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these Army Aviators who successfully landed aircraft without damage following emergencies encountered in flight.

Well Done

CPT Blunt, Co A, 25th Avn Bn
CPT Jacobs, HHC, 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div (AM)
CPT Quarles, HHC, 214th CAB
LT LaBourn, 170th Avn Co
CPT Cook, 220th Avn Co
CW2 Dartos, Co A, 289th AMB
CW2 Modlin, Co A, 28th Avn Bn
WOL Beasley, Co A, 123d Avn Bn
WOL Crawford, 120th Avn Co
WOL Grossman, 48th Avn Co
WOL Hancock, C Trp, 18th ACS
WOL Long, B Trp, 3/17th Cav
WOL Mansfield, 336th Avn Co
WOL Geiger, 385th AHC
WOL Stuble, C Trp, 7/17th Cav
WOL Hume, A Trp, 3/17th Cav
WOL Troisi, Co E, 222d AMB
WOL Warren, Co A, 4th Avn Bn
WOL Wilson, C Trp, 7/1st ACS
WOL Young, B Trp, 3/17th Cav
COMMANDER'S COMMENTS

During the buildup of Army aviation in Vietnam and throughout the period of increasing combat intensity cresting soon after Tet 1968, a malady known as the "combat syndrome" surfaced in all kinds of units. This syndrome sometimes attacked unsuspecting aviators and aviation commanders causing them to shrug their shoulders and comment "C'est la guerre," when accidents occurred as a result of the overextension of a pilot's skill or an aircraft's capabilities. Strong command action and the ever growing professionalism of Army aviators have achieved marked success in keeping this problem under control.

As the tempo of combat in Vietnam diminishes and the presence of Army aviation in Vietnam is reduced, a new malady awaits the unwary. The threat today and in the future is the "complacency syndrome." There is a growing tendency to regard today's challenges with less respect than those of the past. "There is nothing new (in airmobile operations) under the (Vietnam) sun." It is also human nature to respond to the occasion. Army aviation in Vietnam has faced mounting challenges with boundless energy, ever growing professionalism, innovation, and dauntless courage. On the other side of the human nature coin is the tendency to do even less when less is demanded, to overrelax when the heat is off or the pressure is eased.

It is time for each Army aviator, irrespective of his duty assignment and the scope of his responsibilities, to take stock of himself and his situation and to resolve not to become a victim of the "complacency syndrome," but to use the opportunities available to improve himself and his performance. Army aviation has established an enviable record under most trying circumstances. As activity declines, our accident experience must also decline, preferably at a more rapid rate. To do otherwise would result in losing sight of past accomplishments and would inhibit future developments. This could only hamper development of the Army's program of fully integrated aviation. We have only "scratched the surface" of the potential for application of three dimensional mobility to Army operations. The challenges to innovate and improve are as great as ever. Only through moving forward can this program remain viable.

It is with these thoughts that I take this opportunity to wish each of you a Merry Christmas and to ask all of you to join in making 1971 a safe and Happy New Year for the Army Aviation community.

JACK W. HEMINGWAY
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding
The story you are about to read is partially true. It is a reconstruction of an actual event, only the names have been changed to protect the innocent. It’s purpose is to illustrate a point that should become obvious. Despite all the efforts of instructor pilots at training centers in CONUS, unit instructors within RVN, the guidance of older and more experienced pilots, and the concentrated efforts of commanders at all levels, there will always be the individual that doesn’t appreciate his own limitations or accept the advice of others. I call him the:

"Ten Percenter"

This story really begins with a conversation that went something like this:

"Hey, Hoss! What’s up?"
"Nothing man. Doing any flying today?"
"Maybe-standby all day."
"You gun drivers have it made!"
"Oh yeah? Want to trade jobs for a day?"
"Tell you what, if you’re not scheduled tomorrow why not fly as my copilot on resupply? I don’t think you can keep up with me, but I offer you the opportunity."

"I’m not scheduled tomorrow and I’ll take that offer. You know, I have not flown slicks for four months, but I’ll bet I can still fly your butt off."
"Okay, we’ll see, takeoff is at 0730. Be there."

The mission was a typical resupply along coastal compounds. Some of the areas were pinnacle type, others confined areas and none extremely difficult for a pilot familiar with the areas, existing winds, etc. During the seven sorties flown in the morning hours, the aircraft commander had closely monitored the flying techniques of his friend/copilot. He insured that no unnecessary risks were taken and continued to remind himself that "John" had not flown slicks for four months. During the sorties flown after lunch, the progress of the copilot continued to improve and the aircraft commander allowed him to make more of the takeoffs and landings.

They had reported to the supported headquarters at 0800, flown seven sorties in the morning and were completing the third of the afternoon when they received word that release time would be 1600 rather than 1730 as originally planned.
"How about that!" Exclaimed the
aircraft commander. "These people have their "Sierra" in order. We will be home by 1630. It's about time the good guys got a break!"

The final sortie was completed and the aircraft began it's flight home. They had to drop off one passenger at LZ Squak enroute to their home station.

The aircraft commander spoke, "Well John, what do you think?"

"I'll tell you, I'm a bit tired. 0730 to over 1630 gets to be a long day in and out of these areas. From what I've seen today though, the units seem to be reasonably well organized. Tell me, do things usually go this well with an early release time thrown in?"

"Hell no! Quite often they try to extend us for some additional mickey mouse thing. Today, admittedly, went real well. I have to admit too, that for a gun driver you did pretty good. I will even buy the first round tonight.

Upon landing at LZ Squak the aircraft was met by the district advisor who told the aircraft commander, "Yoµ fellows did a fine job for us today and I really hate to ask, but could you make one more short trip to pick up three PAX, one of whom needs to get here to close out his records. He is scheduled to DEROS tomorrow."

The aircraft commander switched to "PVT" and said, "See what I mean John, always something else. We'll pick up his man for him since he's going to DEROS. This is going to be his last in-country ride, so we will give him a DEROS ride he won't forget. What do you say?"

"Yeah, that's a good idea and since we'll have only the three PAX aboard, I'd like to see just what this thing will do."

The aircraft commander told the advisor they would pick up the passengers and return them to LZ Squak and then took off. The flight to the pick-up area was uneventful.

The PAX's had not been notified and twenty minutes elapsed before they were all on board and ready to go. Needless to say, the extra 20 minute delay contributed to the irritability of the entire aircraft crew. Takeoff was made hastily and a route of flight established that would take the aircraft along the beach.

The pilot spoke to the crew chief saying, "Hey Chief! Tell that "grunt" we're going to give him a ride he can tell his civilian friends about!"

"I told him, Sir. He looks kinda scared already."

"Tell you what John, we will go low level along the beach from X-ray to Bravo. I know that area and it's OK. That should impress the grunt. Besides, I know my slick like you know your gunship. With all the time I've put in slicks, I can fly this thing blindfolded."

"How much time do you have now?"

"Oh, I've got an least 500 hours."

"Is that X-ray over there?"

"Yeah, that's it. Here we go!"

Dear Mr. & Mrs. Jones:

It is with the greatest sympathy that I find it necessary to write this letter, As the commanding officer of your son, ..............

Post Script

This aircraft was observed by a Vietnamese fisherman, flying at an excessive rate of speed at less than 20 feet above the beach. As the aircraft neared a slight rise, the nose of the aircraft rose abruptly, an obvious attempt to avoid recently constructed fishnet towers. The tail boom impacted with the edge of a sand dune and subsequently crashed. Wreckage was strewn for 700 meters along the beach. Of the seven personnel aboard, the only survivor was the man for whom the DEROS ride was given.
FROM RISING SUN 'TIL MISSIONS END,
LET ONE OF THE "SOULS ON BOARD"
BE YOU... TO WATCH OVER THE MEN
WHO ARE ARMY AVIATION. GUIDE THEM
HOMeward SAFELY TO THEIR LOVED
ONES, KNOWING QUIETLY, PROUDLY,
THAT THEY ARE THE BEST
CPT Clifford Knight is the Assistant Division Safety Officer for the 1st Cav Div (AM). He is a graduate of the USC Aviation Safety Course and is serving his first tour in Vietnam.

Recently an Army aircraft was involved in a serious mishap which resulted in its total destruction. The bird was hit by hostile fire and burst into flames at 1200 feet. The aircraft commander did an excellent job of bringing the aircraft down, even though the flames were in the cockpit all around him and the tail boom was severed on short final. The most remarkable result, however, was that the pilot and aircraft commander survived with only minor burns. This can be directly attributed to the fact that both aviators wore nomex flight suits, gloves, and leather boots. The fact that both had their helmet visors down contributed greatly to the protection of their faces. The pilot's helmet and the AC's nomex shirt were recovered after the wreck. The helmet, an SPH-4, was blistered, the microphone had melted and the visor had begun to melt. This is an indication of the intense heat, yet, the pilot was protected. A close check of the nomex shirt revealed that the shoulder harness had been melted onto the collar of the shirt, but the AC received no burns in this area.

A great deal of money and effort has been expended in order to make protective clothing available to aviators. Any man who does not make use of this advantage is a fool. Nomex makes the difference in walking away from disaster and being burned to death in the wreckage.

TIPS ON WEARING NOMEX:

1. Never alter or repair nomex flight suits. The thread will burn and the suit will come apart in a fire.

2. Wear nomex gloves. The flight suit should be large enough to over-
During December, the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) is completely under the influence of the northeast monsoon. Compared with the southwest monsoon, however, the northeast monsoon is relatively cool and dry.

December is a dry season month except along the northeast and east coasts. Significant decreases in rainfall occur everywhere over RVN. Most rainfall is produced by showers or thunderstorms, but drizzle contributes to monthly totals along the east and northeast coast. The principal factor influencing precipitation is exposure to the moist monsoonal wind flow. Thus, the heaviest precipitation occurs along coastal and mountainous regions exposed to moist monsoonal winds.

Thunderstorms occur on an average of one day on the Ca Mau Peninsula and in the lowlands east of Saigon, and on less than one day everywhere else. They normally occur during the late afternoon, generally last only a few hours, and are seldom violent; however, strong winds can occur.

With northeast monsoonal winds dominating the area during December, cloudiness decreases over most of the Republic of Vietnam but increases, particularly below 8,000 feet, over the east coast, and adjacent highland regions. During surges of the northeast monsoon, multi-layered stratus, with ceilings below 2,000 feet, frequently occurs along the east coast of RVN. These clouds usually break up by midmorning and become scattered to broken cumulus, with bases 3,000 to 4,000 feet during the afternoon. The stratus may re-form and lower at night.

Stratus ceilings below 1,000 feet occasionally form over major rivers, particularly the Mekong, near sunrise, but usually burn off by 0900 LST. Nights are relatively clear and afternoon cloudiness is usually scattered 2,000 to 4,000 foot cumulus. Thunderstorms are rare but occur most often over southern RVN.

Visibility of 1 to 5 miles is common in early morning fog in the interior mountain valleys and in haze and smoke near heavily populated areas. Showers and thundershowers reduce the visibility to less than 5 miles for brief periods, and in more intense storms, to less than one mile. Nevertheless, visibility greater than 10 miles is not common anywhere. In general, surface visibility is best during the afternoon and air-to-ground visibility is best between 0900 and 1100 LST. During December the occurrence of fog increases. Radiation fog is most likely in river valleys, and most prevalent and persistent in deep, steepwalled valleys.

Detailed observations of actual weather and/or forecasts for flight planning to any location in the Republic of Vietnam can be obtained by calling 5th Weather Squadron weathermen located at all Army division and most brigade base camps or major Army resupply airfields.
DECEMBER 1970

Mean number of days with precipitation

LAOS
CAMBODIA

15
10
5
3

QUANG TRI
HUE
DA NANG
TAM KY
CHULAI
QUANG NGAI
KONTUM
PLEIKU
AN LIEU
QUI Nhon
NHA TRANG
PHAN RANG
TAY NINH
BIEN HOA
SAIGON
PHAN THIET
VUNG TAU
RACH GIA
BOC TRANG
QUANG LONG

DECEMBER
MEAN NUMBER OF DAYS
WITH PRECIPITATION

DECEMBER 1970
PAGE NINE
DECMEAN MONTHLY PRECIP
(INCHES)
A Unit Aviation Safety Officer I find myself asking this question with ever increasing frequency. The answers are elusive, but perhaps they shed some light on the motivation behind pilot error, the accident cause factor which is responsible for the greatest number of stupid accidents.

Being an aviator requires a spirit of adventure. I think it’s this very same spirit of adventure that creates some of our problems. How many accidents are caused by the pilot while performing an unauthorized maneuver? This is a case of an aviator putting all his confidence in his aircraft and testing his ability to go one step beyond what he has been taught. This is adventure, perhaps the same drive that put him in helicopters at Fort Wolters, Texas. It is also gross negligence and carelessness.

Pride is another contributing factor to pilot error. I have seen many blade strikes caused by pilots who just wouldn’t abort. A significant reason why they wouldn’t abort is their unwillingness to admit that a challenge exists that they cannot or, more accurately, should not accept. And, with half a dozen pilots in the air witnessing this contest between man, aircraft, and terrain, a pilot’s pride could lead him to his own death.

This is a brief look at only two of the reasons why we do it... why every day of the year, one of us makes that error which endangers our life and the lives of our crew. I have not discussed lack of knowledge, or professionalism, and I’m positive there are many more reasons why the best helicopter pilots in the world are also at times the most unsafe pilots. Perhaps an awareness of what causes pilot error could help reduce the frequency of this killer, caused by many things but, most often, by our own stupidity.
After making a recon. by fire run the pilot began his pull-out and struck a tree with his main rotor blades. A left turn was initiated and the main rotor blades and tail boom struck another tree. The horizontal stabilizer "hooked" the second tree and bent the tail boom at a point halfway between the body and the tail rotor assembly. The pilot entered autorotation and landed the aircraft, at which time the main rotor blades struck another tree. RESULTS: 1 injury.
The pilot of the UH-1D decided to fly low level in order to avoid other air traffic. After flying at 90 knots for 3-5 minutes a slight right turn was made to gain visual contact with traffic. All traffic was avoided but a 40 foot tall tree wasn't. (EDITOR'S NOTE: The blade struck the tree between one-half and one-third the way down from the top of the tree. The DASH 10 for the UH-1D states that the distance from the stabilizer bar to the ground is 13' 7". Just how close to the ground was the aircraft?)

During a test flight following a periodic inspection the test pilot noticed an unusual vibration and returned to maintenance to have the trim tabs adjusted. The flight was continued with a crew of three (one pilot) and six passengers were taken on board. During the final phase of the flight the autorotational characteristics were to be checked. The pilot entered autorotation and when he attempted a power recovery the engine failed to respond and the autorotation was continued to the ground. The right skid stuck in mud and the aircraft rolled on its right side and burst into flames.

Safety violations included:

1. Unauthorized personnel on board during the test flight.
2. Safety belts were not worn by passengers.
3. The pilot was not wearing nomex gloves and received 2nd degree burns of the left hand.
4. The autorotational check should have been conducted over an airfield with a crash rescue crew available.

RESULTS: 1 fatality, 1 injury.

CAUSE:
Test Pilot
Failure

The UH-1A pilot circled a Special Forces landing strip to determine if it was secure and to wait for smoke from ground troops to determine the wind direction. An approach was initiated and the aircraft touched down at midfield with full flaps. The pilot decided that he did not have enough room to stop the aircraft and elected to make a go-around. Full power was applied and the co-pilot brought the flaps all the way up, causing the aircraft to lose lift at a slow airspeed. The aircraft struck a low stump, ripping the fuel cells open and burst into flames. RESULTS: 4 fatalities.
The UH-1H was making mail runs to several locations. After off-loading a bag of mail, the pilot elected to make his takeoff in the direction of three high tension wires that were in his flight path to take advantage of a slight headwind (2 knots.) The pilot started his takeoff while the copilot was attempting to read off a hover check. The pilot stated that he thought he could clear the wires with a normal takeoff. The wires were approximately 50 feet from the aircraft and 30 feet higher than the takeoff area. The pilot departed under the wires and the tail rotor contacted the lowest wire, severing it. The tail rotor system was torn from the aircraft, causing it to spin to the right two or three times. The main rotor system contacted the ground, breaking it at the mast. The crew chief was in the process of strapping in when the wire strike occurred and he was thrown from the aircraft. RESULTS: 6 injuries.
ANYWHERE, RVN (AP) - When at approximately 125 feet and 50 to 60 knots airspeed the pilot heard a loud noise from the rear of the aircraft. Autorotation was entered and a left turn initiated. At 50 to 75 feet the pilot initiated a power on landing, at which time the aircraft began to spin out of control to the right. The aircraft hit the ground in a tail low attitude, striking the ground with the tail boom and rear portion of the skids. The loud noise that the pilot heard was caused by a briefcase that flew out of the aircraft and hit the tail rotor blades. When the pilot attempted the power recovery the tail rotor driveshaft snapped, resulting in the spin. RESULTS: 2 injuries.

CHU YAK, RVN (UPI) - A young Army aviator was reported to be in fair condition after suffering a mild stroke when he was told by his battalion flight surgeon, Dr. Altispeed, that the 140 hour flight restriction was going to be enforced. The pilot said he wasn’t tired but fell down the stairs when leaving the dispensary.
While hovering to a parking area, the pilot of the UH-1H heard a sound which he believed to be a piece of paper hitting the tail rotor. Suddenly the aircraft started a slow clockwise rotation. The pilot managed to stay clear of another parked aircraft and successfully completed a hovering autorotation.

When the tunnel cowling was opened the third section of the driveshaft was found to be extensively scored, cut and twisted apart in an area approximately four to six inches from the second hangar bearing. The bristles and wooden handle of a mechanics paint brush were strewn along the bearing tray beneath the driveshaft.

The aircraft was supporting ground troops and it was necessary to offload supplies from a high hover because the landing zone was too small for the aircraft. The first sortie was completed with no complications. On the second sortie, the aircraft carried a crew of four, one passenger, 500 pounds of cargo and 900 pounds of fuel. The approach was made downwind and was terminated at a 40 feet hover. The aircraft began to wobble, rotor RPM was bleeding off and the aircraft turned 180 degrees to the right, settling into the trees. (EDITOR'S NOTE: Hovering downwind, out of ground effect, while approximately 500 pounds over max gross, will most often lead to an accident.)

After refueling, the aircraft was brought to a hover while waiting for a departure clearance. There was a sudden loss of power and a successful hovering autorotation was completed. The aircraft was inspected and a three inch tear was found under one of the M-60 gun mounts. The pilots started the aircraft and completed a hover check and a droop cam check, at which time it was decided to attempt a five minute flight to the home base.

On takeoff, the engine again experienced a power loss and autorotation was entered with partial power. There was no visible damage. A maintenance operational check was accomplished and the aircraft was hovered for five minutes before the AC decided to hover the aircraft across a small field to his own maintenance area. As he attempted to hover over some small trees and bushes, the main driveshaft failed, resulting in a hard landing.

Inspection revealed that the short shaft had failed because of lack of lubrication and overheating. Maintenance records showed that the main driveshaft was overdue an inspection and lubrication by approximately 65 hours. (EDITOR'S NOTE: The day's mission had been completed, the aircraft was in a secure area and close enough to be towed to the unit's maintenance area.)
fter starting the OH-6A the pilot noticed that his fuel gauge indicated 300 pounds. After 40 minutes he noticed that the gauge was reading 150 pounds and that it dropped to 100 pounds after 45 minutes. At this time the pilot departed for his home station and, when on a right base, the engine surged and then quit. Autorotation was entered from 150 feet and 70 knots airspeed. The aircraft touched down with a high rate of descent, and the tail boom was torn off by a small knoll. The main rotor blades also flexed and contacted the rear of the aircraft.

(EDITOR'S NOTE: The pilot did not visually check the fuel tank during his preflight. In addition, he did not read the 2408-14, where the fuel gauge was written up as inaccurate. No leaks were found in the fuel cell or anywhere in the fuel system.)
HMM... WHAT’LL I GIVE EVERYBODY FOR XMAS?....
I KNOW WHAT THEY NEED!!

I’LL GIVE LINUS A NEW DASH 10!..... HE SURE CAN USE IT!!

LET’S SEE- Yup, FOR SCHROEDER, A NEW VISOR FOR HIS HELMET.
...HIS IS ALL SCRATCHED!!

NO QUESTION ABOUT PIG PEN, NEW LEATHER BOOTS- HE CAN’T BE FLYING WITH JUNGLE BOOTS!

I WONDER WHERE SANTA GETS HIS RED NOMEX!

SNOOPY FROM PEANUTS © United Features Syndicate, Inc., 1966
The air cavalry assets of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) accounted for an overwhelmingly one-sided victory in a mid-summer battle with NVA forces near the old Marine base at Khe Sanh.

North Vietnamese activities have persisted for several years in this grassy plains area located about 27 miles west-southwest of Quang Tri City. Enemy attempts to infiltrate regimental-size units near Khe Sanh have waxed and waned since early 1968. The 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), in close coordination with the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN), during early July of this year, determined that there was evidence of a new infiltration effort; that the Khe Sanh area should be kept under close surveillance.

The air cavalry element of the "Screaming Eagles" -- the 2nd Squadron (Airmobile), 17th Cavalry, commanded by LTC Robert F. Molinelli, -- consists of three air cavalry troops, one cavalry troop (ground combat unit), and Company L, 75th Infantry (Ranger). In their airmobile configuration, common items of the armor inventory, such as tanks and other tracked vehicles, have been traded for the helicopter. The inventory consists of UH-1H "Huey" slicks, which are used for command and control and troop lift; AH-1G "Cobra" gunships and the OH-6A light observation helicopter (LOH). The mission of these assets, stated generally, is to be the eyes and the ears of the division in the far reaching corners of the division area of operation. On 8 July, they did their job well!

As background, it was decided that, to support the increased surveillance plans, repositioning of cavalry assets was to be accomplished by moving two air troops and one ground troop from normal base camp areas of the 101st, near Hue, to Quang Tri Combat Base on 5 and 6 July. When completed, the reshuffling placed these reconnaissance elements much closer to the area of interest and decreased enroute time.
to the Khe Sanh Plain area.

On 8 July, at approximately 1130 hours, a "Pink Team" (One of several color coded combinations of different type helicopters or loads; in this case, one LOH "low bird" and one AH-1G "Cobra") from Troop A was conducting armed aerial reconnaissance in the plains area.

The "low bird," piloted by CW2 Russel Brown, III, had the job of looking for signs of enemy activity. He was backed up, above and behind, by his pink teammate a rocket-carrying Cobra. Brown was flying just above the elephant grass when he observed fresh footprints crossing the road. Closer inspection revealed three or four NVA soldiers; suddenly there were 10 to 15 enemy, then 20. Brown marked the target to pinpoint the group for the Cobra and then rolled away, observing as he did approximately 20 additional NVA soldiers who were sitting along both sides of a trail. He marked the new target with smoke and spotted another group, and then another. He continued along the trail, spotting and marking new groups of NVA. His radio transmissions reported that he was observing NVA "all over the place."

A total of 150 to 200 enemy were engaged by the pink team, and an accompanying command and control ship contributed to the firepower by employing its door gunners' M60 machineguns.

The sightings were passed immediately to the squadron tactical operations center (forward), located at Quang Tri. It was requested that all available gunships be dispatched to the area. Initial engagements resulted in 50 enemy killed.
CW3 Eddie L. Watson is the ASO for the 228th Aviation Battalion, 1st Cav Div (AM). He is a graduate of the USC Aviation Safety Course and is serving his second tour in Vietnam. CW3 Watson is an IP in the OH-6A, UH-1, and the CH-47.

Ever notice how a little tyke starts picking up his dad's mannerisms? He tries to walk, talk, gesture and, in short, imitate the one person he respects and looks to for guidance. This imitating instinct of the child will have an important part in the development of his character and habits.

The same process of "imitating" can be applied to individual aviators and aviation units from company level on up. Let's take a fairly typical example of how this applies to the individual aviator. First, he probably just finished flight school with a turn-around course in, for example, the Chinook. He arrives in country with approximately 225 hours of SP time and another 50-60 hours in the "Hook". He arrives at his unit a bit apprehensive about what his job is going to be and how he will react "under fire." The first impressions he gets are going to be the most important. Does he see a well maintained and smoothly run operations section or one with a lackadasical, disinterested attitude?
The mission DCS (Direct Combat Support) termed "ash and trash" by veteran Army Aviators gives a degrading implication to newly rated aviators arriving in country for their first tour. After all, the recently rated aviators (aviator heroes to be) came here to fly their "D" model Hueys in the business of winning the war not in the business of taxi service or milk runs. They want to be where the action is. CA's (combat assaults) are their meat. They do not have the time for "ash and trash."

Nevertheless, these same aviators may find themselves assigned to a DCS unit. What then? What does an "ash and trash" mission entail? Well, for the 2nd Platoon, 117th Aviation Company (Aslt Hel), DCS missions encompass the whole Third Military Region with such diversification of units and support that the 2nd Platoon pilots and crews can expect to be involved, single ship or in some instances dual ship, in every type of mission. From day to day 2nd Platoon missions will include CA, DCS or even OCS (other combat support). However, it is not infrequent for the platoon to be involved in all three types of missions in one day's "ash and trash." Other 2nd Platoon activities for the Third Military Region are aerial reconnaissance, insertion, extraction, intelligence, propaganda, and firefly or night hawk.

The supported units of the Third Military Region affect the diversification of activity for the 2nd Platoon. Operating from Bien Hoa under CORDS (Civil Operation Rural Development Support) and MACV (Milita-
CPT Francis N. Frediani is the ASO for the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion, 1st Avn Bde. He is a graduate of the USC Aviation Safety Course and is serving his first tour in Vietnam.

You're feeling good, everything is running smoothly and you're completely caught up with paperwork; now, you think, you can get ahead of the game. Suddenly the phone rings and as you answer it you know what's going to be said. You're right, an accident out in the thickest jungle in your area. You grab your gear and you're on your way. But what gear do you grab?

The KIT, Crash Investigating Army Aircraft, FSN 5180-093-1049, is a nice thing to have, but if you've got to walk to the wreck through a quarter of a mile of jungle it might be a little cumbersome. It seems that every wreckage site I go to is in the deepest, thickest jungle that we have, so I've made a small, easily carried kit, utilizing an empty gas mask carrying bag.

What do I carry in it? To begin with, plenty of film. I use a 35mm camera for investigations and I make sure someone else brings a camera. That way, if you get a bad roll of film or if the camera malfunctions, you have a back-up set of photographs for the report. A 100 foot tape measure is handy to measure distances as is a compass to get bearings. An optical angle measuring tool is with each crash kit. This comes in handy to measure impact angles and with trigonometry you can measure the heights of surrounding trees. Gloves are nice to have, especially if there has been a fire and everything is still hot.

It seems that someone is almost always going to gash themselves on ragged edged metal, so band-aids and iodine are always good to have along. A clipboard with plenty of paper and with the back painted black, comes in real handy to identify photographs. Just print with chalk a description of the item to be photographed on the black painted side and lay it next to the item; instant identity later on. A small penlight is always useful and last, but not least, a radio. One of the new multi-band survival radios is best but any type will do. Any radio that will allow you to talk to the aircraft overhead is well worth carrying.

The whole kit weighs only a few pounds and is easily carried. You can add other things to your kit but remember, the more you add, the more you have to carry around. This kit has supplied me with everything I've ever needed and still doesn't become a hindrance when you have to cover some distance on the ground.
tude? What sort of safety briefing does he get? Does the safety officer explain the unit's safety goal and objectives or does he brief "by the numbers" with a get-it-over-with attitude?

The most important person the new aviator is going to come in contact with in his first few days is the IP that checks him out. This first check is where he is going to start picking up habits and techniques that could stay with him the rest of his flying career. The older and more experienced the IP is, the deeper and more lasting the impression will be. Does the IP present to him sound techniques and safe practices that will complement the training the pilot has already received or is he the type that teaches from a "personal experience" and "this is the way we do it here" type philosophy? If the latter is the type of instruction he receives then it is a safe bet that six months from now that individual will be in a position (either an AC or IP) to pass on the same type of misinformation to another new aviator. You now have a cycle of basically erroneous, potentially dangerous information started. Once this cycle starts it is extremely hard to stop. Generally it is the "little" things that are omitted or skipped or changed in some way. For example, checklists are not used and hover checks are made occasionally or not at all. These "little" items can soon build into the bigger ones such as, "Forget what you were taught in flight school, we are in a combat zone and you will make your approaches this way."

I am not trying to downgrade or belittle experiences or lessons learned in the field, nor am I saying the book is the only way to fly. Let's face it though, the book was written and rewritten and continues to be written by individuals whose combined total experience, flight time and technical knowledge far exceed anything you and I will ever possess.

You and I as SIP's, IP's and AC's are obligated to examine our entire unit's flying program to make certain that we are teaching and adhering to safe, sound and established flying principles. Let's do away with a lot of "old wives tales" about flying that were started years ago by the Cincinnati Flying Club.

Above all, let's consider the new aviator who is going to learn from us the techniques and skills that will influence his future flying career. Remember gentlemen, "Like father - like son."
SP/4 Charles E. Bergquist, 45th Air Amb Co (Dust Off), 58th Med Bn, was wearing this "chicken plate" during a hoist mission on 24 Aug 70. The aircraft received small arms fire and SP/4 Bergquist took a hit but completed the mission unharmed. By the way, the 45th Air Amb Co has a new slogan:
lap the gloves.

3. Insure that the nomex extends over the tops of your leather boots.

4. Turn the collar of the flight suit up to give further protection to the neck. Keep visor down when possible.

5. Never wear nomex with grease or oil stains. This destroys the fire retardant qualities of the material.

Remember, "Safety is an integral part of aviation and regardless of motive, its cost is more easily sustained than the price paid for the lack of it."

ASH AND TRASH

The 2nd Platoon will work with subordinate units from Cu Chi to Song Be providing U.S. military advisors and Vietnamese the flexibility and aerial movement necessary to negate the VC ambush positions and mined routes. Also from Bien Hoa, the 2nd Platoon flies missions for the 5th Special Forces Group, 3rd Mobile Strike Force, covering areas of operations from Phuoc Vinh to Xuan Loc. Southeast in the Nui Dat operational area, the platoon has been well trained using the McGuire rig from its many missions with "C" Team, 3rd Mobile Strike Force. Further south along the coastland, 2nd Platoon has the unique opportunity to work with the U.S. Navy, Nha Be, and fly with Navy aviators whose "B" model gunships, the Seawolfs, are able and ready for direct fire cover. Up North, continuous trips are made within sight of the Cambodian border when providing "slick" support to the many fire support bases under II Field Forces, 23rd Artillery Group, Phu Loi. Beside the regular DCS mentioned the platoon will fly many one-time and special missions throughout the Third Military Region.

To the pilots and crews of the 2nd Platoon, 117th Aviation Company, DCS infolds all the hazards and risks of the war zone. In addition to the environmental perils, each aircraft commander will be his own air advisor, air mission commander, and command and control. Yes, DCS will always be "ash and trash" and there will always be taxi service and milk runs. But each member of the 2nd Platoon understands that the nature of his mission demands well rounded professionalism. Therefore, they proudly accomplish their DCS role in Vietnam.
Within 30 minutes of the initial sighting, a total of seven AH-1G, two armed OH-6A, and two UH-1H aircraft engaged the enemy in the target area. Ten additional NVA were killed by gunships at 1230 hours, in the area of the first sighting. The LOH pilots flew "low and slow" to evaluate accurately the number of NVA killed. It is of interest that very little enemy fire was directed against the aircraft, even though the gunships damaged or destroyed three 12.7 mm heavy AA machineguns during the day.

Troop D (the rifle troop) and the Aero Rifle Platoon of Troop A were inserted by UH-1H troop lift helicopters in the vicinity of the initial contact at 1358 hours, where a number of NVA bodies and rucksacks had been observed. These aircraft received sporadic enemy small arms fire as they approached the landing zone (LZ).

Captain Blair Craig, Commanding Officer of Troop D, secured the LZ and began maneuvering his element to the west of the LZ. Two NVA were observed and captured.

At approximately 1430 hours, the 3d Platoon of Troop D was extracted and reinserted 400 meters to the east, in an area where an aerial observer had sighted a second group of NVA bodies and rucksacks. As the platoon secured the new LZ and gathered abandoned enemy equipment for extraction, the remainder of Troop D began moving overland to the east to link up with the 3d Platoon. This left the Aero Rifle Platoon of Troop A to secure the initial LZ.

At 1500 hours, shortly before linkup was to occur, elements of the 3d Platoon were engaged by enemy small arms fire. The platoon sustained minor casualties and killed five NVA. Several minutes later the 1st Platoon, now about 200 meters from the initial LZ, also came under enemy small arms fire from very close range. The enemy's fire was well disciplined and the intense vegetation he was occupying made manuever against him impossible without risking heavy casualties. Aerial rocket artillery from the 4th Battalion (Aerial Artillery), 77th Artillery (Airmobile) was adjusted on the NVA positions, and Captain Craig requested that his troop be extracted.

The contact ended at 1730 hours, and the troop was lifted from the primary LZ at 1758 hours, leaving behind 28 dead enemy soldiers.

Throughout the afternoon and evening, Troops A and C and sections from the ARA remained on station and continued to observe and destroy the enemy. Between 1455 and 1630 hours, 38 additional enemy were killed, 24 of whom were killed by gunships supporting Troop D, while it was engaged in the ground contact.

At the end of the day, the Squadron had accounted for 138 confirmed enemy killed on the Khe Sanh Plateau.

The rapid and aggressive reaction of aerial and ground elements of the squadron and the continued pursuit of the enemy throughout the day had done irreparable damage to elements of an NVA regiment.

The Khe Sanh engagement demonstrated, in the classic manner and with conspicuous success, the full potential and flexibility of air cavalry. The operation was testimony of the values of prior planning, detailed search and surveillance, immediate reaction, and a large measure of determination and courage.

This action does not relate an isolated success in air cavalry operations, but is a classic example of normal employment, set apart only by the size and significance of the action.
Statistics...

Reflect Efficiency!
### Aircraft Accident Rate Per 100,000 Flying Hours by Major Commands

1 July 1970 Thru 30 Sep 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>September Flying Hours</th>
<th>September Accidents</th>
<th>September Accident Rate</th>
<th>Cumulative Flying Hours</th>
<th>Cumulative Accidents</th>
<th>Cumulative Accident Rate</th>
<th>FY 70 Accident Rate</th>
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<td>1st AVN BDE</td>
<td>130,079</td>
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<td>57,275</td>
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<tr>
<td>25th INF DIV</td>
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<td>1/5th INF DIV</td>
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<td><strong>261,183</strong></td>
<td><strong>56</strong></td>
<td><strong>21.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>811,783</strong></td>
<td><strong>189</strong></td>
<td><strong>23.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>23.3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ Includes float and S account flying hours.
2/ Includes accidents which are special cases such as USARV Training team accidents not charged to any unit.
3/ Flying hours and accidents not included in FY 70 totals.
## FY 1971 SEPTEMBER AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT RATE

### *FIXED WING*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MODEL A/C</th>
<th>FY 1971 HOURS FLOWN</th>
<th>HOURS FLOWN SEP</th>
<th>ACCIDENTS SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>CUMULATIVE ACCIDENTS</th>
<th>CUMULATIVE RATE</th>
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<td>O-1</td>
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<td>YO-3A</td>
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### *ROTARY WING*

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<th>HOURS FLOWN SEP</th>
<th>ACCIDENTS SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>CUMULATIVE ACCIDENTS</th>
<th>CUMULATIVE RATE</th>
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<td>AH-1G</td>
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<td>OH-58A</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL ALL TYPES</td>
<td>811,783</td>
<td>261,183</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MONTHLY
USARV Aircraft Accident*Rate
PER 100,000 FLYING HOURS

\[ \text{Rate} = \frac{\text{Number of Accidents} \times 100,000}{\text{Number of Flying Hours}} \]
MONTHLY
USARV Aircrew Fatality*Rate
PER 100,000 FLYING HOURS

*Rate = \( \frac{\text{Number of Accidents} \times 100,000}{\text{Number of Flying Hours}} \)
Conversation in our poker game turned to the famous ex-madame, Polly Adler, and her book of memoirs, *A House Is Not A Home*. "Yep," sighed one of the boys, "it just goes to show it takes a heap o' lovin' to make a home a house."

—Dick Tyler, San Jose, Calif.

"Without my friend, here, I might have cracked."

Two attractive girls were walking down the street with a lone sailor dogging their every step. Finally, one of the girls turned to him and shouted angrily, "Hey you, either quit following us or get another sailor!"

"Doctor, whatever possessed you to put this fountain in such a place?"
PAMPHLET
NUMBER 95-44

1. PURPOSE: To supply information and assistance to Army Aviation units in RVN.

2. GENERAL: This headquarters does not necessarily endorse the professional views or opinions that may be expressed in this pamphlet apart from official notices. (AVHAV)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

CHARLES M. GETTYS
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

PAUL T. SMITH
Colonel AGC
Adjutant General

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Team 34, APO 96375

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