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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: KHE SANH

In response to your telephone call to me last evening, I asked General Westmoreland to provide me his views as soon as possible on our reinforcement capability in the Khe Sanh area. His reply to me is presented in the following paragraphs for your information.

"1. I agree with (General Wheeler's) response on the question of our Khe Sanh reinforcement capability and would add the following amplification.

"2. Our situation at Khe Sanh as compared with the French at Dien Bien Phu is different in three significant respects. We have supporting air (tactical air and B-52's) for all-weather attack of enemy forces by orders of magnitude over that at Dien Bien Phu. We have reinforcing heavy artillery within range of the Khe Sanh area from USMC positions east of the mountains. We have multiple and vastly improved techniques for aerial supply and we are within helicopter support range for troop reinforcement, logistic support, medical evacuation and other requirements.

"3. We now have four Marine Corps battalions and one ARVN ranger battalion with combat and combat service support in the Khe Sanh area. We currently have two brigades of the 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile), plus one brigade of the 101st Airborne Division, with appropriate light and medium artillery support, located north of the Ai Van Pass, within prompt reinforcing distance of Khe Sanh. We have plans to further reinforce this area on short notice if required.

"4. We have a significant capability to reinforce Khe Sanh by fire in all weather conditions by artillery, tactical air, and B-52's. There are 18 105MM howitzers and 6 155 MM howitzers within the Khe Sanh defensive system. Additionally, 16 175MM guns are with the 3d Marine Division forces east of Khe Sanh positioned at the Rock Pile and at Camp Carroll. These guns are within range of Khe Sanh and their fires can be massed as required through the use of the centralized fire direction facility at Dong Ha. In addition to this heavy artillery support, and in contrast to the French situation at Dien Bien Phu, we have a highly effective tactical air and B-52 capability. Radar or "SKY SPOT" technique allows us..."
direct tactical air strikes either at night or in zero visibility conditions throughout the Khe Sanh area. In addition to tactical air, our B-52 strikes are also weather independent. During adverse weather in the Khe Sanh area there are frequent breaks of three or four hours, in which we could intensify the air strikes, and insert helicopter gun ships into the area for additional fires as required. If the enemy masses to attack, he will be extremely vulnerable to the massed B-52's against his supporting forces and destructive power of tactical air, gunships and artillery against his infantry. This capability of reinforcement by fire alone could have changed the course of battle at Dien Bien Phu.

"5. Although logistical support will present a major problem, I am satisfied we can resolve it by our multiple means of resupply. Enemy interdiction of the airfield at Khe Sanh will not deny our reinforcement and support capability by helicopters. As pointed out in General Wheeler's response to the President, we could also re-open Route 9 for a land line of communication. This would take 22 company days of engineer effort, but with considerable cost in security.

"6. Although not ideal, the tactical situation at Khe Sanh as well as our improved combat techniques and capabilities are considerably different from those at Dien Bien Phu.

"7. Addressing the President's query on additional help required, with the current level of activity we need an additional squadron of C-130 aircraft, complete with ground handling and maintenance crews, for immediate usage. In addition, I recommend a second squadron of C-130's be alerted for immediate movement if unforeseen contingencies arise. Admiral Sharp may wish to address these requirements from the standpoint of assets available elsewhere in the theater. Additionally, it would be prudent to have heavy air drop equipment in reserve which can be called forward if we need it. We currently have a capability of delivering 600 tons per day for 14 days with no recovery. I would like at least an equal quantity ready for immediate air shipment forward if required. These requirements are also being submitted separately. Acceleration of the issue of M-16 rifles, M-60 machine guns and M-29 mortars to South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) units would improve our posture in economy of force areas. The importance of helicopter assets in the pending battle cannot be overstated. To achieve the necessary helicopter lift for forces deployed to Northern Corps Tactical Zone, I plan drawing on Rosson's (Commander I Field Force) and Weyand's (Commander II Field Force) assets to a major degree. Expediting the rate of delivery of replacement helicopters for assault helicopter companies and assault support helicopter companies would aid in maintaining our situation in the south during the battle in the north. We are also experiencing high loss rates of 0-1 observation aircraft and
replacements are urgently needed to maintain our observation and surveillance capability over our newly opened LOC, new areas under pacification, enemy routes of infiltration and enemy base areas. The northern I Corps Tactical Zone has greatly increased our engineering requirements. Construction of a logistical base, the maintenance of Route I in that area, construction of DYE MARKER obstacle/strong point system, plus the need of opening Route 9 to Khe Sanh will tax severely our construction capability. Providing the Naval Mobile Construction Battalion yet to be furnished as part of Program 5 would significantly improve our buildup in the north. With regard to Republic of Korea Forces, action should be taken to oppose any thought of withdrawing elements of Republic of Korea forces in Vietnam and returning them to Korea. In addition, every effort should be made to re-open negotiations regarding the proposed ROK light division deployment as soon as the situation in Korea will allow. Expedited deployment of the Thai light division, within practical limitation, is most desirable and would permit greater flexibility in the employment of our ready reaction forces in RVN.

"8. The use of tactical nuclear weapons should not be required in the present situation in view of the authority to use COFRAM. However, should the situation in the DMZ area change dramatically, we should be prepared to introduce weapons of greater effectiveness against massed forces. Under such circumstances I visualize that either tactical nuclear weapons or chemical agents would be active candidates for employment."

Earle G. Wheeler
EARLE G. WHEELER
CHAIRMAN
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Mr. President:

Herewith Bus Wheeler's first daily report on Khe Sanh.

"Gravel munitions," in para. 7, are the small anti-personnel mines developed for the barrier.

W. W. Rostow

attachment

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 10-2-78 letters

By NARS, Date 3-16-79
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Situation in the Khe Sanh Area

1. At the present time, the situation in the Khe Sanh area is quiet. No enemy contacts have been reported in the area since the attack on Hill 861 ended yesterday at 6:25 PM EST, the details of which are described in the succeeding paragraphs.

2. At 3:00 PM EST yesterday, the Khe Sanh combat base began receiving heavy concentrations of enemy rocket, artillery and mortar fire. Twenty minutes later a force of from 200 to 300 enemy, supported with rocket and mortar fire, launched a ground attack against the US Marine company position on Hill 861, three and one-half miles northwest of the Khe Sanh airstrip. As the fighting grew in intensity, the Khe Sanh combat base provided artillery support, which included the delivery of chemical munitions (CS tear gas) on the enemy. At 4:20 PM EST a small group of the enemy succeeded in penetrating the defensive wire on the perimeter of the position, but the Marine defenders held their positions and drove the enemy off. Approximately thirty minutes later the enemy resumed the assault on Hill 861 while continuing to deliver mortar fire on the Khe Sanh combat base. Approximately one hour later the mortar fire on the Khe Sanh base ended and the attack on Hill 861 began to diminish in intensity. At 6:25 PM EST all action had ended and the Khe Sanh airstrip was open. In the attack on Hill 861, the enemy lost approximately 100 killed; eight of the dead were found inside the perimeter and numerous enemy dead were hanging from the barbed wire on the perimeter of the Marine company position. US Marine casualties, all from the company on Hill 861, were placed at seven killed and 44 wounded. Marine units in the Khe Sanh area expended a total of 2,800 rounds of various calibre artillery and mortar rounds in response to enemy shelling of the Khe Sanh base and surrounding area.
3. Yesterday, US Air Force B-52 bombers flew 45 sorties against enemy targets in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area. This brings the total number of B-52 sorties flown in that area since 15 January 1968 to 566, with approximately 16,980 tons of bombs delivered on the enemy. In these strikes a total of 426 secondary explosions have been observed.


5. Air landed resupply during the period amounted to 128 tons.

6. No COFRAM was used during the period; however, these munitions are available and will be considered for use at the appropriate time.

7. General Westmoreland told me this morning at 9:30 AM EST that gravel munitions were emplaced yesterday in areas north of Khe Sanh.

8. The weather observation at 3:00 AM EST today in the Khe Sanh area reflects cloudy conditions with visibility at 15 miles. The outlook for the next 15 hours is cloudy with low ceilings, poor visibility, drizzle and fog. From 10:00 PM EST today until 7:00 AM EST tomorrow the outlook is improved; cloudy, but with higher ceilings and visibility at seven miles.

9. Planned operations in support of Khe Sanh:

   a. During the next 24 hours, a total of 45 US Air Force B-52 aircraft are scheduled to bomb six targets near the Demilitarized Zone. Four of the targets are in the vicinity of Khe Sanh while two targets are adjacent to the Demilitarized Zone approximately 20 miles northeast of Khe Sanh.
b. For the period ending 11:00 PM EST today, 156 tactical sorties are planned in the Khe Sanh area. Some 192 additional sorties are available on call to augment the planned effort. Should the situation require it, additional sorties up to a theoretical total of 623 could be diverted. The actual number which could be employed depends upon the weather in the area and the ability to control the strikes. In addition, the aircraft carrier KITTY HAWK has been alerted to provide additional close air support when requested.

10. Enemy units in contact are unknown at this time, but it is believed that the 95th Regiment is targeted on Hills 881 and 861 and the 101st Regiment on Khe Sanh. The exact location of other enemy units believed to be in the area is unknown.

Earl J. Wheeler
EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Tuesday, February 6, 1968
9:50 a.m.

Herewith Gen. Wheeler's daily Khe Sanh summary.

The handwritten note on Abrams' assessment is encouraging.

In fact, there are now two solid conclusions:

-- the people didn't rise;
-- the government and the South Vietnamese functioned under maximum surprise, shock, and strain.

W. Wright Rostow

CM-2970-68
6 February 1968

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 2510-2-28 letter
By DARS, Date 3-16-79
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Situation in the Khe Sanh Area

1. There have been no major enemy contacts reported in the Khe Sanh area since the enemy attack on Hill 861. An updated report on US Marine casualties during the attack on Hill 861 shows 14 killed and 32 wounded.

2. Marine units in the Khe Sanh area received sporadic small arms and mortar fire. The enemy fire increased as supply missions to the outlying outposts and Hill 861 were conducted. However, there were no reports of casualties during the period. Marine units in the Khe Sanh area expended a total of 7,788 rounds of various caliber artillery and mortar ammunition in response to the sporadic harassment fire by the enemy forces.

3. During the past 24 hours, US Air Force B-52 bombers flew 55 sorties against enemy targets in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area. On 4 February (5 February South Vietnam time), 33 B-52 sorties, not previously reported, were flown against enemy targets in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area. The B-52 sorties flown in that area since 15 January 1968 now total 654, with approximately 19,000 tons of bombs delivered on the enemy.


5. Air landed resupply during the period amounted to 214 tons.

6. No COFRAJ was used during the period.

7. The weather observation at 3:00 AM EST (4:00 PM, 6 Feb, South Vietnam time) today in the Khe Sanh area reflects cloudy conditions with visibility at 10 miles. The outlook for the next 14 hours is cloudy with low ceilings, poor visibility,
drizzle and fog. From 9:00 PM EST, 6 Feb (10:00 AM, 7 Feb, South Vietnam time) until 7:00 AM EST, 7 Feb (8:00 PM, 7 Feb, South Vietnam time) the outlook is improved: cloudy, but with higher ceilings, and visibility at seven miles, with occasional light showers.

8. Planned operations in support of Khe Sanh:

a. During the next 24 hours, a total of 33 US Air Force B-52 aircraft are scheduled to bomb five targets near the Demilitarized Zone. Two of the targets are in the vicinity of Khe Sanh, two targets are near the Laotian border approximately 10 miles southwest of Khe Sanh, and one target is adjacent to the Demilitarized Zone approximately 20 miles northeast of Khe Sanh.

b. For the period ending 11:00 PM EST today (12:00 Noon, 7 Feb, South Vietnam time), 175 tactical sorties are planned in the Khe Sanh area. One hundred thirty-four additional sorties are available on call to augment the planned effort. Should the situation require it, additional sorties up to a theoretical total of 646 could be diverted into the area.

9. There have been no changes reported in enemy troop dispositions in the Khe Sanh area.

Earl G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

P.S. I talked to Gen Westmoreland at 0830 hours. He had nothing spectacular to report. However, he stated that Gen Abrams has now visited all ARVN divisions except the 1st and 2nd in I Corps. Gen Abrams is highly pleased by alacrity, aggressiveness and skilfulness of all division commanders.
SUBJ: DAILY REPORT ON KHE SANH/DMZ SITUATION

THIS IS MY INITIAL REPLY TO YOUR REQUEST FOR A SUMMARY OF ACTIVITY IN THE KHE SANH/DMZ AREA. THE PERIOD COVERED IS 041200H TO 051200H FEB 68:

DURING THE INITIAL 17 HOURS OF THE PERIOD KHE SANH COMBAT BASE AND MARINE UNITS IN THE SCOTLAND AREA REPORTED A TOTAL OF APPROXIMATELY SIX ROUNDS OF ROCKET FIRE AND 70 ROUNDS OF MORTAR FIRE RESULTING IN THREE USMC VIA EVACUATED. AN ARTILLERY MISSION WAS FIRED RESULTING IN A REPORTED 10 NVA KIA. IN ADDITION, AT 050400H, KHE SANH COMBAT BASE BEGAN RECEIVING ROCKETS, ARTY AND MORTAR FIRE AND AT 050400H MARINES ON HILL 861, NW OF KHE SANH, CAME UNDER GROUND ATTACK BY AN ESTIMATED 200 ENEMY (BN MINUS) USING BANGALORE TORPEDOES, SATCHEL CHARGES AND MORTARS. THE MORTAR ATTACK ON KHE SANH COMBAT BASE TERMINATED AT 0530H BUT RESUMED AGAIN AT 1100H.

THE GROUND ATTACK ON HILL 861 HAD DIMINISHED AT 0645H, WITH INITIAL CASUALTY REPORTS LISTING AN ESTIMATED 100 ENEMY KIA AND FRIENDLY LOSSES OF SEVEN KIA AND 24 VIA EVACUATED. DURING THE PERIOD, 39 B-52'S RAN SIX STRIKES DELIVERING 975 TONS OF ORDNANCE IN SUPPORT OF THE KHE SANH COMBAT BASE AND THE SCOTLAND AREA.

MARINE UNITS IN THE KHE SANH AREA EXPENDED A TOTAL OF 2819 ROUNDS OF VARIOUS CALIBER ARTY/MORTAR IN RESPONSE TO THE ENEMY SHELLING OF THE KHE SANH COMBAT BASE AND ENVIRONS. THE MARINE AIRCRAFT WING FLEW 94 SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION DURING THE PERIOD. 81 OF THE SORTIES WERE TPG'S IN DIRECT SUPPORT, 13 SORTIES FLEW IN CLOSE SUPPORT. BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OF THE FOREGOING SORTIES INCLUDED THREE STRUCTURES DESTROYED, SEVEN BUNKERS DESTROYED, AND THREE SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS. WEATHER CONDITIONS PREVENTED A COMPLETE BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT. 43 OF THE TOTAL SORTIES FLOWN, DELIVERING A TOTAL OF 100.7 TONS OF ORDNANCE, WERE FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF THE IMMEDIATE KHE SANH AREA, NOU SORTIES WERE IN SUPPORT OF THE
AIRCRAFT IN THE KHE SANH AREA. USAF SORTIES AMOUNTED TO 79, WHILE THE USN FLEW 43 SORTIES. TOTAL TACTICAL SORTIES FLOWN WERE 203.

AIRLANDED RESUPPLY DURING THE PERIOD AMOUNTED TO 128 TONS. NO COFRAF WAS USED DURING THE PERIOD.

FOR THE NEXT 24 HOUR PERIOD, FMARW PLANS 30 STRIKE SORTIES IN THE KHE SANH AREA IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF THE 26TH MARINES. THESE SORTIES WILL BE FLOWN THROUGHOUT THE 24 HOUR PERIOD AND CONSIST OF A VARIETY OF ORDNANCE.

AN ADDITIONAL 12 STRIKES SORTIES WILL BE AVAILABLE ON HOT PAD ALERT FOR SCRAMBLE AS REQUIRED. DUE TO DAMAGE SUSTAINED BY MARINE AIRCRAFT ON GROUND DURING RECENT ROCKET ATTACK ON CHU LAI, THERE HAS BEEN A REDUCTION IN AVAILABLE MARINE AIR SORTIES. FIFTY EIGHT 7TH AF STRIKES SORTIES ARE PLANNED TO AUGMENT THE FMARW EFFORT IN THE VICINITY OF KHE SANH COMBAT BASE. THE USN WILL FLY 48 SORTIES. FIVE ARC LIGHT STRIKES WILL BE FLOWN FOR THE 5 -6 FEB PERIOD. THERE ARE CURRENTLY 32 ADDITIONAL AF TACTICAL SUPPORT AIRCRAFT ON CALL IN SUPPORT OF KHE SANH WHICH COULD PRODUCE 180 SORTIES IN A 24 HOUR PERIOD. SHOULD THE SITUATION REQUIRE, ADDITIONAL SORTIES COULD BE DIVERTED UP TO A THEORETICAL TOTAL OF 523. THE NUMBER THAT COULD BE EMPLOYED WOULD DEPEND UPON THE WEATHER AND OUR ABILITY TO CONTROL THE STRIKES.

ENEMY UNITS IN CONTACT ARE UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT THE 95C REGT IS TARGETED ON HILLS 881 AND 861 AND THE 101ST REGT ON KHE SANH. THE EXACT LOCATION OF OTHER ENEMY UNITS BELIEVED TO BE IN THE AREA IS UNKNOWN.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY. CAS "PASS TO MR CHILLEM" FOR AMB BUNKER.

650
THIS IS THE SECOND REPORT ON THE KHE SA'NH AREA AND COVERS THE PERIOD 051200Z TO 061200Z FEBRUARY 1963.

DURING THIS PERIOD THE KHE SA'NH COMBAT BASE AND MARINE UNITS IN THE SCOTLAND AREA CONTINUED TO RECEIVE SPORADIC SMALL ARMS AND DQTTAR FIRE. THE ENEMY FIRE INCREASED AS SUPPLY MISSIONS TO THE OUT-LIYING OP'S AND HILL 861 WERE CONDUCTED. HOWEVER, THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF CASUALTIES DURING THE PERIOD. MARINE UNITS IN THE KHE SA'NH AREA EXPENDED A TOTAL OF 7738 ROUNDS OF VARIOUS CALIBER ARTILLERY AND MORTAR AMMUNITION IN RESPONSE TO THE SPORADIC HARASSMENT FIRE BY THE ENEMY FORCES. NO COTRAM WAS USED. DURING THE PERIOD, 43 B-52 AIRCRAFT MADE FIVE STRIKES IN THE NIAGARA AREA. AIR SUPPORT IN THE KHE SA'NH (NIAGARA) AREA WAS PROVIDED BY 35 USN SORTIES, 38 USAF SORTIES AND 90 USN SORTIES FOR A TOTAL OF 213 TACTICAL SORTIES. ALTHOUGH COMPLETE BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT WAS PREVENTED BY ADVERSE WEATHER, THE FOLLOWING WAS REPORTED: ONE SECONDARY EXPLOSION, THREE SECONDARY FIRES, SEVEN GUN POSITIONS DESTROYED, THREE TRUCKS DESTROYED, AND 15 BUNKERS DESTROYED.

AIR RESUPPLY WAS EFFECTED IN THE KHE SA'NH AREA DURING THE PERIOD WITH THE DELIVERY (AIRPLANTED) OF 214 SHORT TONS.

FOR THE PERIOD 061200Z TO 071200Z FEBRUARY, THE MARINE AIR WING PLANS TO FLY 69 TACTICAL AIR SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF THE KHE SA'NH AREA WHILE AN ADDITIONAL 14 AIRCRAFT WILL BE ON CALL DURING THE PERIOD. USAF SORTIES PLANNED FOR THE NEXT PERIOD IN NIAGARA AMOUNT TO 54, WHILE THE USN WILL FLY 52 SORTIES, FOR A GRAND TOTAL OF 175 PLANNED SORTIES. THE USAF WILL HAVE 100 SORTIES ON CALL FOR THE NIAGARA AREA. ALSO, AN ADDITIONAL 396 USAF SORTIES AND 250 USN SORTIES COULD BE DIVERTED INTO THE KHE SA'NH AREA, FOR A THEORETICAL TOTAL OF 646 ADDITIONAL SORTIES. THIRTY-SIX ARC LIGHT STRIKES ARE SCHEDULED IN THE NIAGARA AREA.

ENEMY UNIT IDENTIFICATIONS REMAIN THE SAME AS REPORTED YESTERDAY, AND THE THREAT TO THE SA'NH REMAINS UNCHANGED.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.
Wednesday, February 7, 1968
10:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Gen. Wheeler's Khe Sanh daily -- key passages marked.

W. A. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: JCS 10-2-78 letter
By: NARS, Date: 3-16-78
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Situation in the Khe Sanh Area

1. The enemy has renewed his efforts against US and South Vietnamese forces in the Khe Sanh - Lang Vei area. During the early morning hours yesterday (approximately 3:00 AM on 6 February, South Vietnam time) the Khe Sanh Combat Base and US Marine units in the surrounding area received 58 rounds of mixed mortar fire and an undetermined number of rockets resulting in five US Marines wounded. At 11:45 AM EST yesterday (12:45 AM on 7 February, South Vietnam time), the Khe Sanh Combat Base began receiving a heavy volume of rocket and mortar fire. At approximately the same time, the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp came under a heavy ground attack by an estimated enemy infantry company supported by nine armored vehicles believed to be Soviet PT-76 Amphibious Tanks (description attached). By 1:50 PM EST (2:50 AM on 7 February, South Vietnam time) five of the tanks were reported to have been damaged or destroyed. The attacking enemy also directed heavy supporting mortar and artillery fire on the Lang Vei defenses, and an aerial observer saw the enemy employing flame-throwers in the assault on Lang Vei. Despite poor weather conditions US tactical aircraft provided continual close air support during the heavy fighting and the Khe Sanh Combat Base delivered a large volume of supporting artillery fire throughout the battle. The supporting fire included 28 rounds of 105-mm COFRAM ammunition, but no report of its effectiveness has been received. The intensity of the fighting began to diminish at 10:00 PM EST last night (11:00 AM on 7 February, South Vietnam time). US tactical aircraft continued to strike enemy concentrations throughout the Khe Sanh - Lang Vei area during the day (7 February, South Vietnam time). A reaction force was on-route to Lang Vei at 3:30 AM EST this morning (4:30 AM on 7 February, South Vietnam time). Latest reports indicate fighting still prevails, but on a limited scale. There are no reports as yet of the exact extent of enemy or friendly casualties, but a preliminary report states...
that 16 US Special Forces advisors, who had been wounded, were evacuated from Lang Vei at 2:00 AM EST today (5:00 PM on 7 February, South Vietnam time). Fourteen wounded South Vietnamese were also evacuated at the same time. A preliminary report also indicates that all buildings in the Lang Vei camp were destroyed. The military population of the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp included 18 US Army Special Forces advisors, 494 members of the South Vietnamese Civilian-Irregular Defense Group organized into three companies and a mobile strike force, and 29 other South Vietnamese personnel. The Khe Sanh Combat Base continued to receive enemy fire throughout the night and early morning hours (South Vietnam time) until it ceased completely at 9:47 PM EST last night (10:47 AM on 7 February, South Vietnam time). The runway at Khe Sanh airfield was craters, but it was repaired and the airfield was fully operational at 9:50 PM EST last night (10:30 AM on 7 February, South Vietnam time). In another action at 9:40 AM EST yesterday (10:40 PM on 6 February, South Vietnam time), the US Marine company on Hill 861 was hit by a light ground attack from the southeast. The attack ended about one hour later. The results of the attack have not yet been reported.

2. During the past 24 hours, US Air Force B-52 bombers flew 30 sorties against enemy targets in the Khe Sanh area. The number of B-52 sorties flown in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area since 15 January 1968 now totals 684 with approximately 19,900 total tons of bombs delivered on the enemy.

3. US tactical aircraft flew 199 strike sorties in support of units at Khe Sanh during the past 24 hours (83 US Air Force, 67 US Marine Corps, 49 US Navy). Bomb damage assessment of the reported air sorties was somewhat hindered by weather, however, one very large explosion and 15 other secondary explosions were reported by tactical support aircraft.

4. During the period, 136 short tons of supplies were delivered to the Khe Sanh Combat Base by air, over half of which was ammunition.

5. The latest weather observation at 5:00 AM EST (6:00 PM 7 February, South Vietnam time) today in the Khe Sanh area reflects cloudy conditions with visibility at five miles in fog. The forecast for the next 14 hours is cloudy with low ceilings, poor visibility, drizzle and fog. From 9:00 PM EST, 7 February (10:00 AM, 8 February, South Vietnam time) until 7:00 AM EST, 8 February (8:00 PM, 8 February, South Vietnam time) the outlook is improved: cloudy with intermittent light rain, higher ceilings and visibility at seven miles.
6. Planned operations in support of Khe Sanh:

   a. During the next 24 hours, 39 US Air Force B-52 sorties are scheduled against targets in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area. Four of the targets are in the vicinity of Khe Sanh, and one target is adjacent to the Demilitarized Zone, approximately six miles north-northwest of Camp Carroll.

   b. For the period until 11:00 PM EST today (12:00 noon 8 February, South Vietnam time) 152 tactical air sorties are scheduled into the Khe Sanh area. 16 additional sorties are available on immediate call to augment the scheduled sorties. An additional 396 US Air Force and 250 US Navy sorties could be diverted into the Khe Sanh area, for a total of 646 additional sorties.

7. US Marine units defending the Khe Sanh area have a vast amount of fire support available to them from external sources (16 175-mm guns, all-weather tactical aircraft, armed helicopters, and B-52 bombers). These units also have considerable fire power from their own assigned weapons, which, in addition to a large number of automatic weapons, include 102 mortars (60-mm, 81-mm, and 4.2 inch), 32 106-mm recoilless rifles, and 24 howitzers (105-mm and 155-mm). Also available are two vehicles which mount four 50-caliber machine guns (quad 50s) each and two track-type armored vehicles with two 40-mm guns (twin 40s) on each vehicle. The quad 50s and twin 40s are dual-purpose and can be used either for air defense or against ground targets. In addition, there are five M48 tanks (90-mm guns) and ten light track-type vehicles (ONTOS) on each of which are mounted six 106-mm recoiless rifles. Because of the significant fire power of the units defending Khe Sanh and the reinforcing fires immediately available from the heavy artillery east of Khe Sanh along with the supporting strikes of tactical aircraft, armed helicopters and B-52 bombers which can be delivered against the enemy, it is not considered necessary to deploy additional supporting weapons and forces to the Khe Sanh Combat Base. Moreover, additional weapons and units within the Khe Sanh defensive perimeter would inordinately increase the concentration of our resources in a relatively confined area, correspondingly increasing the risk of losses to enemy fire, and would add a significant amount of logistic support requirements. It is considered preferable to retain additional fire support means for employment in concert with counter-attacking and exploitation forces when they are committed.

Earl G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
SUBJ: SPECIAL TELECON (KHE SANH/LANG VEI) (U)

1. SITUATION AS OF 071200H FEB: THE ENEMY CONTROLLED THE CAMP ABOVE GROUND WITH AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF CIDG AND AN ESTIMATED 14 USASF PERSONNEL HOLED UP IN BUNKERS (UNDERGROUND). ARTILLERY AND AIR WAS DELIVERED AGAINST THE ENEMY AND AN ELEMENT OF BV 33 BATTALION ADVISED BY A USASF SGT ATTEMPTED TO PENETRATE THE CAMP TO ASSIST IN THE EXTRACTION OF THE FRIENDLY PERSONNEL ON SITE.

2. AS OF 071630H FEB: A HELIBORNE RELIEF FORCE LED BY USASF PERSONNEL FROM THE KHE SANH COMBAT BASE WAS DISPATCHED WITH THE MISSION OF JOINING WITH THE BV 33 UNIT IN A RAID ON THE CAMP. GUNS, SHIPS AND TACTICAL AIR FROM THE 1ST MARINE AIR WING FIRED SUPPRESSIVE FIRE ON THE TOC OF THE CAMP IN PREPARATION FOR THE RAID. UNDER COVER OF THIS FIRE AND PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE RELIEF FORCE, THE FRIENDLY PERSONNEL ON SITE TOOK ESCAPE AND EVASION ACTION.


4. THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT APPROXIMATELY 70-100 OF THE 450 INDIGENOUS FORCES ORIGINALLY IN THE CAMP HAVE BEEN PICKED UP. AN ADDITIONAL UNKNOWN NUMBER OF THESE PERSONNEL ARE ASSUMED TO BE IN AN ESCAPE AND EVASION STATUS.

5. THREE DESTROYED TANKS WERE OBSERVED IN THE AREA (ONE INSIDE THE PERIMETER, TWO ON THE ROAD OUTSIDE THE PERIMETER). IT IS BELIEVED THAT AN ESTIMATED ENEMY COMPANY NOW CONTROLS THE CAMP SITE.

6. THE FOREGOING CONSTITUTES A PRELIMINARY REPORT. FURTHER INFORMATION AND REFINEMENT WILL BE PROVIDED AS AVAILABLE.

GP-4

BI
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Situation in the Khe Sanh Area

1. The enemy has renewed his efforts against US and South Vietnamese forces in the Khe Sanh - Lang Vei area. During the early morning hours yesterday (approximately 3:00 PM on 6 February, South Vietnam time) the Khe Sanh Combat Base and US Marine units in the surrounding area received 58 rounds of mixed mortar fire and an undetermined number of rockets resulting in five US Marines wounded. At 11:45 AM EST yesterday (12:45 AM on 7 February, South Vietnam time), the Khe Sanh Combat Base began receiving a heavy volume of rocket and mortar fire. At approximately the same time, the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp came under a heavy ground attack by an estimated enemy infantry company supported by nine armored vehicles believed to be Soviet PT-76 Amphibious Tanks (description attached). By 1:50 PM EST (2:50 AM on 7 February, South Vietnam time) five of the tanks were reported to have been damaged or destroyed. The attacking enemy also directed heavy supporting mortar and artillery fire on the Lang Vei defenses, and an aerial observer saw the enemy employing flame-throwers in the assault on Lang Vei. Despite poor weather conditions US tactical aircraft provided continual close air support during the heavy fighting and the Khe Sanh Combat Base delivered a large volume of supporting artillery fire throughout the battle. The supporting fire included 28 rounds of 105-mm COFRAH ammunition, but no report of its effectiveness has been received. The intensity of the fighting began to diminish at 10:00 PM EST last night (11:00 AM on 7 February, South Vietnam time). US tactical aircraft continued to strike enemy concentrations throughout the Khe Sanh - Lang Vei area during the day (7 February, South Vietnam time). A reaction force was on route to Lang Vei at 3:30 AM EST this morning (4:30 PM on 7 February, South Vietnam time). Latest reports indicate fighting still prevails, but on a limited scale. There are no reports as yet of the exact extent of enemy or friendly casualties, but a preliminary report states
that 16 US Special Forces advisors, who had been wounded, were evacuated from Lang Vei at 2:00 AM EST today (3:00 PM on 7 February, South Vietnam time). Fourteen wounded South Vietnamese were also evacuated at the same time. A preliminary report also indicates that all buildings in the Lang Vei camp were destroyed. The military population of the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp included 18 US Army Special Forces advisors, 494 members of the South Vietnamese Civilian Irregular Defense Group organized into three companies and a mobile strike force, and 29 other South Vietnamese personnel. The Khe Sanh Combat Base continued to receive enemy fire throughout the night and early morning hours (South Vietnam time) until it ceased completely at 9:47 PM EST last night (10:47 AM on 7 February, South Vietnam time). The runway at Khe Sanh airfield was cratered, but it was repaired and the airfield was fully operational at 9:30 PM EST last night (10:30 AM on 7 February, South Vietnam time). In another action at 9:40 AM EST yesterday (10:40 PM on 6 February, South Vietnam time), the US Marine company on Hill 861 was hit by a light ground attack from the southeast. The attack ended about one hour later. The results of the attack have not yet been reported.

2. During the past 24 hours, US Air Force B-52 bombers flew 30 sorties against enemy targets in the Khe Sanh area. The number of B-52 sorties flown in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area since 15 January 1968 now totals 684 with approximately 19,900 total tons of bombs delivered on the enemy.

3. US tactical aircraft flew 199 strike sorties in support of units at Khe Sanh during the past 24 hours (83 US Air Force, 67 US Marine Corps, 49 US Navy). Bomb damage assessment of the reported air sorties was somewhat hindered by weather, however, one very large explosion and 15 other secondary explosions were reported by tactical support aircraft.

4. During the period, 136 short tons of supplies were delivered to the Khe Sanh Combat Base by air, over half of which was ammunition.

5. The latest weather observation at 5:00 AM EST (6:00 PM 7 February, South Vietnam time) today in the Khe Sanh area reflects cloudy conditions with visibility at five miles in fog. The forecast for the next 14 hours is cloudy with low ceilings, poor visibility, drizzle and fog. From 9:00 PM EST, 7 February (10:00 AM, 8 February, South Vietnam time) until 7:00 AM EST, 8 February (8:00 PM, 8 February, South Vietnam time) the outlook is improved: cloudy with intermittent light rain, higher ceilings and visibility at seven miles.
6. Planned operations in support of Khe Sanh:

a. During the next 24 hours, 39 US Air Force B-52 sorties are scheduled against targets in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area. Four of the targets are in the vicinity of Khe Sanh, and one target is adjacent to the Demilitarized Zone, approximately six miles north-northwest of Camp Carroll.

b. For the period until 11:00 PM EST today (12:00 noon 8 February, South Vietnam time) 152 tactical air sorties are scheduled into the Khe Sanh area. 16 additional sorties are available on immediate call to augment the scheduled sorties. An additional 396 US Air Force and 250 US Navy sorties could be diverted into the Khe Sanh area, for a total of 646 additional sorties.

7. US Marine units defending the Khe Sanh area have a vast amount of fire support available to them from external sources (16 175-mm guns, all-weather tactical aircraft, armed helicopters, and B-52 bombers). These units also have considerable fire power from their own assigned weapons, which, in addition to a large number of automatic weapons, include 102 mortars (60-mm, 81-mm, and 4.2 inch), 32 106-mm recoilless rifles, and 24 howitzers (105-mm and 155-mm). Also available are two vehicles which mount four .50 caliber machine guns (quad 50s) each and two track-type armored vehicles with two 40-mm guns (twin 40s) on each vehicle. The quad 50s and twin 40s are dual-purpose and can be used either for air defense or against ground targets. In addition, there are five M48 tanks (90-mm guns) and ten light track-type vehicles (ONTOS) on each of which are mounted six 106-mm recoilless rifles. Because of the significant fire power of the units defending Khe Sanh and the reinforcing fires immediately available from the heavy artillery east of Khe Sanh along with the supporting strikes of tactical aircraft, armed helicopters and B-52 bombers which can be delivered against the enemy, it is not considered necessary to deploy additional supporting weapons and forces to the Khe Sanh Combat Base. Moreover, additional weapons and units within the Khe Sanh defensive perimeter would inordinately increase the concentration of our resources in a relatively confined area, correspondingly increasing the risk of losses to enemy fire, and would add a significant amount of logistic support requirements. It is considered preferable to retain additional fire support means for employment in concert with counter-attacking and exploitation forces when they are committed.

Earl G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Mr. President:

Herewith Westy reports minor operations at Khe Sanh.

Weather operational for both resupply and tactical air support.

W. W. Rostow
Thursday, February 8, 1968

Following is the text of a cable sent by General Westmoreland at 5:22 AM this morning.

This is the fourth report on the Khe Sanh area and covers the period from midnight EST February 7 to midnight EST February 8.

During this period the Khe Sanh combat base continued to receive sporadic shelling from mortar and rockets throughout the afternoon and night. By 3:00 am February 7 thirty-two persons had been helilifted from the Lang Vei special forces camp, including 14 Americans. Three helicopters received enemy fire in the extraction resulting in one pilot being wounded. Three enemy tanks are reported to have been destroyed in the Lang Vei area.

At 4:25 pm the Marine outpost southwest of Khe Sanh started receiving rocket and mortar fire, followed by a ground attack. The attack continued until 5:45 pm. The enemy penetrated the wire of the platoon outpost but was repulsed. The enemy broke contact by 6:30 pm.

At 8:00 pm a Marine reinforcing element moved into position at the outpost. The position continued to receive sporadic incoming fire throughout the morning (last evening Washington time). The enemy fire was returned but with unknown results. During the period one Marine was reported killed, and two Marines were wounded and evacuated.

At 10:45 pm EST an air observer reported four enemy tanks southwest of Khe Sanh. Air strikes were run and it is believed that two of the tanks were disabled. An air observer also reported siting 20 vehicles moving in a westerly direction five kilometers west of Lang Vei. Air strikes were conducted with unknown results.

During the period Marine tactical air flew 44 sorties in support of the area, the Air Force flew 98 sorties, the Navy 37, for a total of 179 sorties. Four Arc Light strikes (35 sorties) were flown against targets in the Niagara area. Reported bomb damage assessment as the result of the Arc Light strikes included three secondary fires and numerous secondary explosions.

The logistics status remains satisfactory in the Khe Sanh area. Airlift resupply provided 127 short tons of supplies, 94 tons of which was
ammunition. Individual combat rations were increased from 15 to 26 days.

No COFRAM type ammunition was expended during this period.

For the period encompassing the 24-hours of February 8 EST, seven Arc Light strikes (45 sorties) will be flown in the Niagara area. Tactical sorties include 44 Marine, 48 Air Force, and 52 Navy, for a total of 144 sorties. The Marines will have 16 aircraft on call for the Khe Sanh area while the Air Force will have 120 sorties on alert. Additional sorties that could theoretically be diverted into the Khe Sanh area total 406 Air Force, 250 Navy, for a grand total of 656.

Enemy unit identifications in the Khe Sanh area remain the same as previously reported.

The weather on the afternoon of February 7 was marginal for flying with a ceiling of 1,500 feet. The period from 7:00 am to 7:00 pm was poor with low ceilings and visibility as low as one third to one half miles in fog. Weather conditions improved to marginal at 7:00 pm, with ceilings of 2,000 feet and good visibility.

The forecast is for marginal to good conditions in the afternoon and evening of today, with ceilings varying from 2,000 to 3,000 feet. Early tomorrow the weather will become poor, with low clouds and visibilities restricted to one quarter to one mile in fog. By morning the weather should improve again to marginal, with ceilings of 1,500 feet.
Thursday, February 8, 1968
2:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a supplementary from Gen. Wheeler on Khe Sanh.

W.A.D. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
Authority JCS 10-2-78
By, NARS, Date 3-16-79
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Situation in the Khe Sanh Area

You have received General Westmoreland's fourth report on the Khe Sanh area, covering the period through 11:00 PM EST, 7 February 1968. I have received additional information from General Westmoreland and Admiral Sharp which is reported in the succeeding paragraphs.

General Westmoreland informed me that he has issued instructions to General Weyand (Commanding General, II Field Force) to arrange for a US unit to be brought into the race track area of Saigon. This will release Vietnamese troops to put more pressure on enemy elements in the city. Although General Westmoreland is reluctant to take this step, he feels that it is essential to push ARVN to greater action to clean up Saigon. Additionally, as I told you yesterday, he plans to move a battalion of the 101st Airborne Division to Hue/Phu Bai. Also, a Vietnamese Marine Battalion will be moved to Hue/Phu Bai to replace one of the depleted Vietnamese airborne battalions in that area. He indicates that he may follow these deployments with two more Vietnamese Marine Battalions into that area.

You may be interested to know that, yesterday, as a result of an ambush of an enemy party by US forces west of Saigon, a North Vietnamese passport containing a Cambodian visa, stamped Phnom Penh, and a baggage claim check from Phnom Penh, were taken from one of the bodies. The party had a sophisticated radio, believed to be single sideband. It was reported that this appeared to be a most important group.
Regarding the North Vietnamese air threat, Admiral Sharp has assured me that all concerned have been watching this activity closely and that all forces have been alerted to this potential threat. In this regard, air strikes are being conducted daily at Vinh and Bai Thuong airfields to preclude their being used as forward staging bases for MIG operations. These airfields are being seeded with 500 pound bombs with influence fuzes (Mark 36s) as necessary to harass and disrupt repair operations. Additionally, fighter cover is being provided for B-52s operating in the DMZ and Mu Gia Pass areas. A full report on the air threat will be provided separately as requested by you.

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Situation in Vietnam

You have received General Westmoreland's fifth report on the situation in Khe Sanh through 11:00 PM EST, 8 February 1968. I talked to General Westmoreland at 8:30 AM EST this morning and obtained some additional information which is contained in the succeeding paragraphs.

Yesterday was fairly quiet. The enemy appears to be tired. However, General Westmoreland expects the second cycle of attacks to begin soon and he has been getting ready for these attacks.

In Khe Sanh, B-52 and tactical air strikes continue to pound the area. The weather is marginal in that area and bad along the coast.

In Hue/Phu Bai, three ARVN Airborne Battalions are down to the approximate strength of 160 men each. General Westmoreland is reinforcing with three Vietnamese Marine Battalions - one to be airlifted into Hue today, one tomorrow, and one the day after. In addition, one battalion of the 101st Airborne Division will be deployed to Hue/Phu Bai tomorrow. A second battalion of the 101st will be moved to Hue by landing ships. There have been reports out of I Corps that the Citadel in Hue has been cleared of enemy; however, General Westmoreland can neither confirm nor deny this yet.
The situation in Dalat is clearing up, although there is still some fighting in the western part of the city. In Saigon, there have been some skirmishes.

The IV Corps area, according to General Westmoreland, is in good shape. He is concentrating his Riverine Force at My Tho.

The Provisional Field Army Headquarters, to be called MACV Forward, under General Abrams (who continues in his capacity as Deputy COMUSMACV) will open tomorrow, to control all forces generally in the area of the I Corps Tactical Zone. I previously reported this to you, but the events since TET have delayed the establishment of this headquarters.

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Friday, February 9, 1968
9:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Westy's latest on Khe Sanh.

W.W. Rostow
Friday, February 9, 1968

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is the fifth report on the Khe Sanh area and covers the 24 hour period of Thursday, February 8, 1968.

During the period the Khe Sanh Combat Base and the surrounding area continued to receive sporadic mortar, rocket, and harassing small arms and sniper fire. A total of 21 Marines were killed and 27 were wounded and evacuated. There were 124 enemy killed, one captured, and 27 individual and 23 crew-served weapons captured as a result of the enemy mortar and ground attack on the Marine Company yesterday morning.

Marine aircraft flew 49 sorties in support of the Khe Sanh area while the Air Force flew 101, and the Navy flew 77, for a total of 227. Ten secondary fires and one secondary explosion were reported. Three personnel carriers and a "tank-like" vehicle were destroyed, and 10 other vehicles were damaged. The latter was the action taken against the enemy tanks and vehicles sighted yesterday southwest and west of Khe Sanh.

Seven ARC LIGHT strikes (39) sorties were run in the Niagara area. Four of these strikes were in proximity to Khe Sanh. Marine units in the area fired 5543 rounds of mortar and artillery ammunition.

The Khe Sanh logistics position continues to improve. A total of 214 short tons of supplies were airlifted in during the period for an increase of 87 short tons. The bulk of the airlift was the delivery of 140 short tons of ammunition. 41.5 short tons of engineering equipment, including bunkering material, and 24 short tons of vehicles were also delivered. Airlift resupply is being accomplished with Air Force C-130 and C-123 Aircraft and Marine C-130 and CH-53 helicopters. The 26 days of individual combat rations reported yesterday was not correct. The revised status of these ratios is 12 days. The ammunition stocks are adequate, the lowest being 11 days for the 105 MM howitzers. No COFRAM type ordnance was used during the period.
For the next period, four ARC LIGHT strikes (27 sorties) will be flown in support of Khe Sanh. Marine tactical air plans 44 sorties (additional 16 on call), the Air Force plans 74 sorties, and the Navy 52, in support of Khe Sanh, for a total of 172 sorties. The Air Force will also have 123 tactical air sorties on call, and a potential of diverting pre-planned strikes from other areas for a total of 631 sorties (Air Force 381, Navy 250).

There is no new information on enemy identification, strengths, and capabilities.

The weather in the Khe Sanh area for the early afternoon of the 3rd February was good but about 2:00 PM it became marginal. Fog formed at about 8:00 PM making the weather poor for the rest of the night and for the morning of the 9th. The forecast for the afternoon of the 9th is for marginal weather. The formation of fog by 8:00 PM will make the rest of the night poor with improvement to marginal again by noon on the 12th.
Saturday, February 10, 1968
9:25 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Westy's latest on Khe Sanh.

W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 05.0 10-18-78 letter
By NARS, Date 3-16-79
TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is the sixth report on the Khe Sanh area and covers the 24-hour period of February 9, 1968 (Washington time).

During the reporting period the Khe Sanh Combat Base and the outlying areas continued to receive sporadic shelling from mortars, with occasional rocket rounds reported.

The night of February 9 - 10 was characterized by brief contacts with exchanges of small arms fire and grenades. At 10:15 AM EST a Marine Listening Post about three kilometers northwest of the Khe Sanh Base received small arms fire and grenades in conjunction with a ground attack by an estimated 35 to 40 enemy. The Listening Post withdrew to the company perimeter and the Marine Company then received seven satchel charges in the perimeter wire, with two enemy penetrating the outer wire. In the face of the defense action, the enemy did not press the attack. This action resulted in two Marines killed and three other receiving minor wounds. The extent of the enemy casualties is unknown.

At midnight last night C-130 aircraft received enemy fire about two miles southwest of the Khe Sanh airstrip while approaching for a landing. The aircraft caught fire and was completely destroyed, resulting in two killed, four critically injured, and three missing.

During this period Marine Tactical Air flew 34 sorties. The Air Force flew 66 sorties, the Navy flew 63, for a total of 163 sorties in the Khe Sanh Area. The Marine air strikes produced several secondary explosions while the Air Force reported three secondary explosions, four secondary fires, and three trucks destroyed.
Photo reconnaissance obtained confirms the presence of several PT-76 tanks in the Lang Vei area. There were four ARC LIGHT strikes (27 sorties) run in the Niagara area in support of the Khe Sanh Base and its environs.

On February 9 the Ground Control Facility at the Khe Sanh was rendered inoperative due to enemy fire. As a result only three C-130 aircraft were able to resupply with 32 short tons of cargo. Twenty-two short tons of the resupply was petroleum, oil, and lubricants, and the remaining ten short tons were individual combat rations. The level of stocks of all classes remains adequate. The Ground Control equipment was back in operation today. No COFRAM type ordnance was used during the period. For the period midnight Friday to midnight Saturday EST, there will be six ARC LIGHT strikes (39 sorties) flown in the Niagara area. Marine tactical air plans 44 sorties in support of Khe Sanh, while the Air Force has 88 sorties planned, and the Navy has 100 planned, for a total of 232 sorties. The Air Force has 120 additional sorties on alert.

There is no change in enemy unit identification in the area.

On February 9 the weather was poor in the afternoon with cloud ceilings of 700 feet and fog. By 4:00 PM the weather conditions began to deteriorate with zero visibility by 8:00 PM. The weather improved to marginal early Saturday morning and there was good visibility. The weather then remained marginal the rest of the morning. The forecast for the period noon Saturday to noon Sunday is for marginal weather to continue until about 8:00 PM. At this time the formation of fog will make the weather poor with visibilities of less then 1 mile. Conditions will improve to marginal by 11:00 AM on February 11 with ceilings of 1200 feet.
TOP SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Saturday, February 10, 1968
1:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Gen. Wheeler's latest situation report.

Walt Rostow

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 9CS 10-2-78 letter
By NARS, Date 3-16-78
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Situation in Vietnam

Authority JCS 10-3-78 letter
By , NARS, Date 3-16-79

You have received General Westmoreland's sixth report on the situation in the Khe Sanh area for the period through 11:00 PM EST, 9 February 1968. I talked to General Westmoreland at 8:00 AM EST this morning and obtained the information on the situation in Vietnam which is contained in the succeeding paragraphs.

General Westmoreland assesses the current situation as similar to that which prevailed in China in 1948, in that the Red Chinese moved their people into the cities and then besieged the cities. In this connection, he is continuing his preparations for an anticipated second cycle of attacks. He is also striving to reopen the roads, so as to permit the resupply of food. He reports that there is plenty of rice in Saigon and Danang.

General Westmoreland considers that the enemy may use tanks in the eastern part of the DMZ area, and he is sending General Abrams to talk to the commanders in that area about this potential threat. General Westmoreland is concerned about the impact a tank attack might have upon the ARVN units, and accordingly, General Momyer is developing plans for the use of Napalm and Zuni rockets against any tank attack in that area.

The Hue/Phu Bai area is, as was reported yesterday, being reinforced by three Vietnamese Marine Battalions. Presently, three-fifths of the city is controlled by South Vietnamese forces; however, General Westmoreland estimates that there are some 2,000 Viet Cong still in Hue.
There are five battalions of the Americal Division south of
Danang. There was heavy fighting there yesterday, and it is
reported that elements of the 2d North Vietnamese Division are
now pulling back.

The KC-130 which was destroyed in Khe Sanh was hit on
landing by a 12.7 mm machine gun; as the aircraft landed, the
POL aboard exploded.

The II Corps area was relatively quiet. There is still fighting
in Dalat, but we are making headway there. Elements of the 33d
North Vietnamese Regiment have been located south of Ban Me
Thuot along the river. Kontum is quiet. In Dak To, a lieutenant
who defected from the 174th North Vietnamese Regiment reported
that one-third of his regiment had been killed. In Binh Dinh
Province, the ROK forces have been doing well, killing some 800
members of the 3d North Vietnamese Division in the Qui Nhon area.

In Long An Province, 123 enemy were killed and 17 captured,
one of whom was a North Vietnamese from Cambodia – significantly,
several brand new weapons, of Red Chinese make (still in cosmoline)
were captured. In the capital, Viet Cong assassins killed eight
policemen.

General Westmoreland has intelligence of an expected attack on
Tan Son Nhut tonight, and has made preparations for this.

The IV Corps area was also relatively quiet. The Riverine
Force killed 83 enemy in the My Tho area, where there is an enemy
build-up. General Westmoreland hopes to reopen Highway 4 by
Sunday night.

MACV Forward, the Provisional Field Army Headquarters which
I mentioned in my memorandum to you yesterday, has opened.
General Abrams will operate from that headquarters from time to time.

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

2
Sunday, February 11, 1968
11:35 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Gen. Wheeler's supplementary report from Westy, including the possibility of their using ground-to-ground missiles on their tanks.

They have a G.O. of the week.

[Signature]

Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 9CS 10-2-27 Letter
By 7P  NARS, Date 3/6/29
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Situation in Vietnam

You have received General Westmoreland's seventh report on the situation in the Khe Sanh area for the period through 11:00 PM EST, 10 February 1968. I talked to General Westmoreland at 8:15 AM EST this morning and obtained the information on the situation in Vietnam which is contained in the succeeding paragraphs.

As General Westmoreland's report indicated, Khe Sanh airfield was shelled yesterday. A C-130 aircraft was hit by fragments of a mortar shell upon landing, damaging its hydraulic system; they may be able to repair this aircraft tomorrow. General Westmoreland plans to use C-123 and Caribou aircraft in resupplying Khe Sanh and, to meet this need, has had General Momyer convert for airlift use some C-123s used in the defoliation effort.

Sniper fire continued in Hue. The first of the three Vietnamese Marine Battalions to reinforce in Hue arrived there yesterday; in addition, elements of a US Marine Battalion were moved in. There was heavy fighting south of Danang, resulting in 195 enemy killed. There was light contact on the outskirts of Dalat.

The attack on Tan Son Nhut did materialize as General Westmoreland expected, resulting in 196 enemy killed and 170 or so weapons captured.

In the IV Corps area there was light contact in several towns.

A raller (defector) taken at Khe Sanh gave information on the following order of enemy attack: (1) Lang Vei; (2) Con Thien; (3) Khe Sanh. He stated also that he had seen near Thanh Hoa several weeks...
ago about 20 missiles mounted on PT-76 Amphibious Tank chassis (the PT-76 was used at Lang Vei). General Westmoreland indicated these could be FROG missiles (see attachment) and that this could be the "big surprise" which the Soviet correspondent in Hanoi wrote about recently. Other possibilities for the "big surprise", in General Westmoreland's view, could be the use of SA-2 missiles near the DMZ, air strikes in the DMZ area by IL-28s, and MIG attacks against B-52s. General Westmoreland and his commanders are alert to all of these possibilities and taking appropriate measures.

In addition, General Westmoreland provided me the following assessment of South Korean and Australian troops in Vietnam:

"South Korean and Australian forces have aggressively and professionally fought the enemy wherever and whenever encountered. In addition to providing very capable defense of their own tactical areas of responsibility (TAOR) the presence of these allies has provided us the flexibility for redeployment of our own more mobile forces to contend with other threat areas. It is also significant that Highway 1 has remained open through the length of the Korean TAOR during the current situation. The fact that the more dramatic events of well coordinated enemy attacks have bypassed Korean and Australian areas is attributable to an extent to the emphasis of enemy strategy."

Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachments
FROG Missile
PT-76 Amphibious Tank
Mr. President:

Here is Gen. Westmoreland’s morning report.

Figures on the Khe Sanh supply situation are given on page 2.

Bromley Smith
Sunday, February 11, 1968

Following is the text of a report submitted to Superintendents of the area.

This is the seventh report on the Khe Sanh area and covers a period of 24 hours ending at midnight last night.

During the reporting period the Khe Sanh combat base and the surrounding area continued to receive sporadic machine gun fire and occasional artillery rounds. Between 7:17 February 10 and noon February 10 units had brief exchanges of small arms fire and grenades on the western end of the perimeter and western outposts resulting in three enemy killed. At 7:15 February 10 a trip flare exposed 14 enemy just west of Khe Sanh near the wire. An exchange of fire resulted in one enemy killed. At noon February 10 lights were spotted moving between Hills 861 and 8615, and metallic noises were heard. Lights and noises were fired on with unknown results. Tactical air strike runs during the period resulted in four secondary explosions.

Several enemy encroachments toward friendly positions and increasing enemy pressure was noted during the period. Enemy in the area continued to harass, proove their defensive positions with emphasis on anti-tank defenses. On February 10, 130 mines were emplaced southwest of the airfield. A review of all 106mm recoilless rifle, 3.5 rocket launchers, light-antitank weapon, and tank positions has been conducted to ensure complete coverage of all likely tank approaches.

Latest information received on the Marine C-130 crash which was reported yesterday reveals that the aircraft is believed to have received 50-caliber machine gun fire on its approach. The aircraft was loaded with POL which caught on fire and burned upon landing resulting in two killed and four wounded in critical condition and three missing. Search continues for the missing. During the period a total of 2,985 rounds of various caliber and types of mortar/artillery was fired in response to enemy efforts in the area. Aside from the tactical strikes mentioned, there were five additional secondary explosions, 14 secondary fires, 42 enemy killed, two bridges damaged, and 193 military structures destroyed.

There were no sightings of enemy vehicles.

During the period delivering a total 975 tons of ordnance in the Niagara area.

Following the C-130 crash of yesterday, and received a total of 53 short tons of supplied. The resupplies
represented four of the five classes, class I, rations, excepted. Unfavorable weather continues to effect air resupply in the northern highlands; however, early sorties were able to land on February 11, without the aid of the ground control facility. Requisitions received from Khe Sanh on the night of February 10 are being scheduled for air delivery or air drop on February 11.

The Khe Sanh dump or ammo supply point status reported as number of days on hand on February 11 is as follows: Class I: 105mm, 17 days on hand; Class III: Aviation fuel, 12 days on hand; jet fuel, 4 days on hand; motor fuel, 6 days on hand and diesel fuel, 6 days on hand; Class V: ammunition 40mm and high explosive, 12 days on hand; 81mm, 17 days on hand; 90mm, 94 days on hand; 4.2 inch shells, 30 days on hand; 105mm, 10 days on hand and 155mm, 25 days on hand. Class V (firecracker). 105 mm, 5 days on hand; 155mm, 5 days on hand; 40mm, 5 days on hand and hand grenades, 10 days on hand. The ammo supply point status of anti-tank ordnance, not including basic loads on position is as follows: 90mm head, 478 rounds; 66mm rocket, 190 rounds; M19 mines, 100 mines and 106mm head, 316 rounds. NOTE: Firecracker ammo is COFRAM.

No COFRAM type ordnance was used during the period.

For the next 24-hour period Marine tactical air plans 44 sorties in support of Khe Sanh, while the Air Force has 76 scheduled and the Navy has 100, for a total of 220 sorties. The Marines will have 16 aircraft on call for additions runs, and the Air Force will have 120 alert sorties on call. Five Arc Light strikes (33 sorties) are scheduled in support of the Khe Sanh area.

The weather for the afternoon of February 10 was marginal and deteriorated to poor after noon EST with zero visibility in fog by 3:00 PM EST, February 10. Weather conditions continued to be poor through the morning of February 11. The forecast for the afternoon of February 11 is for marginal weather conditions. By 8:00 AM EST fog and low clouds will cause poor weather which will last until 10:00 AM EST on the 12th of February. Conditions should improve to marginal with cloud ceilings increasing to 1,200 feet by mid-night February 11.

Lao personnel evacuated from Khe Sanh and now located at DaNang for on-shipment to Laos, total 114. Four persons remain to be evacuated on February 11, including the BV-33 battalion commander. Arrangements are underway to transport the Lao personnel to ultimate destination by Lao aircraft.
Monday, February 12, 1968
8:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Westy's daily report on Khe Sanh.

We will send up shortly a table on the supply situation.

W. D. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 05010-18-78 letter
By NARS, Date 3-16-79
TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is the eighth report on the Khe Sanh area and covers the 24-hour period of February 11, 1968.

During the period the Khe Sanh Combat Base and the surrounding area continued to receive heavy enemy shelling by mortars, rockets, and artillery. By 1:00 AM the shelling had subsided to sporadic incoming and terminated at 3:00 AM. Early Sunday morning a 122MM rocket impacted 15 feet away from a Air Force C-130 in the process of off-loading troops, resulting in one killed and four wounded and evacuated. The aircraft was damaged, but repairs are underway and hopefully it can be flown out today.

A helicopter conducting medical evacuation on Hill 861 received small arms fire resulting in one wounded and evacuated.

Two Navy aircraft dropped eight tanks of tear gas on a village eight kilometers southwest of Khe Sanh and followed with air strikes. No movement was observed from the village.

For the period there were four Marines killed and eight wounded, including those mentioned above. Two thousand two hundred and five rounds of mortar and artillery were fired by friendly forces. Tactical air sorties for the period totalled 258, Marine Tactical Air flew 75 sorties, and reported one road cut, four secondary fires, and one tank destroyed. The Air Force and Navy Tactical flew 88 and 95 sorties respectively, reporting six road cuts, four military structures destroyed, one secondary explosion, eight secondary fires, and one bridge damaged. Five ARC LIGHT strikes (33 sorties) were flown in the Niagara area.

Aerial resupply of Khe Sanh increased to 83 short tons on February 11. Ammunition and engineer bunkering material accounted for 40 and 25 short tons respectively. Seventeen short tons of replacement were delivered along with one short ton of medical supplies. C-123 Aircraft are providing air landed delivery to the Khe Sanh Airfield and air drops from C-130 Aircraft began at 11:00 hours.

No COFRAM Type Ordnance was used during the period.
For the next 24 hours Marine Air Plans 44 Tactical Air Sorties, the Air Force will run 74, while the Navy plan 100, for a total of 218 tactical air sorties in support of the Khe Sanh area. I have just instructed Momyer to increase the above with emphasis in the B-52 ring.

The Marines will have 16 aircraft on call. The Air Force will have 120 sorties on call. There will be five ARC LIGHT strikes (36 sorties) run in the Niagara area.

There is no change in enemy unit identification in the area.

The weather was poor on the afternoon of February 11. Cloud ceilings were 500 to 700 feet and visibilities were 3 to 5 miles in fog. By 6:00 PM the fog increased and visibility was reduced to 1/16 of a mile. The weather remained poor all night and through the morning hours. The weather is forecast to remain poor until about mid-morning on February 13. During this period cloud ceilings will remain 600 feet or lower and visibilities will be near zero at night. Late on the morning of the 13th weather should improve to marginal.