3. **OB Summary Estimate**

   a. Guerrillas 1,420  
   b. Self-Defense Forces 1,305  
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 905

Total 3,630

4. **Captured Documents**

   a. USMACV CDEC Doc Log No 11-0661-65, 14 Feb 66, ARVN G2-31st

   DTs. "Special Intelligence Report". Based on information on the number of guerrillas in Can Duc and Tan Tru Districts, the ARVN G2 used a mathematical extrapolation formula to determine the total number of guerrillas in Long An Province. Supported by two captured documents from the two districts mentioned above, his estimate is that there are 2,000 guerrillas in VC Long An Province (this would include GVN Hau Nghia and Long An Provinces). Since he seems to be using the term "guerrilla" to encompass all irregular forces, the estimate is fairly close to the 2,660 figure which is the total of the two RITZ reports from the two GVN provinces.

   **CONCLUSION:** The RITZ figure is used.
1. KIU estimate

a. Guerrillas
b. Self-Defense Forces
c. Secret Self-Defense Forces

Total 120

No supporting data was referenced by the U.S. Sector 5-2 advisor.

2. Relief estimate

Figures are available for guerrillas in the Linh Province only. Their strength is estimated to be 517.

3. Summary estimate

a. Guerrillas
b. Self-Defense Forces
c. Secret Self-Defense Forces

Total 1,215

4. Captured Documents

Report on Doc Log No. 01-3005-67, 16 Jan 67. This document is translated run 71 pages and is one of the most significant enemy documents ever received. It was captured during Operation Cedar Falls and its contents of VC N.4 Headquarters were overrun. The document gives the following picture of the strength of VC Irregular Forces since 1962:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Office Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO Guerrilla</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO Guerrilla</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO Guerrilla</td>
<td>926</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>F 0947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop Guerrilla</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>577</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO Self Defense</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>1,151</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>679</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,999</td>
<td>2,253</td>
<td>3,559</td>
<td>3,114</td>
<td>2,055</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This is the summary translation of a notebook belonging to an unidentified cadre containing notes on political lessons taken during a political reorientation course. Most of the lessons dealt with the resolutions of M. IV and missions to be accomplished. According to this document, "The criteria for guerrilla strength in 1966 were programmed to be 2,000 for Cu Chi and from 600 to 1,000 for each of the other five districts."

c. CDEC DOC LOG No 01-3262-67, 27 Jan 67, "An Introduction to M. IV Resolution." This document contains the following significant paragraph:

"The military task to be performed during 1966 and in early 1967 requires a wide scale Guerrilla Movement, whose main objectives would be areas surrounding cities with a dense population. Before the end of the year (1966) the total Guerrilla strength in rural areas (M. IV) should attain 6,000 to 10,000, where as the armed and semi-armed elements in cities should number 3,000. In addition, efforts should be made to get 3,000 to 3,500 youths to enlist."

Conclusion: Very seldom is a document like the one cited in 4 (a) available to Intelligence Analysts. The circumstances surrounding its capture lend great support to its authenticity. The 1966 figures carried in this document are the ones used.
IV CORPS

The first page contains a chart depicting the new revised MACV strength figures for VC Irregular forces. These figures are broken out by province and by type of Irregular force, i.e., Guerrillas, Self-Defense Forces and Secret Self-Defense Forces.

The succeeding pages contain analysis of the various provinces within IV Corps and show how the MACV figures were determined. As in the other Corps, the RITZ estimates represent the best current information available to the US Sector S-2 Advisors. References are specified where they were reported. The ARVN figures represent revised estimates prepared at Corps level on the basis of information submitted from ARVN Sector S-2's through the ARVN Division G-2's (for the official translation of this corps level estimate see USMACV CDEC Doc Log No 9-0802-66). The ARVN IV Corps G-2 believes that generally the strength figures for Self-Defense Forces should be much higher. There are large areas of the Corps under VC control about which little is known. In such places population figures and VC territorial organization are unclear. It is therefore very difficult to make an accurate estimate of self-defense strength in these areas. The OB Summary estimates reflect strength figures supplied by RVNAF JGS in May 66 and are the figures which have been carried in the MACV OB Summary. They have been questioned as being too low and thus the present study was initiated.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Guerrillas</th>
<th>Self Defense Forces</th>
<th>Secret SD Forces</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Go Cong</td>
<td>1,173</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>1,478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kien Hoa</td>
<td>2,760</td>
<td>2,954</td>
<td>1,232</td>
<td>6,946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Giang</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dinh Tuong</td>
<td>2,311</td>
<td>4,730</td>
<td>1,104</td>
<td>8,145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kien Phong</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>1,882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kien Tuong</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>1,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chau Doc</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinh Binh</td>
<td>1,441</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>2,898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinh Long</td>
<td>1,640</td>
<td>3,500 Self Defense &amp; Secret Self Defense Forces</td>
<td>5,140</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadec</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba Xuyen</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>1,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phong Dinh</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>2,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kien Giang</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>1,677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuong Thien</td>
<td>2,295</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>2,545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bac Lieu</td>
<td>1,122</td>
<td>7,200</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>8,857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Xuyen</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>3,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV Corps</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50,223</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. RITZ Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 254
   b. Self-Defense Forces 190
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 165
   Total 609

   No references were submitted by the US Sector S-2 Advisor.

2. ARVN Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 1,173
   b. Self-Defense Forces Unk
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 305
   Total 1,478

3. OB Summary Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 445
   b. Self-Defense Forces 160
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 3,235
   Total 3,830

4. Captured Documents - None

    Conclusions: Until substantiated RITZ figures are submitted, the revised
    ARVN figures are used.
1. RITZ Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 2,760
   b. Self-Defense Forces 2,954
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 1,232
   Total 6,946

   Information used to arrive at this estimate was obtained from ARVN 7th Div G-2, Kien Hoa FICG, DICC's and Sub-Sector Advisory Teams.

2. ARVN Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 4,729
   b. Self-Defense Forces 4,054
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 2,066
   Total 10,849

3. OB Summary Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 1,865
   b. Self-Defense Forces 890
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 895
   Total 3,650

4. Captured Documents
   a. Translation Branch J2-USMACV Log No 6-268-65, 30 June 65, Interrogation Report of District Committee Member in charge of Civilian Proselyting at Binh Dai District town. The translation of the report contains the following significant information on VC strength:
      "Liberation Youth Group: The total number of youths, from 16 to 35 years old in the district was:
      4,025 (male)
      4,049 (female)
      125 of them, male and female, are still living in New Rural Life Hamlets. The rest live in liberated areas and join the Liberation
Youth Group.

Recruits and guerrilla men: Binh Dai District has:
- 558 recruits, assigned to the province
- 80 Guerrilla men
- 370 hamlet self-defense members
- 90 secret self-defense members (1)
- 15 covert self-defense members (2)

Although this information covers 1964 only, it may be significant as an indication of past attainable strength. The current RITZ report gives the following strength breakdown for the same district:

Binh Dai District:
(1) Guerrillas 312
(2) Self-Defense Forces 354
(3) Secret Self Defense Forces 147
Total 813

Conclusion: The RITZ report is used as the best current estimate of the strength of VC Irregular Forces within the province.
AN GIANG PROVINCE

1. RITZ Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 158
   b. Self-Defense Force 0
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 95
   Total 253

   The source material used to make this estimate consisted in most cases of district and province OB files which are fed by interrogation reports, agent and informant information, and Hoi Chan interviews. The US Sector S-2 advisor evaluates the strength figures at C-3.

2. ARVN Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 243
   b. Self-Defense Forces 845
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 553
   Total 1,641

3. OB Summary Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 265
   b. Self Defense Forces 615
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 1,210
   Total 2,090

4. Captured Documents - None

   Conclusion: According to the MACJ-33 population statistics, 100% of the people of this province live in "Secured Areas". In line with this, the US Sector S-2 advisor states that, "An Giang has no VC-controlled areas, thus there are no Self-Defense Forces." These statistics indicate that the ARVN & OB Summary estimates are too high, especially in their rating of Self-Defense Forces, and thus the RITZ figures are the ones used.
Dinh Tucng Province

1. RITZ Estimate
   a. Guerrillas                  2,100
   b. Self-Defense Forces        455
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 180
   Total                        2,735

   The strength estimates are broken out by village and all except one carry an A1 or B2 rating (as rated by the Sector or District). The estimate is based primarily upon current reports received at the FICO and the Sector Intelligence office.

2. ARVN Estimate
   a. Guerrillas                2,311
   b. Self-Defense Forces       4,730
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 1,104
   Total                       8,145

3. CE Summary Estimate
   a. Guerrillas                1,780
   b. Self-Defense Forces       335
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 4,665
   Total                       6,780

4. Captured Documents - None

Conclusion: Given the MACJ-33 estimate that the VC control approximately 1/3 of the population of this province, the RITZ figures for Self-Defense Forces and Secret Self-Defense Forces appear unrealistically low. The ratio of the revised ARVN figures is more in line with the strengths that would be expected for these three different types of Irregulars; thus, the ARVN estimate is used.
1. RITZ Estimate
   a. Guerrillas  915
   b. Self-Defense Forces  689
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces  278

   Total  1,882

   The sources of information, rationale, evaluation and validity of this estimate have been reported as follows by the US Sector S-2 Advisor:
   "The primary sources of information have been from captured enemy documents and documents brought in by Hci Chan's. These documents are not complete in themselves, but do allow the S-2 Section to make a good estimate.... The National Police and MSS also contributed information to this estimate."

2. ARVN Estimate
   a. Guerrillas  875
   b. Self-Defense Forces  529
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces  216

   Total  1,620

3. OE Summary Estimate
   a. Guerrillas  1,300
   b. Self-Defense Forces  670
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces  750

   Total  2,720

4. Captured Documents - None

   Conclusion: The RITZ estimate, which is well supported and in accord with the ARVN estimate, is used.
Acknowledging:

1. High Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 471
   b. Self-Defense Forces 445
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 216
   Total 1,132

   Primary sources of information for this estimate were the Province Interrogation Center and the National Police.

2. High Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 297
   b. Self-Defense Forces 172
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces Unk
   Total 469

3. Of Summary Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 325
   b. Self-Defense Forces Unk
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 180
   Total 505

4. Captured Documents - None

   Conclusion: Since the other estimates are obviously incomplete and low, the RII2 estimate is used as the best presently available.
CHAU DOC PROVINCE

1. HITZ Estimate
   a. Guerrillas: 500
   b. Self-Defense Forces: 150
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces: 150
   Total: 800

   Sources of information for this estimate listed by the US Sector S-2 Advisor were the Sector operations and Intelligence Center, MSS, National Police and Province Recon Unit. The estimate was coordinated with these agencies and the figures are considered to be "as exact as possible."

2. ARVN Estimate
   a. Guerrillas: 899
   b. Self-Defense Forces: 411
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces: 471
   Total: 1,781

3. OE Summary Estimate
   a. Guerrillas: 950
   b. Self-Defense Forces: 590
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces: 90
   Total: 1,630

4. Captured Documents – None

   Conclusion: Considering the degree of VC control in this province as reported by the MACJ-33 population statistics, the lesser RITZ estimate seems to be more accurate.
1. RITZ Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 1,441
   b. Self-Defense Forces 560
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 897
   Total 2,698

According to the US Sector S-2 Advisor, this estimate is based on information gained from Vietnamese agents of the National Police, M5S and ARVN Sector S-2. Additional information from Ralliers and VC captives supplemented the figures. The US Sector S-2 Advisor states that, "This estimate is believed to be below the actual figure for the Province. However, our information will not support a higher estimate at this time."

2. ARVN Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 2,210
   b. Self-Defense Forces 580
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 460
   Total 3,250

3. O3 Summary Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 1,530
   b. Self Defense Forces 460
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 580
   Total 2,570

4. Captured Documents - None

Conclusion: The RITZ report is used as the latest current estimate of the strength of VC Irregular Forces within the province.
Vinh Long Province

1. Estimate
   a. Guerrillas  1,640
   b. Self-Defense Forces  3,500
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces

   Total  5,140

This estimate is based on reports from captives and returnees. The information had been coordinated with the following intelligence agencies: ARVN Sector S-2, MSS, National Police & District Intelligence personnel. The US Sector S-2 Advisor gives his estimate an overall C-4 rating.

2. ARVN Estimate
   a. Guerrillas  934
   b. Self-Defense Forces  3,000
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces

   Total  4,400

3. US Summary Estimate
   a. Guerrillas  1,725
   b. Self-Defense Forces  1,950
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces  1,995

   Total  5,670

4. Captured Documents

F 0960
The situation in Vinh Long Province in 1964 and nine months of 1965 contains the following significant information:

1964: Village guerrillas 542
Hamlet guerrillas 3,192

During nine months of '65: 2,734
Village guerrillas 401
Hamlet guerrillas 2,693

Total number (1965: 3,094 including 223 women, 186 squad leaders, 180 assistant squad leaders, 344 cell leaders, 109 Party members, 383 Group members and 725 Farmers Association members.

Proportion: 21.7% of the population

Organization: 59 villages had hamlet guerrillas (204 hamlets known and 55 villages had village guerrillas)

Conclusion: Hamlet guerrillas were increased in four villages

Conclusion: All of the estimates are in the same range. The RITZ Report is used since it is the best documented and represents the most current information.
1. RITZ Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 350
   b. Self-Defense Forces 200
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces Unk
   Total 550

This estimate is based on National Police Interrogation Reports and other reports available to the US Sector S-2 Advisor.

2. ARVN Estimate - None available

3. CF Summary Estimate - All categories unknown (UNK).

4. Captured Documents - None

Conclusion: The RITZ estimate is used since it represents the only information on the strength of Irregular forces in this Province.
LA AUYEN PROVINCE

1. Estimate

   TOTAL (no further breakdown)  814

   No references were submitted by the US Sector S-2 Advisor.

2. NVN Estimate

   a. Guerrillas  920
   b. Self-Defense Forces  139
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces  UNK

      Total  1,059

3. UB Summary Estimate

   a. Guerrillas  720
   b. Self-Defense Forces  550
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces  UNK

      Total  1,270

4. Captured Documents - None

   CONCLUSION: Until there is a more compelling, better documented reason
   for change, the old UB Summary figures will continue to be carried.
PHONG DINH PROVINCE

1. MIA Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 1850
   b. Self-Defense Forces 500
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 600
   Total 2,950

   No references were submitted by the US Sector S-2 Advisor.

2. ARVN Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 800
   b. Self-Defense Forces 4000
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 1270
   Total 6,070

3. UB Summary Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 510
   b. Self-Defense Forces 290
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 1200
   Total 2,000

4. Captured Documents
   a. USAIDG, CDEC Doc Log No. 01-1611-67, 12 Jan 67,
      "Annual Strength Report". This document is from VC Can Tho provinces
      which includes all of GVN Phong Dinh and parts of GVN An Giang and Chong
      Thien provinces. It concerns "comparisons of the development of military
      forces, para-military forces and various branches subordinate to U4 head-
      quarters (Can Tho) in the first 6 months of 1966." Significant parts of
      the document are quoted below:
"Village Guerrilla Unit"

The total number of cadre was:
- 735 comrades in late 1965
- 637 comrades in the first 6 months of 1966
- 108 squad cadres
- 529 soldiers

There were 96 fewer squad cadres and soldiers in early 1966 than in late 1965.

"Hamlet Guerrilla Unit:"

The total number was:
- 2635 comrades in late 1965
- 2065 comrades in the first 6 months of 1966

The number of cadre decreased 570 from 1965.

"Militia Self Defense:"

The number of Militia Self Defense cadre was:
- 3516 cadres in late 1965
- 2543 cadres in the first 6 months of 1966

This represents a decrease of 973 comrades.

On the basis of the passage concerning the village Guerrilla unit, the term "cadre" seems to include both soldiers and cadre. Putting these figures into the OB format produces the following estimate for the first 6 months of 1966:

(1) Guerrillas: 2,702
(2) Self-Defense Forces: 2,543
(3) Secret Self-Defense Forces: UNK

Total: 5,245
b. USMACV, CDEC Doc Log No. 01-1610-67, 15 Jan 67. This untitled document contains a group of charts, among which are some containing significant information on strength. Under the heading "Guerrilla Force in each District", appears the total 4,654. This figure is divided into the following categories:

(1) Village Military Section 155
(2) Hamlet Military Section 499
(3) Village armed Guerrilla Forces 383
(4) Hamlet Armed Guerrilla Forces 2,421
(5) Military & Civilian Self Defense Groups 1,193
(6) Special Cell Members 3

Total 4,654

These figures were reported current as of Sept 66.

c. USMACV CDEC Doc Log No. 08-1171-66, 20 Aug 66, "1965 annual report of U4 (VC Can Tho Province)". This document contains the following statistics on the strength of Irregular Forces in 1964 and 1965:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1965</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Village Guerrillas</td>
<td>712</td>
<td>547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamlet Guerrillas</td>
<td>5,420</td>
<td>5,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secret Guerrillas</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militia &amp; Self Defense</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>2,662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>6,726</td>
<td>8,731</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* "In 1964, the organization of militia and self defense forces had no longer existed, in 1965 it was reorganized with 2,662 members."
...The captured documents indicate that the old OB Summary figures were probably very low. Although VC Can Tho province covers more territory than just Phong Dinh province, most of its population is still in Phong Dinh, and thus the difference in boundaries should not be a cause of much distortion between the figures. The captured documents point to a range of at least 4,000 to 5,000 irregulars. As a conservative estimate, the RITZ figures are used.
ALPB GIANG PROVINCE

1. HIN estimate
   a. Guerrillas 745
   b. Self-Defense forces 600
   c. Secret Self-Defense forces 0
   Total 1,345

   *According to the US Sector S-2 Advisor, "There are no Secret Self-Defense Units in this province."

   No supporting data was referenced by the Sector S-2.

2. ARVN Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 578
   b. Self-Defense forces 190
   c. Secret Self-Defense 332
   Total 1,100

3. 8b Summary estimate
   a. Guerrillas 1,200
   b. Self-Defense forces 680
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 1,470
   Total 3,350

4. Captured Documents - None

Conclusions: Because of the VC pattern of force development in other provinces throughout SVN, it is difficult to believe that there are no Secret Self-Defense Forces in Kien Giang province. However, since most of the province is under VC control and there is no need for a large Secret Self-Defense Force, the 1,470 which have been carried in the 8 Summary seems extremely high. Thus, the HIN figures are accepted for the first two categories, and the revised ARVN estimate of 332 is used for the strength of the Secret Self Defense Forces. TO
CHUONG THINH PROVINCE

1. H1TZ estimate
   a. Guerrillas 2295
   b. Self-Defense Forces 1250
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces UNK
      Total 2545

This estimate was compiled from reports received from agents, returnees, and captured VC. The US Sector S-2 advisor coordinated with the ARVN Sector S-2, Sub-sector 5-2's, and National Police in preparation of the figures reported. The US Sector S-2 advisor rates the estimate as "probably true".

2. ARVN estimate
   a. Guerrillas 1,000
   b. Self-Defense Forces 600
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 600
      Total 2,200

3. OB Summary Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 1,190
   b. Self-Defense Forces 1,000
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 1,100
      Total 3,190

4. Captured Documents - None

CONCLUSIONS: The H1TZ report is used as the best current estimate of the strength of VC Irregular Forces within the province.

F 0969
1. hITZ Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 1,122
   b. Self-Defense Forces 7,200
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 535
   Total 8,857

This estimate is based primarily on information supplied by agents and
informants of the Bac Lieu ARVN S-2. The National Police - Special
Branch and HSS were coordinated with in preparation of these figures.

2. ARVN Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 535
   b. Self-Defense Forces 910
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 249
   Total 1,794

3. Ob Summary Estimate
   a. Guerrillas 795
   b. Self-Defense Forces 515
   c. Secret Self-Defense Forces 580
   Total 1,890

4. Captured Documents - None

CONCLUSION: Because of the extensive degree of VC control in this
province, the higher hITZ figures seem to be more accurate and are the ones
used.
### XUYEN PROVINCE

#### 1. KITZ Estimate
- a. Guerrillas: 1,300
- b. Self-Defense Forces: 1,800
- c. Secret Self-Defense Forces: 600

**Total:** 3,700

No references were submitted by the Sector 5-2.

#### 2. ARVN Estimate
- a. Guerrillas: 1,400
- b. Self-Defense Forces: 2,000
- c. Secret Self-Defense Forces: None

**Total:** 3,400

#### 3. UB Summary Estimate
- a. Guerrillas: 2,390
- b. Self-Defense Forces: 1,805

**Total:** 9,620

#### 4. Captured Documents - None

**Conclusions:** The Secret Self-Defense category which has been carried in the UB summary seems to be highly inflated because of the extent of VC control in this province. The more conservative figures of the KITZ estimate are used.