The smell of these things.

Jim, you can stand ciemmetes.
S1.

1. (V) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation SHERMANOAH II was a reconnaisance in force operation and a road clearing operation conducted in two phases. References: Map, Vietnam, Pages 5211, 6211, 6311 III, 6311 IV, 6212 I, 6312 I, 6312 II, 6312 III, 6312 IV.


3. (O) LOCATION: SHERMANOAH II was conducted in two phases. Phase I was conducted west of Highway 19 from Ben Cat to Chon Thanh in the Long Nguyen base area. Phase II was conducted in the rubber and jungle areas surrounding Loc Ninh. The areas of operation are shown at Annex B.

4. (O) CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: Operation SHERMANOAH II was a 1st Infantry Division controlled operation.

5. (O) REPORTING OFFICER: The reporting officer is Major General Keith L. Ware, Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division. A list of commanders is shown at Annex A.

6. (O) TASK ORGANIZATION:

   Phase I (26 Sep - 26 Oct 67)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st Brigade</th>
<th>24 Brigade</th>
<th>31 Brigade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
   | 1-25 Inf    | 2-16 Inf  | 2-3 Inf (Mech)(-)
   | 1-26 Inf    | 2-18 Inf  | 1-16 Inf   |
   | 1-2 Inf     | TASK FORCE STEEL | 1-18 Inf |
   | 1-4 Cav (-) | 1-7 Arty (IB) | 2-23 Inf   |
   | 1-5 Arty (IB)|          | 5/2-34 Arty |
   | 6-13 Arty (IB)|       | 2-33 Arty (IB) |

7. (O) SUPPORTED FORCES:

   - Artillery: See Annex C.
The following is a resume of the sorties flown and ordnance expended during Operation MEKELAAN II:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PHASE I</th>
<th>PHASE II</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preplanned</td>
<td>744 sorties</td>
<td>462 sorties</td>
<td>1,206 sorties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate</td>
<td>669 sorties</td>
<td>339 sorties</td>
<td>1,008 sorties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinance</td>
<td>1,902.92 tons</td>
<td>873.74 tons</td>
<td>2,776.66 tons</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(2) B-52 Strikes: There were 11 B-52 strikes conducted during Phase I and 12 during Phase II. Strikes were delivered based upon intelligence and their impact on the scheme of maneuver. The B-52 strike is extremely effective in opening jungle areas habitually used by the VC. Due to the extensive construction of base camp complexes found during Phase I, the B-52 strike offered one practical method of destroying them. Some base camps extended over three to four grid squares requiring more than one B-52 strike to effectively destroy them. The value of B-52 strikes cannot be over emphasized. A list of targets and the results obtained are included as Annex D.

e. Army Aviation — See Annex E.
(1) Aviation units supporting Operation SUNDANCE:

(a) 1st Aviation Battalion
(b) 11th Aviation Battalion
(c) 222d Aviation Battalion
(d) 269th Aviation Battalion
(e) 214th Aviation Battalion

(4) Statistics for airborne operations during Phase I:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Unit Model</th>
<th>Nr of 1/4 Aircraft</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Distance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) 29 Sep</td>
<td>1-26 Inf 1-16 Inf</td>
<td>25 20</td>
<td>75 60</td>
<td>450 360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) 1 Oct</td>
<td>1-16 Inf</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) 2 Oct</td>
<td>2-26 Inf</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) 4 Oct</td>
<td>1-18 Inf</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) 8 Oct</td>
<td>2-26 Inf</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) 10 Oct</td>
<td>1-26 Inf 1-2 Inf</td>
<td>25 25</td>
<td>75 75</td>
<td>450 450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) 13 Oct</td>
<td>1-18 Inf 1-16 Inf</td>
<td>25 25</td>
<td>75 75</td>
<td>450 450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(h) 15 Oct</td>
<td>1-16 Inf</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) 17 Oct</td>
<td>0/2-26 Inf D/1-16 Inf</td>
<td>10 10</td>
<td>20 20</td>
<td>120 120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(j) 18 Oct</td>
<td>1-2 Inf 1-16 Inf 2-18 Inf</td>
<td>20 20 20</td>
<td>65 45 60</td>
<td>210 270 360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(k) 19 Oct</td>
<td>1-26 Inf</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(l) 21 Oct</td>
<td>1-16 Inf</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(m) 23 Oct</td>
<td>1-26 Inf</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n) 26 Oct</td>
<td>1-2 Inf 1-26 Inf 1-16 Inf</td>
<td>20 20 20</td>
<td>70 75 60</td>
<td>420 450 360</td>
</tr>
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</table>

TOTALS 22 Units 425 1,425 8,260
(3) Statistics for airborne operations during Phase II:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>N of R/N</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Passengers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) 29 Oct</td>
<td>1-16 Inf</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>210</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1-26 Inf</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1-18 Inf</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>450</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) 31 Oct</td>
<td>1-26 Inf</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>450</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1-4 Inf</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>450</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) 2 Nov</td>
<td>1-26 Inf</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>450</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2-12 Inf</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>480</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) 6 Nov</td>
<td>1-26 Inf</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>450</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) 7 Nov</td>
<td>1-18 Inf</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>450</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2-12 Inf</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>480</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) 10 Nov</td>
<td>1-16 Inf</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>450</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) 11 Nov</td>
<td>1-26 Inf</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>450</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(h) 16 Nov</td>
<td>1-16 Inf</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>450</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) 19 Nov</td>
<td>2-18 Inf</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>450</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTALS 14 Units 260 1,000 5,820

(4) CH-47 Support - Phase I.

(a) Average aircraft per day = 8.5.
(b) Total troops moved = 23,000.
(c) Tons of equipment and supplies moved = 7,900.

(5) CH-47 Support - Phase II.

(a) Average aircraft per day = 8.
(b) Total troops moved = 16,000.
(c) Tons of equipment and supplies moved = 5,500.

8. (U) INSTALLATIONS: See Annex F.

9. (U) MISSILES:

a. Phase I: 1st Infantry Division conducts operations commencing 29 September 1967 to locate and destroy the 271st VC Regiment; to capture or destroy militarily significant installations, equipment, and supplies; to open access Route 240 from Ben Cat to via X0653293 and clear jungle approximately 100 meters to the flanks of the road.

b. Phase II: 1st Infantry Division conducts operations commencing 29 October 1967 to locate and destroy the 272d and 273d VC Regiments and capture or destroy militarily significant installations, equipment and supplies in the rubber and jungle area surrounding Loc Ninh.
10. (0) CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. Phase I: 1st Infantry Division employs the 1st Brigade in 10 SHERMAN OAH North to locate and destroy the 271st VC Regiment commencing 29 September 1967. 3d Brigade in 10 SHERMAN South to locate and destroy VC/AVN units and installations, clear and repair Route 240 from Dan Oot to vicinity XT53493 commencing 30 September.

b. Phase II: 1st Infantry Division employs 3d Brigade initially on 29 October 1967, then 1st Brigade on 30 October 1967 to locate and destroy the 272d and 273d VC Regiments in the vicinity of Loi Kho commencing 29 October 1967.

11. (0) EXECUTION:

PHASE I (29 September - 30 October)

a. 29 Sep - The 1st Brigade initiated Operation SHERMAN OAH II by moving the 1-2 Infantry from GABSON III (X7792519) to field position vicinity XT49340.

The 1-26 Infantry conducted an air assault into a field position vicinity XT28502 at 1000 hours.

The 1-16 Infantry moved overland from vicinity XT79066 to Loi Kho.

The 1-26 Infantry located at Phuc Ho became the Division RFQ.

The 1-4 Cavalry (-) secured Fire Support Patrol Bases CALBSON III South (XT790555) and CALBSON III (XT792519).

b. 30 Sep: 1st Brigade - the Brigade tactical CP moved from Phuc Ho to GABSON III B - (X790555).

The 1-2 Infantry conducted RFQ operations vicinity XT77541. At 1455, vicinity XT74044 Co D made contact with 2 VC. VC broke contact immediately.

The 1-26 Infantry moved via F/M from Phuc Ho to Quan Loi and became OPCON 3d Brigade.

3d Brigade - The 3d Brigade began Operation SHERMAN OAH by moving the 2-2 Infantry (Mech)(-) and elements of the 1st Eng Bn from Loi Kho to vicinity XT72536 and commencing RFQ, jungle clearing, and road repair operations.

The 1-16 Infantry moved via F/M from Quan Loi to Phuc Ho and became OPCON to the 1st Brigade.

c. 1 Oct - 1st Bde - The 1-2 Inf conducted operations northwest of their field position. At 1024, Co B, working with a combat tracker team, was hit by two command detonated devices vicinity XT712539, causing 2 WIA. The VC withdrew into a suspected base camp area. Three airstrikes and artillery were put into the area.

The 1-4 Cav (-) continued security of FSB GABSON III South (XT790555) and CALBSON III (XT792519).

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (Mech)(-) continued RFQ, jungle clearing and road repair operations along Route 240 vicinity XT725355. Rome
The 1-16 Infantry Battalion conducted an air assault vicinity XT71444 and established FSPB LORRAINE I (XT710432).

d. 2 Oct - 1st Bde - The 1-28 Inf established a new NDP vicinity XT721585. The 1-2 Inf established a NDP vicinity XT718537. At 0905H a Reconnaissance platoon outpost received M-79 fire. At 0955H Co C reported movement while searching the area from which the fire had been received. Co C fired into the area with small arms. At 1105H Co B located 1 VC KIA and 1 VC WIA vicinity XT718537. Two AK-47 weapons were captured. The wounded VC was evacuated. At 0220H the 1-2 Inf NDP vicinity XT735543 received 15 62mm mortar rounds from the southwest. Countermortar was fired and Spooky and LIT supported. There were 8 US WIA.

3d Bde - The 2-28 Infantry conducted an air assault vicinity XT715485. At 1235H Co B located 5 tons of unpolished rice vicinity XT710481.

The 2-2 Inf (-) continued RIF, jungle clearing and road repair along Route 240 vicinity XT725355. At 0805H a Rome Plow hit a mine vicinity XT718593 causing no casualties or damage. The Rome Plows cleared 70 acres. The 1-16 Inf secured FSPB LORRAINE I and conducted RIF operations. At 1156H Co D received small arms fire from vicinity XT692437. A search of the area revealed a base camp and 19 VC suspects. 2 US were WIA and the suspects were evacuated.

e. 3 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-28 Infantry Battalion conducted RIF operations vicinity XT721585. At 1005H vicinity XT723578 Co D located and destroyed an underwater footbridge.

The 1-2 Inf conducted RIF operations vicinity XT718537. At 1610H vicinity XT713544 a patrol from Co C engaged 1 VC with negative results.

The 1-4 Cav (-) continued to secure FSPB CAISSON III South (XT790555) and CAISSON II (XT792513).

3d Brigade - 2-2 Infantry (-) continued RIF, jungle clearing and road repair along Route 240 vicinity XT725355. Rome Plows cleared 70 acres of jungle.

The 1-16 Inf secured FSPB LORRAINE I and conducted RIF operations. At 1225H vicinity XT735546 Co B located and destroyed 2 bunkers. At 1150H vicinity XT692414 an AD received 1 round of small arms fire through the aircraft window. Artillery fired into the area resulting in 1 VC KIA (DC), 4 military structures destroyed, 1 large tin building destroyed and 4 water buffaloes destroyed. At 1845 vicinity XT704443 the Reconnaissance Platoon made contact with 4 VC. Artillery fired blocking fires and a LIT expanded into the area. Contact was broken at 1853H. Results were 1 VC KIA (DC) and negative US casualties. Equipment captured: 1 set of webgear, 2 pr blue pajamas, 10 days supply of food, 3 AK-47 magazines and 300 rounds of ammunition.

The 2-28 Inf located and destroyed 5.5 tons of rice vicinity XT710481.

f. 4 Oct - 1st Brigade - The Reconnaissance Platoon and C Co, 1-2 Infantry, departed their NDP vicinity XT718537 at 0735H. At 0745H contact was made with an unknown size VC force vicinity XT712537. Artillery and mortars supported the contact and a light fire team was airborne at 0800H. The first airstrike was put in at 0835H. The Reconnaissance Platoon and C Co closed back into the NDP vicinity XT712537.
AVIR-IT
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: N00 33-32) (E-1) (U)

US casualties were 3 KIA and 27 WIA. There were 12 VC KIA (BO) and 3 VC WIA (POW).

The 1-18 Infantry moved from Phuoc Vinh to Chon Thanh and conducted an air assault into an VC vicinity X762541. A large VC base camp was located 500 meters west of the L2 consisting of bunkers and tents. 7 air strikes vicinity X7607542 resulted in 19 VC KIA (BO).

The 1-4 Cavalry (-) secured FSB CAISSON III South (XT70555) and CAISSON IV (XT792913).

CAISSON II was disestablished and CAISSON IV established vicinity XT778542.

3d Brigade - The 2-26 Infantry Battalion conducted RIF operations vicinity XT700477 and extracted to Lai Khe and assumed RAF mission.

The 2-2 Inf (-) continued RIF, jungle clearing, and road repair along Route 240 vicinity XT725955. Some Flows cleared 95 acres of jungle.

The 1-16 Inf secured FSB LORAIN I (XT709432) and conducted RIF operations.

6. 5 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-18 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT698534. At 1045H Company B located and destroyed 12 bunkers with overhead cover vicinity XT605540. At 1510H vicinity XT694513 Co C local security elements made contact with an estimated VC squad resulting in 1 US KIA. VC losses unknown. VC broke contact immediately.

The 2-26 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT719538. At 1130H vicinity XT724575 the Reconnaissance Platoon received small arms fire while searching a base camp. 2 VC in the open and 1 VC in the bunker were sighted. Fire was returned with small arms, M-79 and hand grenades resulting in 3 VC KIA (BO).

The 1-2 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT719538. At 1007H vicinity XT713543 an ambush force from the Reconnaissance Platoon killed 2 VC and 4 VC (POW). At 1015H vicinity XT714542 the platoon received sniper fire. Fire was returned with small arms and M-79 and artillery was fired into suspected locations.

The 1-6 Cavalry (-) continued to secure FSB CAISSON III South (XT70444) and CAISSON IV (XT778546). CAISSON IV was disestablished and CAISSON V established vicinity XT76540.

3d Brigade - The 2-26 Infantry conducted security operations at Lai Khe and was the Division RIF. At 1324H Company C moved to CAISSON V.

The 2-2 Infantry (-) continued RIF, jungle clearing and road repair along Route 240 vicinity XT725955. Some Flows cleared 100 acres of jungle.

The 1-16 Infantry secured FSB LORAIN I and conducted RIF operations. At 0630H Company C moved to a new RIF vicinity XT690437. At 1205H vicinity XT690437 Co G received approximately 12 M-79 rounds and 100 rounds of small arms fire.
AVDR TT

12 April 1968


6 Oct - 1st Brigade. The 1-18 Infantry conducted RIF operations in the vicinity XT69834. At 1435H vicinity XT69853 an 82mm mortar round landed inside the NDP. The counter mortar response was a 2nd RIF, 1 VCB (BC) and 4 bunkers destroyed. At 1458H vicinity XT69933 an AP engaged an unknown number of VC. The 1st RIF returned fire with at least two heavy machineguns, small arms and 3 claymores. The AP maneuvered back to the RDF under heavy automatic weapon and small arms fire. US casualties were 2 WIA and 1 KIA. A Spooky, LPP, and dust-off were requested but could not get airborne due to bad weather. At 1916H the NDP began receiving 60mm and 82mm mortar fire. The firing stopped at 1916H and started again at 1926H and stopped at 1934H. An estimated 75 rounds of 82mm mortars were received. As of 1928H four battalions were firing in support. At 1953H the Battalion received heavy automatic weapons fire on the south side of the perimeter. Fire was returned with small arms and 4-79 RIF. Firing ceased at 1954H. At 1955H a patrol was sent out to the location of contact to search for the missing man. Spooky began dropping flares at 2020H. The patrol came under mortar and small arms fire during the entire mission and was unable to locate the missing man. At 2050H an AP from Co C made contact while returning to RDF resulting in 1 US WIA. At 2120H 1 VC body was pulled into the perimeter. The VC was dressed in fatigues and had 1 Chinese Communist archive, a large amount of ammunition, North Vietnamese money and postage stamps. At 2141H automatic weapons fire was received on the east side of the perimeter. At 2141H automatic weapons and small arms fire was received on all sides of the perimeter. The firing continued every 5 to 7 minutes until 2145H. A second Spooky was on station at 2144H. At 2147H the perimeter received a heavy mortar attack and a ground attack consisting of automatic weapons, small arms and grenades. An estimated 60-70 mortar rounds (60mm and 82mm) were received and 7 machinegun positions were observed. The attack was broken off at 2330H resulting in 2 US KIA and 5 US WIA. A VC raider picked up by the 1-16 Inf on 27 October 1967 mentioned that his unit, the 2d Battalion, 271st Regiment had 59 KIA and 67 WIA as a result of counter mortar and ground fire during the attack described above. At 070615H 1 wounded man died. At 070815H a patrol located the missing man who was KIA.

The 1-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations in the vicinity XT719538. At 1248H vicinity XT712566 Company D located 2 bunkers and sighted 2 VC in the area. An airstrike in the area resulted in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 3 bunkers destroyed.

The 1-2 Infantry conducted RIF operations in the vicinity XT719538. At 2258H vicinity XT719538 the NDP received 3 mortar rounds causing no casualties or damage.

1-4 Cavalry (-) continued to secure FSPB CuLiSon III South (XT790555) and CuLiSon V (XT736540). At 1005H vicinity XT786554 4 individuals were detained and questioned for interrogation. 3 were released and 1 turned over to the National Police.

3d Brigade. The 2-2 Infantry (-) continued RIF, jungle clearing and road repair along Route 246 vicinity XT725353. At 0833H vicinity XT707435 an AP hit a mine causing 6 WIA. At 0905H vicinity XT723563 a squad from Co B fired on 3 VC. A platoon reinforced the squad to make a search of the area. 7 military structures with a campfire burning were located and destroyed. Also located and destroyed in the
same area were 6 bunkers, 1 trip flare, 1 Chinese Communist grenade and 5 GBU's.

The 1-16 Infantry continued to secure FSB LO MAINE I and conducted RIF operations. At 0804H vicinity XT633132 a patrol from Company C located and destroyed 50 rounds small arms fire. Fire was returned with small arms and AK-79. At 0942H vicinity XT705421 a patrol from Company A located and destroyed 500 pounds of rice and activated a booby trapped GBU causing 2 WIA. At 1225H vicinity XT710454 an LP from Company G received approximately 20 rounds of AK-47 fire. Fire was returned with N-79 and 81mm mortar. There was one US WIA.

1. 7 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-16 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT69534. A search of the area of the attack at 1855-2334 hours 6 October 1967 resulted in 24 VC KIA (BC), 1 AK-47 rifle, 1 Chinese Communist 56 machine gun, 1 Chinese Communist rifle, 3 rice sacks, 3 shovels, 10 Chinese Communist grenades, 4 RPG rounds: 7.62 ammunition. The VC were wearing mixed uniforms and new fatigue. Some of the VC were belts with red stars on the buckles. 125 fighting trenches and positions were located. Most of the trenches were 4 feet by 2 feet by 1/2 feet. At 1205H vicinity XT693534 Company B located 6 bunkers with fresh bloody bandages inside. Airstrikes vicinity XT684543 destroyed 2 bunkers, vicinity XT675545 destroyed 16 bunkers, 5 military structures, and vicinity XT705524 destroyed 5 bunkers.

The 1-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations and established a new NDP vicinity XT695506.

The 1-4 Cavalry (-) continued to secure FSB CAISSON III South and CAISSON V. At 0930H vicinity XT736543 3 Troop located 1 VC body dressed in a green uniform.

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (Mechanized) (-) conducted RIF, jungle clearing and road repair along Route 224 vicinity XT725355. The 1-16 (-) conducted RIF operations and established a new NDP vicinity XT681484.

2. 8 Oct - 1st Brigade - At 1145 vicinity XT091345 a 1st Aviation Battalion UH-1D while on a Bloodhound mission received automatic weapon fire. At 1200H same aircraft received small arms fire.

The 1-18 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT699534. At 1000H vicinity XT692538 Company G located and destroyed 25 prone positions. Co G moved back and artillery and airstrikes were put in. At 1438H vicinity XT694525 the point of Company D while moving into a base camp drew automatic weapons fire, returned the fire resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). Due to close proximity of the Company G contact and ground fire received by lift aircraft of 2-28, Co D was moved back to its Night Defensive Position to allow maneuver space and priority of fires to Company G and 2-28. At 2115H vicinity XT698534 an unknown number of VC activated a trip flare. Illumination was fired at 2135H and 2 VC were observed dragging a third VC. They were engaged by machine gun fire resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC). The 1-2 Infantry moved to Phuoc Vinh, OPGO to 1st Brigade, and remained DIV RIF.

The 2-28 Infantry air assaulted into a landing zone vicinity XT599557 and established an NDP vicinity XT665555. At 1105H vicinity XT658559, one lift aircraft received a short burst of automatic weapons fire. A light fire team expanded into the area and the 1st flight touched down at 1128.
3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (Mechanized) (-) continued RIF, jungle clearing, and road repair along Route 13 vicinity XT725355. At 0840H vicinity XT713399 2 armored personnel carriers hit mines causing 2 WIA. Rome Plows cleared 50 acres.

0/1-16 Infantry continued to secure Fire Support Base LORRAINE I. The 1-16 Infantry (-) conducted RIF operations from its Night Defensive Position (XT691424).

x. 9 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-18 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT698534. At 1032H vicinity XT696545 Company B received small arms and automatic weapons fire as the point entered a base camp. The point man engaged and killed one VC. The point withdrew and artillery and air strikes were put into the area resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC) and one secondary explosion. At 1955H vicinity XT577542 an ambush patrol from Company B made contact with an unknown number of VC resulting in 1 US WIA.

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (Mechanized) (-) conducted RIF, jungle clearing, and road repair operations along Route 240 vicinity XT725355. Rome Plows cleared 35 acres of jungle.

Fire Support Base LORRAINE II was established at XT685433 and secured by 1-16 Infantry (-). 0/1-16 Infantry continued to secure Fire Support Base LORRAINE I.

1. 10 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-18 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT698534. At 1000H vicinity XT695422 the rocon platoon located 1 pair of sandals, 1 bolt with a red star on the buckle and fresh graves. The graves contained 4 VC bodies, approximately 5-7 days old. At 1120H vicinity XT696532 a patrol from Company D made contact with an unknown number of VC. Contact was broken at 1130H. 1 US WIA. VC casualties unknown.

The 1-28 Infantry extracted to Phan Vinh and assumed the Division Ready Reaction Force mission. The 1-2 Infantry conducted an air assault vicinity XT697512 and established an RIF vicinity XT695509.

ii. 11 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-18 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT698534. The Battalion (-), traveling in column with Company B in the lead followed by the Command Group and Company C, received sniper fire vicinity XT700552. Light fire teams were employed on the west flank. An outflanked VC company then assaulted Company B from the west in order to flank the company. Air strikes and artillery were employed on the north and east, respectively. Company B withdrew through Company C as the VC preceded the attack against Company C. Contact was broken at 1515H. A total of 9 sorties of air were flown in support of the contact. US casualties were 1 KIA and 3 WIA. There were 21 VC KIA (BC). Documents taken from the bodies identified the 3d Battalion, 271st VC Regiment.

The 1-2 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT695509. At 0211H vicinity XT630514 an ambush patrol from Company C fired claymores at 3 VC. A grenade was thrown at the ambush patrol causing no casualties. The ambush returned fire with small arms and then moved to a new location. At 0700H a search of the area resulted in 3 VC KIA (BC). Two of the VC were wearing black pajamas and one was wearing mixed clothing. At 1830H vicinity XT642506 the rocon platoon triggered an ambush with negative results. As the patrol was moving they made contact with 10-15 VC with unknown results. Artillery and mortars
operations vicinity X660555. At 1535H vicinity X661553, Company A observed 2 VC running out of a base camp as the company moved in. The VC were fired on with small arms and artillery was fired in the direction the VC were moving. In the base camp the company located 3 VC bodies and destroyed 20 bunkers and 3 bundles of clothing. 1 AK-47 rifle was captured.

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (Mechanised) (-) continued to secure Fire Support Base LORRAINE I (X706433) and conduct RIF, jungle clearing and road repair operations along Route 240. At 1155H vicinity X669479 an Armored Personnel Carrier was hit by a command detonated claymore causing 4 WIA. Sniper fire was also received. Fire was returned with small arms and automatic weapons and artillery. Contact was broken at 1206H. At 1640H vicinity X687428 the Recon platoon located and destroyed 25 bunkers with tin roofs and 4 chickens. Four women and 15 children in the area were evacuated for interrogation.

The 1-16 Infantry continued to secure Fire Support Base LORRAINE II (X763493) and conduct RIF operations. At 1435H vicinity X764461 Company D located 15 tons of unpolished rice. At 1510H vicinity X762491 Company C received sniper fire. Fire was returned resulting in 1 VC KIA. A second VC was KIA while attempting to recover the first VC's weapon. A total of 1 AK-47, 1 M-1 rifle, 5 AK-47 magazines, with 90 rounds of ammunition and 4 clips of M-1 with 15 rounds of ammunition were captured.

n. 12 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-16 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity X696534. An ambush patrol on the previous day at 1955H vicinity X705540 fired claymores at an estimated 5 VC. At 0555H Company D located 4 VC killed by the ambush patrol and 34 prone shalors.

The 1-2 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity X625509. At 1115H vicinity X624508 the Recon platoon engaged 2 VC with unknown results.

The 2-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity X660555. At 1217H vicinity X668552 Company D received 1 hand grenade believed to have been thrown from a tree. Fire was returned with small arms and artillery.

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (Mechanised) (-) continued to secure FSB LORRAINE I (X706433) and conduct RIF operations, jungle clearing and road clearing operations along Route 240. At 1230H vicinity X684248 the Recon platoon located and destroyed a base camp consisting of 12 freshly camouflaged military structures, 1 wall, 1 Chinese Communist grenade, 2 mortars, 1 bicycle and 1 meat grinder. Recco Platoon cleared 75 acres of jungle. An ambush patrol made contact with 6 VC at 2135H vicinity X712442. Contact was broken at 2203H. No US casualties, unknown VC casualties.

The 1-16 Infantry conducted RIF operations and continued to secure LORRAINE II (X763493). At 0915H vicinity X695497 Company D fired on 6 VC moving north. Artillery and light fire was fired with VC in the area with unknown results. At 1230H vicinity X675480 an outpost received small arms fire. The outpost fired claymores and brought in artillery. The area was checked with negative findings. Eight tons of rice were found and evacuated from vicinity X798534.
b. 13 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 101st Infantry extracted from vicinity XN602534 to Phupon Vinh and became Division Rocky Reaction Force. The 1-29 Infantry conducted an aerialinsertion vicinity XN602534.

The 1-2 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XN635509.

The 1-16 Infantry continued to secure FSB LORNAINE II (XN665483). At 0700H Company C conducted an air assault into a landing zone vicinity XN635462. At 1010H vicinity XN677469 Company C received small arms and claymore fire resulting in 1 US KIA and 2 WIA. Fire was returned with small arms and automatic weapons. Artillery and LFT supported. Contact was broken at 1045H. At 1125H, Company C moved back into the area and received more fire causing 4 KIA and 2 WIA. Fire was returned and 260 Air, artillery and LFT supported. Contact was broken at 1325H. At 1525H, Company C moved back into the area of contact and received small arms fire. Fire was returned and 260 Air and artillery supported. Contact was broken at 1700H. At 1615H Company D moved by R/W from LORNAINE II to Landing Zone vicinity XN634666. Company C and D established an RIF at that location. At 1645H, Company B moved by R/W from Le Khe to LORNAINE II.

p. 14 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations. At 1215H vicinity XN677531 Company D received small arms fire, causing 1 KIA and 1 WIA. Fire was returned and 260 Air and artillery supported.

The 2-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations and established a new RIF vicinity XN624590. At 1355H vicinity XN665560 Company D fired on 3 VC. Artillery was fired into the area with unknown results.

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (MECH) (-) continued security of FSB LORNAINE I (XN706433) and conducted RIF operations, jungle clearing, and road repair of Route 240. Company D, 1-16 Infantry moved from field positions to Le Khe.

q. 15 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-18 Infantry became OPCON to 3d Bde and moved to Song Be. The 1-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XN698539. At 1035H vicinity XN894335 Company E received automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of VC. Fire was returned. Artillery and mortar supported. Contact was broken at 1100H resulting in 1 US KIA and 2 VC KIA (DO).

1-2 Infantry conducted RIF operations and established a new RIF vicinity XN642527. At 1500H vicinity XN641525 Company B wounded and captured 1 VC. The VC was taken to Le Khe for treatment but was DOH. 1 AK-47 rifle was captured. Several rice storage areas were located in the RIF (XN642527). Total estimated was 10 tons.

The 2-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XN685590. At 1426H vicinity XN685578 Company B located a base camp. At 1445H vicinity XN685578 Company B received automatic weapons fire from an estimated 3 VC. VC broke contact at 1453H. A pool of blood and a pair of bloody sandals were located.

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (MECH) (-) continued to secure FSB LORNAINE I (XN706433) and conducted RIF, jungle clearing, and road repair along Route 26G. At 1600H vicinity XN683979 Company C received 10 rounds of small arms fire. Fire was returned and contact broken at 1610H. Negative friendly casualties. VC casualties unknown. Pene rice cleared 65 acres of jungle.
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Firing broke out again to the right flank of the line of march in the Company A sector and progressed with increasing intensity down the flank toward Company D. Firing then broke out in Company D's sector on the right and left flank and left front. At this time, approximately 1045H, the Command Group had all become casualties.

Company A began to withdraw with the leading elements pulling back through the rear platoons and Company Command Group. The Company then moved north and east elements of Company B which had been sent out of the HDP by the Battalion Commander to assist in the return to the HDP.

At approximately 1220H the 1st Brigade Commander assumed command of the battalion. By 1400H Co C/2-26 Infantry had been inserted into the HDP and was committed to cover the route into the HDP while Company B moved north to assist in the withdrawal and evacuation of casualties. All firing had ceased by 1430H.

Company D/1-16 Infantry was inserted into the HDP at 1545H as additional reinforcement. The last of the wounded had been evacuated by 1730H and the last unit closed the HDP by 2000H. US casualties were 56 KIA, 75 WIA, and 2 MIA. There were 106 VC KIA (IC) and 55 KIA (POW). There were 36 sorties of air used to support the contact and four batteries of artillery. The VC were identified as elements of the 271st VC Regiment.

The 2-2 Infantry (-) secured FSPB LORRAINE II (XT685463) and conducted KIP operations. At 1400H vicinity XT685463 52 individuals were detained and evacuated for interrogation to Lai Khe. At 1505H vicinity XT685485 Company C received sniper fire resulting in 1 US KIA. Artillery and airstrikes were placed into the area of contact. VC losses were unknown.

3d Brigade - The 1-18 Infantry continued security, patrolling and KIP operations at Song Be (TU142069). At 1135H vicinity TU146095 Company A received automatic weapons fire. Fire was returned and the VC broke contact immediately. There was 1 US WIA.

15 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-26 Infantry battalion conducted KIP operations vicinity XT698539. At 1450H an airstrike vicinity XT698546 resulted in 2 VC KIA (IC).

The 1-2 Infantry extracted from HDP 1oo (XT641527) to Phuoc Vinh and became the Division KIP.

The 2-2 Infantry (NECII) (-) secured FSPB LORRAINE II and conducted KIP operations. At 1410H vicinity XT681462 an OP from Company G received sniper fire from an estimated 4 VC. Fire was returned with small arms and mortars.

The 1-16 Infantry moved from Lai Khe by R/A to HDP vicinity XT55586.

2-26 Infantry extracted from HDP vicinity XT685586 to Lai Khe, OPCON to 3d Brigade.

3d Brigade - The 1-16 Infantry was committed into the 1st Brigade AO. The 2-26 Infantry was extracted from 1st Brigade AO and was OPCON to 3d Brigade at Lai Khe.
Area T.2-
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u. 19 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-28 Infantry was extracted from HDP to Cha Ti Tchou (X76542). Extraction completed by 1125H. After a B-52 strike was placed in the vicinity X691551 the battalion was reassembled and conducted security and patrolling vicinity of HDP.

3d Brigade - The 1-26 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity Guai Lin. At 1500H vicinity X629130 Company B located and destroyed 12 military structures. Inside one of the structures 2 VC bodies were found in graves approximately 2 weeks old.

v. 20 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-16 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity X765386. At 1426H vicinity X685386 5 VC bodies were located.

3d Brigade - No significant activity.

v. 21 Oct - 1st Brigade - An air-strike conducted on 20 October vicinity X643330 resulted in 2 VC KIA (DC). The 1-2 Infantry conducted an air assault and established an HDP vicinity X635509. At 1525H vicinity X635496 a LSP engaged 3 VC on bicyciles resulting in 3 VC KIA (DC) and 3 bicyciles destroyed.

The 2-2 Infantry (NISE) (-) secured FSB LORRAINE II (X7685496) and conducted RIF operations. At 1319H vicinity X787475 Company 0 located a suspected VC hospital consisting of 3 military structures containing 1,000 bottles of medicine, 1,000 syringes, 50 pounds of guns, 1 sewing machine, cooking utensils, 50 medicine boxes and miscellaneous clothing. At 1300H vicinity X783343 the battalion HDP received 2 RPG rounds, 1 APC received light damage. At 1537H vicinity X665589 Company 0 received small arms, automatic weapons and M-79 fire. Fire was returned and contact broken at 1546H. There was 1 US WIA. VC casualties unknown. The medical supplies, with the exception of a few, were not executed due to enemy contact.

The 1-28 Infantry moved on foot to a new HDP vicinity X692550 and secured a landing zone for the insertion of the 1-16 Infantry which was inserted to form a joint HDP with the 1-28 Infantry.

3d Brigade - At 2016H vicinity X764175 an anti-personnel device was detonated against an HDP outpost. 1 US was WIA.

v. 22 Oct - 1st Brigade - At 1017H vicinity X922405 a platoon from 1-28 Infantry sustained 3 WIA by a booby trapped grenade as it moved to secure a downed aircraft.

The 1-16 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity X7692549. At 0945H vicinity X695358 Company B threw grenades into a tunnel in a base camp resulting in 1 VC KIA (DC) and 1 VC KIA (POW).

3d Brigade - No significant activity.

v. 23 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (NISE) (-) became CP308 to 3d Brigade and remained at FSB LORRAINE II.

The 1-26 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity X7692549.

The 1-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity X7635509.
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3d Brigade - The 3d Brigade assumed OPCON of FSPB LORRINE I and LORRINE II. The 1-26 Infantry moved by R/W from Quan Loi to Chon Thanh and conducted an aerial assault vicinity XT652/62. The 2-28 Infantry moved by R/W from Lai Ke to Quan Loi.

24 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT692/49. At 1145H vicinity XT662/54 the Battalion (-) located 10 caches containing a total of 5 122mm rocket motors, 2 122mm rocket warheads and fuses (all with carrying cases and packed in wooden boxes), 24 120mm mortar rounds, 13 cases of RPG-7 rounds (78 rounds and boosters packed in plastic, 60 rounds per case), 21 81mm mortar rounds, 25 60mm mortar rounds, and 18 additional carrying cases for 122mm rockets.

The 1-2 Infantry located and destroyed 13 tons of salt vicinity XT626/58.

3d Brigade - The 1-26 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT664/46. At 1224H vicinity XT664/56 Company A received sniper fire resulting in 1 US KIA and 2 US WIA. Fire was returned and airstrikes, artillery and a LPI supported. At 1403H vicinity XT664/58 Company A received 2 claymores causing no casualties. Fire was returned and air and artillery supported.

25 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-28 Infantry established a new NIF vicinity XT666/52.

The 1-2 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT635/59. At 1224H vicinity XT635/52 the room platoon fired on 1 VC with unknown results. At 1427H Company A located and destroyed 10 tons of unpollished rice. At 1510H vicinity XT635/59 a LPI engaged an unknown number of VC resulting in 1 VC KIA.

The 1-16 Infantry established a new NIF vicinity XT701/56.

The 2-2 Infantry (-) secured FSPB LORRINE I (XT713/47).

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (-) secured FSPB LORRINE I (XT713/47) and LORRINE II (XT664/46).

The 1-26 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT666/59. At 1526H vicinity XT666/58 Company C located and destroyed 3,000 pounds of rice, 4 75mm rounds, 1 claymore, 4 RPG-7s, 1,200 pounds of sugar, 15 pounds of salt, 15 canteens, 8 gas masks, 8 cooking pots, 35 sets of BD fatigues. The following items were evacuated: 2 complete night light sights, 1 magazine for Russian Rifle, 3 pounds of documents, 8 gas masks, 1 compass case, 1 mortar carrying case, 1 mortar aiming stake.

26 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT666/52. At 1400H vicinity XT664/519 Company D located 20 tons of salt and 6 caches of rice containing approximately 50 tons. 17 tons were evacuated and operations continued on 27 Oct.

The 1-2 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT635/59. At 1145H vicinity XT672/528 Company B located a base camp containing a grave with 1 VC body. 18 bunkers, 1 military structure and 2 fighting positions were destroyed. 2 pounds of documents, 1 billfold and a small amount of medical supplies were evacuated.
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3d Brigade - The 1-26 Infantry continued RIF operations vicinity KT656459.

ee. 27 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-28 Infantry extracted 44 tons of unpolished rice from vicinity KT666536. The 1-2 Infantry located and destroyed a VJ classroom at 1110H vicinity KT638515. A VJ flag, a blackboard and some documents were evacuated. At 1222H vicinity KT638519 Company D located 1.5 tons of polished rice and extracted 7500 pounds.

The 1-16 Infantry battalion conducted RIF operations vicinity KT701562. At 0910H vicinity KT698566 Company D captured 1 VJC.

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry continued to secure PSPB LORRAINE I and LORRAINE II. At 1335H vicinity KT664454 Company B received small arms fire and rifle grenades from 3-4 VJC causing 2 KIA. Contact was broken at 1345H. Aerial strikes, artillery and LSF's supported.

The 1-26 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity KT692457. The 1-18 Infantry continued security of Song Be (KT142069). The battalion received a total of 85 mortar rounds between 0040H and 0100H. There were no casualties.

dd. 28 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-28 Infantry evacuated 32 tons of unpolished rice and 2 tons of salt from vicinity KT668539.

The 1-2 Infantry moved from vicinity KT635509 to Phuoc Vinh.

At 1422H the Brigade Commander's UH-1D was hit by ground fire and landed at LORRAINE II. There were no casualties and the aircraft was extracted at 1615H.

3d Brigade - The 1-26 Infantry moved from vicinity KT656459 to Phuoc Vinh.

The 1-18 Infantry moved from Song Be (KT142069) to Lai Khe.

PHASE II (29 October - 19 November)

ee. 29 Oct - The 1-2 Infantry moved from vicinity KT666528 to Quan Loi and became OPCOM to the 3d Brigade.

The 1-16 Infantry moved from vicinity KT713447 and KT685483 to Lai Khe and became OPCOM to 3d Brigade.

The 1-26 Infantry moved from Phuoc Vinh to Quan Loi and became OPCOM to 3d Brigade.

The 2-28 Infantry (-) and two batteries of artillery moved to Loc Ninh airstrip (KT730080) and established a PSPB.

The 1-18 Infantry moved from Lai Khe to Quan Loi by Chinook and conducted an air assault vicinity KT697102 at 0950H without incident. The insertion of the 1-18 was in reaction to an attack of the District Headquarters and Special Forces Camp at Loc Ninh Airfield. The VJ were identified as elements of the 1st and 2d Battalion, 273d VC Regiment.
As the last elements of the 1-18 were being inserted, a request was received for assistance from a Special Forces element attached to a CIDG company at Loc Minh. The CIDG company was in contact with an estimated VC platoon about 1,000 meters north of the 1-18 KDP. The Assistant Division Commander-B ordered Company C north at 1200H. When the company was approximately 600 meters north of the KDP, it made contact with the VC. The VC were in a trench line 200 meters inside the rubber oriented north. The CIDG company was 400 meters further north in the open. The point of C Company got within 20-30 meters of the VC before either side fired. The lead platoon overran the VC position killing 9. The company then deployed and policed the area. The CIDG company reported additional VC 200 meters north of Company C along the edge of the rubber. Light fire teams and artillery were called in.

About 30 minutes after the initial attack, the VC launched a counterattack from the east with at least 2 platoons. The C Company Commander shifted his platoons to meet the attack with two platoons on line. The Battalion Commander alerted D Company to reinforce. D Company moved north and tied in to C Company's right flank. The fire fight lasted approximately 15 minutes. The VC broke contact at 1305H as D Company came on line. The CIDG Company moved to join the Battalion (-). The Battalion (-) and the CIDG Company swept to the east for 300 meters behind artillery which was constantly being shifted to concentrate on the fleeing VC. The VC fled in a north-south draw where they were subject to intense artillery and airstrikes. Bodies, numerous pieces of web gear, and miscellaneous items were later found which testified to the effectiveness of the artillery and airstrikes.

US casualties were 1 KIA and 9 WIA. There were 24 VC KIA (EC). Nine individual weapons and three crew served weapons were captured along with documents which identified the VC as elements of the 165th NVN Regiment. (See Inclosure 1 to Annex B).

A total of 10 tactical air sorties were flown in support.

22. 30 Oct - The 1-18 Infantry conducted a RIF operation with Company A to the south and east, closing at 1045 without incident. At 1200H Company A was again dispatched on a search and destroy mission. The company moved south through the rubber for 700 meters, turning southwest on a route over the western slope of Hill 203 (XU705150). As the companies moved up the slope the company was engaged at 1300H by a VC Battalion, later identified as part of the 165th NVN Regiment. The NVN Battalion was occupying trench lines and was apparently oriented to the east. The trenches occupied by the NVN were 2-3 foot in depth, 2 foot wide and varied in length.

The point element of Company A initially saw a single NVN stand up on the side of the hill and engaged him with small arms fire. The fire was returned by an NVN Battalion which had not been seen at this time. The Company Commander deployed his Platoons in the direction of fire. The NVN force assaulted the company twice but was repulsed by a heavy volume of fire. The NVN then attempted to flank the left of the company position. The 3d Platoon turned back the enveloping force.

The firing could be heard at the 1-18th KDP. The Battalion Commander immediately organised D Company and the CIDG Company to reinforce Company A. As the column moved out, the Battalion Commander received
The situation report from Company A. When the relief force was 200 meters short of Company A, it made contact with the NVA force attempting to envelop Company A. The Company Commander deployed two Platoons on line to engage the assaulting forces. The artillery fires forced the NVA to move closer to the friendly forces. Company A withdrew 50-100 meters as artillery was brought closer and Company D worked to close the gap between Company A. The friendly forces maintained fire superiority during this time. The NVA, although well armed with automatic small arms, light machineguns and RPGs, were firing high. Artillery was shifted to the south, behind Hill 203 to allow airstrikes to be brought in on the trench line. The trench line was worked over with CBU, napalm, and leafs for 2½ hours. At 1530H the Battalion Commander ordered D Company to assault, using A as a pivot and the CIDG to protect Company D's left flank. Company D overrun seven trench lines as the NVA forces fled to the southwest through a draw. US casualties were 4 KIA and 5 WIA. There were 83 VC KIA (BC); 27 individual and 5 crew served weapons were captured. Sixteen sorts of tactical air were flown in support. (See Inclusion 2 to Annex B). Company C, 2-28 Infantry secured Firebase at Loc Minh airfield (XT733080) as Company B, 2-28 Infantry, moved from Loc Minh to An Loc (XT764674). The 1st Brigade Tactical CP moved from CAISCON III South (XT685577) to Quan Loi. The 1st Brigade became control HQs for Phase II and assumed OPCON of the following battalions at 1800H:

- 1-18 Infantry
- 2-28 Infantry
- 1-26 Infantry
- 1-26 Infantry

A VC raider picked up by the 1-16 Infantry on 27 October vicinity XT698566 stated that his unit had 59 KIA in an attack against the 1-16th Infantry on 061857. October vicinity XT698566. The raider also stated that on 14 October 20 members of his unit were killed by bombs vicinity XT701568. A B-52 strike was put into that area on that date.

31 Oct - The Special Forces Camp and the FSB at Loc Minh airfield (XT733080) came under mortar attack at 0053H. At 0115H Company C/2-28 Infantry reported receiving heavy small arms fire. At 0210H the small arms fire was sporadic. At 0314H the Special Forces Camp began receiving small arms fire. At 0607H the District Headquarters, located north of the Special Forces Camp on the west side of the road reported VC on the air strip north of C/2-28 Infantry location and crossing from east to west. Battery I/6-15 Artillery commenced firing HE timed fire directly down the runway. At 0515H Company C/2-28 Infantry reported receiving sporadic small arms fire. At 0520H the VC were reported as having been pushed back outside the District Headquarters Compound.

US casualties were 10 WIA; ARVN casualties were 3 KIA, 21 WIA; PF casualties were 2 KIA and 1 WIA; CIDG casualties were 4 KIA, 18 WIA. There were 110 VC KIA (BC). The unit was identified as the 1st and 21 Battalions, 272d VO Regiment. 69 sorts of tactical air were flown in support of the contact.

The 1-28 Infantry conducted an air assault vicinity XT761070. At 1435H vicinity XT759082 Company D engaged 10 VC resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC). At 1705H vicinity XT759082 the Recon Platoon surprised a VC who was digging a position resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). The 1-18 Infantry continued KIP operations vicinity engaged 3 VC resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC) and 1 AE-47 captured.
The 1-26 Infantry moved from Phnom Vihn to positions along Route 13 and became OPCON to the 3d Brigade.

The 1-26 Infantry secured FSB CLISSON VI (XT73882) and CLISSON VII (XT761892).  

Nov. 1968 - The 1-26 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity X761070. At 0703H, an 18th Infantry ambush patrol engaged an unknown number of VC resulting in 2 US KIA. There were 5 VC KIA (DC). At 1412H, the lead element of the Battalion (-) made contact with an unknown number of VC resulting in 2 VC KIA (DC) and 4 VC WIA (Fossa).

Delta Troop 1-4 Cavalry engaged an unknown number of VC resulting in 3 US KIA (DC) vicinity X728813 at 1115H. D/1-4 Cavalry killed another VC vicinity X7719126.

The 1-18th Infantry NDF came under heavy mortar attack commencing at 0730H and lasting for 20 minutes. The mortar positions were reported by ambush patrols, one being directly south of the NDF and one being located to the southwest. About 5 minutes later, Company A ambush patrol reported movement coming from the south. The VC were in the rubber guiding north along a road which led into the NDF. The ambush patrol blew its claymores and returned to the NDF. One VC was KIA attempting to follow the ambush patrol inside the NDF.

To the east, Company D's ambush patrol reported heavy movement and the patrol was ordered to return to the perimeter. Company C ambush patrol located north of the NDF also reported movement. The patrol blew its claymores and returned to the NDF. The VC attacked the NDF from three sides, northeast, east and south. Artillery and mortar defensive concentrations served to blunt the assault. Two VC armed with flamethrowers were killed before their weapons could be fired.

As the artillery was brought in close to the NDF from one direction, the VC fire would diminish and build up from another direction.

When LST's arrived on station, they were directed to expand on the main attack force to the south. The gunships as well as the FAC and the AD received heavy machine gun fire from three locations to the south. Fire from 12 heavy machine guns were identified. Air strikes eliminated the positions. The artillery battery inside the NDF was directed to, prepared to fire anti-personnel rounds. The guns were readied but their use was not required.

Contact was broken at 0415H. US casualties were 1 KIA and 6 WIA. There were 198 VC KIA and 22 KIA by body count in the immediate vicinity of the NDF. For the next five days patrols found additional VC bodies bringing the final body count to 263 VC KIA (DC) and 6 POW's. There were 18 individual weapons, 10 crew served weapons, and 3 flamethrowers captured. The flamethrowers were Soviet Model 1950's. The unit was identified as the 273d VC Regiment. There were 50 sorties of tactical air flown in support of the contact. (See Enclosure 3 to Annex B).

The 1-26 Infantry moved by R/D from CLISSON VI and CLISSON VII to Guan Lot and at 0820H conducted an air assault vicinity X707147. CLISSON VII and VI then became OPCON to the 3d Brigade and the 3-22 Infantry (25th Division) was inserted at both locations.
The 1-28 Infantry Battalion continued RIF operations vicinity XD761070. At 0743H vicinity XD756077 the lead elements of the Battalion made contact with an estimated 20 VC wearing khaki uniforms. Small arms fire was exchanged. The VC broke contact at 0750H. Aerial strikes were called in and artillery and mortars supported the contact. There were no US casualties. VC casualties were unknown.

The 2-2 Infantry (25th Division) moved to Loc Ninh via P/H and conducted an air assault into vicinity XD768136. At 2203H 3-4 VC were discovered inside the NDF carrying flashlights. 4 VC were KIA and 4 were captured.

11. 3 Nov - The 2-12 Infantry received 40-50 rounds of 62mm mortar fired into their NDF (XD768136) from the North. A Spooky, FAC, AO and LIT were sent to the area to support. At 0230H the Battalion received a ground attack from the northeast, east and northwest. At 0439H contact was broken. US casualties were 3 KIA and 34 WIA. There were 28 VC KIA (DC). A total of 24 sorties of tactical air were flown in support of the contact.

At 0955H the Battalion NDF received small arms fire from an unknown number of VC who were using villagers as a shield. The Battalion Commander succeeded in gathering the civilians inside the NDF and then returned the fire. There were no US casualties. VC casualties were unknown.

The 1-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XD761070. At 0715H vicinity XD756076 an ambush patrol from Company C killed one VC. At 0910H vicinity XD776090 the Rocon Platoon received fire from an unknown size VC force. Artillery and mortars were fired into the area and a search revealed 1 VC KIA (DC) and 1 AK-47 captured. At 1005H vicinity XD776086 the Rocon Platoon located a fresh grave containing three VC bodies. At 1335H vicinity XD750102 the Battalion made contact with an unknown number of VC resulting in 1 US WIA. Aerial strikes and artillery were put into the area. VC casualties were unknown.

12. 4 Nov - The 1-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XD761070. At 1128H vicinity XD775102 the Battalion received automatic weapons fire from two locations. Contact was broken at 1145H. Results were 1 US KIA, 2 WIA. VC losses: 1 VC KIA (DC). The 1-18 Infantry continued RIF operations vicinity XD695093. At 1645H vicinity XD699106 the Battalion located 12 VC bodies in fresh graves.

The 1-26 Infantry continued RIF operations vicinity XD711145. At 1045H XD713164 Company C fired on 4-5 VC with unknown results. The 2-12 Infantry continued RIF operations vicinity XD783136. At 1350H vicinity XD781135 the Battalion located 6 VC bodies in 5 fresh graves. At 1415H vicinity XD780137 1 VC body and 1 AK-47 rifle were found. At 1430H vicinity XD781161 3 VC bodies and 2 60mm mortar rounds were found. At 1455H vicinity XD785135 one VC body was found. At 1508H vicinity XD783138 1 VC body was found.

13. 5 Nov - 2-28 Infantry (-) continued to secure the FSPD at Loc Ninh airfield (XD733000). At 1506H vicinity XD738063 the Battalion (-) found 3 VC bodies, apparently killed by artillery or mortar fire, 17 60mm mortar rounds, 1 60mm mortar sight, 1 60mm mortar base plate, 6 cartoons, 1 rock sack, 60mm ammunition pouches, 2 VC gas masks, 6 shovels, 2 lbs of medical supplies, 800 rounds of small arms ammunition, 7 groundmos and 2 RPG-2 rounds.
The 1-18 Infantry continued RIF operations vicinity XU95095. At 1005H vicinity XU704056 the Battalion located 3 VC bodies, 9 82mm mortar rounds, 1 82mm mortar base plate, and 2 CHICOM grenades.

The 2-12 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XU783138. At 0945H vicinity XU779139 the Battalion located 7 VC bodies, 4 60mm mortar rounds, and 1 CHICOM grenade.

Note. 6 Nov - The 1-26 Infantry continued RIF operations vicinity XU761070. Company B and C of the 2-26 Infantry continued to secure the NWP at Loc Minh airstrip (XU733080). At 1030H vicinity XU803869 a hand grenade was thrown at Company A causing 1 WIA. The VC who threw the grenade ran into the village vicinity XU803869. The National Police searched the village with negative results.

The 1-18 Infantry continued RIF operations vicinity XU695095.

The 2-12 Infantry at 0930H vicinity XU971337 found 1 VC body and destroyed 10 NQ positions. At 1820H the NWP received 20 rounds of 60mm mortar fire causing 1 KIA and 17 WIA. Small arms fire was also received. All incoming fire ceased at 1930H.

The 1-26 Infantry was extracted from its field position and conducted an air assault vicinity XU807127.

Note. 7 Nov - The 1-18 Infantry was extracted from field positions vicinity XU695095 to Quan Loi. The 2-12 Infantry extracted from field positions, vicinity XU783138 to Song Bo and became OPON to the 25th Infantry Division.

The 2-12 Infantry continued RIF operations vicinity XU807127. The battalion route ran initially due east through rubber trees. At 0945H vicinity XU822125 the point element received rifle fire from one VC in a tree. Fire was returned and the VC ran into a village to the east. The village, mostly uninhabited, was searched with negative results. The battalion column moved east from the village and received more sniper fire from an estimated 3-4 VC. The column then returned northeast. About 10 minutes after the Battalion began to change direction, at 1305H vicinity XU638126, contact was made with an estimated VC Battalion reinforced. The command group was hit directly with an unknown number of RLG-2 and RLG-7 rounds. Commanders and radio operators became primary targets. The Battalion Command Group sustained 100% casualties during the initial contact. The VC tried to encircle the Battalion on the west using elements located north and south of the Battalion. Both encircling elements ran into the trail company in the column and were stopped. The artillery and air strikes caused the VC to become disorganized and withdraw to the southeast. Contact was broken at 1400H. There were many snipers tied to trees. Company 2 was sent to reinforce until the arrival of Company B. 1-26 Infantry from Loc No. At 1645B 1-26 Infantry replaced D/1-18 Infantry at the 1-26 NWP and D/1-18 Infantry moved to Quan Loi.

The battalion closed into the NWP at 2100H. US casualties: 17 KIA, 21 MIA. VC Losses: 66 KIA (NQ), 10 VC KIA (Posa), 27 VC WIA, 1 KIA-50, 1 AK-47, 1 RLG-2, 1 CHICOM grenade, and 1 village were captured. The unit was identified as the 3d Battalion of the 272A NVA. There were 27 sorties of tactical air flown in support of the contact.
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Do. 8 Nov - Task Force 2-28 Infantry moved from Quan Loi to CAISSON VI (XT745817) and became OPGON to the 3d Brigade. Companies B and C continued to secure the FSPB at Loc Ninh Airfield (XT7335060). Company B/1-16 Infantry moved from Quan Loi to CAISSON VII and became OPGON to the 3d Brigade. The 1-26 Infantry was relieved in place vicinity XU804126 by the 1-16 Infantry. The 1-26 Infantry became OPGON to the 3d Brigade.

pp. 9 Nov - At 0015H Quan Loi received 15-20 rounds of 122mm rockets causing 5 KIA and destroying one ammo trailer. The 1-28 Infantry continued RIF operations vicinity XU761070. At 0840H the Recon platoon found 2 VC bodies in separate graves vicinity XU804126. At 1023H the Battalion (-) conducted an air assault vicinity XU803109, to search a B-52 strike area. At 1501H the Battalion (-) was extracted and returned to the NDF.

pp. 10 Nov - The 1-16 Infantry was extracted from its field location vicinity XU804126 to FSPB CAISSON VII (XT745894). Company B/1-16 moved from CAISSON VII to Quan Loi. Companies B and C of the 2-28 Infantry continued to secure the FSPB at Loc Ninh Airfield. The 1st Brigade assumed OPGON of CAISSON VI and CAISSON VII.

pp. 11 Nov - The 1-28 Infantry extracted from their field positions vicinity XU761070 to Loc Ninh by R/H and then from Loc Ninh to Phuoc Vinh by P/H.

pp. 12 Nov - The 1-28 Infantry became Division RIF at Phuoc Vinh. The 1-16 Infantry conducted RIF operations at Quan Loi. The 1-16 Infantry continued to secure FSPB CAISSON VII (XT745894). Task Force 2-28 Infantry continued to secure FSPB CAISSON VII (XT745817). Companies B and D of the 2-28 Infantry continued to secure the FSPB at Loc Ninh airfield.

pp. 13 Nov - No significant activity.

pp. 14 Nov - At approximately 1130H vicinity XT733945 the 399 RF Company made contact with an estimated VC platoon in an ambush position. The 969th RF Company was committed to reinforce. Contact was made at approximately 1430H. Results were 9 VC KIA (BO) including a Company Commander of the 165th Regiment. An AK-47, 1 M-1 rifle, 2 M-2 carbines, and a pistol were captured.

The 1-16 Infantry (-) conducted an air assault vicinity XT738917. At 1130H vicinity XT669514 Company C fired on 1520 VC with unknown results. Artillery, airstrikes and a LSF supported. 1 VC KIA (POW) was claimed. The Battalion (-) extracted at 1510H from vicinity XT694891. The FSPB at Loc Ninh airfield received 4 rounds of mortar fire at 2159E causing no casualties.

pp. 15 Nov - The 1-16 Infantry (-) conducted an air assault at 0645H vicinity XT697959. At 1745H vicinity XT701835 the Battalion (-) made contact with an estimated 40 VC. Contact was made as the Battalion (-) approached the village at those coordinates. Airstrikes, artillery and LSF supported the contact. Contact was broken at 1239H. US casualties were 2 KIA and 2 WIA. VC losses were 10 KIA (POW). The Battalion (-) extracted from vicinity XT714854 at 1500H and returned to CAISSON VII.
A111-111

Nov. 16 Nov - The 1-16 Infantry (-) moved by R/A from CAISSON VII to Quan Loi. 0/1-16 Infantry remained at CAISSON VII. Company B/2-28 Infantry moved from Loo Minh to Lai Khe. D/2-28 Infantry continued to secure the FSFB at Loo Minh.

xx. 17 Nov - The 1-16 Infantry conducted RIF operations at Quan Loi. The 1-16 Infantry (-) conducted RIF operations at Quan Loi. The 0/1-16 secured FSFB CAISSON VII. Task Force 2-28 secured FSFB CAISSON VI. D/2-28 Infantry secured the FSFB at Loo Minh Airfield.

yy. 18 Nov - At 0220H the Special Forces Camp at Tong Le Chon received an unknown number of mortar rounds. At 1035H vicinity XN055458 the 1-9 LAR Battalion made contact with an estimated VC Company. 1/3rd Battalion supplied a FAC. Airstrikes placed in the vicinity of the contact resulted in 14 VC KIA (BO) and 4 VC KIA (Powe). Task Force 2-28 Infantry (-) moved from Quan Loi to CAISSON VI. At 0700H the 2-28 received approximately 10 rounds of mortar and recoilless rifle fire at CAISSON VI. Casualties were 3 KIA and 9 WIA.

zz. 19 Nov - The 1-16 Infantry moved from Quan Loi to positions along Highway 13 and became OPCOM to 31 Brigade. The 1-26 Infantry moved from positions along Route 13 to Quan Loi and became OPCOM to the 1st Brigade. The FSFB at Loo Minh was closed and D/2-28 moved from Loo Minh to Lai Khe and became OPCOM to 31 Brigade. Operation SEKANDAR II terminated at 1935H November 1967.

12. (c) RESULTS:

a. Friendly Losses:

(1) KIA - 106
(2) WIA - 323

b. VC Personnel Losses:

(1) VC KIA (BO) - 957
(2) VC WIA's - 15

c. VC Equipment Losses:

(1) Weapons:
(a) Small Arms - 70
(b) Crew Served - 31
(c) Flamethrowers - 5

(2) Ammunition:
(a) Small Arms - 6316 rds
(b) Mortar - Total 174 rds
(c) 120mm - 24
(d) 82mm - 25
(e) 81mm - 21
(f) 60mm - 104
(g) Rockets - Total 134 rds

1. RPG - 7
2. RPG - 2
3. Unk type - 3
AVD_977

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(1) Explosive Material:
- Explosives - 1 lb
- OSU - 18
- Claymores - 21
- Mines - 20
- Fuse exp. - 5
- Grenades - 250
- Artillery rds. - 5
- 122mm rocket warheads - 2
- Bangalore torpedoes - 1
- Booby traps - 141
- Mortar charges - 1
- Claymore detonators - unk amount
- 122mm rocket motors - 5
- Gunpowder - 41 lbs
- CS - 105 lbs

(2) Foodstuffs:
- Rice - 246.9 tons
- Tea - 30 lbs
- Salt - 26 lbs
- Peanut - 5 lbs
- Sugar - 1,200 lbs

(3) Medical Supplies:
- Medicine - 1,000 bottles
- Cams - 30 lbs
- Syringes - 1,000
- Medical tucks - 30
- Morphine - 103 bottles
- Med supplies - 1,000 lbs

(4) Signal Equipment:
- Xyrophones - 1 set
- Cams Wire - 710 meters
- Radio packs - 1
- Telephones - 1

(5) Miscellaneous:
- Small arms magazines - 21
- Gas masks - 23
- Canteens - 29
- Entrenching tools - 3
- Pistol belts - 9
- Tool sets - 1
- Mortar base plates - 3
- Mortar sights - 1
- Mortar sandisters - 23
- Packs - 24
- Litters - 9
- Messkits - 4
- Assm hooks - 7
- Pencils - 8
- Bicycles - 22
- Picks - 2
- Sledge hammers - 1
- Seals - 2
- Shovels
- Sewing machines - 1
13. (U) **ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:**

a. Supply, Maintenance, and Transportation: See Annex H.

b. Treatment of Casualties and Medical Evacuation: See Annex I.

c. Communications: See Annex J.

14. (G) **SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:**

a. Airmobile Operations:

   (1) General: 1st Infantry Division airmobile operations are characterized by preparatory fires on the landing zone, the "five ship LZ", and the five points of LZ security.

   (2) Landing zone areas are always assumed to be occupied by the VA and a policy of thoroughly "prepping" every landing zone with hand bombs, napalm and artillery is adhered to. An LZ preparatory fire plan is prepared, assigning sectors to the artillery and showing where the tactical air and gunships are to expend. Preparatory fires on a landing zone are controlled by the brigade commander through the artillery and Air Force RO's riding in his command and control ship. No more than five ships are put into an LZ at one time. This is the maximum number that should be exposed at any one time. All LZ's are secured by an initial force inserted after the "prep" which sets up five secure positions equally spaced around the LZ. Their positions are immediately marked with smoke to facilitate the immediate use of air and artillery in case of every contact. Insertion of the remainder of the unit begins two minutes after insertion of the security element.
while the artillery fires on one flank and the gunships on the other. Troops in contact receiving effective artillery fires will not have this fire lifted in favor of some other means of fire support.

15. (O) OCHANDERS ANALYSIS:

a. SHERMAN DOLPH II revealed several significant changes in VC tactics. Their repeated attacks, despite heavy casualties, against well-prepared positions were a distinct departure from prior tactics.

b. There was a marked increase in the number of RPGs, especially RPG-76, used during this period. The RPG has become the VC's assault artillery and is extremely effective and accurate weapon, although the sloped frontal barrier of the 1st Division fighting position offers excellent protection from the round.

c. The use of the infiltration method to attack a prepared position became increasingly evident. The VC advance by crawling, digging prone shelters, firing, crawling forward again, digging in again, and repeating the same process until the perimeter is reached. The M-79, used in searching pattern of fire, has a devastating affect on this type tactic.

d. Standardized methods of operation contributed significantly to the success achieved during SHERMAN DOLPH II. Standardization was the goal of a program begun in July 1967 to preserve the experiences of seasoned commanders who rotated in the spring and summer months.

(1) For example, air mobile operations are conducted in the same manner by all battalions in the division. Planning is facilitated because all factors are known and can be applied to any battalion. Air mobile operations become more efficient and can be conducted rapidly with a minimum of warning time given.

(2) For the defensive operations, the fighting positions and the organization of a night defensive position became standard throughout the division. The time required to construct an ICP was reduced and the effectiveness of the position to withstand assault was improved to such an extent that each VC attack was repulsed with tremendous losses to the attacker and few if any casualties to friendly forces.

(3) Standardization greatly facilitated the learning process of the new commanders, as well as their troops, and raised the proficiency of each battalion to a very high degree.

e. Another factor which contributed to the success of SHERMAN DOLPH II was the careful analysis of the terrain, to use it to the best advantage.

(1) Objective areas must be selected where the placement of US troops poses the greatest threat to the VC/AVA units and yet offers the greatest possible security for US troops.

(2) Fire support bases should be selected so that firing batteries are in mutual support.
12 April 1968

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(3) A detailed intelligence study will indicate the best areas to rapidly employ a helicopter force to block or ambush VC/NVA forces. This quick reaction type force can pay excellent dividends.

(4) Once VC/NVA forces are fixed, all available resources, combat and combat support, should be concentrated upon the destruction of that force.

2. Forward logistical bases become absolutely essential once it becomes evident that the VC/NVA forces are going to stand and fight. There must be any proper in providing the necessary fire power and mobility necessary for the destruction of enemy forces; therefore, placement of Class III and Class V must be as near to the action. For operation SHENANDOAH II, Quan Loi provided this logistical base. Without it, the entire outcome of the battle of Loc Ninh could have been very different.

16. (G) Close coordination between US/ARVN units is particularly important when both forces are engaged. There can be no error in knowledge of where each force is located. This is especially important in fire control and coordination. This coordination can best be achieved by the participating brigade placing liaison officers at province, district and any other ARVN headquarters that is actively engaged. Division headquarters should place liaison officers at ARVN division level.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

THOMAS L. VERHIER
CPT, ACC
Asst AG
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAC J3-32 (K-1) (U))

DA, HQ II FORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 25 APR 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

The attached after action report for the 1st Inf Div, Operation Shemandoah II, is forwarded in accordance with MACV Dir 335-8, 1 September 1967, subject: Combat Operations After Action Reports (MACV J3-32(K-1)).

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

O. B. FORY
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

30
30 OCTOBER 67
XU 700090

D CO
8N CAD GP
CIDG CO
REINFORCE

D CO
ASSAULT

HILL 203
XU 7009

NVA

NVA
RETREAT

RUBBER

RUBBER

SREK
SNAKLINE
CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
1ST INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY
APO US FORCES 96345

AVDB-RAC

6 December 1967

TO: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: O3
APO US FORCES 96345

SUBLJET: Combat Operation After Action Report (U)

1. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: SHENANDOAH II: Search and Destroy

2. (U) DATE OF OPERATION: 30 September 67 to 19 November 67

3. (U) GENERAL: The 1st Infantry Division Artillery was the command headquarters for the operation. The 1st Bn, 5th Artillery, was initially in direct support of the 1st Brigade. On 30 Oct 67 it was assigned the mission of reinforcing the 2d Bn, 33d Arty. The 1st Bn, 5th Arty was responsible for planning and controlling fires for Shenandoah II North. The 2d Bn, 33d Arty was in direct support of the 3d Bde and was responsible for planning and controlling fires for Shenandoah II South. The 6th Bn, 15th Arty was initially in direct support of TF DIXIE at Quan Loi. Later it was assigned the mission of direct support of the 1st Brigade in the Loc Ninh area and was responsible for planning and controlling the fires in the Loc Ninh area. The 1st Bn, 7th Arty was in direct support of the 2d Bde. The 8th Bn, 6th Arty was in general support of the 1st Inf Div. The missions were specified in Annex C (fire support plan) to OORD 19-67 (Shenandoah II). Direct support and reinforcing fires were provided from Quan Loi, Loi Khe, and the following fire support bases:

- CAISSON I
  - XT792446
- CAISSON II
  - XT78515
- CAISSON III S
  - XT76566
- CAISSON III N
  - XT76567
- CAISSON V
  - XT775-541
- LORRAINE I
  - XT700433
- LORRAINE II
  - XT693483
- FSPB
  - XT699102

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR LIMIT
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report (U)

6 December 1967

FEPB XU711149
FEPB XU760972
FEP B XU804126

a. Reporting Officer: Maj Fredrick H. Mieremeyer, Assistant S-3
1st Inf Div Arty.

b. Task Organization:

1st Bn, 5th Arty (LTC Joseph V. Spilker Jr, CO)
30 Sep 67 to 30 Oct 67, DS 1st Bde.
30 Oct 67 to 19 Nov 67, reinf 2d Bn, 5th Arty.

2d Bn, 33rd Arty (LTC Arthur D. Wells, CO)
DS 3d Bde.

6th Bn, 15th Arty (LTC Frank E. Serio, CO)
30 Sep 67 to 28 Oct 67, DS TF DIXIE
29 Oct 67 to 19 Nov 67, DS 1st Bde.

1st Bn, 7th Arty (LTC John W. Cassel, CO)
DS 2d Bde.

8th Bn, 6th Arty, (LTC Ambrose A. Szelwinski, CO)
CS 1st Inf Div

6th Bn, 27th Arty (-) (LTC Robert J. Harris, CO)
OFR 1st Inf Div Arty.

2d Bn, 13th Arty (-)
OFR 1st Inf Div Arty, further assigned
OFR 1st Bn, 7th Arty.

Btry C, 7th Bn, 9th Arty (CPT Walk CO)
Attached 2d Bn 33rd Arty.

1st Plt, Btry B, 1st Bn, 84th Arty (LT John Sokula)

1st Plt, Btry I, 29th Arty
CS 1st Inf Div

4. (C) INTELLIGENCE: See annex A (Intelligence) to OPORD 19-67
(Op Shenandoah II). The terrain, weather, and fortifications encountered
did not significantly effect the artillery support.

5. (C) MISSION: 1st Infantry Division Artillery provided artillery
support for the maneuver elements.

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AYDB-RAT

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report (U)

6. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: Artillery units moved to field locations and occupied fire support bases Caisson I, II and III S from 25 to 29 Sep to provide initial fire support. All units were prepared to occupy additional fire support bases as required by the actions of the maneuver elements.

7. (C) EXECUTION:

1. Oct 67 Btry A, 2d Bn, 33d Art: moved by rotary wing to fire support base Lorraine I.

2. Oct 67 Btry B, 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved by road from Di An to Lai Khe and then by rotary wing to Caisson III S.

3. Oct 67 Btry 3, 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved by rotary wing to Caisson III S.

4. Oct 67 Btry 4, 1st Bn, 5th Arty moved by rotary wing and established Caisson V. Btry 5, 7th Bn, 9th Arty moved by road from Di An to Lai Khe, attached to 2d Bn, 33d Arty.

5-6 Oct 67 No Arty moved. All units continued support of maneuver units.


12 Oct 67 Btry 7, 6th Bn, 15th Arty moved by rotary wing from Caisson III S to Caisson V.

11-15 Oct 67 No Arty moved. There were no significant arty actions during this period.

16 Oct 67 Btry A, 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved by rotary wing from Lorraine I to Lai Khe.

17-22 Oct 67 No significant change in Arty support.

23 Oct 67 Btry A, 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved by rotary wing to Lorraine I.

24-27 Oct 67 No change in Arty support.

28 Oct 67 Btry C, 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved by rotary wing from Lorraine II to Lai Khe.

25 Oct 67 6th Bn, 15th Arty resumed mission of direct support of the 1st Bn, Quan Loi, for action starting in the Loi Minh area. Btry A, 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved by rotary wing from Lorraine I to Lai Khe and then by fixed wing to Quan Loi attached to 6th Bn, 25th Arty. Btry A, 6th Bn, 15th Arty moved by rotary wing from Quan Loi to the Loi Minh area (XU751078).
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Btry C, 1st Bn, 7th Arty moved by rotary wing from Quan Loi to the Loc Minh area (XU751078), attached to 6th Bn, 15th Arty.

10 Oct 67 1st Bn, 5th Arty assumed the mission of reinforcing the 2d Bn, 33rd Arty. Btry C, 1st Bn, 7th Arty moved by rotary wing from Loc Minh back to Quan Loi.

31 Oct 67 Btry A, 2d Bn, 33rd Arty moved by rotary wing from Quan Loi to Loc Minh area (XU699102).

1 Nov 67 No significant Arty action.


3-4 Nov 67 No significant change in Arty support.

5 Nov 67 Btry B, 2d Bn, 33rd Arty moved by rotary wing from XU711149 to XU760772.

6 Nov 67 No significant Arty action.

7 Nov 67 Btry A, 2d Bn, 33rd Arty moved by rotary wing from Loc Minh to Quan Loi and returned to control of parent unit. Btry C, 2d Bn, 15th Arty moved from XU751078 to XU760126 by rotary wing.

8-10 Nov 67 No significant Arty action.

11 Nov 67 Btry B, 2d Bn, 33rd Arty moved from XU760772 to XU731078 by rotary wing.

12-15 Nov 67 No significant Arty action.

16 Nov 67 Btry A, 6th Bn, 15th Arty moved by rotary wing to XU731078.

18-19 Nov 67 All Arty units extracted from the Loc Minh area. Operation terminated.

b. There were three significant artillery actions during the operation.

1) On 17 Oct 67, 2 companies of 2d Bn 28th Infantry engaged in heavy contact with a large Viet Cong force in the vicinity of XU688576. The immediate response of artillery fires was instrumental in disrupting the enemy force. During this engagement, an artillery observer was killed while moving between two units to adjust close-in artillery fires. During this engagement, 105 Howitzers fired 6,400 rounds and 1000 rounds were fired from the 155 Howitzers.