Contents

(period 27 Feb - 10 Mar 69)

Operation EAGLE PERSUAD II Post Operation Report. 22 Apr 69. S&C 910 159
(period 10-29 Mar 69)

Operation EAGLE PERSUAD III Post Operation Report, 13 May 69. S&C 910 665
(period 16-26 Apr 69)

(period 30 Apr - 20 May 1969)

(period 19-25 May 1969)

(period 27 Jun - 6 Jul 1969)

(period 5 - 20 Jul 1969)

Operation DEFIANT STAND Post Operation Report, 9 Oct 1969. (C)
(period 7 - 19 Sep 1969)
From: Commander Amphibious Ready Group ALFA, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet
To: Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet
Subj: Operation FAGER PURSUIT Post Operation Report: forwarding of (U)

Ref: (a) COMPHRIRFORSEVENTHFLT/CTF 76 INST 3500.1C
(b) Joint COMFIRSTFLT/COMSEVENTHFLT INST 3500.3/3500.8A

Encl: (1) Task Organization
(2) Initiating Directive
(3) Chronology of Events
(4) Planning/Operations
(5) Intelligence
(6) Medical/Logistics
(7) Communications
(8) Public Affairs
(9) Supporting Arms
(10) Lessons Learned (Omitted)
(11) Ship-to-Shore Movement/Amphibious Objective Area
(12) Distribution

1. (C) Background. Intelligence indicated to Commanding General, Third Marine Amphibious Force (CG, III MAF) that enemy strength was building up in the area west of Danang. Based on information received from prisoners captured, the units involved in the buildup were believed to be the NVA 31st and 141st Regiments. CG, III MAF therefore requested ARG/SLF ALFA conduct an Amphibious Assault Landing on or about 1 March 1969 in the vicinity of an area about 12 kilometers west of Danang.

2. (C) Concept of Operations. To employ the Amphibious Task Force in an Amphibious Assault supported by Naval Gunfire and if required by close air support. On D minus one day land the 105" Howitzer battery by waterborne means to support the landing force ashore.

At L-Hour land the battalion by helicopterborne means in selected Landing Zones (LZ's) to find, fix and destroy enemy forces.

a. Mission. Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) conduct an amphibious operation against VC/NVA forces in the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) in Quang Nam Province of 1 Corps Tactical Group-4.
Zone (ICTZ), or other operations as agreed upon with CG, III MAF or his designated representative.

b. Execution. Operation EAGER PURSUIT was executed as a helicopterborne landing of four companies, two each simultaneously from USS DULUTH and USS OKINAWA with an L-HOUR of 010645H March 1969. All scheduled and on-call helicopterborne serials had been landed by 011435H.

(1) Augmentation Forces. During Operation EAGER PURSUIT augmentation forces used were:

(a) Aircraft: Two UH-1E (armed) and one UH-1F (unarmed) helicopters were provided by Commanding General, First Marine Air Wing (CG, FIRST MAW) on 1 March 1969. Two A4 aircraft for Close Air Support (CAS) were also provided but not used.

(b) Naval Gunfire: USS OKLAHOMA CITY (CLG 5) supported the operation on 1 March. She fired one on-call mission and no Harassment and Interdiction (H & I) missions. Results of the on-call mission are described in enclosure (9).

(2) Casualties:

(a) Combat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Friendly</th>
<th>Enemy</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
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</table>

(b) Non-Combat

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DAI*</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Personnel captured/detained: None

(4) Material captured: None

"Died of accidental injury when a truck overturned 071930H March 1969.

3. (U) General. Hot meals were provided for the troops ashore by ARG ALFA ships. Meals provided: USS OKINAWA - 500, USS DULUTH - 475, USS FORT MARION - 200.

4. (C) Conclusions.

a. The employment of ARG/SLF ALFA was effective only so far as landing the BLT when and where requested by CG, III MAF.
If effective employment is measured in terms of contacts with, and destruction of enemy forces, then this operation indicated an ineffective employment of the ARG/SLF. The BLT was landed on D-Day without opposition or any enemy sighting. During the period 1 March (D-Day) through 7 March the BLT conducted extensive search operations, with ARG/SLF support, throughout its original Area of Operation (AO). During this period there was no contact with enemy forces and there were no sightings of enemy forces, installations or caches.

b. The major achievements of Operation EAGER PURSUIT were:

(1) Landing the BLT in the area west of Danang increased the density of friendly troops around Danang.

(2) The commitment of the BLT to its assigned Area of Operations permitted the deployment of one rifle company of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine from that area to an area where contacts with enemy forces had been frequent since 22 February 1969.

(3) The ARG/SLF benefited from the practice acquired during the operation.

5. (C) Recommendations

a. That when an amphibious operation is considered necessary to permit repositioning of in-country forces, commitment of only so much as is necessary to accomplish the mission should be the policy. The major accomplishment of Operation EAGER PURSUIT could have been achieved by the landing of one rifle company, thus retaining the bulk of the combat support power in reserve and in a position for immediate employment if enemy contact was made in this AO or in some other area of active enemy contacts.

George W. Stroud

Distribution:
(See enclosure (12))
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TASK ORGANIZATION

TG 76.4
Amphibious Ready Group ALFA
USS OKINAWA (LPH 3)
USS DULUTH (LPD 6)
USS WINSTON (LKA 94)
USS FORT MARION (LSD 22)
TACRON ELEVEN, DET ALFA
UDT THIRTEEN, DET ECHO
BJU ONE, TEAM TWELVE, DET FOXTROT
EMU ONE, DET ALFA SEVEN
ACU ONE, DET ALFA

TU 76.4.0
Command and Special Operations Unit

TE 76.4.0.1
Flagship Element
USS OKINAWA (LPH 3)

TE 76.4.0.2
Tactical Air Control Element
TACRON 11, DET ALFA

TE 76.4.0.3
Beach Reconnaissance Element
UDT TEAM 13, DET ECHO

TE 76.4.0.4
Special Operations Element
BJU ONE, TEAM 12, DET FOXTROT

TE 76.4.0.5
Transport Area Defense Element
USS FORT MARION (LSD 22)

TE 76.4.0.6
Naval Beach Party Element
BMU, DET ALFA SEVEN

TU 76.4.1
Gunfire Support and Screen Unit
USS OKLAHOMA CITY (CLG 5)

TU 76.4.2
Transport Unit
USS OKINAWA (LPH 3)
USS DULUTH (LPD 6)
USS FORT MARION (LSD 22)

TU 76.4.3
Cargo Unit
USS WINSTON (LKA 94)

TU 76.4.4
Waterborne Control Unit
USS FORT MARION (LSD 22)

CAPT G. W. STROUD, USN
COMPHIBRON FIVE

CAPT H. D. WILLIAMS, USN
CO, USS OKINAWA (LPH 3)

LCDR R. H. WALL, USN
CINC, TACRON 11, DET ALFA

LTJG B. (n) DYER, USNR
CINC, UDT 13, DET ECHO

LTJG G. B. GOITEMOELLER, USNR
CINC, BJU 1, TEAM 12, DET "P"

CDR J. W. FARLEY, USN
CO, USS FORT MARION (LSD 22)

LTJG N. J. WALTER, USNR
CINC, BMU DET ALFA 7

CAPT W. D. SURFACE, USN
CO, USS OKLAHOMA CITY (CLG 5)

CAPT G. W. STROUD, USN
COMPHIBRON FIVE

CAPT "H" R. HUNTER, USN
CO, USS WINSTON (LKA 94)

CDR J. W. FARLEY, USN
CO, USS FORT MARION (LSD 22)

CONFIDENTIAL
Enclosure (1)
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TU 76.4.5
Hilborne Control Unit
USS OKINAWA (LPH 3)
CPT H. D. WILLIAMS, USN
CO, USS OKINAWA (LPH 3)
USS DULUTH (LPD 6)

TG 79.4
Special Landing Force ALFA
COL J. F. McMAHON, USMC
CO, SLF ALFA
Bt 2/26 (1-2 MAR) LTCOL W. F. SPARKS, USMC
(3-10 MAR) LTCOL G. M. EDMUJDSON, USMC
HMM 362
LTCOL J. E. SCHLARP, USMC

DECLASSIFIED

Enclosure (1)
CONFIDENTIAL
0 280322Z FEB 69
FM COMSEVENTHFLT
TO CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
CTF SEVEN SIX
CTF SEVEN NINE
COMUSMACV
CG III MAF
INFO CNO
CINCPAC
CMC
CINCPACFLT
COMNAVFORV
COMPHIBPAC
CG FMFPAC
CG FMFPAC (FWD)
CG FIRST MAW
CG FIRST MARDIV
CMDC SEVENTH AF
CTF ONE ONE FIVE
CTF SEVEN THREE
CTF SEVEN SEVEN
CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
CTG SEVEN NINE PT THREE
CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE
CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE
CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE
CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE
CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT TWO
CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE
NAVCOMS WESTPAC
NAVCOMMSTAS WESTPAC

OPERATION EAGER PURSUIT INITIATING DIRECTIVE (U)

A. MY OPLAN 101-69
B. NWP 22 (B)

1. (C) SITUATION: SUBJECT TO CONCURRENCE OF COMUSMACV, CG III MAF HAS REQUESTED THE EMPLOYMENT OF AN ARG/SLF IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE ICTZ. COMSEVENTHFLT WILL PROVIDE CG 76.4/79.4 AND SUCH OTHER FORCES AS MAY BE NECESSARY FOR THIS OPERATION. INITIATING DIRECTIVE IS FOR PLANNING PURPOSES. THE OPERATION WHEN EXECUTED, WILL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A AND B.

2. (C) MISSION: COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (CATF) CONDUCT AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION AGAINST VC/NVA FORCES IN AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE OF ICTZ OR OTHER OPERATIONS AS AGREED UPON WITH CG III MAF OR HIS DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE.

CONFIDENTIAL
Enclosure (2)
CONFIDENTIAL

3. (C) CTG 76.4 (COMMANDER 5) EMBARKED IN USS OKINAWA (LPH 3) DESIGNATED CATF.

4. (C) CTG 79.4 (COMMANDER SLF ALFA) EMBARKED IN USS OKINAWA (LPH 3) DESIGNATED COMMANDER LANDING FORCE (CLF).

5. (U) COMMAND RELATIONSHIP LAW PARA 3K.(2) AND (C) OF REF A.

6. (C) COMUSMACV WILL PROVIDE CAS AND OTHER SUPPORT AS AGREED UPON WITH CATF LAW PARA 1B(1) OF REF A.

7. (U) THE AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA (AOA) WILL BE PROMULGATED BY SEPARATE MESSAGE.

8. (C) NICKNAME FOR THIS OPERATION WILL BE EAGER PURSUIT WITH TENTATIVE D-DAY 1 MARCH 1969. D-DAY AND H AND L HOURS TO BE DETERMINED AND CONFIRMED BY CATF. WHEN ALL FORCES ARE PREPARED, CATF REPORT TO ORIG STATE OF READINESS AND FINAL CONFIRMATION CONCERNING D-DAY, H AND L HOURS. EXECUTE ON D-DAY AT H AND L HOURS UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED REPORT EXECUTION TO ALCON.

9(C) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

A. WHEN FIRMLY ESTABLISHED ASHORE, AND WHEN MUTUALLY AGREED UPON BY CATF/CLF AND CG FIRST MAR DIV, REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF SLF CHOP TO CG FIRST MAR DIV.

B. UPON CHOP OF REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF SLF TO IN-COUNTRY COMMANDER, CATF REMAIN IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS ASHORE.

C. WITHDRAWAL LAW ANNEX B TO REF A.

10. (U) TERMINATION LAW ANNEX B TO REF A.

11. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS LAW ANNEX V TO REF A.

12. (U) DOWNGRADED TO CONFIDENTIAL UPON TERMINATION.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

27 February 1969

a. Liaison with First Marine Division and 26th Marines indicated a request for ARG/SLF employment was in the process of being forwarded to COMSEVENTHFLTL.

b. 1500H - TG 76.4 Underway for holding area off Danang.

c. 2140H - CIG 76.4 received CG, III MAF request for employment of ARG/SLF ALFA addressed to COMUSMACV and COMSEVENTHFLTL.

d. 2307H - Received COMSEVENTHFLTL message concurring in employment of ARG/SLF ALFA in an amphibious assault.

28 February 1969

a. 0830H - CTG 76.4 and CIG 79.4 attended planning conference at First Marine Division Headquarters with III MAF, First Marine Division and 26th Marines representatives.

b. 0920H - USS DULUTH, USS WINSON, and USS FORT MARION proceeded to UNREP with USS TOLOVANA (Ag 64), USS OKINAWA UNREP at 1907H.

c. 1300H - CTG 76.4 received COMSEVENTHFLTL initiating directive for Operation EAGER PURSUIT. (DTG 130322Z FEB 69)

d. 1318H - CIG 76.4 requested temporary assignment of AIG 16, approval received from OTF 76 for use of AIG 16 at 1904H.

e. 1436H - CIG 76.4 requested Naval Gun Fire Support from CTU 70.8.9.

f. 1600H - USS FORT MARION anchored Danang to off load artillery as previously arranged at planning conference with First Marine Division and 26th Marines.

g. 1600H - CIG 76.4 recommended AWA to COMSEVENTHFLTL.

h. 1620H - CIG 76.4 requested from Director TACC SEVENTH AF a NOTAM commencing 010545H MAR 69.

i. 1930H - Basic SWORD 301-69 for Operation EAGER PURSUIT, promulgated. (DTG 193130Z FEB 69)

Annex ALFA - DTG 281156Z FEB 69
Annex DELTA - DTG 281139Z FEB 69
Annex GOLF - DTG 281154Z FEB 69
Annex HOTEL - DTG 281134Z FEB 69
Annex INDIA - DTG 281152Z FEB 69
Annex NOVEMBER - DTG 280640Z FEB 69

CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosure (3)
DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

j. 1946H - CLU 70 8 9 assigned USS OKLAHOMA CITY (CLG 5) as NGFS ship.

k. 212H - CONSEVENTHFLI conchs in AOA for Operation EAGER PURSUIT.

1 March 1962

a. D-Day for Operation EAGER PURSUIT.

b. 0545H - Confirmed L-HOUR.

c. 0550H - Signaled Land the airborne Landing Force.

d. 0600H - USS OKINAWA and USS DULUTH anchored in assigned anchorage in Danang Harbor.

e. 0630H - USS FORD MARION and USS WINSLOW anchored in assigned anchorage in Danang Harbor.

f. 0645H - L-HOUR, assault troops landed by helo in LZ FALCON (AT 887786) and EAGLE (AT 897773). No opposition and no contact.

g. 1030H - USS OKINAWA underway to launch helo's due to drop in wind velocity and increasing temperature in harbor.

h. 1257H - Last of scheduled serials airborne to LZ.

i. 1410H - Last of on-call serials airborne to LZ.

j. 1500H - OPCON BLT 2/26 passed to CG, FIRST Marine Division for Operation EAGER PURSUIT. ARG/SFL remaining in support of BLT 2/26.

k. 1635H - Remainder TG 76.4 commenced getting underway for assigned operation areas off Danang.

2 March 1962


b. TG 76.4 anchored Danang Harbor and off loaded additional BLT 2/26 vehicles.

c. 1400H - CONSEVENTHFLI visited CIG 76.4 aboard USS OKINAWA.

d. TG 76.4 night steamed in assigned opareas off Danang.

3 March 1962


b. USS DULUTH assumed MEDEVAC guard while USS OKINAWA UNREP from USS PALUGA, USS OKINAWA reassumed MEDEVAC guard upon completion UNREP.
4 March 1969

a. TG 76.4 anchoring Da Nang Harbor, continued in support of BLT 2/26, underway to assigned opareas prior to sunset.

5 March 1969

a. Continued in support of BLT 2/26 from assigned opareas off Da Nang.

6 March 1969

a. Continued in support of BLT 2/26, TG 76.4 UNREP with USS PROCYON, USS DULUTH assumed MEDEVAC guard while USS OKINAWA alongside USS PROCYON. USS OKINAWA assumed MEDEVAC guard upon completion UNREP, USS DULUTH proceeded to AF UNREP.

7 March 1969

a. Continued in support of BLT 2/26, TG 76.4 anchoring Da Nang Harbor.

b. 1600H - TG 76.4 underway for assigned opareas.

c. 1930H - Truck overturned during the overland movement to an assembly area resulting in one man killed and 31 injured.

8 March 1969

a. Continued in support of BLT 2/26 in assigned opareas.

b. 1450H - BG W. J. E. WILLIAMS, Commanding General, 9th MAB visited CTG 76.4, CTG 79.4 and Commanding Officer, USS OKINAWA.

c. 1200H - MEDEVAC guard shifted to FIRST MAB.

d. BLT 2/26 moved south overland and joined FIFTH Marines located vicinity Liberty Bridge (near An Hoa) in preparation for an operation on Go Noi Island.

e. 1830H - OPCON of BLT 2/26 passed to FIFTH Marine Regiment for an operation on Go Noi Island.

9 March 1969

a. Continued in support of BLT 2/26, TG 76.4 anchoring Da Nang Harbor.

b. 1600H - RADM BEHRENS, CAG 76, visited CTG 76.4 on board USS OKINAWA.

10 March 1969

a. Operation EAGER PURSUIT terminated as of 0800H and Operation EAGER PURSUIT II commenced 0800H. TG 76.4 continued in support of BLT 2/26 on Go Noi Island.

CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosure (3)
PLANNING/OPERATIONS

1. (U) The planning conference was held at CG, FIRST MARDIV Headquarters on 28 February 1969. Present were representatives from III MAF, FIRST MARDIV, 26th Marine Regiment, and ARG/SLF ALFA.

2. (C) It was decided to conduct an amphibious assault, the ARG/SLF assuming a support role at the completion of the assault. The CHOP of BLT 2/26 to CG, FIRST MARDIV would be effected when mutually agreeable. D-DAY was established as 1 March 1969, with an L-Hour of 06-5H.

3. (C) BRAVO Artillery Battery was offloaded and shipped to CG, FIRST MARDIV the afternoon of 28 February to be established ashore and render artillery support if needed. Arrangements were made to assign the USS OKLAHOMA CITY (CLG-5) in direct support of BLT 2/26 during the amphibious assault phase.

4. (C) Planning for the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA):

   a. In establishing an AOA the following general requirements had to be considered by JFJ 76-4:

      (1) Not to restrict normal air traffic in and out of the Danang Air Base.

      (2) Not to restrict normal surface traffic in and out of Danang Harbor.

      (3) Permit an artillery battery southeast of the landward corridor to fire in support of BLT 1/26 located northwest of the corridor and at the same time fire in support of BLT 2/26 if required in the AOA.

      (4) Establish helicopter lanes for the amphibious assault that would not conflict with subparagraphs (1) and (2) above.

      (5) Designate a location for the NGFS ship to operate and fire from, that would not conflict with subparagraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4) above.

   b. The airspace from 0 to 25,000 feet in the AOA was therefore divided along the following guide lines:

      (1) Free access granted to all surface and air traffic in the seaward portion of the AOA including Danang Harbor.

      (2) Free access to air traffic above 500 feet over the corridor portion of the landward AOA and free access to air traffic over 6,000 feet over the remaining portion of the landward AOA. (See enclosure 11 for description and diagram of the AOA.)

   c. To complete the requirements the helicopter lanes for the assault were kept below 500 feet. The helicopter lanes were over friendly ground and therefore 500 feet or less was considered safe from enemy fire for the assault waves. The artillery battery, on the southeast side of the corridor, and the NGFS ship were to fire over the helicopter lanes if their support was required. SAV-A-PLANES, if required, were to be coordinated between FIRST MARDIV Fire Support Coordination.

Enclosure (4)
Center (FSCC) and the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CAlF), Supporting Arms Coordination Center (SACC) and Tactical Air Control Center (TACC).

(C) The landing was unopposed. USS OKLAHOMA CITY was called upon only once to fire an observed mission prior to her release at 1300H and the subsequent shift of control of supporting arms to the FIRST MAARDIV FSOC.
1. (C) While the concept of this operation was mainly to increase the density of friendly troops west of Danang, it was believed that elements of the NVA 5151 and 14151 regiments were possibly in the area. No contact with the enemy was made during this operation.
A - MEDICAL

1. (C) Operation EAGLE PURSUIT began on 1 March 1969 and ended at 0800 on 10 March 1969. The operation was conducted in the I Corps area west of Danang.

2. (C) The Task Group consisted of USS OKINAWA (LPH 3), USS DULUTH (LPD 6), USS FORT MARION (LSD 22), and USS WINSTON (LKA 94). The embarked battalion was BLT 2/26 with HMM 362 providing vertical support.

3. (U) The USS OKINAWA was designated as casualty receiving ship. Medical Officers on board consisted of:

   a. Surgical Team
      (1) CDR J. J. RYSKAMP, Jr., OinC
      (2) LCDR E. H. WIDELL, Jr.
      (3) LCDR M. C. SHESKEY
      (4) LT B. C. M. SAH

   b. Ship's Medical Officer
      (1) LT H. D. HICKFY

   c. Clearing Platoon
      (1) LT G. E. HARP
      (2) LT I. ROUBAL
      (3) LT J. W. WALLACE

   d. Battalion Surgeon
      (1) LT J. J. TEDFORD

   e. Flight Surgeon
      (1) LCDR V. L. POLICH

4. (C) Most of the MEDEVACs consisted of routine sick-call complaints. On the evening of 7 March 1969, a truck transporting Marines overturned killing one and injuring 31 men. Nine of these were received and treated on the USS OKINAWA while the others were treated at in-country facilities.

5. (C) Casualty Statistics

   a. Blood. A total of 113 units of whole blood were on hand at the start of the operation. This blood was obtained from NSA Danang Hospital. A total of 4 units was cross-matched for 1 patient.
however, none were transfused. 64 units of out-dated blood were returned to NSA Danang Hospital on 7 March 1969.

b. **SUMMARY OF CASUALTY STATISTICS** (Treated aboard OKINAWA)

(1) **TOTAL CASUALTIES RECEIVED**

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<th>Category</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Combat</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wounded in Action (WIA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Killed in Action (KIA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Died of Wounds (DOW)</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Death of Accidental Injuries (DAI)</td>
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(2) **NON-COMBAT CLASSIFIED**

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<td>Hemorrhoids</td>
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<tr>
<td>Undiagnosed-No Disease</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fracture Arm, Pelvic, Clavicle, Wrist, Mandible</td>
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(3) **COMBAT CASUALTIES CLASSIFIED**

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<td>b. Minor</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NON-MISSILE INJURIES</strong></td>
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<td>1. Major</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Minor</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Enclosure (6)
CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY OF O.R. ANESTHESIA

1. General 0
2. Spinal 0
3. Regional Block 0
4. Local 1

MAJOR SURGICAL PROCEDURES 0

DISPOSITIONS

1. Treated and Released 31
2. Admitted to Sickbay 12
3. Discharged to Duty 6
4. Transferred *1*
5. Died of Wounds 0
6. Remaining in Sickbay, End of Operation 5

*DAI Transferred for Care of the Dead.

3 CONFIDENTIAL
Enclosure (6)

DECLASSIFIED
B. LOGISTICS

1. C. Maintenance
   a. USS DULUTH's number one main engine, number 1A and 1B turbogenerators placed out of commission due to ruptured bonnet of root steam valve to air ejectors. Ship was limited to 6 knots. Casualty was repaired by ship's force.

   b. USS FORT MARION, while conducting the quarterly PMS check of the number one main reduction gear, detected ball gear teeth worn. Maximum speed was limited to 8 knots, while making repairs. Repairs were made by ship's force.

   c. USS OKINAWA developed a casualty to the number 1 boiler main steam stop. Temporary repairs made by ship's force consisted of straightening and welding valve yoke and manufacture of valve stem. Repairs were completed in 72 hours. Permanent repairs will be made when new stem and yoke are received.

2. C. Outside Assistance
   a. While TG 76.4 ships were in Danang Harbor, RVN, the USS COCONINO COUNTY (LST 603), not a task group ship, asked for immediate assistance due to a gyro casualty. The USS FORT MARION (LSD 22) answered the call and sent personnel to correct the gyro casualty. The COCONINO COUNTY was then able to proceed on duty assigned.

3. C. UNREPS/VERTREPS. A total of eight underway replenishments were conducted, with each ship in TG 76.4 replenishing from an AO and the PROCYON:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHIP</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>NSFO</th>
<th>JP-5</th>
<th>AVGAS</th>
<th>PROVISIONS</th>
<th>STORES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TALUGA (AO 62)</td>
<td>3 MARCH</td>
<td>78,866 GAL</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>PROCYON (AF 61)</td>
<td>6 MARCH</td>
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<td>-6.65</td>
<td>3 S/T</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>MATTAPONI (AO 41)</td>
<td>8 MARCH</td>
<td>141,835 GAL</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tbody>
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CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosure (6)
1. PLANNING. The ARG Communication Annex for Operation EAGER PURSUIT was promulgated four hours after receipt of the Initiating Directive and 13 hours prior to L-Hour. EMCON was not set enroute to the AOA due to the geographical position within Danang Harbor. The Communication Annex provided for communications in accordance with CTG 76.4 Operation Plan 101A-69. Delivery of Operation EAGER PURSUIT OP-PLAN annexes was delayed while awaiting permission to use AIG 16 as the address indicating group for units of EAGER PURSUIT. It is recommended that an AIG be assigned to an ARG/SLF which is tentatively committed to an operation prior to delivery of the Initiating Directive. This would allow ample opportunity for NAVCOMMSTSAs, out-routers, and service clerks to adjust accordingly.

2. REQUIREMENTS VERSUS ASSETS. As experienced in previous operations, the onset of EAGER PURSUIT strained equipment assets to fulfill required radio circuits. After the landing force chopped to in-country forces in the afternoon of D-Day, many of the VHF, FM, and UHF voice circuits were abolished or placed in stand-by status which released equipment needed for backup purposes on other circuits.

3. USABLE FREQUENCIES. Frequencies were adequate and usable in all spectrums except VHF, FM, and UHF. Due to the topography of the AOA and Danang Harbor, VHF and UHF communications were disrupted whenever the flagship was north of Danang Harbor and attempted communicating with units within the harbor or ashore.

4. CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS. Adequate cryptographic systems were available throughout the operation. USKAK 279 was not used in order to avoid conflict with systems employed by Navy and Marine operators.

5. RPIO RESUPPLY. No requests for RPS draws were placed with the RPIO during the timeframe of the operation.

6. TRAFFIC LOAD VERSUS CIRCUIT AND PERSONNEL AVAILABILITY. The traffic load strained circuit and personnel availability between receipt of the Initiating Directive and mid-day of D-Day. Incoming inhouse message time never exceeded eight hours and outgoing inhouse message time never exceeded three hours.

7. TERMINATION. The NAVCOMMOPNET Orestes termination was excellent throughout the operation. Occasional outages were due to men afloat, ship's power failure, and equipment failure.

CONFIDENTIAL
Enclosure (7)
8. (C) BROADCAST RECEPTION. Fleet broadcast reception was excellent throughout the operation. Missing numbers were normally procured from ships in company, CTF 76 Flagship, Amphibious Ready Group BRAVO, or NAVSUPPACT Danang without resorting to NAVCOMMSTA Philippines. The Low Frequency Broadcast of 86 KHz was successfully copied.

9. (U) EQUIPMENT RELIABILITY. Communications were very reliable and minor outages were corrected on an as-occurring basis.

10. (C) LANDING FORCE PROBLEMS. A teletype loop between the flagship's Communication Center and Troop Operations was used to pass embarked Marine's traffic to them for reproduction as the Marines required. This greatly reduced ships inhouse message time and backlog.

11. (C) KY-8. The KY-8 covered voice was used on the Maneuvering and Warning Circuit, Reporting Circuit, and several Marine circuits and no major difficulties occurred. The change of keylists and time for setting up the KY-8 produced no significant difficulty.
PUBLIC AFFAIRS

1. (U) For Operation EAGER PURSUIT one press release was submitted to CTE 70.2.1.1 on 28 February. On the afternoon of 1 March release was authorized by this command and the concurrence of the Commanding General, First Marine Division was requested. Two days later subject concurrence was received. Twelve days after the initial assault CTE 70.2.1.1 requested concurrence of Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force; this concurrence has not been received as yet.
SUPPORTING ARMS

1. (C) General. The CATF Supporting Arms Coordination Center was fully manned on D-Day. USS OKLAHOMA CITY CLG 5, was assigned in direct support of BLT 2/26. Close air support and helicopter escort aircraft were assigned. Control of supporting arms was passed ashore at 1500H on D-Day.

2. (C) Naval Gunfire Support:

a. Schedule of Fire. Since the landing zones were in a relatively friendly area, no prep fires were planned. All naval gunfire support was on-call.

b. Assignment of Ships. USS OKLAHOMA CITY CLG 5 was stationed at Point Carol in Danang Harbor to prevent interference with troop-carrying helicopters and normal traffic at Danang Air Base.

c. Mission. USS OKLAHOMA CITY fired only one call fire mission on D-Day, expending 27 rounds of 6"/47 HICAP against an enemy rocket position. Ground damage assessment was evaluated as excellent by the BLT 2/26 spot team.

d. Communications. SACC communications were excellent while USS OKINAWA was in Danang Harbor. Decreasing wind late in the morning forced USS OKINAWA to steam outside the harbor entrance, where naval gunfire communications were lost, necessitating the one naval gunfire call fire mission to be relayed over PRI-TAC to and from SACC.

3. (C) Close Air Support:

a. Planning:

(1) The planning for Operation EAGER PURSUIT began with the receipt of ARG/SLF ALFA Employment message (CG, 111 MAF 271232Z FEB 69) requesting an Amphibious Assault Landing in an area west of Danang on or about 1 March.

(2) On 28 February, Officer-in-Charge, TACRON ELEVEN, Detachment ALFA attended a conference at FIRST MARDIV and conducted liaison with 111 MAF and FIRST MAW to discuss concept of operations.

(3) The Initiating Directive (COMSEVENTHFLT 280322Z FEB 69) was received 28 February amplifying on mission, situation and special instructions.

(4) The AOA for Operation EAGER PURSUIT was promulgated by COMSEVENTHFLT 281118Z FEB 69 describing both landward and seaward portions of the AOA.
5. The Notice to Airmen (CTG 76.4 280820Z FEB 69) was sent to Director, Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), SEVENTH Air Force, Saigon covering AOA of Operation EAGER PURSUIT up to 8000 feet.

6. The Air Support message (CTG 76.4 280822Z FEB 69) and Annex Hotel (CTG 76.4 281340Z FEB 69) were also published on 28 February 1969.

b. Execution:

1. On 1 March one UH-1E Slick aircraft arrived on station at 0618H for command and control and reported to TACC for control. Two UH-1E (armed) also arrived at 0646H for Helo Escort and reported for control

2. Two A4 aircraft scheduled for Close Air Support (CAS) at 0645H did not check in until 0735H. The two A4's were on station at 0645H but radio trouble forced them to return to Chu Lai. No ordnance was expended by the A4's.

3. Control of Supporting Arms passed ashore and the NOTAM was cancelled 011500H MAR 1969.

4. On 3 March and again on 5 March the MEDEVAC guard, manned by TACRON personnel along with two MEDEVAC aircraft, moved to USS DULUTH while USS OKINAWA was on UNREP.

5. In addition to processing MEDEVAC requests, numerous FRAG requests and SAV-A-PLANES were processed.

6. Operation EAGER PURSUIT terminated 100800H MAR 69.

c. Communications;

1. TACC radio nets were established and manned in accordance with Annex Hotel of CTG 76.4 OPORD 101-69.

2. Nine nets were requested but one was unavailable.

3. Communications during the operation were especially good with all nets up 90% of the time. Twice there was a loss of communications; once during a power loss at 1710H 6 March, and another time when the Battalion was changing positions on 8 March.
SHIP-TO-SHORE MOVEMENT

1. **Airborne.** The helicopter ship-to-shore movement was conducted from anchor in Danang Harbor. The disadvantage of the light wind condition encountered was outweighed by the much shortened distance from launch position to LZ afforded by anchoring. The light winds were countered by cutting serial assignments to three and four troops versus the normal five troops and no problems arose from this procedure during the early morning hours. As the temperature increased it became necessary for USS OKINAWA to get underway to complete the off-load. Eight helicopters were used to off-load each ship (LPH and LPD). ECHO and HOTEL companies were lifted from USS DULUTH to LZ EAGLE. FOXTROT and GOLF companies were lifted from USS OKINAWA to LZ FALCON. Off-load was facilitated by assigning companies from each ship to a different LZ. Aircraft refueling was conducted at Marble Mountain airfield. Some resupply was conducted from an in-country site.

2. **Waterborne.** The waterborne ship-to-shore movement was conducted as follows:

   **D minus One:** "B" Battery, First Battalion, Thirteenth Marine Regiment was off-loaded from USS FORT MARION to the Bridge Ramp Danang, in order to support operation EAGER PURSUIT.

   **D-DAY:** The truck platoon was off-loaded from USS WINSTON to the Bridge Ramp Danang.

   **D plus One:** The tank platoon was off-loaded from USS DULUTH to the Bridge Ramp, Danang.
CONFIDENTIAL

0 281118Z FEB 69
FM COMSEVENTHFLT
TO CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
CTF SEVEN SIX
CTF SEVEN NINE
COMUSMACV
CG III MAF
INFO CNO
CINCPAC
CMC
CINCPACFLT
COMPHIBPAC
CG FMFPAC
CG FMFPAC (FWD)
CG FIRST MAW
CG FIRST MARDIV
CMR SEVEN AF
CTF ONE ONE FIVE
CTF SEVEN THREE
CTF SEVEN SEVEN
CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
CTG SEVEN NINE PT THREE
CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE
CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE
CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE
CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT ONE
CTU SEVEN ZERO PT SEVEN PT TWO
CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE
NAVCAMS WESTPAC
NAVCOMMSTAS WESTPAC
SECRET (DOWNGRADED TO CONFIDENTIAL BY COMSEVENTHFLT 301110Z MAR 69)
OPERATION AGER PURSUIT AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA (U)
A COMSEVENTHFLT 280322Z FEB 69

1. C. THE SEAWARD PORTION OF THE AOA WILL ENCOMPASS THAT SEA AREA WITHIN A 14 MILE RADIUS CIRCLE CENTERED AT LATITUDE 16-12N, LONGITUDE 108-12E INCLUDING DANANG HARBOR AND THE ASSOCIATED AIRSPACE FROM 0-25 THOUSAND FEET. DUE TO THE DENSITY OF SURFACE AND AIR TRAFFIC IN THE DANANG AREA, FREE TRANSIT IS GRANTED FOR SURFACE AND AIR TRAFFIC.

2. C. THE LANDWARD PORTION OF THE AOA WILL ENCOMPASS THAT LAND AREA FROM 9384 SOUTHWEST TO ROAD AT 9082 THENCE SOUTHERLY ALONG ROAD TO AT 9080 THENCE SOUTHWEST ALONG STREAM TO AT 8679 THEN SOUTH TO AT 8675 THENCE EAST TO AT 9275 THEN NORTHEAST TO AT 9477 THENCE IN A NORTHEASTERLY DIRECTION ALONG RIDGE TO ROAD IN VICINITY OF AT 9178 THENCE TO AT 9482.

GP-4
BT
2672

2

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Enclosure (11)
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DISTRIBUTION: D1

CINC PACFLI
COMSEVENHELI
CMPACFLI
COM feminism.sevenheheli
CG. EM SEVENHELI
CG. EMFPAC
COM S BIFAC
CG. LAN FORIRACOM FAC
CG. NAV HIBOOL; CORONADO
COMHIBGRU ONE
COMHIBGRU THREE
COMHIBRON ONE
COMHIBRON THREE
COMHIBRON FIVB
COMHIBRON SEVEN
COMHIBRON NINE
COMHIBRON ELEVEN
COMLAN SHIELD ONE
COMOACGRU ONE
COMNASFORGRUPAC
COMNAVBAC GRU ONE
CO. BU ONE
CO. ACU ONE
CO. BMU ONE
OINC BMU ONE WE DEI
OINC ACU ONE WE DEI
OINC WP DEI NAVSFECWARGRU
OINC NAVSRUAC GRU ONE WE DEI
OINC NAV BEAC GRU WE DEI
CO. IACKON ELEVEN
CO. UDI IH TIBEN
USA CG CS C. FL LEAVENWORTH; KANSAS
OINC NAV IACCO GACI

CINC PACFLI
COMUSMACY
COMNAVFORV
CG. AI NADE
CG. 7 MARE
CG. 81 MARDIV
CG. 83MARDIV
CG. 87MARDIV
CG. 89MARDIV
CG. 09B9, HISTORICAL DIV.
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From: Commander Amphibious Force, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet
To: Commander Amphibious Ready Group ALFA,
   U.S. SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: EAGER PURSUIT Post Operation Report; approval of (U)

Ref: (a) Commander Amphibious Ready Group ALFA ltr 3500
     ser 017 of 1 April 1969

Encl: (1) Commander Amphibious Force, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet
     ltr 3500 ser 037 of 19 April 1969 (less Encl. (1))
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet ltr 3500 ser N6-588 of
    27 May 1969

1. Reference (a) is approved for distribution upon incor-
   poration of the corrections noted in enclosure (1) as
   approved by enclosure (2).

2. Enclosures (1) and (2) may be made enclosures to or
   distributed with the corrected Post Operation Report if
   desired.

F.W. CLIFT III
Chief of Staff
CONFIDENTIAL - Unclassified upon removal of enclosure

From: Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet
To: Commander U. S. SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: Operation EAGER PURSUIT Post Operation Report; forwarding of

Encl: (1) COMPHIBREADGRU ALFA 1tr 3500 ser 017 of 1 April 1969
(5 copies)

1. Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet concurs with the contents of enclosure (1) except as noted below:
   
   a. Enclosure 1, page 2, note that LTCOL G. M. EDMUNDSON, USMC, commanded BLT 2/26 from 3 March 69 until termination of the operation.

   b. Enclosure 6, page 1, paragraph 3, Change "a" to "as".

   c. Enclosure 6, page 1, paragraph 5.b. Add "(Treated aboard OKINAWA)" following "SUMMARY OF CASUALTY STATISTICS."

2. The originator has taken comment regarding AIG assignment enclosure 7, page 1, paragraph 1 of enclosure (1) for action. CTF 76 will make AIG 16 available to the ARG Commander in a timely manner, providing it is not already assigned.

3. It is noted that rounds expended by OKLAHOMA CITY indicated in enclosure 9, page 1, paragraph 2.c. of the Post Operation Report and in CTG 76.4 SITREP number 1, DTG 010016Z MAR 69, differ. Total rounds actually expended are correctly indicated in the Post Operation Report (OKLAHOMA CITY 010954Z MAR 69 NOTAL refers).

F. W. CLIFT III
Chief of Staff

Certified to be a true copy:

[Signature]

E.L. KENYON
CWO2, USN

CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosure (1)
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

From: Commander SEVENTH Fleet
To: Commander Amphibious Force, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: Operation EAGER PURSUIT Post Operation report; approval of

Ref: (a) COMPHIBFOR "A" Conf 1tr CARG "A"/N1:ed 3500 ser 017 of
    1 April 1969
(b) COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT Conf 1tr N312:CCN:gd gds 3500 ser 76/037
    of 19 April 1969

1. References (a) and (b) have been reviewed and are approved for
   distribution as recommended reference (a) with additions and corrections
   noted reference (b).

ALDRINE W. MCLANE
Asst Chief of Staff
for Plans

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY:

L.L. KENYON
CWO2, USN

Enclosure (2)
From: Commander Amphibious Ready Group ALFA, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet
To: Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: Operation EAGER PURSUIT II Post Operation Report; forwarding of (U)

Ref: (a) COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT/CTF 76 INST 3500.1C
(b) Joint COMFIRSTFLT/COMSEVENTHFLT INST 3500.3/3500.8A

Encl: (1) Task Organization
(2) Initiating Directive (Omitted)
(3) Chronology of Events
(4) Planning/Operations (For Demonstration)
(5) Intelligence (Omitted)
(6) Medical/Logistics
(7) Communications
(8) Public Affairs (Omitted)
(9) Supporting Arms
(10) Lessons learned (Omitted)
(11) Demonstration
(12) Distribution List

1. (C) Background. Amphibious Ready Group ALFA (ARG ALFA) had previously landed the Battalion Landing Team (BLT 2/26) for Operation EAGER PURSUIT by a helicopterborne amphibious assault in an area about 12 kilometers west of Danang on 1 March, 1969. Although BLT 2/26 was chopped to Commanding General, FIRST Marine Division (CG, FIRST MARDIV) at 1500H on 1 March, ARG/SLF ALFA remained in support for the rest of Operation EAGER PURSUIT.

   a. BLT 2/26 did extensive search operations in their Area of Operations (AO) from 1 March to 7 March 1969 but no enemy contact was made nor any sighting of the enemy occurred during this period. The BLT began moving overland the evening of 7 March and assembled on 8 March at Liberty Bridge (coordinates AT 925532) to conduct a search and destroy operation on Go Noi Island. BLT 2/26 was chopped to the FIFTH Marine Regiment (FIFTH Marines) at 081830H March 1969 for operational control. Operation EAGER PURSUIT was terminated at 0800H on 10 March and Operation EAGER PURSUIT II started at that time, in accordance with COMSEVENTHFLT 090920Z MAR 69.

2. (C) Concept of Operations. The concept of operations was to withdraw Battalion Landing Team 2/26 from the Operation EAGER PURSUIT AO and move them overland to Liberty Bridge to conduct search, clear, and destroy missions on Go Noi Island.
a. Mission. The mission of ARG/SLF ALFA was to support BLT 2/26 in-country. The mission of BLT 2/26 was to advance from the western end of Go Noi Island to the railroad berm (North/South coordinates BT 10) conducting search, clear, and destroy missions plus clearing trees, filling bunkers, and removing other obstructions that could be of use to the enemy, after withdrawal of BLT 2/26.

b. Execution. The ARG/SLF supported BLT 2/26 by providing helicopter troop lifts, medical evacuations, resupply, administration and liaison flights. All flights were only as far as An Hoa due to the lack of required armed gunships for escort.

The BLT conducted search and destroy operations in their assigned AO. Contact with the enemy was light, limited primarily to sporadic sniper fire and surprise firing devices (booby traps). BLT 2/26 conducted an attack on Bao An Dong Ville (Christmas Village), (coordinates AT 9853) on 15 March with no resistance encountered.

Amphibious Ready Group ALFA conducted an Amphibious Demonstration on 16 March 1969 off the mouth of the Song Cua Dal. (Amplified in enclosure (11)).

On 17 March the ARG/SLF commenced liaison with III MAF and FIRST MARDIV representatives to coordinate the tentative backload of BLT 2/26 on or about 24 March.

Having reached the eastern boundary of their AO, the railroad berm, by 19 March, the BLT was withdrawn to the southwest on 20 March in preparation for a helo lift back to the ARG. The scheduled reembarkation of BLT 2/26 was postponed at 1800 on 22 March, when CG, FIRST MARDIV directed CO, FIFTH Marines to reposition the BLT back along the railroad berm to serve as a blocking force for the 51ST ARVN REGT conducting a sweep from east to west on the eastern half of Go Noi Island. BLT 2/26 moved back across the western half of Go Noi Island at night, to be in position at the railroad berm by the morning of 23 March.

The ARG/SLF ALFA commenced offloading BLT 2/26 cargo from USS OKINAWA and USS WINSTON on 24 March, from USS DULUTH on 25 March and completed by offloading USS FORT MARION on 26 March. The cargo was offloaded on a phased basis to prevent congestion on the limited ramp staging areas available.
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The PLT was again withdrawn from the railroad berm on Go Noi Island on 26 March. On 27 March the four rifle companies of BLT 2/26 were extracted by helicopter and returned to the USS OKINAWA. Commencing at 220900H the four rifle companies plus the Battalion Headquarters of BLT 2/26 were offloaded. Approximately one-half of the personnel were offloaded by helicopter and the remainder plus cargo and sea bags were offloaded by boat the afternoon of 28 March. Operation EAGER PURSUIT II ended at 1200H, 28 March 1969. HMM 362 (less six UH-34s and associated personnel) were offloaded at Phu Bai on 29 March.

3. (C) Summary of Execution:

(1) Casualties:

Friendly | Enemy
---|---
KIA | 5 | 9
WIA | 60 | 1

(2) Personnel captured/detained: None.

(3) Material captured: None.

4. (C) Conclusions. For ARG/SLF ALFA, Operation EAGER PURSUIT II was combat support of BLT 2/26 on a search, clear and destroy operation on Go Noi Island.

(a) The operations of ARG/SLF ALFA were not economical support of BLT 2/26.

(b) An Amphibious Demonstration was planned to simulate a landing on the eastern end of Go Noi Island with the following objectives:

(1) Confuse the VC/NVA into thinking an actual landing was going to take place to prevent their escape from the western end of Go Noi Island as BLT 2/26 advanced.

(2) Disrupt any timetables and schemes of maneuver they may have planned for the Han An/An Hoa area during the TET offensive period.

(3) To procure Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS) and Close Air Support (CAS) as a partial blocking force for BLT 2/26 to work against as they advanced across Go Noi Island.
4. Training for the ARG/SLF in planning and executing an amphibious assault.

(c) The capabilities of the ARG were only of very minor influence in operations of the BLT after 1 March 1969.

5. (U) Recommendations. None.

[Signature]
GEORGE W. STROUD
DECLASSIFIED

TASK ORGANIZATION

IG 76.4
Amphibious Ready Group ALFA
USS OKINAWA (LFH 3)
USS DULUTH (LPD 6)
USS WINSTON (LKA 94)
USS FORI MARION (LSD 22)
IACRON ELEVEN, DET ALFA
UDI I13EREE, DET ECHO
BU ONE, TEAM TWELVE, DET FOXIHOKI
BMU ONE, DET ALFA ONE
ACU ONE, DET ALFA

IU 76.4.0
Command and Special Operations Unit

IE 76.4.0.1
Flagship Element
USS OKINAWA (LFH 3)

IE 76.4.0.2
Tactical Air Control Element
IACRON 11, DET ALFA

IE 76.4.0.3
Beach Reconnaissance Element
UDI TEAM 13, DET ECHO

IE 76.4.0.4
Special Operations Element
BU ONE, TEAM 12, DET FOXIHOKI

IE 76.4.0.5
Transport Area Defense Element
USS FORI MARION (LSD 22)

IE 76.4.0.6
Naval Beach Party Element
BMU, DET ALFA ONE

IU 76.4.1
Gunfire Support and Screen Unit

IU 76.4.2
Transport Unit
USS OKINAWA (LFH 3)
USS DULUTH (LPD 6)
USS FORI MARION (LSD 22)

IU 76.4.3
Cargo Unit
USS WINSTON (LKA 94)

IU 76.4.4
Waterborne Control Unit
USS FORI MARION (LSD 22)

CAPT G. W. STRoud, USN
COMMAND BRON FIVE

CAPT H. D. WILLIAMS, USN
CO, USS OKINAWA (LFH 3)

LCDR R. H. WALL, USN
CINC, IACRON 11, DET ALFA

LIGB B. (n) DYER, USNR
CINC, UDI 13, DET ECHO

LIGG B. B. BOYENGELEL, USNR
CINC, BU ONE, TEAM 12, DET FOXIHOKI

CDR J. W. PARLEY, USN
CO, USS FORI MARION (LSD 22)

LIGG H. B. MACHAH, USNR
CINC, BMU, DET ALFA ONE
None assigned

CAPT G. W. STRoud, USN
COMMAND BRON FIVE

CDR J. W. PARLEY, USN
CO, USS FORI MARION (LSD 22)

Enclosure (1)
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IU 76.4.5  Heliborne Control Unit
USS OKINAWA (LPH 3)
USS DULUTH (LPD 6)

IG 79.4  Special Landing Force ALFA
BLT 2/26
HMM 362

CAPT H. D. WILLIAMS, USN
CO, USS OKINAWA (LPH 3)

COL J. F. McMAHON, USMC
CO, SLF ALFA
LTCOL G. M. EDMONSON, USMC
LTCOL J. E. SCHLARF, USMC

Enclosure (1)
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

10 March 1969

a. 0800H - Operation EAGER PURSUIT II began with ARG/SLF ALFA in support of BLI 2/26.

b. TG 76.4 at sea in assigned opareas off Danang.

11 March 1969

a. IG 76.4 anchored Danang Harbor.

b. CIG 76.4 conducted liaison with III MAF on proposed demonstration and NGFS of BLI 2/26.

c. 1410H - CIG 76.4 submitted to COMSEVENTHFLT a proposed plan for an ARG demonstration and NGFS for Operation EAGER PURSUIT II.

d. 1600H - TG 76.4 underway for assigned opareas.

12 March 1969

a. 0800H - OKINAWA and FORT MARION UNREP with USS CALIENTE (AO 53).

b. CIG 76.4 conducted liaison with III MAF and FIRST Marine Division on proposed demonstration.

13 March 1969

a. 0900H - IG 76.4 anchored Danang Harbor.

b. CIG 76.4 conducted liaison with III MAF on proposed demonstration.

c. 1211H - Received from CG, FIRST MARDIV "no objection" to proposed demonstration and NGFS.

d. 1930H - TG 76.4 commenced getting underway for assigned opareas.

14 March 1969

a. 0950H - CIG 76.4 received from CG, III MAF "no objections" to conduct demonstration.

15 March 1969

a. 0700H - DULUTH and WINSTON conducted UPREP with USS TOLOVANA (AO 64).

b. 0900H - OKINAWA and FORT MARION anchored Danang. DULUTH and WINSTON anchored Danang Harbor on completion UNREP.
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16 March 1969

a. 0800H - TG 76.4 conducted VERTREP/UNREF with USS NIAGARA FALLS (AFS 3).
b. 1332H - Received permission from COMSEVENTHFLT to execute demonstration.
c. 1345H - Confirmed H-Hour and L-Hour as 1535H.
d. 1420H - TG 76.4 arrived in area off mouth of Song Cua Dai River to conduct demonstration.
e. 1421H - "Land the Landing Force" signalled by TG 76.4.
f. 1430-1500H - USS NEWPORT NEWS (CA 148) conducted prep fire on simulated landing zones.
g. 1535H - H-Hour and L-Hour, Landing craft turned away 100 yards from beach and helicopters turned away at the beach line.
h. 1645H - Landing craft recovered, TG 76.4 left demonstration area to return to assigned oparea off Danang.

17 March 1969

a. 0900H - TG 76.4 anchored Danang Harbor.
b. 1600H - TG 76.4 underway for assigned opareas.

19 March 1969

a. USS OKINAWA provided helo haven for six CH 46's and one CH 53.

20 March 1969

a. 0800H - OKINAWA and FORT MARION UNREP with USS IALUGA (AO 62), upon completion anchored Danang Harbor.
b. 0900H - DULUTH and WINSTON anchored Danang Harbor.
c. 1930H - TG 76.4 commenced getting underway for assigned opareas.

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21 March 1969

a. 0900H - TG 76.4 anchored Danang Harbor.

b. IG 76.4 underway for assigned opareas prior to sunset.

c. OKINAWA provided Helo Haven for six CH 46's.

22 March 1969

a. 0700H - DULUTH and WINSTON conducted UNREP with USS MATTAPONI (AO 41).

b. OKINAWA provided Helo Haven for four CH 46's.

23 March 1969

a. 1330H - CIG 76.4 conducted liaison with NAVSUPPACT Danang for offload BLI 2/26 cargo and equipment.

b. OKINAWA provided Helo Haven for six CH 46's.

24 March 1969

a. 0630H - WINSTON and FORT MARION anchored Danang Harbor to commence offloading cargo from WINSTON. FORT MARION provided additional boats to WINSTON.

b. 0930H - OKINAWA and DULUTH anchored Danang Harbor. DULUTH provided boats to OKINAWA to commence offload, additional boats provided from NAVSUPPACT Danang.

c. OKINAWA, DULUTH and FORT MARION underway for assigned opareas.

25 March 1969

a. 0100H - WINSTON completed offload, underway for assigned opareas.

b. 0630H - DULUTH and FORT MARION anchored Danang Harbor to commence offload DULUTH. FORT MARION provided additional boats to DULUTH.

c. 0930H - OKINAWA and WINSTON anchored Danang Harbor. NAVSUPPACT Danang provided boats to assist offloading.

26 March 1969

a. 0630H - IG 76.4 anchored Danang Harbor, completed offload FORT MARION, WINSTON and DULUTH.

b. 1200H - DULUTH, WINSTON, and FORT MARION underway for Taiwan.

Enclosure (3)
c. 1330H - OKINAWA underway for assigned oparea.

27 March 1969

a. 0750H - OKINAWA backloaded the four rifle companies of BLT 2/26 by helicopter.

b. 1330H - OKINAWA UNREP with CALIENTE.

28 March 1969

a. OKINAWA offloaded two companies of BLT 2/26 by helicopter.

b. 1200H - Operation EAGER PURSUIT II ended.

c. 1300H - OKINAWA anchored Danang Harbor and completed offload BLT 2/26.

29 March 1969

a. 0845H - Commenced offload HMM 362 at Phu Bai.

b. 1210H - Completed offload HMM 362 (less six UH-34's and associated personnel).
A. PLANNING FOR AMPHIBIOUS DEMONSTRATION:

1. (C) The plan for an Amphibious Demonstration to support BLT 2/26 on Go Noi Island was developed within ARG/SLF ALFA. The concept was forwarded to COMSEVENTHFLT on 11 March 1969. After liaison conferences with III MAF on 11 and 12 March and with FIRST MARDIV on 12 March, a "no objection" was received on 14 March from CG, III MAF. On 15 March ARG ALFA representatives proceeded to An Hoa for a liaison and planning conference with CO, FIFTH Marine Regiment and his representatives. Details worked out at this conference were:

   a. CTG 76.4 would request NGFS to be on station and fire Landing Zone (LZ) prep fire from 161430H to 161500H on simulated LZ's.

   b. CO, FIFTH Marines would request CAS to be on station at 161500H to complete the preparation of the landing zones for the simulated landing.

   c. CSLF would furnish Air Observer (AO) from SLF staff. (CTG 76.4 had concurred in this previously).

   d. Simulated Landing Zones (LZ's) would be: primary LZ at coordinates BT 056548 and alternate LZ at coordinates BT 035545.

   e. The NGFS ship and CAS aircraft would be under control of CO, FIFTH Marine FSCC and TACC.

2. (C) CTG 76.4 submitted final plans for the Amphibious Demonstration and request for NGFS to COMSEVENTHFLT, CG, III MAF and CTU 70.8.9 at 151548H March 1969. (CTG 76.4 150748Z March 1969).

3. (C) After some rapid exchanges of messages around noon on 16 March due to a "non-delivery" of the message referred to in paragraph 2 above, permission was received to conduct the demonstration and CTU 70.8.9 designated the USS NEWPORT NEWS (CA 148) to conduct the NGFS.

Enclosure (4)
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A. MEDICAL:

1. (C) Operation EAGER PURSUIT II began on 10 March 1969, and ended on 28 March 1969. The operation was conducted in I Corps in Quang Nam Province. The ARG provided medical support for routine and priority MEDEVACS.

2. (C) The Ready Group consisted of USS OKINAWA (LPH 3), USS DULUTH (LPD 6), USS WINSTON (LKA 94) and USS FORT MARION (LSD 22). The supported battalion was BLT 2/26 with HMM 362 providing vertical support.

3. (C) The USS OKINAWA was designated a casualty receiving ship. Medical Officers onboard consisted of:

   a. SURGICAL TEAM
      (1) CDR J. J. RYSKAMP, Jr., CinC
      (2) LCDR E. H. WIDELL, Jr.
      (3) LCDR M. C. SHESKEY
      (4) LT B. C. M. SAH

   b. SHIP'S MEDICAL OFFICER
      (1) LT H. D. HICKEY

   c. CLEARING PLATOON
      (1) LT G. E. HARP
      (2) LT I. ROUBAI
      (3) LT J. W. WALLACE

   d. BATTALION SURGEON
      (1) LT J. J. TEDFORD

   e. FLIGHT SURGEON
      (1) LCDR V. L. POLICH

4. (C) Most of the MEDEVACS were routine sick-call problems and most casualties were of a routine and priority nature while all emergency MEDEVACS were moved to in-country MEDEVAC facilities via the in-country MEDEVAC pack.

5. (C) On 10 March 1969, a request was received from the Hospital Ship REPOSE for blood donors due to the shortage of blood at NSA Hospital, Danang. The USS OKINAWA, Medical Department drew sixty-three (63) units of whole blood, typed the blood and did serology tests on each unit, and sent the blood to the REPOSE.

6. (C) Casualty Statistics:

   a. BLOOD. At the beginning of the operation forty-nine (49) units of whole
blood were on hand from Operation EAGER FURSUIT. This blood was returned to NSA Danang Hospital, three days later when it expired. During the operation, sixteen (16) units of blood were drawn from donors on the ship. Four (4) units were transfused, one (1) unit was destroyed, and at the conclusion of the operation eleven (11) units were remaining in the Blood Bank.

b SUMMARY OF CASUALTY STATISTICS

(1) TOTAL CASUALTIES RECEIVED 91
   (a) Non-Combat 50
   (b) Wounded in Action (WIA) 35
   (c) Killed in Action (KIA) 6*
   (d) Died of Wounds (DW) 0

*NOTE: One of the 6 KIA's noted here was killed on 9 March during EAGER FURSUIT but was not brought aboard OKINAWA until 10 March and is therefore shown under casualties received by the Surgical Team as a KIA during EAGER FURSUIT.

(2) NON-COMBAT CASUALTIES

   (a) F/U 8
   (b) Diarrhea 4
   (c) Sprain 4
   (d) Dental 4
   (e) Genital-Urinary 3
   (f) Contusion 3
   (g) Abscess 3
   (h) Back Pain 2
   (i) Dermatitis 2
   (j) Burns 2
   (k) Hematemesis 2
   (l) Tonsilitis 2
   (m) Neuropsychiatric 2
   (n) Chancroid 1
   (o) Abrasion 1
   (p) Strain Ligaments 1
   (q) Gun Shot Wound (Accidental) 1
   (r) Melena 1
   (s) Heat Exhaustion 1
   (t) Laceration 1
   (u) Stomatitis 1
   (v) Gastroenteritis 1

(3) COMBAT CASUALTIES

   (a) MISSILE WOUNDS 32

Enclosure (6)

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## a. Major

### (1) Site (Major Wounds Only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Count</th>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Face</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neck</td>
<td>1</td>
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### (2) Fractures (Open)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fracture</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Left Fibula</td>
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<tr>
<td>Left Calcaneus</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Femur</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Tibia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#2,3,4 &amp; 5 Metatarsals</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nose</td>
<td>1</td>
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</table>

## b. Minor

### (b) NON-MISSILE INJURIES

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<td>Burn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sprain</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Puncture (Stick)</td>
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### (c) OPERATIVE CASES PERFORMED (Initial Rx Only)

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<tr>
<th>Status</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>4</td>
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</table>

### (d) MAJOR SURGICAL PROCEDURES

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Procedure</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Repair Left Brachial Artery</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>B.K. Amputation Left Foot</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debridement Compound Fracture</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Femur</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debridement GSW Right Leg</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removal Bone Fragments Left Foot</td>
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<tr>
<td>Debridement S/W Face</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Debridement S/W Neck</td>
<td>1</td>
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### (e) SUMMARY OF O.R. ANESTHESIA

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<tr>
<td>Spinal</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Block</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B. LOGISTICS

1. (C) Maintenance. USS DULUTH (LPD 6) required divers services to plug number one and number two boiler bottom blow lines. Services were provided by UDT personnel embarked on USS FORT MARION (LSD 22).

2. (C) Replenishment. A total of 12 replenishments were conducted during this period, ten were alongside replenishments and two were VERTREP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHIP</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>NSFO*</th>
<th>AVGAS*</th>
<th>JP-5*</th>
<th>PROVISIONS</th>
<th>STORES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CALIENTE (AO 53)</td>
<td>12 MAR</td>
<td>190,424</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>1,244</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLOVANA (AO 64)</td>
<td>15 MAR</td>
<td>107,557</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIAGARA FALLS (AF3 3)</td>
<td>16 MAR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>55.5 S/T</td>
<td>17.2 S/T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TALUGA (AO 62)</td>
<td>20 MAR</td>
<td>193,609</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATTAFONI (AO 41)</td>
<td>23 MAR</td>
<td>168,620</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALIENTE (AO 53)</td>
<td>27 MAR</td>
<td>105,759</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* NSFO, AVGAS and JP-5 quantities in gallons.
COMMUNICATIONS

1. (C) Planning:
   a. Operation EAGER PURSUIT II did not require the promulgation of a communications Annex. Communications were in accordance with the Operation EAGER PURSUIT Annex NOVEMBER and CTG 76.4 OPLAN 101A-69.
   b. EMCON was not set during any portion of this operation.
   c. During off-load operations in Da Nang Harbor, mutual radio interference was encountered with elements of the FIRST Marine Air Wing on 35.2 MHz and 36.3 MHz. These circuits were being used for boat operations and beach control. This situation was reported by CTG 76.4 message DTG 241502Z MAR 69. CINC PACFLT message DTG 262012Z MAR 69 in reply stated III MAF had priority use of these frequencies. It is recommended that required frequencies be assigned permanently to the ARG for exclusive use on these circuits.

2. (C) Requirements versus assets:
   a. Due to the limited scope of this operation, equipment assets were more than adequate to fulfill requirements.

3. (C) Usable Frequencies:
   a. Frequencies were adequate and usable in all spectrums except VHF (FM) and UHF. Due to the topography of the AO and Da Nang Harbor, communications were disrupted whenever the flagship was north of Da Nang Harbor and attempted communicating with units within the harbor or ashore.

4. (C) Cryptographic Systems:
   a. Adequate Cryptographic systems were available throughout the operation. USKAK 279 was not used in order to avoid conflict with systems employed by Navy and Marine operators.

5. (C) RFIO Resupply:
   a. No requests for RFIO draws were placed with the RFIO during the time frame of the operation.

6. (C) Traffic Load versus Circuit and Personnel Availability:
   a. The traffic load encountered in the operation did not overtax the available circuit assets or cause any major increase in personnel commitments.

7. (C) Termination:
   a. The NAVCOMMOPNET Crestes termination was excellent throughout the operation. Occasional outages were due to men aloft, ship's power failure, and equipment failure.
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8. (C) Broadcast Reception:

a. Fleet broadcast reception was excellent throughout the operation. Missing numbers were normally procured from ships in company, CTF 76 flagship, Amphibious Ready Group BRAVO, or NAVSUPPACT Danang without resorting to NAVCOMSTA Philippines. The Low Frequency Broadcast of 86 KHZ was successfully copied.

9. (C) Equipment Reliability:

a. Communications were very reliable and minor outages were corrected as they occurred.

10. (C) Landing Force Problems:

a. A teletype loop between the Flagship’s Communication Center and Troop Operations was used to pass embarked Marine’s traffic to them for reproduction as the Marines required. This greatly reduced ships inhouse message time and backlog.

11. (C) Covered Voice:

a. The KY-8 for covered voice was used on the Maneuvering and Warning Circuit, Reporting Circuit, and several Marine circuits and no major difficulties occurred.

Enclosure (7)
SUPPORTING ARMS

A. Close Air Support:

1. (C) During Operation EAGER PURSUIT II Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) radio nets were established and manned in accordance with Annex HOTEL of CTG 76.4 OFORD 301-69. Constant communications were maintained with 1ST MAW, while the remaining nets were monitored.

2. (C) All radio circuits were monitored during the Amphibious Demonstration in the vicinity of Go Noi Island on 16 March.

3. (C) Additional radio nets were manned during the period that Danang was under high threat of rocket attack. These nets included MEDEVAC Common and the medical net between III MAF and the Hospital Ships.

4. (C) The TACC relayed numerous messages between 1ST MAW and CTG 79.4 concerning helo missions and requests. Several times, during the period of 19-23 March while Marble Mountain was under high threat of rocket attack, the TACC processed requests from 1ST MAW for the USS OKINAWA to serve as "helo haven" for CH-46's and CH-53's.

5. (C) Total flight operations statistics for the operation were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>2745</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tasks</td>
<td>425</td>
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<tr>
<td>Passengers</td>
<td>3714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo</td>
<td>51.0 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours</td>
<td>765.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDEVACS</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Enclosure (9)
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DEMONSTRATION AND NAVAL GUN FIRE SUPPORT

1. (C) ARG ALFA conducted an amphibious assault demonstration off the mouth of the Song Cua Dai using helicopters, landing craft, and Beach Jumper Unit communications on 16 March. The demonstration was designed to disrupt the enemy's timetable and to hinder his possible attempts to withdraw eastward from the western end of Go Noi Island.

   a. USS NEWPORT NEWS provided naval gunfire support by firing landing zone prepsfires on simulated landing zones from 1430H to 1500H. Simulated landing zones were on the eastern end of Go Noi Island. The primary landing Zone (LZ) was at coordinates BT 035548 and the alternate LZ at coordinates BT 035545. Combat Air Support (CAS) was on station at 1500H but not used due to poor visibility.

   b. The waterborne ship-to-shore movement of the demonstration was off the mouth of the Song Cua Dai. The boat lane was two thousand yards long and five hundred yards wide extending from the center of the Line of Departure (LOD) at Grid coordinate BT 235595 along axis 220 degrees true. The PCS made maximum display of boats by having them move back and forth in a column across the LOD and then turn toward the beach down the boat lane in a corpen movement. Wave one consisted of the wave guide commander and six LCM8s; wave two consisted of the wave guide commander, five LCM6s, and the heavy salvage boat. Boats proceeded in a column down the boat lane to simulate an approach for going up the river for a landing, only to turn away as directed by PCS at H-Hour (1535H).

   c. The helicopter ship-to-shore movement of the demonstration consisted of 12 helicopter airborne and orbiting over the LPH then making their approach toward point JASPER (coordinates BT 220570). The helicopters turned away at point JASPER at L-Hour (L-Hour 1535H).

   d. The Beach Jumper Unit conducted communications in line with their primary mission for a period of 1.5 hours.

   e. The SLF ALFA Air Observer and close air support aircraft were on station at 1430H and 1500H respectively but returned to base due to poor visibility.

2. (C) Visibility on the afternoon of 16 March 1969 was limited to about two miles due to haze. The effectiveness of the demonstration was reduced due to the poor visibility. Commanding General, FIRST Marine Division reported no unusual enemy movement or reaction that could be directly attributed to the demonstration.
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<tr>
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<td>COMUSMACV</td>
<td>COMNAVFORV</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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**DECLASSIFIED**
CONFIDENTIAL - Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1)

From: Commander Amphibious Force, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet
To: Commander Amphibious Ready Group ALFA, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: EAGER PURSUIT II Post Operation Report; approval of (U)

Ref: (a) Commander Amphibious Ready Group ALFA ltr 3500 ser 037 of 22 April 1969

Encl: (1) Commander Amphibious Force, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet ltr ser 76/045 of 8 May 1969
(2) Commander U.S. SEVENTH Fleet ltr ser N6-589 of 27 May 1969

1. (U) Reference (a) is approved for distribution upon completion of corrections as required by enclosures (1) and (2).

2. (U) Enclosures (1) and (2) may be made enclosures to or distributed with the corrected Post Operation Report if desired.

F.W. CLIFT III
Chief of Staff
From: Commander SEVENTH Fleet
To: Commander Amphibious Force, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet

Subject: Operation EAGER PURSUIT II Post Operation Report; approval of

References: (a) COMPHIBFOR Ready GRU "A" Conf ltr CARG"A"/M1:kjb 3500 ser 037 of 22 April 1969
(b) COMPHIBFOR SEVENTHFLT Conf ltr M31:RHL:gd's 3500 ser 76/045 of 8 May 1969
(c) CTG 76.4 MSG DTG 270010Z MAR 69
(d) CTG 79.4 MSG DTG 221416Z MAR 69

1. References (a) and (b) have been reviewed and are approved for distribution as recommended reference (a) with corrections and comments noted reference (b) subject to the following:

a. Page 3, paragraph 3 - the enemy casualty summary noted agrees with reference (c), but does not reflect results reported reference (d). A reconciliation of this conflicting enemy killed in action count is required.

ALPINE W. McLANE
Asst Chief of Staff
for Plans

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY:

W.L. KENYON
CWO2, USN

Enclosure (2)
CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet
To: Commander SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: EAGER PURSUIT II Post Operation Report; forwarding of (U)

Encl: (1) COMPHIBREADGRU ALFA 1tr 3500 ser 037 of 22 April 1969 (5 copies)

1. (U) Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet concurs with the contents of enclosure (1) except as noted below:

   a. Page 1, add under Encl: "(12) DISTRIBUTION LIST".
   
   b. Page 1, last sentence, paragraph 1.a., change "090902Z" to read "090920Z".
   
   c. Page 2, paragraph 2.b., next to the last sentence, change "9835" to read "9853".

2. (C) The originator has previously taken action concerning assignment of circuits for exclusive use by the ARG as recommended in enclosure 7, page 1, paragraph 1.c., of enclosure (1). Two VHF frequencies have been assigned to CTG 76.4 for exclusive use as approved by CG III MAF.

   F. W. CLIFT III
   Chief of Staff

Copy to:
CTG 76.4

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY:

L.L. KENYON
CWO2, USN

DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED

COMANDER AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP ALFA
FPO San Francisco 96601

CARG'A'Nlft
3500
Ser: 020
13 May 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commander Amphibious Ready Group ALFA, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet
To: Commander Amphibious Force, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: Operation EAGER PURSUIT III Post Operation Report; forwarding of (U)

Ref: (a) COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT/CTP 76 INST 3500.1C
(b) Joint COMFIRSTFLT/COMSEVENTHFLTINST 3500.3/3500.8A

Encl: (1) Task Organization
(2) Initiating Directive (Omitted)
(3) Chronology of Events
(4) Planning/Operations (Omitted)
(b) Intelligence (Omitted)
(6) Medical/Logistics
(7) Communications
(8) Public Affairs (Omitted)
(9) Supporting Arms
(10) Lessons Learned (Omitted)
(11) Other (Omitted)
(12) Distribution

1. (C) Background. On the return of ARG ALFA to I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ) from upkeep in Subic Bay, Battalion Landing Team 1/26 was in defensive positions north of Danang and could not be embarked until the completion of Operation OKLAHOMA HILLS. Therefore, COMSEVENTHFLT instructed ARG ALFA to embark HMM-362 and commence support Operation EAGER PURSUIT III.

2. (C) Concept of Operations

   a. Mission. The mission of ARG/SLF ALFA was to provide helicopter augmentation to III MAF for troop lift, MAG-16 and logistic support. USS OKLAHOMA was also available to provide halo/haven and medical facilities for support of Marine activities ashore.

   b. Execution. Operation EAGER PURSUIT III started at 160800H with the backloading of HMM-362 off Phu Bai. On completion of the backload, ARG/SLF ALFA was responsive to CG, III MAF requests for support throughout the ICTZ.

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(1) Support rendered included sending two HMM-362 helicopters in-country daily to FIRST Marine Division (FIRST MARDIV) as Command and Control aircraft. Three additional aircraft were assigned to FIRST MARDIV each day as courier aircraft. It was not necessary for USS OKINAWA to provide helo haven during the operation. The first MEDEVACS were received from in-country on 21 April and a total of seven were received and treated during the operation.

(2) On 24 April elements of BLT 1/26 began embarkation with the final elements embarking shortly after Operation EAGER PURSUIT III was terminated at 260800H.

4. (C) Conclusions.

a. The mission of ARG/SLF ALFA in EAGER PURSUIT III was to provide helicopter support to III MAF. In this effort HMM-362 flew 1274 sorties for a total of 370 hours. The operation is considered successful in that all support requested by III MAF was provided by ARG/SLF ALFA.

b. Seven MEDEVACS were brought to and treated by USS OKINAWA. This phase is also considered successful in that all services requested by III MAF were provided by ARG/SLF ALFA facilities.

c. Helo haven, although available, was not requested by III MAF.

d. Although the mission was accomplished, its scope was too narrow to make full use of all ARG/SLF ALFA assets.


GEORGE W. STROUD
CONFIDENTIAL

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TASK ORGANIZATION

TG 76.4 Amphiibious Ready Group ALFA CAPT G. W. STROUD, USN

USS OKINAWA (LPH 3)
USS DULUTH (LPD 6)
USS WINSTON (LKA 94)
USS FORT MARION (LSD 22)
USS TORTUGA (LSD 26) (Except from 180001H to
201442H APR 69)

TACRON ELEVEN DET ALFA
UDT THIRTEEN DET ECHO
BJU ONE TEAM TWELVE DET FOXTROT
BMU ONE DET ALFA ONE
ACU ONE DET ALFA

TU 76.4.0 Command and Special Operations Unit CAPT G. W. STROUD, USN

TU 76.4.0.1 Flagship Element CPT H. D. WILLIAMS, USN

TU 76.4.0.2 Tactical Air Control Element LCDR R. H. WALL, USN

TU 76.4.0.3 Beach Reconnaissance Element CDR J. J. DYER, USN

TU 76.4.0.4 Special Operations Element CDR J. J. Vogel, USN

TU 76.4.0.5 Transport Area Defense Element CDR J. W. FARLEY, USN

TU 76.4.0.6 Naval Beach Party Element CDR J. W. FARLEY, USN

TU 76.4.1 Gunfire Support and Screen Unit None Assigned

TU 76.4.2 Transport Unit CAPT G. W. STROUD, USN

TU 76.4.3 Cargo Unit CAPT "H" R. HUNTER, USN

TU 76.4.4 Waterborne Control Unit CDR J. W. FARLEY, USN

DECLASSIFIED USN
CONFIDENTIAL

TU 76.4.5  Heliborne Control Unit
USS OKINAWA (LPH 3)
USS BOXER (LPH 6)

TG 79 - Special Landing Force
HMM 362

CAPT H. D. WILLIAMS, USN
CO, USS OKINAWA (LPH 3)

COL W. C. DUFFY, USMC
CO, SLF ALFA

LCDR J. E. SCHLARF, USMC

Enclosure (1)
CONFIDENTIAL
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

16 April 1969

a. 0800H - Commenced Operation EAGER PURSUIT III in accordance with COMSEVENTHFLT 140332Z APR 69.

b. 0800H - Commenced backload of HMM-362 off Phu Bai.

c. 1200H - CTG 79.4 assumed OPCON of HMM-362.

d. 1800H - Backload HMM-362 completed on board USS OKINAWA.

e. TG 76.4 Steamed in assigned areas.

17 April 1969

a. 0700H - TG 76.4 ships anchored in Danang harbor to load cargo on BLT 1/26.

b. USS FORT MARION diverted to Cua Viet for LCM-8 lift to Danang.

c. 0800H - USS TORTUGA offloaded an LCU and two LCM-8’s of ACU ONE Det ALFA in Danang Harbor.

d. 1900H - USS DULUTH assumed tactical command of USS TORTUGA and proceeded to UNREP with USS TALUGA. BMU ONE Det ALFA ONE remained in Danang to assist USS WINSTON with backloading.

18 April 1969

a. 0001H - USS TORTUGA deleted from TG 76.4 and proceeded on duties assigned.

b. 0800H - USS DULUTH anchored in Danang Harbor to backload BMU ONE Det ALFA.

c. 1300H - USS FORT MARION loaded damaged LCM-8’s at Cua Viet for further transfer to Danang.

19 April 1969

a. 0800H - USS FORT MARION anchored in Danang to offload damaged LCM-8’s and backloaded LCU and two LCM-8’s of ACU ONE Det ALFA previously offloaded by USS TORTUGA.

b. USS FORT MARION developed trouble starboard main engine (see enclosure (6)).

20 April 1969

a. 0800H - USS OKINAWA UNREP USS COOK (LPR 130)
b. 0815H - CTG 76.4 and Staff Logistics Officer visited USS FORT MARION. USS FORT MARION CASREPED number one main engine reduction gear.

c. 0930H - RADM F. T. NORRIS, MC, USN, Inspector General (Acting), Medical Corps, visited USS OKINAWA.

d. 1000H - USS FORT MARION anchored Danang Harbor to offload one LCU and two LCM-8's of ACU ONE Det ALFA and proceeded to Subic Bay, P.I. for repair to number one main engine reduction gear.

e. 1442H - USS TORTUGA assigned to TG 76.4 to replace USS FORT MARION.

21 April 1969

a. 0730H - TG 76.4 anchored in Danang Harbor for backloading BLT 1/26 Admin/Rear.

b. TG 76.4 underway from Danang Harbor prior to sunset for assigned operation.

22 April 1969

a. 0730H - USS OKINAWA UNREP from USS CALIENTE.

d. 0900H - USS OKINAWA and helicopters from HMM-362 conducted a search northeast of Danang where USS CALIENTE reported man overboard on morning of 22 April. Search terminated at sunset with negative results.

c. 0810H - CTG 76.4 conducted liaison with III MAF on backload of BLT 1/26.

23 April 1969

a. 1045H - TG 76.4 anchored Danang Harbor to complete backload of advance party BLT 1/26.

b. 0730H - Representatives from CTG 76.4, CTG 79.4 and C.O. of BLT 1/26 conducted aerial survey of area about two miles south of Cua Viet to determine suitability for an amphibious rehearsal area.

c. TG 76.4 ships underway for assigned operation prior to sunset.

d. 1700H - USS OKINAWA and USS DULUTH UNREP from USS PASSUMPSIC.

24 April 1969

a. 0330H - USS TORTUGA rendezvous with TG 76.4 in assigned operation.
b. 0730H - USS TORTUGA anchored Danang Harbor to embark LCU and two LCM-8's of BMU ONE Det ALFA ONE previously off-loaded by USS FORT MARION on 20 April. On completion USS TORTUGA returned to assigned oparea.

25 April 1969

a. TG 76.4 ships less USS OKINAWA anchored prior to first light in Danang Harbor to commence embarkation of BLT 1/26.

b. 1626H - Completed embarkation of BLT 1/26.

26 April 1969

a. EAGER PURSUIT III terminated in accordance with COMSEVENTHFLT message 251644Z APR 69.
A. MEDICAL.

1. (C) Operation EAGER PURSUIT III began on 16 April 1969 and ended on 26 April 1969. The operation was conducted in I Corps in Quang Nam Province. BLT 1/26 was under the operational control of 26TH Marine Regiment with the ARG providing medical support for routine and priority MEDEVACS.

2. (C) The Ready Group consisted of USS OKINAWA (LPH 3), USS DULUTH (LPD 6), USS WINSTON (LKA 94), USS TORTUGA (LSD 26), and USS FORT MARION (LSD 22). No battalion was embarked and HMM-362 provided helicopter support to III MAF.

3. (C) The USS OKINAWA was designated as casualty receiving ship. Medical Officers on board consisted of:

   a. SURGICAL TEAM
      (1) CDR J. J. RYSKAMP, Jr., OinC
      (2) LCDR E. H. WIDELL, Jr.
      (3) LT B. C. N. SAH

   b. SHIP’S MEDICAL OFFICER
      (4) LT H. D. HICKEY

   c. CLEARING PLATOON
      (5) LT G. E. HARP
      (6) LT L. ROUBAL
      (7) LT J. W. WALLACE

   d. BATTALION SURGEON
      (8) LT T. R. GADACZ

   e. FLIGHT SURGEON
      (9) LCDR V. L. PLICH

4. (C) LCDR M. C. SHESKEY, the Anesthesiologist for Surgical Team ALFA, was on Emergency Leave and since no replacement has been received for the Nurse Anesthesist, the USS OKINAWA was not up to full casualty receiving capacity.

5. (C) All of the MEDEVACS were of routine sick-call problems and the casualties were of a routine nature with one being received from 1ST MED BLT for further treatment. All emergency MEDEVACS were moved to in-country medical facilities via the in-country MEDEVAC pack. There was one emergency appendectomy performed during this period.
6. (C) Casualty Statistics:

   a. BLOOD: There were no units of blood on hand at the beginning of the operation nor were any drawn from NSA Danang Hospital or other commands.

   b. SUMMARY OF CASUALTY STATISTICS

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<th>Total Casualties Received</th>
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<td>(a) Non-Combat</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) Wounded in Action (WIA)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
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<td>(c) Killed in Action (KIA)</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>(d) Died of Wounds (DOW)</td>
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<td>(c) Hernia</td>
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<td>(d) Laceration</td>
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<td>(e) Sunburn</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(c) MAJOR SURGICAL PROCEDURES</td>
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<td>(d) SUMMARY OF O. R. ANESTHESIA</td>
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<td>(2) Admitted to Sick Bay</td>
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<td>(3) Discharged to duty</td>
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<td>(4) Transferred</td>
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<td>(5) Died of Wounds</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Remaining in Sick Bay end of Operation</td>
<td>4</td>
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B LOGISTICS

1. (C) Maintenance. USS FORT MARION (LSD 22), after having been loaded with a medium load and steaming about 12 hours, discovered metal particles on the magnet in the number one main engine lube oil strainers. An inspection of the reduction gears revealed that the second reduction gears had started to wear. Further investigation proved that the main thrust bearing was not loaded and all the thrust was placed on the reduction gear thrust bearings. It was also discovered that one reduction gear thrust bearing had started to wipe. FORT MARION steamed to Subic Bay on number two main engine for repair to the number one main engine.

2. (C) UNREPS/VERTREPS. Four underway refueling operations were conducted; two for USS DULUTH (LPD 6), one for USS WINSTON (LKA 94) and one for USS OKINAWA (LPH 3). USS TORTUGA (LSD 26) received stores from USS TALUGA (AO 62).

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<td>USS PASSUMPSIC (AO 107)</td>
<td>17,465 GAL</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>1 S/T</td>
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COMMUNICATIONS

1. (C) Planning.
   a. Operation EAGER PURSUIT III did not require the
      promulgation of a Communications Annex. Communications
      were in accordance with the Operation EAGER PURSUIT Annex
      November and CTG 76.4 OPLAN 101A-69. EMCON was not set
      during any portion of the operation as the operation
      commenced with BLT 1/26 ashore.

2. (C) Requirements versus Assets.
   a. Equipment assets were adequate to handle all require­
      ments due to the limited scope of the operation and the fact
      that BLT 1/26 was in-country and not attached.

3. (C) Usable Frequencies.
   a. As experienced in EAGER PURSUIT and EAGER PURSUIT II,
      communications were disrupted between units within Danang
      Harbor and those at sea due to the topography of the area
      involved. Frequency assignments to the LPD L/L and LPH
      UHF Home for WESTPAC deployment created mutual interference.
      Lack of dedicated VHF (FM) frequencies for boat control
      for ARG ALFA created safety hazards, interference, and
      unnecessary message traffic while embarking the BLT. The
      periods of multiple boat operations, loading and unloading
      Amtracs, ammos and other supplies without adequate communica­
      tions caused problems to the Beachmaster Unit and the PCE.

4. (C) Cryptographic Systems.
   a. Adequate cryptographic systems were available through­
      out the operation.

5. (C) RPS Resupply
   a. No difficulties were encountered with RPS resupply.

6. (C) Traffic and Load versus Circuit and Personnel Availability.
   a. The traffic load throughout the operation was normally
      consistent with the everyday traffic volume in the Vietnam
      area. No particular traffic handling problems were encountered.

7. (C) Termination.
   a. The NAVCOMMOPNET ROMULUS termination with NAVCOMMSTA
      Philippines was shifted to an ORESTES system within the early
      days of the operation when the USS VALLEY FORGE relinquished
      their Danang termination. Occasional OUTAGES were mainly
      attributable to men aloft and ship's power failure.

Enclosure (7)
8. (C) **Broadcast Reception**

   a. Fleet Broadcast reception was excellent throughout the operation, using the 3072 KHZ broadcast re-keyed by NSA Danang.

9. (C) **Equipment Reliability.**

   a. Communications equipment was very reliable and repairs were made as soon as required. The realistic performance of the PMS checks contributed greatly to fore-knowledge of deteriorating circuitry within equipment in sufficient time to permit corrective action prior to actual outage.

10. (C) **KY-8.**

    a. The Ky-8's for covered voice were used on the maneuvering and warning circuit, reporting circuit, and several Marine circuits. Though no major difficulties occurred, a potential loss of these circuits is posed by: A lack of adequate repairmen, inadequate spare parts, minimum allowance of equipment, and an inherent overheating problem.
1. **Close Air Support.**
   
a. During Operation EAGER PURSUIT III, TACC radio nets were established and manned in accordance with Annex Hotel or CTG 76.4 OPLAN 101A-69.
   
b. Six nets were operating, two of which were MEDEVAC Common and the medical net between III MAF COC and the hospital ships.
   
c. TACC was useful in passing messages and frag requests to the FIRST MAW TADC. On two occasions heavy lift aircraft were requested from FIRST MAW TADC through TACC.
   
d. Total flight operation statistics for Operation EAGER PURSUIT III were:
   
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA C&amp;GSC, FT LEAVENWORTH, KAN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OINC NAVTACDOC ACT</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DECLASSIFIED</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enclosure (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONFIDENTIAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENTIAL - Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1)

From: Commander Amphibious Force, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet
To: Commander Amphibious Ready Group ALFA, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: Operation EAGER PURSUIT III Post Operation Report; approval of

Ref: (a) Commander Amphibious Ready Group ALFA ltr 3500 ser 020 of 13 May 69

Encl: (1) Commander Amphibious Force, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet ltr 3500 ser 76/056 of 27 May 1969

(2) Commander U.S. SEVENTH Fleet ltr 3340 ser N6-622 of 9 June 1969

1. Reference (a) is approved for distribution upon completion of corrections as required by enclosure (1).

2. Enclosures (1) and (2) may be made enclosures to or distributed with the corrected Post Operation Report if desired.

F.W. CLIFT III
Chief of Staff
CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commander Amphibious Force, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet
To: Commander SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: EAGER PURSUIT III Post Operation Report; forwarding of (U)

Enc1: (1) Commander Amphibious Ready Group ALFA ltr 3500 ser 020 of 13 May 1969 (5 copies)

1. (C) Commander Amphibious Force, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet concurs with the contents of enclosure (1) except as noted below:


   b. Enclosure 12, change "COMSERGRU THREE" to read "COMSERVGRU THREE".

2. (C) It is noted that the figures for cumulative hours flown by HMM 362 and MEDEVACS as shown in enclosure 9, paragraph 1.d., and CTG 76.4 message 260006Z APR 69, (Final sitrep for EAGER PURSUIT III) do not reconcile. A review of separate records maintained by TACRON ELEVEN indicates that the figures in enclosure (9) are correct.

F. W. CLIFT III
Chief of Staff

Copy to:
CTG 76.4

Certified to be a true copy

L. L. KENYON
Staff Secretary
Commander Amphibious Ready Group ALFA

DECLASSIFIED
From: Commander SEVENTH Fleet
To: Commander Amphibious Force, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: Operation EAGER PURSUIT III Post Operation Report; approval of

Ref: (a) COMPHIBREADYGRU "A" Conf ltr CARG "A"/N1:ft 3500 ser 020 of
13 May 1969
(b) COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT Conf ltr N314/RHL:gs 3500 ser 76/056
of 27 May 1969

1. References (a) and (b) have been reviewed and are approved for distribution
as recommended reference (a) with corrections noted reference (b).

ALPINE W. McLANE
Asst Chief of Staff
for Plans

Certified to be a true copy

L. L. KENTON
Staff Secretary
Commander Amphibious Ready Group ALFA

ENCLOSURE (2)
From: Commander Amphibious Ready Group ALFA, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet
To: Commander Amphibious Force, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: Operation DARING REBEL Post Operation Report; forwarding of (U)

Ref: (a) COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT/CTF 76 INST 3500.1C
    (b) Joint COMFIRSTFLT/COMSEVENTHFLT INST 3500.3/3500.8A

Encl: (1) Task Organization
    (2) Initiating Directive/Modification to Initiating Directive
    (3) Chronology of Events
    (4) Planning/Operations
    (5) Intelligence
    (6) Medical/Logistics
    (7) Communications
    (8) Public Affairs
    (9) Supporting Arms
    (10) Lessons Learned (Omitted)
    (11) Ship-to-Shore Movement/Amphibious Demonstration/Withdrawal/ Psychological Operations
    (12) Distribution

1. (C) Background. Barrier Island, a wedge-shaped island located about twenty miles south-southeast of Danang in Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces, was a known harboring and staging area and considered a rest and recreation area for Viet Cong (VC) and Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). The VC/VCI had entrenched themselves with numerous bunkers, AA sites and arms caches and had won some sympathetic support from the indigenous populace. Probable enemy units in the area included the V.25 Local Force (LF) Battalion, Q.80 Local Force Company and 105th Local Force Company. The current Black List contained over 220 names. There had been other successful amphibious operations on Barrier Island, always with significant VC casualties and a considerable amount of contact.

   a. Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Forces, Danang, Vietnam, (CG, III MAF), requested approval on 1 May 1969 from Commander SEVENTH Fleet to employ Amphibious
Ready Group/Special Landing Force (ARG/SLF) ALFA in an amphibious operation on Barrier Island commencing 5 May 1969. The operation would be multi-national, multi-battalion in the HoI An Area including Barrier Island. The first phase would be from 3 May to 5 May 1969. Four companies from SECOND Republic of Korea Marine Corps (ROKMC) Brigade and Vietnamese Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/FF) in conjunction with Vietnam River Assault Group 32 would attack in North Central and Eastern Day Xuyen and Hieu Nhon Districts respectively, to usher the enemy south and east. The second phase would start 5 May 1969 with Amphibious Ready Group/Special Landing Force ALFA conducting a heliborne assault into landing zones on the western edge of Barrier Island attacking to the east and waterborne assault in the southern portion of the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA). Simultaneously, the 51st and 54th Battalions of Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) would conduct an assault in the northern sector of Barrier Island by helicopter. The forces in phase one were to assume blocking positions in their areas by early on 5 May. Americal Division would provide support with screening operations to the south and west with two Cavalry Troops. Task Group 115.1 and Coastal Group 14 would provide blocking forces to seaward and on the Song Cua Dai.

2. (C) Concept of Operations. To employ the Amphibious Task Force (ATF) in an Amphibious Assault supported by naval gunfire and Close Air Support (CAS). Conduct a waterborne landing at H-Hour at Red Beach in the southern sector of the AOA and a heliborne landing at L-Hour into Landing Zones (LZ's) on the western edge of the AOA to find, fix and destroy enemy forces.

   a. Mission. Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) conduct an amphibious operation against VC/VCI forces in the Amphibious Objective Area on Barrier Island, Quang Tin Province of I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ) to open the waterway, Song Cua Dai, to commercial traffic and to conduct a detailed search for and destruction of Local Forces and Viet Cong Infrastructure of other operations as agreed upon with CG, III MAF or his designated representatives.

   b. Execution. Operation DARING REBEL was executed at H-Hour and L-Hour on 5 May 1969. H-Hour and L-Hour were 1000H (local time) so as to be coordinated with the ARVN’s heliborne landing in the northern sector of Barrier Island. USS MULLINNIX and USS WHITE RIVER fired prep fire into Helicopter Landing Zones and on Red Beach prior to H and L-Hour. ALFA Company of Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 1/26 landed at H-Hour on Red Beach meeting no enemy opposition.
DELTA Company landed by helicopter into Landing Zone TIGER and received small arms fire from the enemy west of the AOA. Initial prep of LZ LION uncovered numerous bunkers. The landing of CHARLIE Company in that area was then delayed until 1145H while fixed-wing aircraft were recalled to prep LZ LION again. BRAVO Company remained in reserve aboard USS DULUTH. There was no major contact made with enemy forces on D-Day.

1. The small arms fire received from the western side of the Truong Giang River, just west of the AOA, was in the area where American Forces were to screen. The small arms fire was initially suppressed by CAS strafing runs. That night Popular Forces conducted ambushes on the western side of the river which reduced the danger of enemy fire. American Division made this area a free fire zone from 1930H until 0530H daily commencing on 7 May. Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS) and landing force artillery conducted H and I fires and call fire as requested into this area each ensuing night effectively suppressing enemy fire or attack from the west.

2. ALFA Company, as a screening/blocking force in the southern AOA, also conducted search and clear operations. CHARLIE and DELTA Companies, situated in the green vegetated sector of the western AOA from D-Day until the morning of 9 May, conducted night operations consisting of listening posts, night patrols and ambushes. During the day the landing force conducted a thorough search of the western portion of the AOA, collecting detainees for evacuation to the Combined Holding and Interrogation Center (CHIC). To increase the density of forces in the western sector, CATF landed BRAVO Company originally held in reserve aboard USS DULUTH, by helicopter into LZ TIGER on the morning of 7 May. On the morning of 9 May ALFA Company, in the southern sector of the AOA, commenced its movement north, while the main body of the landing force commenced movement from the western side of the AOA eastward toward and across the sand dune/beach line. (See Enclosure III, page 7). The landing force encountered light to moderate contact with the enemy, finding many spider holes, bunkers and tunnels which were destroyed by the engineers. Detainees were lifted every day to CHIC. Intelligence reports indicated some of the enemy crossed the Truong Giang waterway into the western sector of the AOA. Consequently CHARLIE and DELTA Companies were repositioned in LZ LION by helicopter on 17 May to conduct a second search and clear operation in that area. CATF commenced withdrawing the landing force at 200630H. The withdrawal was completed at 201230H.

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An amphibious demonstration was conducted on 9 May to keep the VC, VCI forces off balance and disrupt any scheme of maneuver they had planned. The simulated L-Hour was 0800H and the simulated H-Hour was 0830H. Simultaneously, with the demonstration, the landing force commenced their movement north and east. Naval gunfire and CAS conducted prep fire on two landing zones prior to L-Hour. Eight helicopters flew in assault formation towards a simulated LZ only to turn away at L-Hour. Naval gunfire and landing force artillery prepared a simulated assault beach as ten amphibious track vehicles (LVT's) proceeded in assault formation toward the northern beach to turn away at H-Hour.

4. Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) THIRTEEN Detachment ECHO, in addition to their duties as beach reconnaissance, requested and received permission from CATF on 10 May to assist ALFA Company in placing explosives and blowing bunkers along the beach area. On 11 May the UDT assisted in blowing seven well concealed bunkers. Petty Officer STICKLE, while in one bunker to place explosives captured a prisoner who had been hiding behind a false bunkhead in the bunker. UDT, in company with elements of ALFA Company, reported capturing three VC prisoners, four grenades, one inoperable rifle and various papers and clothing on 11 May.

5. Beach Jumper Unit ONE Team TWELVE Detachment FOXTROT was tasked with providing population control and psychological operations. Leaflets were dropped from helicopters and aerial loudspeaker broadcasts were used during Operation DARING REBEL. (See Enclosure 1(b)).

6. The Combined Holding and Interrogation Center (CHIC) was located about one mile south of the AOA at grid coordinates BT 214438. Province Forces established ambushes on the main route between the AOA and the CHIC as a security force. Later, on 15 May, a reinforced platoon from ALFA Company was moved to the CHIC to supplement the local security force. On the evening of 18 May the CHIC received probes by an unknown number of enemy. The enemy used small arms, mortars and set up loudspeakers warning CHIC that they would be overrun. Artillery was called and an AC-47 (SPOOKY) suppressed enemy activity in the area of CHIC. (See Enclosure 14, paragraph 3.b).

7. Augmentation Forces. During Operation DARING REBEL, augmentation forces used were:

a. Aircraft: Air support was requested from CG, III MAF for Operation DARING REBEL. CG, III MAF tasked
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CG, FIRST MAW to provide fixed-wing Close Air Support and CG, America's Division to provide helicopter gunships for helicopter escort. In addition, helicopter gunships could be requested directly from America's Division, on a mission basis, for MED-VAC escort and fire suppression and were provided if available. On D-Day an airborne air controller from the America's Division was on station at H and L-Hour minus 60 to control fixed-wing aircraft for landing zone prep and close air support. Fixed-wing aircraft arrived on schedule at L-50 and prepped the landing zone with 500 pound bombs. Fixed-wing aircraft arrived on schedule at L-15 minutes and suppressed automatic weapons fire as needed. The Amphibious Task Force (ATF) Tactical Air Control Center controlled 1,162 aircraft through the AOA during the operation. Forty-two of these were fighter and attack aircraft for Close Air Support. Eight were AC-47 "SPOOKY" aircraft for fire support and twenty were UH-1E gunships for helo and MED-VAC escort. Total ordnance expended by aircraft for Operation DARING REBEL was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombs</td>
<td>146,500 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockets</td>
<td>8 5&quot; ZUNI, 145 2.75&quot; Rockets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napalm</td>
<td>29,000 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammo</td>
<td>5,600 rounds 20MM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>166,600 rounds 7.62MM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Anti-infiltration Craft: One WPB was assigned to patrol area in the littoral of the AOA in direct support by CTG 115.1. The WPB was called upon to investigate activity on the beach at grid coordinates BT 270428, just south of the AOA, when USS DULUTH spotted about 200 Vietnamese, about 1900 6 May. When the WPB arrived in the vicinity they all ran over the sand dune and out of sight. On the morning of 8 May the WPB reported several sightings of people moving along the beach in the AOA toward Red Beach. This was the result of the psyops broadcast 7 May instructing people to move south along the beach for transfer out of the combat area. USS CROCKETT (PG 88) was assigned 13 through 15 May. On 15 May with air observer assistance CROCKETT fired 67 rounds of 3"/50 at a bunker complex.

(c) Naval Fire: USS MULLINNIX (DD 944) and USS WHITE RIVER (LPR 536) supported the assault landing on 5 May with preparatory fire into landing zones and on Red Beach, later provided on-call fire, and harassment and interdiction fire at H and L. USS MULLINNIX was relieved on station by USS FRANK E. EVANS (DD 754) at 061200H MAY.
USS WHITE RIVER was detached 062000H MAY. USS NOA (DD 841) relieved USS FRANK E. EVANS 150830H MAY, and USS DOUGLAS H. FOX (DD 779) relieved USS NOA 190845H MAY, USS DOUGLAS H. FOX was detached 201000H MAY. (Enclosure (9) refers to Naval Gunfire Support).

(8) Casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Enemy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>2 USMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOW</td>
<td>2 USMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>50 USMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA (Not Evacuated)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(9) Personnel Captured/detained:

<p>| | |</p>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POW</td>
<td>74</td>
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<tr>
<td>VCI</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHIEU HOI</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DETAINNEES</td>
<td>3333</td>
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(10) Material captured:

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<tr>
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<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>9,425 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>170 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Weapons</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayonet</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades (CHICOMS)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-26 Grenade</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket Propelled Grenade</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cartridge Belts</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carbine Magazines</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK 47 Magazines</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Web belt with canteen and ammo pouch (no ammo) 1

Assorted Clothing

Assorted Medical Supplies

3. (C) Enemy Advance Warning of Landing. Through interrogation at CHIC, indications were that the enemy was notified of the Marines landing on 5 May 1969.

a. A Viet Cong Prisoner of War at CHIC stated that on 4 May, 150 enemy from C-16 Sapper Battalion left the AOA after conducting training, and that they were warned by loudspeaker that the Marines were coming on 5 May. They also took hostages from the villages to keep their locations unknown.

b. Various civilians (determined innocent by CHIC) reported a large force of Viet Cong crossed the river moving west on the night of 4 May.

c. One Hoa Chanh who was a member of V-16 (no further information on V-16) stated that he was tired of war and then indicated that V-16 was notified of a landing by loudspeakers, probably set up on the west side of the bank of the Truong Giang.

4. (D) USS DULUTH provided 900 hot meals and USS OKINAWA provided 550 hot meals to troops ashore. Because of a shortage of rice at the CHIC, USS OKINAWA also provided 1,110 pounds of bread to the CHIC.

5. (C) Coordination/Problem Areas.

a. At the planning conference one of the agreements made was that American Division would provide a blocking/screening force of two Cavalry Troops west of the Truong Giang waterway to cut VC/NVA escape routes and suppress attack by rifle on the landing force from the rear.

The screening force did not accomplish this mission and heavy automatic weapons fire was received from west of the AOA, so a proposed extension of the AOA was submitted to CG, 111 MAF and COMSEVENTHFLT at 051150H. At 1420H on 5 May, BGEN CLEMENT visited CATF and CLF aboard OKINAWA and a new agreement was reached whereby an area about 1000 meters west of the AOA would be declared a fire zone between the hours of 1930H and 0530H to permit naval gunfire, artillery and CAS to suppress enemy fire.
b. Americal Division offered to provide an available Armed Cavalry Troop to set up a blocking/screening force along the sand dune/berm-line behind the landing force as it moved west to east. The screening force would serve as protection to the landing force rear as they moved into the vegetated area east of the dune line. A request was submitted at 090250H to COMSEVENTHFLT for a modification to the initiating directive to permit CG, Americal Division to position an armed cavalry troop on the sand dune line as a supporting force as defined in JCS Pub 2. The initiating directive was modified by COMSEVENTHFLT at 090716H MAY to allow the armed cavalry troop in the AOA subject to approval of CG, III MAF. CG, III MAF concurred at 110932H. The armed cavalry troop entered the AOA about 111330H but was withdrawn the evening of 12 May due to other commitments.

6. (C) Conclusion. Operation DARING REBEL was a successful Operation combining a waterborne assault and a heliborne assault into the Objective Area. Naval gunfire and Close Air Support gave adequate support in H and L-Hour prep and throughout the operation. Commander Amphibious Ready Group ALFA successfully landed two companies simultaneously, one waterborne and the other heliborne at H and L-Hour. The ELT artillery was landed in a scheduled assault wave at H plus 24 minutes and in position to give support throughout the entire operation. The Landing Force found many bunkers, tunnels and spider holes which were destroyed. The number of arms caches discovered was less than expected, but in view of the possibility that the enemy was warned of an operation he could have moved arms and ammunition as well as troops from the AOA. Additionally, throughout the operation Task Group 115.1 Elements proved effective in their blockade efforts. A review of the results reflects the success of the operation: Enemy KIA 105, POW 74, captured VCI 108, Chieu Hoi 14 and detainees 3,333 with the loss of only two U.S. Marines KIA and two who died of wounds.

a. Although CATF would have preferred an earlier H and L-Hour than 1000H it doesn't appear that agreeing to the scheme of maneuver of the ARVN Battalions had any appreciable effect on giving time for additional VC/NVA to escape. It appears from the intelligence reports that some of the VC/NVA did evacuate Barrier 1 on 3 and 4 May. If there was indeed a leak of information concerning the planned operation, this Command does not know of any action it took that could have tipped off the enemy. It also appears that if there was leak or a tip off, it occurred too late for the VCI and Local Forces to escape.
b. Helicopter gunships stationed aboard the LPH would expedite and facilitate MEDEVAC's and fire suppression missions. When HUEY gunships had to be called from Chu Lai during Operation DARING REBEL for night MEDEVAC's the delay sometimes ran as much as one hour, which in most cases would be unsatisfactory for emergency MEDEVAC's.

7. (C) Recommendations.
   a. HUEY gunships be assigned to the SLF and stationed aboard the LPH for all amphibious operations.
   
   b. Planning conferences for multinautal operations be conducted no more than 72 hours before the tentative A and B-Hour to reduce the time for security leaks.
   
   c. Continued employment of ARG/SLF in amphibious operations of the nature of Operation DARING REBEL.

George W. Stroud

Distribution:
(See Enclosure (14))
Amphibious Ready Group ALFA

Command and Special Operations Unit

Task Organization

USS OKINAWA (LPH 3)
USS DU LUTH (LFD 5)
USS MILANNIX (DD 944) (Detached 061200H May 69)
USS FRANK E. EVANS (DD 754) (Detached 061200H May 69)
USS WHITE KIYER (LRF 536) (Detached 061200H May 69)
USS DOUGLAS H. FOX (DD 179) (190845H to 201000H May 69)

Task Group 76.4

Task Force 76.4

Transport Unit
USS OKINAWA (LPH 3)
USS DU LUTH (LFD 5)
USS MILANNIX (LSD 26)

Task Force 76.4

Transport Area Defense Element

Task Group 76.4.1

USS MILANNIX (DD 944) 5-6 May 69

Transport Unit
USS OKINAWA (LPH 3)
USS DU LUTH (LFD 5)
USS MILANNIX (LSD 26)
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IU 76.4.3 Cargo Unit
USS W. NATION (LKA 94) Detained 8 May 1969
USS FORI MARION (LSD 22) 8 May 1969

IU 76.4.4 Waterborne Control Unit
USS TORTUGA (LSU 26)

IU 76.4.5 Heliborne Control Unit
USS OKINAWA (LPH 3)
USS DULUTH (LPH 6)

TG 79.4 Special Landing Force
BLI 1/26
HMM 362

Capt. H. R. HUNTER, USN
CO, USS FORI MARION (LSD 22)

CDR G. W. PARISH, USN
CO, USS FORI MARION (LSD 22)

CDR J. J. VOELL, JR., USN
CO, USS TORTUGA (LSU 26)

Capt. R. D. WILLIAMS, USN
CO, USS OKINAWA (LPH 3)

Col. W. C. BOW, USMC
CO, SLF ALFA

LTCOL G. C. KLIEFOH, USMC

LTCOL J. E. SCHLARP, USMC

Enclosure (1)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNvV PAID 005/9
0 0201262 MAY 69

FM COMSEVENTHFLT
TO CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
CTF SEVEN SIX
CTF SEVEN NINE
COMUSMACV
CG III MAF
INFO CINCPAC
CNO
CMC
CINCPACFLT
COMNAVFORV
COMPHHPAC
CG FMPAC
CG FMPAC PFWD
CG FIRST MAW
CG FIRST MARDIV
CMOK SEVENTH AF
CTF ONE ONE FIVE
CTF SEVEN THREE
CTF SEVEN SEVEN
CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE
CG AMERICAN DIV
CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE
CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
CTF SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE
CTF SEVEN ZERO PT ONE PT ONE
NAVCOMMS WESTPAC
NAVCOMMSUS WESTPAC
CG SECOND ROK MAR BDE

OPERATION DARING REBEL INITIATING DIRECTIVE (U)
A. MY OPLAN 101-69
B. NWP 22.8

1. SITUATION: CG III MAF HAS REQUESTED THE EMPLOYMENT OF
AN ARG, SLF IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE 1 CTZ. COMSEVENTHFLT
WILL PROVIDE TO 78.4.79 4 AND SUCH OTHER FORCES AS MAY BE
NECESSARY FOR THIS OPERATION. INITIATING DIRECTIVE IS FOR
PLANNING PURPOSES THE OPERATION WHEN EXECUTED, WILL BE
CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH KEF A AND B

2. MISSION: COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (CATF) CONDUCT
AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION AGAINST VC/NVA FORCES IN AMPHIBIOUS

Enclosure (2)
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

OBJECTIVE AREA IN QUANG TIN/QUANG NAM PROVINCE OF I CTZ TO CONDUCT A DETAILED SEARCH FOR AND DESTRUCTION OF LOCAL FORCES (LF) AND VCT AND SUCH OTHER OPERATIONS AS AGREED UPON WITH CG III MAF OR HIS DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE.

3. CTG 76.4 (COMPHIBRON 5) EMBARKED IN USS OKINAWA (LPH 3) DESIGNATED CATF.

4. CTG 79.4 (COMMANDER SLF ALFA) EMBARKED IN USS OKINAWA (LPH 3) DESIGNATED COMMANDER LANDING FORCE (CLF).

5. COMMAND RELATIONSHIP IAW PARA 3X (2) AND (3) OF REF A.

6. COMUSMACV WILL PROVIDE ANTI INFILTRATION/EXFILTRATION PATROL CRAFT FOR THIS OPERATION AND WILL PROVIDE CAS AND OTHER SUPPORT AS AGREED UPON WITH CATF IAW PARA 1B (1) OF REF A.

7. THE AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA (AOA) THE LANDWARD AOA WILL BE THAT LAND AREA ENCOMPASSED BY A LINE DRAWN FROM BT 228523/2 RPT BT 228523, 2 SOUTHWEST ALONG THE PROVINCE BOUNDARY OF QUANG NAM AND QUANG TIN PROVINCES TO THE TROUNG GIANG AT BT 110496/7 RPT BT 110496, 7 THENCE SOUTHEAST ALONG THE TROUNG GIANG TO EAST-WEST GRID LINE 45 RPT 45 THENCE EAST TO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AT BT 225045/0 RPT BT 225045/4 INCLUDING THE AIRSPACE FROM 0-25,000 FEET MSL. THE SEAWARD EXTENSION OF THE AOA WILL BE THAT SEA AREA ENCOMPASSED BY A 15 NM ARC CENTERED AT BT 225000/0 RPT BT 225000, 5 TRUNCATED ON THE NORTH BY A LINE DRAWN 045 DEGREES FROM THE NORTHERN TIP OF BARRIER ISLAND AT BT 222522.0 RPT BT 222522/0 AND EXCLUDING THE SURFACE AREA OF OFF-SHORE ISLANDS CU LAO CHAM, HON GIAI, HON TAI AND THE SURFACE RESTRICTED AREA AROUND CU LAO CHAM, HON GIAI AND HON TAI ON H & O CHART 6209 INCLUDING THE AIRSPACE FROM 0-25,000 FT. FREE AIR TRANSIT GRANTED 1,000/5 FEET MSL AND ABOVE OVER AOA.

8. NICKNAME FOR THIS OPERATION WILL BE DARING REBEL WITH TENTATIVE D-DAY 5 MAY 69. D-DAY AND H AND L HOURS TO BE DETERMINED AND CONFIRMED BY CATF. WHEN ALL FORCES ARE PREPARED, CATF REPORT TO ORIG STATE OF READINESS AND FINAL CONFIRMATION CONCERNING D-DAY, H AND L HOURS. EXECUTE ON D-DAY AT H AND L HOURS UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED REPORT EXECUTION TO ALCON.

9. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

A. WHEN FIRMLY ESTABLISHED ASHORE, AND WHEN MUTUALLY AGREED BY CATF AND CG III MAF, REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF SLF CHOP TO CG III MAF.

B. UPON CHOP OF REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF SLF TO IN-COUNTRY COMMANDER, CATF REMAIN IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS ASHORE.

Enclosure (2)
C. WITHDRAWAL LAW ANNEX B TO REF A.

10. TERMINATION LAW ANNEX B TO REF A.

11. PUBLIC AFFAIRS LAW ANNEX V TO REF A.

12. DOWNGRADED TO CONFIDENTIAL ON TERMINATION.

GP-4

BT
CONFIDENTIAL

02 JUN 69

FM CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
TO COM SEVENTH FLT
INFO CG III MAF
CG AMERICA DIV
CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
CTF SEVEN SIX

OPERATION DARING REBEL

1. (S) AFTER DETAILED PLANNING WITH CG AMERICA DIV REPS ON 2 MAY REQUEST SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF AOA BE CHANGED TO EAST
WEST GRID LINE 46.0 VICE GRID LINE 45/9.

2. (O) CG III MAF CONCURS.

GP-4 GC 1 JUNE 1969
BT

Enclosure (2)
CONFIDENTIAL
FM COMSEVENTHFLT
TO CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
CTF SEVEN SIX
CTF SEVEN NINE
COMUSMACV
CG III MAF
INFO CINCPAC
CNOC
CMC
CINCPACFLT
COMNAVFORV
COMPHIBAC
CG FMPAC
CG FMFPAC FWD
CG FIRST MAF
CG FIRST MARDIV
CMDR SEVENTH AF
CTF ONE ONE FIVE
CTF SEVEN THREE
CTF SEVEN SEVEN
CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
CTG SEVEN NINE PT THREE
CG AMERICAL DIV
CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE
CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE
CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE
CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE
NAVCOMMASAS WESTPAC
CG SECOND FOR MAF UDE

OPERATION DARING KEBEL AOA MODIFICATION (U)
A. CTG 76.4 021320Z MAY 69 NOTAL
B. COMSEVENTHFLT 021320Z MAY 69

1. REF A RECO MODIFICATION OF SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF AOA WITH
   CG III MAF CONCURRENCE.

2. MODIFY PAR 2 OF REF B TO DELINEATE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY
   OF AOA TO EASIER WEST GRID LINE 46/0 VICE EASIER WEST GRID
   LINE 45.9

GP-4
BT

5 Enclosure (2)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

0635Z MAY 69

FM CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
TO COMSEVENFLTLT
CG AMERICAL DIV
INFO CTG SEVEN SIX
CTF SEVEN NINE
CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
CG III MAF

OPERATION DARING REBEL
MODIFICATION TO INITIATING DIRECTIVE (U)
A. JCS PUB 2 (UNAAR)
B. COMSEVENFLTLT 020126Z MAY 69

1. SITUATION: BLT 1/26 CURRENTLY SEARCHING VILLES IN WESTERN PORTION AOA. EFFECTIVE 090730H9 BLT WILL BEGIN MOVING EASTWARD ACROSS THE DUNE LINE HAVING GENERAL TRACE FROM BT 193481/2 TO BT 217464. TERRAIN FOR APPROX ONE KILOMETER EAST OF DUNE LINE MAINLY DESERT. AFTER CROSSING DESERT BLT WILL ENTER VEGETATED, CULTIVATED TERRAIN CONTAINING VILLES. THE DUNE LINE WILL PREVENT OBSERVATION OF WESTERN PORTION OF AOA BY BLT. EXPECTED TROOP COMMITMENTS FOR SEARCH AND DESTROY AND THE POSSESSIBILITY OF ENEMY CONTACTS IN CENTRAL AOA RENDER POSITIONING OF REAR SECURITY FORCE FROM BLT ASSETS UNDESIRABLE. VULNERABILITY OF BLT TO ATTACK, PRIMARILY BY FIRE, FROM WESTERN AOA MAKES REAR SECURITY A NECESSITY. ONE SOLUTION LIES IN POSITIONING CURRENTLY AVAILABLE, OFFERED ARMED CAVALRY UNIT FROM AMERICAL DIV ON, VICINITY OF DUNE LINE.

2. PRESENT PLAN IF APPROVED IS FOR ARMORED CAVALRY UNIT TO MOVE INTO SCREENING POSITION ALONG THE DUNE LINE ON 10 MAY AND REMAIN UNTIL OPERATION DARING REBEL TERMINATED OR COMMITTED ELSEWHERE BY CG AMERICAL DIV. IN VIEW LIAISON TEAMS ALREADY EXCHANGED BY SLF, SUPPORTING CAV UNITS AND CURRENTLY OPERATING, FORSEE NO DIFFICULTIES. DUE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A RECOMMITMENT OF ARMED CAV UNIT DO NOT DESIRE A CHANGE IN PRESENT AOA.

3. COMMAND RELATIONS:
A. COMMAND RELATIONS LAW REF A PARA 30275/7 AND 30278/0
B. FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION UNDER THE CONTROL OF CAIF.
C. A NO FIRE LINE INFLN BETWEEN CAV BLT UNITS.

4. FOR COMSEVENFLTLT: REQUEST AMPLIFYING INSTRUCTION OR MODIFICATION OF INITIATING DIRECTIVE REF B TO PROVIDE FOR SUPPORTING FORCE.

Enclosure (2) 
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DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

5. FOR CG AMERICAN DIV:

A. REQUEST ESTABLISH SUPPORTING FORCE WITH FOLLOWING MISSION:
   PROVIDE ARMED CAVALRY SCREENING FOR BLT 2/20 GENERALLY ALONG
   TRACE OF DUNE FROM VICINITY OF BT 191467/2 TO BT 217464/4.

B. COORDINATION THROUGH PRESENTLY ESTABLISHED CHANNELS.
   REQUEST SCREENING FORCE BE IN DIRECT COMMUNICATION WITH
   1/1 CAVALRY LIAISON PARTY CURRENTLY LOCATED BLT 1/26 CP.

6. (C) CTG /9.4 HAS CONDUCTED LIAISON WITH AMERICAN DIV AND
   CONCURS WITH THE ABOVE.

GP-4 (C) 1 JUNE 1969
BT
CONFIDENTIAL

002102 MAY 69

FM COMSEVENTHFLI
TO CG SEVEN S.A PT FOUR
INFO CG AMERICAN DIV
CTF SEVEN SIX
CTF SEVEN NINE
CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
CG III MAF

OPERATION DARING REBEL INITIATING DIRECTIVE (U)
A. COMSEVENTHFLT 020126Z MAY 69
B. CTG 16.4 081850Z MAY 69

I. MODIFY PARA 9 REF A (SPECIAL INSTS) TO ADD NEW SUBPARAGRAPH DELTA TO READ: THE EMPLOYMENT OF A SUPPORTING FORCE IN THE AOA IS AUTHORIZED SUBJECT TO CONCURRENCE OF III MAF OR HIS DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE. THE GENERAL SUPPORT TO BE PROVIDED AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COMMANDERS WILL BE IAW JCS PUB 2.

GP-4
BT

Enclosure (2)
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CHRONOLOGY

30 April 1969

a. 1330H - CTG 76.4/79.4 attended planning conference for Operation DARING REBEL at III MAF Headquarters. Also present were representatives from: Commanding General, Americal Division; Commanding General, SECOND Republic of Korea Marine Corps (ROKMC) Brigade - Hoi An Deputy Senior Advisor (DSA) I Corps Danang; Province Senior Advisor (PSA) Quang Nam Province, Republic of Vietnam; CTG 115.1; Commander Vietnamese Navy Coastal Group 14 Hoi An Sector, Republic of Vietnam; and Vietnamese Navy RAG-32.

1 May 1969

a. 1638H - CG, III MAF published the agreements reached at the planning conference on 30 April 1969 for a combined operation.

2 May 1969


3 May 1969

a. 1258H - USS MULLINNIX (DD 944) and USS WHITE RIVER (LFR 536) were assigned as Naval Gunfire Support Ships by CTU 70.8.9.

b. 1330H - ARVN L-Hour determined to be 051000H MAY 69.

c. 1858H - CTG 76.4 promulgated OPORD 303-69 with the following Annexes: A, D, F, G, H, I, J, and N.

4 May 1969

a. 1330H - Pre-Sail conference held aboard USS OKINAWA.

b. 1610H - NOTAM requested.

c. 2350H - L and H-Hour confirmed as 051000H MAY 69.

5 May 1969

a. 0545H - "Land the Landing Force" directed.

b. 0820H - Twenty one civilian and military news media representatives and their III MAF escorts arrived aboard USS OKINAWA and were briefed by CATF and CLF.

Enclosure (3)

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c. 0900H - USS WHITE RIVER commenced beach prep.
d. 0915H - USS WHITE RIVER ceased fire.
e. 0920H - News media representatives were transferred by helo to USS DULUTH for further transfer to Red Beach by LVT's and assault craft.
f. 0925H - Fixed-wing aircraft reported on station for prep of LZ TIGER.
g. 0932H - USS MULLINNIX commenced prep fire on landing zones.
h. 0941H - USS MULLINNIX ceased fire.
i. 0947H - USS MULLINNIX commenced prep fire of Red Beach.
j. 0948H - Waterborne wave one crossed LOD.
k. 0952H - USS MULLINNIX ceased fire.
l. 0958H - Fixed-wing aircraft departed station after prep of LZ TIGER.
m. 1000H - Heliborne and waterborne wave one touched down.

n. 1029H - One armed VH-53E reported hit by small arms fire, departed AOA for secure area to investigate damage.

o. 1040H - Recon platoon landed at Red Beach.
p. 1115H - Fixed-wing aircraft reported on station for prep of LZ LION.

q. 1115H - Heliborne wave one to LZ LION touched down.
r. 1148H - Fixed-wing aircraft departed station after prep of LZ LION.

s. 1200H - Sixteen civilian news media representatives and their escorts returned to USS OKINAWA.

t. 1415H - News media representatives and their escorts departed USS OKINAWA for Danang by helicopter.

u. 1430H - BGEN CLEMENT, Assistant Division Commander, Americal Division, conducted liaison visit with CATF and CLF aboard USS OKINAWA.
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v. 1500H - BJU Detachment commenced psyops overfly of AOA dropping leaflets.

w. 1529H - Primary Control Ship (PCS) reported boating difficulties due to sandbars and low tides.

x. 1610H - PCS reported boating conditions improved sufficiently to transport 4.2" mortar battery to Red Beach.

y. 1645H - CTF 76 Mobile Amphibious News Team arrived aboard USS OKINAWA, with a two-man detachment sent to USS DULUTH.

a. 1745H - USS WHITE RIVER spotted eight people on the beach vicinity of BT 230515, received clearance from SACC to commence fire at 1800H. First salvo flushed four additional people onto beach.

bb. 1856H - After firing second salvo at people on beach USS WHITE RIVER sighted several bodies on the beach but darkness precluded an accurate count.

6 May 1969

a. 0002H - Command Information Bureau (CIB) established aboard USS OKINAWA

b. 0840H - BJU Detachment conducted overfly of AOA

c. 0900H - USS WINSTON moved from her assigned spot to a position 1,000 yards to seaward of the LOD to facilitate boat resupply of the Beach Support Area (BSA).

d. 1155H - One C-130 sighted yellow dye in water in southern end of AOA, USS DULUTH and USS OKINAWA help investigated with negative results.

e. 1155H - USS MULLINNIX caused a secondary explosion while firing a call fire mission.

f. 1200H - USS FRANK E. EVANS (DD 754) relieved USS MULLINNIX (DD 944), as NGFS ship.

g. 1300H - in spotting for FRANK E. EVANS, WHITE RIVER saw enemy movement and cleared call fire through Supporting Arms Coordination Center (SACC). WHITE RIVER fired three salvos and caused one secondary explosion.

h. 1726H - USS TORTUGA directed to proceed to Danang to offload cargo at Bridge Ramp and remain over night (RON) in Danang to assist WINSTON/FORT MARION load transfer and

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then return independently to AOA in daylight of 9 May.

1. 1900H - USS DULUTH sighted approximately 200 Vietnamese just south of the AOA who scattered and ran over sand dunes on approach to PCF.

j. 2020H - CATF issued warning order to USS DULUTH to land BRAVO COMPANY commencing about 070930H.

k. 2200H - CATF released USS WHITE RIVER to proceed on duties assigned.

5 May 1969

a. 0930H - USS DULUTH commenced helo offload of BRAVO Company to LZ TIGER.

d. 1000H - While conducting psyops mission the helo in which the BJU personnel were riding drew several rounds of small arms fire from the northwestern portion of AOA. USS FRANK E. EVANS called to cover area target and expended 361 rounds of 5"/38.

c. 1100H - Helo lift of BRAVO Company to LZ TIGER completed.

d. 1330H - USS FRANK E. EVANS departed AOA to return from USS MAUNA KEA.

b. 1400H - Four LIII MAF CIB representatives departed USS OKINAWA after returning from the beach via USS DULUTH.

t. 1700H - American Division cleared CATF supporting arms to fire into an area west of the AOA from BT 1749 to BT 1946 to BT 2246 from 1930H to 0530H each day to suppress sniper fire and prevent possible attack from that quarter.

g. 1745H - USS DULUTH departed AOA to join USS FRANK E. EVANS in AO under USS CALIENTE.

h. 1800H - USS TORTUGA departed AOA for Danang to offload LCU 1483 with deadline vehicles as directed.

1. 2200H - USS DULUTH and USS FRANK E. EVANS returned to the AOA.

8 May 1969

a. 0000H - USS WINSTON departed AOA for Danang to turnover sea tail cargo to USS FORT MARION.

b. 0325H - USS TORTUGA returned to AOA leaving LCU 1483 in Danang as directed.
c. 0510H - Four secondary explosions resulted from USS FRANK E. EVANS 207 rounds of 5"/38 against an area target.

d. 0600H - Market Time Forces (CG WPB's) reported several sightings of people moving south along the beach.

e. 0600H - Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PF) moved into the area west of the AOA and north of the Quang Nam/Quang Tin Province boundary.

f. 1000H - USS FORT MARION relieved USS WINSTON as sea tail.

g. 2100H - One secondary explosion and a sustained fire resulted when FRANK E. EVANS commenced her H and I fire.

h. 2200H - USS FORT MARION reached AOA with 1483 pre-loaded with ammunition and rations.

9 May 1969

a. 0615H - COMSEVENTHFLT issued a modification to the Initiating Directive to allow American Division forces into the Eastern AOA as a supporting force.

b. 0745H - USS FRANK E. EVANS and landing force artillery commenced target fires on simulated landing zones for amphibious demonstration.

c. 0750H - Target fires ceased.

d. 0800H - Helos turned away as scheduled.

e. 0815H - LVT's from USS DULUTH splashed for simulated waterborne assault.

f. 0815H - Beach target fires by USS FRANK E. EVANS and landing force artillery commenced.

g. 0820H - Target fires ceased.

h. 0820H - Fixed-wing aircraft conducted a strike against a third simulated LZ.

i. 0915H - LVT's turned away from the beach on schedule.

j. 0940H - A fourth DZ was prepared by fixed-wing aircraft.

k. 0900H - CATF cleared ARVN artillery to fire into grid square 2051 to prevent enemy exfiltration from ARVN AO into AOA.
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1. 0940H - USS FRANK E. EVANS commenced prep fire to cover the northern advance of the landing force.

m. 1800H - A total of 500 detainees were resettled by the CHIC about four miles south of the AOA on Barrier Island.

n. 2200H - Landing force liaison officers with ARVN forces to the north of the AOA reported that the ARVN's were in continuous contact with V-25 Battalion of the 38th Local Force Regiment.

10 May 1969

a. 0330H - USS FORT MARION departed AOA for Danang.

b. 0700H - About 180 resettled detainees were intercepted attempting to return to the AOA.

c. 0830H - 180 detainees were transferred back to CHIC.

d. 1030H - USS FRANK E. EVANS departed AOA to rearm from USS FIREDRAKE.

e. 1115H - CATF cleared ARVN artillery to fire into the area north of a line from BT 200514 to BT 230514 from 1500H to 1800H to prevent enemy exfiltration from ARVN AO into AOA.

11 May 1969

a. 0430H - Artillery prep fires commenced prior to troop movement to the east.

b. 0600H - Prep fires ceased.

c. 0600H - USS OKINAWA, USS FORT MARION, and USS FRANK E. EVANS commenced A0 UNREP from USS TOLOVANA.

d. 0630H - The landing force commenced their eastward movement.

e. 0850H - CATF requested USS FRANK E. EVANS remain as NGFS Ship until termination or released by CATF.

f. 1030H - Elements of the FIRST of the FIRST Cavalry (American Division) moved into the western portion of the AOA to provide a screen for the landing force. Free fire into the area west of AOA cancelled until operation terminated or troops withdrawn.

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12 May 1969

a. 1700H - Helicopters shuttling to and from the CHIC reported small arms fire from the northwest and the south of CHIC.

b. 0345H - USS DULUTH departed AOA for Danang.

c. 1830H (about) - American Screening Force withdrawn by CG, American Division from AOA to re-inforce units in the American AO in preparation for increased enemy activity.

d. 1940H - USS DULUTH returned to AOA.

13 May 1969

a. 1145H - USS FRANK E. EVANS refueled from USS DULUTH.

b. 1204H - CAI requested authority from COMSEVENTHFLT to send a combat patrol to assist in the protection of the CHIC and Lines - not authorized from the AOA.

c. 1624H - COMSEVENTHFLT approved the request to dispatch a combat patrol to CHIC subject to the concurrence of III MAF.

d. 1730H - Helo Pilot was wounded by enemy mortar round while loading at CHIC L2.

e. 1900H - USS CROCKETT (PG 88) arrived in the area to strengthen the Market Time Forces.

14 May 1969

a. 0015H - USS DULUTH and USS TORTUGA conducted AO UNREP from USS PASSOPELIC.

b. 0030H - CG, III MAF concurred in the request for a combat patrol to assist in the defense of the CHIC and authorized direct liaison with CG, American Division.

c. 0200H - USS FORT MARION departed the AOA for Danang.

d. 1400H - USS FRANK E. EVANS rearmed from USS MAUNA KEA.

e. 1730H - USS FORT MARION returned to the AOA.
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15 May 1969

a. 0058H - CG, I l MAF requested CATF and CLF take necessary action to insure a six hour backload if the situation required.

b. 0630H - USS NOA (DD 841) relieved USS FRANK E. EVANS (DD 754) as NGFS Ship.

c. 1830H - USS CROCKETT departed area to proceed on duties assigned.

d. 1834H - CLF ordered combat patrol lifted to CHIC to assist in defense.

16 May 1969

a. 0210H - USS FORT MARION departed AOA for Danang.

b. 1545H - USS NOA departed AOA to refuel from USS PONCHATOULA.

c. 1815H - USS FORT MARION returned to AOA.

d. 2005H - USS NOA returned to AOA.

17 May 1969

a. 0727H - USS NOA and landing force artillery ashore commenced prep fires of three landing zones in the western portion of the AOA.

b. 0737H - Prep fires ceased.

c. 0740H - First helo wave touched down in the northern landing zone.

d. 0810H - One helo reported down in a pick-up zone due to mechanical failure.

e. 0837H - Helo assault completed.

f. 0923H - BGEN J. E. WILLIAMS, CG, NINTH MAB, arrived aboard USS OKINAWA for briefing and field tour.

g. 1020H - Downed helo returned aboard USS OKINAWA by CH-53.
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h. 1040H - USS NOA departed the AOA to rendezvous with USS NIAGARA FALLS to conduct a vertical replenishment.

i. 1605H - USS NOA returned to the AOA.

j. 1615H - COL TRUONG TAN THUC, CO, 51st ARVN Battalion arrived aboard USS OKINAWA to visit CATF and CLF.

k. 1815H - USS OKINAWA and USS DULUTH received two CH-46 helicopters each from Danang to remain over night.

18 May 1969

a. 0830H - CATF and CLF returned call on COL TRUONG TAN THUC, CO, 51st ARVN Battalion.

b. 1445H - CATF and CLF conducted liaison visit to III MAF.

19 May 1969

a. 0630H - USS OKINAWA, USS TORTUGA and USS FORT MARION conducted a vertical replenishment from USS NIAGARA FALLS.

b. 0830H - USS DULUTH conducted a vertical replenishment from USS NIAGARA FALLS.

c. 0845H - USS DOUGLAS H. FOX (DD 779) relieved USS NOA (DD 841) as NGFS Ship.

d. 1310H - Appendix VII to Annex I (withdrawal order) issued.

e. 1803H - CG, III MAF recommended termination of Operation DARING REBEL on or about 20 May.

f. 1820H - USS OKINAWA and USS DULUTH received a total of five CH-46's from Danang to remain over night.

g. 1850H - COMSEVENTHFLT concurred in the withdrawal on 20 May.

20 May 1969

a. 0502H - W-Hour confirmed.
b. 0545H - LVT's from USS DULUTH splashed.
c. 0615H - LVT's touched down on Red Beach.
d. 0630H - Withdrawal commenced on schedule.
e. 0700H - First helo waves airborne for pick-up zones.
f. 1000H - USS DOUGLAS H. FOX (DD 779) released to proceed on duties assigned.
g. 1136H - Helo withdrawal completed, last helo waves received small arms fire from the vicinity of the LZ's as they lifted out.
h. 1230H - Red Beach cleared.
i. 1255H - All boats and LVT's aboard Amphibious Task Force ships.
j. 1300H - Red Beach closed.
k. 1304H - CATF recommended termination of the Operation as of 201300H.
l. 1306H - CATF dissolved AOA as of 201300H.
m. 1308H - CATF requested NOTAM be cancelled.
n. 1600H - Received COMSEVENTHFLT 200718Z MAY 69, terminating Operation DARING REBEL.
PLANNING/OPERATIONS

1. (C) The initial planning conference was scheduled for 301400H April 1969 by CG, III MAF. Representatives from the various commands expected to participate in the operation were invited. As a result of the conference the following forces were scheduled to participate in Operation DARING REBEL: ARG/SLF ALFA, two Cavalry Troops from Americal Division, Swift boats from CTG 115.1, two ARVN Battalions, two Regional Force (RF) Companies, one Popular Force (PF) Platoon, Vietnamese Navy RAG-32, Coastal Group 14 and VNN River Patrol, four companies from Republic of Korea Marine Corps (ROKMC), and Provincial Forces to operate the Combined Holding and Interrogation Center (CHIC).

2. (C) Agreements reached at the planning conference were:

   a. General concept of Operations:

      (1) Commencing about 3 May 1969 two ROKMC Companies would enter the ROKMC Objective Area (the area encompassed by Route One on the west, the Song Cau Lau on the north, the waterway between grid coordinates BT 115559 and BT 148530 on the east, and Route 537 on the south) by land and two companies would land in the eastern portion of the Objective Area by helicopter. After two days of search and clear operations in the Objective Area the ROKMC would establish blocking positions in their Objective Area by the morning of 5 May 1969 to prevent the escape of VC/NVA from the combined operation area.

      (2) Also commencing on 3 May RF/PF together with RAG-32 would clear the eastern portion of Duy Xuyen District and the portion of Hieu Nhon District east of Hoi An and assume blocking positions by early 5 May along Song Cua Dai and Song Thu Bon to prevent enemy escape from the northern end of Barrier Island and vicinity.

      (3) On 5 May ARG/SLF ALFA would conduct a helicopter assault with two companies on the western side of Barrier Island (south of the Quang Nam/Quang Tin Province boundary) and a waterborne assault with one company, plus artillery, in the southeastern corner of the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) in the vicinity of Grid coordinates BT 250467. Simultaneously two ARVN battalions would conduct a helicopter assault into the northwest area of Barrier Island (north of the Quang Nam/Quang Tin Province boundary) and conduct search and clear operations in close coordination with the ARG/SLF landing force south of the Province boundary. Both forces would move west to east across Barrier Island while

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maintaining close liaison to insure their schemes of maneuver were complementary.

(4) H and L-Hour were established as 051000H for both the ARVN helicopter assault and the combined helicopter and waterborne assault by ARG/SLF ALFA.

(5) American Cavalry Troops were to conduct mobile screening operations to the west of Barrier Island commencing on 5 May and initially conduct mobile screening operations south of east-west grid line 46, until BLT 1/26 could establish a blocking force north of east-west grid line 46.

(6) Coastal Group 14 and CTG 115.1 forces were to conduct a Naval Blockade along the northern and eastern coasts of Barrier Island to prevent infiltration/exfiltration of enemy forces.

(7) A Combined Holding and Interrogation Center (CHIC) was to be established in eastern Duy Xuyen for screening, classification and intelligence exploitation of Vietnamese evacuated from Barrier Island. Innocent civilians were to be returned at the end of the operation or resettled as required.

(8) Between the time of the planning conference, 30 April, and the start of the operation for the ARG/SLF, a second CHIC was established, at the request of the Quang Tin Province Chief, for all Vietnamese detained from Quang Tin Province. This second CHIC was established outside and south of the AOA at grid coordinates BT 213438.

b. Command Relations:

(1) All commands involved agreed to exchange liaison officers and to conduct operations in cooperation and coordination in accordance with agreements made at the planning conference.

c. Fire Support Coordination:

(1) Barrier Island north of east-west grid line 46 was declared a free fire zone, for fire within assigned Areas of Operation/Amphibious Objective Area (AO/AAO). All other areas within the combined operation areas required political clearance from either Hoi An, for Quang Nam Province, or from Tam Ky, for Quang Tin Province.

(2) Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) would control supporting arms within the AOA and supporting arms outside the AOA would be controlled through Hoi An and Tam Ky.
3. (C) Modifications to General Scheme of Maneuver.

a. On 9 May (at the request of Americal Division) CATF requested a modification to the initiating directive to permit an Armed Cavalry Unit from Americal Division to enter the AOA and set up a blocking/screening force behind the Landing Force as they moved eastward across the AOA. The general situation indicating the desirability of such a plan was:

(1) BLT 1/26 had been methodically searching the inhabited area in the western portion of the AOA (between the Truong Giang waterway and the sand dunes/desert running generally north and south across the AOA) and when the landing force moved east across the sand dunes their rear would be unprotected unless a blocking force was left behind. The expected troop commitments for search and destroy and the possibility of enemy contact in the central and eastern portions of the AOA rendered positioning of a rear security force from BLT assets undesirable. The vulnerability of attack, primarily by fire, from the western edge of the AOA made rear security a necessity. Americal Division offered an Armed Cavalry Unit to swing in behind the Landing Force as they moved east across the dunes/desert and into the vegetated/cultivated area.

(2) Command relations were agreed upon and were in accordance with paragraphs 30275 and 30278 of JCS Pub 2. Fire Support Coordination was under control of CATF and a No Fire Line (NFL) was established between the CAV/BLT units.

(3) Liaison teams had been exchanged as a result of the original planning conference, therefore additional liaison teams were not required.

(4) Elements of the 1st Squad, 1st Cavalry, Americal Division, moved into blocking positions along the sand dunes at 111330H but were withdrawn on 12 May.

b. On 13 May CATF requested authority to send a combat patrol outside the AOA into Grid Square BT 2144 and an area of operations 2,000 meters around the CHIC in order to assist in the protection of CHIC and Lines of Communications (LOC) between CHIC and the AOA. The assistance was considered necessary because of the increasing small arms fire, mortar rounds and other enemy fire being received by the CHIC. Several helicopters had taken small arms fire both coming into and leaving the CHIC and one helo had been damaged, but not put out of action, by mortar rounds while offloading in the CHIC. One helo copilot was wounded slightly by mortar fragments while his helo was offloading at the CHIC.
An extension of the AOA was considered undesirable due to the presence of a minimal ARVN force at the CHIC and Regional Forces (RF) in the area.

(2) In the late afternoon of 14 May a Reinforced Platoon (task organized to conduct combat patrols) was lifted into the CHIC to assist in the defense due to dwindling numbers of Province Forces (PF) remaining in the area and the increasing likelihood of the CHIC being overrun. The platoon remained at the CHIC until W-Day, 20 May 1969, and was then lifted out by helo.
1. The intelligence estimate was accurate in that the area proved to have been a VC infested semi-safe haven and supply base for local forces. The large numbers of VC KIA (105), VCI (108) and POW (74) tends to confirm the fact that Barrier Island was a strongly dominated Communist area. While the estimate listed several specific enemy units as possibly being in the area, no specific unit was identified during the operation. The enemy did not show any significant organized resistance in the AOA during the operation and limited his activities to sapper fire, occasional mortar fire, automatic weapons fire directed at helos in the landing zones, and a few sapper attacks using satchel charges. The majority of the enemy fire came from an area just west of the AOA (VIC BT 199459, BT 192470, BT 213448).

2. ARG ALFA intelligence files did not carry a beach survey for the area where the Battalion wanted to land the waterborne landing force. A message request was therefore sent to CTF 76 who replied with a message report. The beach under consideration had been surveyed only 2 weeks prior to the request, so current information was immediately available. CTF 76 recommended a 300 yard stretch of NIS Beach 8 as being the best place for the beach based on the recent survey. That spot turned out to be exactly the place where the SLF wanted the troops landed, and it was designated Red Beach. It was predicted that the LCU and LCM8's would achieve dry ramps at high tide only as the gradient was expected to be about 1:40. High tide occurred shortly after H-hour and the initial offload during the assault went very smoothly. Later in the day, as the tide began to ebb, the LCU and LCM8's began experiencing wet ramps, with between 2 and 4 feet of water at the ramps. In this regard, the tide prediction table issued in the intelligence estimate was considered accurate by observation by Beachmasters, in numbers of tides, daily, times, and range. An effort was made by UDT Det ECHO to find a better landing place by making a check survey 500 yards each side of beach center, and it was reported that a better place might be located about 200 yards north of beach center. The LCU was landed there, however, the conditions were not significantly different from beach center, the initial landing place was not moved.

3. There was one POW report that the enemy in the AOA had been warned by loudspeaker the day before D-Day that the Marines were coming the next day. No other information on this subject was forthcoming, and it could not be determined how the enemy got the word on the impending amphibious assault.

4. No new intelligence was obtained which had not been previously reported.

Enclosure (5)
A. MEDICAL:

1. (U) USS OKINAWA (LPH 3) was designated as casualty receiving ship for Operation DARING REBEL.

2. (C) Several Vietnamese casualties were treated aboard USS OKINAWA, two of these died as a result of their wounds. One was a proven enemy and one was a young male child.

3. (C) It is to be noted that in the casualty statistics there were a total of fifty two combat injuries received, of this total there were forty eight missile injuries and eight non-missile injuries, which total fifty six. The apparent discrepancy of these totals is due to the fact that a few casualties had both missile and non-missile injuries.

4. (C) Casualty statistics:

a. On 4 May, 79 units of blood were received from Naval Support Activity Danang Hospital. On 8 May, 36 additional units were received for a total of 115 units. During the operation there were 70 units cross-matched with 22 units transfused. There were 93 units remaining on hand at the end, which were returned to Naval Support Activity Danang. There were no transfusion reactions.

b. Summary of casualty statistics.

(1) TOTAL CASUALTIES RECEIVED: 126
   (a) Non-Combat 66
   (b) Wounded in Action (WIA) 52
   (c) Killed in Action (KIA) 2
   (d) Died of Wounds (DOW) 2
   (e) VC-POW 3
   (f) ARVN 3
   (g) Civilian 2

   *Both Vietnamese

(2) NON-COMBAT CLASSIFIED:
   (a) Heat Exhaustion 16
   (b) Laceration 7
   (c) Miscellaneous Condition 7
   (d) Abscess 5
   (e) Appendicitis 4
   (f) FUO 4
   (g) Hyperventilation 3
   (h) Genital-Urinary 3
   (i) Malaria 3

Enclosure (6)
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(j) Sunburn 2
(k) Dog bite 2
(l) Foreign Body Eye 2
(m) Dermatology 2
(n) Acute Anxiety Reaction 1
(o) Strain 1
(p) Hemorrhoids 1
(q) GSW (Self Inflicted) 1
(r) Burn 1
(s) Sprain 1

(3) COMBAT CASUALTIES CLASSIFIED:

(a) MISSILE WOUNDS 48

1. Severity

a. Major 17

(1) Site (Major wounds only)

(a) Lower Extremity 9
(b) Upper Extremity 3
(c) Head 2
(d) Chest 1
(e) Abdomen 1
(f) Eye 1

(2) Fractures (Open) 10

(a) Tibia and Fibula 3
(b) Femur 3
(c) Phalanges 2
(d) Metatarsal 1
(e) Metacarpal 1

b. Minor 31

(b) NON-MISSILE INJURIES 8

1. Concussion 1
2. Contusion 2
3. WP Burns 2
4. Abrasions 1
5. Puncture 1
6. Laceration 1

2 Enclosure (6)

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OPERATIVE CASES PERFORMED
(Initial Rx Only)

1. Major 21
2. Minor 9

MAJOR SURGICAL PROCEDURES

1. Debridement and stabilization of fractures 7
2. Appendectomy 4
3. Debridement major soft tissue extremity wounds 4
4. Insertion of chest tube 2
5. Debridement of GSW abdomen 1
6. ARTERIAL REPAIR 1
7. Amputation, digits 1
8. Exploratory laparotomy and splenic flexure colostomy 1

SUMMARY OF OR ANESTHESIA

1. General 8
2. Spinal 6
3. Regional Block 5
4. Local 2

DISPOSITION

1. Treated and Released 58
2. Admitted to Sickbay 68
3. Discharged to Duty 40
4. Transferred 12
5. Transferred (Care of the Dead) 4
6. Died of Wounds 2*
7. Remaining in Sickbay End of Operation 12

*Both Vietnamese

Enclosure (6)
B. LOGISTICS:

1. (C) Maintenance. Due to low wind velocity for helicopter operations USS OKINAWA was required to exceed the hours between cleaning firesides on number two boiler.

2. (C) UNREP/VERTREPS. A total of four replenishments were conducted during Operation DARING REBEL, three were along side replenishments and one was a VERTREP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHIP</th>
<th>NSFO</th>
<th>JP5</th>
<th>PROVISIONS STORES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CALIENTE</td>
<td>72,369</td>
<td>60,349</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOLOVANA</td>
<td>186,650</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASSUMPSIC</td>
<td>102,182</td>
<td>5,040</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIAGARA FALLS</td>
<td>81.25 S/T</td>
<td>15.8 S/T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NSFO and JP5 quantities in gallons.

Enclosure (6)
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COMMUNICATIONS

1. Planning: Communications were in accordance with Operation DAMANG REBEL Annex November and OPIG 754 OPNAV 101A-09. The ARG communications annex was promulgated 48 hours prior to A-Hour; hence, no problems were encountered in establishing communications on ARG circuits. No significant problems were encountered during liaison and planning for the operation.

2. Requirements versus Assets: Initial requirements exceeded flagship equipment assets in the UHF and VHF frequency ranges. Adding to the problem, two UHF transceivers were CASKFI throughout the operation.

3. Usable Frequencies: At times, acute interference occurred on both NGFS CONTROL and Beach UHF circuits. Frequency Interference reports were originated upon occurrence. The flagship experienced difficulties passing traffic to RN TG MAC over the RN TG MAC COMMAND 1 circuit, although communications with other units on the circuit were continuously reliable.

4. Cryptographic Systems: Adequate cryptographic systems were available throughout the operation.

5. REI0 Resupply: No difficulties were encountered with REI0 resupply.

6. Traffic Load versus Circuit and Personnel Availability: The traffic load, though heavy, did not exceed circuit or personnel availability. At times, heavy outgoing traffic volumes caused slight delays in operational traffic; however, no extensive backing or traffic occurred during the operation.

7. Termination: The NAVCOMMNET CHESTES termination with NAVSURFAC DANANG was considered excellent. Only significant problems occurred when the AUC14 circuit was inoperative during the period 27 and 28 May. No acute problems were caused by this outage. Circuit reliability was lost for a short while on the FLEET FLASH NET when control of the circuit passed from NAVCOMMNET to NAVCOMM DANANG...

8. Broadcast Reception: Fleet broadcast reception was excellent throughout the operation, using the OPI 11 AOM broadcast re-keyed by RN MAC DANANG.

9. Equipment Reliability: Communications equipment was very reliable and repairs were made as such as required.

10. KT-5: The KT-5's for covered voice were used on the maneuvering and warning circuits, reporting circuit, and several Marine circuits. No major difficulties occurred.

Enclosure (7)

DECLASSIFIED
PUBLIC AFFAIRS

1. During Operation DARING REBEL this command issued 13 press releases for clearance by COMUSMACV, hosted eleven civilian news media representatives, three III MAF escorts and seven military news media and CIB representatives.

2. On the morning of 5 May a total of 18 news media representatives and three escorts arrived aboard the flagship from III MAF via CH-46 furnished by ARG/SLF BRAVO. CATF and CLF briefed the newsmen and answered their questions. The group of 21 requested to ride the initial waterborne assault waves and were taken to USS DULUTH. Aboard DULUTH the newsmen were positioned in LVT's and LCM-8 assault craft. The newsmen hit the beach in the first and second waves.

3. After about three hours on the beach the civilian newsmen and their escorts returned to the flagship and, within 45 minutes, were enroute to Wanag via two CH-46's again furnished by ARG/SLF BRAVO. News media represented were: NBC, CBS, AP, UPI, TIME-LIFE, AFP and STARS AND STRIPES.

4. CTF 76 sent a four-man Mobile Amphibious News Team to establish a Command Information Bureau (CIB) aboard the flagship with a highly mobile photo detachment to visit all ships present. The news team reported aboard USS OKINAWA on the afternoon of 5 May and immediately established the CIB. The detachment of two enlisted photographers was sent to USS DULUTH.

5. CIB personnel observed USS WHITE RIVER from USS OKINAWA helo during a firing mission on 6 May. Three prints and negatives were sent to CTE 70.2.1.1.

6. On 7 May, BRAVO Co., held in reserve until then, was helo-lifted from USS DULUTH by HMH 362. CIB personnel photographed the helo ops and mailed eight rolls of film to CTE 70.2.1.1.

7. On the morning of 9 May a simulated helo assault was launched from USS OKINAWA while a simulated waterborne assault was launched from USS DULUTH. Because of Naval Gunfire prep fires, a helo for airborne photography was not available, however, the LVT's splashing in formation made great amphibious photography. This film was mailed immediately to CTE 70.2.1.1.

8. RJU ONE, Team 12, Det FOXTROT employed PSYOPS on the morning of 10 May in the form of a leaflet drop and aerial broadcasts. CIB personnel accompanied the mission and compiled information and photographs for a feature story.

9. On the morning of 11 May, CIB personnel went ashore to cover BMU ONE Detachment on RED BEACH. Information was compiled for two photo features and a tape recording of the OIC and his experience the first night of the operation when the camp was attacked by small arms fire was made. That afternoon COL William C. DOXY, USMC, Commander of the Landing Force was interviewed on tape and the tape sent to CTE 70.2.1.1.

10. In the two week operation nearly every ship in the Task Force was visited at least once by CIB personnel. Two futile attempts were made to visit USS FRANK E. EVANS (NCGS ship). Travel coordination by USS OKINAWA (LPF 3) was outstanding.

Enclosure (8)
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SUPPORTING ARMS

1. General. All MAF provided UH-1E, OV-10, A-4, A-6, F-4 and F-105 aircraft when needed for close air support and spotting control purposes. USS WHITE RIVER (LPR 536), USS MULLINNIX (DD 944), USS FRANK E. EVANS (DD 754), USS NOA (DD 841), and USS DOUGLAS H. FOX (DD 799) were assigned at various times to provide Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS). USS WHITE RIVER fired 5" spin stabilized rockets, USS MULLINNIX was armed with 5"/54 guns, and the other destroyers carried 5"/56 guns. MARKET TIME forces, HOB and FG, patrolled the seaward AOA, intercepting and investigating all unidentified contacts, and provided limited fire support along the beach.


a. Schedule of Fires. On D-Day WHITE RIVER fired 500 rounds of 5" Spin Stabilized Rockets (SSR) prep fire on Red Beach from H-40 to H-60, in order to detonate any mines which might have been planted and to disclose any bunkers in the bomb line. The beach prep was scheduled to eliminate any line of fire problems that may have arisen with both TORTUGA and DULUTH in the vicinity of the LDD by H-30 to launch boats and LVT's. WHITE RIVER had conducted a similar mission on 4 May north of Red Beach so it was decided that this early prep at Red Beach would not give premature disclosure of the actual amphibious landing. MULLINNIX fired 200 rounds of 5"/54 on Red Beach from H-10 to H-30 to eliminate any enemy movement into the area after the WHITE RIVER prep. The Supporting Arms Coordination Center (SACC) then confirmed her fire to the primary landing zone to fire 100 rounds prep fire until L-2-1 minutes, to neutralize any enemy in the vicinities.

b. AOA Division. Operating generally southwest of the AOA, designated an area extending approximately 1000 meters into the American AV and running adjacent to the AOA as a free fire zone nightly from 1900H to 0500H. This prior coordination made it possible to rapidly silence any snipers or mortar fires generated from the free fire zone into the primary LVT's and company positions along the southwestern edge of the AOA. It also eliminated problems in scheduling and conducting H and I and elimination missions in this border area. Nightly NGFS H and I fires were coordinated with artillery and mortar H and I fires to obtain the greatest probable target coverage and effectiveness.

c. Naval gunfire prep fires were employed on a simulated helicopter landing zone and beach in the northern portion of

Enclosure (9)
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the AOA on D+4 to confuse the enemy. USS FRANK E. EVANS fired 25 rounds of 5"/38 at each target, in coordination with artillery and close air support strikes.

d. The primary LZ's were again prepped on D+12 when CHARLIE and DELTA Companies were lifted back to the LZ's in the western portion of the AOA to make a second search and clear sweep of the area.

e. Assignment of Ships. Naval gunfire ships were assigned as follows to provide direct support of BLT 1/26:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Missiles Fired</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USS WHITE RIVER</td>
<td>5-6 May</td>
<td>1290 rounds/8 targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS MULLINNIX</td>
<td>5-6 May</td>
<td>469 rounds/11 targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS FRANK E. EVANS</td>
<td>6-15 May</td>
<td>3074 rounds/79 targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS NOA</td>
<td>15-19 May</td>
<td>335 rounds/26 targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS DOUGLAS H. FOX</td>
<td>19-20 May</td>
<td>Not fired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS CROCKETT</td>
<td>13-15 May</td>
<td>57 rounds/1 target</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. Missions. Total missions fired during the operation were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Missions</th>
<th>Rounds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prep Fires</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>1503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H and L</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call Fire</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illumination</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>5236</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

g. Communications. No prolonged difficulties were experienced with SACC communications during the operation. The CATF flagship remained within reasonable distance from the beach in order to maintain communications. On one occasion severe interference from in-country units was experienced on the naval gunfire spot net. This was promptly corrected after a Harmful Interference Report was sent to appropriate in-country commands.

3. (C) Close Air Support.
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a. Planning. CTG 76.4 representatives conducted a liaison visit to Quang Tin Province Headquarters on 3 May 1969 regarding CHIC locations and intelligence information about Barrier Island and also attended a planning conference at the American Division Command Post. Again, on 4 May, liaison was conducted with representatives of the American Division at Chu Lai regarding control of fixed-wing air strikes and Tactical Air Observers in support of Operation DARING REBEL.

b. Execution.

1. On 5 May, the Forward Air Controller from the American Division was on station at L-60 to control fixed-wing aircraft for LZ prep and CAS.

2. At L-50, fixed-wing aircraft arrived on schedule and prepped the LZ with 500 pound bombs.

3. At L-15, fixed-wing aircraft for CAS arrived on schedule and suppressed automatic weapons fire as needed.

4. CTG 76.4 Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) controlled 1,162 aircraft during Operation DARING REBEL, forty-two of these were lighter and attack aircraft for CAS, eight were AC-47 "SPOOKY" aircraft for fire support and illumination and twenty were UH-1E gunships for high escort and MEDEVAC fire support. Total ordnance expended was:

- **Bombs**: 145,500 pounds
- **Rockets**: 85" Zuni, 145 2.75" ROCKETS
- **Napalm**: 29,000 pounds
- **Artillery**: 5,600 rounds, 20MM, 166,600 rounds, 7.62MM

A total of 43 MEDEVAC requests were processed during DARING REBEL, 22 of these were emergency requests. A total of 140 SAV-A-PLANE's were processed.

5. Frequently at night UH-1E gunships were requested from Chu Lai, through HAWK HILL (CP for 1.1 Armored Cavalry) for fire support of emergency MEDEVAC flights. The distance between our operating area and Chu Lai caused a delay of 40 - 70 minutes for gunship support of emergency MEDEVAC's. CTG 76.4 requested from CG, III MAF that gunships be positioned at LZ BALDY, approximately 3 miles west of the AOA, at night to avoid this delay. CG, III MAF answered that this was not practical and recommended that CATF station MEDEVAC.
helicopters at Marble Mountain or Chu Lai (CG, III MAF 070440Z
MAY 69 NOTAL). CTG 76.4 was told informally by the American
Division that gunships were at LZ BALDY on the night of 8
May but when requested for an emergency MEDEVAC that night
they were, in fact, in Chu Lai.

(6) CG, III MAF required that all air support requests
for pre-planned missions be submitted prior to 1200 the day
before their use. This necessitates the BLT ashore to deter-
mine their requirements 24 hours in advance when, in effect,
these requirements often change throughout the day.

(7) In the later stages of Operation DARING REBEL
the southern CHIC frequently received ground fire and mortar
attacks. Fire support was requested by TACC through FIRST
MAW on these occasions even though the CHIC was not in our
AOA.

(8) Twice during Operation DARING REBEL the MEDEVAC
Guard was transferred to DULUTH where TACRON personnel and
MEDEVAC helos assumed the guard while OKINAWA conducted
underway replenishments.

(9) On 20 May, two UH-1E's for helo escort assisted
in the withdrawal of BLT 1/26.

c. Communications.

(10) TACC radio nets were established and manned in
accordance with Annex HOTEL of CTG 76.4 OPORD 103-69. Ten nets
were requested and all ten were provided.

(11) Communications throughout the entire operation
were excellent. The biggest problem was contacting FIRST
MAW in the late night or early morning for "SPOOKY" gunship
support. Often it was necessary to relay these requests
through some other station.

(12) OKINAWA experienced a power loss at 131250H.
All circuits were back in operation by 181322H.

(13) Again, as in previous operations, LZ Control was
useful in expediting SAVA-PLANE information to embarked air-
craft unable to talk with Helicopter Direction Center (HDC).
This appreciably lessened the time delay in clearing artillery
and naval gunfire missions.
SHIP-TO-SHORE MOVEMENT

AMPHIBIOUS DEMONSTRATION

WITHDRAWAL

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

A. SHIP-TO-SHORE MOVEMENT:

1. (C) Waterborne: The waterborne ship-to-shore phase of the amphibious assault took place over Red Beach located in Quang Tin Province of I CTZ. The boat lane at Red Beach was 500 yards wide and 1,500 yards long with the center of Red Beach at grid coordinates BT 250467 and center of Line of Departure (LOD) at grid coordinates BT 263473. D-Day was 5 May 1969 with H-Hour 1000H.

a. USS WINSTON (LKA 94) and USS TORTUGA (LSD 26) rendezvoused at 0600H ten miles seaward of Red Beach to make pre H-Hour transfer of ALFA Battery (105 howitzer) to six LCM6's from WINSTON. On completion of transfer TORTUGA proceeded to the LOD at Red Beach with LCM6's in convoy and assumed duties as Primary Control Ship (PCS) at 0945H. USS MULLINNIX and USS WHITE RIVER conducted prep fire of the beach and landing zones as outlined in enclosure (9). USS DULUTH (LPD 6) arrived in the vicinity of the LOD launching four LCM8's preloaded with tanks and ten LVT's with ALFA Company embarked just prior to 0948H, then proceeded to the helicopter transport area. USS TORTUGA as PCS controlled all scheduled assault wave's in following sequence:

1) WAVE 1, ten LVT's ALFA Company embarked - Touchdown 0959H (early one minute).

2) WAVE 2, four LCM8's with one tank each - Touchdown 1003H on time.

3) WAVE 3, two LCM8's with two antos each - Touchdown 1010H on time.

4) WAVE 4, LCU/LAH with Beach Master - Touchdown 1017H on time.

5) WAVE 5, six LCM6's with 105 Howitzers - Touchdown 1024H on time.

Enclosure (11)  
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2. (C) Heliborne. The heliborne ship-to-shore movement was conducted on 5 May 1969 into Landing Zone TIGER at grid coordinates BT 198477 and Landing Zone LION at grid coordinates BT 173493. Alternate Landing Zones were PANTHER at grid coordinates BT 210476 and ALLEY at grid coordinates BT 197489. All landing zones were located in Quang Tin Province of I CTZ. DELTA Company embarked in USS OKINAWA was lifted by helicopter into Landing Zone TIGER at L-Hour, 1000H. Helicopters received small arms fire from the western side of the river bank, just outside of the AOA. The lift of CHARLIE Company from USS OKINAWA into Landing Zone LION was delayed because of numerous bunkers uncovered by the first mission of Close Air Support prep. A second Close Air Support prep was therefore conducted on Landing Zone LION. CHARLIE Company was landed in Landing Zone LION at 1145H.
B. AMPHIBIOUS DEMONSTRATION:

1. (C) The Battalion started their general eastward movement on the morning of 9 May. ALFA Company in the southern sector of the AOA started moving north and the rest of the BLT in the western sector of the AOA started moving eastward. An amphibious demonstration was conducted in the northern sector of the AOA to confuse and influence enemy action within the AOA. USS FRANK E. EVANS fired prep fire into a simulated landing zone from 0745H to 0750H. Eight helicopters flew to the simulated landing zone at grid coordinates BT 215504 and turned away at L-Hour, 0800H. USS DULUTH took station at 0800H on the simulated LOD at grid coordinates BT 250515 and launched four LCM8's and ten LVT's. DULUTH as PCS then controlled the LVT's toward the beach at grid coordinates BT 232510 with a turn away at the surf line at H-Hour, 0830H.

   a. A WPB at 0945H sighted about 50 civilians on the beach just north of the AOA at grid coordinates BT 227530. The civilians reported that a large force of VC/NVA had occupied their village (vicinity grid coordinates 225530). From the northward movement of the VC/NVA out of the AOA immediately after the demonstration, it is believed the VC/NVA thought their possible escape route to the south was about to be closed.
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C. WITHDRAWAL:

1. (C) Withdrawal day was 20 May 1969 with W-Hour 0630H. CHARLIE and DELTA Companies and the Battalion Command Group were flown from landing zones to USS OKINAWA. BRAVO Company was lifted to Red Beach by helicopter and was further withdrawn to USS DULUTH by LCM8's. Remaining on the beach during the initial stages of the withdrawal was ALFA 1/13 (105 Howitzer Battery). ALFA 1/13 was lifted by LCM8's to USS DULUTH about 0900H. ALFA Company was a security force on Red Beach and was the last to leave. They were withdrawn by LVT's to USS DULUTH at 1230H. All LVT's were aboard USS DULUTH by 1255H.
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D. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS:

1. Concept.

a. During Operation DARING REBEL, Beach Jumper Unit ONE Team TWELVE Detachment FOXTROT was tasked with providing population control and psychological operations in support of BLT 1/26.

b. The leaflets used to accomplish this task were prepared by the SEVENTH Psyops Battalion located in Danang. The aerial loudspeaker broadcasts were prerecorded tapes prepared by Detachment FOXTROT using Vietnamese liaison personnel assigned to BLT 1/26.

2. Conduct.

a. 5 May - at 1415H, after BLT 1/26 had landed, Detachment FOXTROT commenced the population control and psyops effort by dropping 100,000 leaflets and making an aerial broadcast. 50,000 of the leaflets informed the civilian population of the operation and gave the populace general instructions to follow in evacuation of the area. 25,000 of the leaflets asked the population to report the location of any mines or booby traps and insured the people that they would be rewarded for giving this information and that their identity would be kept secret. The remaining 25,000 leaflets were standard Chieu Hoi leaflets giving the VC an opportunity to return to the GVN. At the completion of the leaflet drop an aerial loudspeaker broadcast was used to give the civilian population specific instructions to be followed in the evacuation of the area.

b. 6 May - at 0840H another 100,000 leaflets were dropped. These leaflets were a mixture of the standard Chieu Hoi leaflet and a leaflet giving the VC information covering the rewards they would be given for turning in their weapons when they rallied.

c. 7 May - at 1015H an aerial loudspeaker broadcast was conducted using the evacuation tape played on 5 May to inform the civilians remaining in the area that they were in grave danger and must leave the area by sunset. At 1415H, 70,000 leaflets were dropped and an aerial broadcast was made over the area. The leaflets were rally instructions that gave the VC specific instructions for returning to the GVN. The aerial broadcast was a personal message from the Marine Commander telling the VC that they were completely surrounded and that they were to rally to the GVN or face the possibility of death.
d. 12 May - at 0815H, after receiving information that some civilians still remained in the area, Detachment FOXTROT personnel made another aerial loudspeaker broadcast warning the civilians of the danger they were in and directing them to move to the ocean and to Marine positions. As a result of this broadcast, 75 civilians moved to the Cua Dai River and were picked up by Swift Boats. A problem occurred in that civilians outside the area of operation heard the broadcast and followed the instructions by moving to Marine positions for evacuation.

e. 12 May - at 1530H 60,000 standard Chieu Hoi leaflets were dropped over the area and an aerial loudspeaker broadcasted a message from the Marine Commander to the VC. This message warned the VC of the danger they were in and gave them the opportunity to Chieu Hoi.

f. 18 May - at 1630H, another message from the Marine Commander was given via aerial broadcast to the VC who had crossed the Truong Giang River and fled the Marine cordon. This message assured them that they might not be so lucky in the future and that the Allied Forces would always be after them.
DISTRIBUTION LIST

CINCPACFLT
COMSEVENTHFLT
COMPHIBPAC
COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT
CG, FMFSEVENTHFLT
CG, FMFPAC
COMPHIBTRAPAC
CG, LANFORTRACOMPAC
CO, NAVPHIBSCOL, CORONADO
COMPHIBGRU ONE
COMPHIBGRU THREE
COMPHIBRON ONE
COMPHIBRON THREE
COMPHIBRON FIVE
COMPHIBRON SEVEN
COMPHIBRON NINE
COMPHIBRON ELEVEN
COMLANSHIPFLOT ONE
COMTACGRU ONE
COMNAVSPECWARGRUPAC
COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
CO, BJU ONE
CO, ACU ONE
CO, BMU ONE
01NC BMU ONE WP DET
01NC ACU ONE WP DET
01NC WP DET NAVSPECWARGRU
01NC NAVBEACHGRU ONE WP DET
01NC NAVSECGRU WP DET
CO, TACRON ELEVEN
CO, UDT THIRTEEN
USA C&GSC, FT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
01NC NAVTACDCOCAT
CINCPAC
COMUSMACV
COMNAVFORV
CG, III MAF
CG, V MEF
CG, 1ST MARDIV
CG, 3RD MARDIV
CG, 5TH MARDIV
CG, 1ST MAW
CNO (OP09B9) HISTORICAL DIV.
CMC
COMPHIBLANT
CG, FMFLANT
PRES, NAVWARCOL
CMCS QUANTICO, VA
CHAIRMAN ARB COMPHIBTRALANT
CG, LANFORTRACOMLANT
CO, NAVPHIBSCOL, LITTLE CREEK
COMPHIBGRU TWO
COMPHIBGRU FOUR
COMSERVGRU THREE
CTG 73.5
CTG 70.8
CTF 115
CTG 76.4
CTG 76.5
CTG 79.4
CTG 79.5
CTG 115.1
CO, BLT 1/26
CO, HMM 362
CO, USS OKINAWA (LPH 3)
CO, USS FORT MARION (LSD 22)
CO, USS DULUTH (LPD 6)
CO, USS WINSTON (LKA 94)
CO, USS TORTUGA (LSD 26)
CO, USS MULLINNIX (DD 944)
CO, USS FRANK E. EVANS (DD 754)
CO, USS NOA (DD 841)
CO, USS DOUGLAS H. FOX (DD 779)
CO, USS WHITE RIVER (LFR 536)
CO, USS CROCKETT (PG 88)

Enclosure (12)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL - Unclassified upon removal of enclosures

From: Commander Amphibious Force, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet
To: Commander Amphibious Ready Group ALFA, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: Operation DARING REBEL Post Operation Report; approval of (U)

Ref: (a) Commander Amphibious Ready Group ALFA ltr 3500 ser 023 of 1 June 1969.
(b) COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT/CTP 76 INST 3500.1C

(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet ltr 3340 ser 0138 of 23 July 1969.

1. Reference (a) is approved for distribution upon incorporation of the corrections promulgated in enclosures (1) and (2).

2. Compilation and distribution of the subject report will be in accordance with reference (b).

3. Enclosure (1) may be made an enclosure to or distributed with the corrected Post Operation Report if desired.

4. Attention is directed to paragraph 2 of enclosure (2). This is a turnover item until incorporated as a change to reference (b).

John W. O'NEILL
Chief of Staff
CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commander Amphibious Force, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet
To: Commander U.S. SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: DARING REBEL Post Operation Report; forwarding of (U)

Encl: (1) COMREAGRU ALFA ltr 3500 ser 023 of 1 June 1969 (5 copies)

1. (C) Commander Amphibious Force, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet concurs with the contents of enclosure (1) except as noted below:

   a. Page 2, line 5, change sentence beginning "Four companies....." to read "Four companies from the SECOND Republic of Korea Marine Corps (ROKMC) Brigade and Vietnamese Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PF.....".

   b. Page 8, paragraph 6. Insert the following before the last sentence: "Additionally, throughout the operation Task Group 115.1 Elements proved effective in their blockade efforts."

   c. Enclosure 3, 30 April 1969, paragraph 4, line 5, change to read "Korea Marine Corps (ROKMC Brigade - Hoi An Deputy Senior Advisor."

   d. Enclosure 4, page 3, paragraph 3.a(4), change line 1 to read "Elements of the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry."

   e. Enclosure 8, paragraph 4, delete "In response to a request from this command."

F.W. CLIFT III
Chief of Staff

Copy to:
CTG 76.4

Enclosure (1)
CONFIDENTIAL
From: Commander SEVENTH Fleet
To: Commander Amphibious Forces, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: Operation DARING REBEL Post Operation Report; approval of (U)

Ref: (a) Commander Amphibious Ready Group ALFA, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet
Conf ltr Ser 023 of 1 June 1969
(b) Commander Amphibious Forces, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet Conf ltr
Ser 069 of 23 June 1969

1. References (a) and (b) have been reviewed and are approved for
distribution as recommended by reference (a) with additions and cor-
rections noted in reference (b) subject to the following changes:

   a. Reference (a), Page 6, paragraph 10, under Material Captured.
   Amount of rice is less than that reported by SITREPS. Figure should
   read 9,425 pounds, vice 1,425 pounds.

2. It is desired that future post operation reports include a sta-
tistical summary of damage inflicted by Naval Gunfire Support and
Close Air Support, and the commander's assessment of their effectiv-
ness.

G. A. MITCHELL
Asst Chief of Staff
for Plans
# Operation Gallant Leader - Post Operation Rpt

**Routing Sheet (5511)**

<table>
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From: Commander Amphibious Ready Group ALFA, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet
To: Commander Amphibious Force, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: Operation GALLANT LEADER Post Operation Report;
Forwarding for UJ

Ref: (a) COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT/CLF/T/6 INST 3500.1C
(b) Joint COMPHIBFOR/COMSEVENTHFLT INST 3500.3/3500.8A

Encl: (1) Task Organization
(2) Initiating Directive
(3) Chronology of Events
(4) Planning/Operations (Omitted)
(5) Intelligence (Omitted)
(6) Medical/Logistics (Omitted)
(7) Communications
(8) Public Affairs (Omitted)
(9) Supporting Arms (Omitted)
(10) Lessons Learned (Omitted)
(11) Ship-to-Shore Movement
(12) Distribution

1. (C) Background. Go Noi Island and southern Doda City have continued to provide the enemy with a forward staging base for operations in the Danang, Hoi An, and Dai Loc area, and has traditionally been a haven for main and local force units. Several, Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (CG III MAF) requested approval from COMUSMACV and COMSEVENTHFLT to employ Amphibious Ready Group/Special Landing Force Alpha (ARG SLF ALFA) in a multi-battalion, multi-national operation in the Doda City - Go Noi Island area.

2. (C) Concept of Operations. To employ the Amphibious Task Force in an Amphibious Assault to land, 13, and destroy enemy forces. At 48-Hour land the battalion by helicopter at selected landing zones (LZ's) and simultaneously land combat support units and combat service support units by waterborne means at ramps in Danang Harbor for further movement to the SLF area.

   a. Mission. Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) conduct an amphibious operation against Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army (VC/NVA) forces in the SEVENTH Marine Regiment.
CONFIDENTIAL

Area of Operations (AO) in Quang Nam Province of the I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ), or other operations as agreed upon with CG, III MAF or his designated representatives.

b. Execution. Operation GALLANT LEADER was executed as a helicopterborne landing of four companies, two each simultaneously from USS OKINAWA and USS DULUTH with L-Hour 230630H May 1969. All scheduled helicopter serials were landed by 231043H. H-Hour was 230630H with the remainder of the battalion support units and BLT rear off-loaded by 242315H.

1. Augmentation Forces. Battalion Marines aboard USS DULUTH were helicopter lifted by four CH-46's and one CH-53 helicopters from FIRST Marine Air Wing (FIRST MAW).

2. Casualties: None.

3. Personnel captured/detained: None.

4. Material captured: None.

4. (C) Conclusions. The operation transported the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) to an in-country site and was effective only in that the landing force was landed where requested by CG, III MAF. No contact was made with enemy forces during this operation.

5. (U) Recommendations. None.

George W. Stroud

GEORGE W. STROUD

Distribution:
(See Enclosure 12)
CONFIDENTIAL

TASK ORGANIZATION

TG 76.4
Amphibious Ready Group ALFA
USS OKINAWA (LPH 3)
USS DULUTH (LPD 6)
USS TORTUGA (LSD 26)
USS FORT MARION (LSD 22) (23-24 May)
USS WHETSTONE (LSD 27) (25 May)
TACRON ELEVEN DET ALFA
UDT THIRTEEN DET ECHO
BJU ONE TEAM TWELVE DET FOXTROT
BMU ONE DET ALFA ONE
ACU ONE DET ALFA

TU 76.4.0
Command Special Operations Unit
CAPT G. W. STROUD, USN
COMPHIBRON FIVE

TE 76.4.0.1
Flagship Element
USS OKINAWA (LPH 3)
CAPT H. D. WILLIAMS, USN
CO, USS OKINAWA (LPH 3)

TE 76.4.0.2
Tactical Air Control Element
TACRON 11 DET ALFA
LCDR R. H. WALL, USN
OIC TACRON 11 DET ALFA

TE 76.4.0.3
Beach Reconnaissance Element
UDT 13 DET ECHO
LTJG J. A. LYTHE, USNR
OIC UDT 13 DET ECHO

TE 76.4.0.4
Special Operations Element
BJU 1 DET FOXTROT
LTJG A. C. REYNOLDS, USNR
OIC BJU 1 DET FOXTROT

TE 76.4.0.5
Transport Area Defense Element
USS TORTUGA (LSD 26)
CDR O. J. VOGEL, JR., USN
CO, USS TORTUGA (LSD 26)

TE 76.4.0.6
Naval Beach Party Element
BMU 1 DET ALFA ONE
LTJG H. B. MEACHAM, USNR
OIC BMU 1 DET ALFA ONE
Not assigned

TU 76.4.1
Gunfire Support and Screen Unit
CAPT G. W. STROUD, USN
COMPHIBRON FIVE

TU 76.4.2
Transport Unit

TU 76.4.3
Cargo Unit
USS FORT MARION (LSD 22)
CDR J. W. FARLEY, USN
CO, USS FORT MARION (LSD 22)

TU 76.4.4
Waterborne Control Unit
USS TORTUGA (LSD 26)
CDR O. J. VOGEL, JR., USN
CO, USS TORTUGA (LSD 26)

Enclosure (1)

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TU 76.4,5  Heliborne Control Unit
USS OKINAWA (LPH 3)
USS DULUTH (LPD 6)

TG 79.4  Special Landing Force
BLT 1/26
HMM 362

CAPT H. D. WILLIAMS, USN
CO, USS OKINAWA (LPH 3)

COL W. C. DOTY, USMC
CO, SLF ALFA

LTCOL C. G. KLIEFOTH, USMC
LTCOL J. E. SCHLARP, USMC

Enclosure (1)
CONFIDENTIAL

ZNY SSSS
O 201342Z MAY 69

FM COMSEVENTHFLT
TO CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
CTF SEVEN SIX
CTF SEVEN NINE
COMUSMACV
CG III MAF
INFO CNO
CINCPAC
CMC CINCPACFLT
COMNAVFORV
COMPHIBPAC
CG FMFPAC
CG FMFPAC (FWD)
CG FIRST MAW
CG FIRST MARDIV
CMR SEVENTH AF
CTF ONE ONE FIVE
CTF SEVEN THREE
CTF SEVEN SEVEN
CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
CTG SEVEN NINE PT THREE
CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE
CTF ONE ONE FIVE PT NINE
CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE
NAVCAMS WESTPAC
NAVCOMMSTAS WESTPAC
CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE

OPERATION GALLANT LEADER INITIATING DIRECTIVE (U)
A. MY OPLAN 101-69
B. NWP 22(B)

1. SITUATION: CG III MAF HAS REQUESTED THE EMPLOYMENT OF AN ARG/SLF IN A MAJOR UNIT CPN ON GO NOI ISLAND AND SOUTHERN DODGE CITY AREA IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS IN THE ICTZ. COMSEVENTHFLT WILL PROVIDE TG 76.4/79.4 AND SUCH OTHER FORCES AS MAY BE NECESSARY FOR THIS OPERATION. INITIATING DIRECTIVE IS FOR PLANNING PURPOSES. THE OPERATION, WHEN EXECUTED, WILL BE EXECUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A AND B.

2. MISSION: COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (CATF) CONDUCT AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION AGAINST VC/NVA FORCES IN AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE OF ICTZ IN ORDER TO FIND, FIX AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES AND OTHER OPERATIONS AS AGREED.

Enclosure (2)
CONFIDENTIAL

UPON WITH CG III MAF OR HIS DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE.

3. CTG 76.4 (COMPHIBRON 5) EMBARKED IN USS OKINAWA (LPH 3) DESIGNATED CATF.

4. CG 79.4 (COMMANDER SLF ALFA) EMBARKED IN USS OKINAWA (LPH 3) DESIGNATED COMMANDER LANDING FORCE (CLF).

5. COMMAND RELATIONSHIP LAW PARA 3X. (2) AND (3) OF REF A.

6. COMUSMACV WILL PROVIDE ANTI-INFILTRATION/EXFILTRATION PATROL CRAFT FOR THIS OPERATION AND WILL PROVIDE CAS AND OTHER SUPPORT AS AGREED UPON WITH CATF LAW PARA 1B (1) OF REF A.

7. THE AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA (AOA) WILL BE PROMULGATED BY SEPARATE MESSAGE.

8. NICKNAME FOR THIS OPERATION WILL BE GALLANT LEADER WITH TENTATIVE D-DAY 2: MAY 69. D-DAY AND H AND L HOURS TO BE DETERMINED AND CONFIRMED BY CATF. WHEN ALL FORCES ARE PREPARED, CATF REPORT TO ORIG STATE OF READINESS AND FINAL CONFIRMATION CONCERNING D-DAY, H AND L HOURS. EXECUTE D-DAY AT H AND L HOURS UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED. REPORT EXECUTION TO ALCON.

9. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

A. WHEN FIRMLY ESTABLISHED ASHORE, AND WHEN MUTUALLY AGREED BY CATF AND CG III MAF, REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF SLF CHOP TO CG III MAF.

B. UPON CHOP OF REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF SLF TO IN-COUNTRY COMMANDER CATF REMAIN IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS ASHORE.

C. WITHDRAWAL LAW ANNEX B TO REF A.

10. TERMINATION LAW ANNEX B TO REF A.

11. PUBLIC AFFAIRS LAW ANNEX V TO REF A.

12. DOWNGRADED TO CONFIDENTIAL UPON TERMINATION.

GP-4
BT

Enclosure (2) CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

E 2014162 MAY 69

FM COMSEVENTHFLI
TO CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
CTF SEVEN SIX
CTF SEVEN NINE
COMUSMACV
CG III MAF
INFO CNO
CINCPAC
CMC
CINCPACFLI
COMNAVFORV
COMPHIPAC
CG FMFPAC
CG FMFPAC (FWD)
CG FIRST MAW
CG FIRST MARIO
CMON SEVENTH AF
CTF ONE ONE FIVE
CTF SEVEN THREE
CTF SEVEN SEVEN
CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE
CTG SEVEN NINE PT THREE
CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE
CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT FIVE
CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
CTE SEVEN ZERO PT IWO PT ONE PT ONE
NAVJAMS WESTPAC
NAVCOMMSTATS WESTPAC
CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE

OPERATION GALLANT LEADER AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA (O)
A. COMSEVENTHFLI 2013422 MAY 69

I. THE AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA (AOA) FOR OPERATION GALLANT
LEADER IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE SEAWARD EXTENTION OF THE AOA WILL BE THAT SEA AREA
ENCIRCLED BY A FIFTEEN NM ARC CENTERED AT LAI 16-01PT1N1
AND LONG 106-16E TRUNCATED ON THE NORTH BY A LINE DRAWN 040
DEGREES TRUE FROM THE ARC CENTER AND EXCLUDING THE SURFACE
AREA OF THE SHORE ISLANDS HON CU, HON CO, HON LA, CU LAO CHAM,
HON GIAI, HON MO AND THE SURFACE RESTRICTED AREA AROUND CU LAO
CHAM, HON GIAI AND HON TAI ON H.O. CHART 6209 INCLUDING THE
AIR SPACE FROM ZERO TO TWO FIVE THOUS FT. FREE SURFACE AND AIR
TRANSIT GRANTED THROUGH AOA.
B. The helicopter routes will terminate in landing zones at Hill 55 in the vicinity of grid coordinates at 964618/4. Repeat at 964618/4.

GP-4
BT
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

19 May 1969

a. TG 76.4/79.4 engaged in Operation DARING REBEL with BLT 1/26 ashore on Barrier Island.

b. 1000H - CG, III MAF recommended to COMUSMACV landing BLT 1/26 as specified by CG, FIRST MARDIV to support a major unit operation on Go Noi Island.

c. 1800H - CG, III MAF requested CTG 76.4/79.4 contact FIRST MARDIV to commence planning and provide information for initiating directive for employment of ARG/SLF ALFA on Go Noi Island.

20 May 1969

a. 1820H - CTG 76.4 submitted amplifying information for the initiating directive to COMSEVENTHFLT.

b. 2142H - COMSEVENTHFLT promulgated initiating directive for Operation GALLANT LEADER.

21 May 1969

a. 1000H - Planning conference at headquarters CG, FIRST MARDIV for Operation GALLANT LEADER.

b. 2300H - CTG 76.4 promulgated message OPORD for Operation GALLANT LEADER.

23 May 1969

a. 0026H - CTG 76.4 confirmed H and L-Hour as 230630H.

b. 0530H - USS TORTUGA arrived in Danang Harbor and commenced offload of elements of BLT 1/26.

c. 0630H - USS FORT MARION arrived in Danang Harbor and commenced offload of elements of BLT 1/26.

d. 0650H - L-Hour. Assault troops landed vicinity Hill 55, at grid coordinates AT 964618, by helo. No opposition and no contact encountered.

e. 1035H - DULUTH assumed PCS duties.

f. 1100H - Landing Force was firmly established ashore and OPCON of BLT 1/26 CHOPPED to CG, III MAF for simultaneous chop to CG, FIRST MARDIV.

Enclosure (3)
g. 1200H - CATF dissolved the AOA.

24 May 1969

a. 0600H - USS DULUTH and USS TORTUGA anchored Danang Harbor to continue offload.

b. 0845H - USS OKINAWA anchored Danang Harbor to continue offload by ARG boating.

c. 1100H - USS OKINAWA departed Danang to rendezvous with USS MOUNT MC KINLEY for rehearsal of Secretary of the Navy visit.

d. 1210H - USS WHETSTONE arrived in Danang Harbor and began loadout of ARG material offloaded by USS FORT MARION.

e. 1844H - USS OKINAWA anchored in Danang Harbor to continue offload.

f. 2315H - Offload of BLT 1/26 completed.

g. 2342H - CTG 76.4 recommended termination of Operation GALLANT LEADER.

25 May 1969

a. 0001H - USS WHETSTONE (LSD 27) relieved USS FORT MARION (LSD 22).

b. 0720H - CONSEVENTHFLT directed Operation GALLANT LEADER be terminated.

c. 0800H - Operation GALLANT LEADER terminated.
COMMUNICATIONS

1. Planning. Communications were in accordance with the Operation GALLANT LEADER Annex NOVEMBER and CTG 76.4 OPLAN 101A-69. EMCON was not set during any portion of this operation.

2. Requirements versus Assets. Due to the limited scope of this operation, equipment assets were more than adequate to fulfill requirements.

3. Usable Frequencies. Frequencies were adequate and usable in all spectrums.

4. Cryptographic Systems. Adequate cryptographic systems were available throughout the operation.

5. RPIO Resupply. No requests for RPS draws were placed with the RPIO during the time frame of the operation.

6. Traffic Load versus Circuit and Personnel Availability. The traffic load encountered in the operation did not over-tax the available circuit assets or cause any major increase in personnel commitments.

7. Termination. The NAVCOMMOPNET Orestes termination was excellent throughout the operation. Occasional outages were due to men aloft, and ship's power failure.

8. Broadcast Reception. Fleet broadcast reception was excellent throughout the operation. Missing numbers were normally procured from ships in company, CTF 76 flagship, or NAVSUPPACT Danang without resorting to NAVCOMMSTA Guam.

9. Equipment Reliability. Communications were very reliable and minor outages were corrected as they occurred.

10. Landing Force Problems. There were no major problems with Landing Force communications throughout the operation.

11. Coverd Voice. The KY-8 for covered voice was used on the Maneuvering and Warning Circuit, Reporting Circuit, and several Marine circuits and no major difficulties occurred.
SHIP-TO-SHORE MOVEMENT

1. (C) The helicopter ship-to-shore movement was conducted from USS OKINAWA and USS DULUTH in the helicopter transport area of the Amphibious Objective Area. Helicopters lifted Battalion Landing Team 1/26 to a Landing Zone at grid coordinates AT 964618, in the vicinity of Hill 55. Augmentation helicopters consisting of one CH-53 and four CH-46's were obtained from the FIRST Marine Air Wing. The helicopter portion of the offload was completed at 231043H.

2. (C) USS TORTUGA and USS FORT MARION were anchored in Danang Harbor prior to 230640H May 1969 and commenced their offload of Battalion 1/26 cargo and vehicles at Naval Support Activity Danang ramps at 0630H. The waterborne portion of the offload was completed 241515H May 1969.
**DISTRIBUTION LIST**

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| COMPHIBPAC | COMNAVFORV |
| COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT | CG, III MAF |
| CG, FMFSEVENTHFLT | CG, V MEF |
| CG, FMFPAC | CG, 1ST MARDIV |
| COMPHIBRAPAC | CG, 3RD MARDIV |
| CG, LANFORTRACOMPAC | CG, 5TH MARDIV |
| CO, NAVPHIBSCOL, CORONADO | CG, 1ST MAW |
| COMPHIBGRU ONE | CNO (OP0999) HISTORICAL DIV. |
| COMPHIBGRU THREE | CMC |
| COMPHIBRON ONE | COMPHIBLANT |
| COMPHIBRON THREE | CG, FMFLANT |
| COMPHIBRON FIVE | PRES, NAVWARCOL |
| COMPHIBRON SEVEN | CMCS QUANTICO, VA |
| COMPHIBRON NINE | CHAIRMAN AMB COMPHIBTRALANT |
| COMPHIBRON ELEVEN | CG, LANFORTRACOMLANT |
| COMLANSHIPFLOT ONE | CO, NAVPHIBSCOL, LITTLE CREEK |
| CMTAGRU ONE | COMPHIBGRU TWO |
| COMNAVSECWARGRFU PAC | COMPHIBGRU FOUR |
| COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE | COMSERVGRU THREE |
| CO, BJU ONE | CTG 73.5 |
| CO, ACU ONE | CTG 76.4 |
| CO, BMU ONE | CTG 76.5 |
| OINC BMU ONE WP DET | CTG 79.4 |
| OINC ACU ONE WP DET | CTG 79.5 |
| OINC WP DET NAVSPECWARGRU | CO, BLT 1/26 |
| OINC NAVBEACHGRU ONE WP DET | CO, HMM 362 |
| OINC NAVSECGRU WP DET | CO, USS OKINAWA (LPH 3) |
| CO, TACRON ELEVEN | CO, USS PORT MARION (LSD 22) |
| CO, UDT THIRTEEN | CO, USS DULUTH (LPD 6) |
| USA CGSC, FT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS | CO, USS TORTUGA (LSD 26) |
| OINC NAVTACDOC ACT | CO, USS WHETSTONE (LSD 27) |

Enclosure (12)

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL - Unclassified upon removal of enclosures

From: Commander Amphibious Force, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet
To: Commander Amphibious Ready Group ALFA, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: Operation GALLANT LEADER Post Operation Report; approval of (U)

Ref: (a) Commander Amphibious Ready Group ALFA ltr 3500 ser 022 of 2 June 1969
(b) COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT/CTF 76 INST 3500,1C

Encl: (1) Commander Amphibious Force, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet ltr 3500 ser 76-082 of 27 July 1969
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet ltr 3500 ser N6-868 of 19 August 1969

1. Reference (a) is approved for distribution upon incorporation of the corrections promulgated in enclosure (1).

2. Compilation and distribution of the subject report will be in accordance with reference (b).

3. Enclosure (1) may be made an enclosure to or distributed with the corrected Post Operation Report if desired.

John W. O'Neill
Chief of Staff
CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commander Amphibious Force, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet
To: Commander SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: Operation GALLANT LEADER Post Operation Report; forwarding of (U)

Encl: (1) Commander Amphibious Ready Group ALFA ltr 3500 ser 022 of 2 June 1969, (5 copies)

1. Commander Amphibious Force, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet concurs with the contents of enclosure (1) except as noted below.
   
   a. Enclosure (1)

   TG 76.4 after USS FORT MARION (LSD 22) add "(23-24 May)". Above TACRON ELEVEN DET ALFA, add new line to read "USS WHETSTONE (LSD 27) (25 May)".

   TE 76.4.0.6, change BMU-1 DET ALFA and OINC BMU-1 DET ALFA to read "BMU-1 DET ALFA ONE and OINC BMU-1 DET ALFA ONE" respectively.

   b. Enclosure (2). Under the addressees add "CTG SEVEN NINE PT THREE" below CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE.

   c. Enclosure (3)

   Under 23 May, 1969; subparagraph d, delete "0630H - L-Hour" and replace with "0650". Add new subparagraph e. to read "1035H - DULUTH assumed PCS duties". Add new subparagraph f. to read "1100H - Landing Force was firmly established ashore and OPCON of BM 1/26 CHOPPED to CG, III MAF for simultaneous chop to CG, FIRST MARDIV." Add new subparagraph g. to read "1200H - CATF dissolved the AOA."

   Under 25 May 1969; reletter subparagraphs a. and b. as b. and c. respectively. Add new subparagraph a. to read "0001H - USS WHETSTONE (LSD 27) relieved USS FORT MARION (LSD 22)."

   d. Enclosure (12). Change OINC ACU ONE WE DET" to read "OINC ACU ONE WP DET". Change "COMSERGRU THREE" to read "COMSERVGRU THREE".

Copy to:
CTG 36.4

John W. O'NEILL
Chief of Staff

GROUP-4
DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

DECLASSIFIED
From: Commander SEVENTH Fleet  
To: Commander Amphibious Force, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet  
Subj: Operation GALLANT LEADER Post Operation Report; approval of  
Ref: (a) COMPHIBREADYGRU ALFA Confltr CARG "A"/N33:ft 3500 ser 022  
of 2 June 1969  
(b) COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT Confltr FF3/76-N312:JRE:ps 3500 ser  
76-082 of 27 July 1969  

1. References (a) and (b) have been reviewed and are approved for  
distribution as recommended reference (a) with additions and corrections  
noted reference (b).  

/s/G. A. MITCHELL  
Asst Chief of Staff  
for Plans
From: Commander Amphibious Ready Group ALFA, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet
To: Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: Operation BOLD PURSUIT Post Operation Report; forwarding of (U)

Ref: (a) COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT/CTF 76 INST 3500.1C
(b) Joint COMFIRSTFLT/COMSEVENTHFLT INST 3500.3/3500.8A

Encl: (1) Task Organization
(2) Initiating directives
(3) Chronology of events
(4) Planning/Operations
(5) Intelligence
(6) Medical/Logistics
(7) Communications
(8) Public Affairs
(9) Supporting Arms
(10) Lessons Learned
(11) Ship to Shore Movement
(12) Distribution

1. (C) Background. As part of the continuing campaign by the combined efforts of US and RVN military units to keep pressure on enemy forces in The Republic of Vietnam, Operation BOLD PURSUIT was conducted during the period 27 June to 6 July 1969.

Amphibious Ready Group/Special Landing Force ALFA (TG 76.4/TG 79.4) was employed by Commander U. S. SEVENTH Fleet in support of and at the request of Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force, to conduct operations in order to continue to deny the enemy the use of northern Barrier Island, in Quang Tin Province, South Vietnam. The area was verified by intelligence observation to be customarily and currently used by the enemy as a sanctuary for rehabilitating decimated Viet Cong main force units and as a harboring site for North Vietnamese armed units. The goal of this amphibious operation was to prosecute a search and destroy operation in cooperation/coordination with the U. S. AMERICAL Division which was conducting operations along the southern reaches of Barrier Island and would be providing a blocking force to the south of the AOA. Units supporting the Amphibious Ready Group/Special Landing Force ALFA ashore were: ALFA Company, SECOND Battalion, FIRST Infantry, 196th Light Infantry Brigade and FIRST Squadron, FIRST Armored Cavalry both from the
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AMERICAL Division) operating as a blocking force on the west bank of the Song Truone Giang (River) to the west of the AOA; Second Battalion, 51st Regiment of the Second ARVN Division conducting land clearing operations north of the 53rd East-West Grid line north of the AOA, one company size unit of Regional Forces from Quang Tin Province operating as an infantry block west of the AOA and CTG 115. 1 providing normal screening operations on the Song Cua Dai (River) and to seaward of Barrier Island. Naval gunfire support and close air support were provided by CTU 70.8.9 and CG, FIRST MAW respectively (See Enclosure (9)).

2. (C) Concept of Operations and Execution. The basic concept for Operation BOLD PURSUIT was to employ Amphibious Ready Group ALFA in the northern Barrier Island area of Quang Tin province about 16 miles south of Danang. In a helicopter and amphibious waterborne assault the Amphibious Task Force was to land BLT 1/26 for search and destroy operation against Viet Cong local force and main force units, VC infrastructure and North Vietnamese Armed Forces.

a. Mission. Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF - Commander Amphibious Ready Group ALFA) was directed to conduct an amphibious operation against VC/NVA forces in the amphibious objective area in Quang Tin Province of I Corps Tactical Zone and other operations as agreed upon with the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force, or his designated representative.

b. Execution. Operation BOLD PURSUIT was executed at H-Hour, 270720H June 1969, by a waterborne assault over BLUE Beach in the northeastern sector of the AOA by ALFA Company from BLT 1/26 embarked in LVTP-5 amphibious tractors. Following the initial wave of LVTPs, tanks, artillery, beach masters and shore party units were landed over BLUE Beach. This surface assault was not opposed by the enemy. Beginning at L-Hour, 270730H June 1969, two rifle companies were landed by helicopter at two landing zones in the northern portion of the AOA, followed by helicopter lift of BLT 1/26 Command Post elements and other supporting units. During the helicopter assault, seven helicopters received small arms fire. Two helicopters were forced to make an emergency landing near BLUE Beach, due to small arms hits. These helicopters were later repaired and recovered. Prior to the initial landing at H-Hour, BLUE BEACH and the helicopter landing zones were neutralized by 5"38 naval gunfire and close air support using bombs and rockets. At 271045H June 1969 an additional rifle company was helicopter lifted to a landing zone in the southern reaches of the AOA to provide a blocking force to the south. This landing zone was also prepared by naval gunfire and close air support prior to initial touchdown. Following completion of the helicopter lift of all scheduled forces, infantry units (supported by naval gunfire, artillery and close air support) commenced movement toward initial objectives consisting of expected concentration of enemy fortifications and bunkers in the western and central portion of the AOA. Aerial loudspeaker broadcasts were used to clear the civilian population from the AOA. The population was directed to move from the inland area to the coast and south along the coast to Marine positions in the southern part of the AOA. The Amphibious Task Force continued throughout the first day to build up a limited beach support area. The beach build up was limited by
the necessity to retain, as directed, flexibility for withdrawal within eight hours. PCFs and WPBs from coastal surveillance forces (TG 115.1) provided anti-infiltration/exfiltration protection in the seaward AOA. This protection was provided on a not-to-interfere basis with normal operations. PCFs and WPBs also provided NGFS in the nature of 81MM mortar H and I fires.

Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) THIRTEEN Detachment ECHO conducted a clandestine check survey of BLUE Beach early AM 27 June via PCF provided by CTG 115.1 in a manner consistent with normal patrol operations in the offshore area. This had the following distinct advantages: did not disclose the location of the Amphibious Task Force in an area of impending operations and did not arouse the suspicions of the enemy. (See Enclosure (5)). UDT continued to provide swimmer safety surveillance throughout the operation.

From the aerial observations by HMM 265 pilots on D-Day, not only was an element of surprise achieved, but also a great amount of confusion was generated as the enemy was seen running and moving in a helter skelter fashion as if dazed by the great volume of prep fires and firing from close air support helo gunships.

ATF ships continued resupply of troops in the field and the beach support area throughout the operation by both surface and air movements of supplies and material. Materials consumed during operations ashore were replaced by resupply through the port of Danang from the Force Logistics Command. Ships, except the LPH, were rotated into Danang about every other day for resupply. MOGAS, JP-5 fuel and fresh water were supplied for operations ashore by ATF ships, primarily the LSD and LPD.

On D plus six, operations and objectives were sufficiently accomplished ashore to permit rotation of troops from field positions for rehabilitation on board ATF ships. Plans were established for a 24 hour REHAB period of one rifle company each day. DELTA and BRAVO companies were helo lifted to IWO JIMA and CLEVELAND respectively for REHAB prior to the termination of operations ashore.

On 5 July termination of the operation was ordered by COMSEVENTHFLT. On 6 July a planned withdrawl was executed with W-Hour established for 060700H. Withdrawal was accomplished by air and surface means. The final unit, consisting of ALFA Company, embarked in LVTP-5s departed from BLUE Beach at 061532H. Following withdrawal USS MEREDITH conducted H and I fire on evacuated positions until 061600H. Operation BOLD PURSUIT was terminated at 061600H July.

Prior to this operation ARG/SLF ALFA had conducted an amphibious turn away landing (heli/waterborne) demonstration off the coast of northern Barrier Island, Quang Tin Province, only 1000 meters south of the assault beach chosen for Operation BOLD PURSUIT. It is strongly believed that this demonstration, although in no way directly connected with Operation BOLD PURSUIT assisted in misleading and confusing the enemy.
During the entire planning phase, normal routine evolutions were maintained as ships of ARG ALFA and helos of HMM 265 moved in and out of Danang while continuing to operate from the local OPAREAS just off Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces. No special pattern of unusual activity was established and the pre-D-Day briefing was held aboard IWO JIMA for all participants while the ships were routinely in Danang Harbour to replenish dairy products.

3. (C) Statistical Summary. Following are some of the significant statistical results and accomplishments generated during Operation BOLD PURSUIT.

a. Friendly Casualties: (all USMC) BLT 1/26 and HMM 265

   (1) Non-Combat                                      34
   (2) Combat (WIA)                                    37
   (3) Killed in action (KIA)                           4
   (4) Died of wounds (DOW)                             1 (Danang Hospital)
   (5) Treated and released for return to duty,         35
        by IWO JIMA medical facility
   (6) Admitted and treated by IWO JIMA medical facility 29
   (7) Treated and transferred to Naval Hospital, Danang 3

b. Enemy Casualties:

   (1) KIA                                             42
   (2) POW                                              8
   (3) Detainees                                        720

c. Enemy Equipment and Supplies captured and/or destroyed:

   (1) Individual Weapons                               18
   (2) Crew Served Weapons                               1
   (3) Suprise Firing Devices                            4
   (4) Rice                                              600 lbs
   (5) Salt                                              50 lbs
4. (U) Conclusion. Operation BOLD PURSUIT achieved all objectives.
5. (U) Recommendations. None.

J. B. RANDOLPH
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TASK ORGANIZATION

TG 76.4
Amphibious Ready Group ALFA
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
USS WASHBURN (LKA-108)
USS CLEVELAND (LPD-7)
USS WHETSTONE (LSD-27)
TACRON TWELVE, DET ALFA
BJU ONE, DET ALFA
BMU ONE, DET ALFA TWO
UDT THIRTEEN, DET ECHO

TU 76.4.0
Command and Special Operations Unit
TE 76.4.0.1 Flagship Element
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
TE 76.4.0.2 Tactical Air Control Element
TACRON 12, DET ALFA
TE 76.4.0.3 Beach Reconnaissance Element
UDT TEAM 13, DET ECHO
TE 76.4.0.4 Special Operations Element
BJU ONE, TEAM 12, DET FOXTROT
TE 76.4.0.5 Transport Area Defense Element
USS WHETSTONE (LSD-27)
TE 76.4.0.6 Naval Beach Party Element
BMU ONE, DET ALFA TWO

TU 76.4.1
Gunfire Support and Screen Unit
USS ROWAN (DD-782) 27 JUN - 1 JUL 69
USS MEREDITH (DD-890) 2 - 6 JUL 69

TU 76.4.2
Transport Unit
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
USS WASHBURN (LKA-108)
USS CLEVELAND (LPD-7)
USS WHETSTONE (LSD-27)

TU 76.4.3
Cargo Unit
USS WASHBURN (LKA-108)

CAPT J. B. RANDOLPH, USN
COMPHIBRON THREE
CAPT M. M. CASEY, JR., USN
CO, USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
LTJG J. A. LYTLE, USNR
OIC, UDT 13, DET ECHO
LTJG A. C. REYNOLDS, USNR
OIC, BJU 1, TEAM 12, DET "F"
CDR F. K. RABUN, USN
CO, USS WHETSTONE (LSD-27)
ENS G. I. ARMSTRONG, USNR
OIC, BMU 1, DET ALFA 2
CDR F. R. JOHNS, USN
CO, USS ROWAN (DD-782) 27 JUN - 1 JUL 69
CDR J. E. WITHROW, USN
CO, USS MEREDITH (DD-890) 2 - 6 JUL 69
CAPT J. B. RANDOLPH, USN
COMPHIBRON THREE
CAPT R. R. RENALDI, USN
CO, USS WASHBURN (LKA-108)

Enclosure (1)

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BOLD PURSUIT INITIATING DIRECTIVE (COMSEVENTHFLT 252258Z JUN 69)

Ref: (a) COMSEVENTHFLT OPLAN 101-69
(b) NWP 22(B)

1. SITUATION: CG III MAF has requested the employment of an ARG/SLF in support of operations in the ICTZ. COMSEVENTHFLT will provide TG 76.4/79.4 and such other forces as may be necessary for this operation. Initiating directive is for planning purposes. The operation when executed, will be conducted in accordance with references (a) and (b).

2. MISSION: Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) conduct an amphibious operation against VC/NVA forces in amphibious objective area in Quang Tin Province of ICTZ or other operations as agreed upon with CG III MAF or his designated representative.

3. CTG 76.4 (COMPHIBRON THREE) embarked in USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) designated CATF.

4. CTG 79.4 (Commander SLF ALFA) embarked in USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) designated Commander Landing Force (CLF).

5. Command relationship in accordance with paragraph 3X.(2) and (3) of reference (a).

6. COMUSMACV will provide anti-infiltration/exfiltration patrol craft for this operation and will provide CAS and other support as agreed upon with CATF in accordance with paragraph 1B(1) of reference (a).

7. The Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) will be promulgated by separate message.

8. Nickname for this operation will be BOLD PURSUIT with tentative D-Day 27 June. D-Day and H and L hours to be determined and confirmed by CATF. When all forces are prepared, CATF report to origantor state of readiness and final confirmation concerning D-Day, H and L hours. Execute on D-Day at H and L hours unless otherwise directed. Report execution to ALCON.

9. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
   a. Withdrawl in accordance with Annex B to reference (a). Retain readiness for withdrawal in eight hours.
   b. Expected length of operations is 7 - 10 days.

10. Termination in accordance with Annex B to reference (a).

11. Public affairs in accordance with Annex V to reference (a).

12. Downgraded to Confidential upon termination.

Enclosure (2)
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TU 76.4.4  Waterborne Control Unit  CDR F. K. RABUN, USN
USS WHETSTONE (LSD-27)  CO, USS WHETSTONE (LSD-27)

TU 76.4.5  Heliborne Control Unit  CAPT M. M. CASEY, JR, USN
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)  CO, USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
USS CLEVELAND (LPD-7)

TG 79.4  Special Landing Force ALFA  COL W. C. DOTY, USMC
BLT 1/26  CO, SLF ALFA
HMM 265  LTCOL G. C. KLIEFOTH, USMC
LTCOL R. L. GRAY, JR, USMC

COMSEC TEAM TWO (CTE 70.7.7.2) was embarked in USS CLEVELAND (LPD-7).
By COMSEVENTHFLT 260058Z JUN 69 the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) for Operation BOLD PURSUIT is as follows: The landward AOA will be the land area encompassed by a line drawn from BT 229524/4 southwest along the province boundary of Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces, RVN to the Troung Giang (River) at NBT 172497/0 thence southeast along the Troung Giang to BT 217463/3 then trace to 224470/9 to 230475/1 to 243480/1 at the South China Sea, including the air space from 0-25,000 MSL. The seaward extension of the AOA will be that area encompassed on the north by a line drawn 065 degrees true from a point at BT 22050/6 for a distance of 10 nautical miles and on the south by a line drawn 055 degrees true from BT 309360/1 for a distance of 15 nautical miles and by a line joining the two seaward points excluding the surface area of the off shore islands on HO Chart 6209 including the air space from 0-25,000 feet MSL, free air transit granted 7,000/7 feet MSL and above over the sea and land AOA.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

24 JUNE 1969

a. Received message from CG III MAF indicating ARG/SLF operations were pending in near future.

b. CTG 76.4 and CTG 79.4 representatives attended preliminary planning conference at CG III MAF Headquarters for proposed operations.

25 JUNE 1969

a. 0900H - CTG 76.4, CTG 79.4 and key staff members conferred with CG AMERICAL Division, CG SECOND ARVN Division, CG III MAF representatives and Quang Tin Province Officials concerning proposed operations on Barrier Island.

b. Commenced pre-operation preparations for proposed SPECOPS.

c. Requested NOTAM.

d. Requested Air Support.

e. 1930H - Requested NGFS ship assignment.

f. 2344H - Requested PCF/WPB services from CTG 115.1.

26 JUNE 1969

a. 0750H - Received initiating directive from CONSEVENTHFLTLT.

b. TG 76.4 ships in Danang Harbor for in-port logistics and liaison.

c. 0905H - Promulgated message operation order (CTG 76.4 OPORD 306-69) for Operation BOLD PURSUIT.

d. CTG 76.4 and CTG 79.4 attended planning conference at CG III MAF Headquarters with CG III MAF and CG AMERICAL Division representatives.

e. 1159H - Received AOA description from CONSEVENTHFLTLT.

f. 1600H - CTG 76.4 conducted pre-D-Day briefings on board flagship IWO JIMA for TG 76.4.

g. 2000H - CTG 76.4 confirmed D-Day and readiness to conduct operations.

27 JUNE 1969

a. D-Day for Operation BOLD PURSUIT.

b. 0001H - CTG 76.4 OPORD 306-69 (Operation BOLD PURSUIT) effective for execution.
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c. 0005H - USS ROWAN (DD 782) reported for duty as Naval Gunfire Support Ship. USS CLEVELAND departed op area for the AOA.

d. 0100H - UDT commenced check survey, surf observations and recon of BLUE Beach.

e. USS IWO JIMA, USS WASHBURN AND USS WHETSTONE departed BARBARA op areas independently for assigned positions in the AOA.

f. 0340H - UDT completed check survey and beach recon and embarked in USS CLEVELAND.

g. PCF reported to USS WHETSTONE for AOA security duty.

h. 0500H - USS IWO JIMA, USS WASHBURN and USS WHETSTONE in assigned sectors of AOA.

i. 0520H - Confirmed H and L Hours.

j. 0530H - Signalled "Land the Waterborne Landing Force".

k. 0703H - NGFS beach prep commenced.

l. 0700H - Signalled "Land the Heliborne Landing Force".

m. 0711H - NGFS beach prep ceased.

n. 0713H - 0728H - Air and NGF prep of LZ COBRA.

o. 0720H - Surface wave one touched down on time.

p. 0729H - Surface wave two touched down.

q. 0730H - L-Hour. First helo wave touched down on time.

r. 0739H - Surface wave three touched down.

s. 0747H - Surface wave four touched down.

t. 0750H - Helicopter forced down at BLUE Beach by ground fire from vicinity LZ COBRA.

u. 0810H - Helicopter forced down at BLUE Beach by ground fire from vicinity LZ COBRA.

v. 0830H-0915H - Lifted troops into LZ RATTLER.
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w. 1026H-1044H - Air and NGF prep of LZ KRAIT.

x. 1046H - First heliborne wave touched down in LZ KRAIT.

y. 1400H - Completed scheduled and on-call surface and air ship-to-shore movement.

z. 1410H - Commenced selective offload and limited buildup of beach support area.

aa. 1300-1530H - PSYOPS aircraft delivered warnings and evacuation instructions to civilian population centers.

bb. MGEN L. B. RAMSEY, USA, CG AMERICAL Division visited CTG 76.4 aboard flagship USS IWO JIMA for progress of operations brief.

28 JUNE 1969


b. RADM W. W. BEHRENS, COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT/CTF 76, visited CTG 76.4 for lunch and briefing on progress of operations.

c. 1732H - Completed limited buildup of Beach Support Area.

29 JUNE 1969


b. USS CLEVELAND and USS ROWAN replenished underway from USS KENNEBEC (AO 36).

c. BGEN Nguyen Van TOAN, CG Second ARVN Division visited CTG 76.4/CTG 79.4 for liaison and briefing on progress of operations.

d. USS CLEVELAND in Danang for INREP of ammunition and supplies.

30 JUNE 1969


b. 0645H - USS MEREDITH (DD 890) reported for duty as NGFS ship.

c. USS ROWAN rearmed from USS PARICUTIN (AE 18).

d. 1910H - USS CLEVELAND assumed duties as PCS. USS WHETSTONE departed the AOA to dump contaminated diesel fuel and proceed to Danang for INREP of Ammunition, POL and supplies.
1 JULY 1969


b. 0400H - USS ROWAN (DD-782) released from ARG ALFA.

c. 0400H - Commanding Officer, USS MEREDITH (DD-890) assumed CTU 76.4.1.

d. 0900H to 1130H - USS WASHBURN in Danang for INREP with USS NIAGARA FALLS (AFS-3).

e. 1210H - MEDEVAC guard passed to USS CLEVELAND. USS IWO JIMA, USS WHETSTONE and USS MEREDITH replenished underway from USS GUADALUPE (AO-32).

f. USS WASHBURN replenished underway from USS GUADALUPE enroute to the AOA.

g. 1733H - USS IWO JIMA returned to assigned sector of AOA and resumed MEDEVAC guard.

2 JULY 1969


b. 0500H - USS WHETSTONE resumed duties as PCS.

c. USS MEREDITH rearmed from USS VIRGO (AE-30).

d. 1250H - 1735H - TG 76.4 less USS WASHBURN conducted vertical replenishment from USS NIAGARA FALLS (AFS-3) within the AOA.

e. Conducted check survey of BLUE Beach to locate more suitable landing site at low water. None found.

f. RADM E. M. ROSENBERG, COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT/CTF 76, visited CTG 76.4 and CTG 79.4 and was briefed on current operations.

g. 1821H - One HMM 265 helo on command control mission with SLF Commander embarked received small arms fire. Helo crashed near the beach. Four minor injuries.

3 JULY 1969


b. USS CLEVELAND in Danang for INREP.

c. Lifted DELTA company via helo to USS IWO JIMA for 24 hour REHAB.

d. USS MEREDITH rearmed from USS VIRGO (AE-30).

e. CTG 76.4 and CTG 79.4 visited CG III MAF Headquarters for liaison concerning operations.
1. (C) CG III MAF proposed the concept for a search-and-destroy operation on northern Barrier Island just south of the province boundary between Quang Tin and Quang Nam.

2. (C) Initial planning conferences were conducted with representatives of CG III MAF in Danang and CG: AMERICAN DIV in Chu Lai on 23 June to establish coordination and commitment of forces. Following this conference, agreements were reached with CG: AMERICAN DIV to provide surface security for CTE 76-4-0-3 (UDT) to accomplish a clandestine check survey of the selected landing beach early AM D-Day and further to routinely provide surface surveillance of the AOA and gunfire support when such assets were available.

3. (C) A second planning conference was conducted 25 June at the Quang Tin Province Headquarters, Tam Ky, with representatives of CG: AMERICAN DIV and CG SECOND ARVN DIV. General TOAN, CG SECOND ARVN DIV and COL TIN, Province Chief, Quang Tin Province, and their USMACV advisors were present. Discussions were held; agreements were made as to the coordination/liaison required and to the commitment of forces. Mutual agreements were made on the following:

   a. The landward AOA.
   b. Pacified areas.
   c. Free fire zones.
   d. Location of friendly forces operating in the vicinity of the AOA periphery.
   e. The mutual exchange of liaison officers.
   f. The establishment of D-Day.

Following the conference at Tam Ky, a meeting was held with the Quang Da Special Zone representatives concerning the free fire zone in Quang Nam Province just north of the province boundaries between Quang Tin and Quang Nam. An agreement for the desired free fire zone was achieved.

4. (C) Planning for the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA).

   a. In establishing an AOA the following general requirements were considered:

      (1) Not to restrict normal air traffic in and out of Danang.
      (2) Not to restrict normal coastwise shipping in and out of Danang.

Enclosure (4)
(3) Select a fire support area to permit the NGFS ships to have clear gun target lines.

(4) Permit free air transit over 7000 feet above AOA.

5. (C) Naval gunfire support was provided by CTU 70, 8, 9 by the assignment of USS ROWAN (DD 782) followed by USS MEREDITH (DD 890).

6. (C) CTG 115.1 provided routine surveillance of the seaward AOA and continued river patrol operations along the Song Cua Dai outside the AOA and free fire zone boundaries.

7. (C) Coordination/Cooperation was achieved at all levels with understanding and professionalism.
1. (C) The first indication of an impending operation came on the morning of 24 June 1969 while ARG/SLF ALFA was engaged in conducting an amphibious turn away landing demonstration in the vicinity of Barrier Island, Quang Tin Province. A personal liaison visit by CTG 76.4, CTG 79.4 and various staff members to CG, III MAF Headquarters, Danang, at 1330H on 24 June revealed that III MAF G-2 had indications that major elements of the 70th MF Battalion plus elements of the V-25 LF Battalion had moved back into the Barrier Island vicinity and in conjunction with local guerrilla forces had begun to fortify the area again following the successful sweeps conducted during Operation DARING REBEL. Recent attacks in the area by enemy forces against Operation SEA TIGER PCF's tended to confirm a build up of forces on Barrier Island. D-Day for an amphibious assault targeted against enemy forces in the vicinity of northern Barrier Island was tentatively set for the morning of 27 June thus allowing a period of approximately 64 hours to research conditions in the AOA, prepare and issue an intelligence estimate and complete the planning process.

2. (C) Early in the planning phase the decision was made to conduct a surface assault over the beach in order to establish a fire support base to support the troops in the helicopter assault. Upon review of all beach information available to the command it was discovered that all but 800 yards of the 4000 yards of beach within the AOA had been surveyed within the past year. However, some of the surveys were in the form of rough copies of UDT data attached as enclosures to CTF 76/79 Joint Intelligence Estimate 1-69 and were unevaluated without charts or graphics. An immediate precedence message (CTG 76.4 241321Z June 69) was sent to CTF 76 requesting smooth copies of the IR's reporting beach surveys of Barrier Island beaches, as well as any other information on Barrier Island and vicinity. The smooth IR's were forwarded expeditiously by helicopter arriving on the morning of 26 June. Prior to receipt of the smooth surveys the decision was made to utilize a 500 yard segment of the beach located between coordinates 49P BT 232513 and 49P BT 227529 (designated BLUE Beach) for the assault beach based on the rough UDT information already in hand. Upon receipt of the smooth beach survey with graphic, the location of the assault beach was confirmed and the graphic became the basic document for conducting a clandestine UDT check survey prior to H-Hour.

3. (C) Because the scheme of maneuver within the landward AOA called for a surface assault prior to the helicopter borne assault, it was felt that a check survey of the assault beach would be highly desirable. Previous liaison with CTG 115.1 had indicated a willingness and capability to support amphibious operations by providing a Swift Boat (PCF) from TG 115.1 assets to act as UDT insertion/recovery vehicle and to provide anti-Infiltration/exfiltration patrol in the AOA. A PCF was chosen for a clandestine UDT insertion because such a craft is commonly seen in areas close-in to shore throughout Vietnam and an insertion could be made without breaking the normal patrol pattern thus not arousing the suspicion of the enemy that amphibious operations were pending. USS CLEVELAND (LPD-7) was designated

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Enclosure (5)
as UDT control ship and was to take station 5 to 10 miles from the beach to provide radar vectors to the PCF, if required, and whatever other support was necessary. At about 2300H on 26 June the ARG ALFA UDT detachment embarked in the assigned PCF at the Rockcrusher Pier in Danang (coordinates 49P BT 077818) and were transported to BLUE Beach arriving at 0015H 27 June. Enroute to the insertion point, the PCF approached close enough to USS CLEVELAND to establish positive identification and then received radar vectors to a point directly offshore from the left flank of BLUE Beach. The PCF's radar was used to approach the beach 300 to 500 yards offshore where the UDT was placed in the water. The PCF then remained in the immediate vicinity to provide gun fire support if necessary. When the survey was completed and upon receipt of prearranged flashing light signals from the UDT leader the PCF moved in to recover the UDT. After recovery the PCF proceeded to USS CLEVELAND to disembark the UDT in order that the report of beach conditions could be made directly to the Commanding Officer, USS CLEVELAND. The report was then relayed by means of covered circuit to CATF and the PCS. Except for providing radar vectors to the PCF, it was not necessary to use uncovered radio circuits during the entire UDT insertion/recovery. Had there been adequate navigational landmarks available to allow the PCF to position herself within 50 yards of desired position, even those radio transmissions would not have been necessary. The UDT report showed that the beach information available was accurate and that the beach was usable except at extreme low tide due to a sandbar approximately 10 meters offshore. The report was received in sufficient time to permit changing H-Hour or making supplementary plans, had such proved necessary.

4. (C) Aerial photography of the AOA was requested from CG III MAF as soon as an indication was received of possible interest in the area; delivery of the finished prints, of good quality with mosaics and plots, was made about 48 hours after making the request. In addition, during helicopter flights in the vicinity of the AOA, enroute to liaison visits to Chu Lai and Tam Ky, hand held 35mm cameras were used to photograph the AOA at oblique angles. These photographs were processed by the flagship's photo lab, enlarged to 8 x 10" size, and annotated to indicate landing zones, reference points and prominent landmarks. They were then distributed to the helicopter pilots and others who required them and proved to be very useful.

5. (U) Overall weather support and forecasts were provided by the meteorology unit on the flagship. Surf forecasts were requested from Fleet Weather Central, Guam, utilizing the format contained in CTF 76 OPORD 201-69, Annex W, and proved to be very accurate.

6. (U) No EEI's other than those contained in CTG 76.4 OPLAN 101A-69, Annex C, were utilized or imposed on subordinate units for collection with the exception of determining beach information by UDT as mentioned above.
7. (C) As a last step in the planning process a joint intelligence estimate was issued by CTG 76.4/CTG 79.4 and was distributed to all concerned on 26 June. The information contained therein, with the exception of order of battle, proved to be accurate and comprehensive.

8. (C) Late in the evening of 26 June, CG III MAF OOB Listing of Major Enemy Units ICTZ 88-69 (CG III MAF message 261206Z JUN 69) was received confirming the presence of the 70th MF Battalion in the area of the AOA based on several sources. However, CG III MAF OOB Listing of Major Enemy Units ICTZ 91-69 (CG III MAF message 021234Z JUL 69) received on 2 July invalidated the relocation change of the 70th MF Battalion in OOB List 88-69 and stated that the battalion was located in the area previously listed prior to 24 June, some 25 kilometers south southwest of the AOA. Interrogation of the 8 POW's captured during Operation BOLD PURSUIT did not indicate that anything other than local force VC units were in the AOA.
A. MEDICAL

1. (C) Medical support for Operation BOLD PURSUIT commenced on 27 June 1969 and ended on 6 July 1969. IWO JIMA was designated the primary casualty receiving ship and Surgical Team ALFA, 1st Platoon "D" Company, 5th Medical Battalion 9th MAB, Battalion Aid Station BLT 1/26, and the medical section of HMM-265 were embarked.

2. (C) Most of the combat casualties received were the result of detonated booby traps.

3. (C) There were eighty-eight units of blood on hand at the start of the operation. On 1 July 1969, fifty-five units were returned to NSA Hospital Danang for their use because of approaching expiration dates. On 4 July 1969, fifty-three units were received from NSA Hospital Danang. There were twenty-two units and seven patients crossmatched and ten units transfused to two patients. There were two units contaminated or broken. Seventy-four units were on hand at the end of the operation and twenty-one expired units were to be returned the following day.

4. (C) There was one transfusion reaction due to improper labeling of a unit of blood.

5. (C) Medical Officers on board consisted of:
   a. SURGICAL TEAM ALFA
      (1) CDR J. J. RYSKAMP, Jr., OinC
      (2) LCDR R. F. AMBUR
      (3) LCDR T. C. BROWN
      (4) LT B. C. M. SAI
      (5) ENS W. K. CARAWAY (Male Nurse Anesthetist)
   b. IWO JIMA MEDICAL OFFICER
      (6) LT R. GORDON
   c. CLEARING PLATOON
      (7) LT R. E. BATTMER, OinC
      (8) LT J. W. WALLACE
      (9) LT R. P. KING
   d. BATTALION SURGEON
      (10) LT D. C. HANCOCK
6. (C) Casualty statistics:

a. SUMMARY OF CASUALTY STATISTICS

(1) TOTAL CASUALTIES RECEIVED: 75

(a) Non-combat 34
(b) Wounded in Action (WIA) 37
(c) Killed in Action (KIA) 4
(d) Died of Wounds (DOW) (Danang Hospital) 1

DOW not included in total. Previously included in WIA.

(2) NON-COMBAT CLASSIFIED

(a) FUO 4
(b) Contusion 3
(c) Dysentery 3
(d) Miscellaneous 2
(e) Gastroenteritis 3
(f) Heat Exhaustion 2
(g) Fracture 2
(h) GSW (Self Inflicted) 1
(i) Burn 1
(j) Abscess 1
(k) Ringworm 1
(l) Dental 1
(m) Urticaria 1
(n) Sunburn 1
(o) Pharyngitis 1
(p) Otitis 1
(q) Muscle Strain 1
(r) Dermatitis 1
(s) Laceration 1
(t) Chemical Burn 1
(u) Syphilis 1
(v) Urethritis 1

(3) COMBAT CASUALTIES CLASSIFIED:

(a) MISSILE WOUNDS 29

1 Major 12
7 Minor 17

(b) NON-MISSILE INJURIES 8

1 Burns (White Phosphorous) 6
7 Contusion 1
3 Psychogenic Shock 1

Enclosure (6) CONFIDENTIAL
B. LOGISTICS

1. (C) REPLENISHMENT. During BOLD PURSUIT the following replenishments were conducted providing support to ARG ALFA and gunfire support ships:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SHIP</th>
<th>RECEIVED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29 Jun</td>
<td>KENNEBEC (AO 36)</td>
<td>FUEL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Jun</td>
<td>PARICUTIN (AE 18)</td>
<td>AMMO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jul</td>
<td>NIAGARA FALLS (AFS 3)</td>
<td>PROVISIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jul</td>
<td>GUADALUPE (AO 32)</td>
<td>FUEL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Jul</td>
<td>VIRGO (AE 30)</td>
<td>AMMO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Jul</td>
<td>NIAGARA FALLS (AFS 3)</td>
<td>PROVISIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Jul</td>
<td>VIRGO (AE 30)</td>
<td>AMMO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Jul</td>
<td>CALIENTE (AO 53)</td>
<td>FUEL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Jul</td>
<td>VIRGO (AE 30)</td>
<td>AMMO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. (C) MAINTENANCE. Sporadic leaking in USS IWO JIMA'S main condenser tubes was an ever present problem throughout the operation. Although fit to ably fulfill her assignment as flagship and helo haven, a marginal capability for continuous steaming (especially at higher speeds) existed during the entire period of the operation.

Enclosure (6)
1. (C) Communications throughout Operation BOLD PURSUIT were excellent. The initiating directive was received at 0750H 26 June 1969. CTG 76.4 OPORDER 306-69 was transmitted to all addressees at 1130H 26 June 1969. No difficulties were encountered by the Flagship in handling the increased volume of messages generated by Operation BOLD PURSUIT. The configuration of IWO JIMA (LPH 2) communication spaces provided rapid processing of both incoming and outgoing messages with a minimum of communication personnel. During the peak 24 hour period no backlogging of messages was experienced with a high of 210 outgoing and 350 incoming. Amphibious Ready Group ALFA consisting of USS IWO JIMA (LPH 2) (CATF Flagship), USS CLEVELAND (LPD 7), USS WHETSTONE (LSD 27), USS WASHBURN (LKA 108) and the gunfire support ships USS ROWAN (DD 782) and USS MEREDITH (DD 890) maintained a duplex Task Group Orestes circuit. All Task Group ships delivered their outgoing messages to the Flagship for entry into the NAVCOMOPNET which was maintained by IWO JIMA (LPH 2). This circuit provided a reliable link throughout the operation for the relay of record communication traffic for ships of the Task Group.

2. (C) In the HF and UHF range, the communications suite of the IWO JIMA class LPH was adequate, but totally utilized, to provide the communication circuits required for an amphibious operation. It was not adequate in the VHF range. Three additional VRC-46 transceivers were installed in the SLF operation spaces to provide adequate equipment in this range to meet the circuit requirements for Operation BOLD PURSUIT.

3. (C) The Flagship's NAVCOMOPNET was terminated with Naval Support Activity, Danang and the Fleet Flash Net was patched through NSA Danang, Cam Ranh Bay to NAVCOMMSTA Phil. This termination was extremely reliable during Operation BOLD PURSUIT.

4. (C) Frequency assignments were adequate as assigned by COMSEVENTHFLT OPORDER 201-68. Even though frequency interference is generally a problem in the Vietnam coastal area, all circuits were reliable during this operation.

5. (C) Broadcast coverage was excellent at all times. The flagship maintained coverage of both the rebroadcast from NSA Danang and the direct broadcast from NAVCOMMSTA Phil. All Task Group ships copied the rebroadcast from NSA Danang. Requests for retransmission of missing broadcast messages were kept to a minimum with ships assisting each other. NSA Danang provided missing numbers on request.

6. (C) Amphibious waterborne circuits: Beach operations, Boat control, and UDT CMD/BUU COORD circuits provided reliable communications, with some interference being experienced on the boat control frequency. The interference was primarily local overriding teletype signals, and other local circuits feeding into this circuit. As a result, this frequency has been replaced for future operations.
7. (C) The Task Group Maneuvering and Warning, and Task Group reporting circuits were covered circuits using the NESTOR crypto system. These circuits were excellent throughout the operation. Although these circuits were used primarily for their designated use, they were used, on a not to interfere basis, as a communications coordination circuit and for passing TACLOG requirements from the Flagship to the Primary Control Ship. This was done to hold uncovered voice communications to a minimum.

8. (C) Registered Publications: The supply of keying materials, operational codes and numeral codes were adequate at all times during Operation BOLD PURSUIT.

9. (C) III MAF Command #2: This circuit is vital to Amphibious Operations in the I Corps in that it is the only circuit providing a direct link between the in-country commanders, CTF 76 and CATT/CLF. Communications on this circuit were severely hampered during Operation BOLD PURSUIT in that neither CTF 76 nor CATT/CLF were able to communicate with CG III MAF except on an intermittent basis. Coordination via other communication channels and messages between CATT and III MAF Headquarters during this period did not improve communications significantly. A liaison visit with III MAF after completion of Operation BOLD PURSUIT revealed equipment difficulties were being experienced by III MAF during this period.

Enclosure (7)
1. (C) General

   a. A Command Information Bureau (CIB) was set up onboard the USS IWO JIMA (LPH 2) and a Mobile News Team from CTF 76 Staff provided services from 26 June 1969 through 6 July 1969.

   b. Proximity of Operation BOLD PURSUIT to the Danang area precluded initial embarkation of civilian newsmen, however, newsmen were invited after the initial landing. CG, III MAF CIB arranged for an eight (8) man civilian news team to visit the landward AOA on the morning of 30 June for three hours. Motion picture coverage was thus obtained of BLT 1/26 and HMM 265 in the landward AOA.

   c. Members of CTF 76 Mobile News Team obtained still photo coverage of the landing from the beach.

   d. CTG 76.4 CIB originated eight press releases (advance and seven follow ups) throughout Operation BOLD PURSUIT.

   e. Problems encountered/adverse incidents: None

2. (U) Visits by Dignitaries

   a. 27 June - MGEN L. B. RANSEY, USA, CG AMERICAL DIVISION

   b. 28 June - RADM W. W. BEHRENS, USN, COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT

   c. 29 June - BGEN N. V. TOAN, ARVN, CG 2nd ARVN DIVISION

   d. 2 July - RADM E. M. ROSENBERG, USN, COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT

Enclosure (8)

CONFIDENTIAL
1. (C) Naval Gunfire.

   a. Forces Involved. Operation BOLD PURSUIT commenced on 27 June 1969 with H-Hour at 0720H and L-Hour at 0730H. USS ROWAN (DD-782) conducted beach/landing zone preparation fires. On completion of initial fires ROWAN was available to shoot on-call targets until relieved by USS MEREDITH (DD-890) on 1 July. MEREDITH provided Naval Gunfire Support until termination of the operation on 6 July. U. S. Coast Guard WPB's maintained a coastal patrol and responded to several calls for fire with their 81 MM mortar and .50 caliber machine guns.

   b. Fire Support Coordination. No persistent problems hampered the coordination of fire support.

   c. Restrictions to fire.

      (1) Civil Airway Paths. Although free transit corridors have not been a major problem in the past, the COMSEVENTHFLT/COMNAVFOR Vietnam agreement that air space between 7,000 and 11,000 feet will be left as free transit space limited some NGFS missions in this operation, since the destroyers could not shoot at maximum effective range or use high angle of incidence, non-skipping fire. Other supporting arms had to be used to fulfill their high angle incidence missions.

      (2) Non-observance of Notams/SAV-A-PLANE. Almost daily throughout the operation, check fires had to be called in order not to endanger unidentified aircraft transiting the AOA.

      (3) "SPOOKY" and "SHADOW". When either of these two very useful aircraft were on station they permitted supporting arms to continue firing to within 1000 feet of their operating altitude. This was considered very reasonable contrary to the "total check fire throughout the AOA" that we had been told to anticipate.

   d. Artillery Advisory System and SAVE-A-PLANE.

      (1) The time from receipt of SAVE-A-PLANE request to permission to fire averaged approximately three minutes for the duration of the operation. Although three minutes is an acceptable average it is felt that this might be reduced to two minutes by streamlining the procedures. Part of the answer lies with uniformity in SAVE-A-PLANE message format. CTG 76.4 will investigate SAVE-A-PLANE procedures and submit comments and recommendations for streamlining these procedures to COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT.
e. Communications.

(1) No significant communication difficulties were encountered.

(2) The limited use of Pri-Tac, a covered circuit, as a secure Naval Gunfire net greatly enhanced communications between SACC and the Naval Gunfire Support Ship.

f. Statistical Data.

(1) Rounds Expended

**USS ROWAN (DD-478)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caliber</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Qty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5&quot;/38</td>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HC</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WP</td>
<td>80</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
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</table>

**USS MEREDITH (DD-390)**

<table>
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<th>Qty</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HC</td>
<td>1621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VT</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VT-NF</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WP</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3371</td>
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</table>

**USCG WPB's**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caliber</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Qty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>81 MM Mortar</td>
<td>HE</td>
<td>670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WF</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>719</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Damage assessments... (The below listed data reflect only the observed results of Naval Gunfire. They do not include the unobserved effects of heavy harassment, interdiction and area neutralization fires.)

**USS ROWAN (DD-478)**

Structures Destroyed: 276
Bunkers Damaged ........................................ 102
Bunkers Destroyed ...................................... 45
Trenchline Destroyed .................................... 175 yards
Tree Line Destroyed ..................................... 225 yards
Secondary Fires .......................................... 6
Secondary Explosions ................................... 14
Base Camps Destroyed ................................... 1
Staging Areas Neutralized ................................. 8

USS MERRIDITH (DD-890)
Structures Destroyed ..................................... 86
Bunkers Damaged .......................................... 53
Bunkers Destroyed ........................................ 95
Trenchline Destroyed .................................... 250 yards
Tree Line Destroyed ..................................... 200 yards
Secondary Fires .......................................... 5
Secondary Explosions ................................... 8
Staging Areas Neutralized ................................. 4
Observation Post Destroyed ............................... 1

USCG WPB's
Structures Destroyed ..................................... 40
Bunkers Damaged .......................................... 46
Bunkers Destroyed ........................................ ---
Trenchline Destroyed .................................... ---
Tree Line Destroyed ..................................... ---
Secondary Fires .......................................... 3
Secondary Explosions ................................... 4
Staging Areas Neutralized ................................. ---
Base Camps Destroyed .................................. ---
Sampans Sunk .............................................. 1
KIA (BC) ..................................................... 3
KIA (PROB) .................................................. 7

(3) Ammunition Expenditure.

A somewhat higher than expected ammunition expenditure was encountered as a result of several factors:

(a) No blocking force was present along the northern boundary of the AOA. As a substitute, a blocking force by gunfire was established in the nightly schedule of H and I fires by both artillery and Naval gunfire.

(b) As the operation progressed, it became necessary to move gunfire spot teams and other units into areas previously unoccupied by friendly troops. To minimize resistance and to somewhat reduce the threat of Surprise Firing Devices, heavy preparation fires were laid on these areas.
The very nature of targets encountered in observed fire dictated the use of heavy fires. The BLT 1/26 NGLO estimated that 85 percent of the bunkers attacked had a roof comprised of two crossed layers of logs, a layer of three inch tile and three feet of sand. The remaining 15 percent had slab concrete and somewhat deeper sand.

Problems encountered. None

2. (C) Close Air Support

a. During Operation BOLD PURSUIT, Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) radio nets were established and manned in accordance with Annex HOTEL to CTG 76.4 OPORD 306-69. Constant communications were maintained with FIRST MAW (TADC) HORN DASC, ALD BLT 1/26 and the ICTZ area MEDICAL REGULATING OFFICE. Additional circuits were manned as needed.

b. Scheduling and control of close air support aircraft were smoothly executed. A few isolated cases occurred whereby the pilots were not familiar with the required air control frequencies. Routine requests for close air support and observation aircraft were satisfactorily met. HORN DASC deserves special comment for their timely response to immediate requests for AC-119 aircraft.

c. Operation BOLD PURSUIT close air support operations are summarized below

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) Helicopter Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Sorties .................. 1720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Tasks ...................... 256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Passengers ............... 4389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Cargo (tons) ............. 99.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Flight Hours .......... 395.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) MEDEVACS ............... 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) Ammo Expended (MG) ...... 9295 rounds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(2) Fixed-wing CAS Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Total aircraft controlled... 783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Attack aircraft ............ 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Non-attack aircraft ....... 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Transient aircraft .......... 740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Ordnance expended (tons) ... 27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Bombs ....................... 119 (44,750 LBS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Rockets .................... 80 (5&quot;/2.75&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Napalm (Tanks) ............. 17 (8,500 LBS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Guns (Rounds) .............. 40,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Save-A-Planes issued ....... 267</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Enclosure (9)
CONFIDENTIAL

3. (C) USMC Artillery.

a. General.

An artillery fire support base was established in the northeastern corner of the land AOA on D-Day. ALFA Battery 1/13 (six 105 MM Howitzers) and Whiskey Battery 1/11 (six 4.2 inch Mortars) provided direct fire support in the AOA, Free Fire Zone south of EW grid 53 and in adjacent areas.

b. Liaison/Coordination of Fires.

Supporting Fires were very effectively coordinated as a result of good liaison at two levels. First, a small team was sent to the First Squadron, First Cavalry, AMERICAL Division command post at Hawk Hill where scheduled and on-call missions could be coordinated with the field commander through BLT 1/26 FSCC. Secondly, adjacent units established communications across their boundaries for mission requests, check fires and general exchange of unclassified information. These two levels of coordination resulted in an efficient mutual assistance program in which USMC and Army artillery exchanged requested supporting fires in each others areas.

c. Statistical Data.

(1) Rounds Expended

"A" Battery 1/13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Qty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HE</td>
<td>3766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILL</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4327 rounds</td>
</tr>
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</table>

"W" Battery 1/11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Qty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HE</td>
<td>1406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILL</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1569 rounds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Damage Assessment. No damage assessment of artillery fires was made.

Enclosure (9)
4. (C) **Transport Area Inshore Patrol.** CTG-115,1 assigned WPB's to maintain patrol to counter infiltration/exfiltration across the beach. Early in the operation the WPB's spotted 40 persons immediately south of the AOA and alerted friendly patrols operating in the same general vicinity. That same night a sampan was captured in the AOA and one detainee taken. On several occasions the WPB 81 MM mortars were used to supplement Naval Gunfire in providing observed destructive/area neutralization fires on areas close to the beach. During withdrawal of the battalion a group of about 50 civilians was observed moving north along the beach toward the boat lanes. Most of these civilians were women and young children but seven or eight were men of fighting age. Using its .50 caliber machine guns and 81 MM white phosphorous a WPB made a fence of fire to halt the civilians. The WPB closed the beach and the embarked RVN liaison officer directed the group to move south which they did. This effective use of the varied capabilities of the WPB not only complimented the purpose of ARG ALFA but also prevented killing some possibly innocent civilians.
LESSONS LEARNED

ORIGINATING COMMAND: COMPHIBREADGRU ALFA

SUBJECT: MAJOR: AMPHIBIOUS INTELLIGENCE
       MINOR: BEACH RECONNAISSANCE

1. DISCUSSION: See enclosure (5).

   LESSON LEARNED: It is recommended that other commands(ARG's) consider
   the possibility of utilizing PCF's as an UDT insertion/recovery vehicle
   when a clandestine check survey is required in areas where PCF's conduct
   day-to-day patrol and surveillance.
SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT

1. (C) WATERBORNE. The waterborne ship to shore movement consisted of movement of troops, equipment and supplies from USS CLEVELAND, USS WASHBURN, and USS WHETSTONE. USS WHETSTONE served as primary control ship (PCS) and performed PCS responsibilities while underway in the vicinity of the LOD, which was located 3,000 yards to seaward from BLUE Beach. All amphibious craft and boats used for scheduled and non-scheduled waves were taken from the assets embarked in ships of the Task Group and no augmentation from outside TG 76.4 was required. Four scheduled waves spaced at eight minute intervals provided the initial assault. The remainder of the ship to shore movement was conducted by non-scheduled wave movement consisting of pre-loaded and turn around boats.

Wave One, consisting of seven LVTP-5's with ALFA company embarked, was launched from CLEVELAND while underway in the vicinity of the LOD. Wave guide boats (1-LCVP, 1-LCPL) with wave guide officer and safety swimmers embarked guided Wave One to touchdown at H-Hour.

Wave Two (2-LCM8) with tank platoon, Wave Three (1-LCM8) with ONTOS and Wave Four (1-LCU, 2-LARC) with shore party and beachmasters all touched down as scheduled.

Throughout D-Day and days following, the ship to shore movement and resupply proceeded without significant incident. Minor mechanical casualties developed on amphibious boats of the Task Group and all were quickly repaired by USS CLEVELAND, USS WHETSTONE and USS WASHBURN. One LCM8 with ramp (air operated system) failure was delivered to small craft repair facility Danang for repair.

2. (C) AIRBORNE. The helicopter ship to shore movement was conducted from USS IWO JIMA and USS CLEVELAND to three landing zones. Eight helicopters were used to off-load each ship, each aircraft lifting ten troops per serial. DELTA Company was lifted from USS IWO JIMA to LZ COBRA commencing at L-Hour. Small arms and automatic weapons fire was encountered in the zone. Two helicopters were hit on the initial assault and were forced down. The aircraft were able to make it to the vicinity of BLUE Beach before landing and were subsequently repaired and flown out to the USS IWO JIMA. CHARLIE Company was lifted from USS IWO JIMA to LZ RATTLER which had been previously secured by waterborne troops. At L plus 3 hours 15 minutes BRAVO Company was lifted from USS CLEVELAND to LZ KRAIT. No resistance was encountered. Aircraft were fueled from both USS IWO JIMA and USS CLEVELAND.

Enclosure (11)
CINCPAC
COMUSMACV
CINCPACFLT
CMC
COMPHIBPAC
COMSEVENTHFLT
COMPHIBLANT
CG, FMFPAC
CG, FMFLANT
CG III MAF
COMNAVFORV
COMPHIBTRAPAC
COMPHIBGRU ONE
COMPHIBGRU TWO
COMPHIBGRU THREE
COMPHIBGRU FOUR
PRES. NAVWARCOL
CG, V MEF
CG 1ST MARDIV
CG 3RD MARDIV
CG 5TH MARDIV
CG 11TH MAW
COMSERVGRU THREE
CG, FMFSEVENTHFLT
CG, LANFORTRACOMPAC
CG, LANFORTRACOMLANT
CNO (OP 09B9) HISTORICAL DIVISION
CMCS QUANTICO, VA
CHAIRMAN AWB COMPHIBTRALANT
CO, NAVPHIBSCOL, CORONADO
CO, NAVPHIBSCOL, LITTLE CREEK
COMPHIBFORSVENTHFLT
COMPHIBRON ONE
COMPHIBRON THREE

COMPHIBRON FIVE
COMPHIBRON SEVEN
COMPHIBRON NINE
COMPHIBRON ELEVEN
COMLANSHIPFLOT ONE
COMTACGRU ONE
COMNAVSPECWARGRU PAC
COMNAVBEACHGRU ONE
CO, TACRON TWELVE
CO, BJU ONE
CO, ACU ONE
CO, BMU ONE
CO, UDT THIRTEEN
OINC BMU ONE WP DET
OINC ACU ONE WP DET
OINC WP DET NAVSPECWARGRU
OINC NAVBEACHGRU ONE WP DET
OINC NAVSECGRU WP DET
USA C&GSC, FT LEAVENWORTH, KANS.
OINC NAVTACDOC ACT
CTG 70.8
CTG 73.5
CTG 76.5
CTG 79.5
CTF 115
CO, BLT 1/26
CO, HMM 265
CO, USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
CO, USS WASHBURN (LKA-108)
CO, USS CLEVELAND (LPD-7)
CO, USS WHETSTONE (LSD-27)
CO, USS ROWAN (DD-782)
CO, USS MEREDITH (DD-890)

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**PERMANENT RETENTION**

- Remove from filing and destroy after 30 years.
- G-3

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Return to ABQ upon completion of routing.
From: Commander Amphibious Ready Group ALFA, U.S. Seventh Fleet
To: Commander Amphibious Force, U.S. Seventh Fleet
Subj: Operation MIGHTY PLAY Post Operation Report; forwarding of (U)

Ref: (a) COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT/CTF 76 INST 3500.1C
(b) Joint COMFIRSTFLT/COMSEVENTHFLT INST 3500.3/3500.8A

Encl: (1) Task organization
      (2) Initiating directive (omitted)
      (3) Chronology of events
      (4) Planning/Operations
      (5) Intelligence
      (6) Medical/Logistics
      (7) Communications
      (8) Public Affairs
      (9) Supporting arms
      (10) Lessons learned
      (11) Ship to shore movement
      (12) Demonstration
      (13) Psychological operations
      (14) Distribution.

1. (C) Background. Intelligence and incident reports received by Commanding General III Marine Amphibious Force, indicated that an increase in enemy activity warranted, on an urgent basis, the employment of tactical forces in the Cam Sa/Phong Ho area, Quang Nam Province, I Corps Tactical Zone, RVN. Prisoners of war had recently reported that this area contained major elements of Viet Cong R-20th Battalion. Additionally, the Viet Cong Q92D Special Action Sapper Company and fragmented elements of Q82D and V25th Battalions were also believed to be in the area. Enemy units including North Vietnamese forces in the area were known to disperse and mingle with the population, even to the extent of going under the guise of women. There were ten recent incidents reported involving sightings of small groups of enemy plus small arms exchanges with friendly forces in the area. Most recently, on 4 July 1969, bunker construction site was spotted together with sightings of small groups of green uniformed enemy. The presence of these enemy elements not only posed a direct threat of ground attacks to friendly forces deployed in the southern approaches to and on the outskirts of Danang East, but also intensified the threat of rocket attacks on Danang from this same general locale. This area is astride the U.S. FIRST Marine Division and Republic of Korea SECOND Marine Brigade area of operation but, due to heavy commitments in other portions of their area of operations they would be unable to divert, without unacceptable delay, adequate resources for the required concentrated search and destroy operation.
On 5 July, with due recognition of the quick reaction capabilities and versatility of the Amphibious Ready Group, Commanding General, FIRST Marine Division requested from Commanding General THIRD Marine Amphibious Force that ARG/SLF ALFA be employed. CG III MAF on 6 July proposed to Commander SEVENTH Fleet that ARG/SLF ALFA be employed in an amphibious search and destroy operation. Commander Amphibious Force, SEVENTH Fleet, on 6 July concurred in CG III MAF's proposal. Early 7 July 1969 COSEVENTHFLT concurred in the general concept of the proposed employment of ARG/SLF ALFA in support of and as requested by CG III MAF. On 8 July 1969 CTG 76.4 and CTG 79.4 were designated as CATF and CLF respectively for this operation, and the nickname MIGHTY PLAY was assigned. The objective of this amphibious operation was to prosecute a search and destroy operation in cooperation/coordination with the U. S. FIRST Marine Division and Republic of Korea SECOND Marine Brigade conducting operations adjacent to the AOA.

2. (C) Concept of Operations and Execution

a. Concept. Operation MIGHTY PLAY involved the employment of Amphibious Ready Group/Special Landing Force ALFA (TG 76.4/TG 79.4) in an amphibious assault and units from the FIRST Marine Division to effect search and destroy operations against North Vietnamese, Viet Cong local/main force and Viet Cong infrastructure within the AOA.

b. Mission. Commander Amphibious Ready Group ALFA, CATF, conducted an amphibious operation against Viet Cong/North Vietnamese forces in AOA in the Cam Sa/Phong Ho area of Quang Nam Province, I Corps Tactical Zone, Republic of Vietnam. This operation included search for and destruction of Viet Cong local and main force units, Viet Cong infrastructure and North Vietnamese forces in the AOA and such other operations as agreed upon with Commanding General III Marine Amphibious Force or his designated representative. MIGHTY PLAY to be conducted in cooperation/coordination with the FIRST Marine Division, Republic of Korea SECOND Marine Corps Brigade and Republic of Vietnam Military Forces in the near vicinity of the AOA.

c. Pre-assault operations. The nature of the terrain from 1000 to 3000 meters to landward of the shore line consisted principally of marsh lands with only sparse dry land areas which would permit the use of tracked or wheeled vehicles. In addition, intelligence reports indicated that the enemy had been successfully employing large numbers of mines and booby traps in the area. In view of the factors described above and the availability of reasonably secure overland routes from the DaNang military complex and support facilities to the Northern and Western limits of the AOA the assault landing would be limited to a helicopter ship to shore movement only.

On 0 minus two (8 July) all BLT 1/26 LVTP-5 amphibious vehicles were offloaded from USS CLEVELAND (LPD-7) and staged at the USMC Third AMTRAC Battalion Command Post located ashore about 4000 meters north of the northern limit of the AOA. The LVT Company was instructed to remain on alert in reserve for possible deployment to the AOA in the event that tactical situation required the use of such vehicles for movement of troops or supplies.
On D minus one (9 July) all large non helo transportable vehicles, artillery, shore party and other support units from BLT 1/26, with a two day ammunition and food supply, were offloaded from ARG ALFA ships in Danang harbor. ARG ALFA organic amphibious assault craft were used to transport all equipment and supplies to the Bridge Ramp area in Danang. From the Bridge Ramp area, all equipment and supplies were transported overland to the logistics support area and fire support base where the battalion artillery battery was located. This area was within the THIRD Battalion FIRST Marines established Command Post (BT 074654) perimeter adjacent to the northern boundary of the AOA.

d. Movement to Amphibious Objective Area

Upon completion of the D minus one offloading of BLT 1/26 support forces and supplies, all ships of the Amphibious Ready Group departed Danang prior to sunset 9 July 1969. The ARG proceeded to normal holding stations in the BARBARA OpAreas about 12 miles southeast of Danang and east of the landward AOA. This pattern of ARG ALFA movement having previously been established as routine, was adhered to in a planned effort to avoid alerting the enemy as to time or place of operations. All ships maintained darken ship conditions and normal radio communications. At L minus 9 hours, the USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) proceeded to a point approximately four miles offshore and directly to seaward of the demarkation line between Quang Tin and Quang Nam Provinces, on the northern end of the Barrier Island area. At 100430H (L minus 4 hours 30 minutes) IWO JIMA illuminated the flight deck with lights normally associated with combat operations flight quarters. Simultaneously pre-recorded voice radio transmissions were emitted on Ready Group ALFA amphibious assault radio circuits. The recordings were taped during ARG ALFA's amphibious assault (Operation BOLD PURSUIT) on Barrier Island (27 June - 6 July 1969). Deceptive operations were continued until L minus 3 hours. At L minus 1 hour 30 minutes all ARG ALFA ships arrived in the Operation MIGHTY PLAY AOA and took assigned underway stations.

e. Support Operations

(1) Naval Gunfire Support

One 5"/38 DD was supplied by CTG 70.8 from D-Day to D plus 7 days. USS MEREDITH (DD 890) provided NGFS commencing with prep-fires on landing zones. MEREDITH continued in support providing on-call and H and I fires until D plus three days. On 13 July 1969 USS REPERTUS (DD 851) relieved MEREDITH and provided NGF support until D plus 7 days. REPERTUS was released three days prior to the termination of the operation. Use of naval gunfire during this operation was limited by the close proximity of the AOA and aircraft approach lanes to the Danang air field. One of several flight approach paths to Danang air field passed directly over the AOA. Considerable difficulty was had in maintaining a clear gun target line due to the very heavy air traffic load in and out of Danang air field. Difficulty in maintaining communications with Danang air control agencies was also experienced during the operation.
(2) Close Air Support

Observation aircraft, helo gunships, and attack aircraft were supplied by FIRST Marine Air Wing. Landing zone preparation prior to L Hour was accomplished by one OV-10 observation/spotter aircraft controlling two A-4 and four A-6 type aircraft. Helo gunships provided escort and fire support during the D-Day helicopter ship to shore movement. USAF AC-47 "SPOOKY" type fixed-wing gunships provided on-call support during two night periods when concentrations of enemy personnel were sighted.

(3) Artillery Support

Following the initial assault, troops ashore were supported by pre-positioned BLT 1/26 batteries of six 105 MM howitzers and six 4.2 inch mortars. These batteries were placed in the secure areas of the FIRST MARDIV area of operation north of the AOA on D minus one. The extreme proximity of the 105 MM howitzers to the Danang Air Base and Marble Mountain Airfield precluded almost all fire support from this battery during the daylight hours of high volume air traffic. The 4.2 inch mortar battery located adjacent to the northern boundary of the AOA did not encounter the restrictions imposed on the 105 MM battery. Artillery fire support continued throughout the operation.


(1) Assault Phase

Initial assault consisted of movement of ALFA Company from CLEVELAND and DELTA Company from IWO JIMA by HMM 265 helicopters to two separate landing zones in the AOA. Initial helo waves touched down on time. L Hour was adjusted from 100900H to 100920H due to a delay in air prep of LZ GRANT, (See Enclosure 9). ALFA and DELTA Companies, the initial helo assault wave landed in LZ's GRANT and LEE respectively. BRAVO Company was landed in the vicinity of THIRD Battalion FIRST Marines Command Post and CHARLIE Company landed in LZ SHERMAN. Preparation fire from close air support aircraft and naval, gunfire support, ships was maintained until one minute prior to touchdown at each of the three separate landing zones. The extensive CAS and NGFS neutralization of landing zones was effectively accomplished since no hostile fire was received by helicopters during the assault phase of this operation. At L plus 4 hours 32 minutes scheduled ship to shore movement was completed.

During pre-assault days a tropical storm named TESS began developing in the South China Sea, and on the afternoon of D-Day, TESS was upgraded to a typhoon. The plot of Typhoon TESS's track and effective wind radius indicated that the seaward AOA would soon become marginally safe for navigation of the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG). After ensuring that BLT 1/26 was securely established ashore, OPCON was passed to CG FIRST MARDIV.
at 101600H July and the ARG ships sortied to evade the 30 knot wind radius of the typhoon. On return to the AOA at 111700H July, OPCON of BLT 1/26 was resumed.

During movement overland by troops to initial objectives, only light contact was made with enemy forces in the area. Nine enemy bodies were found in the vicinity of landing zones, killed by pre-assault preparation fires.

Following D-Day, contact with the enemy increased. The AOA was found to contain large numbers of various types of surprise firing devices (booby traps). The peak period of enemy contact occurred from D plus three to D plus seven in the western and central portion of the AOA.

While searching bunkers in the AOA two important document discoveries were made. One of these discoveries was evaluated by intelligence experts and CG III MAF to be of very high level intelligence value and added significantly to the value of Operation MIGHTY PLAY.

(2) Logistic Support Phase

Following D-Day and throughout the operation, ARG ships provided resupply to troops ashore by helicopter lift direct to field positions and through the port of Danang. From Danang, supplies were moved overland by BLT 1/26 motor transport platoon to the previously established logistic support area.

Resupply direct from the Force Logistic Support Command in Danang was also used to avoid draw-down of supplies in ARG ships and thus enhance ARG readiness in the event withdrawal was ordered for emergency deployment to another area.

(3) Termination

On 20 July, by mutual agreement between CATF, CLF, CG III MAF, CG FIRST MARDIV and CG FIRST MAW operational control of the following units was passed ashore at 200800H:

BLT 1/26 to CG FIRST MARDIV

Selected elements HMM 265 to CG FIRST MAW

Operation MIGHTY PLAY was terminated 200800H July 1969. The AOA was dissolved and the Amphibious Task Group departed the area enroute Subic Bay for scheduled upkeep.

3. (C) Statistical Summary. Following are some of the significant statistical results of combat action in the AOA during Operation MIGHTY PLAY:

   a. Friendly Casualties (all USMC except as noted)

      (1) Non-Combat 27
b. Enemy Casualties/Losses and Equipment Captured

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<td>2. POW</td>
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<td>3. Individual Weapons</td>
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<td>5. Chieu Hoi</td>
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4. (C) Conclusions.

Operation MIGHTY PLAY was planned and conducted in accordance with current operation plans, orders and amphibious doctrine. Logistic support and augmenting forces supplied by other SEVENTH Fleet and in-country units was adequate to meet the requirements for this operation. The mission and
objectives specified by COMSEVENTHFLT and CG III MAF were successfully accomplished.

5. (U) Recommendations. NONE.

J. B. RANDOLPH
**CONFIDENTIAL**

**TASK ORGANIZATION**

**TG 76.4**  
Amphibious Ready Group ALFA  
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)  
USS CLEVELAND (LPD-7)  
USS WASHBURN (LKA-108)  
USS WHETSTONE (LSD-27)  
TACRON TWELVE, DET ALFA  
BJU ONE, TEAM TWELVE DET FOXTROT  
ACU ONE, DET ALFA  
BMU ONE, DET ALFA TWO  
UDT THIRTEEN, DET ECHO

**TU 76.4.0**  
Command and Special Operations Unit  
CAPT J. B. RANDOLPH, USN  
COMPHIBRON THREE

**TE 76.4.0.1**  
Flagship Element  
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)  
CAPT J. B. RANDOLPH, USN  
COMPO WO JIMA (LPH-2)

**TE 76.4.0.2**  
Tactical Air Control Element  
TACRON 12, DET ALFA  
LTC D. A. MCCOOLE, USA  
OIC TACRON 12, DET ALFA

**TE 76.4.0.3**  
Beach Reconnaissance Element  
UDT TEAM 13, DET ECHO  
LTJG J. A. LYTLE, USNR  
OIC, UDT 13, DET ECHO

**TE 76.4.0.4**  
Special Operations Element  
BJU ONE, TEAM 12, DET FOXTROT  
LTJG A. C. REYNOLDS, USNR  
OIC, BJU 1, TEAM 12, DET FOXTROT

**TE 76.4.0.5**  
Transport Area Defense Element  
USS WHETSTONE (LSD-27)  
CDR F. K. RABUN, USN  
CC, USS WHETSTONE (LSD-27)

**TE 76.4.0.6**  
Naval Beach Party Element  
BMU ONE, DET ALFA TWO  
ENS G. I. ARMSTRONG, USNR  
OIC, BMU 1, DET ALFA 2

**TU 76.4.1**  
Gunfire Support and Screen Unit  
USS MEREDITH (DD-890) 10-13 JUL 69  
USS RUPERTUS (DD-851) 13-17 JUL 69  
CDR J. E. WITHROW, USN  
CO, USS MEREDITH (DD-890) 10-13 JUL 69  
CDR L. W. FREEMAN JR., USN  
CO, USS RUPERTUS (DD-851) 13-17 JUL 69

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**DECLASSIFIED**

CAPT J. B. RANDOLPH, USN
COMPHIBRON THREE

CAPT R. R. RENALDI, USN
CO, USS WASHBURN (LKA-108)

CDR F. K. RABUN, USN
CO, USS WHETSTONE (LSD-27)

CAPT M. M. CASEY, Jr., USN
CO, USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)

COL W. C. DOTY, USMC
CO, SLF ALFA

LTCOL G. C. KLIEFOETH, USMC

LTCOL R. L. GRAY, Jr., USMC

CONFIDENTIAL
Enclosure (1)
MIGHTY PLAY INITIATING DIRECTIVE (COMSEVENTHFLT 072228Z JUL 69)

Ref: (a) COMSEVENTHFLT OPLAN 101-69
(b) NWP 22(B)

1. SITUATION. CG III MAF has requested the employment of an ARG/SLF in support of operations in the ICTZ. COMSEVENTHFLT will provide TG 76.4/79.4 and such other forces as may be necessary for this operation. Initiating directive is for planning purposes. The operation, when executed, will be conducted in accordance with references (a) and (b).

2. MISSION. Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) conduct an Amphibious Operation against VC/NVA forces in Amphibious Objective Area in Quang Nam Province of ICTZ or other operations as agreed upon with CG III MAF or his designated representative.

3. CTG 76.4, (COMPHIBRON 3) embarked in USS IWO JIMA (LPH 2) designated CATF.

4. CTG 79.4, (COMMANDER SLF ALFA) embarked in USS IWO JIMA (LPH 2) designated Commander Landing Force (CLF).

5. Command relationship in accordance with paragraph 3X.(2) and (3) of reference (a).

6. COMUSMACV will provide anti-infiltration/exfiltration patrol craft for this operation and will provide CAS and other support as agreed upon with CATF in accordance with paragraph 1B(1) of reference (a).

7. The Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) will be promulgated by separate message.

8. The nickname for this operation will be MIGHTY PLAY with tentative D-Day 10 July. D-Day and H and L hours to be determined and confirmed by CATF. When all forces are prepared, CATF report to originator state of readiness and final confirmation concerning D-Day, H and L hours unless otherwise directed. Report execution to ALCON.

9. Special Instructions
   a. Withdrawal in accordance with Annex B to reference (a).

10. Termination in accordance with Annex B to reference (a).

11. Public affairs in accordance with Annex V to reference (a).

12. Downgraded to Confidential upon termination.
By COMSEVENTHFLT 080058Z JUL 69 the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) for Operation MIGHTY PLAY is as follows: The landward AOA is that land area encompassed by a line from the South China Sea at 1-5650/8 Southwest to 100630/0 thence Southwest to trail at 090620/8 thence southwest along trail to road at 080610/5 thence Southwest along trail to 074608/5, thence Northwest to the east bank on the S. Song Binh Dien (River) at 055636/5 thence east to trail at 058636/8 thence northeast along trail to 073646/6 thence Northeast to 080652/1 thence North Northeast to 090664/5 and North Northeast to the South China Sea at 099675/6. The seaward AOA will be that sea area encompassed by a 10 NM arc drawn from 108660/1 truncated on the Northwest by a line drawn 02TV degrees true from 09690/6 and truncated on the Southeast by a line drawn 045 degrees true from 190590/4 and excluding the surface area on the offshore islands within the 10 NM arc. The sea and land AOA will include that air space from 0 to 25,000 feet MSL free air transit will be granted 7,000 feet MSL and above.

By COMSEVENTHFLT 081324Z JUL 69 the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) for Operation MIGHTY PLAY was modified as follows: All coordinates BT: from the South China Sea 113654/0 Southwest to 110650/3 to trail at 108646/5 to 103640/9 to 102632/4 to 089618/2 to 086616/7 West to 073616/3 to 066620/9 to 063620/7 to East bank Song Binh Dien (River) at 057613/7 thence North along East bank of Song Binh Dien to 056636/6 Northeast to 058636/8 Northeast along trail to 073646/6 to 083656/8 to the South China Sea 099675/6.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

5 JULY 1969

a. 1642H - Received first indication operations were contemplated in near future.

6 JULY 1969

a. 0700H-1532H - Withdrew BLT 1/26 from Operation BOLD PURSUIT.
b. 1600H - Commenced BLT 1/26 REHAB.

7 JULY 1969

a. 0356H - Received CG III MAF proposal to COMSEVENTHFLT for SPECOPS.
b. 0503H - Received COMSEVENTHFLT concurrence for employment ARG ALFA.
c. 1722H - Requested assignment NGFS 5"38 DD from CTU 70.8.9.
d. 2042H - Request for NOTAM issue submitted to COMUSMACV.

8 JULY 1969

a. 0115H - CTG 79.4 submitted request for interpreters, interrogation teams and scout dog teams to III MAF as augmentation to BLT 1/26.
b. 0850H - Received initiating directive from COMSEVENTHFLT.
c. 1123H - Confirmation NGFS DD assignment received from CTU 70.8.9.
d. IWO JIMA/WASHBURN/WHETSTONE conducted UNREP from USS ASHTABULA.
e. 1600H - CLEVELAND disembarked and landed nine LVTP-5's at THIRD AMTRAC Camp south of Marble Mountain.
f. 1920H - Request for combat air support submitted to CG III MAF/CG FIRST MAF.
g. 0930H - CTG 76.4/CTG 79.4 and Staff members conferred with CG III MAF staff concerning operation.
h. 2145H - CTG 76.4 OPORD 307-69 for conduct Operation MIGHTY PLAY completed and transmitted to AIC 16.

9 JULY 1969

a. 0700H - All TG 76.4 ships anchored Danang.
b. 0800H - CTG 76.4 OPORD 307-69 effective for operations.
c. 0800H - Commence offload tank and anti-tank PLT, Wheeled vehicles, Artillery PLT (105MM), Mortar PLT, two day ammunition and food rations supplies.

Enclosure (3)
CONFIDENTIAL
d. 0900H - CTG 76.4/CTG 79.4 and staff conferred with CG III MAF staff.

e. 1000H - CTG 76.4/CTG 79.4/TACRON, air and intelligence officers attended combat air support brief and coordination conference with FIRST MAW staff.

f. 1500H - CTG 76.4 conducted pre-operation brief for participants Operation MIGHTY PLAY onboard IWO JIMA.

g. 1600H - Selective offload completed.

h. 1700H - Confirmation of combat air support received (two fixed wing Helo Gunships) from CG III MAF.

i. 1800H - Fire support and logistic support bases established.

j. 2000H - CATF (CTG 76.4) confirmed D-Day and state of readiness.

10 JULY 1969

a. 0001H - IWO JIMA departed BARBARA holding area and proceeded to conduct communications deception operations off northern Barrier Island.

b. 0001H - AOA for Operation MIGHTY PLAY effective.

c. 0430H - Communication deception operation by IWO JIMA. All TG ships maintaining radio silence except IWO JIMA.

d. 0600H - Completed deception operation.

e. 0600H - IWO JIMA arrived in AOA.

f. 0630H - CLEVELAND/WHETSTONE departed BARBARA holding area to assigned stations in AOA. WASHBURN departed BARBARA holding area to enter Danang to offload additional supplies for BLT 1/26.

g. 0730H - All TG ships in assigned AOA areas and remained underway.

h. 0730H - Air observer on station.

i. 0735H-0745H - Scheduled naval gunfire prep of objective BRAVO cancelled.

j. 0748H-0804H - Two A-4 aircraft conducted air prep of LZ SHERMAN.

k. 0800H - IWO JIMA/CLEVELAND took station in vicinity Helicopter Transport Area for flight operations. Helo safety boat on station.

l. 0800H - CATF signaled "Land the heliborne landing force".

m. 0820H - First division helicopter for first assault wave launched. (four CH-46 to CLEVELAND for ALFA Company, plus one SAR A/C)/

n. 0825H-1010H - COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT/CTF 76 RADM E.M. ROSENBERG on board IWO JIMA, to observe operation.

o. 0830H-0840H - Two A-6 aircraft conducted air prep LZ GRANT.
IWO JIMA launched second division first assault wave. (Four CH-46 with DELTA Company, plus one CH-46 command and control aircraft).

q. 0845H - Two UH-1E (Helicopter gunships) reported on station to escort first assault wave.

r. 0855H-0910H - Two A-6 aircraft conducted air prep LZ LEE.

s. 0900H - WASHBURN offloaded additional ammunition and field rations in Danang to Bridge Ramp for transport to LSA.

t. 0910H-0919H - Naval gunfire prep of LZ GRANT and LZ LEE.

u. 0920H - L Hour. First helo assault waves touched down at LZ GRANT. (ALFA Company) and LZ LEE (DELTA Company).

v. 0920H - CG FIRST Marines passed OPCON MIKE Company BLT 3/1 to CLF/CTG 79.4.

w. 0920H-1200H - Two close air support aircraft on station.

x. 0930H-1352H - Continued shuttle movement of troops from CLEVELAND and IWO JIMA to LZs in AOA.

y. 1104H-1114H - Naval gunfire prep objective BRAVO.

z. 1200H - WHETSTONE departed AOA for Tropical Storm TESS evasion.

aa. 1300H - CLF/CTG 79.4 passed OPCON MIKE Company B'T 3/1 to CO BLT 1/26.

bb. 1352H - Completed scheduled ship to shore movement.

c. 1400H - CLEVELAND/MEREDITH conducted UNREP from USS TAPPAHANNOCK (AO-43) then departed for Tropical Storm TESS evasion.

d. 1410H - Received message upgrading Tropical Storm TESS to a Typhoon.

e. 1600H - WASHBURN completed offload in Danang and departed for Typhoon TESS evasion.

ff. 1600H - Because of approaching Typhoon TESS and by mutual consent CTG 76.4/CTG 79.4 and CG III MAF, OPCON BLT 1/26 passed to CG FIRST MARDIV. IWO JIMA departed AOA for Typhoon TESS evasion.

11 JULY 1969

a. 0001H - TG 76.4 continued Typhoon TESS evasion.

b. 0300H - TG 76.4 reversed southerly movement for typhoon evasion and commenced northerly track to return to AOA remaining outside the outer limits of the typhoon.

c. 0800H - IWO JIMA/CLEVELAND/WHETSTONE/MEREDITH conducted UNREP from GRAFFIAS (AF-29).
d. 1545H - TG 76.4 returned to AOA and resumed support of BLT 1/26 combat action ashore.

e. 1550H - CTG 79.4 conducted liaison ashore with FIRST MARDIV and BLT 1/26 for resumption OPCON BLT 1/26.

f. 1700H - CATF/CTG 79.4 resumed OPCON of BLT 1/26.

12 JULY 1969

a. 0001H - ARG ALFA continued support BLT 1/26 ashore.

b. 0900H - CTG 79.4 visited III MAF Headquarters for planning and liaison.

13 JULY 1969

a. 0001H - ARG ALFA continued support of BLT 1/26 ashore.

b. 0930H - CTG 79.4 visited III MAF Headquarters for planning and liaison.

c. 1030H - USS RUPERTUS relieved USS MEREDITH as NGFS ship.

d. 1700H - IWO JIMA/WASHBURN/WHETSTONE and RUPERTUS conducted UNREP from USS GUADALUPE (AO-32).

14 JULY 1969

a. 0001H - ARG ALFA continued support of BLT 1/26 ashore.

b. 0900H-1050H - RADM E.M. ROSENBERG, USN, COMPHIBFORSOUTH/SEVENTHFLT/CTF 76 visited on board IWO JIMA for briefing/review of Operation MIGHTY PLAY and demonstration of LPH capabilities.


15 JULY 1969

a. 0001H - ARG ALFA continued support of BLT 1/26 ashore.

b. 0800H - WASHBURN and WHETSTONE conducted INREP of dairy products and replenished consumed BLT 1/26 and L-Form supplies from FLC Danang.

16 JULY 1969

a. 0001H - ARG ALFA continued support of BLT 1/26 ashore.

b. 0800H - WASHBURN/CLEVELAND and WHETSTONE replenished consumed BLT 1/26 and L-Form supplies from FLC in Danang.

c. 0900H - RUPERTUS conducted UNREP from USS HALEAKALA (AE-25).
d. 1654H - One CH-46A helo from HMM 265 on a test flight lost power, ditched and sank vicinity BT 113769. All hands aboard (crew of three) were rescued by RUPERTUS life boat. Only minor injuries were sustained by helo crew members.

17 JULY 1969

a. 0001H - ARG ALFA continued support BLT 1/26 ashore.
b. 1130H - RUPERTUS released from assignment as NGFS ship and was detached.
c. 1700H - CLEVELAND conducted UNREP from USS KENNEBEC (AO-36).

18 JULY 1969

a. 0001H - ARG ALFA continued support BLT 1/26 ashore.
b. 0800H - WASHBURN conducted INREP from USS NIAGARA FALLS (AFS-3) in Danang.
c. 0830H - IWO JIMA offloaded BLT/HMM vehicles into WHETSTONE assault craft for lift by WHETSTONE to Danang.
d. 1710H - WASHBURN observed a section of two F-4 aircraft not previously cleared into the AOA drop a bomb within MIGHTY PLAY AOA and within 3000 yards of WASHBURN. Incident was reported to CG, III MAF.

19 JULY 1969

a. 0001H - ARG ALFA continued support BLT 1/26 ashore.
b. 0630H - IWO JIMA/CLEVELAND/WHETSTONE conducted VERTREP from USS NIAGARA FALLS (AFS-3) in AOA.
c. 0900H - WASHBURN/CLEVELAND/WHETSTONE unloaded BLT/HMM vehicles, equipment, supplies, and personnel, by assault craft, to Bridge Ramp Danang in preparation for BLT 1/26 and HMM 265 DET ALFA chop ashore.
d. Recommended termination of Operation MIGHTY PLAY to COMSEVENTHFLT.
d. Cancelled NOTAM.

20 JULY 1969

a. 0001H - ARG ALFA continued support BLT 1/26 ashore.
b. 0400H - Detached WASHBURN and WHETSTONE to proceed to Subic Bay.
c. 0700H - HMM 265 DET ALFA consisting of eight helo's and supporting personnel and equipment departed IWO JIMA.
d. 0800H - Chopped selected elements BLT 1/26 ashore to CG FIRST MARDIV.
e. 0800H - Chopped selected elements HMM 265 ashore to CG FIRST MAW.
f. 0800H - Terminated Operation MIGHTY PLAY and dissolved AOA.
g. 0800H - ARG ALFA departed AOA enroute Subic Bay for upkeep.
1. (C) On 6 July 1969 CG, III MAF proposed a search and destroy operation astride the FIRST MARINE/ROKMC AO boundary in Quang Nam Province east of the Song Vinh Dien (River) approximately 8 miles south of Danang.

2. (C) The initial planning conference was conducted with representatives of CG, III MAF on 6 July 1969 to establish specific boundaries for the AOA, ensure that boundaries of previously assigned AO's were considered; and delineate those commands with whom coordination and liaison must be effected. Following this conference, agreements were made with CTG 115.1 to provide surface surveillance of the AOA and gunfire support when such assets were available.

3. (C) A series of planning/liaison conferences were held 7 July 1969 with representatives of CG, FIRST MARDIV, CO, FIRST MARINES and CO, THIRD Battalion FIRST MARINES. These conferences resulted in:

a. Coordination of the scheme of maneuver ashore for F'T 1/26 of SLF ALFA.

b. Location of friendly USMC/ROKMC units and enemy forces.

c. Use of the THIRD Battalion FIRST MARINES area for a fire support base.

d. Restrictions as to safe fire areas.

e. Coordination for control of artillery, naval gunfire, and close air support.

4. (C) A final planning conference was held at III MAF Headquarters on 8 July 1969 with representatives of CG, III MAF, CG, FIRST MARDIV, CG, FIRST MAW, CO, FIRST MARINES and CG, SECOND ROKMC Brigade. Discussions were held, agreements were made as to the coordination/liaison required and to the commitment of force. Mutual agreements were made on the following:

a. The landward AOA: Wherein CG, III MAF would relocate the AO boundary between the FIRST MARINES and SECOND ROKMC Brigade.

b. Location of friendly forces operating in the vicinity of the AOA.

c. Air support requirements.

 d. Restrictions on gunfire support (no firing within 500 meters of friendly positions adjacent to the AOA boundary). Commander Amphibious Task Force would control supporting arms within the AOA.

 e. The mutual exchange of liaison officers.

 f. The prepositioning of equipment/elements of BLT 1/26 on D minus One.

 g. There would be no waterborne landing, hence no beach support area was to be established.

 h. Resupply support for BLT 1/26 would be via HMM-265 helicopters aboard USS NIO JIMA and overland from Danang area from ARG ALFA ships and the in-country Force Logistics Command.

Enclosure (4)

DECLASSIFIED
1. The establishment of D-Day.

5. (C) Planning for the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA)
   a. In establishing an AOA the following general requirements were considered:
      (1) Relocation of the boundary of the AO between the FIRST MARINES and the SECOND ROKMC Brigade.
      (2) Structuring the landward AOA to prevent inclusion of previously established friendly forces command posts.
      (3) Not to restrict normal air traffic in and out of Danang.
      (4) Not to restrict normal coastal shipping in and out of Danang.
      (5) Selecting a fire support area to permit the NCFS ships to have clear gun-target lines.
      (6) Permit free air transit over 7000 feet above the AOA.

6. (C) CTU 70.8.9 provided naval gunfire support by assigning USS MEREDITH (DD 890) and USS HOPPERUS (DD 851).

7. (C) CTC 115.1 provided routine surveillance of the seaward AOA.

8. (C) Coordination of air control was effected by direct liaison of ARG/SLF ALFA Staff representatives with the following agencies:
   a. CG, III MAF
   b. CG, FIRST MAW
   c. CG, FIRST MARDIV FSC
   d. DANANG DASC
   e. DANANG Approach Control, Danang Airbase

9. (C) Coordination and cooperation was achieved by direct and personal liaison of ARG/SLF ALFA Staff representatives with cooperating forces down to the company level of the THIRD Battalion FIRST MARINES. Prompt and effective liaison resulted in early resolution of necessary coordination decisions.
1. (C) The first indication that an amphibious operation was impending came in the form of a message from CG, FIRST MARDIV to CG, III MAF requesting that ARG/SLF ALFA conduct an amphibious/heliborne operation in the Cam Sa/Phong Ho area astride the FIRST Marine Regiment/HOKMC boundary in Quang Nam Province, RVN during the period 10-20 July 1969. At the time of receipt of this message, ARG/SLF ALFA was involved in conducting support operations for Operation BOLD PURSUIT. Intelligence research on the proposed AOA was started immediately by researching all information on hand followed up by requests to III MAF G-2 Section for aerial photography and any other information available. As in Operation BOLD PURSUIT, advantage was taken of helicopter flights enroute to liaison visits by diverting over the proposed AOA where 35MM hand held cameras were used to photograph the area extensively from various oblique angles.

2. (C) Initial research revealed that:
   a. None of the beach within the proposed AOA had been surveyed by UDT within the past year.
   b. That current enemy OOB listed approximately 520 enemy troops within the AOA including major elements of the R-20 Battalion, the Q-82 Company, elements of the 92nd Special Action Sapper Company, and approximately 200 local guerillas.
   c. The terrain was characterized by two high areas, both approximately ten meters in height, on the eastern and western sides of the AOA separated by a low marshy area of rice paddies and swamps over which vehicular movement was extremely difficult, if not impossible.
   d. The AOA was statistically the heaviest booby trapped area in the Republic of Vietnam.

3. (C) Initially, since there was no survey available of the beaches of the AOA, a clandestine survey by UDT of the beach segment selected for an amphibious assault was planned using a TG 115.1 Swift Boat (PCF) for insertion/recovery vehicle as had been successfully accomplished in Operation BOLD PURSUIT. However, later in the planning phase, due to the character of the terrain, the prevalence of booby traps and SFD’s in the AOA, plus the fact that MIKE Company, 3rd Battalion, FIRST Marines would be made available to form a blocking force in the northeast corner of the AOA, a surface borne amphibious assault was ruled out in favor of an all heliborne assault. Therefore, no further efforts were made to determine beach characteristics or to conduct any aspect of a surface amphibious assault.

4. (C) The aerial photographs obtained from III MAF G-2 Section plus the photographs of the AOA taken by ARG/SLF ALFA photographers proved to be high quality with good detail and very useful for selecting landing zones as well as handy guides for helo pilots and others after being annotated to indicate landing zones, reference points, and prominent landmarks.

Enclosure (5)
5. (U) Overall weather support and forecasts were provided by the meteorology unit on the flagship. Surf forecasts were requested from Fleet Weather Central Guam during initial planning but were not used. During the planning phase, Tropical Storm TESS generated southwest of Manila but was predicted to proceed northwest passing over the Chinese Coast east of Hainan Island. However, on D MINUS ONE Tropical Storm TESS built up and was later designated typhoon TESS. In addition its track became more westerly. As a result, ARG ALFA was forced to take evasive action commencing the afternoon of D-Day (10 July) by running southeast along the Vietnamese Coast. Other than the typhoon evasion, weather was ideal for amphibious operations and did not have a significant affect on Operation MIGHTY PLAY.

6. (U) No EEI's other than those contained in CTG 76.4 OPLAN 101A-69, Annex C, were utilized or imposed on subordinate units for collection.

7. (C) As a last step in the planning process a joint intelligence estimate was issued by CTG 76.4/CTG 79.4 and was distributed to all concerned on 9 July. The information contained therein proved to be accurate and comprehensive.

8. (C) During the course of Operation MIGHTY PLAY a considerable number of enemy documents and other material was captured. The most significant recovery consisted of documents captured at 1315H on 12 July 1969 by DELTA Company, BLT 1/26 at 49P BT 083622 which proved to be of high technical value. The documents were current, in good shape and complete. CG, III MAF congratulated BLT 1/26 by message for the professional manner in which the documents were discovered, evaluated, and delivered to higher authority and stressed the particular intelligence value of the documents.
A. MEDICAL

1. (C) Operation MIGHTY PLAY began on 10 July 1969 and ended on 20 July 1969. The operation was conducted in I corps in Quang Nam Province about eight miles south of Danang.

2. (C) The Task Group consisted of USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2), USS CLEVELAND (LPD-7), USS WHETSTONE (LSD-27) and USS WASHBURN (LKA-108). USS MEREDITH (DD-890) and USS RUPERTUS (DD-851) provided Naval Gunfire Support. BLT 1/26 was embarked with HMM 265 providing vertical support.

3. (C) USS IWO JIMA was designated as the primary casualty receiving ship. Medical Officers on board were:

   a. SURGICAL TEAM ALFA
      (1) CDR J. J. RYSKAMP, Jr. OINC
      (2) LCDR R. F. AMBUR
      (3) LCDR T. C. BROWN
      (4) LT B. C. M. SAH
      (5) ENS W. K. CARAWAY (MALE NURSE ANESTHETIST)

   b. SHIP'S MEDICAL OFFICER
      (6) LT R. GORDON

   c. CLEARING PLATOON
      (7) LT R. E. BATIMER
      (8) LT J. W. WALLACE
      (9) LT R. P. KING

   d. BATTALION SURGEON
      (10) LT D. C. HANCOCK

   e. FLIGHT SURGEON
      (11) LT S. A. WILSON

4. (C) Of the 13 missile wounds, five were treated in the operating room; while the remaining 8 missile wounds were debrided under local anesthesia in the R and D area.
5. (C) Many casualties had multiple injuries and therefore only the principle wound was listed.

6. (C) Casualty Statistics

   a. BLOOD. There were 114 units of blood on hand at the start of the operation. On 17 July 1969, 64 units were returned as outdated. On 19 July 1969, 40 units were returned as outdated. A total of eighteen units and four patients were cross-matched and nine units transfused to two patients. It was noted that all blood on hand for the operation had a five to ten day shelf life.

   b. SUMMARY OF CASUALTY STATISTICS

   (1) TOTAL CASUALTIES RECEIVED 61

      (a) Non-Combat 27
      (b) Wounded in Action (WIA) 31
      (c) Killed in Action (KIA) 3
      (d) Died of Wounds (DOW) (STAHOSP DANANG) 1

     * DOW not included in total, previously included WIA.

   (2) NON-COMBAT CLASSIFIED (21 Treated LPH/6 Treated Ashore) 27

      (a) FUO 3
      (b) Upper Respiratory Infection 3
      (c) Contusion 3
      (d) Gonorrhea 2
      (e) Fracture 2
      (f) Pneumonia 1
      (g) Otitis Media 1
      (h) Twisted Knee 1
      (i) Shigellosis 1
      (j) Sunburn 2
      (k) Epididymitis 2
      (l) Sinusitis 1
      (m) Dysentery 1
(n) Rat Bite 1
(o) Heat Exhaustion 2
(p) Acute Anxiety 1

(3) COMBAT CASUALTIES
(a) Classified, Treated aboard LPH: 31

1. MISSILE WOUNDS 13
   A. Major 5
   B. Minor 8

2. SITE OF MAJOR WOUNDS 1
   A. Upper Extremities 2
   B. Chest 1
   C. Head 1
   D. Lower Extremities 1

3. FRACTURES 1
   A. Ulna 3
   B. Metacarpals 1

4. NON-MISSILE WOUNDS (LACERATION) 1
   (b) Unclassified, Treated Ashore 17

(4) OPERATIVE CASES PERFORMED (INITIAL RX ONLY) 2
   (a) Major 2
   (b) Minor 3

(5) MAJOR SURGICAL PROCEDURES 1
   (a) Closed Thoracotomy 1
   (b) Appendectomy 1

(6) SUMMARY OF OR ANESTHESIA (INITIAL RX ONLY) 2
   (a) General 2
   (b) Block 2
   (c) Spinal 1
(7) DISPOSITION (Aboard LPH)

(a) Treated & Released  20
(b) Admitted to sick bay  14
(c) Triaged & Transferred  1
(d) Discharged to duty  2
(e) Transferred  0
(f) Transferred (Care of the dead)  1
(g) Died of wounds  0
(h) Remaining in sick bay end of operation  12

B. LOGISTICS

1. (C) Replenishment. During MIGHTY PLAY the following replenishments were conducted providing support to ARG ALFA and gunfire support ships.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SHIP</th>
<th>RECEIVED</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 JUL</td>
<td>FIRDBRAKE (AE 14)</td>
<td>Ammo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 JUL</td>
<td>GRAFFIAS (AF 29)</td>
<td>Provisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 JUL</td>
<td>TAPPAHANNOCK (AO 43)</td>
<td>Fuel</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 JUL</td>
<td>GRAFFIAS (AF 29)</td>
<td>Provisions</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 JUL</td>
<td>GUADALUPE (AO 32)</td>
<td>Fuel</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 JUL</td>
<td>HALEAKALA (AE 25)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>HALEAKALA (AE 25)</td>
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<td>NIAGARA FALLS (APS 3)</td>
<td>Provisions</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 JUL</td>
<td>NIAGARA FALLS (APS 3)</td>
<td>Provisions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. (C) Maintenance. Sporadic leaking in USS IWO JIMA's main condenser tubes continued to be a problem throughout the operation. Although fit to ably fulfill her assignment as flagship and helo haven, a marginal capability for continuous steaming (especially at higher speeds) existed during the entire period of the operation.
1. (C) Except for initial difficulty with VHF frequencies in passing artillery and NGF warning to aircraft (SAV-A-PLANES), communications during Operation MIGHTY PLAY were excellent. The initiating directive was received at 0738H 7 July 1969. CTG 76.4 OPORDER 307-69 was transmitted to all addressees at 0530H 9 July 1969. No difficulties were encountered in handling the record communications by ARG ALFA during Operation MIGHTY PLAY. During high volume periods all three tapecutting positions were used to maximum capacity in order to avoid outgoing message backlogs. For the peak 24 hours period of Operation MIGHTY PLAY a total of 537 messages were processed, 319 incoming, and 218 outgoing. The average handling times for outgoing messages during this period was two hours one minute each. The majority of messages handled and all pertaining to the operation were transmitted on at least three circuits.

2. (C) Amphibious Ready Group ALFA consisting of USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) (CATF Flagship), USS CLEVELAND (LPD-7), USS WHETSTONE (LSD-27), USS WASHBURN (LKA-108), and the gunfire support ships USS MEREDITH (DD 890) and USS RUPERTUS (DD 851) maintained a duplex Task Group Orestes circuit. All Task Group ships delivered their outgoing messages to the Flagship for entry into the NAVCOMOPNET which was maintained by IWO JIMA (LPH-2). This circuit provided a reliable link throughout the operation for the relay of record communication traffic for ships of the Task Group. The COMNAVOPNET was terminated with Naval Support Activity Danang and the Fleet Flash Net was patched through NSA Danang, Cam Ranh Bay, and terminated at NAVCOMMSTA, PHIL.

3. (C) In all frequency ranges the communications equipment of the flagship was adequate, but totally committed. Since no surface assault landing was conducted there was no shortage of VHF equipments/frequencies as was ARG ALFA's previous experience.

4. (C) Frequency assignments were adequate as assigned by COMSEVENTHFLT OPORDER 201-68. The VHF circuit between the Flagship and Fire Support Coordination Center, located at FIRST Marine Division Headquarters, required shifting. Upon investigation it was discovered that a physical obstruction (Hill 327) negated the line of sight characteristic of this circuit. Following a liaison visit on the third day of the operation this circuit was shifted to an upper high frequency. This higher frequency likewise proved unreliable and a second liaison visit was required. A lower frequency was then established which proved to be satisfactory for the remainder of the operation. Following these visits and the final assignment of a usable high frequency it was necessary on several occasions to use other communications to alert the FSCC operators that SACC had SAV-A-PLANE traffic to pass. This alerting method had the effect of producing clear communications with FSCC. Consequently it appeared that once a usable high frequency was established with FSCC the problem was operational vice frequency assignment/equipment. This provided marginally reliable communications between Flagship and FSCC for the remainder of the operation. Some minor interference was experienced on various other frequencies during the operation; however, none were severe enough to cause a circuit to be unusable.

CONFIDENTIAL
Enclosure (7)
PUBLIC AFFAIRS

1. (C) General

a. A Command Information Bureau (CIB) was set up onboard the USS IWO JIMA (LPH 2) and a Mobile News Team from CTF 76 Staff provided services from 9 July 1969 through 18 July 1969.

b. Proximity of Operation MIGHTY PLAY to the Danang area precluded initial embarkation of civilian newsmen, however, newsmen were invited to the flagship after the initial landing.

c. CTG 76.4 CIB originated six press releases (initial and five follow-ups) throughout Operation MIGHTY PLAY.

d. In addition special press releases were disseminated on:

   (1) The visit of ADM FENG, CN, VADM BRINGLE, VADM CHEW and RADM ROSENBERG to ARG ALFA on 14 July 1969.

   (2) The recovery of all Marine crewmen from a downed CH46A helicopter by the life boat from the USS RUPERTUS (DD 851) (at the time assigned to CARG ALFA as NGFS ship).

e. Problems encountered/adverse incidents: None

2. (U) Visits by Dignitaries

a. 10 July RADM E.M. ROSENBERG, USN, COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT

b. 14 July ADM FENG CHI-CHUNG GRC, CINC

c. 14 July VADM W.F. BRINGLE, USN, CONSEVENTHFLT

d. 14 July VADM J.L. CHEW, USN, COMUSTDC

e. 14 July RADM E.M. ROSENBERG, USN, COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT

f. 17 July COL A.E. COFFEEN, USMC, SLF BRAVO
5. (C) Broadcast coverage was excellent during the operation. The flagship maintained coverage of both the rebroadcast from NSA Danang and the direct broadcast from NAVCOMMSTA PHIL. All Task Group ships copied the rebroadcast from NSA Danang. Requests for retransmission of missing broadcast messages were kept to a minimum with ships assisting each other. NSA Danang provided missing numbers on request.

6. (C) The Task Group Maneuvering and Warning, and Task Group reporting circuits were covered using the NESTOR crypto system. These circuits were excellent throughout the operation. Although these circuits were used primarily for their designated use, they were used, on a not to interfere basis, as a communications coordination circuit and for passing TACLOG requirements from the flagship to the Primary Control Ship. This was done to hold uncovered voice communications to a minimum.

7. (C) Registered Publications: The supply of keying materials, operational codes and numeral codes were adequate at all times during Operation MIGHTY PLAY.
1. (C) General

   a. Operation MIGHTY PLAY began on 10 July 1969 with naval gunfire, USMC artillery and air preparation of three landing zones and one diversionary target. L-Hour was 0920H. Operation MIGHTY PLAY terminated on 20 July with the CHOP of BLT 1/26 ashore to CG, FIRST MARDIV.

   b. Due to the proximity of the AOA to Danang Airbase and instrument approach patterns to Danang airbase penetrating the AOA, it was necessary to pass artillery and naval gunfire warning information (SAV-A-PLANE) to Danang approach control. Communication circuits used to transmit SAV-A-PLANE information were initially unsatisfactory. Pre-operation liaison between CTG 76.4 representatives, the FIRST MARDIV Fire Support Coordinator, and the OIC of the Danang Approach Control, agreed that FIRST MARDIV FSCC would be given SAV-A-PLANE information over established VHF (PM) nets, and that information would be forwarded to Danang Approach Control by the FSCC. At the onset of Operation MIGHTY PLAY direct contact with FSCC could not be established as their VHF antenna system was masked by its location on Hill 327. Time consuming circuitous communications were resorted to for passage of SAV-A-PLANE information to FIRST MARDIV FSCC for relay to Danang Approach Control. As VHF communications were unsuccessful, an HF circuit was established. Additional liaison visits were required before marginally satisfactory HF communications were established with FSCC. See enclosure (7) for amplification.

2. (C) Naval Gunfire

   a. Forces involved: USS MEREDITH (DD890) conducted landing zone preparation fires and provided on-call support from 100830H July until relieved by USS RUPERTUS (DD851) at 13030H July 1969. RUPERTUS was detached 171130H July 1969.

   b. Fire Support Coordination: The only significant condition detrimental to good fire support coordination was the unsatisfactory communications relay of SAV-A-PLANE information to Danang Approach Control. Initially this resulted in cancellation of a scheduled pre-L-Hour NGF target and caused unacceptable delays in fire mission approval throughout the remainder of the operation. This problem is addressed as a Lesson Learned in enclosure (7).

   c. Restriction to fire

      (1) Civil Airways Paths. By COMUSMACV/CINCPACFLT agreement, the airspace between 7,000 and 11,000 feet within civil airways will be left as free transit space, i.e. a no fire zone through the AOA. This limits some fire missions in that destroyers cannot shoot at maximum effective, or greater, ranges without at sometime violating this space. At times it is desirable to use maximum effective ranges to produce a high angle-of-incident, non-skipping projectile.
(2) Non-observance of NOTAMS/SAV-A-PLANE. This problem was not as obvious as in the past due to the reduced amount of gunfire. However, on one occasion, ten minute LZ prep mission was interrupted five times by different transient military aircraft flying across the gun target line.

(3) "SPOOKY" While the SPOOKY gunship was on station in the AOA, all fires were restricted to a maximum altitude of 1,000 feet less than the gunship's altitude. However, the advantage of having the SPOOKY readily available generally overcame the fire altitude restriction.

d. Artillery advisory system and SAV-A-PLANE. A revised SAV-A-PLANE form has been devised to reduce duplication of effort, eliminate mutual interference and speed processing of the request. However, local variations may be required to facilitate operations in specific SACC facilities or to meet local clearance requirements, but this is considered to be a good basic form. (The information indicated below is printed three columns per page, four sheets per pad, stapled with carbon paper between sheets and cut to yield three ready-to-use request forms.)

SAV-A-PLANE

TOR

A. TG # ____________ SAP # ____________

B. FIRING UNIT __________________________

C. GRID: FM ____________ TO ____________

D. TIME: FM ____________ TO ____________

E. MAX ORDINATE __________________________

F. TGT NATURE __________________________

G. OBSERVER __________________________

END OF MISSION TIME __________________________

(1) Although communications difficulties precluded a thorough evaluation of this new form, it is estimated that up to 30 seconds can be shaved off the present SAV-A-PLANE request processing time. Additionally, more information

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Enclosure (9)

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required by the three supporting arms is now recorded on one standard form.

e. Techniques evaluated.

(1) To reduce the time between cessation of LZ preparation fires and helo touchdown, a two-fold procedure was successfully implemented. First, the NGF ship was instructed to fire white phosphorous as its last round of LZ preparation fire. This gave the helicopters a visual indication of "cease fire." Secondly, both the reports of "cease fire" and "splash" for the last round were passed to the helicopter Direction Center for verbal confirmation of "cease fire." As a result of the confidence gained in this combined procedure, the assault helicopters touched down in the designated landing zones less than 45 seconds after the last round fell on target. The effectiveness of this method is further indicated in that no hostile fire was taken in any of the landing zones.

f. Statistical Data

(1) Rounds expended:

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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
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USS RUPERTUS (DD 851)

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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>529</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

GRAND TOTAL 1282

(2) Damage Assessments. The below listed data reflects only the observed results of naval gunfire. They do not include any of the unobserved effects of heavy harassment, interdiction and area neutralization fires.

(a) Bunkers destroyed 23
(b) Structures destroyed 29
(c) Base area neutralized 2
(d) Secondary explosions 10
(e) Secondary fires 3

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g. Problems encountered. USS RUPERTUS (DD 851) reported for duty with approximately 98 percent bore erosion in all four barrels. However, this was determined to be acceptable by the battalion in view of her reported range dispersion of only 100-200 yards; observed fires during the day seemed to verify this.

3. (C) Close Air Support.

a. Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) radio nets were established and manned in accordance with Annex H (Air Operations) to CTG 76.4 OPORD 307-69. Continuous communications were maintained with USAF CRC Danang, FIRST MAW (TADC), HORN DASC, BLT 1/26 Air Liaison Officer, and the IGTZ Area Medical Regulating Office. Danang DASC and other additional stations were used as needed.

b. Scheduling and control of close air support aircraft were executed as planned. Priority and routine requests for non-scheduled air support were promptly filled.

c. On D-Day a twenty minute delay of L-Hour resulted from a combination of factors. The first scheduled close air support flight did not appear in the requested numbers, nor did they carry the desired ordnance for LZ prep. The second flight of close air support aircraft checked-in slightly early, but with an unexpectedly large ordnance load which required additional time to complete the LZ prep. These factors, added to a delay in joining the TAC(A)/TAO and CAS aircraft, were the major cause of the delay of L-Hour. It should be noted that observing helicopter pilots classified the results of NGF and CAS coordination as outstanding, and that no troop-lift helicopters were hit by enemy fire although enemy movement was observed throughout the area.

d. Throughout the operation numerous aircraft transiting the AOA failed to contact the TACC (ICEPACK ALFA) as required by NOTAM and by CTG 76.4 OPORD 307-69. High density air traffic was anticipated because of the proximity of both Danang Airbase and Marble Mountain Airfield to the AOA. AOA airspace incidents included a report from the USS WASHBURN that a flight of 2 F-4's apparently dropped a bomb within 3000 yards of the USS WASHBURN and the USS CLEVELAND. These aircraft had neither checked-in with ICEPACK ALFA, nor did they have approval from CTG 76.4 to utilize any portion of the AOA as an "ORDNANCE DUMP AREA". CATF reported this incident to CG, III MAF by message.

e. Operation MIGHTY PLAY close air support operations are summarized as follows:

(1) Helicopter operations

(a) Sorties..........................1641

(b) Tasks...........................218

(c) Hours flown......................305.9

(d) Cargo (tons)......................149.8

(e) Pax carried......................4178

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(f) Medevacs ........................................ 55
(g) Ammo expended (rounds) .................... 50 (M-7)

(2) Fixed-wing CAS operations
(a) Total aircraft controlled .................. 208
  1. Attack aircraft .......................... 21
  2. Non-attack aircraft .....................  7
  3. Transient aircraft ...................... 180
(b) Ordnance (tons) (Excludes 7.62 MM) ...... 28.3
  1. Bombs .................................. 111 (55,500 lbs.)
  2. Rockets ................................  8 (5" ZUNI) (1200 lbs.)
  2. 7.62MM (rounds) ....................... 21,000
(c) SAV-A-PLANES issued ..................... 109

4. (c) Artillery
   a. Forces Involved. ALFA Battery 1/13 (six 105 MM howitzers) was placed
      ashore on D minus one Day in a secure area approximately 7,000 meters north
      of the AOA center. The same day, Whiskey Battery 1/11 (six 4.2 inch mortars)
      was placed ashore 2,000 meters north of the AOA center in vicinity of the THIRD
      Battalion, FIRST Marines Command Post. Artillery fire support was used through­
      out the operation subject to restrictions discussed below.
   b. Fire Support Coordination. No conditions worthy of note.
   c. Restrictions to Fire. The extreme proximity of ALFA Battery (105 MM
      howitzer) to Marble Mountain and Danang Airfields precluded almost all support
      from this unit during periods of heavy air traffic.
   d. Statistical Data
      (1) Rounds Expended

      | Caliber          | Type | QTY  |
      |----------------|------|------|
      | 105 MM howitzer | HE   | 1466 |
      |                 | WP   |  38  |
      |                 | ILLUM|      |
      |                 | TOTAL| 1505 |

Enclosure (9)
## WHISKEY Battery

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<th>Qty</th>
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<td>248</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**TOTAL** 1203

**GRAND TOTAL** 2708 RDS

(2) Gun Damage Assessment. None Available
LESSONS LEARNED

ORIGINATING COMMAND: COMPHIBREADGRU ALFA

SUBJECT: MAJOR: AMPHIBIOUS PLANNING
MINOR: CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AND LANDING ZONE PREPARATION

1. DISCUSSION: In planning for the ordnance required to ensure adequate preparation of the landing zones it was determined that a division of 4 attack aircraft would be required for each LZ. This figure was based on ordnance loading of A-4 and F-4 aircraft. The flights that were provided for preparation of LZ's GRANT and LEE consisted of 2 A-6's. The amount of ordnance carried was sufficient for the mission, but because of the large quantity carried by each aircraft the LZ prep lasted longer than planned in the schedule of fires. The extended time required for LZ prep contributed to L Hour being delayed.

LESSONS LEARNED: Due to the existing procedures for requesting air support under the single-manager system for tactical air support, it is usually not possible to determine in advance what type of aircraft will be furnished for a specific mission. The only way the TACC has of finding out which specific aircraft types and ordnance loads will be furnished is to discuss this with the area Direct Air Support Center over an uncovered voice radio circuit, thereby possibly compromising the assault. Sufficient flexibility to allow time for additional air preparation will be provided in future air schedules, and naval gunfire schedules will allow for additional preparatory fires to cover gaps in air preparation if they occur.
LESSONS LEARNED

ORIGINATING COMMAND: COMPHIBREADGRU ALFA

SUBJECT: MAJOR: AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE
        MINOR: SUPPORTING ARMS COORDINATION

1. DISCUSSION: The location of the AOA for Operation MIGHTY PLAY was an area normally used by large numbers of aircraft proceeding along the coastline to and from Danang. While numerous aircraft were observed transiting the AOA, the number of aircraft contacting the TACC for clearance through the area averaged only 19 per day. Transient aircraft interfere with employment of supporting arms, and often fires of naval gunfire and artillery elements must be checked in order to avoid endangering aircraft.

LESSONS LEARNED: Amphibious planners should be aware of the fact that when operating in the vicinity of a major air terminal, or in an area commonly transited by large numbers of aircraft, there will be many aircraft passing through the AOA without the pilot's being aware of an amphibious operation in progress. The publication of a NOTAM has only limited effectiveness in informing all pilots of the existence of an AOA due to many aviation units, especially those with helicopters and light fixed-wing aircraft, being located at small bases which do not always receive current NOTAM information.
LESSONS LEARNED

ORIGINATING COMMAND: COMPHIBREADGRU ALFA

SUBJECT: MAJOR: AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE
MINOR: SUPPORTING ARMS COORDINATION

1. DISCUSSION: Due to the location of the MIGHTY PLAY AOA in close proximity to Danang Airbase, and instrument approach patterns to Danang Airbase penetrating the AOA, it was necessary to pass information on artillery and naval gunfire warnings (SAV-A-PLANES) to Danang Approach Control through FIRST MARDIV. Fire Support Coordination Center. A VHF (FM) voice radio circuit was used for this purpose initially, and proved unsatisfactory due to line of sight limitations. A High Frequency voice radio circuit was established with FIRST MARDIV FSCC with marginal initial success. At times it was necessary to relay SAV-A-PLANES information through several stations on other radio nets to get the information to FIRST MARDIV FSCC when direct communications were not operating. A more suitable high frequency for the distance involved established by personal liaison finally resolved the problem.

LESSONS LEARNED: More detailed advance coordination is required to plan adequate communications for artillery and naval gunfire warnings when the AOA is in the vicinity of a major air terminal. Amphibious planners should be familiar with existing in-country warning systems and procedures, in order that artillery and naval gunfire warnings during amphibious operations can be integrated into in-country systems when necessary.
SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT

1. (C) Terrain features between the beach portion of the AOA and inland objectives rendered an over the beach assault by surface craft infeasible. Therefore, the actual assault landing was conducted entirely by helicopter. All necessary BLT 1/26 heavy equipment for the support of combat action ashore was offloaded by assault craft in Danang Harbor on D-minus one (9 July) and transported overland via highway for prepositioning at established areas in the FIRST MARINE Division AO. These locations were in close proximity to the northern boundary of the AOA. The prepositioned equipment and material consisted primarily of the artillery battery, trucks and other land transport vehicles plus an initial two day supply of ammunition and field rations.

2. (C) The assault ship to shore movement consisted of helicopter movement of troops embarked in USS IWO JIMA and USS CLEVELAND to three separate landing zones in the central portion of the landward AOA. The first assault wave, landing at L-Hour (100920H), consisted of eight helicopters divided into two sections. The first section lifted ALFA Company from USS CLEVELAND to LZ GRANT and the second section lifted DELTA Company from IWO JIMA to LZ LEE. Upon completion of the insertion of ALFA and DELTA Companies, CHARLIE Company was lifted from USS IWO JIMA to LZ SHERMAN as an on-call wave at L-plus 1:55 hours. No resistance was encountered in the landing zones during the assault phase of the landing. At L-plus 3:05 hours the Command Group and BRAVO Company (Reserve Company) were lifted from USS CLEVELAND into LZ 413, the THIRD Battalion FIRST MARINE Division Command Post located just to the north of the AOA. Helicopter movement of all troops was completed at 101352H.
1. (C) ARG ALFA conducted an amphibious deception off the northern Barrier Island area using the USS IWO JIMA. The deception was primarily a tactical communicative deception. With the exception of the IWO JIMA no other physical elements including boats or helo's were used. The deception was designed to mislead the enemy and disrupt his time table of events.

   a. Beginning at 100400H, USS IWO JIMA steamed in the general vicinity (Grid coordinate BT 31053012) for a period of about 2 hours to conduct deception operations. All normal flight operation lights were on to provide for maximum display of the IWO JIMA in the darkness and early morning light.

   b. Communications deception consisted of both live and tape broadcasts over four of the most commonly used circuits during an amphibious operation, simulating a Helio and Waterborne amphibious landing (Beach Boat Common, TACLOG, LZ Control and LPH L/L). The broadcasting began at 0430H and ended at 0600H.

2. (U) No problems were experienced with visibility as USS IWO JIMA could be seen from the beach.

3. (C) During the communications phase a module blew out on one of the TED transmitters; however, the module was replaced within 5 minutes. The communications "breakdown" and repair tended to enhance the credibility of the broadcasts rather than interfere with the communications deception.

4. (C) No evaluation is available as to the results/reaction generated by this deception; however, it is believed that the proficiency gained is not only worthwhile, but offered valuable experience in the planning processes of the ARG Staff.

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Enclosure (12)
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. (C) On D-Day (10 July) at 1400H, after the Marines had landed and were in initial objective positions, an aerial loudspeaker PSYOPS mission was flown over the AOA. The message of this broadcast instructed the innocent civilians in the area to take their possessions and move to Tu Cau (a village to the northwest of the AOA) where they would be resettled in a safe location.

2. (C) On 13 July between 1350H and 1435H a PSYOPS mission urging the enemy to Chieu Hoi was conducted over the western section of the AOA. In this mission an aerial loudspeaker broadcast urged the enemy to Chieu Hoi and avoid the senseless death that had claimed many of their comrades. In addition, 100,000 leaflets were also disseminated by air which gave the enemy specific instructions to follow in order to Chieu Hoi.

3. (C) The effect that either or both of these missions had on the enemy is unknown and no ralliers (HOI CHANH'S) were received.

Enclosure (13)
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DISTRIBUTION

CINCPAC
COMUSMACV
CINCPACFLT
CMC
COMPHIBPAC
COMSEVENTHFLT
COMPHIBLANT
CG, FMFPAC
CG, FMFLANT
CG III MAF
COMNAVFORV
COMPHIBTRAPAC
COMPHIBGRU ONE
COMPHIBGRU TWO
COMPHIBGRU THREE
COMPHIBGRU FOUR
PRES. NAVWARCOL
CG, V MEF
CG 1ST MARDIV
CG 3RD MARDIV
CG 5TH MARDIV
CG FIRST MAW
COMSERVGRU THREE
CG, FMFSSEVENTHFLT
CG, LANFORTRACOM "A"
CG, LANFORTRACOM "A"
CMO (OP 09B9) HISTORICAL DIV
CMCS QUANTICO, VA
CHAIRMAN NAVWARCOM
CO, NAVPHIBSCOL, CORONADO
CO, NAVPHIBSCOL, LITTLE CREEK
COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT

COMPHIBRON ONE
COMPHIBRON THREE
COMPHIBRON FIVE
COMPHIBRON SEVEN
COMPHIBRON NINE
COMPHIBRON ELEVEN
COMPHIBRON TWELVE
COMPHIBTRAPAC
COMPHIBGRU ONE
CO, TACRON TWELVE
CO, BUJ ONE
CO, ACU ONE
CO, BMU ONE
CO, UDT THIRTEEN
OINC BMU ONE WP DET
OINC ACU ONE WP DET
OINC WP DET NAVSPEWARU
OINC NAVBECOGRU ONE WP DET
OINC NAVSECWP DET
USA C&GSC, FT LEAVENWORTH, KANS.
OINC NAVACOCACT
CTG 70.8
CTG 73.5
CTG 76.5
CTG 79.4
CTG 79.5
CTF 115
CO, BLT 1/26
CO, HMM 265
CO, USS TWO JIMA (LPH-2)
CO, USS WASHBURN (LKA-108)
CO, USS CLEVELAND (LPD-7)
CO, USS WHETSTONE (LSD-27)
CO, USS RUPERTUS (DD-851)
CO, USS MEREDITH (DD-890)

Enclosure (14)
CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commander Amphibious Ready Group ALFA
To: Commander Amphibious Force, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: Operation DEFIANT STAND Post Operation Report, forwarding of (U)

Ref: (a) COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT/CTF 76 INST 3500.1C
     (b) Joint COMFIRSTFLT/COMEVENTHFLT INST 3500.3/3500.8A

Encl: (1) Task Organization
     (2) Initiating Directive
     (3) Chronology of Events
     (4) Planning/Operations
     (5) Intelligence
     (6) Medical/Logistics
     (7) Communications
     (8) Public Affairs
     (9) Supporting Arms
     (10) Sensor Employment
     (11) Ship to Shore Movement
     (12) Deception
     (13) Psychological Operations
     (14) Distribution

1. (U) General. Operation DEFIANT STAND was conducted by Amphibious Ready Group ALFA during the period 7 September to 19 September 1969 in support of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. This operation marked the first occasion in which a single Amphibious Ready Group commanded, supported and assaulted two separate landing forces consisting of U.S. Marines and Republic of Korea Marines in the Vietnam theater of operations.

2. (C) Background. Intelligence and incident reports collected by CG, III MAF, indicated that enemy forces were accumulating in the northern reaches of the area known as Barrier Island, located on the coast astride Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces in the Republic of Vietnam. Because of the geographical isolation afforded the area, by the Cua Dai River on the north and on the west by the Truong Giang River and salt marshes; this region has been historically used as a regrouping area and harboring site for enemy forces attempting to evade search and clear operations conducted by U.S. and allied forces in the southern portion of I Corps Tactical Zone. Recent reports identified the V25 Local Force Battalion and the Q60 Local Force Company as enemy forces using the area for perpetrating attacks by fire against river craft on the Cua Dai River and against Hoi An. With due recognition for the versatility and self-supporting capability of the SEVENTH Fleet Amphibious Ready Group and because of the tactical limiting features of the geographic terrain to attack overland, on 26 August 1969, Commanding General III MAF submitted a request to Commander SEVENTH Fleet for the employment of Amphibious Ready Group/Special Landing Force ALFA to conduct an amphibious assault in the Barrier Island area.

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On 26 August 1969 Commander SEVENTH Fleet contoured in the general concept of the proposed employment of ARG/SLF ALFA in support and as requested by CG, III MAF. In addition to the employment of U.S. Marine Corps Battalion Landing Team 1/26 embarked in Amphibious Ready Group ALFA ships, it was also proposed and agreed that following the initial assault landing, Regimental Landing Team TWO, SECOND Republic of Korea Marine Corps Brigade would be committed to the operation by embarking in ARG ALFA ships and assault landed in the Amphibious Objective Area. The landward Amphibious Objective Area was subdivided into two separate areas of operation with the southern area assigned to SLF ALFA (BLT 1/26) and the northern area assigned to RLT-2 ROKMC. The outer perimeter of the landward Amphibious Objective Area generally followed limiting geographical terrain features such as rivers which would limit escape routes for enemy forces in the area. (See enclosure (2) for detailed description of the Amphibious Objective Area.) On 29 August 1969, CARG ALFA/CTG 76.4 was designated Commander Amphibious Task Force. CSLF ALFA/CTG 79.4 and Chief of Staff, SECOND ROKMC BDE were designated as Commander Landing Force of the Southern and Northern Landing Forces respectively.

During planning and coordination conferences with CG, III MAF and Republic of Vietnam Province Chiefs, agreements concerning processing and disposition of civilian population in the area were established, one for civilians from Quang Nam Province on Lang Dong Island in the Cua Dai River, north of the Amphibious Objective Area and one for civilians from Quang Tin Province in the lower Barrier Island area just south of the Amphibious Objective Area. A blocking force consisting of Battalion Landing Team THREE from the SECOND ROKMC BDE under command of CG, SECOND ROKMC BDE was helicopter lifted into the northwestern portion of what was to become a part of the landward Amphibious Objective Area, two days prior to operational control of Commander Northern Landing Force on D-Day, when the entire AOA became effective for operational control by CATF. Anti-infiltration/exfiltration patrols and limited gunfire support was obtained from Coastal Surveillance Forces (CTG 115.1). Scheduled and on-call air support was supplied by Commanding General FIRST Marine Air Wing. One 5"/38 destroyer, USS TAUSSTIG (DD 746), was assigned as NGFS ship to augment TG 76.4 throughout the operation.

3. (C) Concept of Operations and Execution.

a. Concept. Operation DEFIANT STAND involved the employment of ARG/SLF ALFA and RLT-2 ROKMC in a combined search and clear operation against enemy forces consisting of North Vietnamese Armed Forces, Viet Cong local/main force units and Viet Cong infrastructure within the AOA. The Southern Landing Force was comprised of SLF ALFA/CTG 79.4 composed of USMC BLT 1/26 and HMM 265. The Northern Landing Force consisted of RLT-2 from the SECOND ROKMC BDE. Following S-Day and D-Day assault landings, ARG ALFA remained in support of the Southern and Northern Landing Forces until 19 September when RLT-2 ROKMC was firmly established ashore and operational control was shifted to CG, SECOND ROKMC BDE and BLT 1/26 was tactically withdrawn. At 1700H on 19 September
1969, the AOA was dissolved and Operation DEFIANT STAND terminated.

b. Mission.

(1) Commencing at H and L-Hour on S-Day (7 SEP) the Southern Landing Force (SLF ALFA) conducted a surface and helicopter amphibious assault against enemy forces in the southern portion of the landward AOA in Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces, RVN, in order to conduct a detailed search and clear operation and such other operations as agreed on with CG, III MAF or his designated representative and in coordination with other friendly forces in the area.

(2) Commencing at H and L-Hour on D-Day (12 SEP), the Northern Landing Force (RLT-2 of the SECOND ROKMC BDE) conducted a surface and helicopter amphibious assault against enemy forces in the northern portion of the AOA in Quang Nam Province, RVN, in order to conduct a detailed search and clear operations and such other operations as agreed on with CG, III MAF or his designated representative and coordination with other friendly forces in the area.

c. Pre-Assault Operations. Training lectures and briefings for troops, helicopter crews and ship crews were conducted on board ARG ALFA ships during the planning phase for the operation. All amphibious assault craft and control personnel were exercised in surface ship to shore movement procedures until one day prior to the S-Day landing. During this period all ARG ships maintained normal holding stations in the off-shore area in the general vicinity of Danang, RVN. These OPAREAS were near the area designated as the seaward AOA. Ships entered the port of Danang for logistical purposes and pre-operational briefings during daylight hours on several occasions in a routine manner during the planning phase. Maximum effort was made to maintain normal operational patterns including careful control of uncovered radio transmissions and by this action masked any appearance of contemplated operations. On 6 September, CG, III MAF proposed to COMSEVENTHFLT that S-Day be advanced to 7 September vice 8 September to take advantage of possible confusion on the part of the enemy following the death of the President of North Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh. This action was agreed to and approved by all parties involved. On 5 September, BLT THREE from the SECOND ROKMC BDE was helicopter lifted from ROKMC Base Camp area just north of Hoi An to blocking positions west of the Truong Giang River sector of the AOA. BLT THREE remained under the operational control of CG, SECOND ROKMC BDE until D-Day.

d. Movement to Amphibious Objective Area. All TG 76.4 ships maintained positions in individual normal steaming areas offshore from Danang, until ordered to proceed directly to assigned steaming sectors in the AOA just prior to S-Day (7 SEP) initial assault operations. At 0100H 7 September USS WHEATSTONE (LSD 27) proceeded to rendezvous position with a PCF patrol craft, with ARG
ALFA UDT embarked, to provide safety support and radar assisted control for clandestine insertion of UDT/Beach Survey Party on GREEN Beach. At 0300H, beach survey operations were successfully completed, UDT embarked in USS WHETSTONE and survey information and surf observations were transmitted to CATF via covered teletype. (See enclosure (5).) During the period 0100-0400H 7 September, USS CLEVELAND (LPD 7) conducted a false UDT check survey in support of S-Day operations. (See enclosure (12).) By 0400H all TG 76.4 units were in assigned S-Day AOA steaming sectors. Darken ship conditions were maintained and only limited radio transmissions were permitted.

e. S-Day Assault Operations/Ship to Shore Movement (Southern Landing Force). Prior to H and L-Hour, GREEN Beach and designated helicopter landing zones were taken under heavy preparation fire by NAG from USS TAUSIIG (DD 746) and/or air dropped ordnance from FIRST MAW supplied combat air support. Air Support included fixed wing as well as helicopter gunships. Detailed description of supporting arms is contained in enclosure (9). "Land the waterborne landing force" was signaled by CATF at 070400H September. Scheduled waves ONE through FOUR loaded and assembled as planned. At 070625H wave ONE consisting of ten LVT's with infantry troops embarked crossed the LOD. As prep fire on GREEN Beach were lifted wave ONE touched down at H plus 2, 070702H, followed by wave TWO at H plus 8, wave THREE at H plus 30 and wave FOUR at H plus 50. Beach preparation fires proved effective and no opposition was encountered on GREEN Beach during the assault landing. "Land the helicopter borne landing force" was signaled at 070730H. L-Hour was initially scheduled for 0800H, however, as the time for the first helicopter wave launch approached visibility was reduced to less than 500 yards by heavy rain squalls. (In view of poor and often times hazardous weather conditions in the AOA L-Hour was delayed.) By 0830H visibility has improved to the point that air prep fires for designated helicopter landing zones could proceed. Landing zone air preparations for helicopter wave ONE was completed by 0900H and helicopter wave ONE touched down in LZ QUAIL at L plus 62, 070902H. One infantry company was air lifted to LZ QUAIL until completion at 1025H. Meanwhile, NAG and air preparation of LZ EAGLE was accomplished. Preparation fires were lifted from LZ EAGLE and at 1037H helicopter insertion of an additional company of infantry was commenced. Preparation fires on LZ QUAIL and EAGLE proved effective and no enemy fire was observed during the helicopter assault. By 071300H the surface and air scheduled ship to shore movement was completed. Southern Landing Force troop movements to initial objectives overland were met with only light enemy resistance during S-Day. During this operation sensors were used for the first time by any ARG/SLF team. The G-3 Special Projects Branch III MAF was most cooperative and eager to have ARG/SLF ALFA participate in sensor utilization. Consequently they trained fifteen persons from the ARG/SLF ALFA and BLT 1/26 Staffs and provided MINISIDS, PSIDS and PORTABLE MINISIDS at known VC/NVA crossing sites and the PSIDS were employed to provide security for CP's and to enhance the effectiveness/security of night patrols and ambushes. Briefly it can be said the devices were effective, worked well and were considered a definite asset by the CO, BLT 1/26. See enclosure (10).
Embarkation of Northern Landing Forces. While maintaining continued support by surface movement over GREEN Beach and by helicopter lift direct to field positions for the Southern Landing Force, TG 76.4 ships embarked RLT-2 ROKMC. Embarkation was accomplished by helicopter movement and over the beach from an area designated embark beach, in the vicinity of the SECOND ROKMC BDE Command Post about 10 miles northwest of GREEN Beach. Embarkation was completed in four hours. Following embarkation shipboard/amphibious operations familiarization training was conducted for ROKMC troops. On D-Day minus one (11 SEP) a rehearsal ship to shore movement was conducted utilizing embark beach for the rehearsal. Time schedules for the D-Day assault landing were verified and pre D-Day briefings were conducted.


In the early morning of D-Day (12 SEP), while TG 76.4 ships maintained holding stations in the seaward AOA and continued support for the Southern Landing Force, a pre-dawn clandestine beach survey was conducted by ARG ALFA UDT in the same manner as at GREEN Beach prior to the S-Day assault. See enclosure (5). ARG BRAVO (TG 76.5) in support of ARG ALFA maneuvered to an offshore position about eight miles south of RED Beach. From 0400H to 0725H ARG BRAVO conducted a turn away demonstration landing in an effort to deceive and delude the enemy into believing that a landing would be conducted in an area to the south of the initial assault. See enclosure (12). At 0715H CATF signaled, "Land the heliborne landing force". At 0730H CATF signaled, "Land the waterborne landing force". Air dropped ordnance was used to prepare LZ SPARROW/DOVE and was completed just prior to first helicopter wave touchdown in the northern AOA. Initial helicopter waves were not opposed. USS TAUSIG (DD 746) provided naval gunfire preparation fires in the RED Beach assault area and was lifted two minutes prior to touchdown of the first surface assault wave, consisting of ten LVT's with infantry embarked. Succeeding scheduled waves; TWO at H plus 8, THREE at H plus 30 and FOUR at H plus 50 followed wave ONE and all touched down near RED Beach center. During the approach of surface wave ONE enemy fire from an unknown location in the nature of rocket propelled grenades were directed toward the BGC (LCPL) preceding wave ONE. No hits were received and all rounds fell short. As the Northern Landing Force moved inland from the beach moderate enemy fire was received. While attempting to flee the central portion of the AOA large numbers of VC suspects were captured by advance ROKMC troops. By 121200H all assault and support troops for the Northern Landing Force were moved ashore and overland movement to initial objectives was proceeding as scheduled. BLT THREE from the SECOND ROKMC BDE, located in the western portion of the northern AO, shifted operational control to Commander Northern Landing Force at 121230H.

Logistic Support Operations. Following S-Day and D-Day amphibious assault landings, ARG ALFA/TG 76.4 continued support over RED and GREEN beaches. Bulk gasoline and diesel fuels plus fresh water were supplied by USS WHISTLESTONE and USS COLONIAL from bulk storage facilities in respective ships. TG 76.4
ships transported palletized supplies direct from the force logistics command in Danang to the GREEN Beach area for resupply of equipment/supplies expended by BLT 1/26. This procedure was used to maintain best possible readiness posture. During the operation, ARG ships were periodically replenished with fuel, ammunition, and food supplies by underway replenishment and vertical replenishment from supporting service force ships. Dairy products were replenished from facilities in Danang as operations permitted. All USMC casualties were helicopter lifted from field positions to the IWO JIMA. ROKMC casualties were heloed direct to Naval Hospital Danang except night emergencies were heloed to IWO JIMA. Most civilians captured/detained during the operation were transported by amphibious assault craft from the GREEN and RED beach areas to the mouth of Cua Dai River where they were transferred to Coastal Group 14 river boats for up river movement to a Combined Holding and Interrogation Center south of Hoi An, maintained by Quang Nam Province officials.

1. Termination. On 19 September commencing at W-Hour (190700H SEP) BLT 1/26 (Southern Landing Force) was tactically withdrawn from the southern AO. Withdrawal was completed at 191310H September. RLT-2 ROKMC, when firmly established ashore and by mutual consent between CATF and Commander Northern Landing Force, shifted operational control to CG SECOND ROKMC BEF at 191700H September for continued operations in the northern AO. At 191700H the AOA was dissolved and Operation DEFiant STAND terminated. ARG ALFA departed the area and prepared to offload BLT 1/26 on 20 September.

4. (C) Statistical Summary. Following are the significant statistical results of combat action in the AOA during Operation DEFiant STAND. More detailed statistics are included in enclosures attached.

a. Friendly Casualties.

(1) Non-Combat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>ROKMC</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
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(2) Combat (WIA)

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<th>USMC</th>
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<tr>
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(3) Killed in Action

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<tr>
<td>5</td>
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(4) Died of Wounds

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b. Enemy Casualties/Losses and Equipment Captured.

(1) KIA

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<th>USMC</th>
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<tr>
<td>44</td>
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(2) WIA

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<tbody>
<tr>
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(3) POW

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
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(4) Detained

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<tr>
<td>923</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>2875</td>
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(a) VC Infrastructure

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<tr>
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<th>ROKMC</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>11</td>
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</table>

6 CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) VC Sympathizer

ROKMC

USMC

TOTAL

---

(c) Civil Defender

7

19

26

(d) Innocent Civilian

913

1855

2768

(e) Returnees

1

0

1

(f) Chieu Hoi

1

0

1

(5) Individual Weapons

1

117

118

(6) Crew Served Weapons

0

3

3

---

Helicopter Operations HMM 265 and USS IWO JIMA

(1) Sorties

2105

127

2232

(2) Tasks

333

27

360

(3) Passengers Carried

4402

448

4850

(4) MEDEVACS

88

19*

107*

*(12 ROKMC to NSA Danang Hospital)

(5) Cargo Carried (Tons)

171.0

19.2

190.2

(6) Hours Flown

491

40.7

531.7

---

Augmenting Air Support Fixed Wing and Helicopter (FIRST MAW and HMM 164)

(1) Sorties

13

446

459

(2) Tasks

4

53

57

(3) Passengers Carried

0

1068

1068

(4) MEDEVACS

0

2

2

(5) Cargo (Tons)

0

310.1

310.1

(6) Hours Flown

14.3

223.0

237.3

---

5. (C) Conclusions.

a. Operation DEFIANT STAND was planned and conducted in accordance with current operation plans, orders, and amphibious doctrine. Logistic support and augmenting forces supplied by other SEVENTH Fleet and in-country units
was adequate to meet the requirements for this operation. The mission and objectives specified by COMSEVENTHFLT and CG, III MAF were successfully accomplished. Although the employment of the Republic of Korea Marine Corps in this operation marked their first combat assault landing in 19 years, the Korean Forces were found to be competent planners, highly motivated and trained, well disciplined and eager to participate. Their superb professionalism contributed in good measure to one of the most successful employments of the Amphibious Ready Group technique in recent history.

b. The following significant "FIRSTS" were achieved in Operation DEFIIANT STAI;

(1) First ROEMC amphibious assault operation in RVN.

(2) First USN/USMC/ROKMC combined amphibious assault since the Korean conflict (19 years ago).

(3) First time a single ARG has simultaneously embarked assault troops and equipment while remaining in combat support of forces actually engaged ashore.

(4) First time SENSORS were employed by an ARG/SLF team in an Amphibious Objective Area.

J. B. RANDOLPH
## Task Organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TG 76.4</th>
<th>Amphibious Ready Group ALFA</th>
<th>CAPT J. B. RANDOLPH, USN</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USS IWO JIMA (LPH 2)</td>
<td>COMPHIBRON THREE</td>
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<td>USS WASHBURN (LKA 108)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>USS COLONIAL (LSD 18)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>USS WHETSTONE (LSD 27)</td>
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<td>USS WASHTENAW CTY (LST 1166)</td>
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<td>SURGICAL TEAM ALFA</td>
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<td>TACRON TWELVE DET ALFA</td>
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<td>BJU ONE TEAM TWELVE DET FOXTROT</td>
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<td>ACU ONE DET ALFA</td>
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<td>BMU ONE DET ALFA TWO</td>
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<td>UDT TWELVE DET ECHO</td>
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<tr>
<th>TU 76.4.0</th>
<th>Command and Special Operation Unit</th>
<th>CAPT J. B. RANDOLPH, USN</th>
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<td>COMPHIBRON THREE</td>
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<tr>
<th>TE 76.4.0.1</th>
<th>Flagship Element</th>
<th>CAPT M. M. CASEY, Jr., USN</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>USS IWO JIMA (LPH 2)</td>
<td>CO, USS IWO JIMA (LPH 2)</td>
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<tr>
<th>TE 76.4.0.2</th>
<th>Tactical Air Control Element</th>
<th>LTC D. A. MCCOOLE, USA</th>
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<th>LTJG J. M. HOWARD, USNR</th>
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<th>Transport Area Defense Element</th>
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<th>ENS G. I. ARMSTRONG, USNR</th>
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<th>TU 76.4.1</th>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USS WASHTENAW CTY (LST 1166)</td>
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Enclosure (1) CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

TU 76.4.3 Cargo Unit
USS VACECTUNE (LKA 106)
CAPT R.R. DEMALDI, USN
CO, USS VACECTUNE (LKA 106)

TU 76.4.4 Waterborne Control Unit
USS COLONIAL (LSD 18)
USS WHITESTONE (LSD 27)
CDR D.P. HARR, USN
CO, USS COLONIAL (LSD 18)

TU 76.4.5 Heliborne Control Unit
USS IWO JIMA (LPH 2)
CAPT M.M. CASEY, Jr., USN
CO, USS IWO JIMA (LPH 2)

TG 79.4 Special Landing Force (7-16SEP)
Southern (17-19SEP)
BLT 1/26
HMM 265
COL W.C. DOTY, USMC
CO, SLF ALFA
LTCOL J.C. GOODIN, USMC
LTCOL R.F. GRAY, USMC

Northern Landing Force
RLT
RLT-2 SECOND ROKMC BDE
COL KOH, KWONG SOO, ROKMC
Chief of Staff 2nd ROKMC BDE
4. CTG 79.4 (COMMANDER SLF ALFA) EMBARKED IN USS IWO JIMA (LPH 2) DESIGNATED COMMANDER LANDING FORCE (CLF) OF SOUTHERN LANDING FORCE FOR USMC OPS. CHIEF OF STAFF 2ND ROKMC BDE EMBARKED IN IWO JIMA (LPH 2) DESIGNATED CLF NORTHERN LANDING FORCE FOR ROKMC OPS.

5. COMMAND RELATIONSHIP IAW PARA 3X.(2) AND (3) OF REF A. WHEN UNITS OF SECOND ROKMC BDE ARE FIRMLY ESTABLISHED ASHORE AND AT A TIME MUTUALLY AGREEABLE TO CATF AND CLF NORTHERN LANDING FORCE, ONE RLT OF 2ND ROKMC BDE WILL CHOP DIRECTLY TO CG 2ND ROKMC BDE.

6. COMUSMACV WILL PROVIDE ANTI-INFILTRATION/EXPILATION PATROL CRAFT FOR THIS OPERATION AND WILL PROVIDE CAS AND OTHER SUPPORT AS AGREED UPON WITH CATF IAW PARA 1B(1) OF REF A.

7. THE AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA (AOA) WILL BE PROMULGATED BY SEPARATE MESSAGE.

8. NICKNAME FOR THIS OPERATION WILL BE DEFIANT STAND WITH TENTATIVE S-DAY

9. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.
   A. WITHDRAWAL IAW ANNEX B TO REF A.
   B. EXPECTED LENGTH OF OPN IS TWELVE DAYS.
   C. S-DAY IS DAY FOR LANDING OF SLF ALFA IN SOUTHERN PORTION OF AOA AND D-DAY IS DAY FOR LANDING OF ROKMC IN NORTHERN PORTION OF AOA.

10. TERMINATION IAW ANNEX B TO REF A.

11. PUBLIC AFFAIRS IAW ANNEX V TO REF A.

12. DOWSIZED TO CONFIDENTIAL UPON TERMINATION.

GP-4
BT
2693

ENCLOSURE (2)
CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNNV PUSN13364
123143
0 290052Z AUG 69
FM COMSEVENTHFLT
TO CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
CTF SEVEN SIX
CTF SEVEN NINE
COMUSMACV
CG III MAF
INFO CNO
CMC
CINCPAC
CINCPACFLT
COMMNAVFORV
COMPHIBAC
CG FMFPAC
CG FMFPAC (FWD)
CG FIRST MAW
CG AMERICAN DIV
CG FIRST MARDIV
CTF ONE ONE FIVE

DECLASSIFIED

Page Two RHUGSAP2693 SECRET
CTF SEVEN THREE
CTF SEVEN SEVEN
CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE
CTG SEVEN NINE PT THREE
CMR SEVENTH AF
CG SECOND ROKMC BDE
ZEN/CTG SEVEN THREE PT FIVE
CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE
CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
ZEN/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE
NAVCAMS WESTPAC
NAVCOMMSTA WESTPAC
CTU SEVEN EIGHT PT ONE PT ONE
ET
SECRET
OPERATION DEFIANT STAND INITIATING DIRECTIVE (U)
A. MY OPLAN 101-69
B. NWP 22(B)
1. SITUATION: CG III MAF HAS REQUESTED THE EMPLOYMENT OF AN ARG/SLF IN SUPPORT
OF OPERATIONS IN THE ICTZ. COMSEVENTHFLT WILL PROVIDE TG 76.4/79.4 AND SUCH
OTHER FORCES AS MAY BE NECESSARY FOR THIS OPERATION. INITIATING DIRECTIVE IS FOR
PLANNING PURPOSES. THE OPERATION WHEN EXECUTED, WILL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH REF A AND B.
2. MISSION: COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (CATF) CONDUCT A COMBINED SEARCH
AND CLEAR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION EMPLOYING SLF ALFA AND ELEMENTS OF 2ND ROKMC
BRIGADE AGAINST VC/NVA FORCES IN AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA IN QUANG NAM AND
QUANG TIN PROVINCE OF ICTZ OR OTHER OPERATIONS AS AGREED UPON WITH CG III
MAF OR HIS DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE.
3. CTG 76.4 (COMPHIBRON 3) EMBARKED IN USS IWO JIMA (LPH 2) DESIGNATED CATF.

Enclosure (2)

DECLASSIFIED
OPERATION DEFIANT STAND AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA (U)
A. CG SEVEN SEVEN LT 290712Z AUG 69 FORAM
B. CTG 76-8 040530Z SEP 69 PASEP
1. MODIFY REF A TO REFLECT PRECISE DEFINITION OF AOA AS SET FORTH IN REF B.
GP-4
BT 5485

REQUEST FOR CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT OF ARG/SLF ALFA (U)
A. CG III MAF 060412Z SEP 69
B. CG SEVEMENFTFLT 060558Z SEP 69
1. RECOMMENDATION SET FORTH REF A TO ADVANCE 5 DAYS TO 7 SEPT APPROVED.
REF B MODIFIED INITIATIVELY INpector FOR OPN DEFIANT STAND ACCORDINGLY.
GP-4
BT 0726
CONFIDENTIAL

OTPSYXYN RUYPKXG2108 2470540-SSSS--RULJSPA RUYPSYD RULAOAJA RUYPSYE
RUMLLIB RUYPSYF RUMBGK RUMPAA RUYPSYM RUMPSAA RUMCSDG,
ZNY SSSS ZYO RUMPSSH
O P 040530Z SEP 69
FM CTC SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
to RULJSPA/COMSEVENTHFLT
INFO RUYPSYD/CG III MAF
ZEN/CTF SEVEN SIX
RULAOAJA/CTF SEVEN NINE
RUYPSYE/CG FIRST MARDIV
RUMLLIB/CG AMERICAN DIV
RUYPSYF/CG FIRST MAN
RUMBGK/CG SECOND ROKMC BDE
RUMPAA/CTF ONE ONE FIVE
RUYPSYM/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT
RUMPSAA/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT EIGHT PT NINE
RUMCSDG/CTG ONE ONE FIVE PT ONE
ZEN/CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR
ZEN/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR
RUMPSAA/USS TAUSSIG
BT
SECRET.
OPERATION DEFIANT STAND

PAGE 2 RUYPKXG2108 SECRET
AMPLIFYING INFO CONCERNING AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA (C)
A. COMSEVENTHFLT 290052Z AUG 69 (NOTAL)
B. COMSEVENTHFLT 290712Z AUG 69 (NOTAL)
1. (S) DURING COORDINATION CONFERENCES BETWEEN CTF 76.4/794
AND REPS CG III MAF, CG 2ND ROKMC BDE, CG FIRST MARDIV AND CG
AMERICAN DIV THE PRECISE DEFINITION OF THE AOA FOR SUBJ OPERATION
HAS BEEN MUTUALLY AGREED UPON AS FOLLOWS:
A. SEAWARD AOA: AN AREA ENCOMPASSED ON THE NORTHWEST BY A LINE
DRAWN 050 DEG TRUE FROM BT 096680/9 FOR A DISTANCE OF FIFTEEN
MILES, ON THE SOUTHEAST BY A LINE DRAWN 050 DEG TRUE FROM BT
292391/6 FOR A DISTANCE OF FIFTEEN MILES AND ON THE NORTHEAST
BY A LINE CONNECTING THE SEAWARD END OF THE NORTHWEST AND SOUTH
EAST BOUNDARIES. THE SURFACE AREA OF THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS IS
EXCLUDED.
B. LANDWARD AOA: THAT LAND AREA ENCOMPASSED BY A LINE DRAWN
THROUGH THE FOLLOWING GRID COORDINATED AND GEOGRAPHICAL TERRAIN
FEATURES (ALL GRID COORDINATES ST) AT THE SOUTH CHI'NA SEA FROM
220576/2, SW ALONG THE CHA DAI RIVER TO 172542/1, SW TO 165532/2,
TO 160530/5, WEST TO 150530/4, SW TO 145523/0 SOUTH TO 144513/R,
SW TO 133505/7, SOUTH FOLLOWING THE SONG LYLY RIVER TO 146460/1.

PAGE 3 RUYPKXG2108 SECRET
SE TO 175443/4 NE TO THE TROUNG GIANG RIVER AT 220460/4 THENCE
NE ALONG CURVING TRAIL TO SHORE LINE AT 243480/1 THE LANDWARD
AOA WILL BE SUBDIVIDED INTO THE NORTHERN AO AND THE SOUTHERN
AO BY A LINE DRAWN THROUGH THE FOLLOWING GRID POINTS (ALL ST)

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BEGINNING AT THE DING RIVER AT 144480/1, EAST ALONG THE 48
GRID LINE TO 183500/7, EAST TO 190503/8, TO
200503/9, TO 210520/3 TO 220523/4, THENCE EAST
TO JUNCTION OF PROVINCIAL BOUNDARY WITH SOUTH CHINA SEA.
C. AIR SPACE: THAT AIR SPACE OVER THE LANDWARD AND SEAWARD AOA
FROM 0 TO 25,000 FT USA. FREE AIR TRANSIT WILL BE GRANTED FROM
7,000 FT.
D. THE LANDING FORCE FOR THE LANDWARD AOA IS ASSIGNED TO COM-
MANDER LANDING FORCE (SOUTHERN) FOR ROKMC OPERATIONS AND THE
SOUTHERN COMMANDED TO COMMANDER LANDING FORCE (SOUTH)
FOR USMC OPERATIONS.
2. (C) REQUIREMENTS WILL BE MODIFIED TO REFLECT DEFINITION OF
AOA AS DUTY FOR PLANNING CONFERENCES.
GP-4
BT
2108

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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

24 AUG 1969

Received first indication from CG, III MAF that an amphibious operation was contemplated in the near future.

25 AUG 1969

CTG 76.4/79.4 staff representatives attended combined planning conference with representatives III MAF and SECOND ROKMC BDE at SECOND ROKMC BDE HQ.

26 AUG 1969

0930H - CTG 79.4 and CTG 76.4 representatives conducted liaison visit to III MAF concerning impending combined USMC/ROKMC operation.

1300H - Representatives from SECOND ROKMC BDE visited IWO JIMA (LPH 2) for familiarization shipboard facilities.

27 AUG 1969

0015H - Received CG III MAF proposal to CONSEVENTHFLT for SPECOPS.

0230H - Received CONSEVENTHFLT concurrence for employment ARG/BLF ALFA.

1802H - Requested assignment MGFS 5"/38 DD from CTU 70.8.9

28 AUG 1969

0050H - Request submitted to CG III MAF for aerial reconnaissance of proposed AOA.

0930H - CTG 79.4 submitted request to CG III MAF for BLT 1/26 augmenting units; interpreters, interrogation teams, scout dog teams and Kit Carson Scouts.

1000H - CTG 76.4/CTG 79.4 and staff members conferred with CG III MAF staff concerning operation.

1947H - CTG 79.4 submitted request to CG III MAF for BLT 1/26 augmenting equipment; LVT Tank retriever and crawler crane.

2002H - Submitted amplifying information to CONSEVENTHFLT for initiating directive.

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29 AUG 1969

1345H - Received initiating directive from COMSEVENTHFLT nicknaming the operation DEFIANT STAND and designating CTG 76.4 as CATF; CTG 79.4 as Commander Southern Landing Force and CG SECOND ROKMC BDE as Commander Northern Landing Force.

31 AUG 1969

0001H - USS COLONIAL (LSD 18) joined TG 76.4

0851H - CNO ADM Thomas A. MOORER and party including COMSEVENTHFLT and CTF 76 visited ARG ALFA.

1 SEP 1969

2042H - Request for combat air Support submitted to CG III MAF/CG FIRST MAW.

ARG ALFA maneuvered to position south of Danang from Typhoon DORIS evasion.

2 SEP 1969

0800H - ARG ALFA returned to OPAREA to seaward of Danang from typhoon evasion.

1000H - CTG 76.4/CTG 79.4 staff representatives conferred with CG III MAF and CG SECOND ROKMC BDE staff concerning operation.

3 SEP 1969

0900H - CTG 76.4/CTG 79.4 and CG III MAF conducted planning liaison meeting with CG SECOND ROKMC BDE.

0905H - USS WASHTENAW CTY (LST 1166) joined TG 76.4 and USS CLEVELAND (LSD 7) departed TG 76.4 for duty as CTF 76 Flagship.

4 SEP 1969

1500H - Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Honorable James D. HITTLE, visited ARG ALFA.

5 SEP 1969

0930H - CTG 76.4/CTG 79.4 staff representatives conducted liaison planning visit with CG III MAF representatives concerning operation. NOTAM request submitted to COMUSMACV and DIRECTOR TACC SEVENTH AF.

1000H - CO, BLT 1/26 and SLF ALFA representatives made aerial reconnaissance of proposed landward AOA.

1330H - CTF 76/CTF 79 visited ARG ALFA for brief concerning operation.
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6 SEP 1969

0930H - CTG 76.4/CTG 79.4 and staff representatives conducted final pre-operation visit to CG III MAF and conducted liaison visit to province officials headquarters in Tam Ky.

1010-1100H - RADM F. B. VORIF (MC), CINCPACFLT Medical Officer, visited IMO JIMA.

1200H - Notified S-Day to be 7 vice 8 September.

1600H - Conducted pre-operation briefing for ARG ALFA unit commanders onboard flagship in Danang.

1917H - CATF (CTG 76.4) confirmed D-Day and readiness to conduct the operation.

7 SEP 1969 - (S-Day - USMC operations commence)

0001H - WHETSTONE assumed duties of UDT control ship.

0100H - WHETSTONE entered AOA to conduct UDT clandestine beach survey of GREEN Beach. UDT operated from PBR provided by CTG 115.1.

0100-0400H - CLEVELAND conducted false UDT beach survey in support of S-Day operations.

0400H - CATF directed "land the waterborne landing force."

0501H - CATF confirmed H and L hours.

0645-0654H - TAUSSIG conducted NGF prep GREEN Beach and beach support area.

0650-0705H - Conducted air prep of GREEN Beach and beach support area.

0702H - Wave ONE (10 LVT's) carrying ALFA and BRAVO Companies touched down.

0715H - CATF directed "land the heliborne landing force."

0745-0759H - TAUSSIG conducted NGF prep LZ QUAIL.

0800H - CATF directed L-Hour be delayed due to heavy rain squalls.

0805-0820H - Conducted air prep LZ QUAIL.

0902H - CHARLIE Company landed in LZ QUAIL. (L-Hour as delayed by CATF)

0917-0929H - TAUSSIG conducted NGF prep LZ EAGLE.

1015-1032H - Conducted air prep LZ EAGLE.

1025H - Completed helicopter insertion of CHARLIE Company in LZ QUAIL.

1037H - Commenced insertion of DELTA Company in LZ EAGLE.

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1217H - Completed helicopter insertion of DELTA Company in LZ EAGLE.

1217H - Landing of all assault elements completed.

1220H - Commenced helo insertion of BLT 1/26 Command Group vicinity of GREEN Beach.

1300H - Completed insertion of BLT 1/26 Command Group. Scheduled ship to shore movement complete.

8 SEP 1969

0001H - ARG ALFA continued support of BLT 1/26 ashore.

1300H - CTF 76 visited CTG 76.4 and CTG 79.4 for planning/liaison.

9 SEP 1969

0001H - ARG ALFA continued support of BLT 1/26 ashore.

0900H - Commenced embark of BLT 2, SECOND ROKMC BDE aboard ARG ships by assault craft and helicopters from vicinity SECOND ROKMC BDE Command Post. (GRID BT 136526).

0930H - CTG 79.4 visited CG, III MAF for planning and liaison.

1300H - TAUSSEIG rearmed from PARICUTIN.

10 SEP 1969

0001H - ARG ALFA continued support of BLT 1/26 ashore.

0800H - Commenced shipboard amphibious operations familiarization training onboard ARG ships for BLT 2 ROKMC.

0830H - CG SECOND ROKMC BDE visited CTG 76.4/CTG 79.4/BLT 2 ROKMC for briefing/liaison.

0855H - WASHBURN/WHETSTONE/TAUSSEIG refueled and received fleet freight from MANATEE.

1000H - TAUSSEIG rearmed from PARICUTIN.

1325-1800H - WHETSTONE/WASHTENAW CTY conducted INREP Danang and loaded BLT 1/26 resupply.

11 SEP 1969

0001H - ARG ALFA continued support BLT 1/26 ashore.

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0630 - TG 76.4 conducted surface ship to shore movement rehearsal and
INO JIMA conducted helicopter embark drills for training of
RLT 2 ROKMC.

1715H - CTG 76.4/CTG 79.4/RLT 2 ROKMC hosted Republic of Korea Ambassador
to RVN, CG III MAF, CG ARVN ICTZ RVN, CG ROKF-V, VICE CG ROKF-V,
CG SECOND ROKMC BDE and COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT aboard INO JIMA.

0800-1800H - WASHBURN conducted INREP Dansang and loaded BLT 1/26 resupply.

2030H - CATF confirmed D-Day and readiness to conduct the operation.

12 SEP 1969

0001H - ARG ALFA continued support of BLT 1/26 ashore.

0215H - CATF conducted clandestine check survey of RED Beach from CTG 113.1
PCF.

0500-0745H - CTG 76.5 with ARG BRAVO conducted deception operations offshore
Barrier Island south of the AOA in support of D-Day operations.

0715H - CATF directed "land the heliborne landing force".

0730H - CATF directed "land the waterborne landing force".

0730H - Korean Ambassador to RVN, Honorable SHIN, Sang Chul, CG ROKF-V,
VICE CG ROKF-V, CG III MAF, CG SECOND ROKMC BDE arrive aboard
Task Group ships to observe the ROKMC landing.

0752-0759H - Conducted air prep LZ SPARROW.

0800H - Company 25 - 5/2 ROKMC landed LZ SPARROW.

0808-0824H - Conducted air prep LZ DOVE.

0825H - Company 26 - 5/2 ROKMC landed in LZ DOVE.

0917-0930H - TAUSSIG conducted NGF prep RED Beach.

0905H - Company 27 - 5/2 ROKMC landed in LZ SPARROW.

0928H - Wave ONE (11-LVT's) carrying RLT 2/2 ROKMC landed at RED Beach.
(M-Hour minus 2 minutes)

1100H - Landing of all assault elements completed.

1300H - TAUSSIG rearmed from VIRGO.

13 SEP 1969

0001H - ARG ALFA continued support of BLT 1/26 and RLT-2 ROKMC ashore.
0930H - ARVN CG ICTZ, CG III MAF and C/S III MAF visited CTG 76.4/CTG 79.4 for brief.

1250H - COLONIAL/WHETSTONE/TAUSSIG conducted VERTREP with NIAGARA FALLS.

1300H - CTG 76.4/CTG 79.4 conducted liaison visit to III MAF.

14 SEP 1969

0001H - ARG ALFA continued support of BLT 1/26 and RLT-2 ROKMC ashore.

0810H - CG SECOND ROKMC BDE aboard Flagship for visit with RLT 2 SECOND ROKMC BDE.

1500H - COMNAVCOM, RADM F. J. FITZPATRICK, and party and CTG 76 visited Flagship for communications briefings by CTG 76.4/CO, TWO JIMA.

1900H - COLONIAL/TAUSSIG refueled from CHIPOLA.

15 SEP 1969

0001H - ARG ALFA continued support of BLT 1/26 and RLT-2 ROKMC ashore.

1300H - TAUSSIG rearmed from VIRGO and conducted VERTREP with CAMDEN.

0830-1800H - WHETSTONE in Danang for INREP and loading of BLT 1/26 resupply.

1130H - CTG 76.5 visited CTG 76.4 for brief on operation.

1330H - CTG 79.4 conducted liaison with III MAF and FIRST MARDIV.

16 SEP 1969

0001H - ARG ALFA continued support of BLT 1/26 and RLT-2 ROKMC ashore.

0900H - CG SECOND ROKMC BDE visited CTG 76.4/CTG 79.4/RLT 2 ROKMC for brief.

17 SEP 1969

0001H - ARG ALFA continued support of BLT 1/26 and RLT-2 ROKMC ashore.

1110H - COL C. W. BOYD, Jr., USMC relieved COL V. C. DOTY, Jr., USMC as Commander SLF ALFA/CTG 79.4.

1500H - CTG 79.4 conducted liaison visit to III MAF FIRST MAF and FIRST MARDIV.

1600-1900H - COLONIAL/WHETSTONE conducted INREP in Danang.

1700H - COLONIAL offloaded portion of BLT 1/26 vehicles in Danang not required for operation.
18 SEP 1969

0001H - ARG ALFA continued support of BLT 1/26 and RLT-2 ROKMC ashore.

0800-1800H - WASHBURN/Colonial in Danang for offload selective BLT 1/26 equipment for overland movement to BLT 2/26 field positions.

0830H - TAUSSIG refueled from GUADALUPE.

0900H - Backloaded selective elements of BLT 1/26 to COLONIAL/WASHTENAW CTY/WHETSTONE.

0930H - CTG 76.4/CTG 79.4 conducted liaison/planning visit with CG III MAF representatives concerning withdrawal and offload of BLT 1/26.

1230H - RLT-2 ROKMC Commander and Staff departed TWO JIMA for relocation in northern AOA ashore.

19 SEP 1969

0001H - ARG ALFA continued support of BLT 1/26 and RLT-2 ROKMC ashore.

0700H - Commenced tactical withdrawal BLT 1/26 equipment by surface and helicopter movement.

0800-1800H - WASHBURN continued offload BLT 1/26 equipment in Danang for relocation to new field position.

0900H - Transferred COMSEC Team TWO to NEW ORLEANS.

1319H - Completed tactical withdrawal of BLT 1/26.

1700H - TAUSSIG chopper to OPCON CTU 70.8.9

1700H - RLT-2 ROKMC chopper to OPCON CG SECOND ROKMC 3DE.

1700H - Dissolved the AOA, terminated Operation DEFIANT STAND and all units departed the area in preparation for offloading BLT 1/26.
1. (C) On 24 August 1969 while CG 76.4/79.4 were conducting routine

liaisons with CG III MAF staff personnel the Commanding General’s idea

of a combined ROKMC/USMC amphibious assault operation was initially

discussed.

2. (C) On 29 August 1969, CG, III MAF requested and received approval

for the employment of ARG/SLF ALFA from COMSEVENTHFLT. Simultaneously

CG, SECOND ROKMC BDE assigned RLT-2 as the ROKMC assault forces in the

forthcoming combined operation. The proposed operation was to conduct

a search and clear operation to return an area located on Northern

Barrier Island in the Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces to normal

commerce under the accelerated pacification program. This area is

located about 16 miles southeast of Danang on the south side of the Song

Ong Dai River.

3. (C) The initial planning conference was conducted 25 August with

representatives of CG SECOND ROKMC BDE and CG, III MAF plus the USMC

Military Advisors to the SECOND ROKMC BDE at the SECOND ROKMC BDE

Headquarters. At this meeting the broad outlines of the ROKMC and

USMC participation in the combined operation were discussed and a

series of follow on planning conferences were scheduled. The dates

to commence the operation, total length, termination and command and

control problems were discussed. A firm understanding was quickly

reached that the Commander Northern Landing Force would be CG, ROKMC

and the Commander Southern Landing Force would be CSLF ALFA

both working in parallel with CATF (CARG ALFA) during the planning

and both reporting to CATF during the execution phase.

4. (C) On 26 August the beginning of a series of planning conferences

commenced at the Headquarters SECOND ROKMC BDE. As this was to be the

first amphibious assault operation for the ROKMC in Vietnam and further

the first combined ROKMC/USMC amphibious assault since the Korean

War ended, many details were to be solved and much understanding was

to be required. Patience, cooperation, and appreciation for various

positions was the watchword. These planning conferences continued on

a daily basis until 1 September when ARG ALFA maneuvered to evade

Typhoon DORIS. Returning to the Danang area on 2 September, planning

resumed at full tilt. Possibly the biggest single problem was the proper

scheduling, staging and embarking of the ROKMC personnel and equipment

in ARG ALFA ships. This was further complicated as USS CLEVELAND

(LPD 7) departed ARG ALFA on 3 September to become CTF 76. Flagship.

This of course meant reshuffling her load to two augmenting ARG ships. USS

COLONIAL (LSD 18) became an ARG ALFA member on 31 August and USS

WASHINGTON COUNTY (LST 116) joined the ARG on 3 September.

These conferences resulted in:

a. Establishment of S-Day 8 September as the initial assault

day for the Southern Landing Force (SLF ALFA).
b. Establishment of D-Day 12 September as the initial assault day for the Northern Landing Force (RLT-2 ROKMC).

d. Coordination of the scheme of maneuver for BLT 1/26 and RLT-2.

d. Location of friendly USMC/ROKMC/RVN Popular Forces/AMERICAL DIV Forces and enemy units.

e. Designation of safe fire, no fire, and coordinated fire areas.

f. Coordination for control of artillery, naval gunfire and close air support.

g. Exchange of liaison personnel.

h. Delineation of communication requirements and location of equipment aboard ships for RLT-2.

i. Producing a workable orderly Embark Plan for RLT-2.

j. Structuring assault craft/wave diagrams for RLT-2.

k. Scheduling embark day as 9 September for RLT-2.

l. Scheduling 10 September for shipboard training and familiarization for RLT-2.

m. Scheduling 11 September as a full rehearsal day for ARG ALFA/RLT-2.

n. Selecting proper assault beaches and providing for check surveys to be conducted.

o. Selecting a proper beach for Embark Day adjacent to the SECOND ROKMC BDE Command Post and accomplishing a full daylight survey to determine suitability.

p. Establish procedures whereby ARG ALFA ships would be reimbursed for food costs during the period RLT-2 would be embarked.

q. Establishing a PSYOPS program.

r. Plans being formulated for BLT 1/26 to use sensors. A first for ARG/SLF operations ashore in an AOA.

s. Mutual support agreement by CTG 115.1 to provide WPB type craft for seaward exfiltration and NGFS support, and PCF type craft for river exfiltration and close fire support.

t. Airlift support agreements were made with CG FIRST MAW representatives.
5. (C) Prior to the planning phase ARG/SLF ALFA hosted CMO, ADM MOORER and his party plus COMSEVENTHFLT, VADM BRINGLE and CTF 76, RADM ROSENBERG for a visit aboard IWO JIMA, WHETSTONE, and CLEVELAND on 21 August. This was followed by a visit on 4 September from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) Honorable James D. HITTLE accompanied by COMSEVENTHFLT. On 6 September, the pre-assault day, ARG/ALFA hosted a visit by CINCPACFLT Medical Officer, RADM F. B. VORIS (MC) in the AM and conducted pre-assault day briefings in the PM.

6. (C) A formal final planning conference with ARG/SLF ALFA was hosted by CO, RLT-2 ROKMC at SECOND ROKMC BDE Headquarters 3 September 1969 with representatives from CG III MEF, CG FIRST MAF and the USMC Military Advisors to the SECOND ROKMC BDE. Presentations/discussions were conducted by CATF and each Landing Force Commander. Final agreements were reached as to coordination/liaison and mutual support requirements were clarified. Mutual agreements were made on the following:

   a. The Landward AOA, its outer perimeter, dividing boundary between northern and southern sectors and a no fire segment.

   b. Location of friendly forces operating in the immediate vicinity of the AOA.

   c. Air support requirements.

   d. Prepositioning of one battalion of the SECOND ROKMC BDE to the west of the Northern Landing Force Commander's AOA.

   e. Exchange of liaison officers including the USMC Military Advisors.

   f. A beach support area would be established in the Southern sector of the AOA at Red Beach. In the Northern sector at Green Beach no beach support area was to be permanently established but would be activated by the GREEN Beach PCS as required.

   g. Resupply support for BLT 1/26 would be via HMM 265 helicopter aboard IWO JIMA and via assault craft over RED Beach.

   h. Resupply support for RLT-2 would be made utilizing FIRST MAF assigned helicopters from in-country assets and by assault craft over GREEN Beach when required.

   i. MEDEVACS - HMM 265 would provide all medevac helos and would transfer USMC casualties to IWO JIMA. ROKMC casualties would be flown to Danang Hospital during daylight hours but would be flown to IWO JIMA in the event of night emergencies, then transferred to Danang Hospital whenever their condition would allow.
7. (C) Planning for the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA).
   a. In establishing the AOA the following general requirements were considered:
      (1) Sufficient land area to provide for free movement and fire
          support to prevent exfiltration.
      (2) No fire area in vicinity of RVN Popular Force located in
          extreme northeast tip of AOA.
      (3) Location of a mutually acceptable/supportable boundary between
          USMC and ROKMC sectors of the AOA.
      (4) Selecting a fire support area to permit the NGFS ships to have
          clear gun target lines.
      (5) Not to restrict normal coastal shipping in and out of Danang.
      (6) Not to restrict normal air traffic in and out of Danang.
      (7) Permit free air transit over 7000 feet above the AOA.

8. (C) CTU 70.8.9 provided naval gunfire support by assigning USS TAUSIG
      (DD 746) for the entire operation.

9. (C) CTG 115.1 provided routine surveillance/exfiltration support along
    the Song Cua Dai River and provided WPB craft in the seaward AOA for
    exfiltration and NGFS purposes plus PCP provided UDT insertion security.

10. (C) Coordination of air control was effected by direct liaison of ARG/
     SLF ALFA staff representatives with the following agencies:
      a. CG, III MAF
      b. CG, FIRST MAF
      c. CG, SECOND ROKMC BDE (USMC ANGLICO Platoon)
      d. Horn DASC

11. (C) Sensors were used for the first time in an ARG/SLF ALFA amphibious
    assault operation during Operation-DEFIANT STAND. Prior to this operation
    15 persons (2 each from ARG/SLF ALFA staffs and 11 from BLT 1/26) were
    provided in-country training by G-3, Special Projects Branch, III MAF at
    the Hoa Cam Training Compound (ARVN training center). This same branch
    obtained the sensors from the COMUSMACV storage facility at Cam Ranh
    Bay. The BLT was issued 10 MINISIDS, 11 PSIDS, one PORTATALE and extra
    batteries. An installation for the PORTATALE was made aboard TWO JJMA
    for readout information. The BLT implanted the MINISIDS on 8 September
    at known/suspected VC/NVA crossing sites. The PSIDS were implanted to
    provide security for CP's and to enhance the effectiveness/security of the
    USMC night patrols and ambushes. The rapid establishment of BLT 1/26 CP
ashore and the short range line of sight capability indicated that the
PORTATALE could be more effectively used at the BLT CP. Briefly it can
be said that these sensors/MINISIDS/PSIDS were effective, worked well
and were considered a definite asset by the CO BLT 1/26.

12. (C) CG III MAF at 1212H on 6 September recommended to COMSEVENTHFLT
that Operation DEFIANT STAND be advanced to commence on 7 September due
to an impending three day truce that would probably commence on 8 September.
ARG/SLF ALFA reported ready, requested that the NGFS and CAS be provided
and that the NOTAM be released 24 hours earlier to meet the new S-Day.
COMSEVENTHFLT approved the recommended change at 1358H 6 September. The
necessary liaison was completed with all supporting commands by 1600H
and the pre-sail conference for ARG ALFA ships was held aboard IWO JIMA.
Each member of the ARG/SLF ALFA team responded in prompt "can do" manner—a fine tribute to their professional flexibility and exceptional readiness
to conduct the operation.

13. (C) Coordination and cooperation was achieved at all levels of the
planning and execution phases of the operation by direct and personal
liaison of ARG/SLF ALFA and RLT-2 ROKMC staff representatives with
operating forces down to the company level. Prompt and effective liaison,
combined with understanding and patience, resulted in early resolution of
the many coordinated command decisions required in this the first USMC/
ROKMC combined amphibious operation to be conducted in the present
conflict in the Republic of Vietnam. The remarkable results achieved
through many hours of direct personal coordination were indicative of
the true amphibious professionalism with which each task was accomplished.
1. (C) Intelligence preparation for Operation DEFIANT STAND was simplified considerably by the fact that Operations DARING REBEL and BOLD PURSUIT were conducted in the area selected for the AOA in recent months. The intelligence summaries and reports of activities for these two operations formed the basis for intelligence material disseminated to all concerned. All that remained to be done to assemble a "complete intelligence package" was to update order-of-battle information, select assault beaches based upon UDT surveys and previous experience in the area, and update such variable data as hydrography, astronomical data, and expected weather and surf conditions. All of this information was assembled, processed and disseminated to all concerned in the form of a Joint CTG 76.4/79.4 Intelligence Summary issued on 3 September 1969.

2. (C) Aerial photography of the AOA was requested through III MAF (G-2, Collections Branch) and two missions were flown in response to the request. The first mission was flown on 29 August 1969 by the 14th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing and the second flown on 4 September 1969 by Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron ONE of FIRST MAF. The mission flown on 29 August was used by the III MAF Photo/Imagery Interpretation Center (P/IIC), G-2 Collections Branch to provide the following:

   a. Photo mosaic of AOA.
   b. Overlay of trail system within the AOA (southern portion).
   c. Overlay/study of helicopter landing zones in southern portion of AOA.
   d. Overlay of enemy defenses within the AOA.

The mission flown on 4 September provided large scale up-to-date photography to BLT 1/26 of the area where blocking positions were to be established. In addition, a photo mosaic of each company operating area was compiled by the SLF S-2 and distributed to the companies concerned. ROKMC RLT-2 was provided two additional sets of prints of that portion of the mission which covered the area of the AOA assigned to RLT-2, SECOND ROKMC Brigade.

3. (C) Dissemination of initial intelligence and all subsequent intelligence received was complicated by the fact that two separate landing forces were involved in Operation DEFIANT STAND one of which was basically a non-English speaking foreign organization. However, enough of the officers of the SECOND ROKMC Brigade spoke English so that any problems that arose in that regard were minor in nature and easily resolved.

4. (C) Operation DEFIANT STAND was somewhat unique in that two assault beaches within the AOA separated by a considerable distance were assaulted on separate occasions by two separate landing forces. As in Operation BOLD.

Enclosure (5)
CONFIDENTIAL
PURSUIT, it was decided early in the planning phase to use CTG 115.1 PCF's as insertion/recovery vehicles for UDT conducting check surveys of the assault beaches. Accordingly, CTG 115.1 made available one PCF during the early morning hours of both S-Day (7 September) and D-Day (12 September) for that purpose. Embarkation of UDT TWELVE Det ECHO was made from the Rock Crusher Pier at Danang (coordinates 12°20'N 108°25'E) at about 0011H on 6 September for transport to and survey of GREEN Beach; and from USS COLONIAL (LSD 18) located approximately 15°58'N 108°25'E at about 0001H on 12 September for transport to and survey of RED Beach. The first check survey was accomplished without incident and verified the accuracy of previous surveys. The second check survey, however, was intentionally aborted due to interference by a friendly unit. This occurred shortly after embarkation of the UDT from COLONIAL at midnight on 12 September as the PCF was approaching RED Beach. The Coast Guard WPB assigned from CTG 115.1 for AOA security detected the PCF in the vicinity of the beach and believing it to be an exfiltrating enemy craft, as had been detected several times previously, closed to identify and intercept. Upon closing sufficiently the WPB illuminated the PCF thus possibly compromising the UDT mission. However, after returning to COLONIAL, it was decided to try again and thus a second attempt was tried about 0215H which was accomplished without further incident. The successful accomplishment of clandestine check surveys of each of the assault beaches once again proved the validity of using PCF's as UDT insertion/recovery vehicles in a combat environment. However, the inadvertent possible compromise of the UDT mission pointed out the continuing importance of insuring that all concerned are aware of activities affecting them and that the necessary coordination is accomplished.

5. (U) Overall weather support and forecasts were provided by the meteorology unit on the flagship. Surf forecasts were requested from Fleet Weather Central, Guam, utilizing the format contained in CTF 76 OpOrder 201-68, Annex W, and proved to be accurate.

6. (U) No EEI's other than those contained in CTG 76.4 OPLAN 101A-69, Annex C, were imposed on subordinate units for collection with the exception of determining beach data by UDT as mentioned above. All intelligence contained in the Joint Intelligence Estimate proved to be accurate and comprehensive.

Enclosure (5)
A. MEDICAL

a. (C) The USS KNO JIMA was designated as the casualty receiving ship for all U.S. Marines. ROK Marine casualties were to be treated aboard KNO JIMA only at night, while during daytime hours casualties were to be taken to NSA Hospital, Danang. Medical Officers on board consisted of:

(1) SURGICAL TEAM
(a) CDR J.J. RYSKAMP, JR. OINC
(b) LCDR R.P. AMBUR
(c) LCDR T.C. BROWN
(d) LT T.J. FAHEY
(e) ENS W.K. CARAWAY (NURSE ANESTHETIST)

(2) SHIP'S MEDICAL OFFICER
(f) LT P.P. FARMER

(3) CLEARING PLATOON
(g) LT R.E. BATTMER
(h) LT R.P. KING

(4) BATTALION SURGEON
(i) LT E. VONDERREID

(5) FLIGHT SURGEON
(j) LT S.A. WILSON

b. (C) Most wounds were due to fragments and missiles. One ROK Marine died of a missile wound traversing the chest and penetrating both sides of the diaphragm, stomach and the liver. Eventual death was attributed to blood loss from the shattered liver.

c. (C) In the summary of major wounds as to site, many casualties had multiple injuries and therefore only the principle wound is listed.

d. (C) Casualty Statistics

(1) BLOOD
(a) Units on hand prior to the operation 4
(b) Units received from NSA 115
(c) Fresh blood donors 20
(d) Total on hand 139
(e) Total units x-matched 40
(f) Total units transfused 22
(g) Total units discarded 0
(h) Total patients x-matched 7

Enclosure (6)
(i) Total patients transfused 
(j) Transfusion reactions 
(k) Returned to NSA on 13 September 
(l) Returned to NSA on 20 September 
(m) Units remaining on hand 

(2) SUMMARY OF CASUALTY STATISTICS:

(a) TOTAL CASUALTIES RECEIVED 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Non-Combat</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Wounded in Action (WIA) (Includes 3 ROK's)</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Killed in Action (KIA) (Includes 1 ROK)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Died of Wounds (DOW) (1 ROK)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) NON-COMBAT CLASSIFIED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Count</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Burns</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Concussion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Contusions</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Dental</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Diarrhea</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Fracture</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. FUO</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Infection</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Lesions of feet</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Lacerations</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Perforated Eardrum</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Puncture Wound</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Rat Bite</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Possible Snake Bite</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Sprains</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Warts</td>
<td>1</td>
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</table>

(c) COMBAT CLASSIFIED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Count</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. MISSILE WOUNDS</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Major (Includes 2 ROK's)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Minor (Includes 2 ROK's)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. SITE OF MAJOR WOUNDS</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Upper Extremities</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Lower Extremities</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Chest</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. FRACTURES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Phalanges</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Enclosure (6)
b. Fibula 1
  c. Humerus 1

4. NON-MISSION WOUNDS
   a. Burns (White Phosphorous) 6
   b. Contusions 1
   c. Psychogenic Shock 1

(d) OPERATIVE CASES PERFORMED (INITIAL RX ONLY)
   1. Major (1 ROK) 5
   2. Minor (2 ROK) 3

(e) MAJOR SURGICAL PROCEDURES
   1. Debridement of Multiple Shrapnel Wounds 2
   2. Debridement of Gunshot Wounds to Arm and Ankle 1
   3. Debridement of Multiple Shrapnel Wounds with Left Subtotal Orchiectomy & Repair of Avulsed Right Thumb 1
   4. Open Thoracotomy & Bilateral Thoracostomy with Chest Tube Insertion 1

(f) SUMMARY OF OR ANESTHESIA (INITIAL RX ONLY)
   1. General 5
   2. Axillary Block 3
   3. Spinal 1*
   *One patient had a spinal and axillary block

(g) DISPOSITION
   1. Treated and Released 45
   2. Admitted to Sick Bay (3 ROK's) 24
   3. Triage and Transferred (1 Civilian) 2
   4. Discharged to Duty 16
   5. Transferred 8
   6. Died of Wounds (1 ROK Marine) 1
   7. Transferred: (to care of the dead) 7
   8. Remaining in Sickbay end of operation 4

B. LOGISTICS

1. (C) REPLACEMENT: During DEFIANT STAND the following replacements were conducted providing support to ARG ALFA and gunfire support ships:

Enclosure (6)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SHIP</th>
<th>RECEIVED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 Sep</td>
<td>KENNEBEC (AO 36)</td>
<td>Fuel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Sep</td>
<td>PARICUTIN (AE 18)</td>
<td>Ammo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Sep</td>
<td>MANATEE (AO 58)</td>
<td>Fuel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Sep</td>
<td>PARICUTIN (AE 18)</td>
<td>Ammo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Sep</td>
<td>VIRGO (AE 30)</td>
<td>Ammo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Sep</td>
<td>NIAGARA FALLS (AFS 3)</td>
<td>Stores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Sep</td>
<td>CHIPOLA (AO 63)</td>
<td>Fuel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Sep</td>
<td>VIRGO (AE 30)</td>
<td>Ammo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Sep</td>
<td>CAMDEN (AOE 2)</td>
<td>Ammo, Stores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Sep</td>
<td>GUADALUPE (AO 32)</td>
<td>Fuel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Sep</td>
<td>GUADALUPE (AO 32)</td>
<td>Fuel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. (C) SIGNIFICANT MATERIAL CASUALTIES: USS WASHTENAW COUNTY (LST 1166) experienced a bow door operating arm casualty on 7 September 1969, prior to H-hour, when the doors were opened prematurely to expedite launching LVT(s), limiting onload/offload over the beach to favorable conditions. Small Craft Repair Facility Danang manufactured new bow door link and CASCOR effected 13 September 1969.

3. (C) SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS RELATING TO SCHEDULING OR COMPLETION OF INREPS/VERTREPS/UNREPS:

a. MOGAS. Since large quantities of MOGAS are used to refuel LVT(s) and other amphibious vehicles during SPECOPS and MOGAS is normally available only in 55 gallon drums, a source of bulk MOGAS had to be located.

NSA Danang does not have MOGAS tankers available for fleet units; SLF ALFA arranged for a MOGAS tanker to supply ARG ALFA LSD(s)/LST during normal import periods (Danang). This tanker was obtained by LOGREQ message 48 hours prior to entering port, with Force Logistics Command (FLC) as info addressee.

b. 5"/38 AMMUNITION. Of the three AE's scheduled for ICTZ operations, one (MAUNA KEA) had no HE aboard and all had limited amounts of illumination aboard. Upon UNREP with VIRGO on 12 September 1969, all afloat AE assets of illumination ammo were depleted. Special loadout of CAMDEN and RAINIER was required. TAUSIG fired a total of 695 rounds of illumination.

Enclosure (6)  
CONFIDENTIAL
1. (C) USS IWO JIMA (LPH 2) served as CATF Flagship and provided the ship/shore termination for Task Group 76.4 ships. Task Group Orestes was maintained with all ships, providing a means for ships' outgoing messages to be passed via the flagship to a NAVCOMMSTA for further relay, and a direct circuit for delivering all outgoing operational messages from the flagship to all assigned ships and embarked units of Task Group 76.4 and Task Group 79.4. The flagship's ship/shore termination and Fleet Flash net were direct patched through NAVSUPPACT Danang to NAVCOMMSTA PHIL. All ships were multi-channel broadcast subscribers, copying NAVCOMMSTA PHIL broadcast which was rebroadcast by NAVSUPPACT Danang. Record communications were excellent throughout Operation DEFIANT STAND. The initiating directive was received at 1346H 28 August 1969. CTG 76.4 OPORDER 308-69 was transmitted to all addressees at 0100H 6 September 1969.

2. (C) Operation DEFIANT STAND, being a combined BLT/RLT operation, required six additional radio circuits. The flagship was capable of providing requirements in all ranges except the VHF range. Prior to embarking the ROKMC 2nd RLT, five additional VRC-46/PRC-25 equipments were installed with antennas mounted along the starboard flight deck, and field remoted to the operational spaces. Two shore fire control circuits were remoted to SACC and three in the 2nd RLT operation control center located on the '02' level, starboard side, just forward of Radio II. The location of antennas, as well as low power of the PRC-25 sets, caused some difficulty in maintaining communications with field units ashore. To minimize these outages the flagship operated as close to the beach as practicable throughout the operation.

3. (C) Frequency assignments were adequate as assigned by COMSEVENTHFLT OPORDER 201-68. No severe interference was encountered during Operation DEFIANT STAND.

4. (C) The Task Group maneuvering and warning and Task Group reporting circuits were covered using the NESTOR crypto system. These circuits were excellent throughout the operation. Although these circuits were used primarily for their designated use, the Task Group reporting circuit was used, on a not-to-interfere basis, as a communications coordination circuit and for passing TACLOG requirements from the flagship to the primary control ship. In this manner uncovered voice communications were held to a minimum.

5. (C) USKAC-288 (WHEEL CODE). This authentication, numerical and operational code was issued by CINCPACFLT to COMSEVENTHFLT commands for evaluation during the period 15 August - 15 September 1969. CTF 76 designated CTG 76.4 to provide training, evaluation instructions, locally prepared brevity codes, and to consolidate and forward evaluation reports. Operation DEFIANT STAND provided an excellent opportunity to evaluate this system under combat conditions.
following commands under direction of CTG 76.4.(CATF) participated in the wheel Code evaluation:

USS IWO JIMA (LPH 2)
USS WASHBURN (LKA 108)
USS WHETSTONE (LSD 27).
USS COLONIAL (LSD 18)
USS TAUSSEG (DD 746)
HMM 265
BLT 1/26

Final evaluation of USKAC-288 is as follows:

Authentication and numeral code:
Excellent

Operational code:

There are no advantages over operational code systems now in use. There is one major disadvantage in using USKAC-288 as an operational code. Additional brevity codes must be available in addition to the basic publication. This is an undesirable feature, especially for field units and air crews. One recommendation would be to provide a capability to encrypt/decrypt the direct alphabet. This would eliminate the requirement for brevity codes.
1. (C) GENERAL:

a. The Command Information Bureau (CIB) was established onboard USS IWO JIMA (LPH 2) on 6 SEP 1969.

b. A Mobile Amphibious News Team assigned by CTF 76 reported on 4 SEP 1969. This team initiated seven press releases on Operation DEFIANT STAND, in addition to an in-depth story with complete photo coverage.

c. Proximity of Operation DEFIANT STAND to the Danang area precluded embarkation of civilian newsmen during the preparation phase of this operation. Newsmen were invited after the initial landing and 14 newsmen arrived.

d. From 9-12 September, a total of twelve Korean civilian newsmen covered USN/ROKMC operations in TG 76.4 ships. These newsmen were escorted by Korean Marine Corps and Army Officers.

e. An ABC news correspondent and photographer, escorted by a III MAF Marine CAPT, came onboard IWO JIMA the afternoon of 11 September and received a briefing by CARG ALFA. This news team spent the night in WASHTENAW COUNTY and landed with the ROKMC the following morning.

f. USS TAUSSIG (DD 746), TG 76.4 Naval Gunfire Support ship, initiated a total of eight news releases.

g. Problems encountered/adverse incidents:

(1) This operation encompassed the first Korean combat amphibious assault landing since the INCHON landing in 1950. Operation DEFIANT STAND was initially released to the press after the ROKMC landing although USMC BLT 1/26 had been operating in their sector of the AOA for the preceding five days.

(2) The impending visit of TG 76.4 ships to Hong Kong resulted in omission of all ARG ALFA ship's names from press releases.

(3) News on Operation DEFIANT STAND was released by MACV and CTU 78.1.1 only under the Korean name of VICTORY DRAGON 15-1. Both names, for reasons unknown, appeared in Stars and Stripes.

2. (C) Visits by Dignitaries:

a. 5 SEP 1969 - BGEN R. B. CARNEY, Jr., USMC, CG 9th MAB/CTF 79
   RADM E. M. ROSENBERG, USN, COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT
6 SEP 1969 - RADM F. B. VORIS, MC, USN, PACFLT Medical Officer

8 SEP 1969 - BGEN W. G. JOHNSON, USMC, AWC, FIRST MAW
RADM E. M. ROSENBERG, USN, COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT

10 SEP 1969 - BGEN LEE, DONG HO, ROKMC, CG 2ND ROKMC BDE

11 SEP 1969 - The HONORABLE SHIN, SANG CHUL, Korean Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam
LTGEN LEE, SAE HO, ROKA, CG ROKF-V
LTGEN HOANG, XUAN LAM, ARVN, CG ICTZ
LTGEN HERMAN NICKERSON, Jr., USMC, CG III MAF
MGEN KIM, JONG SOO, ROKA, Vice ROKF-V
RADM E. M. ROSENBERG, USN, COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT
BGEN LEE, DONG HO, ROKMC, CG 2ND ROKMC BDE
BGEN L. J. DULACKI, USMC, AC/S G-3 III MAF

12 SEP 1969 - The HONORABLE SHIN, SANG CHUL, Korean Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam
LTGEN LEE, SAE HO, ROKA, CG ROKF-V
MGEN KIM, HONG SOO, ROKA, Vice ROKF-V
LTGEN HERMAN NICKERSON, Jr., USMC, CG III MAF
BGEN LEE, DONG HO, ROKMC, CG 2ND ROKMC BDE
BGEN L. J. DULACKI, USMC, AC/S G-3 III MAF

13 SEP 1969 - LTGEN HOANG, XUAN LAM, ARVN, CG ICTZ
LTGEN HERMAN NICKERSON, Jr., USMC, CG III MAF
BGEN LEE, DONG HO, ROKMC, CG 2ND ROKMC BDE
BGEN G. E. DOOLEY, USMC, C/S III MAF

14 SEP 1969 - RADM FRANCIS J. FITZPATRICK, USN, COMNAVCOM
RADM E. M. ROSENBERG, USN, COMPHIBFORSEVENTHFLT
BGEN LEE, DONG HO, ROKMC, CG 2ND ROKMC BDE
1. (C) General.

a. The USMC phase of Operation DEFIANT STAND began on S-Day, 7 September 1969, with naval gunfire and air preparation fires on the landing beach, landing zones and one diversionary target all located on northern Barrier Island, ICTZ, RVN. BLT 1/26 conducted a waterborne (H-Hour 070700H) and heliborne (L-Hour 070900H) assault to commence the first combined USN/USMC/ROKMC amphibious operation of the Vietnam conflict. The ROKMC phase of the operation (titled VICTORY DRAGON 15-1) began on D-Day, 12 September 1969. Air, Naval gunfire, and SECOND ROKMC BDE artillery laid down heavy fires on one beach and two landing zones in the northern end of Barrier Island in preparation for the ROKMC landing. RLT-2 of the SECOND ROKMC BDE conducted a heliborne (L-Hour 120800H) and waterborne (H-Hour 120930H) assault to commence the first Korean amphibious operation since INCHON in 1950.

b. The only factor complicating the supporting arms fire was the initially extreme bad weather which delayed air prep and greatly reduced air observer effectiveness in controlling fires on S-Day and delayed L-Hour by 62 minutes.

c. Naval Gunfire and Close Air Support were adequately available throughout the majority of the operation. However, during the restricted aggressive action period at the time of Ho Chi Minh's funeral, CAS was placed under certain restrictions. Specifically, prior to launching an on-call mission, the supporting agency required that an air spotter be vectored to the scene and verify that the requesting unit was actually receiving incoming fire. As a result of the hit-and-run tactics employed by the enemy, frequently CAS was not as effective as at other times during the operation. The NGF and CAS provided during this operation is considered to have been extremely effective.

2. (C) Naval Gunfire.

a. Forces involved: USS TAUSSIG (DD 746), from CTU 70.8.9, and WPB's, from CTG 115.1, provided preparation fires and on-call support throughout the operation.

b. SECOND ROKMC BDE provided FSC liaison, both ROKMC and ANGLICO, in SACC. As a result of outstanding liaison between these ROK and U.S. fire support coordination personnel there were no significant problems encountered in this area.

c. Restrictions to fire.

(1) Civilian Airway Path. The no fire zones for civilian aircraft between 7,000 and 11,000 feet posed only minor limitations during this operation. Initially the ROKMC artillery was located too distant from the AOA to hit all required targets without penetrating the civil airway path. These units were promptly relocated closer to the AOA.

(2) Non-Observance of NOTAMS/SAV-A-PLANE. In spite of heavy requirements for naval gunfire throughout the operation, fire missions were only interrupted a few very few times by unidentified transient aircraft.
d. Artillery advisory System and SAV-A-PLANE. The SAV-A-PLANE request form (see below) developed during previous operations was evaluated during DEFIANT STAND and found to be very effective. It provides space for the information needed by the various SACC agencies to issue a SAV-A-PLANE. Further, it is a good source of historical information needed to reconstruct specific missions.

SAV-A-PLANE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. TGT#</th>
<th>SAP #</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B. FIRING UNIT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. GRID: FM TO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NAV AID RAD/NM RAD/NM

D. TIME: FM TO

E. MAX ORDINATE

F. TGT NATURE

G. OBSERVER

END OF MISSION TIME

e. Statistical Data.

(1) USS TAUSIG (DD 746)

(a) Rounds Expended:

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<thead>
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<td>HC</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ILLUM</td>
<td>695</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RAP</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3872</td>
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</table>

Enclosure (9)
(b) Damage Assessments. The below listed data reflect only the observed results of naval gunfire. The physical location of other targets in relation to troop scheme of maneuvers ashore precluded the detailed close inspections required to provide complete and accurate gun damage assessment.

1. Bunkers Damaged 77
2. Bunkers Destroyed 38
3. Structures Damaged 42
4. Structures Destroyed 83
5. Base/Staging Areas Neutralized 3
6. Secondary Explosions 7
7. Secondary Fires 6
8. Tree line neutralized (yds) 925
9. Trench line neutralized (yds) 250
10. Mortar emplacement destroyed 2
11. Observation post neutralized 1
12. Enemy KIA (BC) 19
13. Enemy KIA (PROB) 2

(2) USCG WPB's

(a) Rounds expended:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CALIBER</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>QTY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<tr>
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Enclosure (9)
(b) Damage Assessments. The below listed data reflect only the observed results of Coast-Guard Patrol Boat gunfire. The physical location of other targets in relation to troop scheme of maneuvers ashore precluded the detailed close inspections required to provide complete and accurate gun damage assessment.

1. Bunkers Damaged 20
2. Bunkers Destroyed 1
3. Structures Damaged 20
4. Structures Destroyed 38
5. Base areas neutralized --
6. Secondary Explosions --
7. Secondary Fires --
8. Tree line neutralized (yds) 100
9. Trench line neutralized (yds) 25
10. Enemy KIA (FROB) 2
11. Spider holes destroyed 2
12. 25 foot sampan destroyed 1

3. (C) Close Air Support

a. Air support operations were conducted in accordance with Annex H (Air Operations) to CTG 76.4 OPORD 308-69. All scheduled air events were provided as requested and were available on station at the time required. Immediate air support was provided as requested except in one instance when Horn DASC refused the request due to the target location being given in the clear more than one hour prior to time on target. The TACC does not have the code required by Horn DASC for target locations (AKAC-275P-SEA TACS Mission Code Grill). This problem was resolved by a personal visit to Horn DASC at which time it was agreed to provide target locations in the clear less than one hour before time on target. No further difficulties were encountered in filling immediate air requests. Difficulties in air control and airspace congestion while conducting simultaneous air strikes in support of each landing force were anticipated, but simultaneous air strikes did not occur.

b. Continuous voice-radio communications were maintained between the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) and Horn DASC, BLT 1/26-Tactical Air Control Party, SECOND ROK Marine Brigade Tactical Air Control Parties (provided by ANGLICO Platoon), and the ICTZ Area Medical Regulating Office. Additional circuits were manned as required. Direct communications could not be maintained with FIRST Marine Air Wing Tactical Air Direction Center (TADC) due to radio difficulties on their end of the net.
Horn DASC was able to relay TACC traffic to FIRST MAW TADC when requested to do so. This relay procedure was not as effective or responsive as direct communication, but was a satisfactory back-up procedure. During the second phase of Operation DEFIANT STAND, when both the Northern and Southern Landing Forces were ashore, TACC Communications were used to their maximum capability, and all remote positions were in use. The requirement to provide communications for air support to the landing forces simultaneously caused some TACC radio nets to serve two functions (e.g. Tactical Air Request and Landing Zone Control), resulting in periodic congestion on the nets. The high frequency Tactical Air Request net was not utilized as planned due to the inability of the Tactical Air Control Parties to maintain HF communications. Otherwise, TACC communications throughout the operation were good.

c. No practical use of the Wheel Code (USKAC-288A) was realized during TACC operations. The circuit most suitable for Wheel Code use was the Tactical Air Request net. However, the BLT 1/26 Air Liaison Officer did not have a Wheel Code available to use for his tactical air request messages.

d. The following summary of air support provided separately to BLT 1/26 and SECOND RLT ROKMC, incorporates the support from all air assets.

(1) Helicopter Operations HMM 265 and USS IWO JIMA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>ROKMC</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Sorties</td>
<td>2105</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>2232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Tasks</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Passengers Carried</td>
<td>4402</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>4850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) MEDEVACS</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Cargo Carried (Tons)</td>
<td>171.0</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>190.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Hours Flown</td>
<td>491.0</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>531.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Augmenting Air Support Fixed Wing and Helicopter (FIRST MAW and HMM 164)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>ROKMC</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Sorties</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Tasks</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Passengers Carried</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1068</td>
<td>1068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) MEDEVACS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Cargo (Tons)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>310.1</td>
<td>310.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Fixed Wing Operations

### (a) Utilization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>USMC BLT 1/26</th>
<th>ROKMC RLT-2</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Attack A/C</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Non-Attack A/C</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Transient A/C</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Totals</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>899</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### (b) Ordnance Expended (LBS Less Gun Ammo)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>BLT 1/26</th>
<th>ROKMC</th>
<th>TOTAL #/LBS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Bombs</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>179/96,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Rockets</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>29/-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Napalm</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>42/21,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. MG (RDS)</td>
<td>124,000</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>127,600/---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### (c) Miscellaneous

1. SAV-A-PLANES Issued - 346

### e. Damage Assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>ROKMC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers Damaged</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers Destroyed</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures Damaged</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures Destroyed</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 Enclosure (9)

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Type
- Secondary Fires
- Secondary Explosions
- Tree Line Destroyed (YDS)
- KIA (BC)
- KIA (POSS)

USMC   ROKMC
---     4
2       3
75      200
2       ---
---     2

4. (c) Artillery.

a. Forces Involved

(1) USMC. USMC placed one battery of 105MM Howitzers and one battery of 4.2 inch mortars ashore on S-Day. These batteries were both located at the fire support base in the southern portion of the land AOA. Artillery provided support throughout the operation.

(2) ROKMC. ROKMC 105MM and 155MM batteries were prepositioned in the southern portion of the ROK permanent Area of Operations near Hoi An. These units, located to the north of the Song Cua Dai, provided pre-D-Day bombardment and direct support throughout the remainder of the operation. Subsequent to D-Day, additional fire support was provided by a ROKMC LVTH-6 in the northern sector of the AOA.

b. Fire Support Coordination. Coordination between all units was excellent. The ROKMC and ANGLICO FSC assigned representatives to the SACC aboard TWO JIMA helped to solve what few minor problems developed promptly and effectively. The ease with which fires were coordinated is particularly noteworthy considering that this was the first ROKMC amphibious operation in RVN.

c. Restrictions to Fire. The ROKMC artillery units located outside of the AOA could not initially reach all targets because of excessive maximum ordinates that would have been required. RLT-2 relocated these units and were able to fire under the 7000 foot Civil Airway Path for the duration of the operation.

d. Statistical data.

(1) USMC

(a) Rounds Expended

Enclosure (9)

DECLASSIFIED
(a) Damage Assessment. Gun damage assessment from artillery units has been misleadingly scarce in this and previous operations. This results primarily from difficulties involved in making close observations of many artillery targets. There are, however, 10 VC KIA credited to artillery for this operation.

(b) Damage Assessment. The following totals reported by ROKMC represent a combination of air, artillery and naval gunfire preparation fire damage and could not be differentiated as to cause: ten bunkers destroyed/damaged and 63 KIA.
1. (C) Operation DEFIANT STAND was, as far as can be determined, the first amphibious combat assault in which intrusion detection sensors were used.

2. (C) The capability of using sensors within ARG/SLF ALFA in amphibious operations was developed from scratch since no one in the organization had any significant previous experience with sensors. The capability of planting, monitoring and recovering various types of hand-placed sensors was developed as an organic capability of the ARG/SLF. It was also planned to develop the capability to plant various air-dropped sensors utilizing organic ARG/SLF helicopters but lack of time for training air crews and the press of operational commitments prevented the accomplishment of that goal.

3. (C) In order to develop the capability of using sensors, the Special Projects Branch of III MAF Planning Section, who have overall responsibility for sensor management in ICTZ, were contacted on liaison visit by N-21S-2 of the ARG/SLF staffs and asked to provide assistance in training personnel in the use of sensors and in obtaining the necessary equipment. The Special Projects Branch, headed by LTCOL TWO HAH USMC later relieved by LTCOL RAPPE, USMC, were very glad to comply with the request. Accordingly arrangements were made by MAJ CLARK, USMC, of the Special Projects Branch to train fifteen personnel from ARG/SLF ALFA (two each from ARG and SLF staffs and eleven from BLT 1/26) at the Hoa Cam Training Compound south of Danang in the proper preparation, maintenance, placement, readout, and recovery of various types of sensors. In addition, CARG and CO, SLF ALFA, along with concerned staff members were briefed and indoctrinated in the proper employment of sensors and factors to consider in order to take maximum advantage of their characteristics.

4. (C) Simultaneously, MAJ REPPARD, USA, of the Special Projects Branch obtained the required sensors from the COMUSMACV J3-04 Storage Facility at Cam Ranh Bay which consisted of eleven sets of Patrol Seismic Intrusion Detectors (PSID's) and ten Small Hand-placed Seismic Intrusion Detectors (MINISID'S) set on channels 29 and 30. In addition, a ground-plane antenna and PORTATALE receiver were obtained for installation onboard the flagship. The flagship installation was designed so that the PORTATALE could be detached and taken ashore in order to monitor sensors from the Battalion CP.

5. (C) Shortly after completion of the training and delivery of the sensors, Operation DEFIANT STAND was formulated offering an ideal opportunity to test the newly formed ARG/SLF sensor employment capability. Accordingly, three known VC/NVA crossing sites on or near the Truong Giang River west of Barrier Island were selected as likely locations to plant the sensors. Because of the hostile environment and lack of air-drop capability, it was not possible to plant sensors in the proposed AOA prior to the amphibious assault although such a procedure undoubtedly would have been valuable in determining patterns of movement and the degree of activity in the AOA, especially in the landing zones and on the assault beaches. Consequently, three strings of three MINISIDS each were planted by scouts of the BLT S-2 section and the reconnaissance platoon assigned to the battalion on the
afternoon of the day following the initial amphibious assault (S-Day). The sites selected for planting the sensors were reached via LVTP-5 and are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>String No.</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Channel Set</th>
<th>Tone Codes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>LOP BT 19514682</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26-06-03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>LOP BT 17304870</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>02-08-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>49P BT 17434860</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>04-17-18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moderate opposition was encountered while planting the last string but, as far as can be determined, none of the sensors were detected or disturbed during the period they were monitored by BLT 1/26.

6. (C) During the course of Operation DEFIANT STAND, numerous detections were made by the planted MINISIDS but specific patterns were difficult to determine. The site selected for the southermost string was located too close to a local village in the vicinity. The normal local traffic in and around the village, especially during daylight hours, made detection of military targets difficult if not impossible to detect because of excessive ambient "noise level". Additionally, it was found that the sensors were planted too close together to take maximum advantage of the sensors' capabilities having been planted approximately 40 meters apart. Initially it was felt that because of a lack of signals the northernmost two strings were installed incorrectly and failed to operate properly. However, it was later determined that all strings were functioning properly and the initial inactivity was due to a lack of enemy movement in the vicinity of the northern strings.

7. (C) In the event that the sensors could not be monitored from either the flagship or the battalion CP due to terrain features or other considerations, arrangements were made during the planning phase to have CTF 194.1.5.1 monitor the sensors with their equipment in Hoi An and relay the results to all concerned. CTF 194.1.5.1 did offer to furnish an experienced sensor expert to assist in planting the sensors. However, there was insufficient time available to effect the necessary liaison and pickup.

8. (C) Generally, with the exceptions listed above, the MINISIDS were effective and worked well. Many artillery/NGF missions were conducted based on activations obtained. However, due to the hostile environment, terrain limitations, and the fact that all available troops were committed to other aspects of the operation of higher operational priority, no patrols could be sent into the area where the sensor strings were located to check on results. For the same reasons, none of the MINISIDS were recovered at the end of the operation. All adjacent commands were notified of the data pertaining to the planted sensors to allow for continuing monitoring by those concerned for the projected life of the sensors after withdrawal from the area by BLT 1/26. CTF 194.1.5.1 indicated intentions of recovering the sensors prior to the end of projected life span. It is felt that the MINISIDS would have been more effective had they been combined with other types of sensors such as a MAGID (magnetic intrusion detector) or PIRID (photo infrared intrusion detector) or ACOUBUOY thus allowing
more positive identification of acquisitions. However, at the time of planting the MINISIDS no other types of sensors were immediately available.

9. (C) The PSIDS were considered very effective and were well received by units once their use and effectiveness was demonstrated. They proved to be valuable tools for small units in the conduct of night activities, perimeter defense of CP's and ambushes. On occasion, the PSIDS were set to be too sensitive thus taking too long to settle down following an activation due to the impact of supporting arms fire nearby. Some of them were even sensitive enough to be activated by artillery/NGF projectiles passing overhead.
SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT

1. (C) Surface Ship to Shore Movement. Ship to shore movement was accomplished on S-Day 7 September over GREEN Beach (BT 242484) and D-Day 12 September over RED Beach (BT 224544). Troops were surface landed by amphibious assault craft and vehicles assigned to ARG ALFA. Assault craft included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NR.</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>PARENT COMMAND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ONE</td>
<td>LCU</td>
<td>ACU ONE DET ALFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIX</td>
<td>LCM-8</td>
<td>ACU ONE DET ALFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIX</td>
<td>LCM-6</td>
<td>USS WASHBURN (LKA 108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWO</td>
<td>LARC</td>
<td>EMU 1 DET ALFA TWO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELEVEN</td>
<td>LVT</td>
<td>FROM BLT 1/26 (on S-Day)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELEVEN</td>
<td>LVT</td>
<td>FROM ROKMC ASSETS (on D-Day)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two salvage boats, one heavy and one light (LCM-3), were on station during both assault landings. A BGC and ABGC embarked in LCPL's supplied by the primary and secondary control ships respectively were on station for both assault landings. For S-Day landing primary control ship was USS WHETSTONE (LSD 27) and secondary control ship was USS COLONIAL (LSD 18). For D-Day landing USS COLONIAL (LSD 18) was primary control ship and USS WHETSTONE secondary control ship. All ships remained underway during the movement ashore. PCS and SCS maintained stations to the left and right flank of the 3000 yard boat lane near the LOD. During both landings LVT's were launched from the USS WASHTENAW CTY (LST 1166) from a position 300 yards to seaward of the LOD. Both GREEN and RED Beaches had a shallow gradient and proved suitable for beaching except for LCU's at low tide when they were unable to beach with a dry ramp. The average difference between high and low water during the operation was 2 feet. During the period of this operation the seasonal tide condition was such that low water tides were always above mean low water. Throughout the operation effective surf height was less than a factor value of 0.8 thus permitting use of LVT assault vehicles plus LCM-6 assault craft and larger without restrictions. A 1 1/2 to 2 kt lateral current flow was experienced in the GREEN and RED Beach boat lanes. This current flow lessened to almost zero shoreward of a point 1000 yards offshore. Following is a description of scheduled assault wave organization for S-Day and D-Day.

**S-Day**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WAVE</th>
<th>COMPOSITION</th>
<th>UNIT EMBARKED</th>
<th>TOUCHDOWN TIME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ONE</td>
<td>11-LVT</td>
<td>Infantry Company</td>
<td>H-Hour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWO</td>
<td>4-LCM6 2-LCM8</td>
<td>Infantry Company</td>
<td>H plus 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. (C) Air Ship to Shore Movement:

   a. S-Day: The helicopter ship to shore movement consisted of airborne
      movement of troops and equipment from USS IWO JIMA to two landing zones
      in the southern portion of the AOA. The first assault wave, landing at
      L-Hour, consisted of eight helicopters which lifted CHARLIE Company into
      LZ QUAIL. At L plus 1:37, upon the completion of the insertion of CHARLIE
      Company, DELTA Company was similarly lifted into LZ EAGLE. No resistance
      was encountered. At L plus 3:20 hours the Battalion Command Group was
      lifted into the Fire Support Base at GREEN Beach. Helicopter movement of
      all troops was completed at 071300H. L-Hour was delayed 62 minutes due to
      rain squalls and resultant low ceilings and visibilities and the necessity
      to properly prep the area by air.

   b. D-Day: The first helicopter assault wave, consisting of 10 aircraft
      (6 HMM 265 aircraft, augmented by 4 from HMM 164), lifted the TWENTY-FIFTH
      Company, FIFTH Battalion, RLt-2, SECOND ROKMC Brigade from USS IWO JIMA to
      LZ SPARROW, in the northern sector of the AOA at L Hour. Similarly, the
      TWENTY-SIXTH Company was lifted into LZ DOVE at L plus 25 and the TWENTY-
      SEVENTH Company was lifted into LZ SPARROW at L plus 1:05. Each company
      was inserted in a single lift. The BLT 5/2 Command Group was lifted into
      a position near RED Beach at 120931H. The helicopter assault lift was
      completed by 121115H.
DECEPTION OPERATIONS

1. (C) S-DAY, 7 September 1969

   a. At 070100H USS CLEVELAND (LPD 7) using own boat conducted a deceptive
      beach survey of a simulated beach located at GRID BT 106665 to mislead enemy
      forces in the area as to the actual S-Day amphibious landing.

2. (C) D-DAY, 12 September 1969

   a. ARG BRAVO (TG 76.5) conducted an amphibious landing deception off the
      southern Barrier Island area in order to confuse enemy forces engaging allied
      forces in Operation DEFIANT STAND.

      b. Commencing 112000H ARG BRAVO operated in Barbara OPAREAS ECHO and
         FOXTROT to allow the VC/NVA forces in the area to observe the Task Group. At
         120500H ARG BRAVO signalled "land the waterborne landing force." Four waves
         of assault craft were launched to meet the 0730H H-Hour, on a simulated beach
         located at GRID BT 347300. Assault craft waves proceeded to within 1500 yards
         of the beach, turned away at H-Hour and reembarked in ARG BRAVO ships. No
         significant difficulties occurred.

   c. Normal boat control communications were conducted in the landing
      demonstration.

   d. No problems were experienced with visibility as ARG BRAVO and the
      landing craft waves could be seen from the beach.
1. (C) Psychological operations conducted in support of Operation DEFIANT STAND were designed to prevent animosity between the civilian populace and the allied forces and to reduce the combat effectiveness of the VC/NVA combatants in the AOA.

2. (C) To aid in population control, Combined Holding and Interrogation Centers (CHICS) were established in Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces as the province boundary lines split the AOA. Leaflet drops, aerial loudspeaker broadcasts, and ground psychological operation teams were used by BLT 1/26 and ROKMC 2nd BDE to inform the populace of the operation and to evacuate them from the AOA. The civilians were directed to move to collection points where they were provided medical care, food, and water before being transported to the CHIC established for their province.

3. (C) The VC/NVA combatants in the AOA were urged to Chieu Hoi by aerial and ground psychological operations broadcasts. They were advised that they were surrounded and given the opportunity to become Ho Chi Minh in order to avoid a senseless death and burial in an unmarked and unattended grave.

4. (C) As a result of the psychological operation conducted in Operation DEFIANT STAND 2768 innocent civilians were moved to safety in the CHICS and one VC returned to the GVN under the Chieu Hoi Program.

5. (C) Psychological operations were beneficial in that the civilian populace demonstrated favorable response to the allied psychological operations effort. This is best demonstrated by the response shown by the innocent Vietnamese civilians evacuated from the AOA. While waiting at collection points for transfer to the CHICS the civilians were withdrawn and afraid, then as the corpsmen began medical treatment and others dispensed food and water the civilians gathered around clamoring for attention and treatment.

6. (C) This personal contact between the civilians and the Allied Forces demonstrates to the civilians that the Allied Forces are interested in their health and welfare and are in Vietnam to help the people of Vietnam and the Government of Vietnam. The long term benefits of this type program will continue to play a growing part in the successful conduct of the war in Vietnam.
CINCPAC
COMUSMACY
CINCPACFLT
CMC
COMPHIBPAC
COMSEVENTHFLT
COMPHIBLAN
CG, FMFPAC
CG, FMFLANT
CG, III MAF
COMNAVFORV
COMPHIBTRAPAC
COMPHIBGRU ONE
COMPHIBGRU TWO
COMPHIBGRU THREE
COMPHIBGRU FOUR
PRES NAVWARCOL
CG, V MEF
CG, 1ST MARDIV
CG, 3RD MARDIV
CG, 5TH MARDIV
CG, 1ST MAF
COMSERVGRU THREE
CG, FMSEVENTHFLT
CG, LANFORTRACOMPAC
CG, LANFORTRACOMLANT
CNO (OP 09B9) HISTORICAL DIV
CG, MCDEC, QUANTICO, VA.
CHAIRMAN AMB COMPHIBTRALANT
CO, NAVPHIBSCOL, CORONADO
CO, NAVPHIBSCOL, LITTLE CREEK
COMPHIBPSEVENTHFLT
COMLANSHEIPRON NINE

COMPHIBRON ONE
COMPHIBRON THREE
COMPHIBRON FIVE
COMPHIBRON SEVEN
COMPHIBRON NINE
COMPHIBRON ELEVEN
COMPHIBRON GRU ONE
COMPHIBRON GRU TWO
COMPHIBRON GRU THREE
COMPHIBRON GRU FOUR
COMPHIBRON GRU FIVE
COMPHIBRON GRU SEVEN
COMPHIBRON GRU NINE
COMPHIBRON GRU ELEVEN

PRES NAVWARCOL
CG, V MEF
CG, 1ST MARDIV
CG, 3RD MARDIV
CG, 5TH MARDIV
CG, 1ST MAF
CO, TACRON TWELVE
CO, BJU ONE
CO, ACU ONE
CO, BMU ONE
CO, UDT TWELVE
OINC BMU ONE WP DET
OINC ACU ONE WP DET
OINC WP DET NAVSPECWARGRU
OINC NAVBEACHGRU ONE WP DET
OINC NAVSECGRU WP DET
USA C&GSC, FT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
OINC NAVTACDOCAC
CTG 73.5
CTG 70.8
CTF 115
CTG 76.5
CTG 79.5
CO, BLT 1/26
CO, HMM 265
CO, USS TWO JIMA (LPH 2)
CO, USS WASHBURN (LKA 108)
CO, USS WHETSTONE (LSD 27)
CO, USS WASHTENAW CTY (LST 1166)
CO, USS TAUSSIG (DD 746)
CO, USS COLONIAL (LSD 18)
ANGLICO
OIC Air/Naval Gunfire Platoon
Second Brigade ROKMC
FPO San Francisco  96602

Enclosure (14)