SUBJECT: After Action Report - Deployment of Brigade

TO: Commanding General
11th Infantry Brigade
ATTN: XIMH Bde Historian
APO 96217

1. Organization of the battalion prior to deployment:
   a. Number of officers, by grade: 1 LTC; 2 MAJ; 10 CPT; 31 LT
   b. Number of Warrent Officers: 1 CW3
   c. Number of Enlistedmen: 724 EN

2. Deployment Planning Conference and consideration:
   Deployment planning was greatly enhanced by taking one officer from each Battalion and having him remain at Brigade as a Battalion Liaison to represent the battalion. The Liaison attended daily conferences and kept the battalion abreast of all changes. Thus, giving the battalion the capacity of remaining aware of current situations.

3. Actions upon receipt of Alert for Deployment:
   a. Preparation accomplished prior to actual deployment;
      (1) POR Qualification; Plans for moving dependents; Plans for Deployable leaves.
      (2) Turn in excess or unauthorized property: All excess or unauthorized property was turned in prior to notification of deployment of this unit.
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(3) Preembarkation Training: Increased emphasis placed on counterinsurgency training to include ambush/counter ambush, practise search and destroy operations, utilizing mock villages, maximum use of allotted space in USARHAW Language Schools. In addition weapons training, both individual and crew-served, was stepped-up considerably utilizing live fire at every possible opportunity. Included in the training program were subjects dealing with area orientations, environmental considerations, legal status of individual soldiers in the host country, host country political, religious and ethnic history and customs.

(4) Intelligence Activities: Intelligence briefing was held weekly thus giving the commanders a better understanding of the enemy, terrain and weather in the area to which they were to deploy. Maps supplies were late in arriving, therefore each company deployed with only one or two maps.

(5) Movement of Dependents

(a) Adequacy of instructions received: The instructions concerning movement of dependents were excellent. Most problems which arose in this field were due to the individual himself in that several waited until the last minute to decide if they wanted their dependents to remain on post or be shipped to CONUS.

(b) Movement orders to facilitate transportation of dependents: The movement orders were handled so as to facilitate each individual. Once again the only problems in this area were those resulting from last minute decisions as to disposition of dependents. Those who requested orders within a reasonable period of time were able to clear and clean quarters, have their house hold goods picked up and depart as per scheduled date.

(c) Dependent Processing Centers: Although we did not have an opportunity to personally contact the Dependent Process Center we received several outstanding comments on the manner in which they aided dependents in their processing and clearing of quarters and arrangements for transportation.

(d) Clearance of Quarters: As to our knowledge the clearance of quarters was excellent. We received no complaints from personnel within our Battalion nor from USARHAW Household Section.
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(e) Arrangement for mainland travel: Arrangements for dependent travel presented no problems. In cases where the EM had deployed prior to his dependent’s departure, the Department Processing Team helped in making the necessary arrangements.

(f) Relocation of dependents on post: The relocation of dependents remaining on post was the biggest problem area with which we were confronted. We felt USAHRHAW waited entirely too long to make the decision concerning who should have to move and in doing so few dependents were able to complete their relocation prior to husband’s deployment.

(g) Organization for handling movement of dependents: Brigade initially published a letter concerning the movement of dependents. Upon receipt of this letter the SI conducted a one hour block of instruction concerning dependents movement with each company in the Battalion. All personnel who were authorized government travel were then required to complete a form stating their desired date for shipment of dependents, disposition of automobiles, etc. The Battalion processed approximately 106 families as follows:

- 1 LTC
- 2 MAJ
- 9 CAPT
- 14 LT
- 1 E9
- 7 E8
- 14 E7
- 31 E6
- 29 E5

In addition, the battalion processed approximately 40 families not authorized government transportation. These personnel received the same instruction with the exception of dependents and household goods transportation. The problem which existed here was one of Finance. However, this was elevated through an authorized partial payment for the purpose of movement of dependents to CONUS.

(6) Logistical Activities:

(a) Adequacy of instructions received:
Instructions were excellent in view of the many last minute changes which were necessary due to the accelerated deployment.

(b) Logistical problems: Issuing and packing of equipment was one of the major logistical problems faced. Packing and issuing of clothing was made impossible due to its late arrival.
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(c) Items that were difficult to obtain:
Small Regular jungle fatigues and certain sizes of jungle boots.

b. Number of personnel by grade or rank assigned and joined after Alert Order:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
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<td>MAJ</td>
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<td>CPT</td>
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<td>LT</td>
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<td>WO</td>
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NOTE: The Battalion strength increased by 33 personnel upon receipt of alert orders to actual deployment. This was due to nondeployable personnel which dropped the Battalion strength approximately 682 personnel; however, this was compensated for through receiving approximately 45 personnel through replacement channels.

c. Interim command structures employed: (1) Advance Planning Group: The Battalion S3. (2) Advance Party: Bn CO, S1, S2 S4, Communications Platoon Leader, Medical Operations Assistant, two commanders and one platoon leader from each company, and one company entact for security of Bridge Base. (3) Main Body.

d. Unit Alert Orders: Personnel were informed they were deploying to a restricted area. Brigade and Battalion policies were established concerning deployment leave. The staff had briefings daily as did the commanders with the Bn CO. These briefings covered information the Battalion CO had compiled through his previous reconnaissance of the restricted area into which we were to deploy and individual problems each commander and staff section were confronted with in their plans for deployment.

4. Force structure considerations during deployment requiring augmentations such as liaison teams and finance sections: N/A.
5. Actions taken during deployment:

a. Unit Movement:

(1) Effective of advance planning: The advance planning was extremely thorough and resulted in a well coordinated move.

(2) Advance planning groups and advance party activities: Advance planning group consisted of one (1) representative from each battalion size unit, plus representatives from Brigade staff and separate companies. The number of personnel was adequate to establish liaison with necessary echelons of sponsoring units and insured a smooth reception for advance party and main body personnel and equipment. Advance party was adequate to accomplish its own security. Activities included preparation of temporary Brigade base and security of the base to include local patrolling, ambushing and static security missions. Interior base activities included construction of fighting/living bunkers, establishing wire and radio communications, organizing logistic and transportation facilities and activities.

(a) Air Movements: One (1) TOE line company, all commanders and selected staff officers were flown to the new restricted area from Hawaii.

(b) Surface movements: The Battalion minus the advance party moved by ship, departing Hawaii 5 December 1967.

(c) Unit Movement Orders: Certificates in lieu of orders were issued to all personnel of the battalion. These were used effectively in shipping household goods, vehicles and dependents.

b. Operations - General plan of deployment: Initially the unit advance party provided local security for the entire brigade base. This mission required one rifle company, complete (Co C). In addition one platoon leader and the unit commander from each unit was included. The in-country training and experience they received by participating in operations with the sponsoring unit was invaluable in speedily orientating the main body on their arrival. The main body deployed as a single element and moved directly to defensive positions on arrival in the brigade base.

c. Coordination Requirements: Initial coordination was required from the Bn S-3, who represented the Battalion on the Advance Planning Group. The S-3 arranged billeting and rations for the advance party. Personnel from the advance party coordinated with their respective staff sections from the 1st Bn 14th Inf. Each company commander was taken out on a combat operation to observe the companies operating in the AO which they were soon to occupy.
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6. Action taken after deployment accomplished:

a. Establishing in country camps at destination: As a whole, the base camps had been established by units previously occupying the area; however, a great deal of work was needed to make living conditions adequate and also to rebuild bunkers on the perimeter.

b. Results of logistical efforts and problems generated: The biggest problem confronted with was anticipation of input of troops that never arrived, thereby causing an adjustment in shipping requirements and delays. Permission was requested and finally approved to ship requirements from a red TAT to a yellow TAT. This caused packing to be done during the final 12 hours prior to departure. No shortages or losses were incurred.

c. Coordination and planning with host unit: The advance planning group as well as the advance party coordinated with the unit we were to replace (1st Bn 14th Inf). Plans were formulated for the replacement of the host unit, transportation was set up and the transition handled smoothly.

d. In-country training prior to combat action: In-country training was greatly reduced due to the tactical situation which required the redeployment of the sponsoring unit earlier than planned. The Battalion assumed responsibility for its assigned area of operation after 8 days of in-country training. Reduction in training time has no effect on the unit's ability to accomplish its mission. Units are working well and morale appears high.

e. Relief of units in place: Subordinate units of the battalion relieved their counterparts in position except for C Company A Company deployed 2 January 1968 on LZ THUNDER and nearby bridges on National Highway #1; B Company deployed 2 January 1968 by air assault on S&D operation; C Company deployed by air assault on 3 January 1968 to conduct S&D operations in the mountainous western portion of the En AO; D Company deployed on LZ CHARLIE BROWN on Sa Huynh and secured the LZ and nearby bridges on National Highway #1. The heavy mortar platoon and battalion recon platoon deployed to U:THUNDER. All units relieved were of the 1st Bn 14th Inf, 3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div. Relief was smoothly conducted without problems or incidents.

f. Fire contact with other forces: Enemy contacts to date have been limited to small groups (2 or 3) of local guerrillas, sniper activity and isolated attempts by individuals to harass bases and bridge security elements.
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7. Evaluation of the following:
   a. Adequacy and effectiveness of briefings presented on deployment procedures: As stated previously, the overall effectiveness of briefings both at Brigade and Battalion level resulted in a well planned and coordinated move.

   b. Adequacy of reference material either on hand or furnished: Reference material was excellent. Brigade published several documents stating priority and dates of items to be completed. They further established the various staff sections responsible for submitting said documents.

8. Problems encountered but not covered in above comments: N/A

9. Conclusions: Although confronted with numerous last minute changes and the normal problems expected in any move of this nature, we feel the battalion's deployment was outstanding in every phase. The coordination and cooperation between battalion and brigade was the biggest factor in accomplishing this move with such efficiency.

10. Recommendations: None.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

RICHARD K LIPSETT
LT, Infantry
Adjutant