CONFIDENTIAL

AFTER ACTION REPORT

PAUL REVERE IV
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION

DO NOT GRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 8000.10
## COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT — PAUL REVERE IV

### TITLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION</th>
<th>PARA</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DATES OF OPERATION</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCATION</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTROL HEADQUARTERS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPORTING OFFICER</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TASK ORGANIZATION</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPPORTING FORCES</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTELLIGENCE</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISSION</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCEPT OF OPERATION</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXECUTION</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESULTS</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMANDERS ANALYSIS</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### INCLOSURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INCLOSURES</th>
<th>TITLE:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>PAUL REVERE IV AREA OF OPERATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>B-52 STRIKES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>DISPOSITION OF ENEMY UNITS AS OF 27 OCTOBER 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>DISPOSITION OF ENEMY UNITS AS OF 18 NOVEMBER 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>DISPOSITION OF ENEMY UNITS AS OF 26 NOVEMBER 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>DISPOSITION OF ENEMY UNITS AS OF 15 DECEMBER 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>DISPOSITION OF ENEMY UNITS AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>SCHEMATIC SKETCHES OF ENEMY TACTICS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>SCHEMATIC SKETCHES OF NVA BASE AREAS AND FORTIFIED POSITIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>FRIENDLY MOVEMENT AND ENEMY CONTACTS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFLICTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96262

28 January 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (ROS: MACV J3-32)

THRU: Commanding General
I Field Force Vietnam
ATTN: AVF-GC-TNG
APO San Francisco 96350

TO: Commander
U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J343
APO San Francisco 96222

1. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV - Search and Destroy.


3. (U) LOCATION: PAUL REVERE IV area of operation is shown at enclosure 1. (Reference: Map, Vietnam, Scale: 1/250,000; Series: JOG(G) 1501, Sheets: 48-5, 48-12, 49-9)

4. (U) CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division.

5. (U) REPORTING OFFICER: Principal commanders and senior staff officers participating in this operation were:

   a. Division Headquarters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Collins, Arthur S. Jr.</td>
<td>18 Oct - 31 Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADC</td>
<td>Walker, Glenn D.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoFs</td>
<td>McDowell, William D.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AcCoFs, G1</td>
<td>Farley, Roy W.</td>
<td>18 Oct - 25 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AcCoFs, G1</td>
<td>Lounsbury, Roy E.</td>
<td>25 Nov - 31 Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AcCoFs, G2</td>
<td>Kitchen, Albert</td>
<td>18 Oct - 31 Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AcCoFs, G3</td>
<td>Duquemin, Gordon J.</td>
<td>18 Oct - 18 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AcCoFs, G3</td>
<td>Rosell, Thomas G.</td>
<td>18 Nov - 31 Dec</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

28 January 1967


A CoFs, G4  LTC  Kuckhan, Carl O.  18 Oct - 13 Nov
A CoFs, G4  LTC  Richards, William G.  14 Nov - 31 Dec
A CoFs, G5  LTC  Braim, Paul F.  18 Oct - 31 Dec

b. Special Staff, 4th Infantry Division.

AG  LTC  Robinson, Herbert A.  18 Oct - 31 Dec
Div Surg  LTC  Dycaico, Armin G.
IG  LTC  Friedly, Howard W.
SJA  LTC  Shugg, Willis E.
FM  LTC  Kulo, Edwin W.
Fin O  LTC  Hess, Frank J.
Chap  LTC  Hett, William R.
Chem O  MAJ  Henderson, William
IO  MAJ  Zenk, Daniel R.
Hq Comdt  MAJ  Vollmer, Gene E.

c. 2d Brigade Task Force, 4th Infantry Division.

(1) Task Force Headquarters.

CO  COL  Miller, Judson F.  18 Oct - 22 Dec
CO (acting)  LTC  Duquemin, Gordon J.  22 Dec - 31 Dec
XO  LTC  Wilcox, George L.  18 Oct - 31 Dec
S-1  MAJ  Neroni, Fredrick J.
S-2  MAJ  Hoeferkamp, Harold R.
S-3  MAJ  Williams, Grady W.
S-4  MAJ  Harrison, William W.
S-5  CPT  Leben, Walter W.

(2) 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry.

CO  LTC  Lounsbury, Roy E.  18 Oct - 17 Nov
CO  LTC  Duquemin, Gordon J.  18 Nov - 21 Dec
CO (acting)  MAJ  Brashears, Bobby E.  22 Dec - 31 Dec

(3) 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry.

CO  LTC  Jay, James R.  18 Oct - 31 Dec

(4) 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry.

CO  LTC  Morley, Leonard, A.  18 Oct - 31 Dec

(5) 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry.

CO  LTC  Proctor, Gilbert J.  18 Oct - 31 Dec
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDH-GC

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

(6) 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery.

CO LTC Farr, Bertram T. 18 Oct - 31 Dec

d. 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division.

(1) Task Force Headquarters.

CO COL Shannahan, James G. 18 Oct - 31 Dec
XO LTC Miller, William H. 18 Oct - 19 Nov
XO LTC Grange, Clinton E. 20 Nov - 31 Dec
S-1 MAJ Lovergood, Robert F. 18 Oct - 12 Nov
S-1 MAJ Crosby, Ben G. 12 Nov - 31 Dec
S-2 MAJ Russel, Richard R. 18 Oct - 20 Dec
S-2 MAJ Egeland, Edgar 20 Dec - 31 Dec
S-3 LTC Meyer, Jules R. 18 Oct - 21 Oct
S-3 MAJ Moore, James E. Jr. 21 Oct - 31 Dec
S-4 MAJ Kirkpatrick, James S. 18 Oct - 10 Dec
S-4 MAJ Joyce, John A. 10 Dec - 31 Dec

(2) 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry.

CO LTC Proctor, Gilbert Jr. 18 Oct - 11 Dec
CO LTC Miller, William H. 11 Dec - 31 Dec

(3) 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry.

CO LTC Kingston, Robert C. 18 Oct - 31 Dec

(4) 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry.

CO LTC Frier, Philip 18 Oct - 31 Dec

(5) 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery.

CO LTC Holbrook, Bruce 18 Oct - 31 Dec

e. Division Artillery.

(1) Command and Staff.

CO COL Cutrona, Joseph F.H. 18 Oct - 31 Dec
XO LTC Bazich, Vincent W. 18 Oct - 12 Dec
S-1 MAJ Crawford, Charles W. 18 Oct - 12 Dec
S-1 MAJ Peterson, Guy E. 13 Dec - 31 Dec
S-2 MAJ Johnson, William D. 18 Oct - 12 Dec
CONFIDENTIAL

S-2 MAJ Crawford, Charles W. 13 Dec - 31 Dec
S-3 LTC Yerkos, Walter E. 18 Oct - 15 Nov
S-3 LTC Kuckhan, Karl O. 16 Nov - 31 Dec
S-4 MAJ Cryar, Carl H. " "
S-5 CPT Morrow, Robert " "
FSCE LTC Nettles, Elritt N. " "

(2) 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery.

CO LTC Citrak, Michael O. 19 Oct - 31 Dec

f. Support Command.

(1) Command and Staff.

CO DOL Boudman, Arthur 13 Oct - 31 Dec
XO LTC Fellow, Dean C. " "
S-1 CPT Smith, Thomas R. " "
S-2 CPT Moore, Donald R. " "
S-3 MAJ Scofield, Charles F. " "
S-4 MAJ Gerich, Robert A. " "
S-5 CPT Womble, Carl C. Jr. 16 Nov - 31 Dec

(2) 4th Medical Battalion.

CO LTC Peard, William D. 18 Oct - 31 Dec

(3) 704th Maintenance Battalion.

CO LTC Kouchoukos, Paul C. 18 Oct - 31 Dec

(4) 4th Supply and Transportation Battalion.

CO LTC Richards, William G. 18 Oct - 13 Nov

CO LTC Jacques, Peter J. 14 Nov - 31 Dec

g. 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry.

CO LTC Nutting, Wallace H. 18 Oct - 31 Dec

h. 1st Battalion, 69th Armor.

CO LTC Clark, Clyde O. 18 Oct - 31 Dec

i. 4th Engineer Battalion.

CO LTC Shultz, Gerhardt W. 18 Oct - 31 Dec
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

1. 124th Signal Battalion.
   CO    LTC Keefer, Loren R. 18 Oct - 31 Dec

2. 4th Aviation Battalion.
   CO    LTC McDowell, William R. 18 Oct - 31 Dec

6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:
   a. Detached units:
      (1) 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division was placed under opera-
           tional control of I Field Force Vietnam on 032400 December 1966 and continued
           OPERATION ADAM in the Tuy Hoa area.

      (2) 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division remained attached to 25th
           Infantry Division.

      (3) No other major units were detached from division.

   b. Attached units:
      (1) 1st Battalion, 69th Armor.
      (2) Team 8, 41st Civil Affairs Company.
      (3) 374th Radio Research Company.
      (4) 33d Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog).

   c. Task Organization for Combat:
      (1) Control Headquarters was Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division.

      (2) Task Force organization for OPERATION PUL REVERSE IV as per
           OPORD 12-66 effective 181000 October 1966:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TF 2/4</th>
<th>TF 3/25</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC</td>
<td>HHC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/8 Inf</td>
<td>1/14 Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/12 Inf</td>
<td>1/35 Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/22 Inf (-)</td>
<td>2/35 Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B/4th Engr</td>
<td>C/3/4 Cav (-)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


AVDDH-GC

4/42 Arty
C/6/14 Arty
1 SIT (Searchlight) B/29 Arty
A/1/30 Arty
Det 237 Arty

D/65 Engr
2/9 Arty
A/3/6 Arty
A/6/14 Arty (-)
1 SIT (Searchlight) B/29 Arty

TF 1/10 Cav
HHT
A/1/69 Armor
1/C/3/4 Cav
B/1/10 Cav (-)
C/3/6 Arty
D/5/16 Arty
PSYOP Tm
Scout Dog Tm

Div Trp
DISCOM

No Change
No Change

Div Arty

HHB
5/16 Arty
6/29 Arty
Flat B/29 Arty (-)

(3) Task Force organization for OPERATION PAUL REVERSE IV as changed by FRAGO 18-66 effective 302200 October 1966:

TF 2/4
HHC
2/8 Inf
1/12 Inf
1/22 Inf
4/42 Arty
B/5/16 Arty
D/5/16 Arty (-)
Sec B/29 Arty
B/4 Engr

TF 3/25
HHC
1/14 Inf
1/35 Inf
2/35 Inf
2/9 Arty
Sec B/29 Arty
A/1/30 Arty
Det B/29 Arty
D/65 Engr

TF 1/69
HHC
C/3/4 Cav (OPOCM)
C/5/16 Arty

Div Arty

HHB
6/14 Arty
Flat B/29 Arty (-)
CONFIDENTIAL

28 January 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

(4) Task Force organization as in paragraph 6c(3) above was modified by Change 1 to FRAGO 18-66 effective 071100 November 1966.

** TF 3/25 **

** Div Trp **

DELETE: A/1/30 Arty
ADD: C/5/16 Arty

TF 3/25

Div Arty

CHANGE: 6/14 Arty to A/6/14 Arty
ADD: C/3/18 Arty


TF 2/4

TF 3/25

No Change

TF 3/25

No Change

TF PRONG (ARVN) effective 080900 November 1966

3d MIKE Force Co, Pleiku
CIDG Co, Duc Co
CIDG Co, Plei Djoeng

(6) Task Force organization for OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV as changed by FRAGO 30-66 effective 110850 November 1966.

TF 2/4

TF 3/25

TF 1/10

HHC

HHC

HHT

2/8 Inf

1/22 Inf

B/1/10 Cav

1/12 Inf

1/35 Inf

D/1/10 Cav

1/14 Inf

2/35 Inf

**C/3/4 Cav

* TF PRONG

A/2/9 Arty

C/2/9 Arty

DIV RESERVE

A/4/42 Arty

C/4/42 Arty

B/2/9 Arty

2/35 Inf

(7) Task Force organization for OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV as changed by FRAGO 34-66 effective 240903 November 1966.

TF 3/25

TF 3/25

Assume OCA of 1/69 Armor effective 250600 November 1966.

Release OCA of 1/10 Cav effective 250600 November 1966.

Assume OCA of C/3/4 Cav effective 250600 November 1966.
AVDDH-GC  

(8) Task Force organization for OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV as changed by FRAGO 38-66 effective 050655 December 1966.

TF 2/4
Assume OCA 1/22 Inf effective 041200 December 1966.

TF 3/25
Assume OCA 2/8 Inf effective 4 December 1966.

(9) Task Force organization for OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV as changed by FRAGO 40-66 effective 110600 December 1966.

TF 3/25
Release 0/3/4 Cav to 1/10 Cav during daylight hours.


TF 2/4
HHC  
1/22 Inf  
1/12 Inf  
4/42 Arty (-)

TF 3/25
HHC  
1/14 Inf  
2/35 Inf  
* CIDG Co, Duc Co  
* CIDG Co, Plei Ms  
2/9 Arty (-)  
1/10 Cav (-)  
C/1/69 Armor  
C/3/4 Cav  
C/3/6 Arty (OCA 1/10 Cav)  

DIV RESERVE  
2/8 Inf (-)  
1/35 Inf

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDH-GC
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: NAV J3-32)

28 January 1967

(11) Task force organization for OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV was changed by FRAGO 43-66 effective 23 December 1966.

TF 2/4

HHC
2/8 Inf
1/12 Inf
1/22 Inf
1/10 Cav

* Operated in coordination and conjunction with 4th Infantry Division.
** Daylight hours only.

7. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Non-Organic and non-attached supporting forces are listed below:

(1) USAID, Pleiku Province.
(2) JUSPAO, Pleiku Province.
(3) GVN District Contact Teams.
(4) 20th ARVN Psyrav Battalion.
(5) Det, 245th Psycos Co Pleiku.
(6) Det, 5th Air Commando Squadron.
(7) 52d Combat Aviation Battalion.
(8) 52d Artillery Group.
(9) 7th USAF.

b. Civic Action Support was planned, coordinated and executed with USAID and JUSPAO, Pleiku Province, and with GVN District Contact Teams. A breakdown of civic action cumulative totals are:

(1) MEDCAP.

(a) Sick Call - 16,780 Patients.
(b) Dental - 27.

(1) MEDEVAC - 8

(2) Sanitation - 22 classes (3331 Attendance).

(3) Distribution of Commodities.
   (a) Food - 58,269 lbs.
   (b) Clothing - 4,180 lbs.
   (c) Blankets - 350
   (d) Soap - 60 cases

(4) Self Help Projects.
   (a) Spillways - 5
   (b) Playgrounds - 1
   (c) Wells - 1 (Capped)
   (d) Water storage tanks - 1

Civic actions were conducted in conjunction with psychological operations. The purposes of these civic actions were to prevent civil interference with operations, protect civilians from friendly and enemy fires, relieve suffering and extreme privation, and render assistance to the GVN in evacuation of refugees and foodstocks.

c. Psyops support was planned, coordinated, and executed with JUSHQO, Pleiku Province; 20th ARVN Psywar Battalion; and detachments from the 245th Psyops Company, Pleiku and 5th Air Commando Squadron. Psyops concentrated on VC/NVA forces. Themes emphasized were the "Chieu Hoi" program, the futility of resistance, and the massive and growing power of GVN/US. The small civil population was encouraged to refuse to assist the VC/NVA, to persuade relatives and friends in VC units to defect, and to move on foot to GVN controlled areas.

d. The following is a summary of the aviation support provided by the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion:

   (1) Air landed combat assault missions - 79

   (2) Sorties - 51,086
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDH-GC

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

(3) Hours flown - 17,547

(4) Troops lifted - 69,323

(5) Tons of cargo lifted - 12,751

(6) Medical Evacuations - 413

e. Artillery Support.

(1) Direct fire support to the maneuver elements was provided by the attachment of the 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery (105T) to the 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division and the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery (105T) to the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division. Reinforcing and general support fires were provided by the 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (-), the organic 155/8" unit of 4th Infantry Division Artillery, and units of the 52d Artillery Group under OCA of the 4th Infantry Division. USSF/CIDG were supported by positioning 175/8" batteries of the 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery, one of the 52d Artillery Group units that was OCA to the Division, adjacent to the camps. Road security missions were supported, when possible, by 105mm SP units which complimented the armored force normally assigned this type of mission. Artillery, both organic and OCA, was often formed into mixed caliber battalion groups.

(2) Fire Support Bases (FSBs), containing single and multiple batteries, were utilized to support the operation, with security being provided from Division and ARVN resources. One of the key principles in selecting FSBs was that they be mutually supporting, thereby permitting one fire base to reinforce another.

(3) The 175/8" FSB at Ploi Djereng proved invaluable, as from this position, long range fires of the 175 were able to fire along the Cambodian border. These fires were paramount in the suppression of enemy anti-aircraft and mortar fires and in heavy harassment and interdiction programs along the border areas.

(4) Artillery metro was utilized throughout PAUL REVERE IV. Due to the fact that only one metrological section was available for use in the PAUL REVERE IV area of operation, the decision was made to place the metro section in the most critical area of tactical significance and where the bulk of the artillery was located. The section was located at Ploi Djereng where it operated throughout the operation.

(5) Countermortar radars, AN/MPQ 4, were used effectively throughout the operation. It was apparent, from the beginning of the operation, that countermortar radars would have to be placed in the forward
areas to derive maximum benefit from their capabilities. Initially one organic countermortar radar section was placed in the forward command post area of the 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division and 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division. These two command post areas were co-located at Y-865455. The other organic radar was utilized in defense of the Division Base Camp. In October and November, two additional radars became available to the Division from the 52d Artillery Group resources giving the division a total of four radars. However, generator and mechanical problems of the organic and OCA radars allowed the Division only three operational radars at any one time. With three radars available, one remained in the Division Base Camp Defense System, one in the forward Brigade's command post area, possibly for the first time in Vietnam, one was airlifted into a forward fire support base where it could give coverage to the Cambodian border. On three occasions these radars successfully located enemy mortar positions resulting in probable destruction of those positions by artillery fire.

(6) Fourth order survey was established in the Pلق Dơrcng area by a joint effort of the survey teams of the 4th Infantry Division Artillery and 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery. The results of this survey were used by artillery units in the Pفق Dơrcng area.

(7) Total artillery ammunition expenditures and average number of tubes available for MAUL REVENU IV were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>Artillery Type</th>
<th>105s (105T)</th>
<th>81s (105 SF)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4th Battalion</td>
<td>42d Artillery</td>
<td>45,757</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Battalion</td>
<td>9th Artillery</td>
<td>42,882</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Battalion</td>
<td>6th Artillery</td>
<td>4,072</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Battalion</td>
<td>16th Artillery</td>
<td>17,039</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Battalion</td>
<td>13th Artillery</td>
<td>2,637</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Battalion</td>
<td>30th Artillery</td>
<td>1,007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Battalion</td>
<td>18th Artillery</td>
<td>601</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Battalion</td>
<td>14th Artillery</td>
<td>(175 SP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GRAND TOTAL: 134,479

BASE CAMP

Searchlight Missions: 302
Ammunition Expended - 105: 686
105: 77
81: 26
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDH-GC

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MCY J3-32)

28 January 1967

Average Artillery available for PAUL REVERE IV:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>105</th>
<th>155</th>
<th>8&quot;</th>
<th>175</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>47</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. Air Support.

(1) The utilization and effectiveness of USAF Close Air Support (CAS) during OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV is best shown by statistics reflecting the ground commanders use of this support. The following table indicated the CAS requested, flown, and results of strikes during OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Mission</th>
<th>Men's req</th>
<th>Men's flown</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Type Aircraft</th>
<th>Damage Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAC PP</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>1347</td>
<td>A1E 57, F4C, F100, Navy USMC</td>
<td>Bunkers, AW, Soc Est, KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC Inmod</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>645</td>
<td></td>
<td>120, 58, 20, 17, 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Proof PP</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>46, 299, 317</td>
<td>8, 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Proof Immod</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>26, 118, 32</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPOOKY</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Another type of air fire support heavily utilized during PAUL REVERE IV was the B-52 bomber strikes. A total of 32 of these raids were used during the operation. The strikes varied in size from six to a maximum of 18 aircraft. The B-52 strikes initially began when division units crossed the So San River and oriented toward the north, with the Nam San River as the western boundary. As the units moved north, B-52 strikes were progressively planned on enemy locations established by ground contacts and current intelligence. In mid-November one brigade was moved west across
the Nam Sathay River to attack enemy units known to be near the border areas. Heavy contacts were made in this area which provided definite information on the location of the enemy. The emphasis on B-52 strikes then shifted to this area. On the 20th, 23rd, and 24th of November, five separate but coordinated strikes went in the southwest part of this sector where previous contacts indicated that enemy troops in battalion or larger size units were defending in strongly constructed, dug-in positions. The effectiveness of the strikes can best be judged by the fact that after the strikes the 4th Infantry Division units moved into the area with little or no opposition. The area which had previously been a strong defensive position with bunkers, tunnels and foxholes was now practically devastated. Innumerable bunkers and gun positions were completely destroyed. It was obvious that enemy personnel had been in the area during the strikes and had undoubtedly suffered many casualties, although he had removed the killed and wounded. In one area a cave was discovered with an estimated 50 bodies buried inside. Although not definitely established, these enemy dead were probably the result of one or more of the B-52 strikes.

(3) During this same period, intelligence and ground contacts in the northern portion of the area of operation, indicated that the enemy was conducting delaying operations to enable his units to withdraw to the northwest. B-52 strikes were planned and executed in this area in the latter half of November to support the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division as it pursued the NVA units. Information from POW's indicated that these strikes were successful in inflicting casualties, forcing constant movement, and lowering the morale of the enemy forces.

(4) The last stage of operations in these areas occurred when division units attempted to trap the withdrawing enemy by blocking likely exfiltration routes in the northwest sector of the area of operations. POW reports, VR sightings, and ground to air fire received, presented three more targets for B-52 strikes in that area. No positive evidence of the success of these strikes was apparent after ground units entered the areas; however, there were indications that enemy personnel had previously been in the strike area.

(5) The B-52 strikes proved to be an effective and surprisingly responsive source of tremendous fire power to the 4th Infantry Division. Combined with intelligence, close air support, artillery and ground follow-up, the strikes greatly contributed to the success of OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV. (See Inclosure 2 for overlay depicting strikes)

8. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Enemy situation prior to commencement of PAUL REVERE IV. During the early days of October, intelligence reports and enemy activity indicated there were significant enemy forces in the southern portion of Kontum
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDH-GC
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

28 January 1967

Province and near the Plei Djereng CIDG Camp. On 4 October, 40 CIDG recruits deserted from the Plei Djereng Camp. Beginning on 5 October, Special Forces reports indicated the presence of an NVA regiment, possibly from the 1st NVA (Le Loi) Division, moving into the Kontum "Panhandle." On 14 October, a Plei Djereng company-sized patrol made contact with an estimated two NVA platoons in the mountains southeast of their camp. Two separate incidents of ground-to-air fire were reported northeast of the camp on 16 October. In response to these indications, visual reconnaissance flights were increased. Sightings on 17 October revealed many rafts on the banks of the Se San River. Finally, on the night of 18 October, Plei Djereng received a mortar attack from east of the camp. The rounds, believed to be 60mm, all fell to the east of the camp. As additional reports from usually reliable sources tended to confirm the presence of elements of the 1st NVA Division, it was estimated that elements of the 32d, 33d, or 66th NVA Regiments were committed in the vicinity of Plei Djereng and southern Kontum Province. It became apparent that the enemy was either preparing to launch a major attack against Plei Djereng or was using the area as a corridor into central Kontum and Pleiku Provinces. However, most of the sources of information normally relied upon to determine more accurately the extent of enemy activity, proved to be inadequate when applied to the southern portion of Kontum Province. The capabilities of visual reconnaissance and imagery interpretation were minimized by the dense vegetation. The sparse civilian population precluded the effective employment of agents. Information available concerning the area west of the Se San River was only sufficient to make the area suspect as part of a major infiltration route leading either east into Kontum and Pleiku, or south into Cambodia and the southern provinces of South Vietnam. The extent to which the enemy had used the area could not be accurately determined. Nevertheless, sufficient evidence of increasing enemy activity did exist to warrant committing of division units into the area to conduct OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV.

b. Enemy activity during PAUL REVERE IV.

(1) Activity during the period 18-27 October: The initial reaction to the enemy buildup and threat to Plei Djereng was to initiate B-52 strikes on suspected targets. Elements of the 4th Infantry Division were then committed to assess and exploit these strikes both east and west of the Se San River. The first enemy contact occurred on 20 October when the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry engaged a platoon size enemy force southwest of Plei Djereng in the vicinity of YA920520. On 21 October, A Company, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry engaged an NVA unit of possible company size, northwest of Plei Djereng, in the vicinity of YA925610. This was the first contact west of the Se San River. On 23 October, A Company, 1st Battalion,
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDH-GC

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

14th Infantry encountered 21 NVA in the vicinity of YA928560, and a CIDG unit under their operational control pursued 15 VC/NMC into caves located in the vicinity of YA682615. Captives taken as a result of these actions revealed they were from the 1st and 2d Battalions, 95B Regiment and that there were two other NVA Regiments operating within the Area of Operations (AO). The next several days were characterized by the northward progression of friendly forces with only occasional contacts with enemy elements of platoon size or smaller. Early on the morning of 27 October, A Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, received small arms, automatic weapons and 17 rounds of estimated 60mm mortar fire from west and southwest of their location in the vicinity of YA725540. This contact with an estimated company size enemy force lasted for more than two hours. Contact was broken when the enemy withdrew to the north and southwest. Prisoners taken as a result of this action identified their unit as the 5th Battalion, 32d Regiment, 1st NVA Division. The discovery of abandoned unit positions, supply caches, trail networks and tunnels, coupled with the fact that contacts with elements of the 95B Regiment had occurred both east, and west of the So San River, seemed to indicate an enemy withdrawal to the northwest across the So San River. There were also indications that the introduction of US forces and the B-52 strikes had thwarted the enemy's plans for an attack against Plei Djorang, forcing him to withdraw. (See enclosure 3 for disposition of enemy units as of 27 October.)

(2) Activity during the period 28 October - 18 November:

The enemy reacted to the advance of friendly forces by withdrawing the 95B and 32d Regiments to the northwest. With increasing frequency, friendly units continued to discover well camouflaged, but generally undefended, enemy base areas and fortified positions of up to battalion size. Other contacts were made with scattered enemy forces, but enemy units larger than platoons were seldom engaged. Exceptions occurred, however, that bolstered the enemy's intent to avoid contact. Early on the evening of 28 October C Company, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry was engaged by an estimated battalion size force in the vicinity of YA770594. Contact continued for five hours and resulted in 7 NVA soldiers KIA and 1 captured. The prisoner stated that his unit was the 2d Battalion, 95B Regiment, located in the vicinity of YA778567. On 29 October, beginning at 0230 hours, two companies of the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry received heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from south and west of their positions in the vicinity of YA755515 and YA690514. The enemy force, estimated to be of battalion size, continued the attack until approximately 0515 hours, and sporadic light contact continued throughout the remainder of the morning. This action resulted in 51 enemy KIA. With the exception of one estimated NVA platoon encountered by 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry at YA830627 on the afternoon of 29 October, and one estimated platoon contacted on the morning of 30 October at YA76808, only sporadic, light contacts were made through 30 October. One PW captured during this period in the vicinity of YA770594 identified his unit as the K2 Battalion, 95B Regiment, 10th Agricultural Site and located the Regimental Headquarters in the vicinity of YA830630. He also
located the K2 Battalion Headquarters at YA827602. Another captive taken at YA671516 stated that his unit was the 1st Battalion, 33d Regiment, Le Loi Division with headquarters in the vicinity of YA668526. He also stated that the 33d Regiment Headquarters was in the vicinity of YA672537 and a new divisional hospital was at YA643541. On 31 October A Company, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry observed an estimated 50 NVA approximately 200 meters from their location at YA767621. A Company attacked, but the enemy withdrew to the northwest and pursuit proved futile. The continued advance of friendly forces to the north and west met with relatively little opposition from 31 October to 4 November. Occasional light contacts and frequent discovery of abandoned enemy positions continued. The enemy appeared to be avoiding decisive engagement with friendly forces. The enemy forces had been severely damaged by heavy fire from air and artillery and by the rapid advance of friendly forces. He was apparently attempting to lure friendly forces into an area where the terrain would favor his ambush tactics and limit the rapid US reinforcement capability. The location of many abandoned defensive positions in close proximity to natural LZ's tended to substantiate this probability. Significant enemy contact was regained on 4 November when a reconnaissance element of the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry engaged an estimated 40 man NVA force in the vicinity of YA745565. Contact was broken when the enemy position was overrun. On 5 November at YA700532, A Company, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry established contact with an estimated enemy company. Contact was broken after approximately one hour when the enemy withdrew. From 6 through 9 November only minor contacts were made, and friendly forces continued their advance to the north and west toward the Nan Sathay River. The relative calm was broken at 0530 hours on 10 November when the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Command Post received an estimated 15-20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire apparently from northwest of their position in the vicinity of YA710532. All rounds fell outside their perimeter. Later the same day Task Force PRONG engaged an enemy force for a period of seven and one-half hours in the vicinity of YA605515, approximately three kilometers from the Cambodian border. This enemy force was estimated to have included three companies in contact at various times. One captive identified his unit as the H-15 AA Company, Nong Truong 10, and stated that it was assigned the mission of setting up ambush sites in the vicinity of landing zone. Another captive taken by the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry on 10 November in the vicinity of YA683564, stated that he was a member of the 4th Battalion, 32d Regiment, and that its mission was to delay the advance of US troops while the remainder of the Regiment crossed the river. He indicated that landing zones in the vicinity of YA5852 were heavily defended with 12.7mm AA weapons. On the night of 10 November, A Company, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry received 20 mortar rounds and heavy small arms fire from northwest of their position at YA677566. The Battalion remained in contact with an estimated company size force for approximately two hours. A PW captured on 11 November as a result of this action stated that he was a member of the K6 Battalion, 95B Regiment located
in the vicinity of YA702549. Early on 11 November Task Force PRONG confronted an estimated two NVA companies in an engagement that continued for ten hours in the vicinity of YA570550. Two of six NVA soldiers captured during this contact stated that they were members of the H-14 AA Company, Cong Truong 3 Regiment, Nong Truong 10. Order of battle records equated this to the 88th Regiment, 10th NVA Division. On the night of 11 November, C Company, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry engaged one NVA platoon at YA605515.

On 12 November at 1805 hours the command post and two companies of the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry plus B Battery, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery located in the vicinity of YA592558 began receiving mortar fire from north and west of their position. At 1900 hours, the mortar fire lifted and a ground attack from the north and west was launched by an estimated two battalion size enemy force. Intermittent mortar fire resumed at approximately 1915 hours and ground contact continued until approximately 0300 hours. Sporadic small arms and automatic weapons fire from the north continued until approximately 0400 hours. During this engagement, the enemy fired an estimated 500-600 60mm and 82mm mortar rounds. This is believed to be the heaviest enemy mortar attack recorded in the Vietnam War. Enemy personnel losses as a result of the engagement were 76 KIA and 2 CIA. One FV captured on the morning following the attack stated that he was assigned to the 88th Regiment and that his unit's mission was to surround US Forces after an artillery or mortar attack and overrun their positions. He located the 88th Regiment Headquarters in the vicinity of YA564552 and 1st Battalion Headquarters in the vicinity of YA583555 and revealed that it had been occupying the area just east of the border for about two months. Early on the morning of 13 November an estimated NVA platoon, well dug in and armed with automatic weapons, was encountered by B Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry in the vicinity of YA573555. Later the same morning, B Company, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry had sporadic contact with an unknown size enemy force at YA740635. Documents found at the location indicated that the unit was probably an element of the 95th Regiment. On the afternoon of 13 November at YA564510, A Company, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry was in contact with an estimated enemy company and received approximately five mortar rounds. At 1527 hours the same afternoon A Company engaged an estimated two NVA companies at YA575009. Contact was broken at 1704 hours and resulted in 26 NVA KIA. From 14 through 16 November, only light enemy contact was made and friendly forces continued their movement virtually unopposed. Shortly before noon on 17 November A Company, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry and an attached CIDG unit made contact with an estimated company size unit in the vicinity of YA600595. Approximately one hour later B Company, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry engaged the same enemy force in the vicinity of YA598601. Results of both contacts were negative. On the afternoon of 17 November a patrol from B Company, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry captured one NVA soldier carrying rice along a stream in the vicinity of YA665661. The captive stated that his unit was the 5th Battalion, 95th
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDH-GC

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

Regiment and that he was a member of a 10 man group responsible for carrying rice from a rice collection point in the vicinity of YA639625 to his battalion's location in the vicinity of YA69679.

(3) The period 28 October to 18 November represented the period of maximum contact. It was marked by an increase in anti-aircraft fire received by friendly aircraft and by the large number of anti-aircraft and other fortified positions detected, especially in the vicinity of potential landing zones west of the Nam Sathay River. As a result, friendly helicopter operations were limited to the few existing, or hastily created landing zones. The enemy, aware of these tactical limitations, devised countermoves by setting up ambushes around landing zones and by deploying his forces in a manner that would facilitate the rapid reinforcement of an ambush with up to a battalion size force. (See Inclosure 8 for schematic sketches of enemy tactics). Contacts with elements of the 86th and the 33d NVA Regiments; incidents of anti-aircraft fire, POW reports, and the discovery of base areas and fortified positions west of the Nam Sathay, confirmed the withdrawal of the 33d NVA Regiment west of the river and the presence of the 58th NVA Regiment in the same area. All indications pointed to their deployment into prepared positions near the Cambodian border in the vicinities of YA556 and YA619. At least some elements of the 32d and 95B (2d Battalion, 95B Regiment and 5th Battalion, 32 Regiment) moved north and remained east of the Nam Sathay River. Enemy plans to attack Plei Djereng and to later destroy US reaction forces north and west of the Se San River were apparently disrupted by the pressure of US Forces and the continuous air and artillery strikes against his units. The enemy suffered heavy casualties during his engagements with US Forces and as a result of artillery, close air strikes, and B-52 activity. FW's indicated that the morale of their units was generally low because of heavy casualties, shortages of food and medicine, and a high incidence of disease. Withdrawal and redeployment into positions along the Cambodian border enabled the enemy to take advantage of the proximity of the border to mass his forces and fire power against advancing US Forces. His logistical lines were not extended thus he was in an advantageous position to support large scale attacks such as the attack on the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry on the night of 12 November. He was better able to obtain food, medicine and other supplies. Most importantly, he could rely upon the immunity of the Cambodian sanctuary in the event that the pressure of US Forces became too great. He could also avoid high casualty tolls from artillery and B-52 strikes by merely withdrawing across the border. (See Inclosure 4 for disposition of enemy units as of 18 November.)

(4) Activities during the period 19 - 26 November: On 19 November in the vicinity of YA60500, B Company, 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry and an attached CIDG element engaged an estimated two NVA Battalions. One FW captured as a result of this contact indicated that he was from the 6th Battalion, 33d Regiment, and that there were two battalions of the 33d
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

located near his place of capture. On the night of 19 November, C Company, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry and a CIDG element made contact with an estimated NVA battalion size unit in the vicinity of YA615515. Enemy losses resulting from these contacts totalled 166 KIA. On 22 November 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry made contact with an estimated platoon size force in bunkers and armed with machine guns in the vicinity of YA602495. These, and frequent minor contacts, along with evidence that the area bounded generally by coordinates YA5758, YA6056, YA6049, and YA5749 consisted of a complex of fortifications prompted friendly forces to call for a series of B-52 strikes between 19-27 November. Although there was no accurate body count, there were several indications that the enemy suffered heavily as result of these strikes. An accurate body count could not be made for several reasons. First, for several days after the strikes, friendly units were pulled out of the area in the late afternoon to avoid being cut off from their parent units after darkness. This allowed the enemy the opportunity to evacuate his casualties. One agent report indicated that on one night during this period 353 NVA bodies were buried in Cambodia. Second, the area in which the B-52 strikes occurred was heavily bunkered, and it is probable that a large number of enemy personnel were buried in fortifications as they were destroyed by the bombing. Four captives interrogated subsequent to the B-52 strikes claimed that losses sustained by the 33d Regiment resulted in its deactivation and reassignment of its personnel as replacements to other units. Yet there was still no evidence that the NVA units west of the Nam Sethay were preparing to withdraw into Cambodia. They appeared to be making a determined effort to remain in Vietnam in the vicinity of the border. The Nam Sethay River Valley has for years served as a major infiltration route. Its importance may have dictated that the NVA remain in Vietnam and defend the area in spite of continuous bombardment by air and artillery.

Despite the concentration of activity in the southwestern portion of the area of operations, contacts with elements of the 95B and 32d Regiments continued as friendly forces pushed northward toward the Plei Trap area, east of the Nam Sethay. On 20 November, B Company, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry encountered an estimated reinforced NVA platoon in approximately 18-20 bunkers in the vicinity of YA674688. Several hours after the contact was initiated, A Company, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry linked up with B Company, and the enemy position was overrun. On the morning of 22 November in the vicinity of YA675699, A Company, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry received heavy machine gun and other automatic weapons fire from an estimated NVA platoon. Later the same day A Company located and pursued an enemy squad in the vicinity of YA677702. The pursuit led to an engagement with a dug in enemy platoon. These, and other daily contacts with individuals and small elements east of the Nam Sethay River during the period 21-25 November, netted several captives whose information
CONFIDENTIAL

28 January 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report—(RCS: NCV J3-32)

intended to confirm that elements of the 95B and 32d Regiments remained east of the Nam Sathay River. A captive taken on 21 November by 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry in the vicinity of YA665661 identified his unit as the 1st Battalion, 95B Regiment. The captive was on a rice carrying mission and had not been with his unit for the last eight days. However, he stated that on 12 November the 1st Battalion was located in the vicinity of YA674735. One NVA soldier captured by 1 Company, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry on 21 November, in the vicinity of YA684710, stated that he was assigned to the 2d Battalion, 95B Regiment. He further stated that in recent months the 2d Battalion had assumed the mission of attacking landing zones and that the 1st Battalion was used as a reserve unit. Both units were moving to locate a new landing zone in preparation for an attack. He gave as a possible location of the 2d Battalion the vicinity of coordinates YA8081, YA8281, YA8328, and YA8085; another captive taken on 24 November by B Company, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry in the vicinity of YA699740, claimed to be a member of the H-20 Engineer Company, 32d Regiment, which he located in the vicinity of YA701716. He also said that the 32d Regiment Headquarters had been located in the vicinity of YA69720 since about 3 November. On 25 November 1 Company, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry captured one NVA soldier in the vicinity of YA684707, who identified his unit as the 2d Battalion, 95B Regiment and located it in the vicinity of YA66569 as of 22 November; another prisoner taken by B Company, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, in the vicinity of YA685699 on 25 November, stated that he was from the 2d Battalion, 32d Regiment which was located in the vicinity of YA680680 on 23 November. On 25 November B Company, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry captured one PW in the vicinity of YA659737 who stated that he belonged to the H-20 Engineer Company, 32 Regiment, and that five days earlier his company had been located in the vicinity of YA685712. Numerous visual reconnaissance reports and other reports from reliable sources, indicated a possible large unit concentration in the vicinity of YA7071, YA7074, YA7471, and YA7474. The sighting of numerous anti-aircraft positions and other activity indicated that the area bounded by coordinates YA6469, YA685, YA6885, and YA6879 was being prepared for receipt of a large enemy headquarters. Frequent sightings of rafts, wood and log bridges and trail activity along the Nam Sathay between YA570781 and YA727870 indicated extensive enemy activity in that area. (See Inclosure 5 for disposition of enemy units as of 26 November.)

(6) Activity during the period 27 November - 15 December: During this period, activity was concentrated in the northern portion of the area of operations and to the northeast along the Nam Sathay River. However, contacts were infrequent and US units seldom encountered a force larger than squad size. Several significant incidents occurred during the period. Several large base areas and hospital
complexes were discovered west of the Nam Sathay River. Also, the capture and interrogation of several NVA soldiers tended to confirm the withdrawal of the 32d and 95B Regiments to the Cambodian border. On 27 November, in the vicinity of YA574537, A Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, located and destroyed 100 huts and 100 foxholes estimated to have been used one month before. The discovery of numerous bottles and vials in the area indicated that it was probably a hospital site. On the afternoon of 27 November, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry captured one NVA soldier near a recently used platoon position in the vicinity of YA675679. The prisoner stated that he had joined the 5th Battalion, 32d Regiment approximately one month earlier when his battalion of the 33d Regiment was disbanded. He stated that the 5th Battalion attacked a landing zone in the vicinity of YA672680 on about 21 November and then withdrew across the river in the vicinity of YA676685. In an area of dense undergrowth in the vicinity of YA579754, B Company, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry located a large number of enemy troops late on the afternoon of 27 November. One NVA soldier taken prisoner identified his unit as the 2d Battalion, 95B Regiment, but he was unable to provide its location. On 28 November, A Company, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry engaged an estimated company size enemy force in the vicinity of YA685706. One prisoner captured as a result of this contact claimed his unit was the 2d Battalion, 95B Regiment, and that at the time of contact, he was a member of a reconnaissance element with the mission of reconnoitering a landing zone in the vicinity of YA669663. He located the 2d Battalion in the vicinity of YA708727. On 28 November the fire support base of 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, located in the vicinity of YA610527, received approximately 25 rounds of estimated 82mm mortar fire from the vicinity of YA597533. Also, the 4th Infantry Division Forward Command Post located south of Plei Gjereng received 24 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from the vicinity of YA65435. In both incidents, all rounds fell outside the perimeter. On 29 November in the vicinity of YA654755, B Company, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry made contact with three NVA soldiers, taking one captive. The captive identified his unit as the 2d Battalion, 95B Regiment and stated that four days earlier it was located near a stream in the vicinity of YA692723. Its mission was to remain at that location and act as a blocking force. On 30 November, C Company, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry made contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of YA77706. Contact was immediately broken as the enemy withdrew to the north. Documents and equipment found in the area indicated that the enemy unit was an element of the 32d Regiment, possibly a battalion headquarters. On the night of 30 November, the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry fire support base, located at YA610662, received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from northwest of their position. On 2 December in the vicinity of YA580540, A Company, 1st Battalion
CONFIDENTIAL

28 January 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: LSC VJ3-32)

12th Infantry, encountered an estimated company size force, an NVN football, who had been separated from his unit, was captured in the same area on 4 December by B Company, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry. The Sergeant identified his unit as the 5th Battalion, 88th Regiment, and stated that the unit in contact in that area on 2 December was an element of the 88th Regiment. He stated that until approximately one month ago, the 88th Regiment had the mission of ambushing US helicopter troops at landing zones, but that heavy casualties had caused a change in mission. According to the captive, the 8th Battalion had been ordered to assume the mission of locating and ambushing Special Forces and CIDG patrols. To the north, on 22 December, A Company, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, located a 75 bed hospital in the vicinity of Y465746. Several documents found in the hospital area indicated that it had been used by the 32d Regiment. In the vicinity of Y473508, C Company, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry located a reinforced company position and, a short time later, located another position consisting of 100 one to three man bunkers in the vicinity of Y4737700. This area had been occupied approximately two or three days earlier. On 4 December an aerial observer from the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division sighted four individuals in the vicinity of Y6665767. Elements of the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry moved into the area and apprehended one NVN soldier who identified his unit as the 16th Communications Company, 2d Battalion. The Battalion mission was to attack landing zones and to ambush US and SVN patrols. Although the prisoner was unable to provide a regimental designation, other information obtained indicated that the 2d Battalion was probably subordinate to the 95B Regiment. An NVN deserter taken by the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry on the same day, in the vicinity of Y664767, stated that he was from the 2d Battalion, 95B Regiment, and that as of 2 December, its location was in the vicinity of Y690766. The mission of the 95B Regiment was to advance in an easterly direction to attack landing zones and conduct ambushes. On a priorometer search of the command post area on 5 December, the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division apprehended one NVN soldier in the vicinity of Y655446. The prisoner presented a safe conduct pass and claimed that he had deserted his unit, which he identified as the 21st Heavy Weapons Battalion, 952d Regiment, 304th Division. He stated that when he deserted 10 days earlier his company was located in the vicinity of Y6936. Although Order of Battle files contained no reference to a 952d Regiment, research indicated that the subject was possibly a member of a battalion designated X-200 and last located in the vicinity of the Kontum, Pleiku, Cambodia border area. However, on 6 December, documents found on a dead NVN soldier in the vicinity of Y656837 by the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, indicated that the individual might have been assigned to a unit designated as the 19th Artillery Company, 6th Battalion, 952d Artillery Regiment. In the vicinity of Y657840 on 6 December, B Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, captured one NVN soldier who claimed
that his unit was the 3d Company, 21st Battalion, 5th Worksite, 304th Division, but stated that he had heard that he belonged to the 42d Regiment. The captive located his company in the vicinity of Ya663810 as of 6 December. Order of Battle research indicated that Worksite 5 is also known as the 66th Regiment and that the 24th Regiment is also known as the 42d Regiment. Neither unit had been contacted during Paul Revers IV and it is possible that the unit to which the captive belonged was a previously unidentified divisional support element. On the night of 6 December, the fire support base of the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, located in the vicinity of Ya656837, received five to six rounds of 82mm mortar fire.

On 9 December B Company, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry captured two NVA soldiers in the vicinity of Ya762666, who claimed to have deserted their unit, which they identified as the 3d Company, 4th Battalion, 95B Regiment. Both captives stated that when they deserted on 28 November, their company was located in the vicinity of Ya764470, but that it was moving to Lang Tung Village in the vicinity of Ya8162. According to the captives, the mission of their unit had been to ambush small friendly elements on landing zones and trails. The current unit mission was to establish Viet Cong installations in the villages of Lang Tung, Lang Nu, and Lang Mit and to set up ambushes west of Hill 772 in the vicinity of Ya8162.

Both captives denied knowledge of the current location and mission of other 4th Battalion elements. In the vicinity of Ya635719 on 9 December, B Company, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, captured one badly wounded NVA soldier who stated that he was a member of the 2d Transportation Battalion, 10th NVA Division, and that he had been separated from his unit 12 days previously after a B-52 strike. On 10 December in the vicinity of Ya626719, A Company, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry located a large village estimated to be regimental size and very recently evacuated. The village included kitchens, latrines, possible classrooms, 50 by 30 feet sleeping quarters, and underground trenches used as air raid shelters. Diggings estimated to be one day old were also found in the area. On 11 December, A Company made contact with two NVA soldiers in a village located in the vicinity of Ya607714. One NVA Lieutenant was captured, who claimed that he was assigned as a platoon leader in the 3d Company, K4 Battalion, 10th Regiment, 320th Division. According to the Lieutenant, the regimental mission was to ambush an American battalion that had landed in a landing zone in the vicinity of Ya638777 on 8 December. The prisoner also said that, as of 10 December, the regimental headquarters was located in the vicinity of Ya610770, and that its subordinate elements, the 4th, 5th, and 6th Battalions, were located in the vicinity of Ya6074, Ya6079, and Ya6082 respectively.

Analysis of all available order of battle indicated that the 10th Regiment was probably the 32d NVA Regiment. On 12 December, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry located a village of 15 huts capable of housing a
battalion in the vicinity of YA606715. The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, located a hospital area in the vicinity of YA676767 on this date. On 12 December, in the vicinity of YA643802, B Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry located a complex of 25 huts and eight bunkers comprising a 150 bed hospital with two surgical wards. Found in the complex were various medical supplies and a system by which water was piped in through bamboo poles. The area had last been used approximately two or three months earlier. In the vicinity of YA635772, on 15 December, C Company, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry located a village of 20 huts, a kitchen, a latrine and a possible 10 to 12 bed hospital. Also found were 10 incomplete huts that appeared to have been built within the last 72 hours. The large amount of military and personal equipment left in the area indicated that it had been hastily evacuated within the previous 24 hours. During this entire period, the enemy avoided significant contact throughout the area of operations. There were several indications that the majority of enemy forces had withdrawn west toward the Cambodian border and possibly into Cambodia. Indications persisted that the 33d Regiment had been disbanded, and the last contact with elements of the 88th Regiment occurred just east of the border on 2 December. Agent reports indicated that a large enemy force was concentrated in Cambodia in the vicinity of YA5550 to YA5560 and it was considered possible that this concentration included the major elements of the 88th Regiment and possibly the 33d Regiment. In the northern portion of the area of operations, the discovery of several large base and hospital areas west of the Nam Sathay River, and also the results of prisoner interrogations, gave credence to indications that the bulk of the 95b and 32d Regiments had withdrawn west toward the border. However, interrogation reports, frequent sightings and minor contacts with elements of both regiments indicated that the enemy units were divided into small groups, and that their exfiltration to the west and northwest was not well organized. During this period there was a marked increase in reports of Viet Cong activity east of the forward US combat elements, particularly along routes 509 and 19. Numerous mining incidents occurred on Route 509 between coordinates YA9245 and ZA0242 and on Route 19 between coordinates YA928260 and YA988296. These incidents indicated a possible attempt to shift attention to this area, thereby relieving the pressure caused by US forces near the border area. (See Inclosure 6 for disposition of enemy units as of 15 December.)

(7) Activity during the period 16 - 31 December: This period was one of only a few minor contacts. These contacts were probably the result of US units surprising small enemy elements that had become disoriented and detached from their parent units during withdrawal. Small scale mining and harassing incidents continued throughout the period. There was a mortar attack against the 1st Battalion,
22d Infantry Command Post, located at YA656757, on 18 December. Twenty-five to 30 rounds of 82mm mortars were fired from northwest of the command post location, but all rounds fell outside the battalion perimeter. Four NVA prisoners taken by B Company, 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 1st Air Cavalry Division (AM) on 22 December in the vicinity of YA953353 identified their parent unit as the 2d Company, 4th Battalion, 95B Regiment. They said the remainder of the 4th Battalion was located in the vicinity of YA690470. The captives also stated that they were a part of a 30 man element composed of NVA soldiers and VMC who had been operating in the area for the past 15 days. The mission of the group included laying mines, shooting helicopters, gathering rice, and spreading propaganda. According to all captives, the 2d Company broke into three groups 15 days earlier. One group was operating in the area of Pleiku, while the third group was operating to the west in the vicinity of YA7836. This tended to confirm previous indications that the 95B Regiment had not been able to withdraw intact from the Plei Djereng area after US forces were introduced in late October. It was probable that the 2d Company had been cut off from the remainder of the 4th Battalion and that it had been operating independently since that time. The enemy continued to avoid contact for the remainder of December. It became apparent that the majority of the 32d, 33d, 88th, and 95B Regiments had withdrawn into Cambodia, leaving behind a few small, scattered elements that had been cut off from their parent units. Small scale mining and harassing incidents continued, but these were attributed to the efforts of local VC/VMC, occasionally operating in concert with small groups of NVA troops whose withdrawal had been cut off. (See Inclosure 7 for disposition of enemy units at the conclusion of PAUL REVERE IV.)

c. Processing and Interrogation of NVA captives.

(1) During PAUL REVERE IV a total of 44 NVA and 34 VC prisoners were taken. In addition there were 14 returnees. An average of 56 hours elapsed from the time of capture to arrival at the Division PW Compound. The most rapid evacuation was eight hours, while the longest delay was 270 hours from time of capture to arrival at the compound. Thirteen captives were evacuated through medical channels. Of these, four died of wounds and/or diseases such as malaria and beriberi. Four captives were exploited while they were in medical channels. During the operation, experience confirmed that rapid evacuation is a necessity and that the value of information obtained from a subject shortly after his capture was far more accurate than information obtained several hours or days later. Further, captives evacuated quickly were generally more cooperative during interrogation than those whose evacuation was delayed.
(2) Observations of NVA captives: Several observations were made during the course of interrogating NVA soldiers captured during PAUL REVERE IV. These observations contributed to the improvement of interrogation techniques and provided US units with a better knowledge of the enemy forces in contact.

(a) Generally, morale among the NVA soldiers was poor. This was attributed to many conditions; however, the primary causes appeared to be an extremely high disease rate, the increasing difficulty in procuring food and supplies and a terrible fear of the B-52 bombers. Most soldiers departed North Vietnam mentally and physically fit to "liberate" South Vietnam, but even the most stalwart became uncertain of themselves after their first contact with US forces. Generally, life in South Vietnam for the NVA soldiers became a struggle for self-preservation. Malaria was the most common disease, but poor living conditions and lack of sufficient medical supplies made the NVA soldier highly susceptible to many other diseases as well. The increasing problem in obtaining adequate food supplies was apparent in the physical condition of most NVA soldiers captured.

(b) No captive interrogated limited their answers to those required by the Geneva Prisoner of War Conventions. Low morale was a contributing factor. However, more significant was an apparent lack of training. Training in conduct as a prisoner may not have been considered necessary because of the NVA practice of giving enlisted men only that information necessary to accomplish their mission.

(c) In spite of their willingness to talk, all responses were not necessarily truthful and many forms of resistance to interrogation were encountered. The most frequently encountered, and the most difficult to discern, was the tendency of several prisoners to give false information. This was often done in an attempt to make a favorable impression upon the interrogator and because of fear of mistreatment for their inability to answer questions. One Lieutenant captured stated that he had lied earlier in his interrogation because he felt that he lacked the experience that US soldiers expected of an NVA officer. In some instances, however, subjects gave false information regarding changes in organization, identification, strength and personalities only to a few key personnel.

(d) Captives were generally lacking in education. This, combined with the linguistic awkwardness of Vietnamese interpreters, frequently retarded interrogations and necessitated much cross checking of both the subjects and the interpreters.

(e) There was much evidence that training programs in North Vietnam have been shortened. Several captives recently inducted into the NVA stated that they had received only one month of
basic infantry training. More recent inductees indicated they had received no political training. This represented a sharp contrast when compared to soldiers inducted in 1956 who received up to six months infantry training and two to three months of political training.

(f) The average length of service of captives interrogated was 21 months. The shortest length of service was four months; the longest, 79 months. Two NVA soldiers questioned had been recalled to active service for the second time. The youngest captive was 18 years old; the oldest was 42 years old. The average age of NVA soldiers captured was 24.

d. Enemy Propaganda. The present collection of enemy propaganda material at this headquarters consists of 15 items. Approximately half of these items are captured documents which tend to show the enemy's psychological approach in certain areas. This lack of propaganda material may be due to the fact that the area of operations did not lend itself to the use of this type program by the enemy. Also, the pressure brought to bear by the tactical situation may have materially affected the enemy's ability to conduct propaganda operations.

(1) The majority of the documents obtained have been rather crude hand drawn or handwritten items, directed at their own personnel. The propaganda material targeted at Allied troops is split into what appears to be two primary categories; finished printing and field printing. The finished printed material appears to be done on large professional type machinery and often includes multiple colors and pictures. Several of the pictures used indicate that some of this printing may have been done out of country. The second category appears to have been done on field or portable type presses. The characteristics of poor quality paper, low grade ink, and improper spellings tend to substantiate the use of field type presses.

(2) Propaganda targeted against the Allied troops has been limited to two basic themes. The first is addressed to the undesirability of the area of operations; heat, insects, etc. The second theme is a standard attack on the administration of the US and GVN. It concentrates on individuals and allied governments as being "lackeys" of the US.

(3) The propaganda targeted at the local or civilian populace is quite limited. The themes are standard attacks on the GVN and attempt to exploit the difference in race and nationality as well as class structure.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDH-GC

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

28 January 1967

(4) The propaganda material which is targeted at their own troops, VC/NVA, is the most revealing. Great emphasis appears to be placed on drawings and symbols. Slogans of one or two words with accompanying pictures appear most often. These items usually depict great victories over the Americans, or attempt to maximize the individuals military and political training.

(5) An analysis of all the enemy propaganda revealed six interesting facts. First, based on the evidence available it appears no new themes are being employed by the Communist forces; second, symbols and slogans continue to be a prime factor in material employed on their own troops; third, adoption of some facets of the enemy's technique might aid our propaganda efforts. This would include an increased use of graphic symbols, pictures, and slogans; fourth, the enemy has poor facilities which limit his capabilities; fifth, most of their standard finished materials are old in regards to themes, and sixth, most of the enemy's propaganda was found in the rear areas rather than at the front.

e. Tactics.

(1) During OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV, NVA units generally attempted to avoid decisive engagement and, when confronted by US forces, the NVA normally broke contact and withdrew as rapidly as possible. Exceptions to this were enemy initiated contacts which were carefully planned and executed at a time and place of the enemy's choosing, although US forces may have forced some actions by threatening the enemy's base areas. Enemy attacks normally occurred during the hours of darkness and included at least a battalion size force supported by mortars. The enemy made maximum use of high speed trails and his ability to move rapidly through the jungle, thus minimizing US forces' superior fire power and aerial observation capability.

(2) Several indications were usually present when a major contact was made. The terrain in the vicinity of the impending contact generally was gently sloping with streams located within 200 meters. High speed trails were normally located in the area and there was evidence of the enemy's presence, such as footprints and cut foliage. The area was extremely quiet, containing little or no wildlife. Frequently, the smell of damp clothing could be detected. Characteristic of all enemy initiated contact was his thorough reconnaissance of the area and detailed planning of his use of the terrain.

(3) Small enemy reconnaissance elements were employed to follow US forces into overnight bivouac areas. These elements thoroughly reconnoitered the area, carefully locating all defensive positions
and cutting wires to trip flares and claymore mines. The reconnaissance completed, the party then returned to its parent unit, making the return route to friendly positions as it withdrew. Telephone wire was frequently laid for this purpose. The attacking enemy force, usually a battalion, would return to the position following the marked route. Enemy mortars were emplaced as close as possible to friendly positions, and every attempt was made to infiltrate personnel inside friendly defensive concentrations prior to launching the attack. The attacks were well planned, controlled and coordinated, and rigid fire discipline was maintained. Control was exercised by using pin point flashlights that had the appearance of fireflies from a distance. Enemy troops were on line and advancing in an orderly manner when first sighted by friendly listening posts. Enemy troops did not fire until ordered to do so, and all firing ceased immediately when ordered. Following an attack, the enemy withdrawal was well organized and executed. He normally left rear elements behind to maintain contact and to delay friendly pursuit.

(4) During OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV landing zones were favorite targets of NVA battalions and larger size units. These units concentrated on locating potential landing zones, usually areas from 300 to 1000 meters in diameter. Once an LZ was selected as a target, two infantry companies prepared positions in a semi-circular pattern approximately one hour’s walk from the LZ. The third infantry company was positioned approximately two hours distance from the LZ, behind the first two companies, for reinforcement. The weapons company was usually located on a hill approximately one and one-half hour’s distance from the LZ. The battalion headquarters was usually positioned on another hill about three hours from the LZ. This deployment was sometimes altered by locating the battalion headquarters between the first two companies and the third company and by positioning the weapons company between the battalion command post and the rear company. This formation afforded greater flexibility and permitted one battalion to cover more than one landing zone. LZ’s were observed either from the location of the weapons company or by observers stationed in close proximity to the LZ’s. When aircraft were observed approaching the LZ, the battalion commander was notified and, upon his order, the attack commenced. The two attacking infantry companies moved toward the LZ along their prepared trails. Meanwhile, unarmed helicopters were allowed to land and dismount personnel. When 12.7mm AA guns were available, they were employed against supporting gunships from well camouflaged, bunkered positions, while 82mm mortars were then employed against personnel in the LZ. In situations where 12.7mm AA guns were not available to the enemy, all helicopters were allowed to depart the LZ prior to the commencement of the attack. The two attacking companies normally deployed into previously prepared positions
in a semi-circle around the LZ while the third company remained in reserve and was not committed in the assault unless one of the two attacking companies received too much pressure from US troops. The assault usually continued for 20 to 30 minutes after which the enemy withdrew along different routes from the side of the LZ opposite that of the attack. This was done in an effort to avoid US artillery fire. The NVA normally attempted to attack large landing zones so that if the attack failed, there would be adequate time to withdraw and deploy into ambush sites along likely routes that friendly forces might use in exiting the LZ.

(5) Throughout PAUL REVERE IV the enemy employed several variations of the ambush tactic, ranging from platoon to battalion size. Ambush sites were usually established along trails. In a battalion size ambush, two companies normally blocked off a section of a trail while the third company attacked on order of the battalion commander. Company ambushes were frequently set up on trails leading into narrow valleys two to three kilometers from a known LZ. Friendly units exiting the LZ were taken under fire by a squad or larger unit. Expecting US troops to pursue, the enemy would withdraw and lead them into the prepared ambush site. In another variation, a company might remain in an ambush site for two or three days waiting for a US unit to enter the position. In this situation, the entire unit was allowed to enter the position before the ambush began. One of the techniques used in establishing an ambush was to deploy the three platoons of a company in a half moon formation on the side of a hill. Observers located in trees on the lower slope of the hill were used to detect advancing friendly troops and to notify the company commander. Although there was a pre-planned signal to open fire, the platoon nearest the advancing element usually opened fire at a distance of 30 to 40 meters. Ideally, the platoon in the center of the half moon formation remained dug in while the other two platoons moved in a semi-circle to the flanks of the unit being ambushed. In the event the unit being ambushed was larger that the ambush force, the enemy either withdrew to a prearranged assembly area approximately 1000 meters from the ambush site or called battalion headquarters for reinforcement. In the event that the ambush force was larger, it would pursue and attempt to capture or kill the withdrawing friendly unit.

(6) Normally NVA units moved during the hours of darkness from 1800-0600 hours. Advance reconnaissance parties preceded the unit and acted as advance guards. The party frequently included local Viet Cong who acted as guides through their own area. When crossing a main route, security elements, frequently local Viet Cong, were placed 500-1000 meters to each flank. When trail watchers were
not already in position, security elements were also located at defiles, saddles or ridge lines and other good vantage points. (See Inclosure 8 for schematic sketches of enemy tactics)

f. Base areas and Bivouac areas. Within the area of operations of PAUL REVERE IV several NVA bivouac and base areas were located. These areas evidenced careful planning in their preparation and indicated that the NVA was thoroughly familiar with the areas selected. Base camps were normally located adjacent to secondary trails from 50 to 100 meters off a high speed trail. The secondary trails normally ran through brush choked draws and paralleled streams. The camps normally did not extend more than 100 to 200 meters from the stream, although a few major complexes were discovered on higher ground. NVA base areas were located contiguous to areas of dense jungle and were situated so that they were not visible from the air. Camps were planned so that each soldier had an individual area consisting of two trees from which to suspend his hammock, and a bamboo pole secured between the trees over which he draped his poncho. At one end of the area was a bamboo stand for individual equipment and at the other end was a prone shelter. Base area construction utilized many logs usually three to four inches in diameter, but there was never evidence that the logs had been cut in the immediate vicinity. Trees were removed from the surrounding jungle and were cut at ground level with a machete type tool. Great care was exercised to avoid disturbing the natural vegetation. The usual layout included latrines and kitchens, and several areas included a hospital. They were organized in an orderly manner and were well policed, reflecting a high state of discipline among the resident troops. Base camps were well defended and normally included two types of bunkers. Located inside the perimeter were protective shelters with overhead covers thick enough to provide protection from artillery and air fires. Firing bunkers were located toward the outer edges of the perimeter. Spider holes accommodating small security forces were located in heavy vegetation 20 to 30 meters off trails serving as entrances and exits to the area.

Fields of fire were constructed so that detection was virtually impossible. Most base camps discovered did not contain enough bunkers to protect all personnel in the area, but there was normally sufficient wood stockpiled to have completed these bunkers had more time been available. Early warning was provided by the small security force which was emplaced at the entrance in such a way that an approaching enemy force would be canalized. After taking the approaching force under fire, the security force began a delaying action, while the main body moved out rapidly to another area over previously selected, covered routes. Meanwhile, the stay behind elements broke contact with the attacking force and disappeared into the jungle (See Inclosure 9 for schematics of NVA base areas and fortified positions).
g. Trail network in the area of operations. The Paul Revere IV area of operation was located with an extensive trail network known to the NVA/VC as the "como-liaison" route. Most trails located were well established and gave evidence of frequent use. Trails were normally about one-half meter wide. However, six large, high-speed trails of two meters in width and running generally north and south were located in the area of operations. Aerial observation of the majority of the trail system was severely limited by the double canopy jungle characteristic of the area.

h. Terrain.

(1) Relief and Drainage: The area of operations was situated on a moderately dissected plateau except for the northwest quarter where the terrain was rugged and mountainous. Several large hill masses and a few isolated volcanic cones loomed above the plateau. The Chu Pong (YV8899) and the Chu Goungot (YA7732) hill masses were located on the southwest edge of the area near the Cambodian border. Four other large hill masses were located in the southern third of the region in the vicinity of Phu Mo, one at ZV1283, the Chu Don at ZV2394 and the Chu Go at ZA2207. Relief near the hill masses averaged 300 meters. Other than the hill masses where slopes were greater than 14 percent, the plateau could be divided into a northeastern half of falling plains with local relief less than 150 meters and slopes of 6 to 15 percent, and a southwestern half of relatively level plains of minimal relief and slopes not greater than five percent. The mountainous northwest quarter of the area, where the majority of activity occurred during the operation, had a maximum relief of 1200 meters and a north-south alignment. The terrain was extremely rugged and contained many steep-walled valleys and ravines. Principal drainage was provided by the Ia Drang, So San and Nam Sethay Rivers. The Ia Drang and its tributaries have an overall northeast to southwest flow off the higher northeastern part of the plateau. The So San River flows northeast to southwest and the Nam Sethay River flows from north to south. Both drain the mountainous terrain in the northwestern portion of the area of operations and their tributaries follow the north-south alignment of the mountains.

(2) Vegetation: The area consisted of open plains, open forests, plains and dense forests. In the open plains, which occupy most of the eastern half of the region, grass, cultivated land, and this scrub were predominant, although there were a few forested areas. The southwestern quarter consisted of open forest plains with closely spaced trees and scattered clear areas; however, the hill masses were covered by a dense forest containing a thick undergrowth. The rugged, mountainous terrain in the northwestern portion of the area was covered by a dense broadleaf ever-green forest with double canopy jungle prevailing throughout the area. The tallest trees ranged from 20 to 25 meters in height and in a
few cases reached to 45 meters. The trees were straight, commonly butt-roseed, unbranched to great heights, and intertwined with woody vines. Undergrowth of evergreen shrubs, vines, herbs, bamboo and savanna was dense and up to three meters in height.

(3) Surface materials: The predominant soil was red to locally black silty clay. The silty clay ranged from three to 30 meters thick over bedrock. Stream bottoms were strewn with rocks and gravel and offered good trafficability to foot troops.

(4) Military aspects of the terrain.

(a) Observation and Fields of Fire: Observation and fields of fire were good in the open plains, but were severely reduced in the open forest plains. In the vicinity of hill masses and in the mountainous terrain to the northwest, the dense vegetation greatly reduced aerial observation capabilities. Terrain irregularities, dense forest and undergrowth hindered ground observation. The hills and mountains restricted fields of fire for flat trajectory weapons, and the dense undergrowth deflected small arms fire. Additionally, vegetation and terrain irregularities limited target acquisition and adjustment of fire for high angle fire weapons.

(b) Cover and Concealment: Overhead cover was generally poor because of the absence of natural caves in the area; however, cover from flat trajectory fire was good over most of the area because of the numerous valleys and the relatively steep stream embankments. The extremely rugged terrain in the northwest provided excellent cover from flat trajectory weapons. The dense vegetation in that area also reduced the blast and shrapnel effect of exploding bombs and shells and gave limited protection from small arms fire. Concealment was fair to poor in the relatively open eastern half of the area; however the dense vegetation provided excellent concealment in the northwest portion of the area.

(c) Obstacles: The steep slopes, irregular surfaces and dense forests of the mountainous terrain covering much of the area prohibited vehicular movement and hindered foot movement. Vehicular movement was restricted to the few roads in the area except in the eastern and southeastern portions where tracked vehicles operated with relative ease. The major obstacles were the So San and Non Sathay Rivers which formed barriers to east-west travel.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDH-GC

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

(d) Key Terrain Features: The Chu Prong and Chu Kan mountains in the northwest portion of the area were two key features overlooking Route 509, the only surface link between Pleiku City and Plei Djereng. In southwestern Kontum Province the key terrain feature was the area in the vicinity of Hill 1282 which dominated the Plei Trap Valley.

(e) Avenues of Approach: There were several avenues of approach into the area. These were from the northwest along Route 14; from the southwest along the many tributaries of the Ia Drang River; from the west along Route 509; from the north down the corridors between the mountain ranges. Excellent avenues of approach into the northwestern part of the area were the Nam Sathay River Valley and many trails leading from Cambodia into Vietnam used as infiltration routes.

1. Weather: The weather throughout the area of operations was good with only small amounts of precipitation in the form of afternoon showers. Cloud cover was generally at two levels: 10,000 feet and 25,000 feet. Morning fog formed occasionally in the deep valleys and along streambeds, but burned off rapidly after sunrise. Surface winds were light and variable at night, prevailing from north/northwest at 10 to 15 knots during the day. On several occasions winds in excess of 30 knots hindered aerial operations.

9. (C) MISSION: Commencing 181000 October 1966, 4th Infantry Division conducts search and destroy operations in PAUL REVERE IV area of operation. Within this broad mission statement there were several deduced missions. One of these was the securing, improving and building of vital roads in the AO. Another was the varied civil action programs necessary to insure complete control in the AO. Also the exploitation of the B-52 bomber strikes was required, or desired, in orienting the direction of search and destroy operations.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: The initial concept of operation was for the 4th Infantry Division, commencing at 1000 hours 18 October 1966, to conduct surveillance along the Cambodian border and conduct reconnaissance in strength in the area east of the border. When possible, division units were to conduct spoiling attacks on VC/NVA forces. The initial phase of PAUL REVERE IV involved crossing the Se San River to exploit B-52 bomber strikes and to gain contact with the enemy. After establishing contact it was necessary to commit units west of the Nam Sathay River in an attempt to intercept the enemy who was withdrawing to the west. When contacts with the enemy developed, increased artillery and close air support fires were utilized and several B-52 strikes were placed on locations of known enemy concentrations. The use of heavy artillery, tactical air, and the B-52 bomber strikes were significant factors in the
success of the division. The rugged terrain and extensive, well dug-in enemy positions would have caused a great increase in casualties if this tremendous fire support had not been used. Resupply of the forward units made it very important to keep Highway 509 open to Plei Djereng. Wheeled vehicles were used to transport the heavy volume of supplies to Plei Djereng which was the forward supply base for the brigades. It was then necessary to use helicopters to resupply the infantry units operating in the dense jungle to the north and west of Plei Djereng. By transporting supplies as far forward as possible by road, maximum use was made of the limited airmobile assets of the division.

11. (C) EXECUTION:
   a. General.

(1) OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV was initiated by the 4th Infantry Division effective 183000H October 1966, with the publication of OPORD 12-66. At this time the Division assumed operational control of the following units:

   3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division
   2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
   A (-), B, and C Batteries, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery
   A and C Batteries, 3d Battalion, 35th Artillery
   A Battery, 1st Battalion, 36th Artillery
   AN/MPX-4 Detachment, 129th Artillery
   Platoon (-), B Battery, 29th Artillery (Searchlight)

   The 1st Battalion, 69th Armor was attached to 4th Infantry Division effective 18 October 1966.

(2) PAUL REVERE IV can be viewed as occurring in four time phases (See Inclosure 10).

   (a) Phase one was from 18 October through 29 October. During this phase four battalions conducted search and destroy operations in the mountainous areas north-northwest of Plei Djereng while two battalions conducted security and patrolling operations in the area between Duc Co and Plei Djereng.

   (b) Phase two began on 30 October and lasted until 2 December. It was during this period that maximum effort was made to locate and destroy NVA units in the AO. Five battalions plus a CIDG Task Force were committed to search and destroy operations north and west of the Se San River to the Cambodian border.
AVDHE-GG


(c) Phase three of the operation began on 3 December and lasted until 15 December. This period was characterized by light, sporadic contacts while division units maneuvered by foot and helicopter to locate and destroy NVA units exfiltrating toward Cambodia. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division was deployed by IFFV to the north of the 4th Division in a further attempt to block the withdrawing enemy forces.

(d) Phase four was a period of search and destroy missions in coordination with ARVN units. These operations started on 16 December and were conducted north and west of Pleiku.

b. Phase one of PAUL REVERE IV began when the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry (minus B Company) returned to the operational control of 2d Brigade and assumed the mission of highway security along Highway 509. The 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry had been under the OCPON of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division conducting rice harvest security missions in the Tuy Hoa area. The 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry was located at ZA08223 and 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry was located at X192537. The 2d Brigade was assigned a new area of operations in the northern portion of the PAUL REVERE IV area and moved its tactical command post to Ploi Dochi (Y932455) on 22 October, adjacent to the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division.

(1) On 18 October the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division command post displaced from Gatoeka (Z42034) to its permanent base camp vicinity AR794525. Elements of the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry remained at Gatoeka, C Battery, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery airlifted to landing zone 3G (Y865455). The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry with A Battery, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery conducted search and destroy operations in vicinities ZA1040 and ZA1050 with the command post located at ZA186499. The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry operating vicinity Y871455, huffed B Company across the Ia Grai River to vicinity Y904483. The 1st Battalion, 69th Armor (-) returned to 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division base camp.

(2) The Division continued operation PAUL REVERE IV on 19 and 20 October. Light contact was made by the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry on the 19th which resulted in two NVA soldiers KIA vicinity X920520 and numerous items of equipment captured.

(3) On 21 October the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division closed into a new forward command post at X1366465.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDH-GC
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

28 January 1967

(a) Light contact was made by the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry in the vicinity L6924521. One NVA soldier was KIA and two AK-47 rifles and eight 82mm mortar rounds were captured.

(b) The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry also established light contact vicinity L6825610 with an estimated two NVA platoons. Results were one US soldier KIA and two enemy radios captured. At 1825 hours, the 3d Platoon, A Company, made contact with an estimated 20 - 25 enemy in the same vicinity. They observed two NVA soldiers who appeared to be coming forward to surrender. Both had their arms held upward and neither was carrying a weapon. At this time other enemy troops began firing and the two NVA soldiers turned and fled. A vicious fire fight ensued. It is estimated that the enemy had two to four automatic weapons which fired from the east and west. This contact lasted about one hour. The 3d platoon called in artillery and mortar fire support. Also an AC-47 "SPOOKY" aircraft was on the scene and provided further fire support. Four enemy were WIA and one US was KIA. The enemy force was believed to be either a security or stay-behind element. A sweep of the battle area revealed a base camp area with 100 foxholes estimated to be two to three days old. No blood pools, trails, or tracks were found, all traces having been effectively removed by a heavy rain during the night.

(c) On 22 October, the 2d Brigade closed into a forward command post at L6862455. On 23 October 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division had light contacts as follows:

(a) The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry destroyed 2500 pounds of rice and seven huts in the vicinity L860615. The Recon Platoon and a CIDG Company from Phoi Djerong (TF MC DONELL) made contact with approximately 15 enemy in vicinity L884840 which resulted in two NVA soldiers KIA and one captured. This action was a meeting engagement with an enemy force composed of NVA, VC and NLF. The action was initiated by the CIDG element. The enemy element returned the fire and fled into caves near the scene of the action. It was necessary to use hand grenades and tear gas to clear the caves.

(b) The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry also had contacts while conducting search and destroy operations at L928560, L933559, and L9931532. Results were one US KIA and 14 US WIA. Enemy losses were 16 NVA soldiers KIA and two captured. Six small arms, 350 rounds of small arms ammunition, four 82mm mortar rounds, and numerous items of equipment were also captured. Eight huts and one bunker were destroyed.

(c) Also on 23 October, the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry air-assaulted into landing zones north of the So San River vicinity L767517 and began search and destroy operations to the northwest.
(5) On 24 October, 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division had light contact when the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry located an unknown size enemy force vicinity L.923564. Results of the ensuing engagement were five NVA soldiers KIA and the capture of one light machine gun with some ammunition and five pieces of web gear.

(a) The 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry air-assaulted north of the Se San River vicinity Y4718472 to begin search and destroy operations to the northwest.

(b) The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry (+) continued search and destroy missions in their assigned area of operation. At 1436 hours, the 1st Platoon, A Company, engaged an estimated NVA squad vicinity L.785598. The enemy returned the fire and fled north. In the meantime, the 2d and 3d Platoons of A Company, which were patrolling to the north and east, attempted to seal off the enemy withdrawal routes by moving to the scene of action; however, no further contact was made. There were no US casualties and no known NVA casualties.

(6) The 2d Brigade had light contact on 25 October. The 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, while conducting search and destroy operations, contacted three Viet Cong vicinity L.758598. Results were two VC KIA and one captured. Also on 25 October a platoon of C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry, while enroute to assess results of an air strike, hit three mines in the vicinity L.899409. US losses were four KIA, eight WIA, two tanks damaged, and one APC destroyed.

(7) On 26 October, 4th Infantry Division continued OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV with negative contact.

(8) The night of 27 October marked the first significant enemy attack of OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV. A Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry was attacked vicinity L.725540 at 0005 hours by an estimated NVA battalion. The enemy utilized mortars, small arms and automatic weapons. There was an estimated 25 to 50 automatic and semi-automatic weapons which fired 1000 to 1500 rounds during the two hour battle. Initial fire consisted of bursts of 30 to 60 rounds per weapon followed by a six to 10 second lull before firing started again at a reduced rate. Approximately 20 to 30 mortar rounds were also received by the unit. The enemy attack was conducted against three sides of the company's night defensive perimeter. The enemy initiated the attack 20 to 50 meters from the friendly perimeter. Approximately 75 percent of the A Company soldiers were engaged. The enemy force consisted of a battalion (200-300 men) from the 32d NVA Regiment, as confirmed by a POW report. Artillery and air support were called and the enemy broke contact at 0200 hours, withdrawing to the northwest.
Artillery and air strikes were continued to deny avenues of withdrawal throughout the remaining hours of darkness. Friendly losses from this battle were three WIA and one PRC 25 radio captured by the enemy. Enemy losses were 21 KIA and three captured.

(a) At 0810 hours, B Company, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry had light contact just north of their command post in the vicinity of YA859597. Results of the action were:

1 US KIA  
1 US WIA  
6 NVA KIA  
1 NVA WIA.

(b) Task Force MC DONNELL (Reconnaissance Platoon 2d Battalion, 35 Infantry and one CIDG company) exchanged CIDG Companies, the 273d for the 276th. The exchange was accomplished by helicopter. On completion of the exchanges, Task Force MC DONNELL searched east and west in the north central sector of the area of operation (CU DOR hill) without enemy contact.

(9) The only significant contact on 28 October was made by the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry. The C Company position, consisting of two rifle platoons and the company command group in the vicinity YA770594, was attacked by two enemy companies (180 men) from the NVA 2K Battalion, 95B Regiment. Contact started at 1805 hours, approximately one hour after C Company occupied the position. The NVA unit moved to within 25 to 30 meters of the perimeter before initiating the attack. The concentrated enemy fire lasted 25 to 30 minutes with 10 to 15 weapons firing simultaneously. Approximately 15 to 20 hand grenades and 10 rifle grenades were employed against the perimeter. The initial firing and assault was made against the northeastern section of the perimeter, with two or three enemy firing automatic fire from position almost due north. Within five minutes, however, a significant number of the enemy were on line and firing on the entire northeastern and eastern portions of the friendly perimeter, as well as a portion of the southeastern side. Within 10 minutes, the defensive perimeter was receiving fire from every direction except southwest. Five minutes later, fire was being received from all directions. At the time of the initial firing, the 2d platoon was on the east and the 1st platoon on the west. Approximately one-third of the men were in their positions digging, and the rest were seated beside their foxholes eating the evening meal or involved in accomplishing miscellaneous tasks. The daylight security outposts were just entering the perimeter and the night listening posts were in the process of moving out to their locations. A water party also was entering the perimeter when the initial enemy burst was fired. The water party was returning
from a nearby creek, having skirted the east of the open area north of the perimeter. When they were approximately 50 meters from the perimeter, the last one or two men noticed a fleeting, shadowy movement to their right rear on the southwest side of the open area. The water party believed the movement might have been the friendly LP going into position. The slightly hurried manner in which the water party then continued to the perimeter may have caused one element of the NVA force to open fire prematurely before all their elements could move into position for a coordinated attack. Almost simultaneously with the initial burst of enemy automatic weapons fire, the left machine gun of the 2d platoon commenced firing. Within five seconds of the initial enemy burst, outgoing fire was three times as heavy as incoming fire. M79 grenadiers were firing heavily using both HE and shot rounds. The heaviest outgoing fire was in the 2d Platoon area where firing continued for approximately 20 minutes. From approximately 1850 to 1915 hours, the enemy made repeated heavy assaults against the 2d platoon sector. Enemy fire consisted primarily of short automatic bursts. Spread over a distance of approximately 50 meters and with 10 to 15 men firing at a time, the enemy advanced, dropped back, and then advanced again. At times, the enemy moved to positions as close as five to 10 meters from the perimeter. During approximately the last five minutes of intense enemy fire, the attacking elements seemed to form a line and from the prone position or from behind trees or irregularities in the ground, simply poured heavy fire into the perimeter. As the charging attacks slowed down in the 2d platoon area, a number of small rushes were made against the 1st platoon sector. The first assault was made astride the trail from the northwest against the MG position in that sector. The enemy came within 10 to 15 meters of the perimeter before being forced to fall back. About five minutes later, the other MG position of the 1st platoon was assaulted astride the trail from the southeast. Again the enemy was repelled by fire. By this time (approximately 20 minutes after the initial enemy burst) artillery began to fall close to the enemy on the east, the intensity of the attacks in that area decreased considerably until after 1915 hours when enemy activity degenerated to a "lie on the ground, shoot, and throw grenades" effort. The enemy had used fire and movement effectively. Also, he had used stealth to crawl to positions very close to the friendly perimeter. In these instances, men armed with shotguns proved to be extremely effective. At this juncture (approximately 1930 hours) after the action in the 2d platoon area had diminished, a third enemy assault was made from the southwest. The brunt of this attack fell on the 1st platoon. As in the case of the other two assaults on the 1st platoon positions, the NVA threw a large number of hand grenades followed by a rapid charge using assault type fire. The adeptness of the 1st platoon machine gunners broke up this attack as long bursts of fire were placed across the
front of the friendly positions forcing the enemy to withdraw. About fifteen minutes later, a final assault was made against the right flank of the 1st platoon. The attack, which again featured a hand grenade prelude, was repulsed by machine gun and small arms fire. From this time (1950 hours) until contact was broken completely, the enemy fired at the perimeter from approximately 50 meters range, threw hand grenades, and fired M79 type grenade launchers. A few minor attacks consisting of only four to five men were made against the 2d platoon sector and were relatively easily repulsed. Action of this type continued until approximately 2000 hours when a red star cluster was fired to the northeast of the perimeter. Upon firing the cluster, an NVA officer, apparently disoriented, ran into the north corner of the perimeter, was pulled into a hole and killed in hand to hand combat. However, it was apparent that the enemy was withdrawing and by 2100 hours fire into the perimeter had ceased. During the entire action, the enemy used grenades to the maximum. The M79 type rounds he used proved to be extremely effective, inflicting nine of the 13 friendly casualties. Many of the enemy rounds had burst on the edge of the friendly positions. There were also a number of tree bursts. In any event, the enemy gunners seemed to be well trained. At 2100 hours, friendly casualties were two KIA and 11 WIA. Two men had been hit in the first exchanges of fire, the others accumulated as the fighting progressed. As contact was considered to be broken, aerial evacuation was requested for the more seriously wounded. At 2213 hours, a USAF "HUSKY" medevac helicopter arrived in the area to extract three seriously wounded men by winch through the heavy tree canopy. At approximately 2237 hours, just as the three wounded had been loaded aboard the aircraft an enemy rocket was fired from southeast of the perimeter. It struck the helicopter, causing it to crash inside the perimeter. The ship was burning as it came down. The three wounded men were killed, either by rocket or the crash itself. The pilot and co-pilot were both injured, however, the men of C Company were able to chop into the aircraft and get them out before the fuel caught fire. One man was pinned inside the wreckage. Although numerous attempts were made to get him out by cutting into the ship, the fuel ignited and the ship was engulfed in flames before he could be saved. This incident raised the KIA total to five. During the time that the helicopter was hovering overhead, the men on the perimeter fired whenever they detected movement or noise. Seeing and hearing was extremely difficult because of the noise of the helicopter and the light generated by its floodlights. Thus, the outgoing suppressive fires, while not continuous, were considerable during the entire period of time taken by the extraction effort. From the time the medevac helicopter crashed until 0630 hours the following morning, there were movements of individuals detected around the perimeter; however, no further attacks were made. The individuals moving about were engaged to prevent them from policing the battlefield, and artillery fire was brought in continuously for the same purpose. The sweeps
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDH-GC

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

of the area in the morning found seven NVA soldiers KIA. One enemy 
WIA was captured. There were 11 small arms weapons found near the 
scene of action. At 0815 hours, a second USAF "HUSKY" medevac helicopter 
returned to the area and evacuated the pilot, co-pilot, and some of the 
C Company wounded. That afternoon, men with relatively minor wounds were 
evacuated by UH-1D helicopters after an LZ had been cut in the clearing 
to the northeast. Total casualty figures for this action were US, 5 KIA, 
8 WIA, NVA, 19 KIA, 1 PW.

(a) Also on 28 October the Recon Platoon, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry and a CIDG Company from Plei Djereng Special Forces 
Camp discovered an ammunition cache vicinity of YA 825625 containing 53 
82mm mortar rounds.

(b) 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry continued operations on 28 October along the Bolam River towards Ya Krong with light contacts 
resulting in seven NVA soldiers KIA.

(c) 2d Brigade main command post and trains moved on 
28 October from Oasis (Z417275) and joined the tactical command post at 
Plei Dochi (4X62155).

(10) On 29 October the 4th Infantry Division continued oper-
ations in the PAUL REVERE IV area with heavy contact reported by the 2d 
Battalion, 8th Infantry, and light contacts by other units.

(a) The contacts made by the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry 
consisted of two separate attacks against company perimeters. B 
Company was attacked by an estimated battalion and C Company was attacked 
by an estimated company. In each case the enemy concentrated his efforts 
on a particular sector of the companies' perimeters in attempting to gain 
a penetration.

1. B Company underwent a coordinated mortar and 
ground attack vicinity YA690514. Initial small arms fire was of high volume 
followed by a sustained rate of 10 to 20 rounds per minute for the duration 
of the attack. The enemy was estimated to have used 15 automatic weapons 
in addition to small arms in each assault. There was approximately 4000 
to 5000 rounds fired by the enemy during each assault of two to five min-
utes. About 50 rounds of 82mm mortar were received at the start of the 
attack on the north and west portion of the perimeter. Initial contact 
by the enemy was established with a listening post at a distance of 25 
meters approximately 75 meters outside the perimeter in the 4th Platoon 
sector. Further assaults were launched from 50 to 75 meters from the 
perimeter. It was estimated that the enemy force was an NVA battalion of 
the 33d NVA Regiment. One UH-1D helicopter was destroyed by enemy fire 
as it was attempting to bring in ammunition during the last stage of the 
engagement.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDH-CC

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (CAS: MACV J3-32)

28 January 1967

2. C Company fought off a persistent ground attack vicinity YA675515. The fight started at 0250 hours and lasted until 1030 hours. Initially the enemy fired bursts of 30 to 60 rounds followed by a 20 second lull. Then the firing would resume at a sustained rate for two to five minutes as the enemy assaulted the company position. There was a series of seven enemy assaults on the company's night position. Initial contact was 25 meters from the listening post located 75 meters outside the perimeter. Approximately 50 percent of the unit was engaged on each assault. According to a PW the enemy force consisted of an estimated reinforced rifle company of the 1st Battalion, 33d NVA Regiment.

(b) The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry with a CIDG Company had light sporadic contact throughout the 29th in the vicinity of YA830627. At 290100 October, a USAF FAC reported sighting ground fire to the west of C Company's 3d Platoon. The suspected enemy target was taken under fire by a USAF AC 147 "SPOKY" aircraft with unknown results. At 0715, the FAC reported receiving heavy caliber automatic ground fire from east of the C Company perimeter. An air strike was brought in at 0723 hours but no results were observed. At 1130 hours, while C Company's 3d Platoon was moving to link up with its parent unit, the platoon engaged two to three NVA vicinity YA765595. The brief encounter resulted in two NVA soldiers KIA. There were no US casualties. Meanwhile, A Company had started moving west toward C Company to place the two units in a better mutually supporting position. At 1220 hours, A Company's point man captured one NVA soldier vicinity YA775525 without a shot being fired. At about 1330 hours, A Company began receiving sporadic enemy sniper fire vicinity YA773594. The company searched out the area and at 1356 hours, reported killing one NVA soldier.

(c) In a separate action at 1250 hours, Task Force MC DONELL reported that one of the CIDG platoons had engaged an estimated squad size NVA force vicinity YA830627 resulting in one NVA KIA. Contact was broken at about 1320 hours. Artillery fire and a USAF fighter strike were called in to harass the fleeing enemy force. At about 1123 hours, contact was re-established resulting in two more NVA soldiers KIA.

(d) From about 2225 to 2235 hours, on the 29th, the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry command post was the target of an enemy mortar attack. An estimated 35 rounds of 82mm mortar fire landed along the northern and southern flanks of the perimeter, moving from west to east. No one was injured. Countermortar fire was placed on the suspected enemy mortar site with unknown results.

(e) Total losses for US forces for 29 October were 10 KIA, 43 WIA, and one UH-1D helicopter destroyed. Enemy losses for
28 January 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

29 October were 51 NVA soldiers KIA by body count, three NVA captured, and 11 small arms, three crew served weapons, 99 rounds mortar ammunition, and 40 rounds of rocket launcher ammunition captured.

c. The second phase of PAUL REVERE IV started on 30 October with the 4th Infantry Division continuing operations in the PAUL REVERE IV area.

1. Operations on 30 October were highlighted by the airlift of 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry across the Se San River to fill the gap between 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry and 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry. This made a total of five battalions committed in the mountainous region to the north-northwest and west of Plei Djereng. At about 1030 hours on the 30th a UH-1D helicopter of the 155th Aviation Company, 52d Aviation Battalion, was shot down by an enemy automatic weapon located vicinity YA831610. The aircraft crashed vicinity YA831608 killing the four crew members. Gun ships of the 52d Aviation Battalion fired into the area from which the enemy fire was reported to have come and a USAF air strike was put into the same area. Task Force MC DONNELL commenced a 2500 meter forced march to the helicopter crash site and recovered the bodies. The next day, Task Force MC DONNELL searched for the enemy automatic weapon position without positive results.

(a) At 301031 October, C Company, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry engaged a small enemy force of undetermined size vicinity YA 768608 with negative results.

(b) The 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, moved from the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division base camp to assume the mission of road security in the PAUL REVERE IV area of operations.

(c) The 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 1st Air Cavalry Division (AM) closed into New Pleiku at 292315 October. They were under the operational control of 4th Infantry Division, and moved on the 30th to the Oasis to assume the mission of the division reserve/reaction force.

2. The 4th Infantry Division continued OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV on 31 October with four battalions north and west of the Se San River, one battalion northeast of Plei Djereng, and one battalion as division reserve. There was no significant contact during the day. The 2d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division (AM) assumed responsibility of the southern portion of the PAUL REVERE IV area of operation on 31 October at 1830 hours, concurrently assuming operational control of 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDH-GC

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

26 January 1967

(a) The only action reported by 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry on 31 October was when one NVA soldier turned himself in with a "Safe Conduct Pass".

(b) 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry had four minor contacts while conducting patrols and reported one NVA soldier KIA. At 1242 hours, vicinity YA766621, A Company's 2d Platoon observed an estimated 50 NVA approximately 175 meters to its front. The 2d Platoon opened fire and assaulted on line. The enemy turned and fled north. With the support of gun ships and artillery, the 2d platoon attempted to seal off the enemy's route of withdrawal; however, contact was not regained as the enemy took full advantage of a previously prepared trail network.

(3) The first two days of November involved the positioning of troops. On 1 November there were four battalions north and west of the Se San River with one battalion northeast of Plei Djereng and one battalion (-) as division reserve. Light contact was experienced on 1 November in the northern portion of the division area of operations. In the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry area, A Company engaged a small NVA force vicinity YA781619. The enemy broke contact almost immediately. The brief encounter resulted in one NVA KIA. The battalion recon platoon found one rocket launcher, one SKS, and several hand grenades. There was no other enemy contact during the day.

(4) On 2 November there was no significant contact. The 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry was heli-lifted west of the Se San River to YA704515. At this time the division had five battalions north and west of the Se San River with one battalion northeast of Plei Djereng as division reserve.

(5) On 3 November search and destroy operations continued without significant contact.

(a) The 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry moved its two forward companies westward toward the Nam Sathay River in the vicinity of YA668507.

(b) The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry was airlifted to landing zone 502E located at YA782584 to establish a fire support base.

(6) Search and destroy operations continued on 4 November with five battalions north and west of the Se San River and one battalion as division reserve.
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RG: MACV J3-32)

(a) The 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry reached the Nam Sathay River and established a fire support base at YA648513.

(b) The 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry moved two companies north to positions at YA724545 and YA718547.

(c) The 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry positioned two companies at YA700539 and YA688528.

(d) The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry airlifted one company with 4.2 inch mortars to YA770593, landing zone 502E. The Recon Platoon made contact with an estimated 40 NVA at YA745565. Results were one US KIA and five US WIA with enemy losses of 12 NVA KIA, 30 packs and miscellaneous documents captured, and approximately three tons of rice destroyed.

(e) The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry had a light contact with three VMC at YA807625 which resulted in one VMC KIA.

(f) A tank from the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, while on a route security mission, hit a mine at YA750222 causing a slight damage to the tank.

(7) Operations continued on 5 November with the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry airlifting its fire support base to join the remainder of the battalion at YA648505. The division continued search and destroy operations to the north with five battalions between the Nam Sathay and Se San/Ya Krong Bo'lah Rivers. A Company, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry made contact with an estimated two platoons of NVA at 0935 hours in the vicinity of YA700532. The enemy initiated fire from prepared positions against advancing friendly troops. This was considered to be part of a delaying action. The volume of fire seemed to be five to seven automatic weapons firing initial bursts of 30 to 60 rounds, expending a total of about 900 rounds followed by a 15 to 20 minute lull. Fire was resumed by the enemy at a sustained rate of eight to 10 rounds per minute. When the firing started about 25 percent of the friendly troops were within 25 to 50 meters of the enemy position. Results of this engagement were three US KIA, eight US WIA and six NVA KIA.

(8) The 4th Infantry Division (-) continued to the north on 6 November in the area generally bounded by the Nam Sathay and Se San/Ya Krong Bo'lah Rivers. A and C Companies of 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry were moved west of the Nam Sathay River. B Company, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, which was the division reserve, was airlifted into the area of operation to secure a fire support base at YA765495.
AVDDH-6C
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MGV J3-32)

(9) Operations continued on 7 November with one significant incident. At 1900 hours, A Company, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry received 11 rounds of 82mm mortar fire at YA692547. Four US personnel were wounded.

(10) Task Force PRONG, consisting of a MIKE Force and two CIDG Companies was airlifted on 8 November to a landing zone secured by A Company, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry at YA614528. Their mission was to screen the west and southwest flank of the division. At this time, in addition to Task Force PRONG, the division had five battalions in the area bounded by the Nam Sathay and Se San/Ya Krong Bo'Lah Rivers operating to the north. One battalion (-) remained south of the Se San River as division reserve.

(11) There were minor contacts throughout the day on 9 November. Task Force PRONG had a total of five contacts with up to an estimated company size force. Results of their operation were friendly losses of two CIDG KIA and three CIDG WIA. There were seven NVA KIA, four NVA captured with 12 days rations, one box 12.7 ammunition, two 12.7mm machine guns, three AK-47's, and three grenades. Movements conducted during the day consisted of the airlift of 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry fire support base to YA762625, and the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry airlifted its fire support base to YA853676.

(12) Heavy contact by Task Force PRONG west of the Nam Sathay River on 10 November resulted in the deployment of the division reserve, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, as a reaction force. Contact by Task Force PRONG was initially made vicinity YA605515 at 1130 hours and broken at 1200 hours. Contact was again established from 1410 to 1500 hours and from 1615 to 1905 hours. The enemy strength was estimated at three companies. Task Force PRONG was placed under operational control of 2d Brigade after being joined by A Company, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry at 2240 hours. Results of the contact were friendly losses of one USSF KIA, two USSF WIA, 2d CIDG KIA. Enemy losses were eight NVA soldiers KIA and two NVA PW's.

(a) The 2d Brigade assumed operational control of 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry at 0530 hours.

(b) The 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry command post received approximately 50 to 20 rounds of mortar fire at YA677566 from 1900 to 2015 hours resulting in one US WIA.

(c) A Company, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry received mortar and small arms fire at YA677566 from 1900 to 2015 hours resulting in three US KIA and 20 US WIA.
28 January 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MiG7 J3-32)

On 11 November heavy contact was made by the MIKE force of Task Force PRONG. They became heavily engaged in the vicinity of YA570550 with an estimated two NVA companies. The contact started at 0600 hours and was not completely broken until 1600 hours. Because of this heavy contact, the decision was made to commit the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry (-) west of the Nam Satha to the vicinity of YA593569, while their B Company was airlifted to vicinity of YA575557 to link up with the MIKE force. Air strikes and artillery landing zone preparations were conducted and touchdown of initial assault elements was 1304 hours. Shortly after touchdown, C Company reported receiving one round of mortar fire and reported hearing automatic weapons fire from their west. Shortly thereafter, a report was received that two helicopters had been shot down approximately 1,000 meters to the west of LZ (YA593569). A FAC in the area reported that he saw the location of the two downed helicopters and was directed to place an air strike in the east and west sectors of the downed helicopters. When the air strike commenced, the fighter pilots reported receiving ground fire. As soon as the air strikes were completed, both mortar and artillery fire was adjusted on the machine gun. After the artillery and mortar fire was lifted, the ground commander reported that machine gun fire was still coming from the same area. The FAC was contacted and another air strike was called. Pilots of the second strike also reported receiving ground fire. After this strike, the Airlift Commander and Battalion Commander approached the area of the downed helicopters in their command helicopter and received ground fire. As their helicopter banked sharply to the left, a gun ship attacked the machine gun, but it was hit by enemy fire and went down in flames. Another air strike was then called. This strike used CBU ordnance on the position and knocked it out. During this action, elements of the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, continued to be lifted into the fire support base. Meanwhile, the Brigade Commander directed the Battalion Commander to contact the MIKE Force Command and verify the security of their LZ. The MIKE Force Command advised that three resupply helicopters had been into their location and had received no fire. B Company was therefore lifted directly into that LZ rather than the one previously selected at YA575557. At 1615 hours, all elements of B Company had closed with the MIKE Force. A Company, was then lifted into the fire support base and the operation was completed as of 1730 hours. Results of the day's operation were friendly losses of one USSF KIA, 20 MIKE Force KIA, seven USSF WIA, and 40 MIKE Force WIA. Enemy losses were 30 NVA KIA and six NVA captured.

(a) In addition the following helicopter and crew losses occurred:

1. UH-1B from D Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry shot down in vicinity of YA585562 resulting in four KIA and one destroyed helicopter.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDH-GC

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

2. UH-1B from 52d Aviation Battalion in support of the 4th Infantry Division was shot down in vicinity YA585562 resulting in four KIA and one destroyed helicopter.

3. UH-1D from 4th Aviation Battalion was hit by ground fire in vicinity of YA586567 but landed at Plei Djereng with no casualties.

4. UH-1D from 52d Aviation Battalion was shot down in vicinity of YA595562 resulting in three KIA and one destroyed helicopter.

5. UH-1D hit by enemy fire while on the ground in vicinity of YA6055112 was able to take-off and land at Plei Djereng but suffered two US KIA.

6. UH-1D was destroyed as a result of an accident at Plei Djereng causing two US KIA.

(b) The division had the 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry and 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry plus A and C Companies from 2d Battalion 8th Infantry along with Task Force PRONG west of the Nam Sathay River.

(c) The 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division assumed operational control of 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry at 1700 hours and continued operations east of the Nam Sathay River.

(d) The 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry assumed the security mission of the brigades command posts at LZ 3G and the FSA at Plei Djereng between the hours of 1600 and 0600 hours daily.

(12) The 4th Infantry Division (-) continued OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV on 12 November with six battalions.

(a) In the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry area there was light, sporadic contact during the day. A Company had the mission of locating the helicopters downed on 11 November and recovering the bodies and equipment. During their movement to the crash sites, light contact was made with four NVA soldiers resulting in one enemy killed. Two of the three helicopters were reached. Four survivors were found with the remains of the other crew members. Survivors and remains were evacuated by 1600 hours. A Company was then directed to proceed from the second downed chopper site to the enemy anti-aircraft gun position (some 200 meters away) which had been knocked out by an air strike the previous day. At approximately 1700 hours they reached the machine gun site and
found a 12.7mm caliber weapon. At 1805 hours the battalion fire support base and command post (380 personnel consisting of the battalion command group, two rifle companies, one artillery battery, and the 1.2 Inch Mortar Platoon) received an extremely heavy mortar attack vicinity YA592568. A Company was about 700 meters out from the perimeter on the western side at that time, but made it back within the perimeter. Mortar fire broke off at 1900 hours. Approximately 500 to 700 rounds had been received. The unit had received a heavy ground attack from the north and west by an estimated two NVA battalions (NVA 88th Regiment according to a POW report). Small arms fire had been exchanged with the enemy from 120 to 50 meters outside the perimeter. Probes were initiated against all sides of the perimeter engaging approximately 20 percent of the friendly units at any one time. The intensity of the attack died down at 2000 hours but sporadic mortar and small arms fire continued until 2340 hours. The first medical evacuation helicopter arrived at the fire support base at approximately 0730 hours. Just as it lifted off, the fire support base again received mortar fire. This lasted for approximately five to ten minutes. The enemy mortar position was located and neutralized by 81mm mortar fire. At approximately 0830 hours, the Battalion Commander directed a search of the area and at approximately 0900 hours, during the search, the fire support base again received mortar fire. This enemy mortar position was also located and neutralized by direct fire from a 105 howitzer. Artillery, TAC Air, and gunships were utilized to the maximum during this action. There were 77 close air support sorties, two SPOOKY missions, and one flare ship mission flown. Three secondary explosions had been observed by the FROCs. Results from the action were five US KIA, 41 WIA (six serious), and 76 NVA confirmed KIA and two NVA captured. It is believed that a much higher body count would have resulted had a more thorough search been made of the area. This was not possible as the battalion was extracted from the LZ at 1500 hours on the day after the battle.

(b) B Company with the MIKE Force of Task Force PRONG conducted search and destroy operations and found 32 NVA bodies in vicinity YA571555 which was credited to the MIKE Force contact on 11 November. In addition one NVA was killed at YA569551.

(c) During the day of the 12th, the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry airlifted its fire support base to YA610600.

(d) A Company and the Recon Platoon, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry located an NVA base area with five NVA bodies at YA678571.

(15) On 13 November the following contacts occurred:

(a) B Company 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry and the MIKE Force of Task Force PRONG conducted search and destroy operations in
vicinity of YA598543, making contact with an estimated NVA platoon at YA573553 resulting in one NVA KIA.

(b) 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry continued operations in the AO. B Company had sporadic contact throughout the afternoon with an unknown size enemy force vicinity YA740635 and YA747638. The results were nine NVA soldiers KIA, two SKS rifles, three RPG-2 rocket launchers, 11 RPG-2 rounds, 49 grenades captured.

(c) Elements of A Company, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry contacted an estimated NVA company vicinity YA564510 at 1200 hours on the 13th. The enemy was defending a prepared position and seemed determined to hold the ground. The enemy commenced firing when the company point was within 50 meters of their position. Only four to five men in the point were initially engaged. This contact lasted 45 minutes and was broken by the enemy unit. The company then continued its mission. Contact was again made at 1527 hours in the vicinity of YA570509, this time with an estimated two NVA companies. Again the enemy initiated the attack, firing approximately 200 weapons continuously for 60 to 90 minutes, expending an estimated 10,000 rounds of ammunition. The company organized a hasty defensive perimeter. The attack commenced 50 meters from the perimeter, closing to within 15 meters. The entire friendly element was under fire. C Company moved to assist A Company and linked up at 1705 hours. Results of the overall action were 15 US KIA and 38 US WIA. Enemy losses were 35 NVA KIA.

(16) On 14 November there was no significant contact. Task Force PRONG was airlifted to Plei Djereng. A MIKE Force from Pleiku and a CIDG Company from Plei Me were airlifted into the area west of the Nam Sathay River.

(17) Operations continued on 15 November with five battalions in the area bounded by the Cambodian border and the Se San/Ya Krong Boi Lah Rivers, and one battalion operating southeast of the Se San River.

(a) There was moderate contact by the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry when A Company encountered an unknown size enemy force at YA602596 and YA606596. This fire fight resulted in four US KIA and 11 US WIA. Enemy losses were one NVA KIA and one machine gun captured.

(b) C Company, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, while conducting search and destroy operations, located a regimental size NVA base area consisting of 208 bunkers at YA600501 and YA606502.

(18) On 16 November there was no enemy contact reported. A and B Companies, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry with a MIKE Force, moved along separate axes to the vicinity where the third UH-1B was shot down.
on 11 November at YA577568. Four US KIA from 52d Aviation Battalion were found. Also, three NVA bodies and a case of 60mm mortar ammunition were found under or near the helicopter.

(19) There was light contact on 17 November when the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry conducted saturation patrolling southwest of their command post to YA602598. At 1120 hours a CIDG Company and A Company had contact with an estimated NVA company size force at YA600595. This resulted in two US WIA, and one USSF WIA. Contact was broken at 1125 hours. B Company made light contact with the same enemy force at 1230 hours at YA598601, resulting in four US WIA. In the area of the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, B Company sighted 15 NVA at 1109 hours at YA673671. The enemy fled to the southwest. At 1340 hours one NVA was captured at YA665661. C Company lost one US KIA and three US WIA from a grenade booby trap at YA732690.

(20) There was no significant contact on 18 November. 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry found 12 NVA bodies and 12 SKS rifles at 1045 hours vicinity of YA591569 which were probably the result of a 5 November B-52 strike.

(a) 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry airlifted the battalion command group and 4.2 inch Mortar Platoon to landing zone 510Z at YA665664.

(b) B Company, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry discovered a fortified base area on the west side of the Nan Sathay at YA650690. An air strike was called on the area. Traces of blood were found after the strike and also 300 pounds of rice and a trail leading southwest.

(21) On 19 November, B and C Companies, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, with a CIDG Company from Plei Me had heavy contact with an estimated two NVA battalions.

(a) The contact started at 1205 hours at YA610500 and did not diminish until approximately 1640 hours that day. B Company, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, part of the division reserve, was committed to the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry area of operations. The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry planned to destroy the large 206 bunker complex discovered the previous day. B Company was to maneuver on an axis parallel to the CIDG Company from YA614525 to LZ "Rio" located at YA605516 and then south to the bunker complex located at YA604502. In the vicinity of the bunker complex a LZ was to be cut so that an engineer platoon (2d Platoon, D Company, 65th Engineer Battalion) could be lifted in to destroy the bunker complex. B Company, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, was to act both as a security force for the engineers and as reaction force for the sweep of C
Company and the CIDG Company to the south and west of the bunker complex. They would then close back to LZ "Rio" for the night. C Company, located at LZ "Rio" at YA605516 planned to patrol south to the bunker complex in front of B Company and the CIDG Company. With one squad of engineers that accompanied them, C Company was to start a LZ near the bunker complex. After B Company and the CIDG Company closed into the bunker area, C Company was to patrol in conjunction with the CIDG to the south then to the west and then to the north, back to LZ "Rio". They were to go within 1.5 km of the Cambodian-Vietnam border, keeping the CIDG on their right flank as they made a sweep clockwise around the bunker complexes. The CIDG Company planned to patrol on an axis parallel to B Company from YA614525 to LZ "Rio" and the south to the bunker complex. From the bunker complex they planned to patrol on an axis parallel and on the right flank of C Company in their sweep of the area around the bunker complex. The Recon Platoon coordinated with the CIDG Company and planned to work with them. The movement went as planned during the morning of 19 November. C Company moved to the bunker complex with B Company and the CIDG Company following on two axes. C Company reached a fairly open area and broke for cover while B Company and the CIDG moved through them toward the bunker area. The CIDG was on the west and B Company was on the east as they moved south. At 1207 hours B Company's right flank began to receive small arms fire and grenades from the southwest. Shortly thereafter the point of the CIDG Company made contact with a well defended fortified enemy position employing numerous snipers. The enemy attempted to infiltrate the friendly forces and also demonstrated a determined effort to hold their position. The enemy initiated the action when the advance guard of 20 to 30 men were within 50 meters of the fortified enemy position. Since the CIDG was moving in a file, their point fell back to bring their company on line. This put the Recon Platoon, B Company and CIDG on line in that order, from east to west. The CIDG was to the right of the Recon Platoon. They began to advance under heavy small arms fire and were hit from the west, on the Recon Platoon's right or west flank. B Company was also receiving heavy fire from the front. In all there were approximately 360 friendly troops engaging what was later confirmed by a POW to be two battalions of the NVA 33d Regiment, 1E IOTI Division. B Company moved to assist the CIDG and became heavily engaged from the west. C Company maneuvered to aid B Company and the CIDG, but also became heavily engaged and pinned down at 1525 hours. One platoon from C Company was left at YA60503 to clear and secure an LZ to extract wounded and the CIDG pulled back to help secure it. At this time B Company maneuvered two platoons against the enemy and heavy contact was broken at 1640 hours. At this point the decision was made to pull back to the new LZ, extract the friendly, NVA and bring artillery and air in on the NVA positions. This decision was carried out during the rest of the afternoon and early evening under heavy harrassment from NVA
snipers fighting from trees and bunkers until 1843 hours. A total of four airstrikes were called on the enemy positions. Approximately 1800 rounds of 105mm and 100 rounds of 8 inch artillery fire were expended. The 4.2 inch Mortar Platoon expended 300 rounds on the enemy. For the night B and C Companies with the CIDG Company and Recon Platoon closed into a perimeter around the LZ located at YA606503. It is interesting to note that on two occasions during the day's operation the battalion primary frequency was jammed. Results of this contact were 19 US KIA and 47 US WIA, 3 CIDG WIA, and 2 USSF WIA. Enemy losses were, 166 NVA KIA, 1 NVA captured, 6 AK-47 rifles, 2 SKS rifles, 20 hand grenades, 5 packs and other miscellaneous items of equipment.

(b) It was at this stage of the operation that a series of B-52 bomber strikes were planned and requested to support the units in the southwestern portion of the AO. (See Inclosure 2 for overlay depicting strikes). One strike was requested for 20 November on the large bunker complex. It was necessary to move units out of the area to meet the minimum safety requirements.

(22) There were only moderate contacts on 20 November.

(a) The heaviest contact was made by B Company, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry. They departed their battalion fire support base (YA668663) at 000831 November, moving in a column of platoons. Order of march was 3d Platoon, company headquarters (augmented by 12 personnel from the Weapons Platoon without heavy weapons), 1st Platoon and 2d Platoon. The company, consisting of 130 men, contacted an estimated NVA reinforced platoon in dug-in positions, at 1128 hours vicinity YA674688. The three point men were hit immediately, and the rest of the point squad returned the fire. The enemy initiated the action when friendly troops were within 15 to 45 meters of his position. The company commander requested air and artillery support and immediately began a flanking maneuver to the west with the 1st and 2d Platoons, with the Weapons Platoon maneuvering to link up with the 3d Platoon's right flank. Just as this maneuver began, the company began receiving sporadic firing from the west and northwest, and enemy personnel were seen infiltrating along the flank. The 1st Platoon reached a point on line with the 3d Platoon, where they encountered a heavy volume of fire. The amount of fire indicated that a considerably larger enemy force was present than first believed. The platoon then went into a position facing west-northwest, in order to protect the 3d Platoon's west flank. The 2d Platoon, which had followed the 1st Platoon in the flanking maneuver, momentarily lost contact with its point squad. The point squad was in visual contact with the 1st Platoon, and the trailing squads were following the track made by the leading elements through the dense undergrowth. At this time, the trailing squads of the 2d Platoon were fired upon by an enemy machine gun in a bunker and by
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDH-GC

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MG 'J3-32)

scattered riflemen. Apparently the enemy had occupied the bunker after the 1st Platoon and the point squad of the 2d Platoon had passed. There were no other enemy found in prepared positions on this flank, nor were any foxholes or other bunkers found in this area after the battle. The bunker was rapidly knocked out by M79 fire and grenades, and the 2d Platoon regained contact with its point squad and went into position on the 1st Platoon's left flank. Enemy automatic weapons fire became increasingly intense. The company commander ordered the platoons to close into a perimeter in the saddle area of the revine, while supporting air and artillery were employed. This was rapidly accomplished, and at 1217 hours the air strikes began. The strikes were directed against the machine guns located to the northeast and against the locations of the automatic weapons fire on the west and northwest. Air attacks, interspersed with artillery, were conducted against the enemy positions until about 1430 hours. At 1530 hours, B Company conducted sweeps around their perimeter, encountering several snipers. The platoons rapidly cleared their assigned areas, collected their wounded and dead, and made their way to the planned landing zone site at Y1672683. At this location a perimeter was established and elements of all platoons were employed clearing a small landing zone. Enemy contact had been broken by 1700 hours, and A Company linked up with B Company at 1859 hours. At 1915 hours, three wounded personnel were evacuated from the landing zone. The following morning the remainder of the wounded were evacuated. Estimates of enemy ammunition expenditures were 1000 rounds heavy machine gun, 1400 rounds light machine gun, 3600 rounds AK 47, and 40 to 50 hand grenades. The nature of the fortified position and the action marked the engagement as an enemy delaying action. Results of the engagement were:

US: 5 KIA
17 WIA

Enemy: 18 KIA
3 AK-47 (captured)
1 SG 43 machine gun carrier (captured).

(b) In another part of the AO on this day, the 2d Battalion, 6th Infantry had discovered a training area and training aids for the 12.7mm anti-aircraft machine gun at Y1607587.

(23) PAUL REVERE IV continued on 21 November with five battalions plus one rifle company conducting search and destroy operations in the area bounded by the Cambodian border and the Se San/Ya Krong Boi Lah Rivers. One battalion (-) remained as the division reserve and conducted local search and destroy operations southeast of the Se San River. There was light contact throughout the area of operations.

CONFIDENTIAL
AVDDH-GC

CONFIDENTIAL 28 January 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

(a) A and C Companies, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry and 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, with an engineer team arrived at the northern edge of the 20 November B-52 strike area at 1215 hours. A Company sighted five NVA soldiers vicinity YA600597 at 1235 hours and killed two of them. B Company, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry and the engineer team received small arms fire from trees and bunkers in the vicinity of YA605493. The area was searched and 14 bodies were found in a grave. Also found were one machine gun and eight AK-47 rifles.

(b) The 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry found one NVA body and one AK-47 rifle at YA605599. They also killed one NVA in the vicinity of YA605519.

(c) There was a light contact made by A Company, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry with an unknown size force at 1400 hours vicinity YA677687. Contact was broken by the enemy force at 1531 hours. Results of this action were one NVA KIA, one rifle, 244 rounds small arms ammunition with 22 magazines, and four grenades captured. At the same time B Company conducted a sweep of the 20 November contact in the vicinity of YA676682 and found an additional seven NVA KIA. C Company made contact with two NVA at YA666667 and killed one of them.

(d) A UH-1B from D Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry received ground fire from the vicinity of YA772728. The fire was returned, resulting in a secondary explosion and one NVA KIA.

(24) There was light contact in the northern and southern sectors of the area of operation on 22 November.

(a) B Company, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry made contact with an unknown size force while exploiting a 20 November B-52 strike. Contact was made in the vicinity of YA602495 at 0849 hours. Automatic weapons and small arms fire were received from bunkers. Results of the contact were one US WIA and five NVA KIA.

(b) A Company, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry made contact with an estimated NVA platoon at 1025 hours in the vicinity YA675699 which resulted in one NVA KIA and one machine gun captured. Contact was regained at 1510 hours in the vicinity YA677702, but the enemy withdrew to the north. At 1556 hours, in the vicinity of YA679701, contact was again established with an unknown size force. Automatic weapons and small arms fire were received from dug in positions. Results of this action were two US WIA and three NVA KIA.

(25) On 23 November a CIDG Company from Ban Bloch with the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry was extracted and returned to their camp. The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry had the only contacts of the day, which results in three NVA KIA.

57
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (JCS: MACV J3-32)

(26) There was no significant contact on 24 November.

(a) The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry discovered a cave complex vicinity YA601501, while searching a B-52 strike area. There were 50 NVA bodies found in the cave and 16 other bodies found in the surrounding area.

(b) The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry located a battalion sized enemy base area at YA689716 which appeared to have been used within the previous 24 hours.

(27) During the period 25 through 26 November, operations continued with five battalions plus one rifle company in the area bounded by the Cambodian border and the Se San/Ya Krong Bo' Lah Rivers. There was no significant contact. One battalion (-) remained as division reserve conducting local patrolling and security southeast of the Se San River. Task Force 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry continued the route security mission of Highway 509 from Pleiku to ZA039431. This was accomplished by aerial surveillance, aggressive day and night mounted and dismounted patrolling in the vicinity of the route, and by establishing mobile strong points along the road.

(28) On 27 November the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry was airlifted back to 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division base camp for rest and refitting. There was no significant contact throughout the AO during the day. A tank from B Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry struck a mine at ZA288229 while escorting a convoy to Plei Ne. There was slight damage to the tank.

(29) On 28 November there was only light contact reported in the AO.

(a) 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry fire support base, vicinity YA610527, received approximately 25 rounds of 82mm mortar fire at 1445 hours. There were no casualties. Countermortar radar determined that the fire was coming from YA597533 and five artillery batteries placed a total of 398 rounds of counter battery fire on the target. The mortar fire ceased.

(b) A Company, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry made contact with an estimated NVA company vicinity YA685708 at 0920 hours. Sporadic contact continued until 1300 hours. Results of this action were US losses of two KIA and one WIA. Enemy losses were 16 NVA KIA, one AK-47 rifle, 20 grenades and 2000 rounds of small arms ammunition captured.
Operations continued in the PaoL MENG LE IV area of operations on 29-30 November with four battalions plus one rifle company conducting search and destroy operations in the area bounded by the Cambodian border and Se Sac/Ya Krong Boi Lake Rivers. One battalion (-) continued the mission as division reserve and one battalion continued training and refitting in preparation for future operations. There was no significant contact on 29 November.

(a) The 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry airlifted its tactical command post, C Company and 4.2 inch Mortar Platoon to landing zone 519A located at Ya655757.

(b) One tank from C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry was slightly damaged by a mine at Ya957434.

(31) On 30 November there was no significant contact.

(a) The 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry found six NVA bodies and miscellaneous equipment at Ya609510 and Ya597542.

(b) The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry airlifted its fire support base to landing zones 30 and 31 respectively.

(c) At 1800 hours, approximately 20 rounds of 60mm mortar fire landed 200-300 meters outside the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry perimeter located in the vicinity of Ya610600.

(d) The 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry airlifted its fire support base to landing zone 519A at Ya656757.

(e) Another tank from C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry hit a mine at Ya934440, causing damage to the suspension system.

(32) There was no significant contact on 1 December.

(a) One tank from 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, hit a mine at Ya940433, causing damage to the suspension system.

(b) The CIDG Companies from Phu Tuc and Ben Bloch terminated search and destroy operations and were airlifted to Plei Djereng.

(33) On 2 December there was moderate contact by 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry. A and B Companies had the mission to conduct search and destroy operations to the west of the battalion fire support
base, and to effect a linkup vicinity YL577545. The operation commenced at 020730 December with the two companies moving on supporting axes; A Company searching on the southern axis and B Company searching on the northern axis. A Company was moving in a wedge formation with the 3d Platoon on the point, 1st and 2d Platoons following each flank with the Weapons Platoon providing rear security. At 0825 hours, the 3d Platoon operating 75 meters forward of the company, having crossed a north-south stream, came upon a camp fire which contained hot coals at YL580540. As the platoon leader was rendering his report on the finding, his platoon came under heavy volume of automatic fire from the north-northwest at 0932 hours. The platoon leader immediately had his platoon deploy off line and return fire. The company commander's estimate was that the contact was with a company size force. Initially, short bursts of small arms and automatic weapons were received, but at 0955 hours the company became pinned down by heavy small arms fire. Indirect fires were immediately called for, with two batteries of 105's and one battery of 8 inch responding. The Battalion Commander and S3 were airborne in the command and control helicopter to direct the action and to provide radio relay. An airborne USAF forward air controller was in the target area 15 minutes after the contact began. Simultaneously, with the call for artillery fires for A Company, the Battalion Commander directed B Company to divert its movement to the southwest and link-up with A Company. The action continued with A Company still in contact and receiving automatic fire. An air strike was scheduled for 1100 hours. B Company's movement to the southwest met with no contact until approximately 200 meters from A Company's position. At that point, B Company encountered sporadic firing. Lead elements of B Company effected link-up with A Company's right flank at 1100 hours. At the same time the first air strike was being placed approximately 150 meters forward of A Company. Upon completion of the air strike, A Company reported it was still receiving ground fire from the hill to the north-northwest. A and B Companies were directed to move abreast and, upon completion of a second air strike, to sweep north. At the same time, both companies were to consolidate their weapons platoons in the vicinity YL561540 and prepare an extraction site for casualties. At 1200 hours, A and B Companies moved north, conducting a sweep of Hill 284, meeting only light resistance in A Company's sector. No further contact was reported after 1230 hours. Support for this action included over 2000 rounds fired by two 105 batteries, 411 rounds fired by the 8 inch battery, and 370 rounds fired by 4.2 inch mortars. The Air Force flew a total of 10 sorties in support of the ground operations; four sorties in direct support of the contact and six sorties along suspected withdrawal routes during the contact. A sweep of the area disclosed 14 NV, KIA, and seven AK-47 rifles. US losses were four KIA and 14 WIA. The medevac was started at 1235 hours and completed at 1430 hours. The bulk of the friendly casualties occurred during the initial volume of fire delivered by the enemy.
The 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry had light contact with three NVA in the vicinity of Y.A.610676. Results were one NVA KIA, and one AK-47 rifle captured. One US soldier was wounded.

(b) The 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry located a 75 bed hospital complex in the vicinity of Y.A.646746. One NVA soldier was killed in that location.

(c) The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry located a large command bunker with 100 additional bunkers in the areas around Y.A.735708 and Y.A.737700.

(d) US losses for the day were seven KIA and 32 WIL. Enemy losses were 31 NVA KIA, 14 small arms, four grenades, 31 rounds small arms ammunition, two magazines, one pack of medical supplies captured. There were 135 bunkers, a 75 bed hospital, one 59 bunker, and three huts destroyed.

d. On 3 December the third phase of the operation commenced. Light, sporadic contacts were characteristic of the action during this phase. It was during this period that action was oriented to the north of the 10 as the division attempted to contact and block the fleeing NVA units.

(1) No significant contact occurred on 3 December.

(a) The 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry located and destroyed two tons of rice in the vicinity of Y.A.654756. The area also contained a 59 bunker complex and one hut, all of which were destroyed. Three tons of rice from the same vicinity were evacuated.

(b) A tank from the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, under operational control of 2d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division (A.C.), struck a mine at Y.A.758232 causing damage to the suspension system and hull.

(2) On 4 December, there was light contact in the northern sector of the area of operations. Results of actions on this day were one US KIA and six US WIL. Enemy losses were two NVA KIA, two NVA captured, one NVA returnee, one individual weapon with three magazines, three NVA uniforms, 60 rounds of small arms ammunition captured. Also, one anti-tank mine was destroyed.

(a) The 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry was airlifted from positions west of the Nam Sotvay River to vicinity of landing zone 3G near the 2d Brigade Command Post. This left three battalions conducting search and destroy operations in the area bounded by the Cambodian border and the Se San/Ya Krong Bo' Loh Rivers.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDH-GC
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: M.GV J3-32)

(b) Task Force 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry continue its mission of securing Highway 509 in the AO. Reconnaissance was conducted of the area north and south of Highway 509 from YL075450 and YL875461. Also, aerial reconnaissance of the Division area of operations was continued by D Troop.

(3) On 5 December there was no significant contact reported.

(a) The 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry located a platoon size bunker complex and 1500 pounds of rice in the vicinity of YL585554. The bunkers were destroyed.

(b) A CIDG Company from Ploi Djering was moved into the area of operations to conduct search and destroy operations in the vicinity of YL734546.

(4) On 6 December, the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry was airlifted to vicinity YL657838 to conduct search and destroy operations in the northern sector of the area of operations. There was only light contact during the day's operations.

(a) Mortar fire was received outside the perimeter of the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry (YL657838) at 1815 hours and again at 1915 hours. About 25 rounds were received and resulted in no US WIA.

(b) At 2010 hours, C Company, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry received approximately four mortar rounds outside their perimeter, vicinity YL668827. The Recon Platoon found one 82mm mortar tube and base plate vicinity of YL657441.

(5) On 7 December, the division continued OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV with six battalions, one tank battalion (-) and one cavalry squadron (-). Four battalions conducted search and destroy operations in the northern sector of the area of operations. One battalion continued the mission of division reserve/reaction force. One battalion conducted local patrolling and security operations. The tank battalion (-) and cavalry squadron (-) conducted route security operations. There was no enemy contact during the day's operations. The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry discovered a 50 bunker complex and four NVN bodies vicinity YL661649. The bunkers were destroyed.

(6) On 8 December the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, discovered a field of 300 punji stakes. Four US soldiers were wounded by the punji stakes. The stakes were removed and destroyed. Also a total of 44 bunkers were found and destroyed by the battalion during the day.
CONFIDENTIAL

LVDDH-GC

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

28 January 1967

(a) The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, conducted an air-assault to landing zone 511A at YL761625, closing at 1225 hours. The unit located 35 enemy bunkers in the vicinity of YL752640.

(b) The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, located 47 two-man foxholes in the vicinity of YL738833.

(c) A village chief reported to C Troop, 3d Squadron 4th Cavalry, that a mine had been located on Route 14B. The report was investigated and two mines were found in the road at YL904386 and YL904382. They were destroyed in place.

(7) On 9 December, only minor enemy contact occurred during the day's operations. No change was made in unit missions.

(a) The 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry engaged six NVA in the vicinity of YL635719. Results of the contact were two NVI. KI, one NVI captured. Also, miscellaneous equipment was captured or destroyed.

(b) The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry reported the capture of two NVI soldiers with small arms and 100 rounds of ammunition. They also destroyed one hut and 800 pounds of rice in the vicinity of YL762646.

(c) The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry located and destroyed six huts at YL722789.

(8) On 10 December there was only light contact throughout the AO which resulted in five NVI soldiers KI, one detained, and miscellaneous small arms, equipment, food and livestock captured or destroyed. The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry completed an airlift from landing zone 510A to the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division base camp for training and refitting. They also continued the mission as part of the division reserve/reaction force.

(9) There was light contact reported on 11 December.

(a) The 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry made contact with two NVI in the vicinity of YL605713, resulting in one NVI. KI, and one NVI captured with two LK-47 rifles, eight magazines, and 12 rounds of ammunition. There was also a five pound satchel charge and eight CHICOM grenades destroyed.

(b) The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry located an enemy base camp vicinity YL732645, with 33 bunkers, four foxholes, four shovels, two picks, 11 grenades, three one-quarter pound sticks of TNT, one blasting cap, one canteen, and 700 rounds of 7.62 ammunition.
AVDDH-GC

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (ROS: MiCV J3-32)

(c) The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry located and destroyed two huts and 500 pounds of rice at YA700803.

(d) The 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry apprehended one detainee and captured 1000 pounds of rice and three picks in the vicinity YA869409. In a sweep of the village of Ploi K nome (YA877391), one detainee was apprehended.

(e) The village chief of Ploi Ya Po reported to C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry that a mine had been placed on Highway 509B at YA988400. The mine was located and destroyed.

(f) The CIDG Company from Ploi Djoreng was extracted at 0300 hours to Ploi Djoreng.

(10) There was light contact on 12 December.

(a) The 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry engaged four NVA at YA601712. Results were one NVA KIA, two AK-47 rifles captured, and 800 pounds of rice and two grenades destroyed. A search of the area revealed three NVA soldiers' graves, estimated to be several days old.

(b) The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry contacted five NVA soldiers at YA673771, resulting in four NVA KIA and four small arms captured.

(11) There was negative contact reported on 13 December. A compilation of unit reports revealed two NVA bodies were found, and also one RB-40 rocket launcher, two small arms, two packs, 50 pounds of rice captured. There were 12 huts, four bunkers, two grenades and a one-quarter pound of TNT destroyed.

(12) There was no contact on 14 December. The 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry did locate and destroy an enemy hospital complex at YA643801. It consisted of 25 huts, eight bunkers, and miscellaneous medical equipment. A security sweep north of landing zone 3G by 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry found one ton of rice at YA839492.

(13) On 15 December there were no significant contacts reported.

(a) The 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry encountered punji stakes in an area around 20 bunkers located at YA663837. Two US soldiers were wounded by the punji stakes.

(b) The 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry located an enemy camp at YA635772. They destroyed 20 huts, a kitchen area, latrine, five rounds 81 MM rocket ammunition, and 250 rounds AK-47 ammunition. One body was discovered in the camp area. Another body was found at YA637776, not far from the camp.

(c) The 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry destroyed eight huts at YA908497 and seven huts at YA983499.

c. The fourth and final phase of PAUL REVERE IV commenced on 16 December. It featured highly successful coordinated US/ARVN operations.

(1) There was no enemy contact on 16 December.

(a) The 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry located and destroyed five bunkers at YA44845.

(b) Task Force QUADRO (security platoon and CIDG Company from Duc Co) conducted search and destroy operations east of Plei Djorong.

(c) The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry located and destroyed 10 huts at YA719801 and 10 more huts at YA747829.

(d) Two ARVN Ranger Battalions moved to Plei Djorong and initiated search and destroy operations in the area south of the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division.

(e) CIDG Task Force MRONG and ARVN Task Force LUAT established blocking positions east of the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division. Task Force MRONG was located at ZA060710 and Task Force LUAT at ZA137510.

(f) Task Force 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry established a screen vicinity of Highway 509 in conjunction with the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division operation north of Highway 509.

(2) On 17 December OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV continued with six infantry battalions, one tank battalion (-) and one cavalry squadron (-). Search and destroy operations were conducted by four battalions, one of which (2d Battalion, 35th Infantry) conducted an air-assault east of the So San/Ya Krong Boi Lah Rivers to positions at YA980654 and YA915694.

(a) Local patrolling and security operations were conducted by 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDH-9C

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

(b) The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry continued training and refitting in preparation for future operations and continued the mission as division reserve/reaction force.

(c) The 1st Battalion, 69th Armor (-) and 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry (-) conducted route and convoy security operations. There was no contact during the day's operations.

(d) Task Force GARRETT continued to search east to the vicinity of YA905577.

(e) The Recon Platoon, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry located and destroyed 14 huts at YA932556, two huts, 600 pounds of wheat, 300 feet of communication wire and miscellaneous equipment at YA933563, and two huts and 30 pounds of rice at YA932564.

(f) Task Force SPRAGUE (Recon Platoon and CIDG Company from Plei Me) air-assaulted from Plei Djereng to landing zone 512Y at YA875631.

(g) The 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division and two ARVN Ranger Battalions continued a coordinated search to the east with the purpose of forcing the NVA toward the blocking positions set up by Task Force MIRONG and Task Force LIMIT at Z1060710 and Z1137510 respectively.

(3) There was light contact on 18 December.

(a) The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry made contact with six NVA at YA906680, resulting in three NVA KIA and the capture of two small arms, 250 rounds small arms ammunition, six blasting caps, three grenades, and miscellaneous equipment. Approximately 10 minutes later another contact was made with a group of NVA suspects at YA903691. Results were two VMC KIA, five VMC captured and 14 detainees.

(b) The 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry fire support base received 25 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from 1815 to 1825 hours at YA656756. The fire came from the northwest. All the rounds impacted outside the perimeter and caused no casualties.

(4) On 19 December there was no enemy contact.

(a) There were two mining incidents on Highway 7A at AR838393 and AR845398 resulting in damage to two five ton trucks and one US WIA, from the 4th Engineer Battalion.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDH-GG

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

(b) The 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry (-) was airlifted from their fire support base to the Division Base Camp at Dragon Mountain.

(5) Operations continued on 20 December with elements of the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry and 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry completing their airlift to the Division Base Camp at Dragon Mountain.

(a) A UH-1D from 52d Aviation Battalion involved in unit personnel lifts, crashed at YA663838 due to mechanical failure. The aircraft burned on impact and was totally destroyed. There were three US KIA and seven US WIA (one KIA and three WIA from 52d Aviation Battalion).

(b) The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry made contact with seven NVA at YA922678 resulting in three NVA KIA.

(c) The 1st Battalion, 69th Armor apprehended one detainee at AB955485.

(6) PAUL REVERE IV continued on 21 December with six infantry battalions, one tank battalion (-) and one cavalry squadron (-). Search and destroy operations were conducted by two battalions and one battalion conducted local security and patrolling operations. Training and refit operations in preparation for future operations were conducted by three battalions. The tank battalion (-) and cavalry squadron (-) conducted route and security operations. There was negative contact during the day.

(7) There was minor enemy contact on 22 December.

(a) C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry, assisting in the route security of Highway 509, apprehended six detainees at Plei La Whoa (YA993117) and eight detainees at Plei Domong (YA985416).

(b) Task Force LUIT made contact with four VC at ZA081538. The VC broke contact, withdrawing to the west with negative results.

(c) The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry (-B Company) was extracted to the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division base camp.

(8) On 23 December 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry and 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry conducted training and refit operations at Dragon Mountain Base Camp.

(a) The 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry continued security for the 2d Brigade complex and engineer construction in the vicinity of landing zones 3G and 3T.

67
AVDDH-6C

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

28 January 1967

(b) B Company, 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry helicopter to the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division Base Camp to participate in the battalion training and refit program.

(c) The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, airlifted to the Brigade Base Camp.

(d) The CIDG Company from Plei Me was airlifted by helicopter from YA959665 to Plei Djereng; then flown by CV-2 to their camp at Plei Me.

(e) The 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry located four detainees at YA992417 and an additional four detainees at YA998402.

(f) The two ARVN Ranger Battalions, Task Force MRONG and Task Force LUAT departed from the area of operations and closed into their respective base camps.

(9) During the period 24-25 December, the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry conducted local patrolling and security operations and the remaining five battalions (-) conducted training and refit in preparation for future operations. The 1st Battalion, 69th Armor (-) and 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry (-) conducted route security operations. The Division maintained a full alert posture with increased ambush sites and intensified aerial and ground reconnaissance patrols during the Christmas truce.

(10) Operations continued on 26 December with only light contacts.

(a) The Division posture consisted of 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry conducting training and refit operations and retaining the mission of division reserve/reaction force. The 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry continued training and refit with one company designated as a one hour notice reserve/reaction force. The 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry provided security for the 2d Brigade command post complex and engineer construction at landing zones 3G and 3T.

(b) The 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry was helicopter into a new area and initiated search and destroy operations in the vicinity of their fire support base established at AR835635, and also in the vicinities of AR819732 and AR814724. They apprehended 17 VMCS who were identified by local villagers at AR805738.

(c) The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry assumed the mission of providing security for Highway 19 from Pleiku east to BR250483, and assumed operational control of B Company, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor.
CONFIDENTIAL

28 January 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

(d) The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry conducted training and refit at their brigade base camp.

(e) The 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry (-) was released from operational control of 2d Brigade and conducted a tactical march to Phu Nhơn to conduct extensive air and ground reconnaissance in the vicinities of AQ869993 and AR912086.

(f) The 1st Battalion, 69th Armor (-) moved their Headquarters and A Companies to the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division Base Camp to conduct training and refit. A Company (-) remained under operational control of 2d Brigade with one platoon under operational control of 2d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division (AM). B Company remained under the operational control of 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division.

(11) On 27 December increased day and night air reconnaissance was implemented.

(a) The 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry continued search and destroy operations in conjunction with two ARVN Ranger Battalions and Task Force LUAT in an area of operations north of Pleiku. A Company and a RF/PF unit provided security for the fire support base. C Company searched south to the vicinity of AR811725 and B Company searched the east side of the Ia Krom River (2000 meters east).

(b) The 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry conducted detailed reconnaissance of Highway 6C from Phu Nhơn to Plei Me. They also reconnoitered for a fording site across the Ia Pett River. One detainee was apprehended at YA885109.

(12) On 28 December, the 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry continued search and destroy operations north of Pleiku in conjunction with two ARVN Ranger Battalions and Task Force LUAT. A village chief identified seven VNCS at AR894660 who were apprehended. The Recon Platoon received automatic weapons fire at AR903652, suffering one US WIA. A search was made of the area from where the fire was received but nothing was found.

(13) There was one minor contact on 29 December involving the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry. D Troop, while conducting dismounted operations with the Aero-Rifle Platoon, had a light contact at 0500 hours when a listening post exchanged automatic weapons fire with an estimated five enemy personnel at AR873957. The enemy immediately broke contact and an extensive sweep of the area produced no further contact. There was one US WIA during the action reported.
On 30 and 31 December there were no significant contacts reported in the area of operations. Intelligence information and lack of significant contact indicated that the majority of the NVA units formerly in the area had either been rendered ineffective or had exfiltrated west into Cambodia. This lack of enemy activity and the New Year's Truce period provided the logical termination point for OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV; thus at 312400 December 1966, the operation came to a close.

f. Civic Action Program, PAUL REVERE IV.

(1) During PAUL REVERE IV, civic action programs were closely allied with the collection of intelligence and psychological operations. Civic Action Programs were essentially concerned with MEDCAP, refugee assistance, public welfare projects, and assisting in the establishment of GVN influence throughout the area of operation. Through civic action efforts, intelligence information was obtained which resulted in 35 VC suspects being detained. In two instances, hamlet chieftains risked their lives to inform US forces of the location of mines.

(2) During the operation, over 700 Montagnards fled NVA or VC control to the Refugee Collection Point at Plei Djereng. These refugees were provided with USAID supplies, which included canned foods, clothing, rice, salt, and soap transported by Division vehicles. In addition, transportation was provided to haul three tons of lumber for use in building refugee housing. Two division bulldozers and operators worked in the refugee center at Thanh An repairing roads to villages. Refugees have responded well to their new locations, scattered among the hamlets of Plei Chorr (YA8517), Plei Dei (YA9513) and Plei Doch (YA9616); in accordance with the Province Resettlement Plan. Construction of homes was begun. As a result of their escape from NVA/VC control, refugees are receptive to the GVN, and have been especially helpful in offering information concerning Psyops and its effectiveness.

(3) The 1st Infantry Division assisted the GVN in establishing its image in the remote areas. One method of accomplishing this was by distributing GVN flags to hamlets. The GVN flag flying from its pole serves as a sign to all that the hamlet is friendly and secure from VC. If there are VC in the hamlet or if it is being harrassed by the VC, the flag is not flown and a reaction force can be sent to the hamlet. Also, 30 hamlet signs utilizing GVN colors were erected and 41 FAMOUS FRIEND (Roundup) Operations were conducted.

(4) Psychological Operations. The psychological operations program began with the initiation of enemy contact. Each Brigade was given the responsibility to plan and carry out its own psyops program. Since the initial guidance was very general in nature, the brigades developed widely
AVDDH-46
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

28 January 1967

varying plans. At the start of the operation, the only means employed to
disseminate psyops material were airborne loudspeaker aircraft and leaflets.

(a) Realizing the inadequacy of this mode of operation,
ground loudspeaker units were requested from II ARVN Corps to support the
operation. Arrangements to obtain these teams and the initial briefing and
orientation, took about three weeks. The teams proved to be a vital asset
to the operations of the forward battalions.

(b) New means, such as the use of ground troops to dis-
sseminate psyops literature, specially developed leaflets and tapes to exploit
tactical gains and to psychologically prepare new areas of operations, in-
troduction of Paywar Cultural Teams, JUSPAO newspapers, magazines, posters,
and movies were introduced into the Psyops Program.

(c) In addition, the Division Psyops Section assumed
role of coordinating center for all psyops efforts in the division and sur-
rounding areas. All brigade requests were channeled through division,
coordinated with II ARVN Corps, then modified as necessary to insure harmony
and effectiveness with all other efforts. In addition to the daily target-
ing by the brigades, Division G5 planned missions as tactical plans were
developed. This added the ability to "soften" the target area prior to
entering into the combat phase. These missions concentrated on civilian
support of the GVN, exploitation of recent combat victories, hopelessness
of the VC cause, and the Chieu Hoi program. On at least one occasion, this
type of operation was directly responsible for the return to GVN control
of 43 refugees. These civilians had been held under VC control and after
hearing a loudspeaker broadcast, fled from the VC to the GVN controlled
area. Psyops, combined with civic actions, also proved useful. On at least
two occasions, reports from local villagers enabled division personnel to
remove VC mines from roads in the area of operations. Psyops totals for
the operation were 25,000,000 leaflets, 211 hours loudspeaker time and
254,000 newspapers and posters.

12. (C) RESULTS:


(1) Personnel:

(a) KIA (BC) 878
(b) NW's (NVa) 44
(c) Detainees 138
AVDDH-GC

1. POW's (VC) 34
2. Civil Defendants 43
3. Innocent Civilians 47
4. Returnees 14

(2) Weapons:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2d Bde 3d Bde 4th Inf Div 25th Inf Div</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK-47</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPD</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKS</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.62 Carbine</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAS-36</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG-43</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistol, U.S., Cal .45</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG-2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistol, 9mm</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.92mm Mauser</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. .30 Cal Carbine</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62 LMG, Soviet (RP-46)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60mm Mortar, Chicom</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82mm Mortar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangalore Torpedo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hern Grenades</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNT</td>
<td>1 lb</td>
<td>4 3/4 lbs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**CONFIDENTIAL**

**AVDDH-GC**

**SUBJECT:** Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-12)

28 January 1967

---

**5. Equipment:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>3/4 Cav</th>
<th>1/10 Cav</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canteens</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shovels</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing Sets</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flashlights</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas Masks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephones</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Web Gear</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosquito Nets</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ponchos</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazine, AK-47</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazine, SKS</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazine, RP-56</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binoculars</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radios</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antenna</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compass</td>
<td>½ mi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMM Wire</td>
<td>½ mi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**6. Miscellaneous:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>3/4 Cav</th>
<th>1/10 Cav</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Printing Press w/6 boxes of type</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**7. Foodstuffs:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>3/4 Cav</th>
<th>1/10 Cav</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>7½ ton</td>
<td>14.7 ton</td>
<td>24.7 ton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3/4 Cav</td>
<td>1/10 Cav</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>½ ton</td>
<td>1 3/4 ton</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**8. Structures Destroyed:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>3/4 Cav</th>
<th>1/10 Cav</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huts</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunnels</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foxholes</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boats/Rafts</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDH-GC

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (AGS: KG-1, J3-2)

b. Summary of Friendly Personnel Losses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Deaths (B)</th>
<th>Injuries (B)</th>
<th>Deaths (NB)</th>
<th>Injuries (NB)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4th Inf Div (--)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bde 25th Inf Div</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>186</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS:</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Fire Support Results:

(1) The number of enemy killed and wounded and other results obtained by artillery fire, is difficult to assess. In the majority of contacts the success of the operation was based on the combined efforts of the artillery fires, air strikes and maneuver elements. Of the 32 B-52 strikes, 30 were exploited by ground troops.

(2) There is no doubt as to the success of the H&I programs, particularly along the Cambodian border, the efficiency of reconnaissance by fire, and other fire missions in destroying and demoralizing the enemy throughout the area of operations. A particular effort by the artillery is the repulse of an estimated regimental size unit on 12 November. The direct fire of B Battery, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery initially held the enemy at bay while mutually supporting FSBs fired on the enemy and the 175mm guns fired suppression fires against mortars located along the border. These fires, combined with air strikes and ground fires, resulted in a successful defense of a key FSB and infantry OP against an enemy force superior in number to the defenders.

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Supply:

(1) General: Logistical support during OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV was provided by a combination of the 1st Logistical Command and Division Support Command activities. The 1st Log Command initially established two Forward Supply Activities (FSA) for the support of combat operation. One FSA was located in the vicinity of Oasis (Z6:120278) and the other at LZ 3G (YA865455).

(2) As the action shifted to the west, the FSA at Oasis was closed and all support activities were relocated to LZ 3G and Ploj Djerong. The 1st Log Command support was complemented with support activities of the Division. FSA support consisted of providing fast-moving, bulky supplies to include Class I, III, and IIIA and Class V as well as barrier material (Class II & IV). Services provided by the FSA included laundry, bath, and graves registration. The Division Support Command augmented the FSA capabilities by furnishing tactical units with medical support, back-up maintenance facilities and a direct exchange facility for personal clothing. Class
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAV J3-32)

II and IV items were obtained from the Division Base Camp by requisitioning through established channels. Logistical coordination was accomplished through the employment of a Forward Control Group from Division Support Command (DISCOM) consisting of representatives from DAQ, DTO, and DSO. Air LOC was used for emergency resupply when weather conditions made the roads unusable.

b. Material and Services.

(1) Supply: The following quantities of supplies were issued to units from supporting FSA's:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE SUPPLY</th>
<th>UNITS OF ISSUE</th>
<th>SHORT TONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class I</td>
<td>418,300</td>
<td>1,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class II &amp; IV</td>
<td>332</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class III &amp; IIIA</td>
<td>1,652,500 (gals)</td>
<td>5,297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class V</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,553</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL: 11,479

In addition, it is estimated that another 3,000 tons of supplies were obtained from Base Camp sources and the ASP at Pleiku. This includes Class III and IIIA utilized by resupply convoys and aircraft, and Class V items resupplied directly to artillery units.

(2) Direct exchange of clothing in forward areas: As PAUL REVERSE IV progressed, the need for clothing exchange facility became more apparent. The FSA was unable to support such an activity due to the lack of personnel. The 4th S&T Battalion established a forward direct exchange facility at the Plei Djerang FSA for the exchange of individual clothing. The facility opened on 17 November and by 24 December had exchanged the following quantities of clothing:

- Trousers, tropical: 1993
- Shirt, tropical: 1224
- Socks, cushion sole: 474
- Under shirt, cotton: 294
- Drawers, cotton: 258
- Towels: 97

(3) A critical shortage of C-4 explosives could not be alleviated due to an in-theater shortage of this Class V item. TNT was also in short supply.

(4) Management of stockage levels at the FSA was not sufficiently flexible. Toward the end of PAUL REVERSE IV excessive stockage
levels of ammunition were maintained in response to established Logistical Command directives. To insure better coordination, Pleiku Sub-Area Command sent a liaison officer to the Division Headquarters to provide a direct channel for coordination. However, management of stockage levels at the FSA could remain a problem if control of these levels by a headquarters removed from the situation continues.

(5) Chain Saws: Due to the characteristics of the terrain in the AO, extensive use was made of chain saws for clearing firing bases and helicopter landing areas. The original TO&E authorizations for chain saws proved inadequate to meet requirements. Redistribution of division assets of chain saws, centralized maintenance, and issue of additional saws eliminated this significant problem area.

(6) Aerial Delivery Containers and Slings: Supplies for the forward tactical areas had to be moved by helicopters utilizing external slings. Shortages of aerial delivery equipment (slings and nets) was experienced in several instances. The problem of obtaining an adequate supply of this type equipment was not resolved by the end of the operation.

c. Maintenance:

(1) C Company, 704th Maintenance Battalion provided direct support maintenance services to the 2d Brigade Task Force by employing a forward detachment with the 2d Brigade Trains. Contact teams were dispatched to forward locations to perform on site repairs as required. Headquarters and A Company, 704th Maintenance Battalion, provided back-up maintenance support, repair parts supply and contact team augmentation as required. Aircraft maintenance was provided from Base Camp and by contact teams sent to forward areas.

(2) The forward maintenance support element initially involved a total of 47 personnel, to include one officer and one warrant officer. Due to a general reduction in equipment density in the forward areas, the detachment was reduced to 21 personnel commanded by a warrant officer.

(3) Toward the end of Paul Revere IV, a rest and refit period of from seven to 10 days was scheduled for the tactical units. During this period, the 704th Maintenance Battalion assisted units by making technical inspections of equipment, concentrating on small arms and crew served weapons. During the rest and refit period the following weapons were repaired.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small arms</td>
<td>679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine guns</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery pieces (105mm)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
d. Medical.

(1) C Company, 4th Medical Battalion provided direct support to the 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division utilizing a light, highly mobile clearing station located at the Brigade forward trains area, with the main clearing station located at Dragon Mountain Base Camp. 3d Brigade 25th Infantry Division was supported by elements of the 25th Medical Battalion, also located at the forward area.

(2) Casualties were evacuated from the battle area to the forward clearing station by means of air ambulance. Further evacuation to Base Camp clearing station or surgical hospital was normally accomplished by administrative support aircraft. In many instances determination to evacuate seriously wounded direct to the 18th Surgical Hospital at Pleiku was made by unit medical personnel in the battle area. This proved to be practical and was instrumental in expediting the evacuation of seriously wounded personnel.

(3) Air Ambulance service was furnished by one helicopter ambulance located in the forward area with back-up air evacuation support furnished by elements of the 498th Air Ambulance Company stationed near Pleiku. Extraction of casualties from forward areas proved to be a major problem. The UH-1D helicopter, equipped with winch for hoisting operations, has proven inadequate in the mountainous area northwest of Plei Djereng, where the terrain is covered by a double and triple canopy jungle. In order to make extractions, helicopters were required to hover over trees which, in some cases, exceeded 150 feet in height at altitudes over 4500 feet above sea level. Adequate helicopter landing zones in these areas are extremely rare. Pilots operating helicopter ambulances found that on a hot day the UH-1D helicopter, equipped with a winch and manned with full crew, will not hover above 150 feet trees. In many cases, the only solution was to request the use of USAF HU3 "Husky" helicopter, or to request the 52d Aviation Battalion to perform the mission with a CH 47 "Chinook". The Air Force is not always able to divert their rescue helicopters from their primary mission. The large CH-47 helicopter, presents a lucrative and highly vulnerable target when used to extract casualties. Recently, some UH-1D helicopter ambulances in the Pleiku area have been equipped with new type engines which increased their capability.

(4) A summary of Medical service activities is given below:

(a) Total patients seen 1664

(b) Patients evacuated to 18th Surgical Hospital 227
CONFIDENTIAL

28 January 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

(c) Patients evacuated to main clearing station: 813
(d) Patients returned to duty from forward clearing station: 624

Above figures do not include casualties processed by 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division medical facilities.

e. Transportation:

(1) Land lines of communications within the PAUL REVERE IV AO include Route 509 from Pleiku to Plei Djereng, Route 19 from Pleiku to Duc Co, and Route 11b. These roads are restricted to one-way traffic, except for the portion of Route 19 from Pleiku to Oasis. Necessary security was provided by tank and armored cavalry units organic to the Division and also by C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment.

(2) Traffic control was maintained by use of TCPs and convoy control personnel. Clearance by the Division Transportation Office was required for movement of a convoy.

(3) An average of 100 cargo vehicles per day used the route from the Pleiku area to Plei Djereng. Normally, convoys were organized in march units of 25 vehicles.

f. Communications.

(1) SOP Radio Relay was established from Division to the Brigades. However, the need to have immediate access to the Forward Supply Agency, Pleiku Sub Area Log Command at Plei Djereng resulted in the establishment of a second Radio Relay system to 2d Brigade. A Radio Relay system from 2d Brigade to the FSA was also established. It is expected that in future operations these communications requirements will be satisfied by the USARV Area Signal Battalion (13d Sig En) located in Pleiku. The need to provide communications to a supporting unit caused a reduction in flexibility of the Division Signal Battalion. During operation PAUL REVERE IV, VHF communications were established from division to battalion level when battalions were on separate missions. As examples, communications were established to the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor and to the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry.

(2) The AN/MRC-112 was tested on an operational basis from Dragon Mountain Base Camp to 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry located at ZA0845 during the period 1 through 5 December. It has been determined that the AN/MRC-112 is extremely expensive, from a frequency utilization standpoint, to operate. The MRC-112 requires six PM frequencies to pass four channels to voice, while six channels of voice can be passed on the VRC-12 series radios utilizing the same number of frequencies.
(3) During the operation the infantry battalions often operated beyond the range of the VRC-12 series radios. To overcome this distance problem the Yagi antenna was used successfully by both the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division, the 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, and the 2d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division (AM). Of particular interest was the 70km shot from 4th Division Base Camp to Hong Kong Mountain at An Khe. The system provided excellent communications in rugged terrain by taking advantage of the phenomenon of obstacle gain.

(4) Dust has been a serious problem in the operation area. Especially susceptible to the effects of dust were switchboards and teletype equipment. Doors of vans had to be kept closed and the ventilation system used in an effort to eliminate dust. Blower filters had to be cleaned as often as twice in a 24 hour period in order to maintain efficiency.

Other services. Services were furnished to units on a continuing basis as indicated.

(1) Bath services were provided at both Oasis and Plei Djereng support areas. Up to 400 personnel availed themselves of these facilities daily.

(2) Laundry facilities were initially provided at both forward support areas. Eventually an augmented laundry section was established in the vicinity of LZ 3G. This facility gave individual laundry service twice each week.

(3) Graves registration services in the forward area were furnished by the F.S.A. Memorial service in Base Camp was furnished by the Graves Registration Section 4th S&T Battalion.

1h. (c) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES.

a. PAUL REVES IV was the 1st Infantry Division indoctrination in the use of CIDG Companies. Personnel from U.S. Special Forces expressed a strong desire for their CIDG Companies to work independently of US Forces and in separate areas of operations. Special Forces advisors recommended that the CIDG Companies be used on the flank, out in front of US elements or for rear area security. The 1st Infantry Division agreed with this method of employment and first utilized the CIDG when operations began west of the Nam Sathay River. Task Force PRONG was formed and conducted a heli-assault into an area of operations west of the Nam Sathay River to screen the west and southwest flank of
the 4th Infantry Division. Task Force PRONG consisted of the 3d MIKE Force from Pleiku, a CIDG Company from Duo Co and a CIDG Company from Plei Djerong. Shortly after being committed, the Task Force encountered a large NVA force. The NVA force had more fire power, more and apparently better trained troops than the CIDG Companies. Consequently, the 4th Infantry Division committed three battalions across the Nan Satray River. The CIDG Companies were now employed by having one CIDG Company operate with each battalion. The US battalion supplied the extra fire power plus man power to assist in any contacts made by the CIDG Companies. Generally, battalions used the CIDG as a flank element or in the locale of the fire support base. A US company or Recon Platoon normally worked with the CIDG Company. This method of employment gave the CIDG more responsive fire power and proved to be the most effective method of using this type force. The technique of employing CIDG with US forces is proving to be a worthwhile method of conducting joint operations against NVA/VC units.

b. During the period 2 November through 31 December, the 33d Infantry Platoon, Scout Dog, committed its 15 available scout dog teams a total of 244 times in support of 167 separate combat missions. The Scout Dog Teams consisted of one scout dog handler and his dog. The teams consistently proved their ability. They alerted supported units to the presence of enemy personnel, equipment and food caches which would have otherwise been undetected, or at best detected too late for proper reaction. Additionally, the teams proved to be an excellent morale booster, inspiring the confidence of supported units by providing an early warning and detection capability.

(1) A recapitulation of actions involving scout dog alerts follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>ACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 Nov 66</td>
<td>Scout dog alerted on a deserted platoon size base camp area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Nov 66</td>
<td>Scout dog alerted to a concealed tunnel containing bloody bandages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Nov 66</td>
<td>Scout dog alerted on enemy. Point squad then reconnoitered by fire killing one NVA and wounding another. Two field packs of rice were captured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Nov 66</td>
<td>Scout dog team discovered five enemy huts and miscellaneous equipment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL

20 Nov 66  Scout dog alerted on enemy 100 meters distance; results were one NVA killed in action and one carbine captured.

25 Nov 66  Two scout dog teams, working together, constantly alerted between 2300 and 2400 hours on a specified area of a company's defensive perimeter. The following morning two claymore mines were missing in the area the dogs had alerted on.

30 Nov 66  Scout dog team discovered three combat packs and miscellaneous clothing.

3 Dec 66   A scout dog team found one AK-47 rifle and 15,000 rounds of 12.7mm ammunition.

7 Dec 66   Scout dog team discovered two tons of rice.

10 Dec 66  Scout dog alert enabled supported company to surprise enemy and kill two NVA soldiers and capture one AK-47 and four bandoleers of ammunition.

11 Dec 66  Scout dog team discovered one VC hiding and 2000 lbs of rice.

(2) The area of operation for PAUL REVERE IV consisted mostly of densely wooded terrain with thick underbrush. This type of terrain is difficult for scout dog operations as it causes the dogs to tire rapidly; thus reducing their performance. To overcome this problem when working in dense underbrush, scout dog teams should work in pairs. The teams can then take turns working at the point of the patrol while one team moves near the rear of the patrol over a cleared path. When the use of scout dog teams was first introduced some commanders lacked confidence and patience with the teams. This attitude later proved to be in error. Several instances were recorded of ignored alerts causing units to be surprised by an enemy or failing to locate enemy positions.

15. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS:

a. During OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV the enemy employed major elements of two NVA divisions against the 4th Infantry Division in one of the most rugged areas in South Vietnam near his Cambodian sanctuary. The terrain, consisting of uninhabited heavily jungled mountains and river valleys, favored enemy operations, restricted the mobility of US forces and to a degree reduced the effectiveness of our fire power.
b. At the beginning of OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV, the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division had already experienced several months of heavy combat and was in every sense of the word a battle tested organization. However, OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV presented 4th Infantry Division troops with the first heavy combat since their arrival in Vietnam. The success of these elements in heavy engagements with large North Vietnamese Army forces established the validity of the pre-deployment training of these forces. In analyzing the performance of these units, it is concluded that the accelerated program conducted by the Division at Fort Lewis, Washington was adequate and that these units were well prepared for combat in Vietnam. Additionally the performance of the young draftees, who comprised a large percentage of the rifle strength, was of such high order as to receive extremely favorable comment by commanders at all levels. These soldiers are well motivated, of high intelligence, resourceful, and in good physical condition.

c. US firepower was a decisive factor in the defeat of the enemy, and resulted in heavy casualties for him and relatively light friendly casualties. The employment of heavy mortar and artillery fire by US forces produced heavy enemy casualties and impeded his capability to withdraw, reinforce or maneuver. Tactical air support was responsive to requirements of the ground commanders and in many instances was the preferred fire support means because of the effectiveness of these weapon systems against enemy bunkers and fortifications under the jungle canopy. The B-52 strikes employed throughout the PAUL REVERE IV area of operations inflicted heavy casualties and in certain instances were the major factor in overcoming strongly fortified and defended positions. In short, US firepower was a decisive element in this operation and unquestionably prevented hundreds of friendly casualties.

d. The area of operation consisted of heavily jungled mountains and river valleys. There were very few cleared areas which could be used for helicopter assault operations or for resupply and evacuation missions. The clearing of suitable landing zones presented major problems and particularly in resupply and evacuation of friendly casualties and enemy prisoners of war. Clearing of areas suitable for the establishment of infantry battalion firebases was a major task. Combat engineers equipped with chain saws and demolitions were effective in clearing the jungle but several days were usually required to complete a single firebase. This was primarily due to the thickness of the jungle and the size and hardness of the trees.

e. Malaria was the major casualty producer during the operation. Although it was known that the area of operation was highly infested with falciparum bearing mosquitoes, and strong command emphasis was placed on all known antimalaria measures, the division suffered a large number of malaria cases. The malaria rate continued to increase as the operation
continued due to fatigue, increased exposure and decreased resistance. In addition, the proximity of US forces to large numbers of malaria-ridden North Vietnamese Army soldiers for extended periods of time is believed to have contributed to the malaria rate.

f. The Cambodian sanctuary afforded major tactical and strategic benefits to the enemy. The availability of the sanctuary enabled the enemy to stockpile large quantities of supplies well forward with no risk of destruction, to withdraw into the sanctuary when his forces became threatened, and to maintain significant forces in complete safety which could be employed at will to reinforce units in contact or to conduct attacks against US forces. Operations against the enemy in the vicinity of the border were difficult for US forces in that maneuver room was limited and it was difficult to interdict enemy routes of withdrawal, reinforcement and resupply without a border violation.

16. (c) LESSONS LEARNED: Observations and analysis of actions occurring during PAUL REVERE IV reveal several items worthy of consideration to improve future operations.

e. Operational.

(1) Item: Employment of CIDG units with US units.

Discussion: During OPERATION PAUL REVERE IV, CIDG companies operated in conjunction with US forces on several occasions. Three general methods of employment were employed.

(a) In the first method several CIDG companies, operating together, were assigned a separate area of operations. These forces, lacking the firepower of US forces, did not have the staying power to successfully engage large NVA forces. Consequently, they suffered heavy casualties and required the rapid commitment of US forces to prevent their destruction.

(b) In the second method, a CIDG company, attached to a US infantry battalion, was assigned a sector of the battalion area of operation in which to operate on its own. Several problems arose in using this technique. Communications were difficult, consequently, control suffered. Fire support proved difficult to employ unless a US forward observer was attached, thus straining battalion resources. CIDG companies operating on their own lacked the staying power to successfully engage North Vietnamese units.

(c) In the third method, a task force was formed which consisted of a CIDG company and a US reconnaissance or rifle platoon, with the headquarters company commander or the US recon/rifle platoon leader in command. In this case, communications were up to standard, as was artillery
fire support and land navigation. By employment of this technique, the CIDG unit also received training and experience in US methods of operation. The US battalion also gained another maneuver element, fully responsive to command's orders. Under this arrangement, CIDG units reacted satisfactorily in contact with the enemy and generally displayed good fire discipline. When closely supervised and supported performance in combat was satisfactory.

Observation: When CIDG units are integrated into a task force with US forces, they can be used effectively. The CIDG unit so employed also receives significant training value from its participation with US forces in this type operations.

(2) Item: Employment of illuminating rounds as initial locating rounds when smoke shells are not available.

Discussion: As an added safety factor when firing close support missions, a smoke shell is normally utilized as the first round (locating round) in "will adjust" missions. It has been found that when smoke shells are not available, illuminating rounds, with a 200 meter height of burst, provide an acceptable substitute. When high angle fire must be utilized, this desired height of burst may be obtained by the following method. Shell illumination is fired with data taken from the high angle firing tables for shell HE. Since we have no tables for high angle illumination, the problem is computation of a fuze setting. The following method was used with good results: convert the terminal velocity (from Table F, TTP) to meters per second (feet x .3048 = meters); divide this figure into 1000, add the vertical interval between the battery and the target (the quotient here is a number of seconds); subtract this figure from time of flight (Table F, TTP), and the result is the fuze setting which gives an approximate 200 meter height of burst. When choices of charges are available, the higher charge should be selected because it gives a greater angle of fall and, therefore, minimizes range deviation.

Observation: The above method provides a usable fuze setting for firing shell illumination, using high angle fire. This method provides an excellent substitute for shell smoke (when smoke is not available).

(3) Item: Use of Fuze VT against enemy snipers.

Discussion: In one area of operation, the supported infantry ran into sniper fire from enemy tied in the tops of trees. Fuze quick or delay was found to be ineffective since the burst would occur below the snipers. On suggestion from the battery FDC, the forward observer began using Fuze VT, high angle, with good effect.
AVDDH-GC

28 January 1967


Observation: In enemy contacts, where snipers in trees are being encountered, the most effective method of utilizing supporting artillery is with Fuze VT, high angle. If carefully adjusted and moved in front of advancing infantry, this is a highly effective means of countering snipers in trees.

(4) Item: Arrangement of battalion fire bases.

Discussion: Over the entire period of OPERATION RAUL REVERE IV, a variety of schemes have been employed concerning the arrangement of the battalion fire bases.

Observation: An orderly plan for CP (fire base) arrangement increases the ease and rapidity with which new CP's may be established, insures a uniform, functional position, and allows commanders involved to deploy their units with dispatch, minimum guidance, and minimum delay.

(5) Item: Command and control aircraft.

Discussion: The Command and Control helicopter, UH-1D, assigned to the battalions on a daily basis are lift ships without consoles and with ground radios installed. Thus an AN/PRC-25 must be taken on the ship by the commander and S3. This arrangement uses a short antenna and provides unsatisfactory communication. The use of the long antenna is extremely hazardous because the natural tendency to place the radio in upright position moves the long antenna into contact with the main rotor blade either breaking the antenna, damaging the rotor blade, or both. A recommended solution (until sufficient consoles become available) is to mount exterior antennas on the C & C UH-1D's, with inside connectors for the unit AN/PRC-25 antennas. This scheme would allow the unit to furnish the radio but would give increased effectiveness because of the improved antenna arrangement.

Observation: Until sufficient consoles can be installed, certain UH-1D's should be designated C & C ships and two exterior antennas for the AN/PRC-25 should be installed on these selected ships.

(6) Item: Winch equipped helicopters.

Discussion: The thick jungle canopy and lack of cleared areas in the area of operations made preparation of LZ's extremely difficult. Evacuation of casualties was a major, time consuming problem. The winch equipped UH-1D lacked the power to be able to hover at these altitudes.

Observation: A more powerful, winch equipped helicopter is required for the extraction of casualties in areas of thick jungle canopy.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDH-GC


(7) Item: Utilization of rifle strength.

Discussion: A large percentage of unit rifle strength is required for static defense-type missions. One rifle company normally secures each battalion firebase and another company is usually required to secure a brigade forward base. Thus a minimum of four of the nine rifle companies in a three battalion brigade are tied to defensive positions.

Observation: The addition of one rifle company to each battalion would increase the battalion's offensive capability by at least one-third.

(6) Item: Countermortar measures.

Discussion: The NVA made extensive use of mortars against our forces. The construction of positions with overhead cover became habitual and significantly reduced casualties from enemy mortar fire. Countermortar radars and countermortar fire limited the effectiveness of enemy mortars.

Observation: Construction of overhead cover should be SOP in all situations when possible. Countermortar radar employed in forward areas has proven that it is a valuable aid in placing rapid and effective countermortar fires.

(9) Item: High terrain between brigade and battalion created a problem for direct communication on voice radio nets.

Discussion: The antenna, RC-292, often would not provide a satisfactory means of communications for the AN/VRC-46 series of radios. Use of the YAGI directional antenna, designed for the VHF terminal set AN/MRC-112, met the requirement to establish VHF/FM voice communications between stations 35 kilometers apart (even though much higher terrain lay directly in the Signal path). A minor adaptation of the coaxial cable connector, U6-255, made the YAGI antenna and its cable compatible with the AN/VRC-46 series of radios. One disadvantage of the YAGI antenna is that only frequencies above 51.9 can be used. This requires placement of an AN/VRC-49 radio in automatic retransmit position order to retransmit the higher frequency (used with the YAGI) to a frequency of a lower kilocycle order used on brigade and battalion command nets. Frequencies of the low kilocycle order must be used on command and artillery nets to communicate with aircraft using the old series of radios (AN/ARC-44).

Observation: The YAGI antenna, designed for the VHF terminal set AN/MRC-112 will meet requirements for VHF/FM voice communications between stations in excess of 35 kilometers separation even though high terrain lies directly in the signal path.
CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDH-GC


b. Logistics and Equipment.

(1) Item: Resupply Operations.

Discussion: All resupply from the brigade base forward was effected by helicopter. Resupply of all classes was adequate throughout the operation even to the extent of feeding hot A rations on a regular basis to many units. Initially, resupply aircraft were allocated on a preplanned sortie basis. However, this system proved to be too inflexible to meet the requirements of the rifle battalion. Subsequently, two UH-1D helicopters were made available each day to each rifle battalion for resupply and command and control purposes. This system of aircraft allocation proved to be most satisfactory. All resupply was accomplished by these aircraft except for artillery ammunition resupply which was accomplished by CH 47's on a preplanned sortie basis.

Observation: Two UH-1D's plus required artillery resupply by CH 47's provide adequate resupply means for a rifle battalion in even the heaviest combat.

(2) Item: Free fall water containers.

Discussion: On numerous occasions during this operation, water and supplies had to be airdropped to individual units. The free fall water container, three gallon capacity, is the best means available for air dropping water. When a unit is in an inaccessible location, the only resupply it receives is that dropped from aircraft. The metal water can cannot be dropped safely from an aircraft. Also, they become heavily damaged. The free fall water containers have been successfully used but sufficient containers are not available to fill the need.

Observation: The free fall water container should be issued to units operating in RVN. The recommended stockage level at battalion is 500 containers for a 90 day operation.

(3) Item: Ammunition Supply, 105mm Howitzer.

Discussion: It has been noted that more time is required to prepare 105mm rounds for firing when they are shipped as individual rounds in metal cannisters than when they are shipped in wooden boxes. This is significant in that it takes several hours longer to prepare 1,000 rounds of 105mm ammunition shipped in metal cannisters than when the same number is shipped in wooden boxes.

Observation: A return to the use of wooden shipping boxes or a modified metal container for 105mm ammunition would be desirable.
CONFIDENTIAL


(4) Item: The need exists for an issued M79 ammunition carrying vest.

Discussion: The M79 grenadiers normally carry 50 (+) 40mm rounds. The basic load of 18 rounds is insufficient. Grenadiers have devised an assortment of methods for carrying extra rounds. Some units have adopted a vest made from jungle fatigues with sewn M79 grenade bandoleers. This vest has pouches for 24 to 30 rounds; additional rounds are carried in a claymore bag. By using the grenade bandoleers as pouches, rapid reloading is effected.

Observation: A standard M79 ammunition vest, strong and light weight, should be devised and issued to M79 grenadiers.

(5) Item: The need exists for 30 round magazines for the M-16 rifle.

Discussion: A 30 round magazine for the M-16 rifle will increase the capability of the individual rifleman to maintain sustained fire. Additionally, such a magazine would enable riflemen to deliver a greater volume of automatic fire which is required in meeting engagements in thick jungle terrain. A limited number of such magazines were obtained and found to be highly satisfactory by personnel who used them in combat operations.

Observation: The 20 round magazines should be replaced by 30 round magazines.

(6) Item: Heavy duty chain saws and light-weight bulldozers.

Discussion: The area of operations was overgrown with hardwood trees, principally mahogany and teak. Clearing of such timber for the construction of landing zones and fire bases was accomplished by demolitions and chain saws. The light weight chain saws issued to infantry units proved incapable of cutting teak and mahogany without mechanical failure. Availability of a light-weight bulldozer, transportable by CH 47, would have greatly expedited the clearing of LZ's and fire bases.

Observation: A heavy-duty chain saw capable of cutting hardwood and a light-weight bulldozer are required by infantry units in such areas of operations.

(7) Item: AN/PRC 6 radio.

Discussion: The AN/PRC 6 radio was useless in combat operations in the jungle. A light-weight short range radio is required for communications between the platoon leader and the rifle squad.
Observation: A suitable radio should be developed and issued for communication between the platoon leader and his squad leaders.

c. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations.

(1) Item: Scheduled leaflet drops are not always on target.

Discussion: The pilots should be given their mission area, the type leaflet to be dropped, frequencies and call signs of the supported ground unit, and be instructed to contact the ground unit prior to dropping leaflets. The ground maneuver unit can guide PSYWAR aircraft to the correct area.

Observation: By contacting the ground unit before dropping leaflets, maximum flexibility and response to the tactical situation can be incorporated into the PSYWAR program.

(2) Item: Village crowd control.

Discussion: Control of the crowds in villages located in close proximity to urban areas is a major problem in conducting civil affairs operations. These people tend to be more aggressive and seek handouts instead of waiting until civil affairs commodities can be distributed as scheduled. Loudspeakers and crowd control barriers (i.e., engineer tape) have proven successful in this respect.

Observation: A well thought out plan for each village operation is a must.

(3) Item: Coordination for use of local labor.

Discussion: Any type of village civil affairs project which involves the use of village labor must be wholeheartedly endorsed by the village chief. If the chief is not present at the time of the proposal of the project to the village, the task will not be accomplished. The village chief is the key individual.

Observation: Insure coordination of civil affairs projects with the village chief prior to instituting any program involving local labor.

(4) Item: Control of gifts and handouts.

Discussion: When conducting village civil affairs operations it is necessary to control handouts and gifts. If the civil affairs teams or units involved are too generous, the village will develop an attitude of "sit around and wait until handouts are distributed".
AVDDH-GC.
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

Observation: Accomplish all work projects in a village before distributing gifts.

(5) Item: Control of spontaneous giving.

Discussion: Uncontrolled spontaneous gifts by units and individuals to villages or villagers disrupt the civil affairs plan for an area and have an adverse effect on progress.

Observation: All gifts and donations must be controlled and coordinated through Civil Affairs personnel.

(6) Item: Attachment of Civil Affairs personnel for village operations.

Discussion: Units engaged in tactical operations involving villages should have civil affairs personnel attached. Entering and searching a village in which civil affairs operations have been or are being conducted should be coordinated through Civil Affairs personnel.

Observation: The effectiveness of both combat operations and civil affairs operations can be enhanced when coordination is effected with Civil Affairs personnel who have worked in villages being cleared by combat forces.

(7) Item: Civil affairs projects completions.

Discussion: The policy of completing one self-help project before initiating another helps motivate the village concerned as well as the adjoining villages in supporting the civil affairs self-help operations.

Observation: Complete one self-help civil affairs project before starting another.

(8) Item: Use of ARVN personnel in civil affairs operations.

Discussion: The use of ARVN personnel in civil affairs operations has proven to be very successful in bringing the Montagnards and GVN closer together.

Observation: Whenever possible, utilize available ARVN personnel to augment US civil affairs personnel when conducting operations.

16. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That a fourth rifle company be added to every rifle battalion.

b. That intensive research be conducted to develop improved antimalaria drugs.
AVFA-OC-OT (28 Jan 67)  1st Inf
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS MACJ 3-32) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, 1 FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, APO 95350  20 MAR 1967

TO:  Commander, United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam, ATTN:
    MACJ 343, APO 96222

1. (U) Concur with the contents of the Combat Operations After Action Report - PAUL REVERE IV of 4th Infantry Division with the following comments.

2. (C) Reference paragraph 13f (1): The subject of which agency provides support to meet requirements such as that described is still under study at USARV.

3. (C) Reference paragraph 16c (1): Leaflet drops are made based on the target area, windspeed, and altitude of the aircraft. Therefore, a ground observer would not be of any value to the pilot. However, there is a requirement for all organizations to submit a daily psychological operations situation report, as indicated in I FFORCIV (C) message C-0820, subject: Psychological Situation Report (U), 03 October 1966. In addition, completion of a mission sheet which should be provided to the 5th or 9th Air Commando Squadron would minimize the problem of coordination.

4. (C) Reference paragraph 17 - Recommendations.

   a. Reference paragraph 17a: A preliminary study has been conducted and the position of this headquarters is that resources required to form a fourth rifle company must be provided from resources outside of I FFORCIV.

   b. Reference paragraph 17b: Extensive research to develop improved anti-malaria drugs has been conducted continuously, for at least a three year period, throughout the United States. A special research team from Walter Reed General Hospital is presently conducting research in-country. These research activities have been widely publicized in various news media, to include USARV medical bulletins.

   c. Reference paragraph 17c: The requirement for a heavy-duty chain saw has been evidenced on numerous occasions, however, these saws should be issued to engineer units rather than infantry units. This would in no way detract from the availability of this item to support infantry units in landing zone clearance.

   d. Reference paragraph 17d: The AN/PRT-4 and the AN/PRT-9 have been developed to meet this requirement. These items are scheduled for delivery in-country beginning in April 1967.
AVDDH-GC

b. That a heavy duty chain saw be procured for issue to infantry units in Vietnam.

c. That a light-weight short range radio be provided for communications between infantry platoon leaders and squad leaders.

d. That the 20 round K-16 magazine be replaced by the 30 round magazine.

e. That a suitable ammunition vest be developed and issued to rifle grenadiers.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

NICHOLAS R. COJLucia
Captain, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION

1 - ACSFOR - DA
1 - QCMH - DA
1 - CINCUSARPAC
1 - USARY
4 - I FFORCEV
1 - CO, 2d Bde, 4th Inf Div
1 - CO, 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div
1 - CO, 1st Air Cav Div (AAB)
1 - CO, 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div
1 - CO, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div
1 - CO, 1st Sodn, 10th Cav
1 - CO, 1st Bn, 69th Armor
1 - CO, 52d Avn Bn
1 - CO, 52d Arty Gp
1 - CO, Div Arty
1 - CC, 4th Avn Bn
1 - CC, 4th Engr Bn
1 - CC, 124th Sig Bn
1 - CO, DISCOM
1 - ACofS; G1
1 - ACofS, G2
1 - ACofS, G3
1 - ACofS, G4
1 - ACofS, G5
4 - TheP (ALO), 4th Inf Div
1 - CO, 29th Mil Hist Det
AVFA-OG-OT (28 Jan 67)

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS MACJ 3-32) (U)

   e. Reference paragraph 17e: There is no overriding requirement for a 30 round magazine. It is desirable to have one 30 round magazine and ten 20 round magazines per weapon, as stated in FFORECV (C) message A-0329, subject: Weapons Information (U), dtg 25Jan 1967, NOSAL.


FOR THE COMMANDER:

CHARLES L. JOHNSON
CPT, AGC
Asst AG