DRAFT STUDY

Estimate of Viet Cong Irregular Forces Strength in SVN

Prepared by
Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam

24 March 1967
Strength Of VC Irregular Forces

This study presents the official MACV estimate of the strength of VC Irregular Forces in SVN. The figures shown are the results of an intensified and coordinated intelligence collection program directed at VC Irregulars. This program was undertaken in the belief that an accurate estimate of the strength of VC Irregular Forces will provide a measure of the VC's ability to increase their regular force strength and to offset their regular force losses. It should also provide a better understanding of the problems facing both the GVN and Free World Forces in pacification and revolutionary development.

The primary means of implementing this collection program has been through Intelligence Collection Program RITZ. Under RITZ the focal point of collection is at the GVN province level. The Sector Intelligence Advisor and assigned sub-sector advisors, in coordination with all U.S. and RVN Intelligence Agencies within the province, are the key collectors. From the provinces the RITZ reports estimating strength are sent to the Corps Advisory Groups which direct, coordinate and monitor the collection activities of the Sector Advisors. From Corps, the collected reports are forwarded to the Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam where they are analyzed and compared with other estimates and captured documents available in Saigon.

Thus, the RITZ estimates from the various provinces are based on the most current information available to the U.S. Sector Advisors and represent what they believe to be the strength of Irregular Forces within their provinces. While these reports are the primary basis of the official MACV estimate, they have not been accepted automatically in all cases.
For example, in some provinces the RITZ estimates are substantially out of line with captured VC documents, other reliable estimates or the degree of VC control within that province. In these cases other figures, which appear to be more accurate, are used. In all instances throughout the study it is made quite clear why the figures used were selected.

The figures presented are broken out by type of Irregular force. For this purpose the following definitions have been decided upon and accepted throughout the intelligence community:

(1) **Irregulars** - These are organized forces composed of guerrilla, self-defense and secret-self-defense elements subordinate to village and hamlet level VC organizations. These forces perform a wide variety of missions in support of VC activities and, in fact, provide a training and mobilization base for the VC maneuver and combat support forces.

(2) **Guerrillas** - Guerrillas are full-time forces organized into squads and platoons which do not always stay in their home village or hamlet. Typical missions for the guerrillas are collection of taxes, propaganda, protection of village party committees, and terrorist and sabotage activities.

(3) **Self-Defense Force** - A VC para-military structure responsible for the defense of hamlet and village areas controlled by the VC. These forces do not leave their home area, and they perform their duties on a part-time basis. Duties consist of conducting propaganda, constructing fortifications and defending home areas.

(4) **Secret Self-Defense Force** - A clandestine VC organization which performs the same general functions in GVN controlled villages and hamlets, as do the self-defense forces in VC controlled areas. Their operations involve intelligence collection as well as sabotage and propaganda activities.
This study is organized by Corps with the respective strengths of the various Irregular forces presented by province. The first section consists of a chart showing total countrywide strength of VC Irregular forces by Corps. Below the chart is an analysis of this total estimate. There are four more sections representing each of the four Corps. Each of these follows the same format with a chart showing total Corps strength by province of the Corps. The conclusion for each province states why the particular figures used for the official MACV estimate were selected.

The new MACV estimate of the strength of Irregular forces is higher than the figures presently carried in the Order of Battle Summary. This is not an indication that the strength of Irregular forces has increased, but only that Intelligence knowledge of Irregulars has been greatly expanded and refined. This new estimate will be applied retroactively to December 1964. As it applies to 1964 and early 1965, this estimate is more conservative because many irregulars have been upgraded to local force and main force units since that time as the war has increased to more large-scale unit encounters.

**Strength of VC Irregular Forces in SVN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I Corps</td>
<td>74,771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Corps</td>
<td>55,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Corps</td>
<td>77,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV Corps</td>
<td>56,223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>177,754</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fortunately there are several extremely significant COSVN level
documents presenting figures which can be compared to this total. It is
quite clear that for 1966 the VC envisaged a "guerrilla force" of 250,000
to 300,000. This same figure was mentioned in the following three separate
VC captured documents:

a. Minutes of a COSVN Military Party Committee meeting held in
May 1965 to review the military situation and map out future courses of
action for the remainder of the year (USMACV CDEC Doc Log No 01-1593-66, 2 Feb
66). This document makes the statement that, "the guerrilla force must be
brought up to 250,000 men or 300,000".

b. A COSVN Current Affairs Committee Resolution concerning the
situation in the rural areas (USMACV CDEC Doc Log No 01-2552-67, 17 Jan 67).
According to this document, "guerrillas dropped to 180,000; the requirement
of this year (1967) is 300,000. The decrease of quantity also involved a
decrease in quality."

c. A notebook belonging to an unidentified COSVN level cadre
containing a record of a speech made by Anh Sau (probably an AKA for Nguyen
Chi Thanh, Chief of the Liberation Army and possibly No 1 man in COSVN)
(USMACV CDEC Doc Log No. 02-1846-67, 23 Feb 67). This speech contained the
following significant passage: "As for the military forces, we must organize
around 300,000 guerrillas (250,000 would be good) and 300,000 militia. Now,
we have 180,000 guerrillas and 150,000 militia. They must be increased,
both in quality and quantity. The concentrated forces from district and
higher echelons should have the same strength as guerrilla and militia.
A total of 100,000 men in the main forces must be maintained at all times."
The VC strength goals are quite clear. It is equally clear that they have not been able to attain these goals. Both documents (2) and (3) mention a "guerrilla" strength of 180,000, and document (3) indicates that there is another category of "militia" with a strength of 150,000. Adding both figures mentioned in document (3) produces a total of 330,000, a figure considerably higher than the MACV estimate. It is not clear, however, just what is being counted in the term "militia" and indications are that a large portion of this number may represent only a potential for mobilization and should not be counted for strictly OB purposes. The 180,000 figure represents the real existing military threat. This figure is not out of line with the MACV estimate.
I CORPS

The first page contains a chart depicting the new revised MACV strength figures for VC Irregular forces. These figures are broken down by province and by type of Irregular force, i.e., Guerrillas, Self-Defense Forces and Secret Self-Defense Forces.

The succeeding pages contain analyses of the various provinces within I Corps and show how the MACV figures were determined. On these pages several different estimates are presented:

1. **RITZ Estimates.** These are based on the best current information available to the U.S. Sector S-2 Advisors. References are specified where they were reported.

2. **AVN Estimates.** These estimates were prepared at the AHVNI CTZ level using captured documents and interrogation reports. For the official translation of this estimate with its supporting documentation and methodology see U.S.MACV CNEC Doc Log No. 9-0802-66.

3. **OB Summary Estimates.** These estimates reflect strength figures supplied by RVNAF JGS in May 66. For I Corps these figures are not broken down by type of Irregular force; only a total is shown for each province.

The RITZ estimates carry the approval not only of I Corps advisory group, but also of III MAF. For this reason, and because they have been coordinated with the other intelligence agencies at the sector level and carry a high rating by the U.S. Sector S-2 advisors, the RITZ estimates have been adopted by MACV as the official estimate of the strength of VC Irregular forces in I Corps.
## I CORPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Guerrillas</th>
<th>Self-Defense Forces</th>
<th>Secret SD Forces</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guang Tri</td>
<td>2274</td>
<td>4687</td>
<td>937</td>
<td>7898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thua Thien</td>
<td>2807</td>
<td>7968</td>
<td>1597</td>
<td>12392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guang Nai</td>
<td>4601</td>
<td>13026</td>
<td>2606</td>
<td>20233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guang Ngai</td>
<td>3324</td>
<td>8809</td>
<td>1761</td>
<td>13894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guang Ngai</td>
<td>4135</td>
<td>13576</td>
<td>2703</td>
<td>20354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I Corps</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>74771</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
QUANG TRI PROVINCE

1. RITZ Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 2,274
   b. Self-Defense Forces 4,687
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 937
   Total 7,898

   The information used for this report was furnished by the National Police, CHD, JTAD and ARVN Sector S-2 and Sub-Sector files. The estimate was coordinated with these agencies prior to sub-mission and is considered by the U.S. Sector S-2 Advisor to be 70 percent accurate.

2. ARVN Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 2,635
   b. Self-Defense Forces 6,885
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 992
   Total 10,512

3. OB Summary Estimate Total 3,200

4. Captured Documents – None

CONCLUSION: The RITZ estimate has been adopted for the following reasons:

(1) It has been coordinated and accepted by other Intelligence agencies at the Sector level.

(2) It is the most current revised American estimate.

(3) It is in the same range as the revised ARVN estimate.
### THUA THIEN PROVINCE

1. **RITZ Estimate**
   - a. Guerrillas: 2,807
   - b. Self-Defense Forces: 7,968
   - c. Secret Self-Defense Forces: 1,597
   - **Total**: 12,392

   The information used for this report was furnished by the National Police, Sub-sector Headquarters and First ARVN Division files. The estimate was coordinated with these agencies prior to submission and is considered by the U.S. Sector S-2 Advisor to be 90 percent accurate.

2. **ARVN Estimate**
   - a. Guerrillas: 4,100
   - b. Self-Defense Forces: 5,522
   - c. Secret Self-Defense Forces: 214
   - **Total**: 9,936

3. **OB Summary Estimate**
   - **Total**: 10,010

4. **Captured Documents** - None

**CONCLUSION**: The RITZ estimate has been adopted because it is the most current and best substantiated estimate presently available.
QUANG NAM PROVINCE

1. RITZ Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 4,601
   b. Self-Defense Forces 13,026
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 2,606
   Total 20,233

The information used to make this report was furnished by the National Police, CRD, JTAD, NLU and the ARVN Sector S-2 and Sub-sector files. The estimate was coordinated with these agencies prior to submission and is considered by the U.S. Sector S-2 Advisor to be 80 percent accurate.

2. ARVN Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 7,381
   b. Self-Defense Forces 7,161
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 303
   Total 14,845

3. OB Summary Estimate
   Total 7,790

4. Captured Documents – None

CONCLUSION: Although it is much higher than the other estimates, the RITZ report is provisionally accepted as the initial estimate with the understanding that it probably represents a maximum figure and will be adjusted as more information becomes available.
QUANG TIN PROVINCE

1. RITZ Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 3,324
   b. Self-Defense Forces 8,809
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 1,761
   Total 13,894

The information used to make this report was extracted from the files of the S-2, Quang Tin Sector and Defector Interrogation Reports. The estimate was coordinated with the ARVN Sector S-2 and the NILO prior to submission and is considered by the U.S. S-2 Advisor to be 85 percent accurate.

2. ARVN Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 4,160
   b. Self-Defense Forces 6,018
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 450
   Total 10,628

3. CB Summary Estimate
   Total 2,590

4. Captured Documents - None

CONCLUSION: Both the revised ARVN estimate and the RITZ estimate are in the same range. The RITZ estimate has been adopted because it is the most current and best substantiated estimate presently available.
1. RITZ Estimate
   a. Guerrillas       4,135
   b. Self-Defense Forces 13,516
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 2,793
   TOTAL           20,354

The information used to make this report was furnished by the National Police and the Sector and the Sector Intelligence files. The estimate was coordinated with the following agencies: ARVN Sector S-2, JTAD, CRD, APR (C), FSB Advisor, 924th representative. It is considered by the U.S. Sector S-2 Advisor to be 80 percent accurate.

2. ARVN Estimate
   a. Guerrillas       8,434
   b. Self-Defense Forces 11,105
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 288
   TOTAL            19,827

3. OB Summary Estimate
   TOTAL            3,660

4. Captured Documents - None

CONCLUSION: The revised ARVN estimate and the RITZ estimate are very close. The RITZ estimate has been adopted because it is the most current and best substantiated estimate presently available.
II CORPS

The first page contains a chart depicting the new revised MACV strength figures for VC Irregular Forces. These figures are broken out by province and by type of Irregular force, i.e., Guerrillas, Self-Defense Forces and Secret Self-Defense Forces.

The succeeding pages contain analyses of the various provinces within II CTZ and show how the MACV figures were determined. It should be noted that the strength figures presently carried by the ARVN II Corps have not been revised and thus are substantially the same as those of the OB Summary Estimate.

Upon review of the several different strength estimates made for VC Irregular Forces in II Corps, I FFV recommends that the RITZ Reports containing the most recent figures submitted by the US Advisors be accepted as the initial estimate.
# II CORPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Guerrillas</th>
<th>Self-Defense Forces</th>
<th>Secret SD Forces</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pleiku</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>1,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Bon</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Yen</td>
<td>8,285</td>
<td>10,050</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>18,787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darlac</td>
<td>1,315</td>
<td>1,570</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>3,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kontum</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>3,750</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>7,594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khanh Hoa</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh Dinh</td>
<td>11,925</td>
<td>3,743</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>16,051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninh Thuan</td>
<td>1,648</td>
<td>2,569</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>4,366</td>
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<tr>
<td>Binh Thuan</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>1,017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lam Dong</td>
<td>650 (including Self-Defense Forces)</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuyen Duc</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guang Duc</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Corps</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. RITZ Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 520
   b. Self-Defense Forces 500
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces Unk
   Total 1,020

   This is the best current estimate of the US S-2 Advisor, Pleiku Sector. No supporting data was referenced.

2. ARVN Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 504
   b. Self-Defense Forces 274
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 208
   Total 986

3. OB Summary Estimate
   Total (no further breakdown) 970

4. Captured Documents - None

   Conclusion: On the basis of the I FFV recommendation, and because it is the most current and refined estimate, the RITZ figures are used.
PHU BON PROVINCE

1. RITZ Estimate

   a. Guerrillas (no further breakdown)  175

   Agent reports from the ARVN S-2 and a study of the VC Infrastructure
   conducted by the National Police are used as the basis for this
   estimate. Other guerrilla units are mentioned, but it is claimed
   that they are under the control of Main or Local Force units. For
   example, an estimated 500 guerrillas are assigned to Main Force
   units with the primary mission of protecting the infiltration/exfil-
   tration routes that pass through southern Phu Bon Province. Another
   200 are engaged in VC Infrastructure activity, farming and some
   security duty.

2. ARVN Estimate

   a. Guerrillas  320
   b. Self-Defense Forces  121
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces  283

   Total  724

3. OB Summary Estimate

   a. Guerrillas  235
   b. Self-Defense Forces  130
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces  295

   Total  660

4. Captured Documents - None

Conclusion: The RITZ report of only 175 guerrillas seems to be the result
of a confusion of definitions. Those guerrillas assigned missions of working
with or for Main and Local force units are still Irregular forces and should
be counted as such. For example, some are only part time soldiers while others
are given security details and assigned to "VC Infrastructure Activites".
Using the numbers furnished by the RITZ report and classifying all of these as Irregulars, results in a total strength of Irregular forces of 875. This is the figure used.
1. RITZ Estimate
   a. Guerrillas  
   b. Self-Defense Forces  
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces  
   Total  

   The following sources were used as the basis for this estimate: Province Interrogation Center Reports (PIC), Embassy Information Reports (EIR), National Police Field Info Reports (FIR), US Interrogation Reports (USIR), 4th MI Interrogation Reports (4th MI), ARVN Interrogations (AI), CRD Information Reports (CRD), 149th Intelligence Group Reports (FILAT). The following units assisted the Sector Advisory team in making the estimate: 4th MI-1st Bde-4th Inf Div, National Police, American Embassy and Phu Yen Province Chieu Hoi Center.

2. ARVN Estimate
   a. Guerrillas  
   b. Self-Defense Forces  
   c. Secret Self-Defense Force  
   Total  

3. OB Summary Estimate  
   Total (no further breakdown)  

4. Captured Documents
   a. US MACV CDEC Doc Log No OL-1371-66, 16 March 66, "VC Top Secret Directive #236 VP Concerning the Development of the Guerrilla Movement," This document, which speaks of the increase of Irregular forces in 1965, contains the following significant passage:

   "Marked increase in strength of guerrilla and militia force:"  

   F 0916
Guerrilla: 3,304 personnel (to include 1,266 women)
Secret guerrilla: 94 women
Peoples self defense: 17,009 personnel (to include 9,334 women)

It is not completely clear what these figures represent, but there is some indication that they might depict some form of gain. For example, the following statement appears shortly after the figures:

"Secret guerrilla force lost 320 personnel while an increase of only 94 new personnel is noted." This is the figure (94) which appears as Secret guerrillas in the quotation.

Conclusion: The RITZ estimate seems to be the most reliable figure and is used. Besides the numerous references and units supporting the RITZ estimate, the captured document cited above also supports a much higher figure than has previously been carried.
1. RITZ Estimate
   a. Guerrillas  1,315
   b. Self-Defense Forces  1,570
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces  315
       Total  3,200

This is the Darlac Sector US S-2 Advisor's best and most current estimate of total VC strength of Irregular Forces within the province. It is based on an assessment of strength by district. No other references or supporting data were furnished.

2. ARVN Estimate
   a. Guerrillas  1,296
   b. Self-Defense Forces  498
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces  1,705
       Total  3,499

3. OB Summary Estimate
   a. Guerrillas  1,170
   b. Self-Defense Forces  380
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces  1,650
       Total  3,200

4. Captured Documents - None

Conclusion: All three estimates are very close and the 3,200 figure is used since it is the most current.
KONTUM PROVINCE

1. RITZ Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 844
   b. Self-Defense Forces 3,750
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 3,000
   Total 7,594

   This is the best current estimate of the S-2 Advisor, Kontum Sector. It is based on his own information plus information supplied to him by CRD, JTAD, MSS, USSF, and the National Police.

2. Revised ARVN Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 2,700
   b. Self-Defense Forces 1,750
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 400
   Total 4,850

   The ARVN S-2 advisor for this province has revised the old ARVN estimate which was 1,936.

3. OB Summary Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 770
   b. Self-Defense Forces 770
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 400
   Total 1,940

   This old figure carried by OB Summary is generally considered to be low.

4. Captured Documents - None

   Conclusion: The RITZ figure of 7,594 is used.
1. RITZ Estimate
   a. Guerrillas  190
   b. Self-Defense Forces  370
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces  210
   Total  870

   This is the best current estimate of the US S-2 Advisor, Khanh Hoa Sector. No supporting data was referenced.

2. ARVN Estimate
   a. Guerrillas  213
   b. Self-Defense Forces  103
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces  10
   Total  326

3. OB Summary Estimate
   a. Guerrillas  215
   b. Self-Defense Forces  100
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces  10
   Total  325

4. Captured Documents — None

Conclusions: On the basis of the I FFV recommendation, and because it is the most current and refined estimate, the RITZ figures are used. Also the ARVN and OB Summary estimates of Secret Self-Defense Forces are obviously low and probably only represent those actually reported.
1. RITZ Estimate
   a. Guerrillas             3,028
   b. Self-Defense Forces    6,362
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces  727

   Total                  10,117

   This estimate is based on information received from local RF/FF elements, ARVN S2, US & ARVN Advisory Sub-Sectors, Coastal Surveillance, Central Registry, Revolutionary Development, liaison with Capitol ROK, MP Bn, Aviation elements, JTAD, Visual Reconnaissance, MI Detachments, and other intelligence agencies on an informal exchange basis. Generally information collected and disseminated through this report is evaluated C-3 by the Sector S-2 Advisor.

2. ARVN Estimate
   a. Guerrillas             1,863
   b. Self-Defense Forces    42
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces  17

   Total                  1,922

3. OB Summary Estimate - 1,870

   NOTE: The Irregular forces' strength figures carried by ARVN II CTZ are substantially the same as those now carried in the OB Summary. I FFV recommends that the figures submitted by the U.S. Advisors under RITZ be accepted as the initial estimate.
4. Captured Documents

a. USMACV CDEC Doc Log #08-1361-66, 26 Oct 66, "Report on the Situation of the First Three Months of 1966 from 25 December 1965 to 25 March 1966". This document divides the total strength of Irregular forces into the following categories:

   (1) Village Guerrillas  2,672
   (2) Hamlet Guerrillas  9,253
   (3) Secret Guerrillas   383
   (4) Militiamen          3,743
   Total                 16,051

b. USMACV CDEC Doc Log #07-1211-66, 19 Jul 66, "Recapitulated Report on the People's Guerrilla Warfare Movement from Binh Dinh Province." This document covers the general situation and activity of the "Peoples Guerrilla Warfare Movement" during 1965 and 1st quarter of 1966. It divides the total strength of Irregular forces into the following categories:

   (1) Village Guerrillas  3,197
   (2) Hamlet Guerrillas  11,887
   (3) Secret Guerrillas   719
   Total                 15,803

This document mentions a fourth category called "militia" which it rates at a strength of 34,441. Since the number is so high and is out of proportion with other figures, it must be assumed that it represents a group of people possibly ready for service but at least not serving in such a manner that they should be included in OB strength.
c. USMACV CDEC Doc Log # 08-1735-66, 8 Feb 67, "Local Situation Report of Hoai Nhon District. According to this document there are 3,272 guerrillas in the district. Another report entitled "Status of Evaluation of Hoai Nhon Units" in 1965 and 1st quarter of 1966 (USMACV CDEC LOG NO 07-1159-66) lists the following categories of Irregulars within the district:

1. Village Guerrillas 360
2. Hamlet Guerrillas 3,202
3. Part Time Guerrillas 4,376
Total 7,938

It should be noted that both these figures for Hoai Nhon district are considerably higher than the 1,482 RITZ estimate for Hoai An. The second captured document is an emulation report and the figures cited are probably inflated. There is no reason to believe that the figures in the first mentioned document are not valid.

Conclusion: The two early ARVN estimates and the OB Summary estimate are based on meager evidence and are obviously very low. The RITZ figure is the best current friendly estimate available. It does have the weakness, however, of including only those guerrillas and guerrilla units that are known. The best figure to carry for Irregular Forces strength in Binh Dinh Province seems to be 16,051 which is based on the two separate captured documents that represent the VC's own estimate of their strength in the province. Since this number was compiled before the extensive American operations in the province during late 1966, and since there have been some possibly significant pacification gains in the province during the past year, this figure will bear watching for possible down grading.
NINH THUAN PROVINCE

1. RITZ Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 465
   b. Self-Defense Forces 0
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 80
   Total 545

   This is the best current estimate of the US S-2 Advisor, Ninh Thuan Sector. No supporting data was referenced.

2. ARVN Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 212
   b. Self-Defense Forces 57
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 0
   Total 269

3. OB Summary Estimate
   Total (no further breakdown) 270

4. Captured Documents
   a. USMACV CDEC Doc Log No 02-1889-67, 19 Feb 67, "VC Militia and Guerrillas in Ninh Thuan Province, KR VI." This report, numbered "OQW/VP", was prepared by the "Militia Sub-section" of Ninh Thuan Province Unit Staff Section, dated 28 Dec 65, and signed by Tam An, VC cadre in charge of Militia. It was authenticated by L Nhat My of the Province Unit command committee. The document provides the following detailed information on the strength of Irregulars in 1965:

   (1) "Total number of village guerrillas: 270 including 40 females."
   (2) "Total number of hamlet guerrillas: 1,066 including 334 females."
   (3) "Total number of militia members: 1,985 including 704 females."
   (4) "Total number of secret guerrillas: 234 including 49 females."
"Both militia members and guerrillas were organized into squads of ten members each, while secret guerrillas were organized into three-man cells." Based on the figures in this document, total strength of Irregulars is 2,555.

b. USMACV, CDEC Doc Log No 02-2147-67, 23 Feb 67, "Guerrilla and Militia Activity Report of Ninh Thuan Province Unit Hu": This document contains the following significant information on the strength of Irregulars during the first 6 months of 1966:

Strength of Militia and Guerrilla Units in the province totaled 4,376, broken down as follows:

- Village guerrillas: 367 including 58 females
- Hamlet guerrillas: 1,261 including 285 females
- Militia members: 2,414 including 1,238 females
- Secret self defense corps members and secret guerrillas: 159 including 52 females
- Assault Youth: 155 (in Western Bac Ai and Eastern Bac Ai Districts only)

This document also contains the following information on the strength of Irregulars in 1966:

"VC Para - Military Force:

-Mountainous Area: Village Guerrilla Unit: 368 members
  Hamlet Guerrilla Unit: 1,320 members
  Militia Unit Guerrilla Unit: 2,414 members
  Vanguard Youth Unit Guerrilla Unit: 156 members

-Lowland: Village Guerrilla Unit: 10 members
  Hamlet Guerrilla Unit: 82 members
  Secret Guerrillas and Self Defense Units: 175 members
Based on the figures in this document, total strength of Irregulars is 1,525.

Conclusion: All three captured documents indicate that the strength of Irregulars in this province is in the range of 3,500 to 4,500. Compared to these, the estimates are extremely low. Since there are 3 documents and all put the strength of Irregulars in the same area, the figures from the document cited in 4B are used.
Binh Thuan Province

1. RITZ Estimate
   a. Guerrillas               222
   b. Self-Defense Forces     562
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces  233
   Total                      1,017

   This is the best current estimate of the US S-2 Advisor, Binh Thuan Sector. No supporting data was referenced.

2. ARVN Estimate
   a. Guerrillas               712
   b. Self-Defense Forces     394
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces  109
   Total                      1,215

3. OB Summary Estimate
   Total (no further breakdown) 1,210

4. Captured Documents - None

   Conclusion: On the basis of the I FFV recommendation, and because it is the most current and refined estimate, the RITZ figures are used.
LAM DONG PROVINCE

1. RITZ Estimate
   a. Guerrillas & Self-Defense Forces  650
   b. Secret Self-Defense Forces  450
   Total  1,100

   This is the best current estimate of the US S-2 Advisor, Lam Dong Province. No supporting data was referenced.

2. ARVN Estimate
   a. Guerrillas  134
   b. Self-Defense Forces  415
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces  Unk
   Total  549

3. OB Summary Estimate
   Total (no further breakdown)  650

4. Captured Documents - None

   Conclusion: On the basis of the I FFV recommendation, and because it is the most current and refined estimate, the RITZ figures are used.
TUYEN DUC PROVINCE

1. RITZ Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 320
   b. Self-Defense Forces Unk
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces Unk
      Total 320

   This is the best current estimate of the US S-2 Advisor, Tuyen Duc Province. No supporting data was referenced.

2. ARVN Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 105
   b. Self-Defense Forces 127
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 210
      Total 442

3. OE Summary Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 105
   b. Self-Defense Forces 125
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 210
      Total 440

4. Captured Documents - None

Conclusion: On the basis of the I FFV recommendation, and because it is most current and refined estimate, the RITZ figures are used.
QUANG DUC PROVINCE

1. RITZ Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 260
   b. Self-Defense Forces 200
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 100
   Total 560

   This is the best current estimate of the US S-2 Advisor, Quang Duc Sector. No supporting data was referenced.

2. ARVN Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 450
   b. Self-Defense Forces Unk
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces Unk
   Total 450

3. OB Summary Estimate
   Total (no breakdown available) 360

4. Captured Documents - None

Conclusion: On the basis of the I FFV recommendation, and because it is the most current and refined estimate, the RITZ figures are used.
III CORPS

The first page contains a chart depicting the new revised MACV strength figures for VC Irregular forces. These figures are broken down by province and by type of Irregular force, i.e., Guerrillas, Self-Defense Forces and Secret Self-Defense Forces.

The succeeding pages contain analyses of the various provinces within III CTZ and show how the MACV figures were determined. As in the other Corps, the RITZ estimates represent the best current information available to the American Sector 3-2 Advisors. References are specified where they were reported. The ARVN figures represent revised estimates prepared at Corps level. They were determined by mathematical calculation without detailed study of the situation in each sector (for the official translation of this Corps level estimate see USMACV CDBC Doc Log No. 9-0601-66). The ARVN Corps G-2 feels that if anything these estimates are high. The OB Summary estimates reflect strength figures supplied by RVNAF JGS in May 66 and are the figures which have been carried in the MACV OB Summary. They have been questioned as being too low and thus the present study was initiated.
### III CORPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Guerrillas</th>
<th>Self-Defense Forces</th>
<th>Secret SD Forces</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Binh Tuy</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phuoc Long</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phuoc Tuy</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>919</td>
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<tr>
<td>Long Khanh</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>780</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>1,519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh Duong</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>2,543</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>5,343</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tay Ninh</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>1,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh Long</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>1,040</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hau Nghia</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>780</td>
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<tr>
<td>Long An</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>1,900</td>
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<tr>
<td>COM</td>
<td>986</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>2,852</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

III Corps 17,000
BINH TUY PROVINCE

1. RITZ Estimate

No formal RITZ report as such has been received, but in response to an earlier MACV message, the U.S. Sector S-2 Advisor submitted the following estimate as of 30 Nov 66:

a. Guerrillas 105
b. Self-Defense Forces 57
c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 105

Total 267

2. ARVN Estimate

a. Guerrillas 415
b. Self-Defense Forces 290
c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 520

Total 1,225

3. OB Summary Estimate

a. Guerrillas 95
b. Self-Defense Forces 510
c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 270

Total 875

4. Captured Documents - None

CONCLUSION: Although it may be conservative, the U.S. Sector S-2 Advisor's estimate is accepted and used as the best available. According to MACV-33, the VC control only a small portion of the population of this province (6.3 percent), thus supporting the lesser RITZ figure.
Estimate of Viet Cong Irregular Forces Strength in SVN

Prepared by
Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam

24 March 1967
This study is organized by Corps with the respective strengths of the various irregular forces presented by province. The first section consists of a chart showing total countrywide strength of VC irregular forces by corps. Below the chart is an analysis of this total estimate. There are four more sections representing each of the four corps. Each of these follows the same format with a chart showing total corps strength by province of the Corps. The conclusion for each province states why the particular figures used for the official MACV estimate were selected.

The new MACV estimate of the strength of irregular forces is higher than the figures presently carried in the order of battle—namely. This is not an indication that the strength of irregular forces has increased, but only that intelligence knowledge of irregulars has been greatly expanded and refined. This new estimate will be applied retroactively to December 1961. As it applies to 1962 and early 1963, this estimate is more conservative because many irregulars have been upgraded to local force and main force units since that time as the war has increased in more large-scale units and encounters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strength of VC Irregular Forces in SVN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

COMMISSIONER

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STRATEGIC MILITARY MONITOR

8-63
1. RITZ Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 173
   b. Self-Defense Forces
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces

   TOTAL 173

   Information used to compile this estimate came from the ARVN Sector S-2, the National Police Field Unit, and documents captured in the sector. According to the U.S. Sector S-2 Advisor these sources "have proven to be fairly accurate in the past and have proven to be usually reliable."

2. ARVN Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 245
   b. Self-Defense Forces 345
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 425

   TOTAL 1,015

3. OB Summary Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 125
   b. Self-Defense Forces 325
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 225

   TOTAL 675

4. Captured Documents
   a. USM.C. Doc Log No. 06-1256-66, 20 Jun 66, "Report on Development of VC Forces in Phuoc Long Province." This document, which is dated 1 April 66 is a report by an unidentified person containing the following information on the development of VC forces in Phuoc Long Province during the first quarter of 1966:
"1. Guerrilla and Militia Forces:

Strength as of March 1966: 38 Village Guerrillas
136 Hamlet Guerrillas
141 Militiamen

One additional village unit activated"

Thus the total number of Irregulars listed by this document is 315.

CONCLUSION: The different estimates for this province are quite widely spread. While the RITZ estimate appears to be incomplete, the ARVN estimate is very high, and the OB Summary estimate is known to be based on limited evidence. All things considered, the figures carried in the captured document appear to be the most accurate. The VC require frequent and accurate strength reports to be submitted through command (VC Infrastructure) channels and this seems to be such a report. There is every reason to believe that these figures are the best estimate the VC themselves have of their strength in the province, and thus, these are the figures used.
PHUOC TUY PROVINCE

1. AITZ Estimate

No formal AITZ report as such has been received, but in response to an earlier MACV message, the U.S. Sector 5-2 Advisor submitted the following estimate as of 2 Dec 66:

   a. Guerrillas                467
   b. Self-Defense Forces      245
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 207

   Total                        919

2. ARVN Estimate

   a. Guerrillas                420
   b. Self-Defense Forces      1,445
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 410

   Total                        2,275

3. OB Summary Estimate

   a. Guerrillas                405
   b. Self-Defense Forces      575
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 410

   Total                        1,390

4. Captured Documents - None

CONCLUSION: The more conservative estimate of the U.S. Advisory Team is used provisionally, but it is believed to be a minimum figure. Supporting this lower figure are the MACV-33 population control statistics which calculate that 84.2 percent of the population of the province are under GVN Control.
LONG ANH PROVINCE

1. RITZ Estimate

No RITZ report has been received from the U.S. Sector 5-2 Advisor.

2. ARVN Estimate

a. Guerrillas 215
b. Self-Defense Forces 210
c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 355

Total 780

3. OB Summary Estimate

a. Guerrillas 35
b. Self-Defense Forces 45
c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 10

Total 90

4. Captured Documents - None

CONCLUSION: The ARVN estimate is used since it represents the most current and refined figures available.
BIEN HOA PROVINCE

1. Ritz Estimate

No formal RITZ report as such has been received, but in response to an earlier MACV message, the U.S. S-2 advisor submitted the following estimate as of 5 Dec 66:

   a. Guerrillas                  556
   b. Self-Defense Forces         738
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces  225

      Total                      1,519

2. ARVN Estimate

   a. Guerrillas                  1,180
   b. Self-Defense Forces         840
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces  1,130

      Total                      3,150

3. OB Summary Estimate

   a. Guerrillas                  1,600
   b. Self-Defense Forces         1,175
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces  795

      Total                      3,570

4. Captured Documents - None

CONCLUSION: The more conservative estimate of the U.S. Advisory Team is used. Supporting this lower figure are the MACJ-33 population control statistics which rate only 1 percent of the population of the province under VC control.
1. ALTZ Estimate

The U.S. Sector S-2 Advisor submitted the following report: "Results of operation Cedar Falls have not been consolidated. Until this is completed accurate information will not be available".

2. ARVN Estimate

a. Guerrillas 390
b. Self-Defense Forces 590
c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 810
   Total 1,790

3. OB Summary Estimate

a. Guerrillas 260
b. Self-Defense Forces 795
c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 585
   Total 1,660

4. Captured Documents

   a. UXM:CDC Doc Log No. 01-1611-67, 12 Jan 67, "Annual Strength Report of Binh Duong Province". This document lists the following comparative strengths for late 1965 and the first 6 months of 1966:

   Late 1965:
   (1) Village Guerrillas 735
   (2) Hamlet Guerrillas 2,435
   (3) Militia Self-Defense 3,516
   Total 6,666

   First 6 months of 1966:
   (1) Village Guerrillas 735
   (2) Hamlet Guerrillas 2,065
   Total 2,800

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   SEC ARMY BY TAG PER
(3) Militia Self Defense 2,543

Total 5,343

The total number of weapons was also listed:

Late 1965: 4,879 guns

Early 1966: 4,795 guns

d. USMACV CDEC Doc Log No. 02-1201-67, 3 Feb 67, "Strength and weapon Report of South Ban Cat District" dated 25 Dec 64. According to this document in 1964, "the strength of Guerilla, Self Guard and Militia in all subordinate village and hamlets (of this one district) totalled 1,072. The total number of weapons available to the District was 202."

c. USMACV CDEC Doc Log No. 01-2653-67, 19 Jan 67. This is a report prepared by "Binh Duong Province Unit, undated, (and) provides the general enemy and friendly situation in 1965 and during the first five months of 1966." The total number of village and hamlet guerillas recorded was 901 men.

CONCLUSION: For a province which traditionally has been a VC stronghold it is felt that the ARVN and OB Summary estimates are very low. More in line with what normally would be expected from such a province is the 5,343 figure appearing in the first captured document cited. This higher figure is supported by the second document which lists 1072 guerillas for a single district. There is no way to reconcile the figure in the third document with those in the other two. However, the 901 figure is merely tacked on in a sentence at the end and the document itself goes into no detail or explanation of strength. For purposes of the new MACV revised strength figures, the 5,343 number is provisionally accepted. Since the number was compiled before the extensive U.S. operations in the province during late 1966, and since there have been some possible significant pacification gains in the province during the past year, the provisional figure will bear watch for possible downgrading.
TAY NHIN PROVINCE

1. RVN estimate
   a. Guerrillas 600
   b. Self-Defense Forces 605
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 806
   Total 1,285

   This estimate is based on information collected within the last 6 months from Hoi Chanh, VC captives and agent reports. The following other intelligence agencies participated in the preparation of the estimate: ARVN sector S-2, ARVN Special Forces S-2, JSS, and the National Police (special branch).

2. ARVN Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 525
   b. Self-Defense Forces 3,137
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 177
   Total 3,639

3. UB Summary Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 625
   b. Self-Defense Forces 760
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 580
   Total 2,165

4. Captured Documents
   a. Usii-CV C Walton Log No. 07-1313-66, 5 Sep 66, "Draft resolution of the Military Conference, Tay Ninh Province Party Committee 1966." This document contains the following significant information on the strength of VC Irregular forces in Tay Ninh Province:
"At the beginning of the year (period covered by the document is 1965 and the first 5 months of 1966), there were 1,150 village and hamlet guerrillas (439 at villages and 711 at hamlets) and at the end of the year there were less than 600 men left.

Secret Guerrillas: recruitment is slow and uneven, especially in the important areas, in cities, towns and areas along strategic roads. Secret guerrillas in these areas are too few or non-existent.

Self-Defense Militia: Instead of increasing, the number of self defense militiamen has decreased. Units in some areas were inactivated without fanfare and just forgotten. Presently the militiamen in the province have almost disappeared. The few who still remain, such as in Trang Bang, are inactive and do not undergo any training."

b. USMACV CDEC Log No 10-1428-66, 26 Nov 66, "Resolution from province Party Committee 1966." This document, which covers the period 1965 and the first 4 months of 1966, states that there were 500 guerrillas at the hamlet and village level.

CONCLUSION: The captured documents indicate that the strength of VC irregular forces in Tay Ninh is down. The lower H172 estimate seems to be more accurate and has a more substantial basis. This is the figure used.
1. RITZ Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 600
   b. Self-Defense Forces 275
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 165
   Total 1,040

   The sources of information for this estimate have been Hoi Chang's captives, documents, agents, informers and sympathizers. This estimate was made after comparing the above information with information on hand and the holdings of other sources within the province and holdings at other provinces and higher headquarters. The U.S. Sector S-2 Advisor states that this estimate is "from 75 to 80 percent valid."

2. AMVN Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 155
   b. Self-Defense Forces 360
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 505
   Total 1,020

3. OB Summary Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 65
   b. Self-Defense Forces 510
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 385
   Total 960

4. Captured Documents - None

CONCLUSION: The RITZ Estimate is used.
**HAU NGHIA PROVINCE**

1. HVTZ Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 430
   b. Self-Defense 200
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 150
   **Total** 780

This estimate is based on information contained in the Hau Nghia Intelligence Coordinating Committee's Order of Battle Handbook. According to the U.S. Sector S-2 Advisor, the information contained in the handbook has proven to be reliable in the past. The following intelligence agencies participate in the maintenance of this Handbook: Sector S-2, National Police and H&G.

2. ARVN Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 500
   b. Self-Defense Forces 180
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 400
   **Total** 1,080

3. OB Summary Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 615
   b. Self-Defense Forces 455
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 330
   **Total** 1,400

4. Captured Documents

The VC combine GVN Hau Nghia and Long An Provinces into one province, which they call Long An. Since VC documents speak of the entire area, they will be considered under GVN Long An province.

**CONCLUSION:** The more conservative HVTZ estimate is used.

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**RECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED ORDER**
SEC ARMY BY TAG PER
LONG AN PROVINCE

1. RITZ Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 1,200
   b. Self-Defense Forces 700
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces Unk

   Total 1,900

   The primary source used to make this estimate were the reports from the U.S. Sub-sector advisors who in most cases received their data from the ARVN District S-2 or the District Chief. Interrogation reports from returnees and captives, where possible, were used to confirm or refute sub-sector reports. According to the U.S. Sector S-2 Advisor, the strength figure for guerrillas "is a fairly accurate figure". These units are generally well organized and normally participate in a varied range of operations; hence intelligence concerning their strength and activities is reported. On the other hand, hamlet self-defense forces usually restrict themselves to their particular hamlets and very little concerning their strength and activities can be learned. Thus, according to the U.S. Sector S-2 Advisor, "the figure citing hamlet self defense strength is a rough estimate".

   The following intelligence agencies were coordinated with in making this estimate: Police Special Branch, MSS and S-2, 2/14 Inf (U.S.).

2. ARVN Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 3,500
   b. Self-Defense Forces 5,859
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 809

   Total 10,166

   F 0945