HEADQUARTERS
2D BATTALION 35TH INFANTRY
(Cacti Blue)
3D BDE 25TH INF DIV
APO 96355

AVDC-C-CTB

8 May 1967

SUBJECT: Quarterly After Action Report ending 31 March 1967

TO: Commanding Officer
3d Brigade TF 25th Inf Div
APO 96355

1. NAME OF OPERATION: Sam Houston

2. DATES OF OPERATION: 0001 hours 2 Jan 67 - 2400 hours 31 Mar 67

3. LOCATION:
   
   a. 2 Jan 67 - Feb 67: Western Pleiku Province
   b. Feb 67 - 28 Mar 67: South West Kontum Province
   c. 28 Mar 67 - 31 Mar 67: Brigade Base Camp at Pleiku, RVN

4. COMMAND AND CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: 2d Battalion 35th Infantry

5. REPORTING OFFICERS:

   a. COMMANDERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>COMMANDER</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn 35th Inf</td>
<td>LTC Clinton E. Granger, Jr.</td>
<td>2 Jan - 31 Mar 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 2d Bn 35th Inf</td>
<td>CPT Clifton G. Fouty</td>
<td>2 Jan - 16 Jan 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, 2d Bn 35th Inf</td>
<td>CPT Jesse L. Horn, Jr.</td>
<td>17 Jan - 31 Mar 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co A, 2d Bn 35th Inf</td>
<td>CPT Charles A. Murray</td>
<td>2 Jan - 6 Jan 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co A, 2d Bn 35th Inf</td>
<td>CPT S. L. C. Barcena</td>
<td>7 Jan - 31 Mar 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co B, 2d Bn 35th Inf</td>
<td>CPT Ralph B. Walker</td>
<td>2 Jan - 31 Mar 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co C, 2d Bn 35th Inf</td>
<td>CPT Ronald B. Rykowski</td>
<td>2 Jan - 21 Mar 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co C, 2d Bn 35th Inf</td>
<td>CPT James W. Lanning</td>
<td>21 Mar - 31 Mar 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery C, 2/9 Arty</td>
<td>(Attached to 2/35 Inf)</td>
<td>2 Jan - 31 Mar 67</td>
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b. STAFF, 2D BN 35TH INF

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Officer</td>
<td>MAJ Frederick J. Siebert</td>
<td>2 Jan - 17 Jan 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Officer</td>
<td>MAJ Robert F. Carr</td>
<td>31 Jan - 31 Mar 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S1</td>
<td>CPT Thomas K. Newman</td>
<td>2 Jan - 22 Mar 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S1</td>
<td>1LT James T. Hennessey, Jr.</td>
<td>23 Mar - 31 Mar 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2</td>
<td>CPT James H. Harris</td>
<td>2 Jan - 31 Jan 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2</td>
<td>1LT Curtis Chase</td>
<td>1 Feb - 31 Mar 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3</td>
<td>MAJ Peter G. Vogantanz</td>
<td>2 Jan - 21 Jan 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3</td>
<td>CPT James R. Lanning</td>
<td>22 Jan - 13 Mar 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3</td>
<td>MAJ Ben G. Crosby</td>
<td>14 Mar - 31 Mar 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4</td>
<td>1LT James T. Hennessey</td>
<td>2 Jan - 31 Jan 67</td>
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<tr>
<td>S4</td>
<td>CPT James H. Harris</td>
<td>1 Feb - 31 Mar 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arty LNO</td>
<td>CPT Ronald Norris</td>
<td>2 Jan - 31 Mar 67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. TASK ORGANIZATION:

a. 1 Jan 67 - 3 Feb 67.
   (1) Team Alpha
       A/2-35 (-)
       Plat B/1-69 Armor
   (2) Team Bravo
       B/2-35 (-)
       Plat B/1-69 Armor
   (3) Team Fitzgerald
       B/1-69 Armor (-)
       Plat A/2-35
       Plat B/2-35
   (4) Bn Control
       HHC 2/35 (-)
       Recon Plt
       107mm Cannon Plt
   (5) C/2-35 Attached to 1/10 Cav vic Oasis
   (6) C/2-9 Artillery attached
b. 3 Feb - 16 Feb 67
   2-35 INF TF
   Company A 2-35
   Company B 2-35
   Company C 2-35
   Battery C 2-9
   Reconnaissance Plat 2/35
   107mm Cannon Plat 2/35

c. 16 Feb - 18 Feb 67
   2/35 Inf
   One CIDG Co/Duc Co
   One CIDG Co/Plei Mrong
   C/2/9
   Sqd/D/4th Eng Bn

d. 18 Feb 67 - 8 Mar 67
   2/35 INF TF
   2/35 Inf
   C/2-9 Arty
   Sqd/D/4th Eng Bn

e. 9 Mar 67 - 28 Mar 67
   2/35 INF TF
   2/35 Inf
   C/2-9 Arty
   3 Scout Dog Teams/40th Infantry Platoon Scout Dog

7. SUPPORT FORCES (ARTILLERY)

   a. Battery C, 2d Bn 9th Arty, (105mm Towed, DS to 2d Bn 35th Inf)
      (1) Fired preparations for air mobile assaults
      (2) Fired H&I fires as requested by CO, 2d Bn 35th Inf and by higher headquarters
      (3) Attempted to channelize enemy into ambush sites by fire
      (4) Assisted unit commanders in land navigation
      (5) Fired countermortar fires
      (6) Fired will-adjust missions and blocking fires for units in contact and in pursuit
      (7) Fired nightly defensive concentrations around unit locations
      (8) Integrated 105mm Howitzer direct fire into the battalion CP perimeter and
           will-adjust missions for units outside the battalion AO
      (9) Fired time-on-target missions at suspected and known enemy locations

   b. ARTILLERY COORDINATION IN SUPPORT OF THE BATTALION
(1) All coordination for artillery fire support for the 2d Battalion 35th Infantry was provided by the artillery liaison section attached to the 2d Battalion 35th Infantry, HQ, 2d Battalion 9th Artillery and HQ 3d Brigade.

(2) Coordination for clearance of fires from artillery units outside the battalion AO was coordinated with HQ, 2d Battalion 9th Artillery and higher headquarters.

(3) Air and artillery preparations of landing zones for combat assaults were prepared, adjusted and coordinated by the artillery liaison officer.

(4) Defensive concentrations, integrated the battalion organic mortars with the artillery, were coordinated by the artillery liaison officer.

(5) All fires by artillery or mortar in the battalion AO were coordinated by the artillery liaison section.

8. INTELLIGENCE

a. General

(1) During the period 2 Jan thru 29 Jan, contact was with scattered VC and NMC elements along Highway 19.

(2) During the period 30 Jan thru 31 Mar 67, contacts were with elements of the 1st NVA (Le Loi) Division.

(3) Confirmation of the above mentioned units was obtained through interrogation of Chieu Hoi returnees and analysis of captured documents and equipment in connection with SAM HOUSTON I.

b. Analysis of significant actions 2 Jan thru 31 Mar 67

(1) 2 Jan - 5 Jan 68: There was no enemy contact made or intelligence gained during this period.

(2) 6 January 1967: At 1945 hours the ARVN radio station in the Mang Giang pass was attacked by a force of unknown strength and sixteen mortar rounds were fired in its support.

(3) 7 January 1967: At 0730 hours, vic BR216524 a Co A, 2-35 sweep discovered three fresh blood trails from counter-mortar fire. No enemy contact.

(4) 8-9 January 1967: There was no enemy contact or intelligence gained during this period.

(5) 10 January 1967: Intelligence Platoon, PLEIKU Sector reported two NVA Battalions vic AR944558. No contact was made with the enemy.

(6) 11 January 1967

(a) The following contacts were made on this date:

At 1007 hours one VC was observed at AR943520; part of suspected NVA force at AR944558. ARVN forces made
contact with the enemy, who broke contact and fled in a NE direction.

2. At 2355 hours RF/PF OP (BR221523) received AW and mortar fire

(b) No results were reported from both contacts

(7) 12 January 1967
   (a) The following contacts were made on this date
      1. At 0035 hours RF/PF Camp located vic BR234521 received SA
         and AW fire; three mortar rounds and rifle grenades, from an
         estimated unknown company
      2. At 1032 hours a convoy traveling on Highway 19 received two
         rounds of SA fire at AR797463
   (b) Sweeps of both areas yielded no results

(8) 13 January 1967: At 1900 hours at BR143518, A/2-35 received one round of
   SA fire from an enemy force (size unknown). Fire was returned with hand
   grenades and 81mm mortars. A sweep of the area yielded no evidence of
   enemy casualties

(9) 14 January 1967: During this period, no contact was made nor intelligence
   gained

(10) 15 January 1967: At 2000 hours at BR208525, A/2-35 received AW fire from
    BR215525. Fire was returned with SA and 81mm mortars without results.

(11) 16 January 1967: During this period no enemy contact was made nor
    intelligence gained

(12) 17 January 1967: At 1300 hours at AR985415 a RF/PF unit contacted an
    estimated VC platoon. Contact lasted approximately five minutes with no
    results. The enemy withdrew to the east

(13) 18 January 1967
   (a) During this period the following intelligence was gained
      1. An ARNV convoy at BR248486 reported that a large enemy
         force wearing green uniforms was N to NE of their location at
         1400 hours (BR264526)
      2. GVN District Headquarters at Le Trung (AR8848) reported
         that an unknown number of VC were located at AR905600,
         AR936605 and AR960584 and the H-15 battalion and main
         force element at BR009410. Information gained from a
         captured PW
   (b) No contact was established with the enemy

(14) 19-20 January 1967: There was no enemy contact or intelligence gained
    during this period

(15) 21 January 1957
   (a) The following contacts and intelligence information gained
1. District Headquarters LE TRUNG (AR8848) reported one VC platoon located AR838414.

2. A patrol from A/2-35 reported finding one blood trail, approximately one week old, running 400 meters from AR211530 to AR210535.

(b) No contact was established with the enemy.

(16) **22 January 1967**

(a) The following contacts and intelligence information are gained as follows:

1. District Headquarters LE TRUNG (AR8848) reported approximately 200 VC in uniform were in the vicinity of the road from PLEI BON to Highway 19 (BR093611 to BR083551). VR check was made of the area without results.

2. District Headquarters LE TRUNG (AR8848) reported an estimated one VC platoon located at BR235525.

3. B/2-35 reported SA fire coming from the vicinity of CP 95 (BR142535), however no contact was made with the enemy.

(17) **23 January 1967**: 4th Inf Div G2 reported an unconfirmed VC Bn is located at BR0456, there was no indications of such a unit on this or subsequent days.

(18) **24 January 1967**: Co A patrol and VR confirmed the presence of 15-20 new living bunkers, holes and caves at BR156485 and BR148493. No contact was made with the enemy.

(19) **25-29 January 1967**: There was no enemy contact nor intelligence information gained during this period.

(20) **30 January 1967**: A patrol from Co C reported two VC located ZA059345. VC were taken under artillery fire with unknown results.

(21) **31 January 1967**: A patrol from Co C located four overhead type bunkers at ZA070337 capable of housing a platoon each. Bunkers were approximately two months old and were destroyed. No contact was made with enemy forces.

(22) **1 February 1967**: At 2307 hours, vic YA982285, an estimated VC company established contact with a PF ambush. Artillery fired at above coordinates with unknown results. The enemy withdrew to the east.

(23) **2-4 February 1967**: During this period, no significant intelligence was gained. There was no contact with the enemy.

(24) **5 February 1967**

(a) Co C, vic YA930037 located approximately 100 bunkers 6-8 months old. There were two company size base camps, with approximately thirty OP type bunkers scattered around the area.

(b) There was no enemy contact during this period.

(25) **6 February 1967**

(a) The following contacts were made on this date:

1. At 1210 hours, vic YA900080, Co B located 50 bunkers and sleeping positions 2-3 months old. All were destroyed.

2. At 1550 hours, vic YA965105, Co B located company size bunker complex. At this location they also found and destroyed 200 lbs of rice and 50 lbs of salt.
3. At 1625 hours, vic YA954020, Co A located 2 US 20mm cannons (found on US propeller driven aircraft) SN 55768M and 54904M
   (b) There was no enemy contact made on this date
(26) 7 February 1967: At 1310 hours, vic YA960115, Co B found a bunker complex with fifty positions and an ambush position on an approach to it. 200 rounds 7.62 linked ammunition were found in area of bunkers.
(27) 8-9 February 1967: During this period there was no enemy contact nor significant intelligence gained.
(28) 10 February 1967: At 1300 hours, vic YA890042, Recon platoon spotted one NVA soldier heading southeast. They pursued the individual but were unable to engage him
(29) 11 February 1967
   (a) At 0915 hours, vic YA925055, Co C located a company size base area, six months old. Twenty bunkers and thirty hooches were destroyed
   (b) At 1130 hours, vic YA935065, Co B observed one NVA soldier with no weapon nor headgear moving east. The company pursued, but could not establish contact
(30) 12-13 February 1967: During this period there was no enemy contact nor significant intelligence gained.
(31) 14 February 1967
   (a) At 0901 hours, vic YA826085, Co C found a well cut trail with sandal tracks estimated 24 hours old and oriented in a westerly direction
   (b) At 1005 hours, vic YA811091, Co C located a well used trail with sandal prints of 40-50 individuals moving west. Footprints estimated to be 24 hours old
   (c) There was no enemy contact during this period
(32) 15 February 1967: Arty FSC reported jamming by foreign language transmission (possibly Russian) on 34.60 KC
(33) 16-17 February 1967: No enemy contact was made of significant intelligence gained during this period
(34) 18 February 1967
   (a) At 1000 hours, vic YA658495, Co C found a trail 3-4 meters wide
   (b) At 1035 hours, vic YA857539, the convoy lead vehicle detonated a mine. The tank tread was blown off, but no casualties sustained. The mine was pressure type, not command detonated and the crater was three feet deep.
(35) 19 February 1967: There was no enemy contact nor significant intelligence gained during this period
(36) 20 February 1967
   (a) At 1235 hours, vic YA684469, Co B located a weapons cache which contained the following:
       60mm mortars complete 3
       French Chatlerault LMG’s 4
       M31 rifle grenades 24
57mm RR rounds 27
7.5 and 7.4 mm rounds 6000
C-3 and C-4 demolition compound 250 lbs
Bangalore torpedoes 7

Miscellaneous NVA personal equipment
(b) At 1448 hours, vic YA660467, Recon plat located squad base camp with six people moving about. People fled across border before contact could be established

(37) 21 February 1967
(a) At 1025 hours, vic YA676407, Co C engaged three NVA believed to be the rear security element of a platoon. Enemy fled to the west
(b) At 1345 hours, vic YA743505, Co A located a 250 lb bomb, which had been dragged toward the nearby bridge. EOD personnel destroyed the bomb

(38) 22 February 1967:
(a) At 1945 hours, vic YA668473, Co C fired on one NVA at a range of 300 meters. Individual fled NE
(b) At 2030 hours, vic YA675484, Co C heard movement and voices around their perimeter; OP spotted four individuals. Enemy was engaged with grenades and artillery. A sweep failed to yield results.

(39) 23 February 1967: At 1230 hours, vic YA676487, Co C located 60-70 bunkers, 3-4 months old

(40) 24 February 1967: there was no enemy contact or significant intelligence gained during this period

(41) 25 February 1967: At 1830 hours, vic YA660470, a four man LRRP from the Recon Platoon was inserted

(42) 26 February 1967
(a) At 0945 hours, vic YA660469, LRRP located a fresh trail used within the last 24 hours. The trail was oriented east and was one meter wide.
(b) At 1627 hours, the LRRP was extracted and returned to the FSB vicinity YA728508

(43) 27 February 1967: There was no enemy contact and no significant intelligence gained during this period

(44) 28 February 1967: At 1100 hours, vic YA645609, a four man LRRP from the Recon Platoon was inserted

(45) 1 March 1967: At 1505 hours, vic YA 682604, Co B located one NVA KIA by H&I fire

(46) 2 March 1967: At 1334 hours, vic YA823627, the LRRP observed five NVA soldiers moving north

(47) 3 March 1967:
(a) At 0850 hours, YA656594 Co C found one NVA KIA wearing khaki in hammock. It was estimated that the individual had been killed by artillery two weeks prior to the discovery.
(b) At 1230 hours, vic YA754000, LRRP observed five NVA soldiers moving north.

(47) 4-5 March 1967: During this period there was no enemy contact nor intelligence gained.

(48) 6 March 1967: At 1430 hours, vic YA762601, Co C located one skeleton totally decomposed. One SKS was also found at this location.

(49) 7 March 1967: At 1435 hours, vic YA766583, Co A located a camouflaged bin containing 500 lbs of unmilled rice. Rice was destroyed.

(50) 8 March 1967
(a) At 0850 hours, vic 763592, Co A located 700 lbs of unmilled rice. Rice was destroyed
(b) At 1255 hours, vic YA(unreadable) Co A located one skeleton, 6-7 months old.

(51) 9 March 1967: There was no enemy contact nor intelligence gained during this period.

(52) 10 March 1967
(a) At 1125 hours, vic YA677563, Co B located two chicom 82mm mortar rounds and one 4.2 round (US type) in a small bunker complex estimated 3-5 weeks old.
(b) At 2030 hours, vic YA723556, Co C observed numerous ground fires. Artillery was fired in the area. There were 10-15 secondary explosions (HE type) and numerous SA, either fired or detonated by artillery. A sweep of the area conducted on 11 March 1967 produced no results.

(53) 11 March 1967: At 1723 hours, vic YA688003, a four man LRRP from the Recon platoon was inserted to observe the area for activity of recent use.

(54) 12 March 1967
(a) 0900 hours, vic YA654486, Co A moving SW, established contact with what was initially estimated as one NVA company. SA and AW fire was received from dug in positions and snipers. 82mm and 60mm mortar fire was also received. Contact varied from heavy to sporadic during the day. (unreadable) broken approximately 2300 hours.
(b) 1745 hours, vic YA658485, Co C advancing east to relieve Co A contacted the enemy and began to receive sniper, SA and AW fire from their front and left flank. Heavy to sporadic fire was received throughout the night of 12-13 March 1967.
(c) 1800 hours, vic YA658488, Co B moving SE received heavy SA and AW fire from the front and flanks from concealed positions. 1915-1930 hours Co B received heavy 82mm fire shot at what appeared to be preplanned concentrations. Co B withdrew and broke contact approximately 0100 hours 13 March 1967.
(d) US losses: 14 KIA, 46 WIA.
(e) Enemy losses (including related small contacts 13-14 March 1967).
(BC)  55
(Observed KIA by SA and Arty)  30
(Est KIA from bandages and blood trails)  115
Total  200

(56) 13 March 1967

(a) Sweeps of the area of contact indicated that all three companies had
been engaged by OP’s and the main perimeter of an estimated two
battalion size base camp (See enclosures 1-5, Combat After Action
Report for 12 March 1967, Hq 2d Bn, 35th Inf, 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div
APO 96355 dtd 19 March 1967)

(b) There were two distinct units engaged. The unit to the north had old
weapons and equipment, indicating that they had been on an extensive
campaign. The unit to the south, engaged by Co C had new weapons,
equipment, ammunition and uniforms. Their feet were not yet
calused indicating that the unit had recently moved in.

(c) The base camp complex was built within the last two weeks as our
elements had been over the ground before and there was no complex
there at that time.

(d) The enemy policed the battlefield on the night of 12-13 March and
withdrew to the SE, leaving a sniper force behind to delay pursuit.
The enemy withdrew to the SW among trails running from YA654488,
YA658487 and YA659486. The trails had wires strung for night
guidelines and were littered with bloody bandages, equipment and
shallow graves

(e) Equipment captured included the following:

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<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SKS</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK47</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local type hand grenades</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82mm mortar rounds</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rounds 7.62</td>
<td>593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice (milled)</td>
<td>2000 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous documents, medical supplies, demolition’s and personal equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(f) 1920 hours, 13 March 1967 2-35 FSB vic YA676535 received 40-50
60mm mortar rounds from NE direction. Counter mortar fire
produced unknown results

(57) 14 March 1967

(a) At 0430 hours, 2-35 FSB vic YA676535 received approximately
eighty rounds of 60mm and 82mm mortar fire. At 0732, received 25-30 rounds 82mm mortar fire

(b) At 1600 hours, vic YA687530, ¼T vehicle from HQ Battery, 16th
Artillery in convoy, struck a land mine with the right rear wheel. The
vehicle was demolished. Results US one KIA and two WIA
US Losses: 1 KIA, 26 WIA (includes mortar attacks on 2-35 FSB)

15 March 1967: At 1839 hours, vic CP 12, two vehicles in convoy were damaged as a result of land mines. There were no friendly casualties.

16 March 1967: There was no contact with the enemy.

17 March 1967:
(a) At 1732 hours, LRRP 2-35 was inserted vic YA691604 with mission to conduct surveillance of LZ for CA.
(b) No contact with the enemy.

18 March 1967:
(a) No contact with the enemy.

19 March 1967:
(a) 1440 hours to 1600 hours, Co C vic YA682597 located a large enemy bunker complex which included a possible hospital site containing blood plasma containers.
(b) 1430 hours, Co A, vic YA679601 located a possible battalion size bunker complex.
(c) No contact with the enemy.

20 March 1967:
(a) 0530 hours Recon platoon, vic YA676535 observed seven NVA soldiers with packs and weapons. Enemy was engaged with grenades and mortars. Sweeps conducted produced footprints of 12-15 individuals and no sign of enemy casualties.
(b) 1445 hours, 2-8 Inf, vic CP 9 reported a 2½ ton vehicle (HQ 68 2-35) struck a land mine. Front end of vehicle damaged and there were no friendly casualties.
(c) 1600 hours, vic CP 9, pilot of resupply ship reported receiving AW fire of unknown caliber. There were no casualties and no hits on the aircraft.

21 March 1967:
(a) 1525 hours, vic YA682567. 2/C/2-35 observed two NVA and engaged them. The NVA fled to the north.
(b) 1525 hours, vic YA680569, 1/C/2-35 located one NVA in a grave and fresh bunker complex.
(c) 1620 hours, vic YA681570, Co C received heavy SA and AW fire. All elements were surrounded by estimated battalion size force, which employed human wave attacks, as well as fire from dug-in positions. Engagement was a chance encounter and the enemy initially fled east and then reorganized and returned to contact.
(d) 1930 hours, vic YA675536, 2-35 FSB received 25-30 rounds 82mm fire. All rounds landed 50-100 meters outside perimeter; no casualties.
(e) 2000 hours, vic YA679570, one DUSTOFF bird was hit by B-40 rocket launcher and crashed. Results 2 US WIA, 2 US KIA.
(f) 2035 hours, vic YA682567, Co A received 20-40 rounds mortar fire; no casualties.
(g) Results of contact 21-22 March 1967.
1. Friendly casualties (including DUSTOFF and C/2-9 Arty): 24 KIA, 55 WIA, no MIA
2. Enemy: 45 KIA (BC), 85 (Est)
3. Enemy equipment CIA: 1 SKS, 6 AK47, 1 RPG, 1 LMG RPD-2, 6 hand grenades, 3 B-40 rounds, miscellaneous equipment

(65) 22 March 1967
(a) 0627 hours, Co C, vic YA582567 received 25-30 82mm mortar rounds; No casualties
(b) 0905 hours, Co A, vic YA682567 received SA, grenades. Enemy was engaged and suffered to KIA

(66) 23 March 1967
(a) 0235 hours, Co A, vic YA676563 heard movement to north and south of their position. Arty fired and the area was swept without results
(b) 0514 hours, Co C, vic YA657536 heard movement north of their position. Contact was not established

(67) 24 March 1967
(a) 0125 hours, Co A vic YA676563, received an estimated 60 rounds of mortar fire. Rounds landed 200M from friendly positions. There were no friendly casualties
(b) 0410 hours, Co A, vic YA676563 received five rounds mortar fire. All rounds landed outside their position; there were no friendly casualties
(c) 1150 hours, Co A vic YA679571, located five NVA KIA in graves

(68) 25 March 1967: 1345 hours, Co B, vic YA680576, located complex of holes under and around rocks. Holes contained one mortar position and one aid station

(69) 26 March 1967
(a) 0843 hours, vic YA683570, Co B located five NVA KIA by small arms; estimated 2-4 days old
(b) 0945 hours, Co B, vic YA680569, located papers with name of a member of Co B who was KIA 12 March 1967

(70) 27-31 March 1967: During this period there was no enemy intelligence gained or enemy contact established

WEAPONS

<table>
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<td>60 MM Mortars</td>
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<td>7.5 LMG M1924/29</td>
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<tr>
<td>SKS</td>
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<td>AK47</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.62 LMG RPD</td>
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<td>Anti-tank grenade launcher</td>
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MISCELLANEOUS

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<td>Field equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hooches</td>
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AMMUNITION

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<th>Quantity</th>
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<td>B-40 RKT</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>57 mm RR</td>
<td>27 rounds</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bangalore torpedoes</td>
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7.5, 7.9mm 6000 rounds
HE rifle grenades 24 rounds
C3 8 cases
C4 6 cases
7.62mm 750 rounds
Chicom grenades 39
82mm mortar 20 rounds
Blasting caps 1 case

9. EXECUTION:

(a) 1 Jan 67: The 2/35 Infantry received 3d Brigade Task Force operation order 1-6M (Road Runner) placing the 2/35 Infantry under the operational control of the 4th Infantry Division
(b) 2 Jan 67: The 2/35 Infantry conducted a motor march from BDE rear CP to the assigned sector of Highway 19 beginning at 1130 hours. The last elements closed their locations at 1430 hours. Company C, went by convoy to the engineer rock quarry vic Oasis and passed to the operational control of the 1/10 CAV.

UNIT LOCATIONS

TF 2/35 INF (-) BR125549
A/2/35 INF BR198522
B/2/35/INF BR125549
TF Fitzgerald BR041541
4.2 Inch Mortar Plt BR198522
Recon Plt BR041541
C/2/9 Arty BR125549

(c) 3 Jan - 5 Jan 67: TF 2/35 INF provided security in the assigned sector of Highway 19E. In addition to strong points being maintained during daylight hours, all bridges in the assigned sector were continuously secured and an aggressive counter-reconnaissance and combat patrolling program as established.
(d) 6 Jan 67: TF 2/35 INF conducted a civic action program to move the rice and personal belongings of 200 Montagnard refugees from a village vic AR922475. The village from which the Montagnards were moved was first entered by an RF/PF element from the Le Trung District. They had received fire from four VC inside the village. The fire was returned and the VC withdrew. Representatives decided to move the villagers from the control of the VC; TF 2/35 supported with security and vehicles. At 1700 hours the mission was completed. Blankets, cooking oil, soap, bulgar wheat and medical treatment by the battalion surgeon were given to these
refugees. At 1945 hours, sixteen rounds of 60/81 mm mortar were received at the village, vic BR216524, occupied by the 2d Platoon (-) OF Company A. Counter mortar fire was delivered in the area. There were no friendly casualties or damage. A sweep at first light the following day revealed three heavy blood trails from the area where the counter mortar fire was delivered.

(e) 7-8 Jan 67: There was little significant action during this period. The ARVN defenses at Mang Giang Pass continued to be probed by small arms fire. Artillery and mortar fire proved effective in halting the attacks.

(f) 9 Jan 67: A civic action team conducted a medcap operation in Plei Herd, vic BR023517, distributing clothing, cooking oil and soap. At 1548 hours, while conducting service practice, three men from the weapons platoon of Company A were injured as a result of an 81mm mortar exploding in the tube at the yoke of the mount. EOD and medical evacuation were called. It was determined that a bad fuse caused the accident.

(g) 10 Jan 67: TF Fitzgerald moved to vic AR850484, the rock quarry near Camp Holloway, to cordon the area. Camp Holloway had received sporadic small arms and mortar fire during the period 7-10 Jan. Results of the operation were 480 detainees, who were taken to district headquarters, Le Trung

(h) 11-14 Jan 67: Local patrols and small medical civic actions programs were conducted in the battalion area of operations. The ARVN camp above the pass continued to be harassed by small probes.

(i) 15 Jan 67: The 2d Platoon, Company A, received small arms fire on their position vic BR208525 from several sites around the bridge. 81mm and small arms fire were returned. There were no casualties

(j) 16 Jan 67: The battalion surgeon delivered a baby girl at 1405 hours during a medcap operation at Kon Chara (1) (BR181528)

(k) 16 Jan - 20 Jan 67: There was no significant activity or changes during this period

(l) 21 Jan 67: At 1007 hours, while accompanying the battalion Reconnaissance Platoon on a patrol through the village of Plei Bon, vic BR093611, Major Peter Vogentanz, the battalion S3, was injured by an AP mine while searching an abandoned position. A medical evacuation helicopter was called, however, the command and control was in the area and evacuated Major Vogentanz.

(m) 22 Jan 67: Captain James R. Lanning assumed duties as S3, 2/35 INF

(n) 23-24 Jan 67: Villagers from Plei Vot were moved by 2/35 INF to a new location, vic BR042538, to eliminate the threat of the VC working in that area. At their new location, the villagers received medical attention and help rebuilding their homes. Their old homes were destroyed at the request of the GVN after the villagers had left to deny the VC of shelter. The CO, 2/35 INF presented the Government of Vietnam flag to the village chief who immediately had it flying.

(o) 25-28 Jan 67: There was little significant activity during this period. Local patrols and strong points between Pleiku and Mang Giang Pass provided for the security of Highway 19. On 28 Jan 67, the battalion received FRAGO 4-1-67 (Sam Houston), which assigned the battalion the following missions:

(1) Move by road to Oasis
(2) Conduct search and destroy operations north and south of Route 19W
(3) Secure the engineer rock quarry, FSA, and engineer construction parties along 19W.

(4) Provide one company on one hour alert for OPPLAN Chase and other reserve missions.

(p) 29 Jan 67: TF 2/35 INF moved to Oasis, vic YA107275, by road, closing at 1715 hours. A/2/35 (-) was designated RRF for the 4th Infantry Division. B/2/35 moved by road to BR198522 to provide route security for 19W. C/2/35 remained in the vicinity of the rock quarry to provide security for engineer work parties. On arrival at Oasis, 2/35 Infantry had A/1/69 Armor attached to replace B/1/69 which had been attached previously.

(q) 30 Jan - 1 Feb 67: There was no significant contact or intelligence during this period.

(r) 2 Feb 67: At 0800 hours, Co A (-) conducted a combat assault from Oasis to vic YA040252 and patrolled back to the Oasis on two axis. At 1405 hours, the 3d platoon on the southern axis, received approximately ten rounds of AK47 fire. There were no friendly casualties. Efforts to find the enemy were hampered by the extremely thick vegetation.

(s) 3 Feb 67: At 0045 hours team Dumont, composed of A/1/69 Armor (-), 3/A/2/35 with one mortar section, A/2/35, was alerted to move to Duc Co to provide assistance to US advisors in quelling an internal disorder by the Duc Co forces against USSF personnel. At 0245 hours, the force (Team Dumont) arrived at the junction of Route 19W and 14N where they were halted pending further orders. At 0345 hours, the team was told to return to Oasis as the disorder had been resolved. Company B/2/35 was released from the operational control of 1/69 Armor and lifted by air to Oasis, closing at 1845 hours, in preparation for execution of a battalion combat assault into the la Drang Valley on 4 Feb 67 (2/35 INF FRAGO 4-1-67).

(t) 4 Feb 67: At 0752 hours, Company A conducted a combat assault into LZ Cacti (YA940050) with elements of headquarters and Company B following. At 1145 hours, Company C conducted a combat assault in LZ 36C (YA941035). Company B immediately departed LZ Cacti to the northeast, making contact with one NVA soldier, vic YA955052; No results. At the close of the day the battalion was disposed in three company perimeters astride the la Drang River.

(u) 5-7 Feb 67: TF 2/35(-) conducted search and destroy operations in the la Drang Valley, finding and destroying numerous old bunkers and base camp complexes. There was no enemy contact during the period.

(v) 8 Feb 67: Company A(-) moved from LZ Cacti to the south to secure a new LZ for the 2/35 INF(-) at YA940010. Company A secured the LZ at the base of the Chu Pong and the balance of the firebase was airlifted to the new location. The battalion (-) closed the location at 1200 hours. Company B moved south to secure LZ Cacti at dusk, to set up ambushes in depth. Company C moved to the southwest closing in a company perimeter at YA941036. Company A secured the battalion fire support base (FSB).

(w) 9-12 Feb 67: TF 2/35 INF continued to conduct small local patrols in accordance with established Tet truce policies. Eleven squad size RATS (Reconnaissance and Tactical Surveillance) teams were positioned at different locations throughout the
area of operation. During the period, no significant enemy activity was sighted by these teams. On 12 Feb, the teams were extracted and returned to their parent units.

(x) 13 Feb 67: At 0730 hours, Company B and Company C departed their respective night locations and moved northwest in accordance with 2/35 INF FRAGO 4-67. A CIDG Company from Duc Co was airlifted to join the battalion reconnaissance platoon at 0830 hours, and the combined team swept to the northwest. Company A was airlifted at 1300 hours to LZ 27D, which has been initially secured by B/2/35 (-), and the battalion closed at 1800 hours, vic YA865135. At 1830 hours, a CIDG Company from Plei Mrong joined C/2/35(-) at their location in preparation for search and destroy operations to the northwest toward Duc Co US Special Forces Camp.

(y) 14-15 Feb 67: TF 2/35 INF conducted intensive search and destroy missions in AO 27 moving in all four cardinal directions. There were no significant results.

(z) 16 Feb 67: At 1200 hours, the CG 4th INF (+) arrived at the battalion CP and instructed the CO, TF 2/35 INF (+) to move to a new location vic YA776187, northwest of Duc Co, in order to be in a position to reinforce C/2/8, then in contact to the north. Company A moved by foot; Company C moved to YA785215 on foot; the reconnaissance platoon and attached CIDG's patrolled on foot with recon closing to the new FSB (YA776187) and the CIDG's to the southwest. Company B provided extraction security and was moved by CH47 and UH-1D closing at 2130 hours. The 4th Division G-3 alerted the CO, 2/35 INF (+) that one company was to be on a one hour alert to support C/2/8 who at the time was heavily engaged to the northwest.

(aa) 17 Feb 67

(1) At 0800 hours, the battalion was alerted to move to Kontum Province and was placed under the operational control of the 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. At 0830 hours, the first elements of the battalion, with Company B, conducting the combat assault, seized an LZ vic YA648503. At 1420 the command group was shifted to the new location. Company A remained at their location near Duc Co with the remainder of the battalion headquarters. The two CIDG companies reinforced the perimeter to provide extra security for remaining elements, including C/2/9 Artillery.

(2) Upon arrival at the new location, Company C moved to the north, then east and south to their night location, vic YA652503. The battalion reconnaissance platoon moved to the west of the Nam Sa Thay River. There was no enemy contact during the day.

(bb) 18 Feb 67: The remainder of the battalion, Company A, C/2/9 Artillery, and CP(-) moved by convoy from Duc Co north to the new FSB, vic YA726512. Enroute, the lead M48 tank hit an anti-tank mine, damaging one road wheel and a section of the track. In addition, the convoy received four rounds of enemy 60mm mortar. There were no friendly casualties.

(cc) 19 Feb 67: At 0935, the battalion command group airlifted to the FSB, vic YA726512, from YA648503. Company C, Company B, and the battalion reconnaissance platoon conducted search and destroy operations in the assigned AO/ Company B closed at YA658485, Company C closed at YA672475, and the reconnaissance platoon returned to the battalion FSB.
20 Feb 67: At 1400 hours, operational control of the battalion was passed to the 1st Brigade 4th Infantry Division. In the afternoon, while conducting search and destroy operations to the southwest of the FSB, C/2/35(-) located a weapons cache vic YA684469. In addition to small arms ammunition and explosives, the cache contained three complete 60mm mortars and four French light machine guns. At 1340 hours, Company B located one satchel charge vic YA673485. All weapons and ammunition, to include the satchel charge were lifted by rope to a hovering helicopter, then evacuated to the battalion fire support base. The mortars were cleaned, checked and then reissued one to each of the rifle companies for tactical employment against the enemy who had provided them.

21 - 22 Feb 67: B/2/35 (-) and C/2/35 continued to conduct search and destroy missions to the southwest of the FSB.

23 Feb 67

(1) Company A moved north along the new engineer road to the northwest and dismounted about 2000 meters south of the 2/8 INF FSB. There after the company patrolled the vic YA675485. C/2/35 (-) moved northeast to the battalion FSB to assume the mission of fire support base security. At 1230 hours, while moving toward the FSB, Company C located a recently occupied enemy battalion size base camp vic YA676487. As a result of this and similar indications, CO, TF 2/35 INF requested a B-52 strike in the area.

(2) Companies A and B, with the reconnaissance platoon attached to B/2/35, were directed to sweep north parallel to, and east of, the Nam Sa Thay River to block any enemy attempt to move through the area. This action followed a heavy contact by B/2/8 vic YA682587.

24-26 Feb 67: TF 2/35 INF continued to conduct search and destroy missions in AO 501. Several RATS teams were inserted at possible LZ sites in the area of operation to check the area for enemy activity and secure LZ’s for the displacement of the battalion FSB. It was decided to move the FSB to the north to improve communication with maneuver elements and to provide more complete artillery coverage.

27 Feb 67: At 1046 hours, a RATS Team from the battalion reconnaissance platoon made contact with two NVA, vic YA684471, killing one and capturing one weapon. At 1130 hours, the RATS team was extracted. At 1132 hours, Company C moved by foot along the MSR to secure a new LZ for displacement of the battalion FSB. At 1510 hours, the battalion CP was moved by convoy, north along the MSR, to YA666548.

28 Feb - 1 Mar 67: Company B, with the battalion reconnaissance platoon attached, and Company A, continued to sweep to the east, through the area of B/2/8 INF’s contact. Three RATS teams were inserted at YA73591, YA722628 and YA640606. Two of the teams were to conduct reconnaissance of proposed sites for the battalion FSB while the third team provided area surveillance and served as a radio relay team.

2 Mar 67: At 0745 hours, Company C conducted a combat assault into an LZ, vic YA773591, to secure the movement of the battalion FSB. The battalion CP closed the new FSB and prepared to act as a blocking force to destroy any enemy forces moving east away from B/2/35 (+) and A/2/35. At 2050 hours, an outpost of
Company C reported red, green and white lights on the hill mass to the west of the FSB. Maximum organic mortar fire was placed on the area of the lights. A sweep of the area the following day did not yield anything of significance.

(kk) 4-6 Mar 67: B/2/35(+) and A/2/35 moved eastward toward the new FSB. On 4 Mar 67, both companies closed the vicinity of the FSB at YA741619 and YA743603, respectively. During the 5th and 6th of March, the companies patrolled in depth around their respective base camps with no enemy contact.

(ii) 7 Mar 67: A/2/35 moved from their night location to the FSB to assume the security mission. C/2/35 searched on two axis to the southwest with B/2/35(+). There was no contact during the period.

(mm) 8 Mar 67: The 4.2 mortar platoon was airlifted from the FSB to the 2/8 FSB, vic YA767535, in preparation for the movement of the battalion FSB to relieve TF 2/8 INF in place.

(nn) 9 Mar 67: TF 2/35 INF was airlifted to the new FSB without incident. At 1720 hours, Premier Ky and Madam Ky toured the new FSB, and talked with members of the command.

(aa) 10 Mar 67: B/2/35 and C/2/35 continued to sweep to the southwest toward the new FSB. Company B was told to move to the FSB and assume responsibility for its security. Company a was alerted to move from the CP on 11 Mar 67, to determine the effects of a B-52 strike to the southwest of the FSB.

(pp) 11 Mar 67: At 0755 hours, Company A (-) departed the battalion FSB in order to survey the damaged area of a B-52 strike scheduled for delivery at 0900 hours. At 0901 hours, vic YA6647, the scheduled strike took place. Company B closed the new FSB and Company C closed their night location vic YA666548.


(2) At 0430 hours, the battalion FSB came under a heavy mortar attack. An armed C-47 and a FAC were called, and were on station at 0514 hours. At 0730, the FSB again came under heavy mortar fire. In both cases the attack was a mixture of 60mm and 82mm mortars, directed from the northeast, north and northwest. Counter mortar fire was initiated and the enemy fire ceased. Results:

- 21 KIA
- One 2 ½ ton truck with a load of 105mm Howitzer rounds
- One ¾ ton truck with radios
- Over 200 incoming mortar rounds, of which 50% landed inside the perimeter.

(2) Companies A, B and C continued to advance to the northeast to close on the fire support base, encountering sporadic sniper fire as they left the area of contact. Results were three enemy KIA.

(3) At 1545 hours, a ¾ ton truck hit a mine on the MSR vic YA687530, wounding three men of a 4th Infantry Division unit. One later died of wounds. At 1530 hours, all three companies closed at the FSB for the night vic YA664479.
15-16 Mar 67: Companies A, B and C continued to conduct search and destroy missions toward the northeast. By 1700 hours, 16 Mar 67, all three companies closed the battalion FSB and were placed in ambush positions along the MSR for a period of 24 hours for rest and resupply.

17 Mar 67: A RATS team was inserted at 1732 hours vic YA693604 to conduct surveillance of a possible LZ for a combat assault by Companies A and C the following day.

18 Mar 67: At 1510 hours, Company C conducted a combat assault into a LZ vic YA (unreadable) without incident. Company A followed and the movement was completed at 1603 hours. At 1812 hours, both companies closed to a night location vic YA695600. Company B and the battalion reconnaissance platoon provided FSB security.

19-20 Mar 67: Companies A and C continued to conduct sweeps in search of the enemy. Moving along a southerly axis, with A/2/35 on the west and C/2/35 on the east, both companies observed recent enemy movement in the AO. Bunkers and base camps with cooking pots still warm increased the certainty of enemy activity. At 1530 hours 20 Mar 67, both companies stopped for the night vic YA665584. They were to continue to the south the next morning.


23 Mar 67

(1) At 1410 hours, the downed helicopter was extracted from A/2/35 location. At the same time, the remains of the medical evacuation helicopter was totally destroyed by A/2/35.

(2) Companies A and B continued to search the area of contact, finding several fresh graves and very fresh blood trails. A combat tracker team was attached to A/2/35 to follow the blood trails which led to the northeast. At 1455, A/2/35 engaged two NVA in a bunker complex located vic YA684561. The two NVA were killed and the bunker complex destroyed. During this period, artillery fire was being utilized to maintain a defensive box around the two companies.

24 Mar 67

(1) At 0125 hours, Company A received approximately sixty rounds of enemy mortar fire around their night location. At 0410 hours, they received another five rounds. There were no casualties.

(2) All indications were that the enemy had withdrawn to the north with equipment and casualties. The companies continued to find graves and bunker complexes, as well as scattered NVA equipment.

25 Mar 67: Company B, while searching to the east of the point of contact, discovered a large rock complex vic YA680576, which had been utilized by the NVA for shelter and as a headquarters. The complex had been made by labor utilizing existing overhead rock formations as cover and concealment. It is probable that this area is the place to which the NVA had withdrawn. The area was thoroughly searched by both companies and the installations destroyed.

26-27 Mar 67
(1) A and B/2/35 continued to sweep the area of contact and then, on two axis, patrolled back to the FSB, closing 27 Mar 67.

(2) (Unreadable) /16 Artillery with C/2/35 as security, displaced from the fire support base to the new base, vic YA765495. The reconnaissance platoon 2/35 was airlifted to (unreadable) to provide security for the next FSB location. Company B assumed FSB security while Company A was positioned along the MSR, adjacent to the FSB. This action was in preparation for TF 2/35(+) displacement to vic Oasis for search and destroy operations in AO 12.

(bbb) 29-31 Mar 67

(1) 2/35 TF conducted a 48 hour maintenance program, in preparation for deployment to Bong Son, RVN. All personnel were given the opportunity to mail personal baggage home, their shot records were up-dated and personnel records checked. In addition all units prepared for the displacement of the battalion rear to the 4th Infantry Division base camp at Dragon Mountain.

(2) An awards parade and memorial service at the Cacti Blue Chapel were held on 31 Mar 67.

Sic Clinton E. Granger, Jr.
CLINTON E. GRANGER, JR
LTC, Infantry
Commanding
Quarterly after action reports, as they are written and later read, are just a history lesson for that period. They relate the cold hard facts with excruciating exactness and icy coldness. But they rarely tell the human side of what it was really like for the men who were there on those seemingly unending dates and grid coordinates. Perhaps my journal will fill in a few of the empty, human, holes.

Our brigade participated in the major battle of the Ia Drang valley with the 1st Cav Division in late 1966. The generals and the politicos called it a major victory for US forces and was the coming of age for the combat air assault. But when you talk to the families of the hundreds and hundreds of men who didn’t come back they have a very difficult time seeing it as a victory.

Our brigade took more than its share of losses in the Ia Drang. As a result, we were given the soft mission of securing Highway 19 from the Mang Giang Pass, west back to Pleiki. This was sham-time - a time for rest, resupply and, most importantly, replacements. On 6 January, 1967, several Air Force C141’s left Travis AFB loaded with Infantrymen for the 3d Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division. We came combat ready with weapons, TA50 (field gear) and a complete issue of jungle fatigues, boots etc. The only thing we didn’t get issued was ammunition.

The aircraft flew straight into Pleiku via stops for refueling at Wake Island and Clark AFB in the Phillipines. (I never realized until my second tour in Nam what a blessing that was rather than Binh Hoa.) On its approach we were told by the load master that the rear door would open prior to touch down and we were to unload as quickly as possible on his command. Deuce and a halves were waiting at the edge of the runway. We were quickly loaded and transported to the Brigade base camp about an hour’s ride. My first impression was “RED DIRT/DUST.” That’s all I could see. Everything was covered in this fine red dust.

Two days after my departure from California I was assigned as the Operations Sergeant of the 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry and the next day flown in the battalion commanders “Charlie-Charlie” (Command and Control helicopter) directly to the battalion fire support base about half way between Pleiku and the Mang Giang Pass. Major Vogentanz, the S3 and my immediate boss, and Colonel Granger, the battalion commander briefed me on the situation and put me right to work. Wow, Korea wasn’t like this. Two weeks later, Maj V stepped on a AP mine and blew off his toes. Captain Lanning took over as the S3

I soon learned that the 4th Infantry Division had big plans. Once we were back to operational strength it was time for the brigade to get back into the war. The 2nd Bn, 8th Inf had a major contact. They lost 24 men from one company and 32 from another. A week later the 1st Bn, 8th Inf got into a fight just as big.