS647540. Unit closed 1445 hrs. Priority of fires to 2/327th Infantry.

(10) On 260730 July, C Btry displaced by air to CARENTAN Base Camp. Unit closed 1140 hrs. Priority of fires to 2/327th Infantry.

6. (C) Results:

a. 27 VC (KB) (C)

b. 34 VC (KBA) (P)

c. 2 VC (KBA)

5. (U) Administrative Matters: N/A

6. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. The AN/MPS-4 radar was successfully helilifted in positions south of CARENTAN Base. One lifting jack was damaged on the initial move, however, changes in placement of the sling - corrected this fault on the second move. The radar was operational within one hour after completion of the second move.
CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 10 (Artillery) Operation MALHEUR (U)

b. Artillery was used extensively to flush the enemy from cover and to block his movement from an area. Two guns firing one round every 20 to 30 seconds can effectively restrict enemy movement. Flushing fires were moved along tree lines and ahead of friendly forces. This caused the enemy to show himself.

c. Landing zone preparations were conducted using simultaneous tactical air and artillery support. Careful planning of flight patterns and artillery trajectories made it possible to provide a heavier volume of fire for a shorter period before the maneuver elements reached the landing zone.

7. (C) Commander's Analysis:

a. Close and continuing coordination between the liaison officers and forward observers and their supported units facilitated the rapid development of thoroughly coordinated fire plans. An outstanding example of this is the use of concurrent air and artillery preparations of landing zones, which was used extensively during MALHEUR I and II.

b. Colocation of the AN/MPS-4 radar with one of the batteries allowed the frequent conduct of radar registrations. This technique reduces ammunition expenditure and also provides valuable training for the radar crew, thereby enhancing crew efficiency and confidence.

c. The use of flushing fires proved to be extremely effective in forcing the enemy to either expose himself or to drive him into an established ambush site. The use of this technique will be incorporated in future operations.

d. The majority of the fires delivered were observed. The use of H and I fires was limited except where solid intelligence indicated a reasonable assurance of attainable results.

e. The use of centrally located fire base permitted economy in the use of security forces. The colocation of the battery FDC's facilitated coordination and rapid delivery of fires.

f. The restricted terrain coupled with the need to conserve security resources (collocation with rifle bn CP), forced occupation by batteries of the highest features. Positions were often so limited in space, that individual gun sections were less than 20 feet apart, whether in "star" or "line" formation. Occupation of high needle-head positions probably surprised the enemy since he failed, with one exception, to fire, booby-trap, and punji these areas, as he normally does in "CPN" arty positions. The training value was immense in that the artillery personnel realized, at great impact, that so-called "impossible" position sites are available in great numbers.

g. The battalion's proficiency was further increased by the daily utilization of light observation helicopters provided by TF OREGON during a period when Brigade's I 0H were down continually for maintenance and/or replacement. I 0H enabled each firing unit to register daily, and reconnaissance/command and control were performed without interruption.

h. A high-water mark had been attained with the rifle battalions and with the Support Battalion forward elements in support, coordination and cognizance of SOP. The results have been increased successes, to include a higher degree of proficiency, professional standard, esprit and morale.
Appendix 1 (Recapitulation of Missions Fired) to Enclosure 10 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation MALHEUR (U)

MALHEUR I

| No of Misses Fired: 1736 | Total Rds Expended: 27,257 |

MALHEUR II

| No of Misses Fired: 1890 | Total Rds Expended: 31,604 |