REPORT of the CONFERENCE to STANDARDIZE METHODS for DEVELOPING and PRESENTING STATISTICS on ORDER of BATTLE INFILTRATION TRENDS and ESTIMATES
INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE REPORT

6 - 11 FEBRUARY 1967

CINCPAC
CAMP H.M. SMITH
HONOLULU, HAWAII
From: Commander in Chief Pacific  
To: Director, Defense Intelligenc~  
Subj: Intelligence Conference Report (U)  
Encl: (1) Report of Intelligence Conference (30)  

1. (C) At the direction of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, a conference was convened on Oahu on 6 February 1967 for the purpose of standardizing methods for developing and presenting statistics on order of battle and infiltration trends. Participants in the conference included representatives from Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Commander in Chief Pacific and component commands.  

2. (U) Enclosure (1) is the final report of this conference. It contains the discussions, comments, and recommendations of the participants. The participants agreed to implement as soon as possible all specific recommendations which are within their purview. There remain national level actions which should be taken if we are to reap the full benefits of this conference. The conclusions and agreements in the report require attention by the Washington agencies with the view towards arriving at agreed procedures. It is recommended that the definitions, methods and procedures listed therein be adopted for common usage by all concerned.

U. S. G. Sharp

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## INDEX

I. Statement of the Problem ........................................... 1

II. Convening Instructions and Authority ............................. 1

III. Objectives and Organization ..................................... 2

IV. Summary of Discussions of the Problem .......................... 3

   Strength Accounting .................................................. 3

   Infiltration Statistics and Trends .................................. 3

   Viet Cong Recruitment ............................................... 4

   Retroactive Adjustments ............................................. 4

   Changes in Unit and Area Designations ........................... 5

   Enemy Losses .......................................................... 5

   Base Areas ............................................................ 6

   Retention of Border Area Units in Order of Battle ............... 6

   Reporting Enemy Attacks .......................................... 6

   Intelligence Estimates .............................................. 7

   General Overview ................................................... 7

V. Discussions of the Problem Areas ................................. 8

   Strength Accounting .................................................. 8

   VC/NVA Strength Gains .............................................. 12

   Validity of Order of Battle Data .................................. 17

   Changes in Unit and Area Designations ........................... 19

   Enemy Losses .......................................................... 20
Base Area Designation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Retention of Border Area Units in Order of Battle . . . . 25
Reporting of Enemy Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Reporting Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Annex A - In-Country Recruiting Data
Annex B - Glossary of Terms and Definitions
Annex C - Index of Current Periodic Reporting on Enemy Strengths, Dispositions, Gains, Losses and Base Areas
Annex D - Relation of Current Reporting to Conference Subject Matter
Annex E - Participants and Committee Assignments
Annex F - MACV Order of Battle Reference Manual - Strength

ISSUED SEPARATELY.
Section I

Statement of the Problem

A. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 19 January 1967, stated to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency his concern over the contradictory order of battle and infiltration statistics which are contained in numerous documents now being circulated.

B. To resolve this problem he directed DIA, on an expedited basis, to take those actions considered necessary with CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency to:

1. Insure the use of standardized methods for developing and presenting statistics on order of battle and infiltration trends; and
2. Insure that this system is used as the single formal source for this information by all agencies involved.

Section II

Convening Instructions and Authority

A. In response to the CJCS directive, the Director, DIA, on 24 January 1967 requested CINCPAC to convene a conference, consisting of representatives from CINCPAC, MACV, DIA, NSA, and CIA, to standardize and agree upon definitions, methodology and reporting procedures. In addition, representatives from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Systems Analysis attended as observers. Problem areas for examination included:

1. VC/NVA order of battle
2. Infiltration
3. In-country recruitment and conscription
4. Retroactive adjustment of strength figures
5. Nomenclature of unit and area designation
6. Loss figures
7. Confirmed, Probable, Possible strength categories
8. Irregular forces
9. Political cadre and support personnel
10. Reporting procedures
11. Base area designation
12. Enemy initiated battalion-size contacts
13. Projected net gains
14. Projected net losses
15. Prisoners of War
B. In response to the DIA request, CINCPAC on 28 January 1967 circulated a proposed agenda for comments, and then convened a conference on 6 February 1967 at Camp Smith, Hawaii.

Section III

Objectives and Organization

A. During the first day of the conference representatives from DIA, MACV, and NSA made presentations related to the problem and the areas requiring clarification. The conference recognized that the process of insuring that every agency adopts and uses standardized methodologies to develop and to present a common body of information is a function of command and coordination. Accordingly, the conference adopted the following objectives to assure the orderly development and accomplishment of its mission:

1. To establish agreed definitions, criteria and methodologies for the computation of statistical data on order of battle, infiltration and related matters, and to establish procedures for coordinating changes.

2. To establish an agreed system for reporting data on these subjects and to establish procedures for coordinating changes.

3. To develop guidelines for the interpretation and dissemination of statistical data on VC/NVA order of battle, infiltration, and related matters.

4. To develop a program which will keep the consumers of the statistics fully apprised of the derivative methodology and limitations on the use of this information.

B. In order to provide for all tasking involved in accomplishing the objectives, the conference was organized into a Steering Committee and three other committees. With the Steering Committee chaired by CINCPAC representative directing the effort, the three other committees were assigned the following tasks:

1. Committee A - To review the MACV definitions, criteria and methodology for the derivation and presentation of statistics pertaining to VC/NVA order of battle and to make recommendations for modifications. The committee was chaired by COMUSMACV representative.

2. Committee B - To review the MACV definitions, criteria and methodology for the derivation and presentation of statistics pertaining to VC/NVA losses and gains and to make recommendations for modification. The committee was chaired by COMUSMACV representative.
3. Committee C - To examine the reporting requirements for enemy strengths considered by Committee A and B; review their current method of dissemination; and develop a single, agreed upon system for disseminating data. Additionally to review the MACV definitions, criteria and methodology for the derivation and presentation of statistics pertaining to Base Areas. This committee was chaired by the MA representative.

Section IV

Summary of Discussions of the Problem

A. Strength Accounting

In an effort to preclude confusion and improper use of order of battle strengths, the conference agreed to the development of four classifications of enemy strength: combat strength, administrative service strength, irregular strength, and political order of battle strength. These classifications permit logical and systematic measurement of each basic component of total strength. Since combat and administrative service units are organized along the lines of a conventional military structure, assessments of their strengths are generally accurate. On the other hand, the changing nature of the irregular forces and the VC infrastructure limit the degree of precision to which their strengths can be measured. As more data is accumulated, and these categories of enemy order of battle are placed in sharper focus, refinements can and will be made in all areas. By including the VC infrastructure at the hamlet level in political order of battle, a substantial increase in enemy strength which has existed, will be reflected retroactively in overall enemy strength. (Detailed discussion in Section V.A.)

B. Infiltration Statistics and Trends

1. The conference concluded that infiltration statistics as now developed are based upon valid criteria and that MACV will be the single source of infiltration data. To preclude confusion, it was agreed that infiltration data will be cut off on the last day of each month and transmitted throughout the intelligence community on the first day of the following month. Two averages will be computed each month, one for Accepted which includes Confirmed and Probable infiltration and one for Accepted and Possible infiltration categories. It was recommended that all agencies use the infiltration data in all reports, briefings and releases until the next monthly report is received. Additionally, it was agreed that the average infiltration cannot be used to project infiltration trends. A stabilization period of three to six months is required to stabilize infiltration data and the changing character of the data base and possible variation in the stabilization period make a statistical analysis of infiltration trends a misleading proposition.
2. It should be noted that intelligence estimates of the rate of infiltration of NVA personnel into South Vietnam should not be used as the primary measure of Hanoi's intentions or capability with respect to its continued direction and support of the insurgency in South Vietnam. For reasons made amply clear in Section V, paragraph B, the time lag alone in collection of sufficient evidence on this one indicator prevents its use on a timely basis. Further, extrapolation of averages of past infiltration as a basis of future infiltration is unsound. At this phase of the war, intelligence on North Vietnam order of battle, campaign plans, unit combat effectiveness, and logistic support operations, as well as infiltration, should all be used as a measure of Hanoi's current support of the insurgency. These factors, together with intelligence of VC recruitment and projected enemy losses, provide a reasonably sound basis for determining North Vietnam requirements for infiltration if current combat strength of the known VC/NVA order of battle is to be maintained or increased.

3. It should be quite clear that if Hanoi wished to provide an indicator of de-escalation, real or pretended, the 324B Division at the DMZ offers a much better opportunity. Complete disengagement there would soon be known and would cost little or nothing with respect to combat capability in that area. (Detailed discussion in Section V. B.)

C. Viet Cong Recruitment

The conference agreed that MACV's present estimate that the Viet Cong are currently recruiting at a rate of 7,000 men per month was an improvement over past efforts in this area and should be used currently. This recruitment figure represents an input to the enemy's military force structure at all levels -- that is, an input to the maneuver, combat support, administrative service and irregular units. In the past, the monthly recruitment rate figure has been stated only as an input to the maneuver, combat support and administrative service units, and not to the irregulars. As a result, a figure of 3,500 men per month had been used frequently in both intelligence publications and press releases as representing Viet Cong recruitment per month. The conference recommended that a suitable explanation of the new estimate and background of the change be provided and considered for public release. (A suggested text is contained in Section V. B. 2.)

D. Retroactive Adjustments

The conference concluded that order of battle strengths, all categories of infiltration, and enemy losses must be updated and adjusted retroactively as new intelligence is received and evaluated. Retroactive adjustments will be published by MACV J2 on a monthly basis using the data and methodology presently developed. These adjustments will permit improved correlation of personnel loss and gain data with order of battle strength. However, precise
correlation will remain impossible. Nevertheless, the reconciliation of statistical data will be aided and the validity of the data base will be strengthened. (See Section V. B.)

E. Changes in Unit and Area Designations

The problem of the use of various unit and area designations at different levels was examined. It was agreed that the intelligence community must use the current true unit designation used by the enemy in preference to earlier ones. It was further agreed that much confusion arising from these changes could be effectively reduced if one basic source for a standard set of designations were adopted. In this instance it was agreed that MACV be recognized as the basic source and that there should be consistent utilization of the accepted designations in intelligence briefings and publications. The conference recognized the constraints imposed by the assigned mission of the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Service Cryptological Agencies (SCA) and that this action should not be binding upon them in all aspects. NSA, however, accepted these terms and designations which fall outside of the recognized constraints and will institute procedures to assure standardization of terminology throughout the cryptological community and to equate such terms with those established by MACV. (Detailed discussion in Section V. D.)

F. Enemy Losses

1. The conference discussed all aspects of losses to the enemy force structure in South Vietnam in an attempt to determine what factors should be considered when estimating enemy attrition for a given time frame.

2. With regard to enemy killed in action (KIA), the conference agreed that body count statistics provide the only reasonably accurate basis at present for determining KIA. The conference also agreed on the use of a wounded in action (WIA) to killed in action (KIA) ratio of 1.5 to 1. This was done after considering various WIA to KIA ratios which were considered relevant in South Vietnam, including a MACV study based on documentary evidence. The conference also reviewed the methodology in this study for estimating the number of enemy who died of wounds (DOW) or were permanently disabled. The conference accepted that there are 35 DOW for every 100 KIA. This 35 percent figure will be used until amended by additional amplifying data.

3. The conference agreed that only the military Hoi Chanhs should be currently used in computing overall enemy losses. When the political order of battle strength is determined for the hamlet level the political Hoi Chanh will be applied as losses. The ratio of one deserter for every military Hoi Chanh used in the past was considered questionable and was dropped from loss computations. Further study is required to determine whether there is a significant category of deserter other than Hoi Chanh.
4. The conference agreed that only those captured personnel who are classified as valid prisoners of war should be counted as losses. It was also considered necessary to use the term "detainee" until captured personnel are classified as prisoners of war, civil defendants, returnees or innocent civilians. (Detailed discussion in Section V. E.)

G. Base Areas

The subject of VC/NVA Base Areas was believed to be one which will increasingly become a focus of attention at all levels. The conference concluded that the methodology employed by MACV J2 in determining the location and long term status of primary enemy base areas was sound. The MACV J3 measurement of progress report is a short term assessment which reflects the field commander's evaluation of the degree of neutralization achieved during the previous month against specific base areas. Since these two studies address a different time frame, the J2 base area update study should not be used in assessing measurement of progress towards the 1967 goals established by MACV. (Detailed discussion in Section V. F.)

H. Retention of Border Area Units in Order of Battle

1. The conference examined the problem of accounting for those enemy units which enter South Vietnam and subsequently withdraw wholly or in part to border areas. Definite criteria for retention in order of battle was established as follows: (1) The unit has entered South Vietnam; (2) the unit, or elements of the unit, remain in South Vietnam; (3) the unit constitutes a direct threat; and (4) that its mission continues to be directed against friendly forces in South Vietnam. A unit must meet all of the above criteria or it will be dropped from the order of battle. The conference concluded that confusion could be avoided by a clear statement of the criteria and adoption of a "flagging system" for the units involved in MACV order of battle publications to insure consistency in interpretation and presentation of strength data related to these units.

2. The question of accounting for these units in infiltration statistics was also treated. It was agreed that the present system of including the units strengths in infiltration statistics upon their initial arrival in South Vietnam, but not upon their reentry was sound. Replacement personnel picked up by such units when out of country are not included in infiltration statistics, unless they meet infiltration acceptance criteria and can be recorded as separate infiltration groups or units. (Detailed discussion in Section V. G.)

I. Reporting Enemy Attacks

The conference agreed that the best procedure for resolving the confusion in statistics on enemy attacks was to agree on one official source for such statistics.
and that reports from this source in the future will break out attacks by
"battalion size and larger" and "company and smaller" categories. Agreement
was reached that the MACV J2 PERINTREP, which reflects refined data, should
be used throughout the intelligence community as the official statistical report
on enemy contacts. Updatings will be disseminated electrically in the MACV J2
Weekly Report of Enemy Strengths cable. The conference noted that operational
reports on South Vietnam also reflect information on enemy attacks, but that
the data is not refined and not necessarily updated. Therefore, the conference
recommends that agencies and commands not use operational reports as the
basis for statistical compilations.

J. Intelligence Estimates

The difference in missions of various commands, the demand of a commander
in the field for timeliness and the freedom to exercise his individual judgment
require separate estimates at MACV, CINCPAC, and DIA. However, higher
authority should review estimates of subordinates and disagreements should
be rectified either through intelligence or command channels. Methodologies
should be reviewed for adequacy and to insure that the consumers of the
information developed understand the limitations of the base data.

K. General Overview

1. It was the general view of the conference that the inconsistent presentation
of statistics on the VC/NVA has been due in large part to the use of different data
base time frames and to variations in the amount of data used. In some cases,
use of the data without a full understanding of its meanings or limitations has
caused most of the apparent contradictions. The data itself has not been the
cause of confusion. A need thus exists for users to identify the exact time period
and data they employ. Furthermore, a need exists for all users to employ only
the latest MACV published data and to explain to the consumers the meanings and
limitations of the data.

2. The conference also discussed and agreed that other actions outside the
authority of this group warrant consideration. These actions are:

   a. The presentation of intelligence statistics, especially on infiltration
      and order of battle, should always include an explanation of the terminology and
      the derivation and limitations on the use of those figures. (See Section V.)
      Additionally, these presentations should include the specific time frame used,
      the confirmed, probable and possible categories of figures, and be based upon
      the previous appropriate MACV periodic report. For example: A presentation
      of infiltration statistics in February should be based on the MACV monthly
      infiltration report for January. (See Annex C for the list of periodic reports)
only a few days before the regiment overran the Ashau Special Forces Camp. Although the 101C and 52d NVA Regiments supported the 95B in its attack against Ashau, these regiments were not accepted in the order of battle until November 1966 and January 1967, when sufficient evidence became available to warrant their acceptance. The 52d Regiment was identified prior to January 1967 as an infiltration group based upon defector statements, but was not accepted in order of battle until documents captured during December 1966, proved conclusively that the 52d Regiment was in South Vietnam operating as an integral combat unit rather than as a replacement pool for other NVA units. The 101C Regiment is held in a possible category because there is some evidence indicating that it may have been used as a replacement pool for other regiments in the area.

b. Administrative Service Units. There are two major elements in this component. The first component comprises the personnel of military staffs from national to district levels. The second comprises rear service technical units (non-combat military support units) directly subordinate to these levels. Present order of battle carries approximately 18,500 as the number of administrative service personnel.

c. There are, however, large numbers of non-combat military personnel not listed. These include many performing a transportation function, district staffs, all medical personnel subordinate to national, regional, provincial, and district headquarters, smaller signal units, and large numbers of personnel working in Viet Cong base areas. The latter category includes personnel performing ordnance and quartermaster functions, repair and maintenance personnel, and soldiers engaged in running such facilities as recruit depots, training centers and POW camps.

d. Until recently, information on these types of personnel was relatively scarce. Now, however, information in the form of documents, POW interrogation and agent reports are becoming available in greater numbers and MACV has more resources to devote to counting military non-combatants. Steps are being taken, therefore, to refine holdings on the numbers of such personnel. There are indications that the order of battle figures will rise.

e. Irregular Strength. Viet Cong irregular forces are organized into guerrilla, self-defense, and secret self-defense elements subordinate to village and hamlet Viet Cong organizations (See Annex B). Present order of battle carries approximately 113,000 as the number of such irregulars. National level reporting has been showing this force as 100,000 to 120,000 and frequently using the mean for computations.

f. The nature of the irregular force structure does not lend itself to the precise measurements which can be made for conventionally organized military forces based upon identifications, command structure, and unit historical data.
b. Information briefing(s) are needed to acquaint all agencies and commands concerned who release information to the news media with the methodology, difficulties and limitations encountered in developing intelligence statistics.

c. Consideration should be given to the establishment of the Defense Intelligence Agency as the single agency for coordination of requests on statistics and to coordinate all statistics prior to dissemination to civilian agencies of the government, military agencies and the public.

Section V

Discussions of the Problem Areas

A. Strength Accounting

1. In an effort to clear up misunderstandings over the proper categorization and the strength of the various components of the enemy forces in South Vietnam, the conference examined current definitions and methodology on these subjects. It was agreed to report enemy order of battle strength under four basic classifications: combat strength (maneuver units and combat support units), administrative service strength, irregular strength and political strength. While the methodology for developing order of battle appears basically sound, it sometimes happens that North Vietnamese or Viet Cong maneuver and combat support units operate in South Vietnam for extended periods of time before they are identified and included in the order of battle. Furthermore, order of battle figures for the strength of administrative service units, irregulars, and political order of battle are at present incomplete. It is noted that efforts to develop a better data base probably will involve major book increases in the numbers listed under the above three categories. Means are being considered by MACV to reflect these figures in the order of battle in a manner which will help prevent consumers of intelligence from viewing the increases as indicative of a sudden growth in the enemy force structure. Consumers should view such changes as an increase of our knowledge of enemy strength already in being.

2. A detailed discussion of the basic components of the enemy's total strength in South Vietnam follows:

a. Maneuver and Combat Support Units. These are the enemy's main combat forces. In many instances maneuver and combat support units are accepted in order of battle several months after they are activated or enter the country. This is due to the strict acceptance criteria which demand highly credible evidence before a unit is entered into the order of battle. The 95B Regiment, for example, was accepted in the order of battle within a few days after it entered South Vietnam in March 1966, because two of its members defected.
Even the captured Viet Cong records that are available for some provinces are obviously "estimates" rather than statistical tabulations of strengths for specifically identified platoons and squads. Lacking this precise accounting data, it is necessary to use an estimate (by province) to ascertain the overall strength of the VC irregular forces throughout South Vietnam. These estimates consider the type of VC infrastructure, the density of population, scale of enemy military activity, and extent of VC control in the various districts, villages and hamlets comprising each province.

MACV's present estimates of the strength of the Viet Cong irregulars are derived from estimates provided by GVN province chiefs. During the past few months, the groundwork has been laid through coordination with all GVN and US agencies from the national to the subsector level, to obtain a more valid estimate of irregular strength by means of a combined collection program. This program places the focus on collection at the sector level, and uses all combined GVN and US assets available at that level. The combined estimates and supporting information developed at the sector level will be forwarded to Saigon for review and comparison with total information available in Saigon. Preliminary indications point to a sharp increase in the number of irregulars to be carried in the order of battle. This will not, however, indicate that actual irregular strength has jumped, but only that we have refined our knowledge of it, and that strengths will be retroactively adjusted.

Political strengths. Each of the enemy forces described above is controlled and directed by the Communist political apparatus in South Vietnam, known as the "Viet Cong Infrastructure". The political order of battle strength which comprises this infrastructure is a vital segment of the insurgency. It includes individuals who devise military plans and operations (particularly in the area of logistical support), issue the orders, and ensure that these orders are carried out. In many cases, these individuals also serve as military commanders. As such, they are included in the military strength categories of the order of battle. This is particularly true at the village and hamlet level where one of the local political bosses will be the leader of the guerrilla platoon or squad. In short, the political infrastructure is an integral part of the total enemy strength and should be included in the order of battle.

The intelligence community has developed a data base on the organization and composition of the Viet Cong infrastructure, but has experienced considerable difficulty in estimating its strength. Much of the confusion can be traced to the problem of defining precisely what is meant by the term Viet Cong infrastructure and then breaking it down into categories which can be counted. To resolve this confusion, the following definition of Viet Cong infrastructure was developed:
"The Viet Cong infrastructure is defined as the political and administrative organization through which the Viet Cong control or seek to control the South Vietnamese people. It embodies the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP), which includes a command and administrative apparatus (COSVN) at the national level, and the leadership and administration of the National Liberation Front (NLF), both of which extend from the national through the hamlet level."

This definition excludes members of the population base who are not assigned to a specific position within the above Viet Cong organizations. The current estimate of 39,200 political personnel carried in MACV order of battle does not include large segments of the VC infrastructure as defined above. Members of the VC infrastructure at the hamlet level are excluded, as are various administrative officials of the NLF and members of the PRP municipal committees. An intensive community-wide intelligence collection program against these segments of the infrastructure and a refinement of previous data has been initiated and probably will result in a substantial increase in the total number carried in the political order of battle.

j. The methodology employed in revising the current estimate of the strength of the infrastructure will use the basic definition listed above. Each element of the infrastructure will be classified and strengths will be computed at the national, regional, provincial, municipal, village and hamlet levels to the extent permitted by the best available information. In computing total strengths for these elements, an estimative allowance will be made for dual membership and military or civilian status.

3. The conference agreed to the following:

a. That the strength figures of all categories of Communist forces, including maneuver and combat support units, administrative service units, irregular forces and political order of battle be retroactively adjusted on a recurring basis.

b. That a new strength estimate for the number of irregulars be developed and disseminated by MACV as a matter of high priority.

c. That the review of the evidence concerning political order of battle be continued, and that the newly identified strength be added to the order of battle as soon as possible.

d. That a listing of administrative service units be included in the MACV Monthly order of battle, and that such units be subject to the same acceptance criteria that apply for current units. These units should be incorporated into the order of battle as rapidly as possible.
That the term "Irregular" be applied to categorize Viet Cong personnel who include guerrillas, self-defense forces and secret self-defense forces. The term "Irregular" replaces "Militia" as used by MACV in their Monthly Order of Battle and appropriate changes to that document will be effected.

That the term "political cadre" as used in the MACV Monthly Order of Battle Summary be changed to "political".

B. VC/NVA Strength Gains

1. The continued growth during 1966 of the VC/NVA force structure - despite the military progress of US, South Vietnamese and other Free World forces - was one of the major concerns of this intelligence conference. In this regard, the conference conducted an intensive review of methodologies currently in use to determine or estimate the source of enemy personnel. The conference considered methods for measuring enemy personnel gains which could be used throughout the intelligence community. Terminologies and definitions were reviewed to insure that they covered all of the necessary information and that they were simple enough to be understood by interested intelligence consumers. Ease of understanding also figures in consideration of the problem of public release of this information. The overall problem of enemy gains can be broken down into two areas. These are VC recruiting and North Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam. A discussion of the major findings and deliberations of the conference in these two areas follows.

2. VC recruiting

a. The conference concluded that the new MACV estimate of in-country recruiting of 7,000 men per month is an improvement over past efforts in this area and should be used currently.

b. This estimate was arrived at by first determining the South Vietnamese population base, the percentage of the base which are males, and those males who are between the ages of 15 and 45 years. With this and other basic information, MACV examined all available captured documents which gave any indication of VC recruitment activity. It was determined that reliable information existed for only six of the 38 Viet Cong designated provinces in South Vietnam. These six provinces were located in three of the four GVN designated Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ). The only CTZ not represented was I Corps.

c. Although the information available was limited to six VC designated provinces, it was used as the basis for a country-wide estimate of VC recruitment. The manpower pool accessible to the VC was determined by applying a set of estimated percentages to various areas located in each of three geographical regions for which province information was available (I and II CTZ were considered as one). For example: 90% of the population was considered available in VC
controlled areas; 50% of the population was considered available in uncontested areas; 30% of the population was considered available in areas undergoing clearing; 20% of the population was considered available in secured areas.

d. During Calendar Year 1966, estimated enemy in-country recruiting was found to be approximately 83,000 men. This figure was supported by an independent study undertaken by the RVNAF Joint General Staff, which estimated in-country recruiting at approximately 78,000 men. MACV then accepted a range of 78,000 - 84,000 men per year as the actual estimate. The 7,000 man per month figure is, of course, an average of the upper figure. These men are being recruited for all levels of the VC/NVA military force structure. The actual computations which MACV used to derive its in-country recruitment estimate can be seen in Annex A.

e. The conference recognized that the acceptance of the new figure of 7,000 men per month recruited internally in South Vietnam was at variance with previous estimates announced publicly both in Saigon and in Washington. The recruitment estimate currently in the public domain is 3,500 men per month. This figure applies, however, only to recruitment for VC/NVA maneuver, combat support, and administrative service units. It does not include recruitment to the VC irregular units.

f. Consequently, the conference recommended that a suitable explanation be provided to assure policymakers, consumers and the public that the newly accepted figure of 7,000 men per month is the best estimate that the intelligence community can make at this time, and that continual efforts are being made to expand the data base on which the estimate is derived. This explanation could run along the following lines:

"A study of VC recruitment was undertaken by MACV to determine the average number of men per month who could be drawn into all levels of the VC/NVA military force. This study was based primarily on captured documents which provide reliable information for only six of the 38 Viet Cong designated provinces. MACV estimates that an average of 7,000 men per month are being recruited into VC ranks at all levels - that is, for maneuver, combat support, administrative service and irregular units - throughout South Vietnam. This new figure is double the figure of 3,500 men per month recruited internally in South Vietnam, which has most recently been used. The difference between these two is that the 3,500 figure was based on less reliable information than is currently available, and represented recruitment only for the maneuver, combat-support and administrative service units of the VC/NVA military force."
The new figure of 7,000 men per month represents the best currently available estimate of VC recruitment for all levels of the Viet Cong military force structure including maneuver, combat support, administrative service and irregular units. It should be remembered that the new figure is subject to continual revision and updating as further information becomes available.

3. Infiltration

a. The second major factor in enemy personnel inputs or gains is the infiltration of North Vietnamese personnel into South Vietnam. The conference examined all aspects of this problem including a review of definitions and criteria. Here again, the conference focussed its efforts toward assuring that the intelligence community speaks with one voice on this subject and that the ramifications of infiltration be easily understandable to policymakers, other intelligence consumers, and the public.

b. The conference felt that one of the major pitfalls in the acceptance of infiltration data has been the quotation of different averages of estimated monthly infiltration. This has arisen in part because varying data time frames have been used to develop the averages and because the separate categories of infiltration (Confirmed, Probable, and Possible) have often been lumped together in varying ways to produce the averages. The conference concluded that users of infiltration averages should always specify the infiltration categories and the data time frame employed to develop the averages.

c. The conference agreed that MACV J2 should report infiltration figures on a monthly basis, cutting off the figures on the last day of the month, and disseminate them to the intelligence community in a special report on the first day of the following month. This report will contain the latest updated infiltration figures as well as two average figures: an average for the Accepted which includes Confirmed and Probable infiltration and an average for Accepted and Possible infiltration. The monthly figures in this report should be used by all agencies for various intelligence publications and other releases during the month. The MACV J2 monthly averages will be computed on a base beginning with October 1965. This beginning date was decided upon as the most valid since it coincided with a period of substantial increase in infiltration and it provided a sufficient data base on which to base an average figure. The conference noted that there are valid arguments for the use of other data time frames, but concluded that any and all averages be accompanied by specific references to the time frame in order to preclude confusion.
d. The conference considered it important that all agencies using infiltration averages should explain to their consumers that an average infiltration figure based on past historical data cannot be validly used to project trends in infiltration, or to determine whether there has been any change in the pattern of infiltration. It was the considered opinion of the conferees that it generally takes from three to six months before infiltration for any given month can be ascertained with an acceptable degree of accuracy. In some cases in the past it has taken even longer than six months for an enemy unit or infiltration group to be discovered. This problem is being compounded because the enemy has been forced to send in more and more replacements for his main force units. For example, it is often more difficult to discover an infiltration group consisting only of replacements than it is to discover a newly infiltrated battalion or regiment.

e. The conference agreed that the categories into which infiltrators fall - Confirmed, Probable and Possible - adequately portray the level of evaluated information. The Confirmed and Probable categories are based upon the best or hardest information and are to be considered "Accepted" infiltration.

f. The conference also agreed that the Possible category of infiltration is a valid one and that it needs to be strengthened in the eyes of the intelligence consumer. The Possible category does not represent the lowest level of infiltration data. The criteria for placing an infiltration unit or group into a category are minimum criteria. In many instances evidence exceeding the minimum is available to support the categorization. Consequently, the conference recommends that the following note be inserted just below the Possible category in publications, graphics and presentations:

"In addition to the infiltrators falling into the Confirmed, Probable, and Possible categories, other units or groups have been mentioned in agent reports, captured documents, interrogation reports or sightings by friendly forces. Based upon the application of consistent criteria and the professional judgment of analysts, this information has been evaluated as insufficient to warrant placement into one of the three infiltration categories."

4. Statistical Analysis of Trends in Infiltration

a. The key factor in a statistical analysis of trends in infiltration is the changing character of the data base. An analysis of the MACV J2 statistics for CY 66 shows that in general, three to six months must pass before the data begins to stabilize. Prior to that stabilization, the variation of the data is considerable. For example, on 31 January 1967 total infiltration (Confirmed, Probable, Possible) for the month of December 1966 was estimated to be 530 men.
The changing character of the data base indicates that by 30 June 1967 this figure could be as high as 5,000 men. Such a change would have a substantial impact on the pattern of infiltration during CY 66.

b. The three to six month stabilization period is itself subject to change. It was determined primarily on data developed during the first three quarters of CY 66, a period of time in which the enemy was infiltrating a substantial number of tactical units which were usually deployed intact. Their detection and identification was a relatively simple matter. On the other hand, as more replacement and filler groups are dispatched to South Vietnam, information about their size and composition probably will be more difficult to obtain.

c. These two factors, the changing character of the data base and the possible variation of the stabilization period, can make a statistical analysis of infiltration trends a misleading proposition. Such an analysis should only be used in conjunction with other factors such as force structures in North Vietnam, South Vietnam and Laos, NVA training capabilities, the changing nature of the North Vietnam manpower pool, enemy replacement requirements in South Vietnam and Laos etc.

5. Projection of Net Gains

The conference considered the MACV methodology for projecting enemy losses, input and net gains. While the methods were considered statistically sound it was agreed that a community wide system of projections should not be adopted as there are other valid means for projecting statistics. It was agreed that those agencies which are required to furnish projections to force requirements planners should explain in detail the rationale for and the methodology utilized.

6. Correlation of Loss and Gain Data with Order of Battle Strength

a. The conference reviewed the methodology for correlating loss and gain data with order of battle strength holdings and agreed that precise accounting would not be possible due to many unknowns. The following reasons were listed which may explain the difference in apparent strength and order of battle strength:

(1) Some infiltrators no doubt reach South Vietnam without being reported.
(2) The number of NVA soldiers who go into VC units is unknown.
(3) Order of battle strengths may not be exactly accurate.
(4) The percentage of total losses which is NVA is unknown.
(5) The in-country recruiting estimate may be low.
(6) There are infiltration units or groups which do not yet meet the criteria for acceptance into order of battle.
b. There may be other reasons in addition to these.

C. Validity of Order of Battle Data

1. The conference examined the validity of order of battle data and found that the establishment of the validity and the categorization of order of battle on VC/NVA units is limited by the following factors:

   a. Accurate assessment of the enemy's composition and strength is hampered by his use of a confusing mixture of cover and code names and the frequent reorganizational changes that he makes.

   b. Accurate assessment is limited in some areas by the enemy's use of border areas which limits the collection effort against the units involved.

   c. Other limitations are imposed by the enemy's avoidance of contact except when it suits his purpose and/or the capabilities of friendly forces to seek him out.

   d. There is a time lag inherent in the collection of order of battle data due to the clandestine nature of operations of enemy units.

2. If procedures for dropping VC/NVA units from the order of battle are not employed, inaccurate and misleading evaluations of enemy strengths will result. In order to maintain uniform validity, the following criteria governing acceptance of units in the order of battle are adhered to:

   a. Confirmed Unit: A confirmed unit is one whose designation is known, subordination has been established, and the location determined from a minimum of two reports from VC/NVA POWs or returnees (Hoi Chanh) from the unit, or captured documents (any combination thereof).

   b. Probable Unit: A probable unit is one whose designation is known, subordination has been established, and the location determined from one VC/NVA POW or returnee (Hoi Chanh) from the unit, or captured document, when supported by information from other sources, which can be evaluated as probably true.

   c. Possible Unit: A possible unit is accepted as such when repeated reports from different sources indicate that the unit exists, even though no VC/NVA POWs or returnees (Hoi Chanh) from the unit, or captured documents are available to verify the reports.

   d. Reported Unit: A reported unit is one which has been mentioned in agent reports, captured documents, or interrogation reports, but the available information is insufficient to include the unit in accepted order of battle holdings.
3. **Criteria for the retention or dropping of a unit from the order of battle** encompass but are not limited to the following considerations:

   a. Validity of information supporting a unit’s original acceptance in the order of battle.

   b. Activity which can be attributed to the unit.

   c. Results of collection activity targeted specifically against the unit.

   d. Positive evidence that the unit is dissolved or amalgamated with other units.

4. Once a unit is accepted it is subjected to continuing scrutiny and all information related to its continued existence is continuously re-examined. Monthly reports are prepared indicating the period of time which has elapsed since the unit was last sighted or contacted. An intensified collection effort is targeted against units not contacted by friendly forces or sighted by patrols or agents in order to develop information which will reconfirm the existence or provide valid indicators that units have ceased to exist. There is no preferred time limit for dropping a unit. MACV publishes a watch list which reflects those units which have not been noted for 90 days and directs emphasized collection efforts against such units.

5. A total of 61 units (platoon to regimental level) were dropped from MACV order of battle during 1966. Fourteen of these units were battalions or regiments which could not be reconfirmed despite intensified collection efforts. Examples of units dropped in CY 66 are:

   a. In March 1966, the B9 NVA Regiment was dropped from order of battle and the 24th NVA Regiment was accepted as Confirmed. Analysis indicated that earlier documents relating to a B9 regiment may have cited a cover designation for the 24th Regiment.

   b. The headquarters, 3d VC Regiment was dropped from order of battle in April 1966 when it was determined that headquarters personnel had been used as cadre for Hq Southern Sub-Region, MR5.

   c. The F25 VC Bn was dropped in April 1966 when it was determined that its personnel were transferred to the D509 Bn.

   d. The 32d VC Bn was dropped in April 1966 because repeated efforts to obtain information on this unit failed to produce confirmation of its existence.
6. There have been several examples of enemy units which have not been confirmed for an extended period of time (6-9 months) only to have them subsequently identified in a major contact. A good example is the 95B NVA Regiment which was confirmed in March 1966, but was not reconfirmed until September 1966 during operation Paul Revere when it was engaged by U.S. forces.

7. The conference found that the criteria for the acceptance, retention and dropping of units in the MACV order of battle are valid and recommended their continued application.

D. Changes in Unit and Area Designations

1. The conference considered the confusion existing among intelligence consumers as a result of variations and changes in enemy unit designations. The NT3 NVA Division, for example, has been reported as the Sao Vang Intergroup, the 610th Division and the Yellow Star Division. Its subordinate regiments have also been identified under a variety of designations.

2. The major factor underlying the multiplicity of designations is the VC/NVA practice of periodic change of designation and of simultaneous use of different titles (some are covers; others are honorific) for the same unit. Moreover, when an enemy unit is in training, reorganized, reassigned or in transit, it may be given a new designation. One purpose for this practice is to confuse friendly intelligence efforts to detect and identify enemy units.

3. In practice there have been only two major enemy designation changes in recent years. In one instance, three divisions (the 610th, 620th, and 630th NVA) were changed; in another, four Viet Cong regional designations, the former Military Regions (MRs) 7, 8, 9, and Saigon/Cholon/Gia Dinh were changed to MRs 1, 2, 3, and 4.

4. The conference recognized that, although these changes have created misunderstandings among consumers, it is also essential that the intelligence community identify a unit by the designation assigned to it by the enemy. To maintain a current and accurate listing of known enemy units, validated changes of designation should be accepted as they occur. Continuity and clarification for consumers can be achieved through rapid dissemination of complete background information simultaneously with any accepted change in designation.

5. The confusion can be reduced further by standardizing the designations used throughout the intelligence community. For example, various agencies use different designators to refer to the same unit. The conference agreed that a single set of designators should be adopted. To accomplish this it is recommended that:
a. The intelligence community adopt the current true unit designation used by the enemy in preference to any earlier ones.

b. J2 MACV be recognized as the authority to determine and change the accepted designation of units identified from MACV sources and all agencies and commands agree to use the designators established by MACV.

c. All agencies and commands provide thorough explanation of designation changes reported in their intelligence products and briefings.

6. Because of the recognized constraints imposed by the assigned mission of the NSA and Service Cryptologic Agencies, it is recommended that certain of the terminology and designations contained in the MACV Order of Battle Reference Manual - Strength not be made binding on these elements in their reporting. NSA will, however, accept those terms which fall outside these recognized constraints. In addition it will institute procedures to:

a. Assure standardized utilization of terminology throughout the cryptological community.

b. Equate the terms used within the cryptological community with those established by MACV.

E. Enemy Losses

1. The conference discussed all aspects of losses to the enemy force structure in South Vietnam in an attempt to determine what factors could be considered with a degree of accuracy as long-range losses when estimating enemy attrition for a given time frame. The factors discussed as part of the attrition of enemy forces included the following:

a. Killed-in-action (KIA) - body count

b. Wounded-in-Action (WIA), Died of Wounds (DOW) and Permanently Disabled

c. Returnees under the Chieu Hoi Program (Hoi Chanhs)

d. Desertions other than Hoi Chanhs

e. Captured Personnel

f. Exfiltration

g. Other losses
During the conference discussion, it was determined that each of the above factors was subject to certain limitations. Available information on some of the factors is so sparse that quotations of a number for inclusion as a loss would be impossible at the present time. On other factors, the available information is such that any quotation of a number must necessarily be classified as a "best estimate". Information relating to these loss factors is under continual study by MACV and other agencies, and it is expected that existing "best estimates" in some areas will improve in the future. Continued refinement may eventually enable use in loss computations of some of the factors for which there is now no quotable loss number.

2. A discussion of each of the factors considered by the conference follows:

a. Killed-in-Action (body count)

(1) The present figures being provided by MACV on KIAs are based entirely on body counts. MACV systematically reviews all KIA reports in an effort to preclude duplicate counting. Moreover, MACV readjusts the KIA figures as new bodies are discovered. Since many members of the conference considered the KIA figure might be low, the idea of providing some constant factor to the KIA figure was considered. Numbered among these considerations are exaggerated reporting in a highly mobile combat situation, the physical impossibility of tabulating the exact number of casualties, the presence on the battlefield of porters and other non-military personnel, the problem of bodies buried in caves, tunnels or under debris and are thus uncountable. Some bodies are also dragged off by the enemy, and there is a lack of information on individuals killed by aerial (including B-52) strikes and artillery attacks: where no ground follow-up action is possible. On the basis of a MACV study of 70 captured documents which gave unit strength figures and breakdowns of these figures, it was determined that enemy losses for these units number 2.13% per month of the total unit strength. When taking the losses reported by body count and applying these figures to the total accepted order of battle (Confirmed, Probable and Possible, less the political) on a monthly basis, a figure of 2.15% is attained. This close correlation indicates that body count is probably a reasonably accurate method for determining a KIA figure. Therefore, the participating agencies will continue to use only body count in the production of a KIA factor in determining enemy losses.

(2) It was additionally suggested that a kill ratio of NVA to VC would be helpful, but the conference determined that this was not a feasible undertaking at this time since it is impossible in most instances to distinguish between NVA and VC bodies. The conference therefore concluded that the KIA figures based on body count, as provided by MACV, when coupled with the 35% of the KIA figure to accommodate DOW and Permanently Disabled give the truest possible picture of actual enemy killed and disabled as discussed below.
b. Wounded-in-Action (WIA)/Died of Wounds (DOW)/Permanently Disabled

Several statistical rates, varying from 1.2 WIA to KIA to 1.62 WIA to 1 KIA, have been used by the intelligence community for estimating enemy WIA. Also, as a result of this 70-document study, it was determined that the rate of 1.44 to 1 was the most accurate WIA rate which could be supported by available evidence. This MACV study further demonstrated that for every 100 KIAs another 34 could be estimated to be either permanently disabled or DOW. The conference commented, however, that because of the relatively small number of documents used in the study (although they represented the total number of documents available which met the criteria for inclusion in the study), and because of conflicting reports on rather high casualty rates suffered by some units, as well as the historical fact that the ratios have been higher, it was agreed that the rates of 1.5 WIA to 1 KIA and 35% of the KIA figure for DOW and Permanently Disabled would be used. The conference agreed that these figures would continue to be used until such time as amplifying data is available to amend them.

c. Returnees under the Chieu Hoi Program (Hoi Chanhs)

The Hoi Chanhs are classified in three basic categories: Military, Political and Other. The military Hoi Chanh is considered as a hard loss and is used in computing the overall losses. It is considered that almost all political Hoi Chanhs are from below village level and therefore are not and should not be deducted from the political order of battle strengths, which currently reflects the infrastructure at village level and above. When political order of battle strength from the hamlet level up is determined the political Hoi Chanh will be applied as losses.

d. Desertions other than Hoi Chanhs

In an attempt to provide an accurate picture of enemy losses, a past estimate stated that for every defection under the Chieu Hoi Program classified as a military Hoi Chanh another enemy soldier deserted. This one for one ratio has been applied in the past to establish the total number of enemy deserters which should be included as long-range losses. The accuracy of this ratio, (1:1) in view of available information, is questionable. The conference agreed that only those deserters counted as military Hoi Chanhs should be used in calculations reflecting total enemy losses. It may be possible to establish a more accurate ratio with receipt of additional information and refinement of that already on hand. The question of including other than military Hoi Chanh in enemy losses requires further study before results can be included in estimating total attrition over a specific time frame.
Captured Personnel

During 1966, available statistics reflect that approximately 10,000 VC/NVA "captives" were taken in South Vietnam. These statistics were developed from Daily Intelligence Summaries and reports from the RVNAF JGS. In the past, the total number of "captives" has been included as a long-range loss and used in determining an estimate of total enemy losses for a specific time frame by all agencies in the intelligence community. In October 1966, MACV Directive 190-3 was published establishing procedures for classifying those people detained by friendly forces. In view of this directive, a reexamination of the "captives" taken during 1966 indicates that a large percentage of those reported were actually innocent civilians. In view of the categorization outlined under MACV Directive 190-3, the conference agreed that only those "captives" classified as valid Prisoners of War and Military/Political Hoi Chanhs could be counted as long-range losses in estimating enemy force attrition. Continued use of the unclassified "captive" totals could have an adverse ramification in the event of a future POW exchange by giving the enemy a basis for demanding repatriation of a larger number of his personnel than are actually interned in RVN. The conference recommended that action be taken to insure the adoption of the term "detainees" by all agencies when referring to unscreened personnel detained by friendly forces in RVN. The term detainee should be adopted in all operational reports such as the Daily SITREP and TELECONS. All existing publications such as the DIA Southeast Asia Fact Book, in which captured tabulations are shown, should be properly caveated to reflect that the totals should be treated with considerable reserve, do not reflect enemy prisoners of war or long-range losses, and that those totals shown should not be used in making comparisons with future data reflecting prisoners of war or in seeking trends. MACV will be the source of all prisoner of war statistics in a recurring monthly report. Only the POW population in GVN POW camps will be considered as long-range losses in estimating total enemy losses for a given time frame.

Exfiltration

The conference agreed that although there have been reports of wounded or sick enemy personnel departing South Vietnam permanently, available evidence does not reflect that these departures indicate any appreciable loss to the enemy force structure. Evidence of exfiltration is being sought on a priority basis per a MACV Directive. Those wounded or exfiltrated are accounted for in the existing formula for estimating long-range losses due to Died of Wounds and Permanently Disabled. Exfiltration will not be considered in estimating total long-range losses until such time as there is hard evidence of exfiltration of enemy personnel.
g. Other Losses

Undoubtedly a number of enemy personnel become long-term losses due to illness and disease; however, available information does not enable an estimated total lost in this fashion.

3. Recommendations

It is recommended that of all the factors relating to total enemy losses only Killed in Action (body count), Died of Wounds and Permanently Disabled, Military Hoi Chanhs (plus Political Hoi Chanhs when the political order of battle is expanded to include hamlet cadre); and the population of valid POWs in POW camps during the chosen time frame be used by all agencies of the community in establishing an estimate of long-range enemy losses for a given time frame.

F. Base Area Designation

1. The MACV J2 methodology for determining location of base areas is contained in the Pattern Analysis Technique SOP published by MACV J2, dated 17 October 1966.

2. The acceptance criteria for base areas are contained in MACV Study ST 67-104, Base and Operational Update, dated 16 November 1966. There is only one category: Accepted. Once MACV has accepted a base, it is held in this category until such time as it no longer meets the acceptance criteria. (See Annex B for definitions and criteria)

3. MACV J2 publishes a monthly update concerning all base areas, as of the last day of each month, based on the reevaluation of all available data existing at that time. Updates are disseminated in 1:250,000 scale graphic format supported by explanatory text to higher and lower echelons. Intelligence reporting primarily concerns the location and possible content of accepted base areas, or, when properly validated by lack of enemy activity for three months, the dropping of a base area from the accepted list.

4. Other reporting concerning friendly operations against base areas is essentially an operational concern and should not be reflected in intelligence reporting. MACV J3 briefs the Measurement of Progress Report to COMUSMACV monthly and to CINCPAC quarterly. Assessments in this report concerning penetration of areas and the percentage of temporary neutralization of bases targeted by the 1967 Campaign Plan are qualitative judgments of field commanders.

5. As stated above, judgments to drop a base from the accepted category follows at least three months of no observed enemy activity in the base concerned. Because of the cited time lag, a base area can be considered neutralized by the field commander and still be reflected in the J2 holdings.
6. After due consideration the conference concluded that:

a. There are no apparent weaknesses evident in the procedures and methodology used by MACV J2 in assessing and reporting on base areas.

b. The assessment of friendly operations and their effectiveness against base areas is and should remain a J3 function and should not be included in intelligence reporting.

7. The conference agreed that the intelligence community at all echelons should use the data and methodologies agreed on VC/NVA Base Areas as reported by MACV J2 in the Base and Operational Areas Update published monthly.

8. The conference recommends:

a. That MACV J3 consider substituting the words "is not able to" in lieu of the words "no longer can" in the definition of a neutralized base area and defining "penetration".

b. That MACV J3 consider inserting the word "temporary" in front of neutralization.

G. Retention of Border Area Units in Order of Battle

1. It was considered that clearly stated criteria are required to explain to consumers why certain NVA units, which enter South Vietnam and subsequently partially or wholly withdraw across the DMZ, into Laos or Cambodia are retained in order of battle. The 324B NVA Division, for example, began its entry into South Vietnam across the DMZ in May 1966. This division, following contact with US forces, redeployed most of its major elements back into the DMZ or north of it. The question considered was, "How should this unit be carried in order of battle?" Some elements of the 324B located within or north of the DMZ are still estimated to be committed against friendly forces in South Vietnam. As this force remains committed against friendly forces, it is believed illogical to remove the 324B from order of battle holdings because of the withdrawal of major units of it into or north of the DMZ. However, the determination of precisely how many troops of the 324B are south, within or north of the DMZ at any given time is above and beyond current intelligence collection capabilities as long as the division remains in the immediate DMZ area. Thus, the whole division should continue to be carried in order of battle.

2. The conferrees examined current rationale and using this rationale as a basis, developed the following criteria which apply to the retention of these units in order of battle:

DECLASSIFIED
a. The unit has entered South Vietnam.

b. The unit is still located in the border area or has elements remaining in South Vietnam.

c. The unit constitutes a direct threat to friendly forces in South Vietnam.

d. Available evidence indicates that the unit continues to be committed against friendly forces or that its mission continues to be operations against friendly forces in South Vietnam.

A unit must meet all of the above criteria or it will be dropped from the order of battle.

3. The conferees agreed that clarification for consumers on this issue can be aided by inclusion of the above criteria and a sketch map in MACV's Monthly Order of Battle Summary. "Units in Border Areas" should also be appropriately identified in order of battle presentations, including messages, estimates and graphics.

4. The question of how units such as the 324B operating in border areas should be dealt with in computing infiltration statistics was also examined by the conference. The conference agreed that the present procedure for handling such units in infiltration statistics was sound. As such units initially enter South Vietnam they are included in infiltration statistics. They are not again counted in infiltration statistics when they leave and then re-enter South Vietnam. However, replacements who joined a unit after it initially entered South Vietnam, and who meet infiltration acceptance criteria, will be recorded by MACV as separate infiltration groups or units.

5. There are other examples of accounting for border area units.

a. Elements of the 1st and 10th NVA Divisions and the 24th NVA Regiment operate just inside South Vietnam provinces bordering on Cambodia and Laos. Upon contact with US forces, these enemy units sometimes withdraw into Cambodia and Laos to re-equip, replace losses, and treat wounded. There is plentiful documentary evidence that these units return to South Vietnam territory to conduct operations. As these enemy units have returned to South Vietnam and remain committed against friendly forces when deployed into the contiguous border areas of Cambodia and Laos, it is illogical to remove elements of these enemy forces from order of battle holdings because of this temporary withdrawal across the border.

b. Only two battalions of the 31st Regiment, 341st NVA Division in South Vietnam are accepted as operating in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces.
These are the only elements of the 341st which can be supported as having entered South Vietnam as complete units. Since the 341st Division traditionally has had a coastal defense mission, this division is considered as a threat to rather than committed against US forces in South Vietnam. Until documentary evidence can be obtained which supports the commitment of other 341st NVA Division elements south of the DMZ, MACV order of battle holding will reflect only the two battalions of the 31st Regiment deployed in South Vietnam.

H. Reporting Enemy Attacks

1. The conferees noted that statistics on enemy attacks maintained by various intelligence agencies and commands are widely divergent. This situation creates doubts among consumers concerning the validity of the data. Agreement was reached that the MACV Monthly PERINTREP should be used throughout the intelligence community as the official source of statistics on this subject.

2. The MACV PERINTREP reflects a refinement of statistics derived from a systematic processing of total information available to J2 MACV. In the future, the MACV PERINTREP will reflect a breakout of enemy "battalion size and larger" and "company and smaller" attacks. Updatings will be disseminated electrically in the J2 MACV Weekly Report of Enemy Strength cable. Operational reports from Vietnam also reflect information on enemy attacks but the data is unrefined and is not necessarily updated. Use of this data outside Saigon in compilations of statistical data results in incomplete and often erroneous reflections of the scale of enemy activity. The conference recommends that agencies and commands obtaining such operational reports not use them in statistical compilations.

3. The conference found that the present definitions and methodology on enemy attacks are sound. Modifications in reporting format and provisions for updating were noted and agreed upon to meet the overall needs of consumers in the intelligence community.

I. Reporting Procedures

1. The conference agreed that it was necessary to tabulate the current vehicles being used to report data concerning enemy strength, dispositions, gains, losses, and base areas. This tabulation and a cross reference of current reporting vehicles are attached at Annexes C and D. In addition, the conference considered the implications of the differences between short range electrically transmitted statistical type reports, which contain raw data, and the adjusted and evaluated reports which are published in hard copy and distributed by slower means.
2. It was brought out in discussion that recipients of the full range of MACV reporting regularly find it necessary to use the short range daily and weekly reports in order to provide current totals, updated summaries, and situation reports. These updates are generally prepared by adding preliminary current data to the monthly summaries. It was agreed that acceleration of the delivery of the key monthly reports, e.g., PERINTREP, Order of Battle Summary, Base Area Update, to the ultimate consumer would contribute significantly toward alleviating the problems of varying statistical presentations which arise from these adjustments. A substantial time lag is nevertheless inevitable, since the reports concerned are published and distributed in hard copy and do not lend themselves to distribution by other means. Modifications were recommended to the current overall reporting system and provision was made for including additional definitions and methodologies in certain reports. It was agreed to add two new reports: one to consolidate the reporting of infiltration data; the other to provide a summary guide of definitions and methodology. (See Annexes B and C)

3. Another problem area arises from the fact that the minimum time frame for updating statistics on certain subjects may be considerably greater than that required for others. Generally, such subjects as enemy initiated incidents, order of battle unit identification and classification, detainees and KIA figures can be validated in a comparatively short time frame. Other topics, such as unit strengths, POW's and infiltration figures require retroactive adjustments over several months before an acceptable degree of validity is attained. Finally, other subjects such as in-country recruitment and irregular strength are difficult to assess because of the present limitations on the availability of raw data. There is no ready solution for this problem, but users of such data should point out the pertinent difficulty when making use of data in their publications or briefings.

4. The conference reviewed and refined the terminology and considered that the terms endorsed are comprehensive enough to meet the requirement for consistent reporting by all agencies. Each agency or command should use these terms and the agreed definitions when disseminating or presenting statistical data.

5. The conference agreed that the glossary of the terminology at Annex B, together with an index to the reporting areas in which they are used, be issued with an internal directive by each participating intelligence agency or command to ensure consistency in usage. Because of the recognized constraints imposed by the assigned mission of the NSA and Service Cryptologic Agencies (SCA), it is recommended that certain of the terminology and designations contained in the MACV Order of Battle Reference Manual - Strength not be made binding on these elements in their reporting. NSA will, however, accept those terms which fall outside these recognized constraints. In addition, it will institute procedures to:
a. Assure standardized utilization of terminology throughout the
cryptological community.

b. Equate the terms used within the cryptological community with those
established by MACV.

6. The conference agreed that proposed changes in the criteria, definitions,
and methodology of the publications addressed in the meeting for the reporting
of statistical data should be circulated in advance among the Department of
Defense agencies and commands for notification and comment. Civilian agencies
should be notified of the changes through the DOD.

7. The participants considered that the establishment of a formal system
whereby the intelligence activities of the civilian agencies could offer comments
and suggestions to the DOD on reporting procedures was beyond their capability.
The conference considered such a system desirable, however, and recommended
the initiation of action at the national level to establish the necessary procedures.
This recommendation is not intended to preclude the initiation of informal
procedures where channels are available.

8. MACV is the primary source for statistical computations on enemy order
of battle, infiltration and base areas in South Vietnam. Eight MACV periodic
reports are the primary vehicles for the reporting of data on VC/NVA order of
battle, gains, losses, prisoner of war statistics and infiltration. They are:
(1) the MACV Periodic Intelligence Report (PERINTREP) which provides a
summary of the enemy situation, reports changes and identifies trends detected
during the reporting period; (2) the MACV Monthly Order of Battle Summary which
presents accepted enemy order of battle, strength recapitulations, newly reported
units, cover names and designations, location of VC/NVA units in South Vietnam,
and the location of NVA units in the border areas of Laos, Cambodia and North
Vietnam, and a historical recapitulation of infiltration units; (3) the MACV
Order of Battle Updating Change reports changes to the Monthly Order of
Battle Summary; (4) the Weekly Report of Enemy Strength recapitulates strength
data and all changes accepted during the week; (5) the MACV Monthly Update
of the MACV J2 Base Area Study, dated 16 November 1966, which summarizes
additions, deletions, locations, and update of current holdings on base areas;
(6) the MACV JI Monthly POW Report which gives a narrative status report
plus tabulations of POWs admitted to ARVN camps by GTZ; (7) the MACV
Order of Battle Reference Manual - Strength, which summarizes the procedures
and methodologies used by MACV to estimate enemy strength; and (8) the MACV
Monthly Infiltration Report.
9. To alleviate confusion in the utilization of data, the conference agreed that the statistical data contained in these reports should be utilized by all agencies which prepare reports, estimates, briefings, etc. In these reporting vehicles the originator should make eminently clear the time frame of the information being reported and the data base.
ANNEX A

IN-COUNTRY RECRUITING DATA *

1. Applying the available population, male population and physically fit male population factors to the total population of the three geographical areas under consideration, yields the manpower pool available to the VC. Table 1 shows the results.

Table 1
Manpower Pool

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Manpower Pool</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I &amp; II CTZ</td>
<td>150,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III CTZ</td>
<td>52,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV CTZ</td>
<td>137,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>339,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Table 2 shows the number of recruits which captured documents indicate were taken from various provinces within the three areas listed in Table 1. It also shows the manpower pool available to the VC within each of these provinces.

Table 2
Recruiting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>VC Province</th>
<th>Recruits</th>
<th>Manpower Pool</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II CTZ</td>
<td>Phu Yen</td>
<td>2,550</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Binh Dinh</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>30,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>9,550</td>
<td>38,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III CTZ</td>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>7,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>7,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV CTZ</td>
<td>Can Tho/Rach Gia</td>
<td>5,850</td>
<td>30,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kien Phong</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td>4,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>7,700</td>
<td>34,250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*DECLASSIFIED*
3. The total number of recruits in SVN can now be estimated. For example, the two provinces in II CTZ indicate that 9,550 recruits were obtained from an available pool of 38,750 during CY 66. This is equivalent to a recruiting rate of 25% of the available males. Throughout the remainder of I and II CTZ there is a population of 111,550 eligible males. Applying this same percentage to this figure yields an additional 27,830 recruits. Thus, it is estimated that 37,380 men were recruited in I and II CTZ during CY 66. Table 3 shows the calculations for all three geographical areas.

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Recruiting Rate</th>
<th>Remaining Pool</th>
<th>Estimated Recruits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I &amp; II CTZ</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>111,550</td>
<td>27,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III CTZ</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>44,750</td>
<td>12,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV CTZ</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>102,950</td>
<td>23,680</td>
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</table>

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>From Table 2</th>
<th>From Table 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I &amp; II CTZ</td>
<td>9,550</td>
<td>27,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III CTZ</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>12,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV CTZ</td>
<td>7,700</td>
<td>23,680</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 19,250 Total: 63,590

19,250

Total: 82,840 ÷ 12 = 6,903

Monthly average input rounded to 7,000

A-2
ANNEX B

GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

I. Order of Battle

A. Categories of Units

**Maneuver Units**: Infantry, armor, security, sapper, and reconnaissance elements from platoon level upward, regardless of subordination.

**Combat Support Units**: Fire support, anti-aircraft and technical service units organized at battalion level and above and not classified under administrative services. Separate fire support companies are classed as combat support.

**Administrative Service Units**: Military personnel in identified COSVN, military region, military sub-region, province, and district staffs, and rear service technical units of all types directly subordinate to these headquarters.

B. Classification of Units

**Viet Cong (VC) Main Force (MF)**. Those military units which are directly subordinate to Central Office South Vietnam (COSVN), a Viet Cong Military Region, or sub-region.

**Viet Cong (VC) Local Force (LF)**. Those military units which are directly subordinate to a provincial or district party committee and normally operate only within a specified VC province or district.

**North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Units**. A unit formed, trained, and designated by North Vietnam as an NVA unit, and composed completely or primarily of North Vietnamese. At times, either VC or NVA units and individual replacements appear in units that are predominately NVA or VC at the command level.

**Irregulars**. These are organized forces composed of guerrilla, self-defense, and secret self-defense elements subordinate to village and hamlet level VC organizations. These forces perform a wide variety of missions in support of VC activities and, in fact, provide a training and mobilization base for the VC maneuver and combat support forces.
Guerrillas. Guerrillas are full-time forces organized into squads and platoons which do not always stay in their home village or hamlets. Typical missions for guerrillas are collection of taxes, propaganda, protection of village party committees, and terrorist and sabotage activities.

Self-Defense Force. A VC para-military structure responsible for the defense of hamlet and village areas controlled by the VC. These forces do not leave their home area, and they perform their duties on a part-time basis. Duties consist of conducting propaganda, constructing fortifications, and defending home areas.

Secret Self-Defense Force. A clandestine VC organization which performs the same general function in GVN controlled villages and hamlets as do the self-defense force in VC controlled areas. Their operations involve intelligence collection as well as sabotage and propaganda activities.

C. Political Definitions

Viet Cong Infrastructure. The Viet Cong infrastructure is defined as the political and administrative organization through which the Viet Cong control or seek to control the South Vietnamese people. It embodies the party (Peoples Revolutionary Party) control structure, which includes a command and administrative apparatus (Central Office South Vietnam) at the national level, and the leadership and administration of a parallel front organization (National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam), both of which extend from the national through the hamlet level.

Political Order of Battle. Political order of battle is defined as the identification, strength, and disposition of the command and administrative organization of the Viet Cong infrastructure.

D. Strengths

Combat Strength. The sum of maneuver unit and combat support unit strengths.

Administrative Service Strength. The sum of units strengths listed under this designation.
Irregular Strength. The sum of strengths of the guerrilla, self-defense and secret self-defense forces.

Political Order of Battle Strength. The strength of the infrastructure. It does not include military personnel within party or front organizations or the members of the population base under Viet Cong control who are not assigned to a specific position within the infrastructure.

Total Strength. The sum of Combat, Administrative Service, Irregular, and Political Order of Battle strengths shown above.

Current Strength. A current estimate of the strength of an enemy unit based upon the best information available. This estimate may be based upon limited information.

Retroactive Strength. A retroactive estimate of enemy unit strength based upon an accumulation of firm documentary evidence. Retroactive strength is computed from the date a unit was activated or entered SVN for the first time.

E. Major Unit/Headquarters Definitions

Light Infantry Divisions (LID) are VC and NVA divisional formations tailored specifically for operations in South Vietnam. These divisions are highly foot-mobile and are flexible in force structure, organization and strength. Normally these light infantry divisions are composed of two to four infantry regiments and a varying number of technical and fire support elements. They lack wheeled transport and the type artillery normally associated with NVA conventional divisions.

Front Headquarters. A military organization designed to perform tactical and administrative functions and to control widely divergent units in a specific area. A front is intentionally unstable, its military force composition changes as operational requirements dictate, and no permanency is attached to its formation (although it may provide the framework for a permanent military unit). A Viet Cong Front or North Vietnamese Army Front in South Vietnam, normally consists of two or more regimental units; however, it can consist of a few small units; a number of regiments exceeding the accepted composition of a division; or several divisions.
F. Criteria for Order of Battle Acceptance

Confirmed Unit. A confirmed unit is one whose designation is known, subordination has been established, and the location determined from a minimum of two reports from VC/NVA POWs or returnees (Hoi Chanh) from the unit, or captured documents (any combination).

Probable Unit. A probable unit is one whose designation is known, subordination has been established, and the location determined from one VC/NVA POW or returnee (Hoi Chanh) from the unit, or captured document, when supported by information from other sources, which can be evaluated as probably true.

Possible Unit. A possible unit is accepted as such where repeated reports from different sources indicate that the unit exists, even though no VC/NVA POWs or returnees (Hoi Chanh) from the unit, or captured documents are available to verify the reports.

Reported Unit. A reported unit is one which has been mentioned in agent reports, captured documents, or interrogation reports, but the available information is insufficient to include the unit in accepted order of battle holdings.

G. Unit Designations

Designation. The literal or digital title conferred on a military unit to distinguish it from others of its category, classification, or echelon.

Cover Designator. A designation used by a unit to conceal its true identity.

Honorific Title. A unit designation, usually literal, used for commemorative or morale purposes by the Viet Cong or NVA.

H. Types of Contact

Battalion Contact. A ground action in which two or more enemy companies are contacted.
Multi-Battalion Contact. A ground action in which two or more enemy battalions are contacted.

Friendly Initiated Contact. A contact initiated by friendly forces against an enemy force.

Enemy Reaction to Friendly Operations. A contact initiated by the enemy in response to friendly operations.

Enemy Initiated Contact. A contact initiated by the enemy against friendly forces.

I. Border Area

An area either in or north of the DMZ or contiguous to SVN in Laos or Cambodia from which the enemy may operate, or to which they may withdraw for purposes of refuge or reconsolidation.

II. VC/NVA Gains and Losses

A. Losses

Killed in Action (KIA). Personnel killed in action as determined by body count.

Wounded in Action (WIA). Personnel wounded in action as determined by the ratio of 1.5 WIA for each 1 KIA.

Died of Wounds (DOW). A figure estimated as 35% of those KIA, and including those personnel who are permanently disabled.

Permanently Disabled. Personnel who cannot return to their units because of severe disability. Estimated as a portion of the DOW figure.

Chieu Hoi. The Government of Vietnam open arms program developed to induce the VC/NVA military, political and civilian populace in South Vietnam to return to, or come over to Government of Vietnam control.
Detainees. Personnel who have been detained but whose final status has not yet been determined. The following categories designate final status of detainees.

Prisoner of War (POW). Persons who qualify under Article 4 of the Geneva Convention. In addition, the following personnel are extended the protection of the Geneva Convention in Vietnam.

Persons who are captured while actually engaging in combat or a belligerent act other than an act of terrorism, sabotage or spying against the Republic of Vietnam, the U.S. or other Free World Military Armed Forces.

Any captive member of the North Vietnamese Armed Forces or of the Viet Cong, whether captured in combat or not, except a terrorist, saboteur, or spy.

Civil Defendant. Personnel who are suspected of being spies, saboteurs, terrorists, or criminals and who do not qualify as prisoners of war under Article 4 of the Geneva Convention or paragraphs above.

Returnees (Hoi Chanh). Personnel who voluntarily return to Government of Vietnam control under the Chieu Hoi Program after having actively supported the Viet Cong in some form of political or military activities.

Military Hoi Chanh. The military returnee under the Chieu Hoi program.

Political Hoi Chanh. The political returnee under the Chieu Hoi program.

Innocent Civilian. Any personnel which do not qualify as detainees under the provisions above.

Deserter. Any individual absent from his unit with no apparent intention of returning.
B. Gains

**Accepted Infiltration.** Those NVA personnel, groups, and units which have entered South Vietnam and are carried either in the confirmed or probable categories.

**Confirmed.** A confirmed infiltration unit/group is one which is accepted in South Vietnam on the basis of information provided by a minimum of two POWs or returnees (Hoi Chanh) from the unit/group, or two captured documents from the unit, or a combination of personnel and documents.

**Probable.** Probable infiltration unit/group is one which is accepted in South Vietnam on the basis of information provided by one POW or returnee (Hoi Chanh) from the unit/group, or a captured document, supported by information from other sources which can be evaluated as probably true.

**Possible Infiltration.** A possible infiltration unit/group is one which may be in South Vietnam on the basis of information which can be evaluated as possibly true even though no POW, returnee (Hoi Chanh), or document is available to verify the reports.

**Note:** In addition to the infiltrators which fall into the above infiltration categories, other units or groups have been mentioned in agent reports, captured documents, interrogation reports and sightings by friendly forces, but the information is insufficient to warrant inclusion of these units or groups in any of the above categories.

**Month of Infiltration.** The month established as the date an infiltration unit/group crosses the international border into South Vietnam for the first time.

C. Base Areas

**Base Area.** A section of terrain which contains installations, defensive fortifications or other physical structures used for the following purposes: for basic or advanced training of personnel and units; as a permanent or temporary location for political, military or logistical headquarters; for storage and distribution of medicine, ordnance, food, POL and other war materiel; as a site used by combat units to rest, regroup, retrain, evade friendly operations and/or initiate preparatory phases of offensive operations.
Neutralized VC/NVA Base Area. One which the enemy no longer can use for its intended purpose. Neutralization can be accomplished by extensive destruction of facilities found within the area, or by the presence in or around the area of friendly forces sufficient to deny the enemy free and unrestricted access to the area for use as a safe haven. Neutralization is not necessarily permanent, and must be re-evaluated each month.
# ANNEX C
## INDEX OF CURRENT PERIODIC REPORTING ON ENEMY STRENGTH, DISPOSITIONS, GAINS, LOSSES, AND BASE AREAS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REPORT TITLE</th>
<th>SHORT TITLE</th>
<th>ISSUED BY</th>
<th>CHARACTER</th>
<th>MODE OF DISEM</th>
<th>AS OF DATES</th>
<th>DISTRIBUTION</th>
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<td>b. Higher &amp; Lateral Cmds X</td>
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<td>c. Cmds &amp; Tactical Units X</td>
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<td>d. Other X</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. MACV Weekly Summary (Annex B)</td>
<td>OREP #5</td>
<td>MACV COC</td>
<td>Weekly summary of VC losses, (KIA, Ho Chanh, weapons)</td>
<td>Electrical</td>
<td>As of 2400 hrs each Saturday</td>
<td>a. Natl Agcys X</td>
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<td>Annex B</td>
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<td>b. Higher &amp; Lateral Cmds X</td>
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<td>d. Other X</td>
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<td>REPORT TITLE</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. MACV - J2 Periodic Intelligence Report</td>
<td>PERINTREP</td>
<td>MACV J2</td>
<td>Monthly summary reports OB and strength changes and identifies detected trends during report period</td>
<td>hard copy</td>
<td>Last day of each month</td>
<td>a. Natl Agcys X</td>
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<td>b. Higher &amp; Lateral Cmds X</td>
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<td>c._cmds &amp; Tactical Units X</td>
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<td>d. Other X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. MACV Monthly Order of Battle (English &amp; Vietnamese editions) Note: Prefatory comment states: &quot;-Report produced with maximum emphasis on timeliness and accuracy of content.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>MACV CICV ** J2</td>
<td>Statistical tabulation of data on strength (by Unit and Category of Units by Unit type) and on confirmed probable, and possible Unit strengths. Also covers unit disposition.</td>
<td>hard copy</td>
<td>Last day of each month</td>
<td>a. Natl Agcys X</td>
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<td>b. Higher &amp; Lateral Cmds X</td>
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<td>c._cmds &amp; Tactical Units X</td>
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<td>d. Other X</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. MACV Weekly Strength Reports of Enemy Units</td>
<td></td>
<td>MACV J2</td>
<td>Reports current updates of strength, changes in rating of combat effectiveness and in infiltrat data. (Partial weekly update of monthly OB summary)</td>
<td>electrical</td>
<td>As of 2400 hrs each Wednesday</td>
<td>a. Natl Agcys X</td>
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<td>b. Higher &amp; Lateral Cmds X</td>
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<td>c._cmds &amp; Tactical Units X</td>
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<td>d. Other X</td>
</tr>
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<td>REPORT TITLE</td>
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<td>MODE OF DISSEMINATION</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. MACV OB Updating Change Report</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>MACV J2</td>
<td>Reports changes in unit disposition, location of contacts, acceptance of units, Recapitulation of unit strength by CTZ. (Partial update of monthly OB summary)</td>
<td>electrical</td>
<td>As required</td>
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<td></td>
<td>d. Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. MACV Daily Intelligence Summary.</td>
<td>INTSUM</td>
<td>MACV J2</td>
<td>Daily intelligence highlights - may at times contain data on strength, losses and gains of units or groups of units</td>
<td>electrical</td>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>a. Natl Agcys</td>
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<td>b. Higher &amp; Lateral Cmds</td>
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<td>c. Cmds &amp; Tactical Units</td>
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<td>d. Other</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. MACV Weekly Estimate Update</td>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>MACV J2</td>
<td>Short term estimates - may contain strength data to support estimates</td>
<td>electrical</td>
<td>As of 1200 hrs Saturday</td>
<td>a. Natl Agcys</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. MACV Weekly Watch Report</td>
<td>Watch Report</td>
<td>MACV J2</td>
<td>Indications of enemy threats - may contain strength data to support indication</td>
<td>electrical</td>
<td>As of 1200 hrs each Tuesday</td>
<td>a. Natl Agcys</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
|               |             |          |           |                |             | b. Higher & Lateral Cmds | x  
|               |             |          |           |                |             | c. Cmds & Tactical Units | x  
|               |             |          |           |                |             | d. Other | x  |
| 10. MACV Measurement of Progress Report*** (Monthly) | MOP | MACV J3 | Intelligence input - selected data on VC personnel & weapons losses; VC initiated incidents; Hoi Chanh input, by CTZ, CB data on combat, support, and irregulars and political personnel, by CTZ. | hard copy | - | a. Natl Agcys | x  
|               |             |          |           |                |             | b. Higher & Lateral Cmds | x  
|               |             |          |           |                |             | c. Cmds & Tactical Units | x  
|               |             |          |           |                |             | d. Other | x  |
| 11. MACV Monthly Evaluations *** | MONEVAL | MACV J3 | Same as ten above. | hard copy | - | a. Natl Agcys | x  
|               |             |          |           |                |             | b. Higher & Lateral Cmds | x  
|               |             |          |           |                |             | c. Cmds & Tactical Units | x  
|               |             |          |           |                |             | d. Other | x  |

*** Command reports which incorporate only those elements of the MACV J2 input relevant to the criteria of progress being employed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REPORT TITLE</th>
<th>SHORT TITLE</th>
<th>ISSUED BY</th>
<th>CHARACTER</th>
<th>MODE OF DISSEM</th>
<th>AS OF DATES</th>
<th>DISTRIBUTION</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MACV Monthly Update of Base Area Study</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>MACV J2 CICV</td>
<td>Summary of additions and deletions, locations, and update of current holdings of base areas.</td>
<td>hard copy</td>
<td>Last day of each month</td>
<td>a. Natl Agcys ( X ) b. Higher &amp; Lateral Cmds ( X ) c. Cmds &amp; Tactical Units ( X ) d. Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>