4. General Westmoreland expressed the view that Hue may have been the enemy’s primary objective from the outset of the Tet Offensive. Reports indicate an enemy effort to reinforce Hue through the A Shau Valley and he is watching the A Shau Valley very carefully.

5. There was little activity in the II Corps area.

6. There was contact early 22 February about 3 kilometers west of Saigon with the enemy repulsed and dispersed. North of Saigon in Southern Binh Duong Province the reconnaissance company of the 5th ARVN Division engaged an enemy force killing 20 enemy while losing only one killed. Southeast of Saigon in the Rung Sat Special Zone an enemy force overran a local police station killing 7 and seizing a small number of weapons, the exact number not specified.

- On the afternoon of 22 February at Cat Lai, anti-tank rockets were used by the enemy to strike several ammunition barges. Two barges exploded and two barges were beached. Demolition experts are in control in the area and are assessing damage. Small enemy detachments are interdicting roads around Saigon using the RPG-2 or B-40 rocket and RPG-7 or B-41 rocket with some effectiveness against vehicles. As we were talking General Westmoreland reported ARVN contact with two enemy battalions east of Tan Son Nhut with the Spooky gun ship with mini-guns firing on this force. Initial reports indicate 1 VC main force battalion and 1 VC local force battalion. The size of the enemy force is tentative and specific unit identifications have not been made.

8. General Westmoreland reports that since the Tet Offensive began on 29 January, 39,417 enemy have been reported killed in action and 6,590 individuals have been detained.
1. General Westmoreland reported quite a bit of shelling at Khe Sanh and in the DMZ area. Other intelligence reports cover the scale. The helicopter reported hit by mortar fire at Khe Sanh may have been hit by a rocket according to information that General Abrams passed to General Westmoreland. An attack on Khe Sanh is expected during the night of 23-24 February, Saigon time. The Vietnamese Ranger Battalion holding a part of the perimeter at Khe Sanh was probed by a force estimated to be a possible enemy battalion. The probing force used fire crackers, but initial reports indicate the probe was not successful.

2. U.S. Marines continued to clear the area of the Citadel in Hue for which they are responsible. The Vietnamese Marines have been less active than desirable. Recoilless rifles discussed in yesterday's telephone call were delivered to Vietnamese Marines on 23 February. More aggressive attacks by this force are expected on 24 February. Security forces on Highway 1, between Da Nang and Hue-Phu Bai continued to be thickened. One battalion of the 82d Airborne Division Task Force moved from Chu Lai and closed at Hue-Phu Bai just southeast of Hue.

3. Throughout the rest of South Vietnam the tempo of activity decreased. There were no reports of activity in II Corps. Contact continues with enemy forces west, north and east of Saigon. General Weyand reported to General Wheeler that forces in III Corps are killing about 300 enemy a day. There is some indication that enemy forces have been directed to break up into smaller units in the Saigon area and to focus their efforts on disrupting normal activity to the maximum extent of their capability. This indication has not been confirmed.

4. In IV Corps there is a mixed picture. General Eckhardt reported to General Wheeler that the main road from Saigon to the south should be opened to Cau Mau in the southernmost province of the Delta by the night of 24 February. He expects interruptions to occur during hours of darkness but expects to be able to restore traffic during daylight hours.
5. The damage to regional and popular forces appears to be small in III Corps. Reports are not yet complete. There is a mixed picture in IV Corps. Some regional forces have been hard hit. Reports indicate that approximately 500 popular forces are still missing, although General Westmoreland does not believe that this is an alarming number because it is a relatively small proportion of the total popular forces in IV Corps.

6. Special B-52 strikes were directed at a reported location of the Headquarters, 7th NVA Division, approximately 10 kilometers south of Phuoc Vinh. Initial assessment indicated some underground complexes have been opened up, and there were numerous secondary explosions. Additional bomb damage assessment will be made. General Westmoreland had intended to direct an intensive bombing by the B-52s of enemy concentrations in the A Shau Valley. He has delayed these strikes in favor of shifting the B-52 effort to the Khe Sanh area because of the reported imminence of enemy attack on Khe Sanh.

7. General Westmoreland reported the latest casualty figures accrued since 29 January 1968: KIA 40,199; detained 6,671; individual weapons captured 9,853; and crew-served weapons captured 1,482. General Westmoreland went on to explain that he believes the casualty count is a reasonable one, although it probably includes porters and laborers assisting enemy forces. Any inflation of reported casualties caused by the inclusion of porters and laborers is offset by casualties resulting from artillery and air strikes that are not included in the reports of enemy casualties.

8. I also talked briefly to General Palmer who believes that the situation throughout southern Vietnam is stabilizing somewhat, although obviously not yet back to normal.

HAROLD K. JOHNSON
ACTING CHAIRMAN
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND.

THIS IS REPORT NUMBER NINETEEN ON THE SITUATION IN THE KHE SANH AREA AND COVERS THE 24 HOUR PERIOD FEBRUARY 22, 1968.


WHILE CAMP CARROLL RECEIVED ONLY 29 ROUNDS OF MIXED MORTAR AND ARTILLERY, FRIENDLY ELEMENTS AT DONG HA COUNTED 81 ROUNDS OF HEAVY ARTILLERY. AT THE DMZ, FOUR MID-AFTERNOON BARRAGES BROUGHT 193 ROUNDS OF MIXED MORTAR AND ARTILLERY TO CON THIEN. TWO MARINES REQUIRED MEDICAL EVACUATION DUE TO WOUNDS SUSTAINED FROM THE BARRAGE. AT NEIGHBORING GIO LINH, THE RECEIPT OF 125 ARTILLERY ROUNDS WAS LINKED WITH EIGHT LATE MORNING ROCKET ROUNDS. INCOMING ROUNDS AT CUA VIET CEASED AT 10:00 A.M., BUT ONLY AFTER 86 ARTILLERY ROUNDS HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY 1ST AMTRAC BATTALION POSITIONS. CASUALTIES FROM THE SHELLING WERE: ONE KILLED, 12 WOUNDED (NINE EVACUATED).

IN GROUND ACTIVITY, ONLY ONE CONTACT WAS REPORTED. MARINES IN OPERATION KENTUCKY, AMBUSHED A SMALL ENEMY FORCE AND KILLED FIVE NVA. ONE MARINE WAS KILLED AND NINE WOUNDED IN THE ENCOUNTER.

AT 4:45 P.M. A HELICOPTER, WHILE ATTEMPTING TO LIFT OFF AT KHE SANH, WAS HIT BY A MORTAR ROUND CAUSING THE AIRCRAFT TO CRASH. RESULTING CASUALTIES WERE TWO KILLED, ONE WOUNDED (EVACUATED).
241 TACTICAL AIR SORTIES WERE FLOWN IN THE KHE SANH AREA. THE MARINE AIRCRAFT WING FLEW 87 SORTIES. BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT INCLUDED ONE SECONDARY FIRE, ONE MORTAR POSITION DESTROYED AND THREE KILLED. THE AIR FORCE FLEW 132 SORTIES, THE NAVY FLEW 22, USING COMBAT SKY SPOT. ARC LIGHT B-52'S FLEW 14 STRIKES (40 SORTIES) IN THE NIAGARA AREA.

AERIAL RESUPPLY FOR THE REPORTING PERIOD AMOUNTED TO 183.5 SHORT TONS. THERE WERE 82 SHORT TONS OF CLASS V, AMMUNITION. NINETEEN SHORT TONS OF VEHICLES, CONSISTING OF FORKLIFTS. MAIL AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES AMOUNTED TO 1.5 AND 4 SHORT TONS RESPECTIVELY. IN ADDITION, 76 REPLACEMENT PASSENGERS WERE LANDED AT THE AIRFIELD. SORTIES INCREASED TO A TOTAL OF 26. ELEVEN C-130 AIRCRAFT COMPLETED 11 AIR DROPS. TWO C-130'S AND ONE USAF C-123 AIRCRAFT LANDED ON THE AIRFIELD. IN ADDITION, RESUPPLY SORTIES BY MARINE HELICOPTERS WERE FLOWN.

THERE WERE TWO MISSIONS FIRED DURING THE PERIOD USING FIRECRACKER. TWELVE ROUNDS WERE FIRED ON ENEMY TROOPS IN THE OPEN WITH UNDETERMINED RESULTS. ANOTHER SIX ROUNDS WERE EXPENDED IN CLOSE DEFENSIVE FIRES.

FOR THE NEXT 24 HOURS A TOTAL OF 288 TACTICAL AIR SORTIES WILL BE FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF KHE SANH. THERE WILL BE EIGHT ARC LIGHT STRIKES (24 SORTIES) FLOWN IN THE NIAGARA AREA.

THE WEATHER AT KHE SANH DURING THE PERIOD REMAINED BAD. LOW CLOUDS AND DENSE GROUND FOG REDUCED THE CEILING AND VISIBILITY TO NEAR ZERO DURING MOST OF THE PERIOD. CONDITIONS IMPROVED SOMEWHAT DURING THE AFTERNOON WHEN THE CLOUD CEILING AND VISIBILITY BECAME 1500 FOOT BROKEN AND SEVEN MILES. THE FORECAST FOR TODAY CALLS FOR GRADUAL IMPROVEMENT FROM NEAR ZERO CONDITIONS TO A 1200 FOOT CEILING AND SIX MILES VISIBILITY BY 1:00 P.M. AFTER 6:00 P.M. THE CLOUD CEILING AND VISIBILITY WILL BOTH LOWER TO NEAR-ZERO AND REMAIN SO THROUGHOUT THE REMAINDER OF THE PERIOD.

DTG 231459Z FEB 68
FEBRUARY 23, 1968

HEREWITH GENERAL JOHNSON'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND.

1. GENERAL WESTMORELAND REPORTED QUITE A BIT OF SHELLING AT KHE SANH AND IN THE DMZ AREA. OTHER INTELLIGENCE REPORTS 'OVER THE SCALE. THE HELICOPTER REPORTED HIT BY MORTAR FIRE AT KHE SANH MAY HAVE BEEN HIT BY A ROCKET ACCORDING TO INFORMATION THAT GENERAL ABRAMS PASSED TO GENERAL WESTMORELAND. AN ATTACK ON KHE SANH IS EXPECTED DURING THE NIGHT OF 23-24 FEBRUARY, SAIGON TIME. THE VIETNAMESE RANGER BATTALION HOLDING A PART OF THE PERIMETER AT KHE SANH WAS PROBED BY A FORCE ESTIMATED TO BE A POSSIBLE ENEMY BATTALION. THE PROBING FORCE USED FIRE CRACKERS, BUT INITIAL REPORTS INDICATE THE PROBE WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL.

2. U. S. MARINES CONTINUED TO CLEAR THE AREA OF THE CITADEL IN HUE FOR WHICH THEY ARE RESPONSIBLE. THE VIETNAMESE MARINES HAVE BEEN LESS ACTIVE THAN DESIRABLE. RECEILLESS RIFLES DISCUSSED IN YESTERDAY'S TELEPHONE CALL WERE DELIVERED TO VIETNAMESE MARINES ON 23 FEBRUARY. MORE AGGRESSIVE ATTACKS BY THIS FORCE ARE EXPECTED ON 24 FEBRUARY. SECURITY FORCES ON HIGHWAY 1, BETWEEN DA NANG AND HUE-PHU BAI CONTINUED TO BE THICKENED. ONE BATTALION OF THE 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION TASK FORCE MOVED FROM CHU LAI AND CLOSED AT HUE-PHU BAI JUST SOUTH EAST OF HUE.

3. THROUGHOUT THE REST OF SOUTH VIETNAM THE TEMPO OF ACTIVITY DECREASED. THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF ACTIVITY IN II CORPS. CONTACT CONTINUES WITH ENEMY FORCES WEST, NORTH AND EAST OF SAIGON. GENERAL WEYAND REPORTED TO GENERAL WHEELER THAT FORCES IN III CORPS ARE KILLING ABOUT 300 ENEMY A DAY. THERE IS SOME INDICATION THAT ENEMY FORCES HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO BREAK UP INTO SMALLER UNITS IN THE SAIGON AREA AND TO FOCUS THEIR EFFORTS ON DISRUPTING NORMAL ACTIVITY TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT OF THEIR CAPABILITY. THIS INDICATION HAS NOT BEEN CONFIRMED.
4. In IV Corps there is a mixed picture. General Eckhardt reported to General Wheeler that the main road from Saigon to the south should be opened to Cau Mau in the southernmost province of the Delta by the night of 24 February. He expects interruptions to occur during hours of darkness but expects to be able to restore traffic during daylight hours.

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