EDITORIAL NOTE

*Indochina Chronology* is a quarterly publication devoted to historical and contemporary events in Vietnam (including the Vietnam War), Cambodia, and Laos; a bibliographic resource on book, monograph, periodical and journal literature; and as a source of news of the field. It was begun in 1982 at the University of California (Berkeley) and moved to Texas Tech University (Lubbock) in mid-1997. It is made available, gratis, to academics, historians, writers, researchers, journalists, veterans, and government officials. Editorial responsibility for the publication is the Vietnam Center, Texas Tech University, James R. Reckner, director. Editor is Douglas Pike. Editorial assistance is supplied by Alison Honig, David Morokoff, Khanh Lê, Myrna Pike, and Rosa Garcia. *Indochina Chronology* operates in conjunction with the Vietnam Archive, also at Texas Tech University (James Ginther and Ronald Frankum).

Long-term readers of the *Chronology* will note a change in content and format. One main alteration is that the three-country chronology of events is replaced by what might be called a quarter-ender of interesting events and significant developments of the three months just passed. Many of the important developments will also be noted in the Bibliography/Periodicals section. Readers requiring a day-by-day recounting are advised to consult the many various websites and lists that have become available. Since we are now closely associated with the Texas Tech History Department, there is a new section titled History Redux intended chiefly for historians. D.P.

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Cover photo: Khải Định Tomb, Hue, 1997  
Courtesy of Philip Phú Bùi.
GLOSSARY OF COMMONLY USED TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFP—Agence France Presse
AI—Amnesty International
ASEAN—Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CPP—Cambodian People’s Party
(CPP—Cambodian People’s Party (ruling party))
CS—Council of State
DK—Democratic Kampuchea
THE ECONOMIST—International Weekly (London)
FEER—Far Eastern Economic Review
SRV—Socialist Republic of Việt Nam
Review (Hong Kong)
FBIS—Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FBIS-CHI—Daily Report/China
FBIS-EAS—Daily Report/East Asia
FUNCINPEC—National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (opposition party)
INDOCHINA INTERCHANGE—USIRP quarterly
JPRS-SEA—Joint Publications Research Service, SE Asia (Dept. of Commerce)
KPL—Lao News Agency
KR—Khmer Rouge
LPDR—Lao People’s Democratic Republic
LPRP—Lao People’s Revolutionary Party
NATION—Bangkok Newspaper (English)
NHÂN DÂN—People’s Daily (Hà Nội)
NRC—National Radio of Cambodia (Phnom Penh)
PAVN—People’s Army Việt Nam
PDK—Party of Democratic Kampuchea
(Khmer Rouge)
PPP—Phnom Penh Post
PRC—People’s Republic of China
RENMIN RIBAO—People’s Daily (Beijing)
RGC—Royal Government of Cambodia
RKAFA—Royal Armed Force
UNDP—U.N. Development Program
UNHCR—U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
USIRP—U.S.-Indochina Reconciliation Project
VBJ—Vietnam Business Journal
VC—Vietnam Courier
VIR—Vietnam Investment Review
VNN—Vietnam News (Hà Nội daily news sheet)
VNU—Viet Nam National University
VVN—Voice of Việt Nam Network (Hà Nội)
VTN—Viet Nam Television Network
XINHUA—China News Agency

EXCHANGE RATES—U.S.$
dông (Việt Nam) 13,907.5
riel (Cambodia) 3,750
kip (Laos) 4,300
baht (Thailand) 40.687
renminbi (China) 8.2796
VIỆTNAM’S FOREIGN POLICY WITH COMMENTARY ON ITS ANTECEDENTS.

Vietnam is a culture of incredible internal strength and durability, led by an elite full of supreme confidence. It is then a paradox how Vietnamese ethno-linguistic unity can be so cohesive and at the same time, be so perpetually, structurally and institutionally divided. How can it have, both a strong sense of ethno-linguistic identity yet be forever riven by divisiveness?

This is true as an internal factor. And it is also true with respect to foreign relations over the centuries. As is commonly observed in political science circles, inconsistency is the mark of a live political system. But that of course is not an explanation.

Vietnam’s Confucian cousins have similar characteristics of internal strength, durability and leadership confidence. That is, China of course, the two Koreas and Japan. However, the sinews of Vietnam’s strengths differ from the other four because Vietnam had its own singular set of historical foreign experiences, from which the Vietnamese have derived differing conclusions of meaning, which subsequently has led to differing patterns of foreign relationships.

So, it is with Vietnamese heritage that we must begin—the important historical experiences and their resultant influences which remain alive and well in Vietnam today. These we must agree are far more important in understanding the Politburo’s thinking and in predicting future foreign policy than are the various current transient developments (such as the end of the U.S. economic embargo).

First and foremost, the Chinese experience—going back into the mists of time. It is a love-hate relationship, is extremely complex compared to other Vietnamese relationships. It heavily influences all of Vietnam’s foreign relations.

Second, there is the long march to the South—something akin to the American western movement. Beginning in the 10th century, the Vietnamese pushed out of the Red River Delta in the north, eventually reaching the Camau Peninsula in the south. This fixed, and today continues to greatly influence foreign policy thinking with Vietnam’s three immediate neighbors: Cambodia, Laos and Thailand. And as well as further to the southeast, and the other ASEAN countries.

It introduced the Vietnamese to the wider world—Europe, particularly—the U.S. and Japan. And it deeply implanted as important sentiment (as reaction to colonialism) that is, ultra nationalism. Or more correctly, the spirit of độc lập, which roughly is translated as independence but more accurately connotes profound resentment to foreign control and which has become something of an impediment in a world of ever growing interdependence.

Two other cultural characteristics are to be borne in mind in understanding Vietnam foreign policy today. Both are abstractions, but that does not make them less important.

The first is praetorianism. The alarms and excursions of war echo like an endless drumroll down the corridor of Vietnamese history. In vast and rhythmic cycles, for two thousand years Vietnamese have experienced invasion, siege, occupation also rebellion, disidence, covert militant opposition, and other forms of social sabotage.

They take pride, communist and noncommunist alike, in grandiloquent accounts of this martial heritage. In the Đông Sơn era, nearly 4,000 years ago, the communal temples were presided over not by gods, but by “generals.” At the time of Christ, Vietnam supposedly had a million man army—at a time when its population could not have been more than three million. The first military academy in Asia opened in Hanoi in the 13th century, and Vietnam then purportedly had the largest navy in the world.

This praetorianism is not militaristic in the western sense, that is jingoistic goose-stepping—certainly not in the view of the Vietnamese. They see their martial array through history as being entirely defensive—chiefly directed against the Chinese. And so is history taught in the schools of Vietnam today. Neighbors, —Cambodians, and the Lao especially—do not see this spirit as being defensive as do the Vietnamese.

The theme of Vietnam’s history—like Prussia’s in Europe—is that Vietnam is the most fought-over ground. Vietnamese battled China with amazing determination for centuries, battled the French, the Americans, then the Khmer, and again the Chinese. In between they
battled the Thai, the Burmans, the Lao, the Cham, the Montagnards, and they battled each other in regional and dynastic combat and other forms of internecine strife. Mentally the Vietnamese have always lived in an armed camp, says one of their poets.

Out of this came the concept of đấu tranh—roughly struggle. Life is đấu tranh, foreign policy is đấu tranh—that is all there is: struggle.

The second cultural characteristic is socio-organizational malaise which most importantly manifests itself as the politics of clandestinism. Clearly it is traceable to centuries—millennia even—of dealing with foreign occupiers, first the Chinese, then the French—by throwing up the powerful clandestine political organization today. The deadly heritage from all this left Vietnamese with a singular inability to trust. A heavy albatross around the neck of the system militating against good and useful foreign relationships. Outsiders tend to label this as “lack of transparency” in foreign relations. Actually it is more a case of Vietnamese lack of confidence in the institutional relations methods which others employ, but which have never seemed to work well for Việt Nam.

Manifesting itself anew is a growing sense of failure of Việt Nam’s foreign relations reliance on Marxism-Leninism. It may be that Việt Nam is moving toward an open society, if so at what speed or pace one cannot tell. It does seem probable that Việt Nam’s future system will not be Western style democracy. But it will have its basic character, that is, political participation, equity, justice and social consensus. It will result in new styles and new policies in foreign relationships, even though they will continue to be authentic Vietnamese.

The Many Wars of Việt Nam. “It was a vast collection of wars, held together by no conceptual cement, no common thread… There was the War of Ia Drang valley when teen-age First Cav troopers, descended from the sky on veterans from Điện Biên Phủ. There was the 13th C. siege war at Khe Sanh the kind of battle Charlemagne would have understood. There was the spectacular war of the 1968 Tết offensive. There was the so-called People’s War, product of Mao though, the 80-year-old inventor of the Cultural Revolution. There was the war in the cities, the bombs and hand grenades in the theaters and restaurants and embassies. There was the silent war in the villages of assassinations and kidnapings in the night. The secret war in the jungle with booby traps and tiger pits everywhere. There was the war at sea and in the rivers and canals. And in the air—the chopper war, close air support…going downtown to Hanoi…And that was only Việt Nam. There was the war in America; living room war in which television showed us whatever images their cameramen had managed to capture that day. There was the war on the American campus, on Capitol Hill, and abroad—in most of the capitals of the world. The nature of the war in Việt Nam was such that it lacked any organizing concept that could make it a single intellectual entity, something easily grasped. Other wars had an overwhelming transcendental meaning on both sides—But not Việt Nam.” (Douglas Pike)

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Academic Irrelevance. “For centuries, academics have been ridiculed for writing needlessly obscure books, teaching nothing of value, and abusing the trust of the general population. Yet scholars and their work have changed very little. Most recently, scholars have been attacked for writing in language so difficult that few others can grasp its meaning. But ‘linguistic obscurity’ is not the worst shortcoming of academics, who churn out far too many ‘books about books.’ The heroic age of scholarship, has ended. Letters have been catalogued and texts deciphered, but scholars still must produce books—most of which neither appeal to the general reader nor make ground-breaking advances. The universities seem to have an impressive ability to override the serious questions which have been leveled at them for centuries. Perhaps the bluntest question we could ask of many academic works is exactly what are they for?” Alain de Bottom (Univ. London) in Prospect, Aug.-Sept. 1998.
CAMBODIA THIS QUARTER: GOVERNMENT BY GRENADE, BOOBY-TRAP, KNIFE, BOTTLE OF ACID.

The July 26, 1998, elections to choose 122 seats in the Cambodian Parliament came and went. And continued to go throughout the quarter.

The results as announced by the National Election Committee (August 5) were: Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), 2.03 million votes (41.4%); the royalist FUNCINPEC Party of deposed co-premier Prince Norodom Ranariddh, 1.55 million votes (31.7%); and dissident Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), 699,653 votes (14%). Translated into seats in Parliament this works out to 52:40:20. All parties, but chiefly the two opposing Hun Sen, at once charged fraud, lodged official protests and more or less indicated they might not accept the results. There was good voter turnout.

Post-election Voxxpopuli sentiment among the electorate seemed to be clearly one of surely resentment that steadily increased during the quarter escalating into an increasingly violent political struggle. B-40 rocket attacks, assassination attempts, rioting, physical intimidation—in general, politics with guns—peaked in mid-September, then diminished somewhat. Throughout there were charges and counter charges over whom to blame. Fixing the guilt would have tested the wisdom of King Solomon. Clearly, there was blame enough to go around.

The most ominous development were the reasonably credible reports that at least 200 persons identified as opposing Hun Sen had disappeared or been killed in the weeks following the election (Economist Oct. 3), which not only conjured up the image of Pinochet-style politics coming to Indochina, but also of Cambodia’s earlier killing fields.

Meanwhile, outsiders, including the official monitors, debated among themselves whether the elections were a) flawed; b) fundamentally flawed; c) unfair but acceptable; d) unimportant since they made no difference; e) all of the above. The UN-sponsored Joint International Observer Group (JIOG) described the voting as "free and fair to an extent that enables it to reflect, in a credible way, the will of the Cambodian people...All parties should accept and honor the results of the election without any attempt to undermine the original outcome.” This assessment was reinforced by most of the national and international observer groups. Some American observers in Cambodia during the election were critical of both the campaign and the voting. But former U.S. Congressman Stephen Solarz, long a fierce critic of Hun Sen, felt moved to say: “What we have witnessed is a successful exercise in self-determination...a miracle on the Mekong.”

Said Amb. James Lilley (co-chair of the U.S. Observer Mission) in a BBC interview: “I will tell you that they did not present us with specific evidence clearly indicating that systematic fraud had taken place. They alleged that it had, but evidence was not presented...Does the international community want to gloss over and forget about Cambodia? Not among the people I’ve talked to. [The media have] lost interest as [the election] didn’t turn out to be violent. It turned out to be peaceful—that isn’t news—Cambodia is very different from England and the United States—it has its own characteristics and its own way of settling political differences. We are now introducing a new way of settling political differences by the ballot box—and an awful lot of Cambodians think this is a very good idea.”

Official U.S. comment in Washington was neutral. The U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh was soon besieged by young scooter-riding Cambodians calling for U.S. intervention amid rumors that the Marines were on their way to put things right. Embassy officials went to the gate and told the demonstrators the U.S. does not support any Cambodian party or individual. Youthful hopes may be naïve, but this was a tribute to America’s reputation. Said one observer, the elections would be a farce if they were not a tragedy.

Hun Sen (Aug. 28) said “formation of a new government was just a matter of time,” adding that division of power was negotiable with the principle of the CPP taking 60 percent of the government posts and FUNCINPEC 40 percent.” He added, “don’t dream
about changing the candidate for prime minister; the CPP designated me as the only candidate. Now that the CPP wins, I have every reason to take up the job in the new government. This cannot be changed." He also ruled out any possibility of forming a coalition government with the Sam Rainsy Party.

In what were termed the tripartite discussions among the political contenders—they can hardly be called negotiations—continued throughout the period. Much of the disputation was over a summit venue, whether in Cambodia as a King Sihanouk "summit" in Thailand or elsewhere, perhaps Japan. The televised "multi-party talks" introduced a new dimension in government in Cambodia. They focused on the question of how to allocate parliamentary seats name the chairman and appoint the nine Assembly committees.

On the formula issue, the CPP position was that it be debated in the National Assembly. FUNCINPEC representative Pok Than countered, "When you talk about meeting in the National Assembly, you are talking about the seats we protest." The Parliament opened (Sept. 24), not the Phnom Penh but in Siem Reap, near the ancient ruins of Angkor. A rocket grenade exploded outside on the grounds of the Sihanouk place (in Siem Reap). All 122 MPs were present. Said the king at the opening ceremony: "Geographically, our country is very small, but if we all as Cambodians agree to unite and to make the necessary sacrifices for the construction and defense of our nation, Cambodia will recover its good reputation and its national strength... I ask our new National Assembly to see to it that a new Royal Government of Cambodia comes to life as a symbol of national reconciliation, union and solidarity...so that our country can rapidly rise out of the state of underdevelopment...Our people's future is in serious jeopardy. We must fight the land mines, illiteracy and the sale of drugs. We must tackle the job of repairing and improving our roads and bridges and renovate, clean up, embellish our capital, Phnom Penh."

The parliamentary meeting was purely ceremonial, as was its intent. Most attendees were satisfied that it came off without some act of violence. Nor, as the quarter ended, was there any visible progress evident at the tripartite working group level. Still alive (although just barely) is the "Summit Plan" that the three parties meet, possibly in Tokyo (chaired by King Sihanouk). Two of the three parties endorsed the idea; Hun Sen rejected a meeting in Tokyo: "We have no money and the international committee will not help us with airplane tickets and hotel rooms." But all agreed to a meeting in Phnom Penh.

In Beijing FM Tang Guoqiang (July 29), asked for comment on the election, said it "reflected the will of the Cambodian people," adding King Sihanouk has the full support of the Chinese government.

*The South China Morning Post* (Aug. 4) quoted one Asian diplomat as saying: "This is far more than the Cambodian constitution can handle...they are effectively forcing a situation where no one can legally take power. God knows what would happen then. Both Rainsy and the prince have moved far too early. They've angered and insulted the international community and only raised the prospect of Mr. Hun Sen ignoring the democratic process to keep power—and if they are not careful, he may actually have some sympathy this time."

There was little important activity in Cambodian foreign affairs save for a new souring in Hanoi relations. Racism is always just beneath the surface of Cambodian-Vietnamese relations and can easily be whipped up by Phnom Penh demagogues of various political stripes. This began with the desecration of the Vietnam-Cambodia Friendship Monument in Phnom Penh (Aug. 30) and led to ethnic clashes and several deaths.

ASEAN officials once again urged the Cambodian factions to "seriously settle themselves to forming a legitimate government." They warned there could be no Cambodian membership in ASEAN until this happens, the (Thai spokesman) adding that this is not to be construed as an ultimatum, only well meant advice. The ASEAN states, and the U.S. and Japan for that matter, seem uncertain over what should be their respective foreign policies. Should there be a renewed effort by outsiders to come in and try to put things right? Or should Cambodians be left alone to sort things out for themselves as to just exactly how their country should be run? As has been observed as good advice elsewhere: trust the people with the gravest questions and in the end you educate the human race.
In other news during the quarter:

**Media vs. Government.** Officials backed away from suggestions that English-language newspapers be closed down and certain Western journalists expelled. Consideration of the harsh measures was related to reports of the B-40 attack in Siem Reap on Hun Sen's motorcade and, indirectly, on the U.S. House of Representatives' consideration of a non-binding resolution calling for investigation of Hun Sen for war crimes and crimes against humanity. An Information Ministry official said (Oct. 5) that U.S. Ambassador Kenneth Quinn had lodged an official protest against a statement by Khieu Kanharit (secretary for information) on the proposed closure of three foreign newspapers and an order to American and British correspondents to leave the country.

**On Agriculture.** The fifth month rice harvest was thin and the promise for the tenth month is not much better. Price of rice consequently rose 65% during the quarter and by its end was the highest it had been since 1993. Rice production in 1997 was estimated at 2.8 million tonnes (for an average of .65 tonnes/acre). Making up the current shortfall needed to guarantee two kilos per day per person requires about 250,000 tonnes.

**The Economy.** The Ministry of Finance reported that 50 percent of 1998 government expenditure up to August went to the military and security forces compared to 15 percent for education and health. International agencies are concerned at the potential for widespread misery as Cambodia’s economy continues to suffer from a decline in foreign aid, investment, and tourism amid the continuing instability and the regional downturn. Research by the World Food Program has found that large numbers of rural poor have been hard hit through loss of seasonal employment and have begun to sell assets in order to make ends meet. U.N. officials in Phnom Penh say the government economic administration is virtually paralyzed. Since 1993 the country has received about $500 million per annum in foreign aid which it has consistently badly managed. Nine percent of GDP goes into the public purse which is low even by developing country standards. Even if stability is soon restored, Cambodia will not enjoy the level of foreign aid it has had in the past and can expect a reduction of around 40 percent. Trade continues more or less as in the previous year—volume through two main ports dropped one percent in the first nine months of the year. The U.N. mission took inventory recently and reported it was missing 1,898 vehicles, 1,787 electric generators and 892 computers.

**Final Comment:** The question for Cambodia at this juncture seems to rest very much on Hun Sen as an individual. Whether he broke early with communism or not, Hun Sen comes out of a Marxist-totalitarian mold that produced the killing fields, which should be remembered not only for their stark horror but as a style of government, as a method for dealing with those who do not share your utopian ideology. Hun Sen apparently feels his chief problem is to garner enough authority to rule—and that may well be the case. He is a strongman, but not very strong, a dictator who worries that he lacks the power to dictate. Given his mind set, and his reputation, the question is whether he will offer Prince Ranariddh a generous role in ruling the country. And whether the Prince dare accept, or has much to offer if he does accept. A thin reed of hope indeed, yet it seems to be the best available at the moment. (DP)

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**VN Diacrits.** From Văn Lê via Vern Weitzel (down under) comes a report on a new and innovative website which allows users to read Vietnamese text without having Vietnamese fonts installed on their computers. Website can be accessed at: [http://www.smart.com/~vanle/project1.htm](http://www.smart.com/~vanle/project1.htm)

Before going to this site configure your Navigator 4 as follows: EDIT, REFERENCES, FONTS. In the FONTS submenu select the last option: USE DOCUMENT-SPECIFIED FONTS, INCLUDING DYNAMIC FONTS.
LAOS IN THE SECOND QUARTER: CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM.

It may be an academic cliché—the term cautious optimism (or guarded optimism if you are less optimistic)—but it did seem to apply to Laos in April through June. The country was surrounded by neighbors in various eco-socio-political conditions. Việt Nam, which the Lao must always carefully watch (and attend to while pretending not), was busy with dissident religionists, severe economic trauma, and a generally restive rural population. Lao officials took careful note of the remedial measures being applied by Hà Nội. Cambodia, in the throes of confusion following parliamentary elections, meant to soften things up, received good will messages from Vientiane but clearly the Lao were not sure of what to expect next in Cambodia (as was the case with the rest of the onlooking world), and more to the point, what this uncertainty could mean for Laos.

Lao officials continued to wrestle with the Asian economic “contagion” made more meaningful now that Laos is a member of ASEAN and trying to cope with a suddenly global economy. A chief problem for the Vientiane government is the worrisome trade deficit, a problem compounded by Laos’s continued unhealthy dependence on large amounts of foreign aid.

Lao-Thai border trade, which reportedly reached nearly 10 billion baht a couple of years ago, has declined sharply due to Thailand’s economic problems and the falling Lao currency (the kip). The kip dropped from 36 to a baht in mid-1997, to 90-100 in March 1998 (130 to a baht on the black market in early June), then began to stabilize in mid-June (80-85) in response to government efforts against black market foreign currency trading.

Lao imports from Thailand were up sharply in the first four months of 1998 but exports to Thailand plunged, giving the latter a big surplus in the border trade. Thai traders want this trend to continue, especially in light of revenue lost from declining trade with other economically depressed SE Asian countries; but prospects are dim. If the kip begins falling again, border trade will drop accordingly; Thai goods will be more expensive to import, and Lao importers who buy Thai goods on credit (in baht) may not be able to make repayments.

While Laos may not have felt the economic shocks experienced by more developed regional countries, it cannot escape the side effects—the border trade deficit perhaps one of the most telling. Foreign investments, most from Thailand and other SE Asians countries, is down. Many contracted Thai-invested projects in Laos have not gotten underway and will be further delayed if the Thai economy does not improve. Laos relies heavily on foreign loans and aid has racked up considerable foreign debt; new loans may now be harder to secure. (From Bangkok Phuchakan, 23 June).

Meantime, Lao foreign affairs officials continued to reach out to contacts near and far.

The first session of the Lao-European Union joint commission was held in Vientiane on June 26, 1997 to implement a basic agreement on cooperation and trading. The meeting sought to work out a strategy and policy for bilateral cooperation, the focus of which is rural development, environmental protection, and refugee issues.

A delegation of Lao officials from the country’s four northern provinces (Luang Namtha, Oudomsai, Bokeo and Phongsaly) make a “working” visit to Yunnan Province in southwestern China in July to “step up” the relationship and discuss improvement of regulations covered in Lao-Chinese border protocols. Yunnan officials also cooperate with Laos (and Myanmar) on anti-drug activities in the “Golden Triangle.” A project, which began six years ago, has aided farmers in three provinces in Laos to raise cash crops and reduce their dependency on poppy production. In July, China donated U.S. $240,000 worth of farm machinery to Laos, a gift from CPC’s Central Committee to the Central Committee of the LPRP.

KPL reports that Lao and American technical officials at a meeting in Vientiane September 10-11 expressed their satisfaction with results of their recent joint operations to account for MIAs in Lao. The joint teams launched a survey on 34 cases during the first half of the year, which included eight excavations yielding bones, teeth, and two dog tags. Plans were made for the second half of 1998 to focus on excavations in provinces most affected by the war.

Lao watchers—academics, journalists, government officials—always in need or more and better and better information on Laos should know of Lao research
facilities at Arizona State University, Tempe. The Williams W. Sage Collection of Laotian Ethnographica (in the Museum of Anthropology) and the William W. Sage Books and Archival Material on Laos (Hayden Library) were established to be the major U.S. research collection dedicated solely to Laos. The contain objects and library materials assembled by William W. Sage while he worked on educational development projects in Laos 1969-1975. Ethnographic objects include eighteen sets of clothing worn by men, women and children of various ethnic groups, including the Akha, Alak, Hmong, Kasseng, Khamu, Lahu, Lao, Lue, Mien, Tai Dam, and Tai-oi; artifacts including: blankets, baby carriers, bags, betel nut boxes, pipes, jewelry of silver, brass and beads, baskets, musical instruments, forms of money, tools, weapons, amulet and figurines, altar objects, sacred paraphernalia and handwritten texts. Documentation includes an unpublished catalog by the donor, 300 prints and slides. Contact Department of Anthropology, Arizona State University, PO Box 872402, Tempe, AZ; tel: (602) 965-6213; Web: http://www.asu.edu/clas/anthropology. (Source: Indochina Interchange vol. 8, no 2, Summer 1998).

“The Dynamics of Regional Disparities in Laos: The Poor and the Rich” by Yves Bourdet (Univ. Lund, Sweden). The rich get rich and the poor get what’s left which is one of the characteristics for spread of well-being and economic development between urban and rural Laos. Much of the article is devoted to analysis of the Party and State effort to redress that balance. Work of considerable effort. With numerous charts and data tabulations. Asian Survey, July 1998.

Radio for Foreigners. VVN—the Voice of Vietnam, September 1, 1998, began broadcasting programs to foreigners in the country. Channel VOV5 at 105.5 FM broadcasts six hours a day in English and French. Chinese language broadcasts are to be added later. (VNA Sept. 4, 1998)

The Vietnam War by Tai Sung An (Washington College, Maryland). A highly commendable fresh look at the “other side” in the Vietnam War: PAVN, PLAF. It comes from an author well grounded in what has come to be termed the “aggressive Confucianism” practiced by China, North Korea, and Vietnam. This is An’s second book on Vietnam (in 1997 came America After Vietnam: From Anguish to Healing). Most important contribution here are the three central chapters devoted to PAVN generals’ strategic thinking and to the Hanoi Politburo’s application of Leninism to organization, mobilization and motivation of the wartime civilian population. Conclusion supports the perception that Hanoi won the war, lost the peace; some might challenge An’s contention that the big winner in Vietnam was the USSR. Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, $32.50. (1998).

The Wrong War: Why We Lost in Vietnam by Jeffrey Record (Georgia Tech Univ.). A refreshing reexamination of the Vietnam War by a civilian (former FSO in the Mekong Delta; legislative aide on Capitol Hill). U.S. leaders did not grasp the full nature of the war they were getting into until it was too late, and after which nothing mattered except extrication. They paid little attention to the nature of their enemy and underestimated the force of his motivations. They overestimated U.S. political stamina in the face of a “fifty year war” challenge. Their allies in Saigon never were able to get organized politically. None of this is new but here is a fine restatement of basic tenets of the postmortem. Record is hard on top brass at the Pentagon (especially Robert McNamara), not so much for their vincible ignorance as for not speaking up. His final judgement, that the U.S. could have won in Vietnam but would have had to pay too high a price doing so, has not yet become the certified, final judgement by history. Recommended. Naval Institute Press, $27.95. (1998).

Cambodia: Report From a Stricken Land by Henry Kamm (New York Times foreign correspondent, ret.). Bitter new report on Cambodia’s endless miseries, which Kamm has tracked on the scene for decades. Slashing hits from the opening page: the incompetence and venality of ten percent or so of the Khmer who have run the country for past 50 years; the outside powers who
prolonged the war out of well meant ignorance or to serve their own strategic objectives. And it is still not over, Cambodia remains an ongoing catastrophe. Perhaps, Kamm suggests, it is too late for Cambodia to be saved (or to save itself). Arcade Publishing, $25.95. (1998).


The Road to War: France and Vietnam, 1944–1947 by Martin Shipway (British historian). Something of a revisionist history of the run-up to the Việt Minh War. Or more to the point, relocating the context of the genesis of the war away from the Neanderthal-minded colons of Indochina to the greatly distracted French bureaucrats in Paris. Shipway puts more emphasis on Vietnamese national unity than seems justified. He dodges the thesis that the French might have won in Indochina (i.e. achieve a stand off) with the four Indochina countries within the French Union had they availed themselves of the opportunities offered by the divisiveness ingrained in the region then and now. Berghahn Books, Providence, RI, $49.95. (1996).


Vietnam: Business Opportunities and Risks by Joseph Quinlan (author, economist with Dean Witter Reynolds, N.Y.) Quinlan says this: understand Vietnam’s turbulent past; Vietnam is poor but rich in natural resources; market reform is taking hold but central planning remains the rule; the economic infrastructure is antiquated; the place is still divided by geographic regionalism; non-U.S. companies have stolen the march on the U.S. but there are many opportunities left for those willing to take the risk. All this in the first chapter. Recommended. Pacific View Press (Berkeley, CA), $19.95. (1995).

Into the Tiger’s Jaw: America’s First Black Marine Aviator. Autobiography of Lt. Gen. Frank Petersen (With Alfred Phelps). He joined the Marines in 1951 assuming the Corps played on an even field. It didn’t, then. But Petersen stuck with it and ended his 38-year career with three stars. He went on to become a Du Pont executive, now runs his own aviation safety business in Washington. The “tiger’s jaw” was Vietnam where Petersen flew an F-4B Phantom jet. His story is a credit to him and the U.S. Marine Corps. Presidio Press, $24.95. (1998).


Lê Thành Tông (1442-1497) Life and Works. Thirty-three excerpts on the life and work of 15th century King Lê Thành Tông, including the formation of the kingdom, organization of national defense, enhancement of culture, by 30 historians from the College of Sociology.

_Inside the Crosshairs: Snipers in Vietnam_ by Michael Lee Lanning (military historian). There is a kind of special panache about the military sniper, master of technology, spirited self-confidence. Sniping may be cruel but it reduces the irrational madness in war. For the military, it is also highly cost effective. Lanning has produced a compendium on the subject (his tenth book on the Vietnam war), 15 chapters on various aspects of sniping, plus seven appendices. Tells all you need to know. A serious work. Ballantine Books, $6.99. (1998).


_Formalities; A Guide for Foreign Guests and Overseas Vietnamese_. What might be called an official introduction to Vietnam's dense bureaucracy. Meant chiefly for those who want to get married, must pay taxes, buy a house, take out citizenship, open a bank account, travel in-country, etc. Handy, but question is, how far can it be trusted? Still, a highly valuable reference work with examples of blank forms. The Gioi Publishers, Hanoi (available from Global Directions, San Francisco), $25.00. (1994).


_Ringed in Steel: Armored Cavalry, Vietnam 1967-68_ by Michael Mahler (Montana State Univ). The tank in the jungle in Vietnam— a trial George Patton could never have imagined. Vulnerability, the heat, terrain, plus the usual challenges of maintenance communication, command, coordination. But the tankers were a special breed and generally managed to surmount all. Mahler, a retired colonel, was there tells it how it was. Presidio Press, $15.95. (1998).


_Fifty Years of Painting and Sculpture on Armed Forces and Revolutionary Wars_. Fine Arts Press, and People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi. If any of the socialist style art out of Vietnam is worth viewing as art (as opposed to studying as history) it is that produced by and about the PAVN military. Here are 160 pages of color reproductions dating from 1947 to the early 1990s. Some mauldin, some mawkish but many are works that reach beyond the propaganda purposes of those who commissioned them. One can learn a great deal about the war by slowly browsing through this book. Reissued to commemorate the 50th anniversary (1994) of PAVN. Available from Global Directions, 116 Maiden Lane, San Francisco, CA 94108, $50. (1994).

_Tet: The Vietnamese Lunar New Year_ by Huu Ngoc (writer and translator) and Barbara Cohen (psychiatrist, pre-eminent Vietnam guidebook writer.) Ah, the joys of Tet for the Vietnamese—all the Western holi-

Hà Nội: Off the Beaten Path by Barbara Cohen, M.D. (guidebook writer). Two volume eclectic "scrapbook" of author's published writings, chiefly on the Hanoi cultural scene: art exhibitions, Đàn Thảo Sơn concerts, the Beatles remembered, Hanoi weddings, etc. About 100 entries in all. From the author (79 Hàng Trống St., Hà Nội) or Global Directions. $10 each. (1993, 1994).

Unfriendly fire: A Mother's Memoir by Peg Mullen (Iowa farm woman now living in Texas). Her son, Michael was killed by "friendly fire" in February 1970 while serving with the Americal Division in Chu Lai. Peg Mullen spent the next 15 years trying to find out exactly what happened and, more to the point, to crusade "against the insanity of war." Compelling account. University of Iowa Press, $22.95. (1995).

Industrial Crops in Vietnam by Võ Công Hậu. The word among Asian investors is, to get rich in Vietnam put your money into industrial crops not into edible products like shrimp, fish or rice but rather rubber, kenaf, ramie, lacquer, two dozen oil-bearing trees and pharmaceuticals (a large number of ingredients in medicines come from the farm and forest, not only quinine bark). This brief work is a good introduction to the subject. Also trust tea, coffee and coconut. Thế Giới Publishers, Hà Nội (and Global Directions, San Francisco), $15. (1996).


Encyclopedia of the American Left by Marie Jo Buhle et al. (eds), 2nd ed. Described as an updated and expanded guide to America's radical social, political and cultural history, i.e.; the 1960s cultural revolution. Oxford Univ. Press, $104. (1998).


Contemporary Vietnamese History by Hà Minh Hồng (Vietnam National University, Hồ Chí Minh City). Text covering the "very glorious struggles in Vietnamese history" from 1858 to date. From Nhà Xuất bản Khoa Học Tự Nhiên (Faculty of Natural Sciences), Hồ Chí Minh City. (1997).


Business, Government, and the End of Empire: Malaya, 1942-195. by Nicholas White. (historian, John Moores Univ., Liverpool.). History of the economic dimension of The Emergency—or the pound vs. colonialism; the sort of book only the British seem to produce. There is depth, and seriousness, the likes of which we have yet to see with Vietnam counter-insurgency history. Heavily documented. From Oxford Univ. Press, $60. (1997).

Cry in the Wilderness: Guinea Pigs of Vietnam, by Rev. Jean Williams. (New Zealand author). An attack from down under by one wearing her heart on her sleeve concerning the Vietnam War. Ms. Williams, no scientist, seems to buy into every allegation on 24-D, Agent Orange, and other defoliation programs. Makes up with passion what is lacking in accuracy. Homecoming Publications, Nambour, Queensland, New Zealand. (1996).

Behind Bamboo Hedges by Mai Phùng (pen name of Lan Cao). Memoir of a young girl coming of age, first in Vietnam, behind the village bamboo hedge, then in North Carolina. Meant for the uninformed seeking insight into the thoughts of the Vietnamese young. Political perceptions and judgments may be oversimplified (for instance, putting the war down to a struggle between communist puppets vs. capitalist puppets), but it is all well expressed and refreshingly honest. From Người Dân, P.O. Box 2674 Costa Mesa, CA 92628, $10. (1996).


General Vietnamese History in Ancient and Medieval Eras by Nguyễn Khắc Thuan. Text covering prehistory to 18th century. Published by Faculty of Natural Science, VNU, HCMC, (1997).


Land Record of Thái Bình Province by Phan Huy Lê et al. (Vietnamese History Studies, VNU). Some 550 pages of data on Chấn Định, Đồng Quan, Quy Nhơn, Cô, Thanh Quan, and Vị Tiên districts of Thái Bình Province. Thế Giới Publishers, Hanoi, (1997).


Letters to An American Advisor (Thư Gửi Người Bạn Mỹ) by Vĩnh Lộc (ARVN’s last chief of staff). Twelve letters sent to Gen. Lộc’s advisors as postmortem on the Việt Nam War. He says none of the Washington decision-makers had a clear idea of their objectives, therefore, had no clear idea what their responsibilities were, nor was there a real desire to win the war. Role of the U.S. advisor was never well-defined; his knowledge of guerrilla warfare and of local realities was limited; his length of service was too brief to remedy the shortcomings. Other factors: the lack of synchronization between the U.S. advisors and the Vietnamese officers, lack of discipline and defection rate in some American units, the failure of South Việt Nam’s plan for pacification and rural reconstruction, contradictions in U.S. Vietnamization policy and its doubtful motivations, errors of the Pentagon’s “search and destroy” strategy. (In Vietnamese; English, French translations due out 1999). From: Ngay Nay, 8200 Wilcrest, #5, Houston, Texas 77072 (1998).

The Revolutionaries They Could Not Break: The Fight for the Fourth International in Indochina, 1930-1945 by Ngô Văn. History of Vietnamese communism’s most dismal decade—the 1930s—caught in the ideological squeeze between the Comintern’s popular front “stop Hitler” strategy in Europe (in Vietnam this meant lie down with the hated colon) and the militantly anti-social activity of the Trotskyites, Đại Việt, and other nationalists. Much of the Party’s effort was given over to helping the French Surete scarf up their political rivals and ship them off to Madagascar. Not a pretty historical picture. Index Books, Lts., 28 Charlotte St., London (1997).

War and the Law. International law increasingly intrudes into the conduct of military affairs (or is it the opposite?). At a Staley Foundation sponsored conference outside Washington (Oct. 1997) the 85 foreign policy professional conference heard, among many others, these papers on the subject.

1) “Accountability and Judicial Response: Building Mechanisms for Post-Conflict Justice.”
2) “The UN Security Council and the International Criminal Court: How Should They Relate?”
3) “U.S. Sanctions Policy: Balancing Principals and Interests.”

Available from The Staley Foundation, 216 Sycamore Street, Suite 500, Muscatine, IA 52761.

From SSI. Received this quarter from the U.S. military’s pre-eminent think tank at Carlisle Barracks are these monographs:


2) The Political-Military Rivalry for Operational Control in U.S. Military Actions: A Soldier’s Perspective by Colonel Lloyd Matthews (USA Ret.). One (military) man’s view of the eternal State-Pentagon policy struggle for which there never can be a resolution satisfactory to all. Argues for greater military autonomy. Matter of fact, straight-forward advice, chiefly aimed at the military on how to beat the civilians at their own game. (June 1998).

3) Breaking Away From the Bear by Dianne Smith (analyst on Russia for Allied Forces, Central Europe). Brief history of U.S. dealings with the former USSR Central Asian States when things went from
simple but dangerous to complicated but potentially dangerous. (August 1998).

4) *Dynamics of Russian Weapon Sales to China* by Stephen J. Blank. (March 1997).


Erratum. The correct title of James Fisher’s work (IC XVII No 2) is *Dr. America: The Lives of Thomas A. Dooley*, 1927-61, University of Massachusetts Press. $29.95. (1997).

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**PERIODICALS**

“Disturbances in Thái Bình” by Carlyle Thayer (Australian Defense Academy). Draft on the Internet (about 4,500 words) of the peasant revolt this year in the always contentious province and Party-State efforts to dampen things down. Farmers were exercised over the rise in the corruption of local officials, involving shake-downs for services performed, gouging taxes, land tenure decisions (seizures to build golf courses), “mandarin” behavior. None of this was particularly new in Thái Bình; what was new was the violence of the protestors and the stern reaction by security forces newly equipped with hi-tech riot control weapons such as electric cattle prods. Hà Nội acted slowly, first dismissing the disturbances as historical, provincial (“long reputation for producing dissenters”) then to blaming them on trouble-making outsiders for fanning the flames (chiefly foreign media). As the matter grew more serious, officials were dispatched from Hà Nội to address the problem for what it really was: genuine grievances. Cadres were purged, governance changed somewhat to allow for more local autonomy and, importantly, the decision made not to bring in the troops. Thayer suggests the Thái Bình events had a significant and beneficial effect on national politics, that Thái Bình proved to be a cautionary lesson for the Politburo, which is now handling rural dissent as well as can be expected. All this is traced in some detail, from 1996 onward. Part of pressure for changed policies, he adds, has been from the outside, that is, impact on the Vietnamese economy of the Asia-wide economic crisis. Thayer’s e-mail (cthayer@adfa.oz.au) and fax: 61-2-6268-8852.

“China in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Organizational Processes and Domestic Modes of Thought,” Rosemary Foot, St. Antony’s College, Oxford. Achievements of, and concerns over, this regional security organization in terms of China’s participation. While acknowledging China’s realist approach to security issues, the author sees hope that its approach can be tempered by ARF processes and the ASEAN culture that emphasizes “consensus and incrementalism.” *Asian Survey*, May 1998.
"The ASEAN Regional Forum: Building on Sand," Robyn Lim, Hiroshima Shudo Univ., Japan. Unlike the writer above, Lim finds little to hope for in the ARF. Regional security, he says, will depend largely on choices China makes, and until it respects the interests of others, ARF’s procedural and institutional approaches are doomed to failure. Even in its own "front yard", the ARF has done nothing to improve security in the face of China’s territorial pressures in the South China Sea. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 20:2, August 1998.

Two more articles in *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, August issue, deal with security/stability issues in SE Asia:

—“Alternative U.S. Strategies with Respect to China and the Implications for Vietnam,”

Peter Van Ness, University of Denver. Prepared for a workshop in Hanoi in March 1998, this article analyzes three alternative strategies for U.S. policies toward the PRC: (1) realist engagement; (2) offshore balancing; and (3) cooperative security. Each has very different implications for Vietnam and author concludes no. 3 offers the best strategy for stability (but with some ifs).

—“Preventive Diplomacy and Pro-Activity in the South China Sea,” Ian Townsend-Gault, Centre for Asian Legal Studies, Univ. of British Columbia. Prospects for oil have exacerbated differences among states at the expense of other uses of the sea and of marine ecology. Author considers the achievements of informal diplomacy (the Workshops) to promote marine cooperation without settling sovereignty disputes.

“ASEAN and the Management of Regional Security,” Shaun Narine, Univ. of Toronto. Article evaluates ASEAN’s efforts to manage security in SE Asia. Member states will have to avoid narrow self-interest if the grouping’s corporate influence is to gain the authority to set the rules for international interaction in the region. *Pacific Affairs*, Summer 1998.

“Japan’s Role in the Cambodian Peace Process: Diplomacy, Manpower, and Finance,” Yasuhiro Takeda, National Defense Academy of Japan. Japan was a "unique external player" in the Cambodia peace process, participating in all three areas (above) of international activity. As a "first testing ground" for Japan to play a positive and direct role in the international arena, the author examines the three areas to show Japan’s possibilities and limitations in peacekeeping efforts. *Asian Survey*, June 1998.

The Cambodian Elections – Articles on results and aftermath of Cambodia’s July 26th national election appeared in several periodicals under such titles as "Unfree and Unfair" and "We Are Scared! But Cambodians Still Voted in Droves" by Nate Thayer and Rodney Tasker in *FEER*, 13 August; "Cambodia’s Flawed Miracle" and "Not Quite the Nelson Touch" in *The Economist*, 1 and 8 August; and "Hun Sen Stages an Election" by Tina Rosenberg, *New York Times Magazine*, 30 August. While noting the election was orderly and largely peaceful, the writers stress the charges of intimidation and fraud, and an aftermath of fear among people who had supported the opposition. They direct special criticism at the international monitoring group for unseemly haste in declaring the election free and fair.

“Don’t Ring Us” by Faith Keenan in *FEER*, 6 August. Moscow’s message to Hanoi is that it might not be able to help build Vietnam’s first oil refinery after all (a framework agreement had been signed May 22), due apparently to Russia’s own economic mess. This has reopened the door for other companies to negotiate a deal, hoping for better terms than PetroVietnam would agree to in the past. Nothing decided yet.

_Watershed_, published thrice annually in Bangkok by TERRA (Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance) and dealing with environmental and local community issues in Mekong countries, devotes its July-October 1998 number to the issue of people dispossessed by “progress” or “development.” Includes features on displaced persons in northwest Cambodia and
BACKGROUND ON THE VIETNAM CENTER
AT TEXAS TECH

by James R. Reckner, Director

Establishment of the Center for the Study of the Vietnam Conflict. In November of 1989, I petitioned the Board to establish the Center for the Study of the Vietnam Conflict, with the dual missions of guiding and funding the development of the Vietnam Archive, and encouraging continuing study of all aspects of the American Vietnam experience. They unanimously supported the proposal, but did not provide any funding. If we were to succeed, that was going to be our responsibility. (At its May 15, 1997 meeting, the Vietnam Center Advisory Board voted to change the organization’s name to The Vietnam Center. The logic driving this change was simplicity: this is the name we actually call ourselves on a day-to-day basis. At the same time we voted to change the Archive of the Vietnam Conflict to The Vietnam Archive.)

The Vietnam Archive. The Vietnam Archive currently houses several million pages of original documentation. A printed guide to the archive is available from the Archive. We continue to seek additional materials relating to the Vietnam War for permanent preservation. Such materials include, but are not limited to:

*Official records, instructions, manuals, correspondence that might be in the personal possession of individuals
*Individuals’ personal correspondence, diaries, photographs, films
*Ephemeral material such as unit newsletters and other instructions produced during the war
*Newsletters, magazines, produced by Vietnam veteran organizations after the war
*Veterans’ memoirs
*Records of Vietnam veteran organizations
*Books, unpublished manuscripts, early drafts of published works

The Anti-War Movement. Documentation of the anti-war movement is another important area of collection. We have a duty to future generations to try to preserve all aspects of the Vietnam War.

The South Vietnamese View. There is a great danger that, if we do not make a concerted effort to preserve it, the South Vietnamese point of view concerning the war also will be lost. It is now quite easy to acquire books and materials from Vietnam. However, to ensure future generations have access to all points of view, it is imperative that we actively collect materials that either were published in South Vietnam during the war, or were published by Việt kiều in the years since 1965.

Our Vietnam Library. We currently hold several thousand Vietnam-related published works in the Archive. We need to press on with acquisition of additional materials to ensure that the most complete possible collection is available for present and future researchers. Books donated to the Vietnam Archive are non-circulating. They are retained in the archive and are available for use only in the Archive; thus we feel reasonably certain that we will suffer no loss of materials. We need, too, to continue to collect all dissertations produced relating to any aspect of Indochina. Our collection in this area already is extensive; however, it is still far from complete. Though we already have extensive hard copy and microfims of newspapers from throughout Southeast Asia, we need to continue to expand these important research resources.

Individuals wishing to donate materials to The Vietnam Archive are urged to contact Mr. Jim Ginther or Dr. Ron Frankum. The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University Libraries, Special Collections Library, Room 108, Lubbock, TX 79409-1041, Telephone: (806) 742-9010, Facsimile: (806) 742-0496, Email: livna@lib.ttu.edu, Website: www.lib.ttu.edu/vietnam

The Conference & Symposium Program. The mission of encouraging continuing study of the Vietnam experience we perform through a program of conferences and symposia. We host smaller, more narrowly focused conferences for two years, and in the third year we mount our major effort in our symposium series.
Outreach to the Vietnamese. For several years, The Vietnam Center has invited Vietnamese to participate in our conferences and symposia. In April 1998 four scholars from Vietnam attended our “Vietnam in Asia” conference and presented papers. We used the occasions of that visit to begin discussions about future cooperative plans between Vietnamese universities and Texas Tech University. I am scheduled to visit Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City in July of 1998 to further these discussions and, hopefully, to set some programs in motion.

Douglas Pike and the Indochina Chronology. With the arrival of Vietnam scholar Douglas Pike at Texas Tech in 1997 as an associate director of The Vietnam Center, the publication of his quarterly journal, Indochina Chronology also was shifted to Texas Tech. The first Tech-sponsored edition, which covered all of 1997, was published in January of 1998, and quarterly editions are now being published. Individuals interested in receiving this journal should inquire with The Vietnam Center.

Texas Tech’s Future “Vietnam Building.” As our program continues to mature and move in new directions, I have proposed—and the Chancellor and President of the University have accepted the idea—that Texas Tech should build an entirely new building to house the Vietnam project. I have in mind a building that probably will cost about $15 M. or more. The ground floor of this building will house the most magnificent museum of the Vietnam War. Upper floors will house the Vietnam Archive and reading room (the latter a combination of document research room and browsing library), the offices of the Vietnam Center, with offices for visiting scholars, class rooms, and meeting facilities.

When we have this building completed, we will have established an absolutely unique facility. Under one roof we will have brought together the archival, artifactual and educational processes relating to Vietnam. From such collocation I am certain a number of very positive synergies will develop. Imagine, for example, giving a lecture about the My Lai tragedy and at the same time having the original documents relating to that event, along with the original photos right there for the students to see. It is one thing to talk about these things in a purely theoretical way; it is much more powerful, though, for the students to examine the original documentation. Similarly, other lectures could be augmented by artifacts from the storage areas of the museum, or lectures might be given right in the museum, if there is a display there that is particularly relevant to the topic being taught.

This new facility also will permit us to conduct an active outreach program to regional high schools, and at the same time will provide a facility that Vietnam veterans will much appreciate. At this point, architects have been contracted; they are developing plans for this building.

The Phil Price Professor of Vietnam War Studies. Chancellor John T. Montford—a Vietnam-era-Marine—is raising funds for a named professorship in Vietnam War Studies. The point is that we will, in the next couple of years, endow a position that is specifically dedicated to studying the Vietnam War. Such a person will be a tremendous assistance with our growing graduate program. About 25% of all history graduate students at Texas Tech are writing theses or dissertations on the Vietnam War.

(Phil Price, after whom the professorship will be named, is a local man, a Vietnam vet who was badly wounded while on service there. He is President and CEO of The Price Communications Group, Inc., and President of the Vietnam Center Advisory Board.)

Keeping “Connected” with the Community. The Center itself is guided by our chairman, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, and by a board of veterans from the community. This community connection is particularly important because, in my view, the Vietnam experience still very much belongs to the people. It cannot yet become purely academic. Also, by engaging the community, we have found remarkable strengths. Services are provided by many organizations free, simply because they remain connected to the project. One board member has already provided us services in kind which exceed $100,000.
the Prek Thnot dam area in southwest Cambodia, (see brief summary in Cambodia section); northern Thailand Shan State in northeast Myanmar and resettlement in Laos (see Laos section).

“Asian Socialism’s Open Doors: Guangzhou and Hồ Chí Minh City” by William S. Turley (Northern Illinois Univ.) and Brantly Womack (Univ. of Virginia). Specialists on China (Womack) and Vietnam (Turley) look at the two cities that are the powerhouses of economic reform in their respective countries. Instructive comparison of their national roles and effect on regional reform. China Journal, July 1998.

“Russian-Chinese-U.S. Relations and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region” by William E. Ferry and Roger E. Kanet (Univ. of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign). Using the evolving relations among the three countries as a framework, the authors examine how Asia-Pacific security has changed in the 1990s. In the Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS) Publication Series, Univ. of Illinois at U-C.

“To Change A War: General Harold K. Johnson and the PROVN Study” by Lewis Sorley (well known military writer) in Parameters. The acronym stands for “Program for the Pacification and Long-term Development of Vietnam”; it was the war fought off the battlefront and largely was the brainchild of Johnson, U.S. Army chief-of-staff (who went into the job at the same time General William Westmoreland was arriving in Sài Gòn). His was not an easy task, small part of which was convincing rigid minds in the Pentagon. Johnson was not the sort of military figure who drew much attention in the press, nor has he gotten much attention from academics since the war. Sorley is attempting to correct this. This article is drawn from his upcoming Honorable Warrior: General Harold K. Johnson and the Ethics of Command published by the University of Kansas Press.

“Việt Minh Attack at Nghĩa Lộ” by Sham Darragh (U.S. Army, ret.) in Vietnam, October 1998. A look back at a battle in late 1951 which seemed for a time to be a turning point in the French campaign to suppress the Việt Minh. After a string of setbacks in 1950 the French army bounced back with a victory at Nghĩa Lộ. This is a rather detailed account of the battle. In the same issue, see the Summer’s (editor) editorial on war and remembrance. His point is that American veterans of the war once tried to avoid memories of Vietnam, but as time passes, remembrance for them becomes a healer.

“Asia’s Woes Make Việt Nam A Bargain Vacation Spot” by Philip Shenon (New York Times reporter). Tourism income in Việt Nam has taken a downturn this year—5 percent or more—which is a shame, Shenon says, because you can room well and eat spectacular meals at a fraction of what you would pay elsewhere. (Chicago Tribune July 12).

“Hotel Industry Continues on Steep Downhill Slide” by Bích Ngoc (reporter) in VIR, July 27-August 2. The occupancy rate in Việt Nam’s four-and five-star hotels (chiefly in HCMC) is running at 20%, a 100% drop from the first six months of 1997. Overbuilding and Asia’s financial troubles are the chief causes. Some 24 construction projects now underway are in deep financial trouble, nine of them involving investors from Southeast Asia.

“PM Blames Officials for Trade Slump” by Hà Thắng (reporter) in VIR July 27-August 2. Việt Nam’s export growth rate the first seven months of 1998 was down by 70%. PM Phan Văn Khải tells reporters in HCMC that regional financial troubles are not chiefly to blame, rather it is an abysmal performance by state bureaucrats. We will press for reforms, VCP Secretary General Lê Khả Phiêu tells a meeting of ambassadors, journalists, and NGO officials in a Hanoi meeting. (July 25).


“Market Reality” by Nick Freeman research chief, ING Barings, Bangkok in Vietnam Business Jour-

"While Awaiting the Elimination of the Beg-Give Mechanism" in Thoi Bao Kinh Te Sai Gon (HCMC) September 3. A rather bold editorial sting from Ho-ville calling for an end to government harassment of business. What is needed in Vietnam is development of society’s "business mind." That will clash with "existing legal stipulations, mechanisms, and institutions," says the editor, but so be it. Rest of the editorial argues for rule of law, as opposed to government by State/Party whim.

"Telling the Stories of Narrative History" by James Goodman (Rutgers Univ.) in Chronicle of Higher Education August 14. The charge is that modern day academics don’t tell stories when they write history books; rather they prefer narrative history writing about wars and politics, for instance. For thousands of years historians told stories; now they leave story telling to journalists. Shame, says Goodman, return to the old days.

"Upwardly Mobile" by Joshua Jake Levine (business reporter) in Vietnam Business Journal October 4. Further on the communication revolution that has descended on Vietnam. It is allowing its citizens to stay in touch as never before because new business deals have rejuvenated what is now one of the world’s fastest growing telecom markets. In the same issue, "Internet in Holding Pattern", also by Levine, on the many trials and tribulations—the over-regulation and firewalls—that are smothering a promising Vietnamese industry at birth.

"The Internet Travel Guide" by Peter Geiser. Updated version of Travel Guide to Vietnam (Cambodia, Laos also available, separately). Major tourist towns described; where to stay, to eat, wide ranging: Kontum described for example, as is shopping in Cholon. To reach: The Internet Travel Guide (http://www.datacom.ch/pmggeiser).

"A Silent Struggle Haunts Vietnam" by David Lamb (Los Angeles Times staff writer). A visit to a ARVN cemetery outside Bien Hoa—abandoned by all but the ghosts—occasions a poignant report comparing this pitiful place of toppled headstones and weed running wild, with the manicured military cemeteries for the PAVN dead found elsewhere in Vietnam. With some long thoughts about how the peoples of what is still two unified countries can forget the past, whether they can. Los Angeles Times July 17, 1998.

"Grasp the Spirit of the Fourth Plenum Resolution and Advance the Economy to a New Developmental Stage" by Pham The Duyet (PB mem.). A more realistic than usual critique of the economic philosophy now in command in Vietnam. The key word, newly introduced, is sustainability. Distinguish between quality and quantity, Duyet says, and think, think, think. Also, let’s not be so hard on ourselves, we are doing quite well compared to economic performance of say 1975-1990. In Tap Chi Cong San April 1998.

"Vietnam: Reality Check" by Faith Keenan, FEER September 3. Officials of Vietnam’s Ministry of Planning and Investment were shocked as the month of June ended and they had not received a single investment proposal. The well had run dry, or the pipeline. The good news is the aftershock,—the Politburo is getting serious about the problem. For more see, "Vietnam is Feeling the Pressure" by Abigail Hornstein in Tribune Business News (Knight Ridder, Hong Kong) August 21 on jittery foreign investors whose cash inflow will probably drop by one third this year. Also, the Associated Press file for July 24, 1998, "Vietnam Government Voices Growing Concern About Economic Policies" based on interview with Le Dang Doanh, chief of the SRV Central
Institute of Economic Management. "Our economic policies are the country's biggest bottleneck," he says.

"Buddhas and Brioche in Vientiane" by Martha Stevenson (SEA travel writer), *New York Times*, August 2. The capital of Laos, now more welcoming to tourists, mixes temples with French colonial architecture. Entering the country is easier (15-day tourist visa is $50 at the airport); there is an upscale hotel (the Lao Hotel Plaza with doubles starting at $120) along with the older (now somewhat faded) Lang-Xang and Asian Pavilion hotels (doubles start at $25); and the eating is good, whether at French/continental restaurants (dinner for two-$25), at noodle shops, or at cafes serving spicy Lao specialties and sticky rice (*khao niaw*). But of course Vientiane is hot most of the year.

"System Failure: Vietnam's Rice Export Network Buckles Under Record Sales" by Faith Keenan (reporter) in *FEER*, July 23. It has been a bumper year so far for rice growers and traders in Vietnam; farmers' earnings have nearly doubled for each kilo of paddy leaving the country for overseas sales. But agricultural officials and exporters are glum. Failure to heed the law of supply and demand in a rush to sign sales contracts early in the year resulted in overbooking followed by problems in filling orders and prospects of default. PM Phan Văn Khải, fearing rice shortages within Vietnam, intervened in April, capping exports for the first half of the year and banning new sales agreements. New contracts were permitted again in the third quarter but with some controls. Rice sells for 40 percent more than a year ago in Hà Nội and the government, worried about inflation, is not expected to lift marketing controls.

**Education in Vietnam.** *The Canadian Quarterly* (No 46, Autumn 1998) carries a series of articles on education in today's Vietnam, all well worth reading. Authors are chiefly former officials or educators in South Vietnam. Included are: "The Sorry State of Education in Vietnam" by Lâm Lê Trinh (former GVN Minister of Interior, now living in Canada), "Education in Vietnam: When the Government is Unable to Provide" by Phạm Cao Dương (University of California Los Angeles; formerly Sài Gòn Upiv). "Buddhism and Education" by Nguyễn Phúc Bửu-Tân (authority on Buddhism, now living in California). "Against All Odds: Why the children of refugees are doing well in schools" by Trần Minh Tùng (former GVN Minister of Health, now living in California) Subscription requests can be mailed to: Attn: Trần Toàn, 477 Decarie, Saint Laurent, H4L-3L1. PQ. Canada ($20 per year)

### Asian-Americans on Campus

"Many college and university campuses have an abundance of ethnic or religious organizations, but usually only one or two of them are Asian-American, and their participants tend to be primarily students of East Asian descent. Asian-American groups with activist agendas rarely attract members and eventually evolve in fraternity-like spon- sors of parties. The problem is that as Asian-American students have become more of a presence on many campuses, the students either have become apathetic or have splintered into groups devoted to the concerns of Filipino-Americans or Korean-Americans, for example. Asian-American students should form umbrella groups that actively seek membership from every Asian-American organization on each campus. Fragmented groups, will never be as strong as one that is truly pan-Asian-American." (Edmund Lee in the April/May 1998 issue of *A. Magazine*: "Where are the Asian-American campus activists?")

### Historic Hải Phòng

City officials in Hải Phòng, in a gesture to the past have declared 86 buildings in and around Hải Phòng as historical sites. They include the city's Great Theater (1900), the Nghĩa Temple, the Trưng Hạnh Temple, and two temples in the oulying villages of Hạng Kênh and Phong Pháp. Most buildings have been vandalized or have deteriorated badly. Plans are underway for restoration.
NEWS OF THE FIELD

CONFERENCES UPCOMING:

9th Annual Conference of the Forum of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam—The Partnership Approach to Poverty Alleviation, Education and Development: Sharing Experiences and Fostering Cooperation within Indochina. Will be held on January 25-28, 1999 in Phnom Penh. General objective is to provide an opportunity for government and non-government agencies to share their views and ideas for social development in the region. It is expected that partnerships might be formed or strengthened between involved parties to more effectively address the social needs of the region. Further information can be obtained by contacting the USIRP office at: Forum on Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, 25 West 45th St. Suite 1201, New York, NY 10036; telephone (212) 764-3925; FAX (212) 764-3896; e-mail: usindo@igc.apc.org

The Popular Culture Association will hold its PCA/ACA National Meeting in San Diego, March 31-April 3, 1999. The Film and History area of the PCA will present papers dealing with the relationship of film and television to history. For information check web site http://n-net.msut.edu/~filmhis, or contact area chair, Robert Fyne at 63 Wich Drive, Fords, NJ 08863-1406; phone (732) 636-8846; FAX (908) 289-1067.

The 1999 Vietnam Symposium will be held at the Holiday Inn, Lubbock Plaza, 3201 South Loop 289 beginning at 5:00 PM Thursday, April 14 and continuing through April 17, 1999. A wide range of papers dealing with Vietnam War related topics, post war experiences, and teaching Vietnam will be presented. The Moving Vietnam Wall exhibit will also be on display at the Symposium. For further information, contact Dr. James Reckner at the Vietnam Center, Texas Tech University, Box 41045, Lubbock, TX 79409-1045; phone (806) 742-3742; FAX (806) 742-8664; e-mail: vietnam.center@ttu.edu

The Third Pacific-Asia Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining will be held at Xiangshan Hotel, Beijing, China on April 26-28, 1999. The conference is sponsored by: Tsinghua University, the National Science Foundation of China, the Chinese Computer Federation, Toshiba Corporation, and NEC Software Chugoku. Invited speakers will be Won Kim (keynote speech, Cyber Database Solutions, USA) and Hiroshi Motoda (Osaka University, Japan). The conference provides an international forum for sharing the results of original research and practical development experiences. Topics include: “Theory and Foundation Issues in KDD,” “KDD Algorithms and Methods,” Process-Centric KDD,” “Soft Computing for KDD,” and “High Performance KDD, Integration and Applications.” For further information, contact Professor Ning Zhong, Department of Computer Science and Systems Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, Yamaguchi University, Tokiwa-Dai, 2557, ube 755, Japan; phone and FAX +81-836-35-9949; e-mail: zhong@ai.esse.yamaguchi-u.ac.jp

The Asian Conference 1999 will be held at the International Cultural Center at Texas Tech University in the Fall of 1999. The five sessions will cover sociology, education, economics, education, diplomacy, and general Asian concerns. Dr. William Lan will be issuing a call for papers shortly. For more information contact Dr. Lan at College of Education, Texas Tech University, P.O. Box 41071, Lubbock, TX 79409-1071; phone (806) 742-1997, ext. 284.

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CONFERENCES: FOR THE RECORD:


Hmong Mental Health: Cultural Influences on Treatment Perspectives. March 18-20, 1998 at the University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire. Health care providers learned several strategies in providing mental health care to Hmong clients.

The Legacy of LBJ and the Great Society. April, 1998 at Miami University in Oxford Ohio. Themes were: Education and Public Health, Foreign Affairs, and Race Relations. A paper by Joan Seeman Robinson, Ph.D. was presented on the Việt Nam War.

International Conference on Applying Multidisciplinary University Models. April 2-3, 1998 at Huae University. Examined models of institutional change in the context of profound transformation in higher education in Việt Nam.

Việt Nam Investor Seminar (cancelled). Scheduled for April 15-18, for foreign investors considering doing business in HCMC. Cancelled due to lack of interest, but it may be rescheduled for later this year.

Fourth Annual Hmong National Conference: “Living the Dream.” April 16-18, 1998 in Denver, Colorado. The many goals of the conference aimed at promoting and preserving Hmong culture while assisting the Hmong people in developing programs to help them succeed in the modern world.

The Việt Nam Center’s 1998 Annual Conference: Việt Nam in Asia. Held at Texas Tech University’s International Cultural Center, April 17-18, 1998. The purpose was to begin a dialogue between scholars in Vietnamese studies and others who are interested in Việt Nam. Conference centered around Vietnamese history and culture in an Asian context.

Indochina Chronology

Vietnamese Youth Conference—The New Horizon: Empowering Today’s Youth. A half-day conference held April 18, 1998 for Vietnamese American youth of Bay Area colleges in California. Designed to inform and empower young Vietnamese Americans. Prominent young community leaders addressed the students.


Việt Nam’s Role in the Aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis. April 27, 1998. Addressed investors’ concerns and attempted to stimulate investment in areas outside traditional Asian sources.


Development and Democracy in Việt Nam: Perspectives and Reality. Organized by the French Committee for Democracy in Việt Nam and held on April 29, 1998. Analyzed the economic crisis in Asia and how Party officials in Việt Nam have been suppressing the truth from their people.

Institutional Cooperation for Solar Energy in the Mekong Riparian Countries. May 11-16, 1998 in Hanoi. Reflected on the barriers that were identified at the CORE meeting, and analyzed the extent and nature of institutional cooperation needed to address the needs of the Mekong River region.

Cambodian Seminar. May 30, 1998. First time this kind of seminar was held in a Cambodian community. The purpose was considered “purely educational.”

Conference for High School Teachers. Sponsored by the Vietnam Center at Texas Tech University. June 11-13, 1998. Designed to equip high school teachers with curriculum and skills to better teach the Việt Nam War to students.

Solidarity Conference III. June 13-14, 1998 in Milpitas, California (home of famous Chinese dissident Harry Wu). Aimed at joining the efforts of Vietnamese-Americans with Vietnamese in Việt Nam to achieve democracy for their country.

Echoes from a Distant Battlefield: Post-War Literature from America and Việt Nam (summer institute for teachers). June 15-16, 1998 at Tulane University. Aimed at assisting teachers in engaging students in an interdisciplinary study to understand how the war was experienced on both sides. Primary source documents from the period should be used to supplement textbook reading.


Southeast Asian Studies Summer Institute Conference. June 26-28, 1998 at the University of Oregon in Eugene, Oregon. Papers focused on historical and contemporary issues of ethnic and/or religious minority groups in Southeast Asian nations.

International Conference on Vietnamese Studies and the Enhancement of International Cooperation. July 15-17, 1998 in Hà Nội. Works presented on Vietnamese studies aimed at increasing understanding of Việt Nam and enhancing international cooperation. Discussed creating an international mechanism to coordinate the study of Vietnamese language and culture.

Blackett Centenary Conference and Dinner. Sponsored by The Royal Navy and Magdalene College in Cambridge, England. September 24, 1998. The guest of honor was Patrick Blackett—Lord, Professor, and Lieutenant in the Royal Navy. Papers were presented discussing Lord Blackett's career and accomplishments as well as papers concerning new research.


International Conference on Computers in Education. October 14-17, 1998 in Beijing. Aimed at helping China employ information technology in education. The Asia-Pacific chapter of the Charlottesville, VA based Association for the Advancement of Computers in Education.

International Genocide Conference. October 23-24, 1998 at California State University at Sacramento. Purpose was to assemble a large group of experts on the subject to address the issues of genocide and make recommendations to governments where genocide has occurred.


CIA in Laos. Because it is swamped in declassifying documents under Congressional mandate, CIA Director George Tenet says the agency is putting off release of secret papers on its 1960's operations in Laos, along with four other covert operations. The Agency is working on 190 million pages of documents, 40 to 60 million of which Tenet says he regards as exempt from the order. Some 350 people at Langley work on the project. Already released are documents on POW-MIA issue in Vietnam; the Kennedy assassination; Gulf War illness; and Nazi gold. (AP July 16, 1998)
NAMES IN THE NEWS

Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom in May in a White House ceremony in which President Clinton called Zumwalt "one of the greatest models of integrity, leadership and genuine humanity our nation has produced." The admiral was cited, first, for his service in three wars and his leadership, as Chief of Naval Operations, in modernizing the Navy to ensure racial and gender integration; and second, for his work, upon his retirement, in helping veterans who suffer from war-related ailments. He started the first national program for bone marrow donations and now serves on the boards of seven charitable organizations.

James Reckner. The director of the Texas Tech Vietnam Center (U.S. Navy brown water veteran of Vietnam War) returned to Vietnam in July to attend an International Conference and to meet with the leadership of Vietnamese universities. He was accompanied by the Center’s Vietnamese Language Specialist, Khanh Lê. During his two and one-half week visit, Reckner conducted meetings with Vietnamese academics and military officers, and signed memoranda of understanding outlining possible areas of cooperation with the Vietnam National Universities in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.

Roger Donlon. First U.S. recipient of the Medal of Honor for actions in Vietnam has joined the National Council of the Texas Tech University’s Vietnam Center. Donlon is executive director of the Westmoreland Scholar Foundation (Leavenworth, Kansa) dedicated to fostering reconciliation between the American and Vietnamese people by rebuilding bridges of understanding through offering educational opportunities. Other members of the National Council are: Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., the U.S. Naval Commander in Vietnam, 1968-70 and Chief of Naval Operations 1970-74 (Chairman); General William C. Westmoreland, Commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam, 1964-68 and Army Chief of Staff 1968-72; Former South Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States, Bùi Diệm, whose diplomatic career spanned from the Geneva Conference of 1954 through to the final demise of the Republic of Vietnam in 1975; and the Diplomat William P. Bundy.

William Overholt. Old Asian hand (chiefly China, Philippines, Hong Kong for the past 13 years) is relocating to Singapore. Leaving Banker’s Trust and joining Bank Boston where he will be dealing with, and writing about, Southeast Asia.

Cambodian Human Rights. The U.N. Secretary-General for Human Rights office in Phnom Penh in September issued a special report titled “Monitoring of Election-Related Intimidation and Violence” Available on email. Contact: Supharith Hy at hy@un.org to request a copy.
OBITUARIES:

Nguyễn Văn Linh, former general secretary of the CPV who died April 27, was given a state funeral, with ceremonies in both Hanoi and Hồ Chí Minh City. The funeral committee was headed by the present party chief, Lê Khả Phiêu, and included most members of the Politburo. Thousands of ordinary citizens reportedly attended.

Although born in Hải Hưng Province in the North, Linh was long associated with the South, first as an underground Communist leader there and after 1975 as party chief of HCMC. He was promoted to the Politburo that year but was dropped at the Fifth Congress in 1982, possibly due to his failure to bring the South completely to submission or his reluctance to do so, recognizing that its more productive economy was critical to rebuilding the nation.

Then, at the Sixth Congress in 1986, he was returned to the Politburo and named party chief. The increasingly desperate economic conditions had led the leadership in Hà Nội to reject past methods and try a less ideological approach to solving the nation’s many economic problems, using the resources and talents found in the South. From that time on, Linh was identified with that effort creating the conditions that led to renovation (đổi mới). In 1989 Linh appeared still in control at the famous Sixth Plenum, although the Plenum reportedly was a mid-Congress assessment of reform that revealed serious differences between conservatives and reformers in the Party. At the Seventh Congress, Linh retired or was ousted and Đỗ Mười took over as general secretary, which was definitely not a generational transfer of power.

Nguyễn Cơ Thạch, who died at 74, apparently of cancer, April 10 in Hà Nội, was as singular in his way as any of his predecessors. He practiced none of the usual sophistication of a foreign minister (including its hypocritical dimension). He moved through the world like an old time football broken field fullback. He was in effect persona non grata in Bangkok for a period (the Thai foreign minister would come down with a case of “diplomatic illness” every time Thạch was in town. Something of the same regard was held for him in Jakarta, Canberra, and Tokyo. It was his proclivity for candid remarks at press conferences. Beijing, as one might imagine, took particular exception to his behavior and remarks. The story has it—[never corroborated] that Thạch’s exit as Vietnamese foreign minister came after the Chinese ran out of patience, telling Hà Nội: If you want to do business with us, get rid of him. There is a good Ph.D. thesis in this.)

The SRV Ministry over the years has been headed by a singular set of foreign ministers, generally untrained for diplomatic intercourse, inexperienced, often hostile to the whole idea of diplomacy unless it involves workers of the world united in diplomatic struggle under the vague construct of proletarian internationalism. Some of the earliest foreign ministers never went to their offices or to diplomatic functions. One was senile in his last several years in office, sleeping through official meetings until he was gently eased out. Foreign affairs simply didn’t count for much in Hà Nội in the early years.

None of this can be said to have been all bad. Thạch was a refreshing breath of fresh air on the international diplomatic cocktail circuit. We miss him. (Sources: Economist April 25, 1998; FEER April 23, 1998)

Vũ Văn Mẫu, who was prominent in the leadership of South Vietnam from its inception to its collapse in 1975, died August 20 in Paris at the age of 84. He was a man who is remembered for different things and in different ways by both Vietnamese and Americans. News stories of his death led with the fact that he was prime minister for five days before the Republic of Vietnam fell to North Vietnamese troops; many of us who were in Vietnam in the 50s and 60s remember him as foreign minister throughout the Ngô Đình Diệm regime (1955-63); Europeans remember as ambassador from a beleaguered country (to Great Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Austria in the later 1960s). Many politically attuned Vietnamese will remember him as president of the Forces for National Reconciliation, a pacifist party hoping to find a “third way” to end the war. But many other Vietnamese will remember him in a more personal way—for his writings on Buddhism and law, as a respected teacher at university, for his theories of non-violence.

General Nguyễn Ngọc Loan, whose street-corner execution of a Việt Cộng in the presence of foreign journalists made him famous, died July 14 at his home in Burke, VA. He was 67. The highly affective photo of Loan, the national police chief, shooting his prisoner in
the head went round the world and has been reprinted hundreds of times.

Now at his death, there has been an outpouring of commentary on the internet revealing deeply held feelings about the man and his act. Some called him a hero, including Eddie Adams, the photographer who took the famous picture and won a Pulitzer for it. Adams was quoted as saying, "The guy was a hero...I just hate to see him go this way, without people knowing anything about him." Loan had been a pilot, chief of staff to the South Vietnamese Air Force commander, and a leader in special ground combat assignments. Others said that whatever Loan was or did in the rest of his life, shooting a captured man with his hands tied behind his back could not be called heroic.

Some criticized news coverage—the San Jose (CA) Mercury News headlined his obituary: "Notorious SVN General Dies at 67"—as the final example of unjust press reports. Several recalled reports that the Việt Cộng captain Loan shot had been captured in the act of murdering a police sergeant, his wife and three children.

Some saw his act as a legal issue—the man was a spy, not a soldier, and therefore, the Geneva Convention did not apply, but others said this summary execution violated "every standard of the rule of law." Finally, one young man, who said, "the war preceded him," suggested the incident was magnified more than it should have been—"it was one scene in the long movie of war. Let it be."

• • • • • • •

HISTORY REDUX

Early U.S. Rationale: Senator John Kennedy c.1957

"Let us briefly consider exactly what is ‘America’s Stake in Việt Nam.’ First, Việt Nam represents the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia, the keystone to the arch, the finger in the dike. Burma, Thailand, India, Japan, the Philippines and obviously Laos and Cambodia are among those whose security would be threatened if the red tide of Communism over flowed into Việt Nam. ...The fundamental tenets of this nation’s foreign policy, in short, depend in considerable measure upon a strong and free Vietnamese nation. Secondly, Việt Nam represents a proving ground of democracy in Asia. ...Việt Nam represents the alternative to Communist dictatorship. If this democratic experiment fails...then weakness not strength will characterize the meaning of democracy in the minds of still more Asians. The United States is directly responsible for this experiment—it is playing an important role in the laboratory where it is being conducted. We cannot afford to permit that experiment to fail. Third..., Việt Nam represents a test of American responsibility and determination in Asia. If we are not the parents of little Việt Nam, then surely we are the Godparents. We presided at its birth, we gave assistance to its life, we have helped to shape its future. As French influence in the political, economic and military spheres has declined in Việt Nam, American influence has steadily grown. This is our offspring—we cannot abandon it, we cannot ignore its needs. And if it falls victim to any of the perils that threaten its existence—Communism, political anarchy, poverty and the rest—then the United States, with some justification, will be held responsible; and our prestige in Asia will sink to a new low. Fourth and finally, America’s stake in Việt Nam, in her strength and in her security, is a very selfish one—for it can be measured, in the last analysis, in terms of American lives and American dollars. ...Military weakness, political instability or economic failure in the new state of Việt Nam could change almost overnight the apparent security, which has increasingly characterized that area under the leadership of President Diệm. And the key position of Việt Nam in Southeast Asia, as already discussed, makes inevitable the involvement of this nation’s security in any new outbreak of trouble."

The assessment that strategic interest, and the belief that common humanity, placed on America a special burden of commitment shaped American perception and dictated American response in during the next decade and a half. It puts America on a track in Việt Nam, which made largely inevitable all of the fateful decisions that were subsequently taken." Senator John Kennedy 1959
Indochina Chronology

Oral History. “In the 50 years since oral history was recognized as an academic approach, scholars have increasingly recognized the importance of the way culture shapes how people communicate. That realization has led oral historians to emphasize that there is no single or universal ‘right way’ to do their interviews. Oral historians in the past 25 years also have shifted from worrying about bias and fabrication in people’s recollections to recognizing that the so-called unreliability of memory can be a source of clues about the cultural meanings of historical events. The current proliferation of multimedia formats also is expanding possibilities for studying oral history by allowing scholars to record huge amounts of textual, oral, visual, and video material—including an interview’s setting and the subject’s voice and body language. Scholars then can use multimedia systems to juxtapose complementary and contradictory accounts and interpretations.” Alistair Thompson (Sussex University, England)

History Teaching. “American schools and universities teach history in a shallow, unthoughtful manner. Students learn so little history that they probably do not even recognize—or care about—their ignorance. I must incorporate history lessons into my English classes to give my historically undereducated students necessary background. The problem is that to avoid a debate over political correctness. State school boards have pushed for history standards that are vague and uncontroversial—as, for example, Wisconsin’s stipulation that history should teach ‘the concepts of time, continuity, and change.’ Teachers should dumb down their history lectures to avoid offending students. Instead of presenting history as a fable, teachers and professors should show that the rigor of the interpreter’s argument is what counts. History must be a field of ardent contestation and not another arid patch of middle ground.” Christopher Hitchens (New School for Social Research) in Harper’s, Nov. 1998.

Millenium. The first millennial year (1,000 A.D.), in Europe at least, was a momentous time, scene of mass social chaos and great religious turmoil. Millions acted out their faith in the social myth of the second coming of Christ. This time around, the second millenium, turmoil and chaos, or fear or it at least, is being transferred to the computer. There will be massive disruptions of satellite communications; air, sea, rail transportation; telephone and television transmissions; electricity; and heating and cooling systems. But it’s not too late. Remedial and preventative measures are suggested. “The Year 2000 Social Chaos or Social Transformation.” By John Peterson, Margaret Wheatly and Myron Kellner-Rogers (futurists; authors; business consultants; Arlington Institute, Washington D.C.)

“North Korea sent 800 pilots to Vietnam between 1967-1972 in groups of 70 on six month tours of duty. They battled American pilots in Mig 17’s and 21’s provided by Russia...80 North Korean pilots died...they had shot down 100 U.S. planes...On May 28, 1969 North Korean pilots in 8 Mig 17 fighters ambushed and shot down 12 American F105’s. For this performance the North Korean unit stationed at Koksan airfield was named the 518 Squadron”—Major Chul-see (pilot defection to South Korea) speaking to Choson Ilbo Newspaper (Seoul, Sept 13, 1998).

POW Report. The Pentagon (Aug. 28, 1998) declassified and released a National Intelligence Council report (dated April 1998) stating that investigations of 120 reports that live Americans POW’s are still being held in Vietnam turned up no credible evidence about any. It also rejected as “invalid” Moscow reports by Soviet intelligence that large numbers of American POW’s were left in Vietnam after Operation Homecoming (exchange of POW’s) in early 1972. Titled “Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities and Performance Concerning the POW/MIA Issue,” the assessment reported increased cooperation by Hanoi in accounting for the 2,000 Americans missing in the war, but said Hanoi refuses access to internal Politburo documents to allow U.S. officials to enter classified locations and facilities nor has it been completely forthcoming on certain matters—(because) in some instances, we believe full disclosure would prove embarrassing. The document said a few reports of transfers of U.S. prisoners of war to Russia and other countries “are unexplained, and the book remains open.” (AFP Aug. 28, 1998)
Scenes From Hue

Thien Mu Pagoda, Hue

Inside the King's Palace

Street peddlers in Hue

Tu Duc Tomb, Hue

Khai Dinh Tomb, Hue
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