SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report for Operation LE JEUNE

THRU: Commanding General
1st Cavalry Division (AM)
ATTN: AVDAGT
APO San Francisco 96490

TO: Commanding General
I Field Force Vietnam
ATTN: AVF-GC-TNG
APO San Francisco 96350

1. IDENTIFICATION OF OPERATION: LE JEUNE


3. LOCATION OF OPERATION: The area designated for Operation LE JEUNE encompassed the DUC PHO District (QUANG NGAI), bounded to the east by the South China Sea and to the North from BS809496 to BS720449 to the west from BS720440 to BS760360 to BS820255, to the south from BS820055 to BS925275.

4. CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: HEADQUARTERS, 3D BRIGADE TASK FORCE, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION, APO San Francisco 96355.

5. REPORTING OFFICER: Colonel James G. Shanahan.

6. TASK ORGANIZATION:

   a. Commanders:

      Headquarters, 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division

      Colonel James G. Shanahan, Commanding
      Lieutenant Colonel Rodney B. Gilbertson, Deputy Commander

      1st Battalion, 14th Infantry

      Lieutenant Colonel William H. Miller

Incl 3
1st Battalion, 35th Infantry
Major James E. Moore

2d Battalion, 35th Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel Clinton E. Granger Junior

2d Battalion, 9th Artillery
Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Holbrook

C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry
Captain John P. Irving III

3d Support Battalion (Provisional)
Major Robert R. Rutledge

Company D, 65th Engineer Battalion
Captain Arthur J. Mansze, Junior

40th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)
First Lieutenant Robert W. Thackery

b. Principal Staff:
S1 Major John D. Welsh
S2 Major Edgar Edland
S3 Major E. P. Houben
S4 Major John A. Joyce
S5 Major John W. Schneider, Junior

7. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. (C) Tactical air support was provided by 7th USAF and utilized by the 3d Brigade TF as indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE OF OPERATION</th>
<th>FAC MISSIONS</th>
<th>KILLS</th>
<th>COMBAT PROOF MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19 - 22 April</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Run</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td></td>
<td>22%</td>
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</table>
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b. Aviation Support:

The 14th Combat Aviation Battalion supported the 3d Brigade TF with the 174th Assault Helicopter Company. Troop lifts, landing zone preparations, command and control capability and re-supply mission were provided.

c. (C) Artillery Support:

During the period 19 - 22 April 1967 the mission of the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, was direct support of the 3d Brigade TF, 25th Infantry Division.

(1) Battery A, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, was in direct support of the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry.

(2) Battery B, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, was attached to the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, with a mission of direct support of the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, under the OPCON of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade.

(3) Battery C, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, reverted to the operational control of the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, on 19 April 1967 with a mission of direct support of the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry.

(4) Additional artillery attached to or reinforcing the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, during the period is listed below. These units provided fire support for the infantry in contact, landing zone preparations, blocking fires, harassing and interdiction fires, and searchlight (visible and infrared) illumination of the 3d Brigade TF forward base camp.

(a) Battery C, 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery, reinforced the fires of the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, during the period 19 - 22 April 1967.

(b) Two searchlights, Battery B, 29th Artillery, were attached to the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, during the period 10 - 22 April 1967, with the mission of illuminating the perimeter of an area in close proximity to the 3d Brigade TF forward base camp.

(c) One M55 squad, Battery C, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery, was attached to the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, during the period 19 - 22 April 1967 with the mission of providing direct fire support for LZ GUADALCANAL.
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8. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Operation LE JEUNE (19-22 April) took place in the coastal plains of DUC PHO District. The terrain was similar to that of PERSHING with coastal shoreline, small mountainous areas, and many rice paddies.

(1) Intelligence indicated that the 2d Regiment of the 3d NVA Division was located in the high ground to the west of DUC PHO city. No contact had been made with the 2d VC Regiment by any friendly unit since Nov 1966 and its strength was estimated to be near 2,000 personnel, all well equipped and well trained. Other intelligence sources and agent reports placed numerous enemy units in the high ground to the northwest of the suspected location of the 2d VC Regiment. The 2d VC Regiment and these other forces posed a major threat to CIDG and Special Forces in the area of operations, as well as to DUC PHO District itself.

(2) During most of Operation LE JEUNE the 3d Brigade TF was engaged in setting up and securing a base of operations. Emphasis was placed on the immediate area surrounding the base area perimeter. Only small contacts were made with up to squad size forces. Sniper fire and booby traps were abundant during the first few days.

b. Summary of Enemy Personnel and Equipment LOSSES:

(1) Personnel:
   a. KIA (BC) 29
   b. CIA 34
   c. Returnees 1
   d. Suspects 0

(2) Weapons
   a. Small arms 13
   b. Crew served 2

(3) Other equipment
   (a) Ammo
      1. Small arms 10 rds
      2. 60mm Mort 1 rd
      3. Grenades 3 rds
      4. 250 lb bomb 1 rd
   (b) MISC:
      1. Magazines 1
      2. Material destroyed
         a. Huts 15
         b. Bunkers 12
         c. Caves 1
      3. Material captured
         Rice 500 lbs
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9. (C) MISSION

a. General:

(1) Reference FRAGO # 7106-1 (U), Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (AM), dated 161200H April 1967.

(a) Deploy to LEJEUNE AO by sea 17-19 April and air on 19 April 1967.

(b) Assume control 2/35th Inf and relieve 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AM) of LE JEUNE AO responsibilities and missions on 19 April 1967.

(c) Upon relief of 2d Brigade in LE JEUNE AO:

1. Conduct search and destroy operations in DUC PHO Area to provide security for base development and clear the DUC PHO area of enemy forces.

2. Provide security for construction of CIDG Camp, Sea LOC Terminal and road leading thereto.

3. Provide security for non-divisional engineer battalion to construct C-130 airfield and improve roads in the DUC PHO Area.

4. Be prepared to provide reserve reaction forces for RF, PP, CIDG Camps and District HQ's in BA TO and DUC PHO Districts.

5. Be prepared to come under control of TF OREGON on order.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

a. General: Operation LE JEUNE commenced 191200H April 1967 with the 3d Brigade TF tactically deployed in the DUC PHO Area under the operational control of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). The operation terminated 221200H April 1967, when the 3d Brigade TF initiated Operation BAKER under the operational control of TF OREGON.

b. During the period 17 - 19 April 1967 in response to FRAGO 7106-1, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), 3d Brigade TF had deployed by sea and air to LE JEUNE AO vic DUC PHO. Brigade CP/FSB was established at LZ MONTEZUMA. The 1/35th Infantry Battalion established the Battalion CP/FSB at LZ OD vic BS781365. The 2/35th Infantry Battalion was released from OPCON 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) on 191200H April 1967 and established the Battalion CP at LZ MONTEZUMA, and the artillery FSB at LZ GUADALCANAL. Troop B, 1/9 Cav became OPCON 3d Brigade TF on 191200H April. The 3d Brigade TF initiated search and destroy operations

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in DUC PHO area to provide security for base development and clear the
dUC PHO area of enemy forces with two infantry battalions, one air cav­
alty troop, and supporting elements. The 3d Brigade TF provided security
for construction of Sea LOC Terminal and road leading thereto and provi­
ded security for the non-divisional engineer battalion (39th Engr Bn)
constructing a C-130 airfield at LZ MONTEZUMA and improving roads in the
DUC PHO area.

c. The operation ended with the 3d Brigade TF, 25th Infantry
Division being released from the operational control of the 1st Cavalry
Division (Airmobile) to the operational control of TF OREGON.

11. (C) EXECUTION:

a. General: Operation LE JEUNE began at 191200H April 1967
with the 3d Brigade TF assuming responsibility for missions in the DUC
PHO area from 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). In spite of
having to employ combat forces to provide security for vital installa­
tions within the area of operations, the 3d Brigade TF effectively ini­
tiated operations in the DUC PHO area designed to search and destroy
elements of several enemy units known to be well entrenched in the area.
Although 3d Brigade TF elements suffered 10 casualties (WIA) from sniper
fire and booby traps, the enemy suffered far more (29 KIA) due in a great
sense not only to the superior US air and ground firepower but also to
the aggressive spirit of the individual soldier.

b. 1/14th Infantry Battalion continued attachment to the 196th
Light Infantry Brigade.

c. 1/35th Infantry Battalion deployed to LE JEUNE AO by C7A
and CH-47 aircraft on 19 April. Co A moved by foot from LZ MONTEZUMA to
LZ OD (BS 891365) and secured the area for the arrival of A 2/9 Artillery
and the Bn CP group, which closed at 1630 hours. Co C conducted search
and destroy operations from LZ MONTEZUMA to vic LZ FRENCHY (BS 798382).
Co B and Recon platoon remained at LZ MONTEZUMA, OPCON 2/35th Infantry
Battalion to reinforce night security forces at LZ MONTEZUMA. On 20
April the primary missions of the Battalion screening, searching for and
thwarting any enemy thrust toward LZ MONTEZUMA and the initiation of
"GOLDEN FLEECE" operations. The initial concern was for the area inside
the valley on the western side of Highway 1. At 201607H, Co B suffered
2 US WHA by a booby trapped hand grenade. At 1626 hours at the same
location Co B received several rounds of sniper fire, called in gunships
and returned fire; results: 1 VC KIA. At 1100 hours, BS 800426, Co C
detained 30 individuals. At 1340 hours, BS 820420, Co C received sniper
fire resulting in 1 US WIA. At 1633 hours, BS 830425, Recon platoon,
following a combat assault exchanged fire with 5 VC in a village. Results:
5 VC KIA. At 211532 hours, Co C and Recon platoon, while conducting S&D
operations in vic BS 794420, had one man wounded by an enemy hand grenade.
Later, at 1630 hours BS 786428, 2 men were wounded, one by sniper fire and

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one by a booby trapped 105mm artillery round. At 211840 hours, BS773378, IRRP 3A, while patrolling along a hill side, struck a booby trap which wounded four men. At 220910 hours, vic BS790430, Co C received sporadic small arms fire which grew in intensity and developed into a major battle after the 3d Brigade TF went under the OPCON of TF OREGON.

d. 2/35th Infantry Battalion was released from OPCON of 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) at 191200H April 1967. During operation LE JEUNE, the Battalion conducted security missions, LZ TRIPOLI, sea LOC Terminal at LZ GUADALCANAL, and LZ MONTEZUMA, and search and destroy operations in the eastern portion of Duc Pho District. At 191225 hours, while conducting local S&D operations to the north of LZ MONTEZUMA, Co C observed 9 VC and called gunships in resulting in 3 VC KIA. At 201135 hours, Co A received sniper fire from the village vic BS822415. Artillery fired on the enemy position, resulting in 12 VC KIA, 10 bunkers and 13 huts destroyed.

e. B 1/9 Cavalry OPCON 3d Brigade TF conducted air and ground recon missions in LE JEUNE AO with priority to "GOLDEN FLEECE" operations in the vicinity north of Duc Pho.

f. C 3/4 Cavalry deployed by LST to LE JEUNE AO, closing on 22 April.

g. D/65 Engrs conducted daily mine sweep operations on road leading from LZ MONTEZUMA to LZ GUADALCANAL. Co (-) improved defensive positions LZ MONTEZUMA and conducted mine sweep operations vic water point outside the perimeter of LZ MONTEZUMA. Combat engineer squads were provided in support of each infantry battalion.

12. (C) ADMINISTRATION MATTERS:

a. Logistics:

(1) Supply:

No major supply problem existed during Operation LE JEUNE. 3d Brigade TF was supported with all classes of supplies by the Forward Support Area TF GALLAGHER of the 1st Logistical Command. Supply points to distribute Class I, II, III and IV supplies were operated in the 3d Brigade TF trains area by forward support elements of the 3d Support Battalion, 3d Brigade TF.

(2) (U) Transportation:

(a) An Air Force C7A was utilized daily to transport replacements, R & R, DEROS, emergency leave, mail and critical supply items from base camp to the area of operation.
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1. Sorties 66
2. Passengers 1,060
2. Cargo 96,480 lbs

(b) On 15 April 1967 3d Brigade TF began its move to the IE JEUNE AO.

1. The lst Battalion, 14th Infantry moved by C130 from QUI NHON to CHU LAI. Statistics are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>PERSONNEL</th>
<th>VEHICLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C130</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry moved from LZ UPLIFT to LZ MONTEZUMA on 15 and 16 April. Statistics are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>PAX</th>
<th>CARGO</th>
<th>VEHICLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C7A</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH47</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>56,000</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH54</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. The 3d Brigade TF (-) deployed by sea and air from LZ UPLIFT to LZ MONTEZUMA during the period 17-20 April 1967. Statistics are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>PAX</th>
<th>CARGO</th>
<th>VEHICLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C7A</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>73,800</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH47</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>629,000</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST (SEA)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>128</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3) (c) Medical:

(a) Number of patients treated by 3d Brigade TF clearing station - 398.
(b) Number of disease cases - 352.
(c) Number of battle casualties - 19.
(d) Number of non-battle casualties - 33.
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(4) Statistics:

(a) Class I
   1. A Rations 103,690
   2. C Rations 25,047

(b) Class III
   1. Mogas 33,671
   2. Diesel 25,980
   3. JP4 154,594

(c) Class V
   1. 40MM 2,178
   2. 81HE 2,970
   3. 412HE 1,650
   4. 105HE 6,920

(5) Personnel:

   (C) Total number of casualties suffered by elements of the 3d Brigade TF during Operation LE JEUNE were as follows:

   1. Unit 1/35 2/35 3/4 2/9 HHC D/65
      (a) KIA
      (b) WIA 6

   2. Total:
      (a) KIA - 6
      (b) WIA - 10

13. CIVIL AFFAIRS:

   a. General:

      (1) Major emphasis was placed on short range, high impact civic action projects in the base camp area as well as in the area of operations.
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(2) 3d Brigade TF CA/PSYOPS personnel worked with military intelligence personnel, MACV sub-sector personnel, missionary personnel, National Police, GVN officials, and US tactical units.

(3) Civil Affairs Area of Operations was DUC PHO District (QUANG NGAI Province).

(4) Public Welfare

Operation "Golden Fleece": On 20 April, 3d Brigade TF initiated operation "Golden Fleece". This was a joint operation with PF and RD cadre to protect rice harvesters taking rice from public lands in DUC PHO District.

(5) Refugee assistance:

(a) The following refugee assistance was provided:

1. Roofing sheets 51
2. Bags of cement 10

(b) During LE JEUNE, construction was begun on 69 refugee units in DUC PHO City.

(c) As of 22 April 1967, there were approximately 11,500 refugees in DUC PHO District. Of these, 1,266 were registered in the refugee center of the district. There were no problems in controlling these people and adequate facilities were occupied, under construction, or planned. The refugees had sufficient food and clothing; 3d Brigade TF provided a continuous MEDCAP Program for health and sanitation.

b. Psychological Operations:

(1) General: PSYOPS appeals were directed at specific hamlets, villages, groups and individuals. Utilizing current intelligence reports, the PSYOPS program supported the tactical situation by exploiting weaknesses, demoralizing and informing enemy forces of US intentions.

(2) Ground loudspeaker missions were used in coordination with battalion operations.

(3) Aerial loudspeakers were used utilizing U-10 aircraft.

14. (U) COMMANDERS ANALYSIS:

a. Lessons Learned:
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(1) ITEM: Adaptation of M-16 rifle for launching CS Riot Grenades and standard smoke grenades.

DISCUSSION: During Operation LE JEUNE, there were many instances when ground troops would have been greatly assisted if they could fire CS grenades at ranges farther than 25 to 30 meters. A grenade launcher type device affixed to the M-16 rifle would have allowed the individual soldier to place non-persistent CS grenades on a target more accurately and at a greater distance than by simply throwing them by hand. In addition the adapter could have been used to fire the standard smoke grenade which could have been of great assistance in marking targets for aircraft.

OBSERVATION: The M-16 rifle should be modified for firing CS and standard smoke grenades. CS placed accurately near the apertures of a bunker, and in sufficient quantity would incapacitate the enemy within, thereby allowing the infantrymen to close in and destroy or capture him. This type modification would be extremely valuable for marking targets for aircraft.

(2) ITEM: Occupation of Positions:

DISCUSSION: Major problems were encountered by an artillery battery upon occupation of a position on the beach. The major difficulty was preventing the trails from creeping back when charge 3 or above was fired were the major difficulties.

OBSERVATION: These problems can be eliminated by building a platform under the wheels to prevent them from sinking in to the sand. The howitzer can be further stabilized by the use of 105mm jungle pack cannisters filled with sand and braced by engineer stakes to minimize creeping.

(3) ITEM: Sling Loading of Miscellaneous Equipment.

DISCUSSION: When displacing Battalion/Company forward fire bases it is often necessary to transport much equipment which cannot be carried in a rifleman's pack. Mortars, medical supplies, comms equipment and heavy ammunition become a hinderance when these items must be internally loaded on any type of aircraft. In these instances much time and energy is expended unnecessarily.

OBSERVATION: The use of a general purpose sling greatly enhances the transporting of miscellaneous equipment. This method saves time and energy normally spent in loading an aircraft, enables the aircraft to carry additional payloads and cuts down turn around time. Each unit should have available GP slings for use in building external loads.
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b. COMMANDERS COMMENTS: In participating in Operation LE JEUNE, the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division proved that it could, on short notice, effectively plan and execute a Brigade Task Force sized relief in place by air and sea and immediately commence combat operations.

JAMES G. SHANAHAN
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding