SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (U)

Commanding General
American Division
ATTN: AVDP-EC (DQT)
APO San Francisco 96274

1. (U) Name of Operation: Operation Burlington Trail.


3. Location: Map Sheets 6640III, 6640III, 6639IV, 6639I, 6739IV.

4. (U) Control and Command Headquarters: 198th Infantry Brigade (Lt).

5. (U) Reporting Officers:
   - COL Charles B. Thomas, CO, 193th Inf Bde (Lt)
   - LTC William D. Kelly, CO, 1-6 Inf Bn
   - CPT Robert D. Leines Sr., CO A Co, 1-6 Inf Bn
   - CPT Garland L. Rovecs, CO B Co, 1-6 Inf Bn
   - CPT Carl A. Crouch III, CO C Co, 1-6 Inf Bn
   - CPT James T. Price, CO D Co, 1-6 Inf Bn
   - LTC Frederick Arman, CO, 1-46 Inf Bn
   - CPT Larry R. Stanford, CO, A Co, 1-46 Inf Bn
   - CPT Paul E. Sims, CO B Co, 1-46 Inf Bn
   - CPT Robert A. Jakos, CO C Co, 1-46 Inf Bn
   - 1LT Ronald M. Kidd, CO D Co, 1-46 Inf Bn
   - 1LT David K. Lyon, CO, 5-46 Inf Bn
   - CPT Herbert B. Erb, II, CO A Co, 5-46 Inf Bn
   - CPT Charles Lesc, CO B Co, 5-46 Inf Bn
   - CPT Robert K. Johnson, CO C Co, 5-46 Inf Bn
   - CPT James T. Yannos, CO D Co, 5-46 Inf Bn
   - LTC Elbert E. Fuller Jr., CO, 1-52 Inf Bn
   - CPT John A. Biondou, CO A Co, 1-52 Inf Bn
   - CPT Charles D. Ebright (d), CO C Co, 1-52 Inf Bn
   - CPT Leonard G. Goldman, CO B Co, 1-52 Inf Bn
   - CPT Peter L. Lawson, CO D Co, 1-52 Inf Bn

6. (U) Task Organization:
   - 198th Inf Bde (Lt) (Control Eq)
     - 1-6 Inf Bn
     - 1-46 Inf Bn
     - 1-52 Inf Bn
     - 5-46 Inf Bn
     - 1-14 Arty Bn
7. (c) Supporting Forces:

a. D Btry, 1-14 Arty was assigned as the direct fire support battery.

b. 17th Avn Co (Air Mobile Support), 7th Avn Co (Air Mobile - Night) provided supply, CAS, Visual Reconnaissance, and gunship support.

c. Tom C; 7th INCES Battalion provided "Kit Carson" teams.

d. B/26th Engineers provided one platoon in direct support.

e. 7th Tactical Air Command provided TAC Air on call.

f. 57th Inf Platoon (SD) provided scout dogs and handlers.

g. 4/3-16 and A/2-13 were used for indirect arty supporting fires.

h. 49th Signal Platoon provided communications support.

i. Chu Lai Dustoff (Helicopter Ambulance Company) provided Medevac aircraft.

j. H Troop, 17th Cav provided M113-1 (9 C.V.) and crews.

8. (c) Intelligence:

a. Terrain: Coastal foothills border the eastern end of the area of operations, while the central and western sectors are predominantly hills and mountains with characteristic river valleys and inundated rice paddies. Vegetation varies from the ubiquitous rice paddies of the lowlands to the multi-cropped dense undergrowth that covers the slopes of foothills and mountains. Bushwood areas are relatively small and scattered throughout the area. Grassy areas are discontinuous and carpet a small number of the flatter slopes and tops of high ground. There are two main waterways in the area: the Song Tram and the Song Bong Hica, which flows Northwest. The depth of the rivers vary from less than 5 meters to approximately 10 meters and have a velocity of about two miles per hour. The width vary from a few meters up to 100 meters. Numerous smaller streams abound in the lowland rice paddies. There are three main foot hill trails, two of which run North-South in the eastern and western sectors respectively. The third runs East-West, perpendicular and South East-West, perpendicular and South of the former two. It interconnects with each of the other two at the respective east and west extremities. There are numerous smaller interconnected trails throughout the entire AO. These smaller trails vary from a high density in the populated areas to considerably less density in the mountain regions. Most of the trails afford easy and speedy movement, even in wet conditions.

b. Weather: The prevailing weather is generally fair, characterized by scattered cloudiness, high ceilings and good visibility. Thunderstorm activity is high during the afternoon and evening hours and reduces visibility. The mean daily temperatures and relative humidity figures are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Temperature (°F)</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Relative Humidity (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low 90's</td>
<td>70's</td>
<td>High 70's</td>
<td>Mean - 91, Minimum - High 40's</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
c. **Enemy**: Intelligence received through agent reports indicated that VC and NVA units were using this area for food supply and infiltration routes from the north. In the past this area has been relatively undisturbed by US operations. An estimated 200 local force guerrillas were reported scattered throughout the villages and at least 2 VC Battalions (409th Suppor and 70th MF) were within one day close-in time. Captured documents and prisoners indicated at least one NVA battalion (40th LKK 80th Bn) of the 1st VC Regt, 2d NVA Div in the area. Villagers in the area reported large NVA forces (200-300 men) evading contact and generally moving out of the AO toward the west. Intelligence reports had confirmed locations of the following units:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>70th MF Bn</td>
<td>BT0802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72nd LF Bn</td>
<td>BT1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74th LF Bn</td>
<td>BT1818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V12 VC Co</td>
<td>BT2221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V13 VC Co</td>
<td>BT1612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V14 VC Co</td>
<td>BT1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V16 VC Co</td>
<td>BT2014</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

9. **(C) Mission**: The mission for the 198th Inf Bde (Lt) was commencing on 9 April 1968 to conduct combat operations via Tien Phuoc, employing 1-6 Inf, D/1-14 Arty, and 1-45 Inf (-) to destroy the enemy in zone and to support 1-1 Cavalry in opening the road from Tam Ky to Tien Phuoc.

10. **(C) Concept of Operations**:  

a. On 9 April 1968 a fire support base was to be established on Hill 62 (BT31612) with B Btry, 1-14 Arty and a security force from A Troop, 17th Cav and the LKK 198th LKB Rifle Platoon (Wolfpack). On the same day 2 Companies at 1-45 Inf were planned to combat assault into blocking positions along the east and southeast boundary of AO boundary. On 9 April one company from 1-45 was scheduled to relieve the security elements on Hill 62 while D Btry, 1-14 Arty and one company from 1-6 Inf with a platoon of E/25 Engr combat assaulting to Hill 218 (BT38142) to establish a second fire support base. Also on 9 April the remainder of 1-6 Inf was to conduct assault into area of operation (AO) Ready. The 1-6 Inf was initially to operate in conjunction with 2d ARVN Div and 1-1 Cav to clear and secure the road from Tam Ky to Tien Phuoc and also to destroy the enemy in AO Ready.

11. **(C) Execution**:  

4 April 1968. All Brigade units received Frag Order 23 to OORD 9-67 initiating Burlington Trail. All units began planning and coordination was affected with Tien Phuoc Special Forces Camp, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry and elements of the 2d ARVN Division at Tam Ky.
7 April 1968. By 1416 hours elements of H Troop, 17th Cav and the Wolfpack had secured Hill 68 and began preparations for the Fire Support Base there.

8 April 1968. By 1500 hours all elements of the 1-6 Inf except B Company were closed at Tam Ky Airfield (BT308188) in preparation for combat assaults on 9 April. D Btry 1-14 Arty also was at the Tam Ky Airfield while the battalion's B Btry completed movement to Hill 68. By 1619 hours 2 companies of the 1-46 Inf combat assaulted into the Burlington Trail AO with D Company landing at BT229143 and B Company at BT294123. At 1525 hours after receiving light automatic weapons fire, D Company assaulted the enemy position near BT275144 resulting in the capture of 2 M-1 carbines, and NVL equipment and documents, as well as probably wounding 2 VC. The company also evacuated 6 VCS of which 5 were classified as Civil Defenders.

9 April 1968. With an LMO on Hill 110 (BT233187) to coordinate artillery fires, 1-6 Inf combat assaulted into the Burlington Trail AO with the battalion command and control group, B Company, A Company, and B Company with a platoon of CIDG, landing on Hill 218 (BT391442), A Company landing at BT256125, and C Company with a platoon of CIDG landing at 263127. All movements of troops were completed by 1230 hrs. A, B, and C companies moved toward their planned objectives while the other elements remained on Hill 218. D Btry 1-14 Arty was also lifted to Hill 218. There were 3 enemy killed at BT229145 when B Company, 1-6 Inf observed 7 enemy and called arty on them at 1925 hrs. 1-45 Inf had negative contact.

10 April 1968. At 1530 hours B Btry, 1-14 Arty's 1/4 ton truck hit a mine on Hill 68 inflicting wounds on 3 men who were evacuated and destroying the vehicle. At LZ Bowman (Hill 225) 47 rounds of mortar fire landed within the perimeter at 2210 hours resulting in 2 men killed and 8 men wounded. Counter mortar fire was employed. Information from a 1-1 Cav prisoner of war indicated that the 72d Local Force Battalion was located in vic BT1014 and an unknown size enemy force at BT206145. There were a total of 2 men killed and 11 men wounded by enemy fire.

11 April 1968. At 1107 hours when A Company, 1-6 Inf received sniper fire at BT271133 the attached CIDG platoon engaged the enemy and captured one weapon. At 1515 hours Blue Ghost gunships engaged and killed 1 enemy who was evading south after being observed by B Company, 1-6 Inf at BT202145. Twenty-five minutes later B Co had 2 men wounded by sniper fire near BT206145. C Co, 1-6 Inf was placed under operational control (CIDG) of 1-1 Cav. The enemy lost 1 weapon and 1 man killed in the day's action while friendly units had 1 man wounded.

12 April 1968. At 1103 hours B Co, 1-6 Inf engaged and killed 1 enemy in vic BT198146 while searching their assigned area, and at 1431 hours received 20 rounds of sniper fire at BT111444 wounding 1 man. Instant gunships in support of B Co killed 1 enemy. There were 2 enemy killed and 1 US soldier wounded during the day's actions with several other mortar or sniper fire incidents causing no casualties or damage.

13 April 1968. A Co 1-6 Inf fouled a cache at BT185123 while searching their area. The cache consisted of 162 60mm rounds, 20 82mm rounds, 10
4-2 rounds, 11 MG LK-53, 11 bolt action rifles, 50lbs of plastic explosives, 4 drums of LK48 x2, 3 LK 47, 4 RIC, 2 launchers, 16 80mm rockets, and 1 carbine. D Co, 1-6 Inf, at 4615 hours engaged and killed 1 enemy wearing B1 jungle fatigue at BT171107, and at 4655 hours A Co engaged 10 to 16 enemy in black uniforms at BT155112 and killed 7 enemy. D Co 1-46 Inf evacuated 65 Vietnamese civilians from BT2708 by helicopter to Tam Ky. At 1430 hours B Co 1-46 Inf engaged 20 VC in a wood line at BT253058 and killed 2, capturing 2 ChiCom carbines. At 2340 hours B Co and D Co received approximately 40 82mm mortar rounds and heavy automatic weapons fire from BT259089 wounding 22 men from B Co. During the day there were 10 enemy killed and 22 friendly wounded.

14 April 1968. At 1110 hours A Co 1-6 Inf found 1 wounded VC in a cave at BT185117 and evacuated him. Seven minutes later at the same location the unit found a cache which included 2 60mm mortars complete, 1 82mm mortar tube and base plate, 100 cases of 50 cal rounds, 23 RIC 2 rounds, 1 LK43, 300 ChiCom grenades, 2 57mm rocket rounds, and 15 cases of 7.62mm rounds. A Co moved to BT1812 where they found 15 enemy bodies which had been hit by the air strike on 13 April. Other elements had negative significant results.

15 April 1968. A Co, 1-6 Inf engaged 3 enemy soldiers at BT1877110 resulting in two VC killed and 1 LK47 and web gear captured. Later at BT181605 A Co again engaged and killed 1 VC. In the enemy's wallet was an ID card saying he was a member of the 72nd Battalion.

16 April 1968. While sweeping to the west, via BT170109 B Co 1-6 Inf engaged and killed 1 VC in uniform. A Co engaged and killed 2 VC at BT148110 and captured 1 weapon. A Co also found 6 bodies in fresh graves at BT157108 which were evidently killed by an air strike.

17 April 1968. B Co, 1-46 Inf in light contact engaged and killed one VC who was carrying an NVI flag and VC propaganda. There was no other significant contacts.

18 April 1968. There was no significant contact in the area of operations.

19 April 1968. At 1210 hours B and D Co's 1-46 Inf received intense sniper fire resulting in 1 US WIA, 1 VC KIA, 1 VCGL. At 1305 hours D Co engaged five VC near the M111 resulting in 3 VC KIA, 2 VC WIA and detained, and 4 LK47's CIA.

20 April 1968. A Co 1-6 Inf engaged 5 VC killing 1, and capturing 1 M-79 at BT175053. B Co 1-6 Inf became engaged with an enemy force at BT177107 resulting in 2 WIA, 1 VC KIA, 1 carbine and 3 RV GL. At 1400 hours B and D Co's 1-46 Inf were placed under the operational control of 1-6 Inf thus terminating Phase I of the 1-46 Inf Burlington Trail Operation.

22 April 1968. A and B Co's were extracted from the Burlington Trail AO and inserted into grid BT072704 to commence operating with Task Force Nanasses. C Co 1-6 Inf was released from GLOCN of 1-1 Cav and was airlifted to grid BT072703, also to join TF Nanasses. B and D Co's 1-46 Inf already operating in the Burlington Trail AO came under 1-6 GLOCN. A Co 1-52 Inf case under GLOCN of 1-6 Inf and provided security for LZ Bowman.
24 April 68. D Co 1-46 Inf engaged and killed 2 VC and captured 1 weapon at BT166113.

25 April 68. D Co 1-46 Inf engaged 5 enemy with small arms at BT167069 resulting in 4 enemy KIA. D Co replaced D Co 1-46 Inf in the AO.

26-27 April 68. Negative contact.

28 April 68. At 1402 hours B Co 1-46 Inf continued their combat sweep to BT221073, engaged 3 enemy with weapons resulting in 1 VC KIA.

29 April 68. B Co 1-46 Inf was released from 1-6 Inf CCFON and replaced by C Co 1-46 Inf. While conducting search and clear operations C Co 1-46 Inf found an SKS rifle at BT211088, and D Co 1-46 Inf found a bolt action rifle at BT167072.

30 April 68. At 0221 hours LZ Bowman received a ground assault consisting of small arms, RPG 2 and hand grenades at the NE side of the perimeter. Gunnships could not be used due to the low ceiling, but all defensive concentrations were fired. The results of the attack were 8 KIA, 4 VC KIA, 1 RPG 2, 1 AK47, 1 carbine, and 3 Chicom HG captured in action. At 0900 hours A Co 1-46 Inf engaged and killed 1 VC at BT125113. Continuing their sweep, A Co found a dead enemy soldier in a hooch at BT151116. D Co 1-46 Inf received a mortar and ground attack on the HNB at BT165073 resulting in 8 WIA.

1 May 68. In an ambush from A Co 1-46 Inf engaged 3 VC at BT165117 resulting in 2 VC KIA. At 1058 hours A Co 1-46 Inf conducted a combat assault into a hot LZ at BT169074 and engaged an unknown number of enemy personnel resulting in 12 VC KIA and 5 AK47s. D Co 1-46 Inf engaged and killed 1 VC at BT160074 and captured his AK47. Continuing the sweep, D Co engaged and killed a VC attempting to evade from the village, they were searching at BT15075. A Co 1-46 Inf, while searching the area of previous contact at BT15075, found 19 more enemy KIA, and captured 3 SKS, 5 AK47, 7 60mm mortar rounds and 8 loaded AK47 magazines.

2 May 68. A Co 1-46 Inf engaged and killed a VC at BT135069, resulting in 1 VC KIA and 5 Chicom grenades CIL. While conducting a search and clear mission, D Co 1-46 Inf captured a bolt action rifle and a loaded AK47 magazine at BT165074.

3 May 68. A Co 1-46 Inf observed and engaged 2 VC at BT255035 resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 Chinese model 53 bolt action rifle captured.

4 May 68. D Co 1-46 Inf was extracted from the Burlington Trail AO to be inserted into LZ East and become part of Task Force I 1Kansas. C Co 1-46 Inf and A Co 1-52 Inf conducted a combat sweep into the AO. A Co 1-52 Inf received small arms fire which they returned killing 1 VC and capturing a bolt action model 53 rifle at BT279099.

5-7 May 68. Combat sweeps were conducted within the AO with negative results.
8 May 68. C Co 1-46 Inf received incoming hand grenades and mortar rounds in their NDF BT131038, resulting in 11 KIA, 11 WIA, 1 VC KL, CL.

Phase II of Operation Burlington Trail began with the insertion of the -146 Command Group to LZ Bowman releasing the 1-5 Inf to operate in Operation Wheeler Wells.

10 May 68. C Co 1-46 Inf found a weapons repair shop at BT187130 consisting of 25 small arms and crew served weapons, 2 US 3.5 rockets, 11 mortars and assorted weapons parts and repair tools.

11 May 68. A Co 1-52 Inf engaged and killed one VC carrying an M-26 hand grenade at BT260090.

12 May 68. C Co 1-52 Inf engaged 3 VC at their NDF, BT0130, resulting in 1 VC KL, 4 VC CL.

13 May 68. Combat swoops were conducted in the AO with negative results.

14 May 68. C Co engaged two VC resulting in 1 VC KL (Chieu Hoi). The co-tired VC lead the company to a weapons cache at BT091717. The cache contained 1 82mm mortar round, 1 57 mm, 1 40mm rocket launcher, 2 Chicom LR's, and 4 US weapons.

15 May 68. D Co 1-46 Inf engaged 3 VC in a hut at BT205129 resulting in 1 VC KL.

16-17 May 68. There were no significant incidents in the AO.

18 May 68. D Co 1-46 Inf discovered a booby trapped cache of ammunition containing 19 mortar rounds, nine 57 mm rounds, and 2,500 small arms rounds at BT10130.

19 May 68. A Hoi Chanh lead D Co 1-46 Inf to a weapons cache consisting of 62 assorted small arms, semi and fully automatic, 8 cases of 9mm rounds, 1 case of CS crystals and 24 57 mm rounds with Russian markings.

20 May 68. D Co 1-46 Inf engaged 2 VC in a rice paddy at BT186112 resulting in 2 VC KL and three radio receivers set on the Rn Command Frequency CL.

21 May 68. At BT188114, D Co 1-46 Inf found and destroyed a grenade factory. A new Chicom HE similar to the M-26 was included in the cache.

22 May 68. D Co 1-46 Inf engaged and killed 1 VC and captured 1 AK-47.

A patrol from C Co 1-46 Inf hit a booby trap near LZ Bowman resulting in 1 US KIA, and 2 US WIA.

23 May 68. A captured VCS lead D Co 1-46 Inf to a weapons cache at BT194137, consisting of 2 SBS rifles, 2 US grenade guns, 1 .38 cal pistol, and 27 60mm mortar rounds.

24-26 May 68. No significant contacts.
27 May 68. B Co 1-46 Inf engaged 11 VC at BT249125 resulting in 1 VC KIA.

28 May 68. LZ Bowman received 6 122mm rockets at 0122 hours with no injuries. The VC employed a "spider" ring to reduce the range of the rockets.

29 May 68. At 1200 hours the 1-5 Inf resumed the control of LZ Bowman and Headquarters 1-46, Operation Burlington Trail. The 1-5 Inf returned to the control of X Corps with reference to Command.

30 May 68. B Co 1-46 Inf engaged VC wearing a green uniform at BT77121, resulting in 1 VC KIA and 2 WIA and 2 Clk of grenades ODA 1-46 Inf assaulted a bunker complex at BT77121. Results of the action was 2 KIA, 5 WIA and two cages wounded. The enemy broke contact and evaded south with unknown casualties.

31 May 68. C Co 1-6 Inf received heavy automatic weapon fire from bunkers at BT212103. Artillery and gunships were used in support while C Co assaulted the enemy positions. The action resulted in 7 enemy KIA and 4 AK-47 captured.

1 June 68. B Co 1-6 Inf made a full scale attack on their RPD. The attack was repulsed in 1 KIA and 23 WIA and C Co 1-46 Inf were airlifted into an LZ at BT212072 and returned to CON to the 1-6 Inf.

2 June 68. Operations in the Burlington Trail AO were continued with no significant contact.

3 June 68. C Co 1-6 Inf received a mortar attack at BT210100 resulting in 4 KIA and 10 WIA. B Co 1-6 Inf engaged VC enemy in the open, resulting in 4 VC KIA and 1 weapon captured. A squad from B Co 1-46 Inf observed a VC squad to check the area, as they neared the location they heard the enemy approaching set up a heavy ambush, and engaged them at fifteen meters killing 1 and capturing a pair of binoculars and 1 AK-47.

3-5 June 68. B Co 1-46 Inf engaged 2 NV at BT254079, resulting in 1 NV KIA and 1 AK-47 captured.

4 June 68. At 1100 hours a minimum helicopter was shot down in grid ST0420. All personnel were safely extracted and the helicopter was destroyed.

6 June 68. B Co 1-46 Inf engaged 2 NV at BT191103, resulting in 1 VC KIA, and 2 WIA and 1 pistol captured. B Co 1-46 Inf located a large weapons cache at BT186103. It consisted of 74 individual and crew served weapons, and ammunition. B Co 1-46 Inf observed and engaged one enemy evading resulting in 1 VC KIA and 2 Clk of grenades ODA. B Co 1-46 Inf received and returned heavy sniper fire at BT213103, resulting in 4 VC KIA and 1 AK-47 Clk. One of the eight mortars of B Co 1-46 ambushed 2 NV at BT151103 resulting in 1 NV KIA and 5 WIA.

6 June 68. C Co 1-46 Inf received heavy automatic weapon fire resulting in 3 WIA, 1 KIA, 1 VC KIA and 1 AK-47 Clk. B Co 275073 Mortar engaged NV Inf received 1 RPG, mortar fire, and heavy automatic weapon fire resulting in 5 KIA and 23 WIA.
7 June 68. At 0830 hours, 1-52 Inf assumed OPCON of B, C, and D Co 1-46 Inf, and moved to BT165169. 2 US kilos, 1 VC KLR, and 2 SKS CL were used in an attempt to overrun the D/1-45 Inf, one man engaged at 1500 hrs. Operation was renewed resulting in 1 VC KLR, 1 AK47 CL, and 2 SKS CL.

8 June 68. 1-6 Inf assumed OPCON of B, C, and D 1-46 Inf. All units were issued orders to conduct night movements north of the Dong Kieu River. At 2305 hours, D Co 1-46 Inf engaged and killed four enemy at BT22072, capturing their web gear and loaded AK47 magazines. At 2307 hours, 1-6 Inf engaged 4 VC in a destroyed village at BT22076, killing 2 and capturing a M-1 carbine. B/1-6 engaged approximately 20 VC at a range of 25-30 meters, killing three and capturing 1 AK47 and 1 M-60 machinegun.

9 June 68. 1-46 Inf assumed control of LZ Bowman and their maneuver elements. 1-6 Inf command and control group assumed control of Hill 69 and the Chu Lei T.O.R. B/1-46 while moving at night, engaged and killed 2 VC at BT22072.

10 June 68. 1-46 captured 1 wounded NV and his AK47 at BT22061. The prisoner stated he was a member of the 80th BN, 1st VC Regt, 2d NV Div. B/1-46 engaged and killed 1 NV at BT22069, capturing his web gear and 1 Chicom grenade.

11 June 68. Maneuvering elements continued to operate to the west of LZ Bowman concentrating on night ambushes and patrols of platoon size elements. At 1005 hours, 1-46 engaged and killed 1 VC at BT212075, capturing 1 AK47.

12 June 68. B/1-46 engaged and killed 1 VC at BT200707 as they were leaving their ambush site. At 2325 hours, 1-46 received a mortar and ground attack by an estimated NV company. The enemy used G3 type gas, 1 flame thrower and several automatic weapons in an attempt to overrun the NDP at BT200707. The enemy attack was repelled.

13 June 68. The attack on 1-46 began again at 0025 hours along with a similar assault on D Co at BT20069. One dust off helicopter was shot down in the NDP during this action. Contact was broken at 0500 hours. Results 2 US kilos, 22 US kilos, 1 VC KLR (C), 5 VC KLR (G), 1 NV flamer thrower, 1 gas mask and 5 Chicoms grenades CL.

14-15 June 68. All activities were of a routine nature with no significant results.

16 June 68. 1-46 engaged an USSF at BT165169 resulting in 5 VC KLR and 2 AK47 CL.

17 June 68. 1-46 Inf regained OPCON of A and D/1-52 Inf, at 0600 hours, 1-46 engaged 15-20 VC with weapons resulting in 4 VC KLR, 2 AK47 and 1 SKS CL.

18 June 68. At 2400 hrs B & C/5-46; Trp H/17 Cav; A, B/1-52 were OPCON of 1-46 for operation in Burlington Trail.
19 June 68. At 0800 hrs B/5-46 Infantry found 1 VC KIL. One helicopter received SIF resulting in 1 US KIL. (Co-pilot).

20 June 68. 1-52 Infantry concluded operations in Burlington Trail. The battalion minus 1/1-52, which stayed to dismantle LZ Clifford, was air-lifted to LZ Beyonet.

21 June 68. H/17 Cav discovered several 250 - 750 lbs bombs at BT210166. They are believed to have been used to mine the Tam Ky & Tien Phuoc Road. The bombs were blown in place and the craters filled. B/1-46 engaged 2 VC at BT26090 resulting in 1 VC KIL, 1 K-50 and 1 Chicom Submachine Gun CL.

22 June 68. All elements of 1-52 Inf returned to their parent unit. Maskot gunships engaged a sniper in a bunker at BT25076 resulting in 5 VC KIL.

23 June 68. At 1100 hours B/1-46 received 2 81mm rds in their NDP at BT34076 resulting in 4 KIL and 17 WIL. Further investigation revealed that C/1-46 had fired the rounds from BT14074. Co B was approximately 800 meters from the location they called in. Investigation was conducted and disciplinary action recommended.

24 June 68. The CIDG force from Tien Phuoc became 0:CON to 1-46 at 0715 hrs. They were to conduct operations with 1/1-46. H/17 Cav engaged and killed 1 VC at BT34076.

25-29 June 68. Activity in Burlington Trail was light and scattered. D/1-46 killed 1 VC at BT142105 and H/17 Cav discovered 1 NVL body.

30 June 68. D/1-46 captured 1 NVL with web gear and gas mask. His unit was the 155th Battalion, 4th NVL Regt. All other activities were of routine nature.

1 July 68. All activities were of routine nature with negative significant results.

2 July 68. C/1-46 had a Chieu Hoi at BT62075. He gave 4 locations of enemy troops.

3-9 July 68. Operations were conducted within the Burlington Trail AO with light contact and no significant results.

10 July 68. C/1-46 engaged 3 VC at BT27116 resulting in 1 VC KIL and 1 VC WIL/GL. The enemy soldiers were carrying NVL sundry type items.

11 July 68. B/1-46 engaged 4 VC at BT22034 resulting in 1 VC CL.

12 July 68. C/1-46 engaged and killed 1 VC in cadre type uniform at BT79175. They also observed 15 VC 500 meters to their east.

13 July 68. B/1-46 engaged and killed 1 VC at BT231089.

14 July 68. B/1-46 engaged and killed 1 VC carrying rice and an N-26 hand grenade. A second VC was wounded and escaped.
15-18 July 68. Operations were conducted in the Burlington Trail AO with light contact and negative results.

19 July 68. B/1-46 engaged 4 VC carrying AK-47's at BT23124, resulting in 2 VC KIA.

20-21 July 68. Contact in the Burlington Trail AO remained light with no significant results.

22 July 68. B/1-46 met a VC on a trail and engaged resulting in 1 VC KIA.

23 July 68. Gunships in support of B/1-46 engaged and killed 3 VC at BT133235.

24-25 July 68. Operations continued in a routine manner with no significant results.

26 July 68. D/1-46 was ambushed at BT10724L. Results of the action were 2 VC KIA and 1 SKS and field equipment captured. A/1-46 engaged and killed 1 NV at BT173137, capturing his AK-47.

27 July 68. Activity in Burlington Trail was light and scattered with no significant results.

28 July 68. B/1-46 engaged and killed 1 VC at BT225083 wearing a grey uniform and US web gear. A/1-46 engaged and killed 1 NV at BT16927. He was wearing green uniform and carrying a steel helmet and AK-47.

29 July 68. C/1-46 flew into an LZ at BT167088 where a command detonated mine was set off and 60mm mortar fire received, resulting in 2 US KIA and 4 WIA.

30 July 68. D/1-46 engaged an estimated VC squad with artillery at BT257145 resulting in 1 VC KIA. C/1-46 engaged and killed 1 NV in green fatigues at BT168071.

1 Aug 68. B/1-46 engaged 3 VC at BT225073, killing 1 and capturing 1 AK-47.

3 Aug 68. C/1-46 discovered 1 VC killed by artillery HEI round. He was planting anti-personnel mines and had 10 CBU type on his body.

4-7 Aug 68. All units moved as planned and assumed control of AO with negative contact.

8 Aug 68. ER/5-46 had contact with 4 VC at BT05021. Results were 1 US KIA, 4 VC KIA, 4 dead. Equipment captured included 2 AK-47's, 1 pistol and 1 rifle of unknown type.

9 Aug 68. D/5-46 captured 1 female VC at BT040090 carrying a LLS-36 rifle and later found 1 dead NV at BT075024.

10 Aug 68. Contact was light in the Burlington Trail AO with negative results.
11 Aug 68. D/5-46 sighted and engaged 4 VC at BT036014, killing 1 and capturing his web gear. D/5-46 became engaged with 3 VC at BT012083 resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 AK-47 CIA.

12 Aug 68. Operations continued in the Burlington Trail 40 with no enemy contact. One large rice cache was discovered at BT015089.

13 Aug 68. C/5-46 engaged 3 VC at BT011089 killing all 3 and capturing 1 M-1 carbine.

14 Aug 68. A/5-46 received fire from BT002101 and returned fire with their organic weapons, resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 SKS CIA.

15 Aug 68. C/5-46 engaged a USEF at BT97105 resulting in 1 VC KIA and 2 VC CIL. A/5-46 engaged and killed 1 NV and captured his AK-47 at BT975126.

16 Aug 68. A hospital complex was located at BT961126 by C/5-46. Along with medical and food supplies 2 NV nurses were captured and 1 VC KIA. The area had a large number of graves, many fresh, and a large pile of human bones.

17 Aug 68. Light contact continued throughout the AO. D/5-46 engaged and killed 1 VC at BT976123.

18 Aug 68. At BT953135 A/5-46 engaged a USEF resulting in 1 VC KIA, 1 VC KIA/CIL, 1 MA 536, 1 AK-47, 1 AK-44 and 1 M-1 Carbine CIL.

19 Aug 68. Operations continued in the Burlington Trail 40 with negative enemy contact. One VC KIA was found by A/5-46 at BT953135.

20-22 Aug 68. All operations within the AO were of a routine nature with negative significant results.

23 Aug 68. LZ Bowman received incoming mortars, small arms and grenades, R.G rounds, satchel charges and bangalore torpedoes from an enemy force estimated to be 25-30 personnel. Results of attack were 5 US KIA, 26 US WIA, 1 VC KIA, and 1 VC KIA/CIL. LZ Young was also mortared resulting in 1 US WIA.

24 Aug 68. LZ Bowman again received a mortar attack with no casualties or damage.

25 Aug 68. B/5-46 sighted and engaged 5 NV with artillery at BT 191185 resulting in 1 NV KIA and 1 9mm pistol CIL.

26-27 Aug 68. All operations in the AO were of a routine nature with no significant results.

28 Aug 68. B/5-46 received a ground attack at BT207165 resulting in 2 US KIA and 5 US WIA. Later the CIDG's sweeping the same area discovered 8 NV KIA and captured 8 VC individual weapons.

29 Aug 68. The 39th Engrs at LZ Young received a mortar attack with no casualties or damage. B/5-46 located 1 VC killed by SDF at BT201179.
30 Aug 68. Operations continued within the AO with light contact. 4/5-46 engaged 2 VC at BT168155 resulting in 1 VC KIA(U).

1 Sep 68. Local search and clear operations were continued in the AO with negative results.

2 Sep 68. At BT182100 4/5-46 engaged 4 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA and 2 VC critically wounded and CIA. All were carrying documents and aid kits.

3 Sep 68. As they were conducting their sweep 4/5-46 engaged and killed 1 VC who was lighting signal fires as they approached vic BT74150.

4 Sep 68. D/5-46 came under a very heavy mortar attack at BT187093 resulting in 27 US KIA. The mortar tube was believed to be at BT151093. This area was engaged resulting in 1 secondary explosion.

5-8 Sep 68. Operations within the Burlington Trail AO were all of a routine nature with light contact and negative results.

9 Sep 68. 1/5 Cav found 1 VC KIA at BT279114. He had been dead about 2 days and had apparently bled to death from leg wounds.

10 Sep 68. While searching a village at BT196172 B/5-46 engaged 2 VC attempting to evade. Results were 1 VC KIA and 1 VC WIA/CIA.

11 Sep 68. The CIDG working with D/5-46 located a large rice cache booby trapped with 2 M-26 hand grenades. The WN in the area stated a company size NVA force had passed there 24 hrs prior.

12 Sep 68. 5/5-46 sighted and engaged 2 VC females with web gear and medical supplies resulting in 1 VC KIA.

13-17 Sep 68. Operations continued in the Burlington Trail AO with light contact and negative results.

18 Sep 68. The 1-52 Inf assumed responsibility of the Burlington Trail AO at 1500 hrs and commenced offensive operations. There was negative contact during the day.

19 Sep 68. At 1530 hrs 01-52 located a recently abandoned NVA base camp vic BT166158. In this area 5 NVA KIA were found along with 1 IW and 7 CSW. There were no significant contacts and no friendly casualties during the day.

20 Sep 68. At 0700 hrs 01-52 captured 1 NVA vic BT166158. The Aero Scouts also engaged and killed 2 VC who were evading. In the abandoned base camp 01-52 captured 12 IW and 1 CSW. B Co also located an abandoned base camp vic BT157151.

21 Sep 68. Offensive and security operations continued under the operational control of the 196th Bde with Co D/4-21 Inf attached. No significant contacts were made.

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22 Sep 68. Activity throughout the day was characterized by numerous enemy initiated contacts. At 0447 hrs the 1-52 Inf resupply base at Mil 54 received incoming 60mm mortars causing 2 WFL. While moving east at 0637 hrs C/1-52 received sniper fire. The enemy were engaged with small arms, artillery and gunships. Contact was broken 1 hour later with 2 US KIA, 2 US WFL and unknown number of enemy losses. At 0910 hrs D/4-21 Inf began receiving automatic weapons fire. Gunships were brought on station and contact was initially broken at 1120 hrs. At 1210 hrs D/4-21 received 12 rds of 60mm mortars while gunships were in the area. Final results were 1 US KIA and 6 US WFL. Enemy losses were not known. During the day B/1-52 also had minor contact, however, at 1720 hrs they received 2 KIA, LW and RPG fire. One track was hit causing negative damage but 3 WFL. Again at 2030 hrs B/1-52 Inf received SLP and grenades resulting in 1 US WFL.

23 Sep 68. Three rounds of 105mm artillery fire landed close to the D/1-52 perimeter at 0854 hrs resulting in 3 WFL and 1 KIA. Later in the morning D/1-52 began receiving SLP and 60mm mortars. Gunships were called on station but there were negative friendly or enemy casualties. B/1-52 located a freshly dug position with firing positions and tunnels vic B2200180 at 1250 hrs. At 1320 hrs D/1-52 also located a large tunnel complex and recovered miscellaneous enemy equipment and 5 KIA KIA. At 1250 hrs D/4-21 located 1 US KIA and 1 US WFL vic BT200177 from a contact on 22 Sep 68. During the period LZ Bowman received 9 incoming mortar rounds while LZ Young received 15.

24 Sep 68. Offensive and security operations continued with the 1-52 Inf returned to the operational control of the 19th LTB at 1200 hrs and B/1-52 and C/1-52 becoming O/CON to 1-1 Cav at 2230 hrs. During the day no significant contact was made but LZ Young received 5 incoming mortars. Three individual weapons, 1 suspected mortar tube and 1 VC KIA were found during the operations.

25 Sep 68. Operations continued with B and C/1-52 OPCON to 1-1 Cav. At 1645 hrs the Aero Scouts reported 8 NVL KIA vic BT145073 and miscellaneous packs and equipment CL.

26 Sep 68. A mortar and ground attack on LZ Young began at 0502 hrs resulting in one bunker being destroyed and 6 US WFL. Approximately 70 mortars and 20 RPG's were received. 14 VC KIA were found in the area and 1 RPG launcher was CL. At 0600 hrs B/1-52 sustained 1 WFL when 2 grenades were thrown inside their perimeter. Later at 1240 hrs they found 3 NVL KIA vic BT245158. A major contact developed in the vic of BT1718 when the Aero Scouts Inserted ground troops to investigate their sighting of 5 mortar tubes. The Aero Scouts engaged and killed 30 VC but sustained 3 WFL during attempted extraction bringing their total to 5 WFL for the morning. At 1245 hrs a gunship was shot down at BT176179 and D/1-52 was given the mission to move north from LZ Young to assist the downed Aero Scout. A LOH was also shot down vic BT190182. D12 was Inserted vic BT185175 moving north on foot to reinforce the Aero Scouts. D12 sustained 5 WFL. At 1445 D15 and D25 linked with D12 vic BT17181. While conducting an air strike at 1645 hrs an F4C jet fighter was shot down vic BT178188. Finally at 1755 hrs D26 linked with the Aero Scouts and prepared litters to move the wounded to the D15 and D25 positions where they were evacuated. At 1845 all personnel were present and accounted for after their extraction to LZ Young. During the day ground troops and artillery killed 40 NVL by SLP and another 50 NVL were killed by air strikes and gunships. During the engagement D/1-52 sustained 6 WFL in addition to the Aero Scouts 4 WFL and 3 KIA. The 1-52 Inf total casualties for the period was 13 WFL.
27 Sep 68. Operations continued in the Burlington Trail AO with D/1-52 and A/1-52 moving north from LZ Young to search the area of the previous day's contact. While moving to secure the downed gunship D/1-52 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 AK-47 GLD. The gunship was extracted at 1215 hrs and at 1430 hrs the 3 MHA Aero Scouts bodies were evacuated. In the vic of BT162158 D/1-52 found 3 CSV and 6 IV. A/1-52 moved to the area of the downed F40 fighter and recovered 1 Smith and Wesson Cal 38 pistol, some documents and the aircraft crew remains.

28 Sep 68. Operations continued with A and D/1-52 conducting search and clear operations northeast of LZ Young. There were no significant contacts or sightings.

29 Sep 68. Contact remained light as A and D/1-52 shifted their search operations towards the south. At 0930 hrs D/1-52 engaged 2 VN who were evading. Results were 1 VC KIA.

30 Sep 68. Offensive and security operations continued in the Burlington Trail AO with negative contact.

1 Oct 68. Offensive and security operations continued in the Burlington Trail AO with platoon size patrols around LZ Young and LZ Bowman. A/1-52 and D/1-52 conducted search operations in the northwest portion of the AO. In the only contact of the day LZ Bowman received 7 rounds of 60mm mortar causing 1 WIA.

2 Oct 68. Throughout the period LZ Young received a total of 12 incoming mortar rounds and sustained 1 WIA. LZ Bowman also received 5 rounds of 82mm mortar at 1847 hrs. A and D/1-52 continued sweeping south along the Tuc Phuc CZ boundary. At 1900 hrs vic BT162158 D/1-52 made contact with 3 VC resulting in 2 US WIA and unknown enemy losses. While in their ML D/1-52 also received incoming mortars and S/LF with negative results.

3 Oct 68. Operations continued with D/1-52 replacing B/1-52 in a two company search of Hill 269 with A/1-52 vic BT158162. A squad ambush near D/1-52 night perimeter suffered 1 KIA and 8 WIA at 0030 hrs when 16 mortar rounds and incoming S/LF was received. LZ Bowman also received 6 incoming mortar rounds at 1915 hrs which caused negative casualties and destroyed a 30mm RR. At 0020 hrs the Aero Scouts engaged and killed 7 WIA in枣 area 117.

4 Oct 68. Contact was light throughout the AO. LZ Young received 4 incoming mortar rounds while LZ Bowman received 3 during the period. In the only significant contact B/1-52 killed 1 WIA and captured 1 IV. The Aero Scouts also killed 2 WIA and a LRRP killed 1 WIA.

5 Oct 68. Throughout the day contact was concentrated around LZ Young. A total of 13 incoming mortar rounds were received causing 9 WIA and 1 KIA. S/LF was also received sporadically. In the only other contact of the day the Aero Scouts engaged 3 VC at BT2552124 resulting in 1 VC KIA.

6 Oct 68. Enemy activity was light throughout the AO. Operations for the day were directed to provide security for an Engineer Convoy between LZ Young and Tien Phuc. During the only contact D/1-52 engaged 2 VC with...
7 Oct 68. Security and offensive operations continued in the Burlington Trail. Without significant contact.

8 Oct 68. B/1-52 continued to search west of LZ Young along the Tien Phuoc road. A/1-52 returned to LZ Bowman and C/1-52 departed to search the area east of LZ Young. At 1050 hrs CIDG elements engaged 2 VC killing one and capturing 1 JK-47 vic BTU65124. Approaching the night location C/1-52 received heavy SAF resulting in 2 WIA. Later at 1910 hrs a booby trapped C4 was tripped while placing claymores resulting in 1 WIA.

9 Oct 68. All elements of the battalion not securing LZ Bowman and LZ Young moved into positions along the Tien Phuoc road to provide security for a convoy. There were no friendly or enemy casualties throughout the period.

10 Oct 68. Offensive operations continued in the Burlington Trail. Without significant contact or friendly losses.

11 Oct 68. Search operations continued with B/1-52 and C/1-52 operating south of LZ Young. Recon patrolling north from LZ Young resulted in 1 VC KIA. At 1130 hrs B/1-52 received SAF and engaged 3 VC resulting in 3 VC KIA.

12-13 Oct 68. Security and offensive operations continued in the LZ without significant contact and no casualties.

13 Oct 68. In the only significant contact of the day D/1-52 engaged 6 enemy vic BTU66122 killing 1 VC and capturing 2 JK-47s and 1 H-16.

15 Oct 68. At 1825 hrs C/1-52 fired artillery on 30 enemy in the open with negative results.

16 Oct 68. B/1-52 and C/1-52 continued company searches while A/1-52 and D/1-52 killed 1 NVN and captured 1 JK-47. Later 2 enemy engaged the rear element of C/1-52 causing 1 WIA.

17 Oct 68. In the only contact of the day a patrol from A/1-52 suffered 1 WIA from light sniper fire vic BT245158.

18 Oct 68. D/1-52 moved off LZ Young to search 500 yards to the north and to the east while A/1-52 departed LZ Bowman to search to the east. During the day there were no enemy contacts. However 1 KIA and 3 WIA were received by D/1-52 when a mine exploded 30 meters to the east of the Tien Phuoc Road.

19 Oct 68. At 1100 hrs D/1-52 came upon 5 enemy and continued their search east of LZ Young. Two platoons from C/1-52 search west of LZ Young where 3 NVA were killed during the day. A/1-52 continued searching east of LZ Bowman with negative results.

20 Oct 68. Search operations continued with D/1-52 OCPON to the 1-46 Inf. During the day's only significant contact C/1-52 detained one VC fanatic.

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21 Oct 68 to 23 Oct 68. Offensive and security operations continued without significant contact throughout the AO. On 21 Oct 68 D/1-52 returned to operational control of the 1-52 Inf.

24 Oct 68. A/1-52 and B/1-52 continued security of LZ Bowman and LZ Young while C/1-52 and D/1-52 searched the valley and hills south of LZ Bowman. At 0730 hrs C/1-52 received sniper fire resulting in 1 WIA. A second WIA was received by D/1-52 when they were engaged by an estimated enemy squad. At 1100 hrs one soldier was wounded by a booby trapped grenade.

25 Oct 68. In contact at 0800 hrs C/1-52 had 1 NVA KIA and 1 VC KIA while suffering 1 WIA. Recon also engaged 2 NVA at BT175125 resulting in 1 NVA KIA.

26 Oct 68. Offensive & security operations continued in the Burlington Trail AO. Recon and B/1-52 detained 1 male while Blue Goat engaged and killed 3 VC. No friendly losses during this period.

27 Oct 68. Activity was light in AO. In only significant contact C/1-52 killed 2 VC attempting to evade.

28 Oct 68. Offensive operations continued as C/1-52 and D/1-52 searched in the central portion of AO. D/1-52 with one platoon from A/1-52 participated in security operations along the Then Phuoc Road.

29 Oct 68. Two companies continued searching central portion of Rd 117 where B/1-52 detained 1 male and 1 female. Recon killed 1 NVA while operating south of LZ Young. At 0745 vic BT215165 the 1-52 O&C received heavy M2R fire resulting in 1 WIA.

30 Oct 68. During operation A/1-52 replaced D/1-52 searching Rd 117 with B/1-52 and R/1-52 moving further south. LREI Team was also inserted and detained 1 female at 1613 hrs. No other contact in AO.

31 Oct 68. At 0220 LZ Bowman received 3 to 4 incoming mortar rounds. At 0400 hrs an attack commenced. UHF Bunker was destroyed, 3 US KIA, 9 WIA. The enemy utilized RPGs, mortars, satchel charges and grenades. 2 VC were killed. At 0615 hrs R/1-52 engaged 1 NVA resulting in 1 NVA KIA. Detained 1 female carrying medical supplies. LREI Team engaged 2 enemy resulting in 1 VC KIA.

1 Nov 68. Activities light in Burlington Trail AO. LZ Bowman received 5 to 6 rounds of mortar fire at 0315 hrs, SIF and 10 to 12 grenades resulting in 1 US WIA. No other significant contacts for the rest of the day.

2 Nov 68. Negative enemy contacts throughout AO during this period.

3 Nov 68. During the day of increased enemy contact D/1-52 observed 20 NVA southwest of LZ Young. They engaged resulting in 1 NVA KIA. At 1200 hrs D/1-52 received heavy SIF, requested an air strike, they checked area and found 4 VC bodies and 1 M2 carbine and 1 RPD MG. A/1-52 engaged 4 enemy with arty and SIF resulting in 3 VC KIA and 2 IW CLA. There were no friendly casualties.
4 Nov 68. B/1-52 while searching the northern portion of Bt 117 engaged 2 NVA resulting in 2 NVA KIA, 1 VC KIA and 1 pistol CIA. B/1-52 located 2 NVA and 1 VC KIA in vic of previous days contacts.

5 Nov 68. Before being extracted from field location and assuming security of Hill 54 A/1-52 returned fire on sniper location resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 AK-47 CIA. At 1650 hrs platoon of B/1-52 received fire while returning to company location. One US WIA and 3 NVA KIA and 1 IW CIA were the results of that contact. Platoon from D/1-52 that was southwest of LZ Young killed 4 VC with grenades and SLA at their NDP location.

6 Nov 68. In only contact B/1-52 while searching in Bt 117 received sniper fire resulting in 1 US WIA.

7 Nov 68. There were no significant contacts. B/1-52 found 3 NVA KIA and 1 NVA KIA by artillery the previous day.

8 Nov 68. Activity increased as C/1-52 operating east of LZ Bowman engaged and killed 2 VC. At 1045 hrs C/1-52 received hand grenade while engaging the enemy resulting in 2 WIA and 2 VC KIA. A/1-52 captured 1 carbine after engaging small enemy force. B/1-52 engaged 3 enemy in area southwest of LZ Young. Recon observed a squad of enemy southeast of LZ Bowman, they engaged with artillery resulting in 3 VC KIA. During the day there were 2 US WIA, 2 NVA KIA, 7 VC KIA and 1 IW CIA.

9 Nov 68. No significant enemy contacts initiated by the enemy. Recon 1-52 engaged unknown size enemy force resulting in 2 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 CIA.

10 Nov 68. At 1213 hrs a platoon of C/1-52 engaged 3 VC within 1000 meters of LZ Bowman resulting in 2 VC KIA. In same vic D/1-52 engaged and killed one NVA.

11 Nov 68. At 0745 hrs B/1-52 detained 1 VC with pack and uniform. He accidentally walked into perimeter southwest of LZ Young. Ambush element of B/1-52 successfully engaged 1 NVA and 1 VC in two separate contacts. Operation Burlington Trail terminated at 2400 hrs the 11th of November 1968.

12. RESULTS:

a. Enemy equipment and personnel losses:

(1) Personnel:

(a) 726 VC KIA
(b) 1187 NVA KIA
(c) 1264 Det
(d) 20 PW/VC
(e) 14 PW/NVA
(f) 10 RTNEE/VC
(g) 2 RTNEE/NVA
(2) **Weapons**: INDIVIDUAL - 441  CREW SERV'D - 104

(3) **Equipment**:
   (a) Radio, PRC-25: 3
   (b) Telephone, T-312: 2
   (c) Bear Traps: 12
   (d) Compasses: 7
   (e) Binoculars: 6
   (f) Mines (M-14, M-16 & homemade): 83
   (g) Food Stuffs: Rice - 12,000 lbs (approx)
       Barley - 5,000 lbs (approx)
       Tea - 1,500 lbs (approx)
   (h) Misc web gear: approx 300 sets

(4) **Ammunition**:  
   (a) .50 Cal: 20,000
   (b) Hand grenades (K-26 & Chicom): 2,700
   (c) RPG rounds: 700
   (d) 12.7mm rounds: 5,000
   (e) SKS rounds: 100,500
   (f) 4K-47 rounds: 165,000
   (g) 60mm rounds: 9,500
   (h) 82mm rounds: 4,000
   (i) 122mm rounds: 7
   (j) 75mm RR rounds: 29
   (k) Explosives: 700 lbs
   (l) .30 cal rounds: 21,000
   (m) 7.62mm rounds: 9,000
   (n) 5.56mm rounds: 1,200
   (o) M-79 rounds: 400
b. Friendly personnel and equipment losses:

(1) Personnel: 

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<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>747 WIA (E)</td>
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<td>1 MIA</td>
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(2) Equipment: 

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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(c) M-79</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(d) PRC-25</td>
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13. Administrative Matters:

a. Supply: All units carried their normal basic load and their normal TQZ weapons were employed. All movement was by foot resupply was provided only when definitely necessary. In many areas dense vegetation and bad weather hampered resupply, which was all done by helicopter, but overall it was adequate.

b. Maintenance: No significant maintenance problems were encountered as only combat elements were involved in the operation. Normal first echelon maintenance was accomplished in the field.

c. Medical: The units medics displayed courage and proficiency during the entire operation. The dustoffs were accomplished in a truly outstanding manner and were very rapid.

d. Transportation: All transportation of casualties and supplies was conducted by helicopter.

e. Communications: Minor communication problems were encountered when rifle companies were using the short antenna with the AN/PRC-25. Rifle relays with adjoining units had to be established at LZ Clifford, but no further problems were encountered once the relay site was operational.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques: Starlight scopes were used with the point and flank elements. The value of the scopes was limited due to the heavy overcast, however; in the early evening and morning hours they were very useful in the observation of danger areas. Scout Dogs were also employed during the operation and the units alertness and security was greatly increased. Whenever possible panel markers or mirrors were used to pinpoint the ground units location to air observers, thus not compromising the units position.
15. Commanders Evaluation: Operations of this type offered the command a tactical capability to deploy his unit in a manner that is able to cope with any unforeseen enemy situation. These units were small enough to preclude being a vulnerable target, but large enough to prevent an enemy surprise attack. In addition they operate adjacent to each other so that within a minimum of time they may provide each other with support. A known enemy tactic is to withdraw while being pursued, thus, the enemy was unable to stop, regroup, cid, and organize to attack. Operations in the mountainous areas presented some problems due to the weather closing in the early afternoon. The practice was initiated of establishing a secure LZ as soon as one was located. Resupply was on standby and aircraft immediately diverted to resupply. This resupply procedure allows the command to move into his night defensive position without being disclosed by resupply aircraft. It was found that the use of LURP rations increased the flexibility of the ground commander. Class A rations should be planned for when the tactical situation permits rather than as a daily requirement. It is a great tactical disadvantage to have your location continually given away by resupply aircraft. Company sized night operations against a determined enemy force, who avoid decisive combat rely heavily upon mortar attacks, are capable of meeting with more success than daylight operations. The enemy's ability mortar positions is increased. Movement in open areas and astride trails can be accomplished at night with greater relative safety than during daylight hours. The increased difficulty in conducting aerial medevac at night is greatly offset by the area in which wounded can be recovered from an enemy kill zone under the cover of darkness. All troops must be trained with the necessary desire to develop enemy contact rapidly so that any friendly casualties can be covered by forward movement.

16. Recommendations: Operations of this type should continue and a greater emphasis should be placed on night operations of the rifle company. Saturation patrols in a smaller area, i.e. grid, could produce effective results providing proper blocking forces were established.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

RODNEY E. HURT
Capt, AGC
Asst Adjutant