Mr. President:

The heart of Ambassador Locke's report on the last two weeks is in the marked passages.

SECRET attachment
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM LOCKE (Saigon, 11/8/30)

Herewith my personal report covering events of the past two weeks.

A. General

The most important event has been the installation of the new Cabinet of Prime Minister Loc on November 9, and the beginning efforts of the new Government to function. The Cabinet members are primarily technicians, rather than politicians. Some of them are identified with political groupings other than Thieu-Ky, but they are reasonably well-divided among southerners, northerners and centralists. They should be able to work as a team, and I believe a framework exists for slowly and carefully broadening the base of the Government. Limited evidence would indicate that the new Government is reasonably competent, honest and dedicated and there has been no evidence of serious differences between Thieu and Ky. I would say "so far, so good," but it is a little early to make definitive judgments.

Political parties as we know them will take time to emerge. President Thieu does not wish to build a "Government party" at this time because of the peoples' memory of Diem's party, and wishes to move slowly, making alliances with various individuals and groupings. Some alliances are emerging in the Senate and the House, but it is too early to know where they will lead. The Senate gives signs of being a responsible body, but the House is less certain and more fragmented at the present time. I am personally very interested in stimulating Village Councils to grasp the reins of local government, involve the people in various subcommittees for their own economic development -- agriculture, irrigation, education, health, water, public works -- having the Government responsive to the desires of the people and with funds and flexibility in the right places to use them at the province level. I believe this is a lever not only for economic development but in the development of political groupings friendly to the Government and a political infrastructure more difficult for the Communists to penetrate.
Militarily, the enemy has mounted an offensive in areas near the Laotian and Cambodian borders. In the jungle and rubber plantation area north of Saigon near the COSVN headquarters and the Cambodian border the enemy struck first. He first hit Song Be in Phuoc Long province, and then Loc Ninh in Binh province. Both attacks were successfully repelled by Vietnamese troops. In the second attack, where the Vietnamese were reinforced by Americans, the enemy struck several times in suicide waves (unusual), and the results were loss of 851 enemy by body count (and possibly others killed by B-52 and other air strikes between Loc Ninh and the Cambodian border) against 50 friendly killed (29 US, 21 RVNAF). Of the 851 enemy killed, RVNAF accounted for 371.

The next major enemy assault was in the central highlands around Dak To. We had intelligence that the enemy was preparing to attack Dak To; so we moved to secure the high ground around Dak To and to preempt the enemy offensive. The enemy was encountered in every direction from Dak To, fighting began November 4 and is still raging, with the enemy continuing to fight instead of retreating to his sanctuary in Laos. To date, the enemy has sustained 1,243 killed, 15 captured, and substantial weapons captured, against 325 friendly killed, 1,137 wounded, and 15 missing.

Vice President Ky believes the purpose of the attacks by the enemy are to gain a significant victory, and in the absence of one to exploit for propaganda purposes, his ability to stand and fight for a significant period of time. Normally the enemy would attack in the central highlands in the wet season, when our air is less effective, than in the present dry season; but the dry season attack is made for political purposes timed to coincide with the establishment of the new Government. Border areas were chosen because these are the areas of his sustained capability and also areas where our forces are the most isolated (as at Loc Ninh).

We are engaged in an intensive campaign to analyze captured documents, and to release them to the press, frequently in briefings on specific subjects supported by captured documents and POW/rallier statements. This week we released two basic captured papers on population control together with an overall analysis of the question of CIA on the basis of additional material culled from interrogation reports and other available evidence. In addition to release to the press, this particular analysis and accompanying documents have been mailed to a constantly growing list of over 300 addressees and has been made available to the State Department for further use in
Washington. With this kick-off we will have a formal analytical paper and briefing, accompanied by supporting documents every two weeks. The subject matter will consist of a different key question each time -- usually a question related to our progress in the war.

I met with a group of correspondents at Barry Zorthian's a few nights ago. Several of the correspondents have told Barry that the dialogue was helpful and our remarks useful. Ambassador Bunker, General Westmoreland, Ambassador Korner and I will each do this from time to time. Inquiries have already been made by the New York Times and Newsweek to their bureau chiefs here for material disputing statements of progress made by Ambassador Bunker and General Westmoreland in Washington recently.

We are in the process of discussing Christmas, New Year's and TET cease fires with President Thieu. Whatever we agree to will be discussed with the Ambassadors of the seven troop-contributing countries before release. Thieu's idea (after talking the Generals Vinh and Vy) was 36 hours at Christmas, 36 hours at New Year's, 72 at TET, with provision that each cease fire would be contingent on the enemy's observance of the preceding cease fire. Our idea was the formulation of 24-24-48 hour stand-downs, which I feel sure President Thieu will accept if we wish. There have been detailed exchanges of cables with State Department about this.

Three Viet Cong terrorists who were to be executed on November 17 have had their executions suspended. The planned executions came normally through Government of Vietnam channels after President Thieu had refused to reverse their sentences. President Thieu says he will change the rule to require a positive order of execution by the Prime Minister before any execution occurs (instead of executions following sentences in routine manner) and that in principle he will suspend executions for the time being. He recognizes that we oppose executions at this time because of the possibility of reprisals on our own POW's.

The Quaker ship Phoenix has now departed Danang, presumably for Hong Kong, without unloading medicines. The problem stemmed from their desire to unload the medicines in North Vietnam (which the Government of Vietnam didn't like) and from their reported desire to distribute part of the medicines directly to militant Buddhists. Actually, there was considerable misunderstanding between the Government of Vietnam and the Quakers on this, and the issue may come up again. Meanwhile, I believe the Government of Vietnam has surmounted this incident without giving any undue propaganda victory to the enemy.
The Lilienthal trip and report has been a success. President Thieu described the Lilienthal plan to Senator Tower as being a "very practical" approach.

John Corson, partner of McKenzie Associates, and Assistant Labor Secretary Werts are here to plan most effective use of manpower by the Government of Vietnam. The partial mobilization decree by the Government of Vietnam provides a framework for the Government to obtain not only additional military forces, but also civilians for key jobs. It has been attacked in the Assembly because it was issued before the Assembly was organized, and because it could lead, if improperly implemented, to unduly denuding the civilian economy in favor of the military. This is not its purpose, and is not a necessary result of the decree, as Vice President Ky says. I believe Corson will do a good job and that this study is a forward step. He will write a preliminary report, returning to the US in a few days, and then returning here for two months early in January.

B. Political

The new Cabinet of Prime Minister Loc, installed in office November 9, is a symbol of the return to Constitutional Government in South Vietnam. The new Cabinet has brought a substantial number of new faces into the Government, only seven previous members of the Cabinet remaining on. As President Thieu indicated to Ambassador Bunker on several occasions in September and October, selection of the Cabinet was based on the need to find the best-qualified group of ministers possible under the circumstances who would work together as a team in resolving national problems. President Thieu is confident that the new Cabinet, most of whose members have had previous experience in the areas of their competence, will be able to work together as a team.

In forming the Cabinet, comparatively limited use was made of opposition figures who were prominent in the elections, and some American press reportage and comment on the Cabinet has made this point. However, a number of the opposition political figures had become seriously alienated from the Government of Vietnam during the campaign and had made personal and vituperative attacks on President Thieu and Vice President Ky. Not much place could reasonably be found for them. President Thieu has told us that he plans to appoint Tran Van Huong to the Inspectorate, though Huong indicated to an Embassy officer November 24 he was loath to accept the position. There are indications that a place may be found for one or two other opposition figures as Presidential advisers.
The new Cabinet is not composed of colorful or dramatic personalities and is unlikely to attract major support for the new Government of Vietnam. However, it is a fairly experienced group in a technical sense and was chosen very carefully by Prime Minister Loc, in consultation with President Thieu and Vice President Ky. Its members have so far seemed ready to work closely with us in dealing with our common problems.

By terms of a decree signed November 23 by President Thieu his office will be considerably broadened in its scope, beyond the administrative and military sections it now has. The chief figure on the political side may well be the President's brother, Nguyen Van Kieu, though for appearance's sake, he will be technically assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nguyen Van Huong, a well-known wheelhorse in the Dai Viet Party, will be Secretary-General at the Presidency, and also concerned with internal political matters. Huong has a good reputation for honesty and determination and has a prodigious memory. Huong has submitted a draft decree instituting the changes at the Presidency, which awaits signature by Thieu. Without burdening you with the names of those under consideration as Presidential advisers (who may or may not ultimately be appointed), it looks to us as if an effort is being made to bring in a solid and experienced group of people to serve right around the President.

The office of Prime Minister Loc is similarly in the process of organization. Assisting him directly will be Doan Ba Cang, Minister Assisting the Prime Minister, whose most recent assignment was as Counselor of the Vietnamese Embassy in Tokyo. Cang has been very well-recommended by our Embassy in Tokyo, which was in contact with Cang on a range of matters and found him capable, imaginative, and industrious.

Prime Minister Loc has made a good beginning, presenting a wide-ranging, though ambitious short-term and long-term Government program on November 15. The program, presented at a press conference, was followed by about a half hour of questions, which Loc handled with good humor and skill. Loc also handled himself well in an interview November 14 with the semi-official Vietnam Press Agency. The Government's program appears to be a rewritten, shorter, and more modest version of the more ambitious, top priority program and national policy described in Ambassador Bunker's 28th weekly telegram. Even so, implementation of the Government program presented by Prime Minister Loc will be a major task, and only beginnings can be made on considerable parts of it in the foreseeable future.

The reaction of the Saigon press and the politically active public to the new Cabinet and to its program has been cautious and reserved. There
is some doubt expressed that Prime Minister Loc will be able to get things moving. Vice President Ky, accentuating the positive, told the new Cabinet at a formal transfer of powers between the old and new Cabinet November 14 that he expected it to serve in office for four years.

No doubt a major factor in the future success of the new Government will be the personal working relationships that will develop. Prime Minister Loc has initially been somewhat concerned over conflicting directions and statements emanating from President Thieu and Vice President Ky and by President Thieu's reported penchant for making decisions affecting Cabinet members without informing Loc. These are typical, early problems often encountered in the first few months of a Cabinet, complicated by the fact that Loc is something of an introvert without the confidence born of a political power base or personal prestige. Loc does not yet have permanent office and is working out of the official resident furnished him at the Government of Vietnam Naval base. Vice President Ky has retained the former Prime Minister's quarters at Independence Palace.

There have been further reports on clarification of the two houses into blocs, but these appear to be without solid foundation so far. In a conversation with an Embassy officer November 18, Nguyen Van Huong, who will be Secretary General of the Presidency, expressed considerable reservations concerning the relative strengths reported for the respective blocs. He commented that "all of them have exaggerated their strength." It is clear that there will be much more maneuvering before the actual blocs crystallize in both houses.

Regarding forthcoming party alignments, Nguyen Van Huong, a Dai Viet figure for many years, commented that the old parties will slowly disappear and will be replaced by new political formations. He said that some of the old party names may be retained, but will be filled in with the new faces and new figures. The main problem with the old parties, he said, is that they have generally lacked adequate leadership and the capacity to attract younger members. This point is recognized by many other political figures here.

Nguyen Van Kieu, brother of President Thieu, told us recently that he is planning to make a variety of trips around the country in connection with developing a nucleus for Government support within the Assembly and ultimately for a political party extending down into the provinces. He hopes to see a fairly broad, pro-Government party emerge and elements of the responsible opposition converge into a second party grouping. He said that the main requirement for both groups was that they be firmly anti-Communists.
Senator Tran Van Don, whose Senate list received the most votes in the September 3 elections and who is likely to be a major political figure, has recently discussed with us his plans for a political party. Briefly, he is thinking in terms of a small, tightly-organized political party, which would control a larger and more loosely-organized mass organization or front. It is true that it will be easier to organize a loose front than a large national party, and control can more effectively be exercised over a small, tightly-organized party. This is essentially the technique used by the late President Diem, but neither the small, cadre party nor the mass organization Diem set up ever achieved any real vitality on their own. Senator Don is aware of the unfortunate results of the Diem experiment and states he is determined to make these organizations into active bodies, rather than mere facades. This is easier said than done.

There continue to be some stirrings among the Buddhists, but so far no resolution of the factional divisions which have continued to create problems in recent months. On November 11 the extremist An Quang Buddhists held a poorly-attended press conference, at which Tri Quang continued to pound away at the need to withdraw the Buddhist Charter issued by President Thieu last July and re-establish the Buddhist Charter of 1964, which, in effect, gave Tri Quang control of the Buddhist Institutions. On November 12 a group calling itself the "Committee Campaigning to Unite Buddhism" held a small and inconclusive organization meeting, attended by only 30 people. Lower-ranking representatives of the two principal contending Buddhist factions were in attendance, as was the interim Chairman of the Lower House, Nguyen Ba Luong, and Senator Trinh Quang Quy, a member of Tran Van Don's senate group.

The attendance of these two figures is a measure of the increasing politization of the Vietnamese scene and a measure also of the potential political significance of a reunited Buddhist movement. However, little progress was made towards unifying Buddhism by the new group, with the contending factions still standing pat on their standard positions. The Saigon press of November 21 reports that Thich Tam Chau, the more "moderate" Buddhist leader, referred to Tri Quang as "a coward who attempted to flee to Cambodia" and to one of Tri Quang's supporters, Thich Ho Giac, as a "leading hoodlum."

A recent problem involves the yacht Phoenix. Manned by a crew of exceedingly determined Quaker pacifists, the Phoenix, on its current trip to the Far East, is carrying a cargo of about $6,000 worth of medicines. The ship originally sought to deliver some medicines to Haiphong but was refused entry by the Communist authorities, on the ground that the security of the ship...
could not be guaranteed while in Haiphong, and the time was therefore not
propitious. The Phoenix then sailed to Danang with the announced intention
dealing a shipment of medicines to the extremists, anti-Government
of Vietnam Buddhist faction allied to the An Quang pagoda in Saigon. The
Government of Vietnam took the position that the medicines had to be
received by the Vietnamese Red Cross for subsequent delivery to the final
recipients. There seems to have been a misunderstanding between the
Quakers and the Government of Vietnam on the arrangements for delivery
of the medicine. The Government of Vietnam apparently thought these
medicines were the ones rejected by Hanoi (which we understand they were not)
and this helped to account for their reaction.

When the Phoenix arrived in Danang on November 19, it was not
allowed to land, as the Government of Vietnam believed that the Quakers
intended to turn the medicines over directly to an An Quang pagoda delegation
that had come to Danang from Saigon to take delivery. (There is considerable
room for doubt that an An Quang delegation ever went to Danang, though Govern­
tment of Vietnam officials there thought an An Quang delegation was on the way.)
After considerable negotiations, the Government of Vietnam decided to tow the
Phoenix out to international waters the evening of November 21. Faithful to
a threat which they had earlier made to the Government of Vietnam authorities,
two of the Quakers jumped overboard as the ship was being towed out. One was
fished out of the water, and the other, Dr. Richard Butterworth, swam to shore,
where he was rescued by the US Marines, given dry clothing and shelter and
breakfast. After Dr. Butterworth and the other Quaker (name unknown) had
jumped overboard, the Vietnamese authorities decided to bring the ship back.
The afternoon of November 22, Dr. Butterworth indicated that the Quakers
would not again jump overboard, and the Government of Vietnam towed it
out to international waters. Dr. Butterworth asked an American Consular
officer in Danang to send a cable to a Quaker representative in Cambodia,
stating that the ship might go to Cape St. Jacques near Saigon, or to Cambodia.
The vessel was followed for a short distance out to sea by the Vietnamese
Navy, and it appeared to be heading for Hong Kong. At this writing, however,
we have received word that it is now in a small bay between Hue and Danang
tacking back and forth. The crew's intentions are unknown.

Since President Thieu signed the Partial Mobilization Decree on
October 24, which provides for calling on the nation's human resources and
requisition of national resources, to meet national defense requirements,
implementing orders have been under study. On October 25 the then Prime
Minister Ky signed one implementing order which provides for the conscription
of men between ages 18 and 33, mobilization of technicians of all kinds, up to
age 45, and the recall of some veterans. Since the new National Assembly
came into being, however, there has been some question raised whether the
mobilization matter should be handled by decree of by law approved by the
Assembly. On November 21, it was announced that 70 members of the Lower
House had signed a petition requesting early House discussion of the decree.
Senator Nguyen Van Chuc, a well-known lawyer, has told us that in his
opinion the mobilization decree issued under Bao Dai in 1953 provided the
Government of Vietnam will all the necessary authority to mobilize human and
other national resources, and he regretted, as a lawyer, that an additional
decree had been issued just before the new Government was installed, which
may become a matter for debate in the National Assembly. He recognized,
however, the political and psychological reasons behind the issuance of the
decree.

We were encouraged by a conversation between Bob Komer and
Vice President Ky on November 13 in which Ky expressed his desire to do his
best to help with the current difficulties in the US with respect to Vietnam.
Bob emphasized that progress in the political and military spheres during the
next six months would be the most helpful antidote to US criticism and
frustrations. Ky indicated his understanding of this.

Ky repeated his desire to be helpful in assisting the US in facing
serious problems with domestic opinion on Vietnam in the course of a 45-
minute conversation with Senator Tower on November 21. Senator Tower
said that Ky should understand that the majority of American opinion supports
our being in Vietnam and added that, as a Republican, he could reassure Ky
that, regardless of the outcome of the elections, the US commitment here would
be honored. He pointed out that the three most likely Republican Presidential
candidates, Nixon, Rockefeller, and Reagan, all supported our basic purposes
here, although they differed with the Johnson Administration on some of the
ways in which our policies should be carried out.

During the same conversation with Senator Tower, Ky also made
a number of other interesting points. He interpreted the recent series of heavy
engagements with the Viet Cong (Loc Ninh, Song Be and Dak To) as aimed at
American domestic political opinion, which he believes the Viet Cong consider
as increasingly opposed to the Administration's policy in Vietnam. In this
respect, the Viet Cong were repeating a tactic used against the French many
years ago. In response to a question, Ky said he thought the holiday stand-downs
in military activity should be shorter than the Communists have proposed, as they
are looking primarily for a longer period in which to reinforce and resupply their
forces. Ky said he was generally satisfied with the steady progress being made
on pacification and described plans to replace most Province Chiefs in January 1968, with a carefully selected group of civilians and military officers who will enter a four-week's training course. He confirmed that the channel of direction for Province Chiefs on civilian matters will be taken out of the hands of the Corps Commanders and would be sent from the Ministry of the Interior of the Province Chiefs.

Senator Cannon of Nevada was here recently and Senator Tower of Texas is here now. In addition, Representatives Fred Schwengel (Rep., Iowa) and William O Cowger (Rep., Kentucky), accompanied by nine other persons, drawn broadly from the business world, the church (a Baptist and a Lutheran minister), and political life (Mr. Robert Henry, newly-elected mayor of Springfield, Ohio, a negro). The Schwengel-Cowger group leaves Saigon November 24 after an extensive round of contacts with political and civic figures and our troops. The group, which traveled under private auspices, had prepared itself fairly carefully for the trip, but I have been told that some of the members have been reluctant to accept facts that disagree with the preconceived notions, some of which are very unfavorable to the Government of Vietnam.

Congressman Schwengel, having heard a version of a recent press interview with North Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, in which the latter was quoted as saying he would consider a visit by US Congressmen to Hanoi, issued a press statement in which he said as follows: "I have heard of a possibility of US Congressmen traveling to Hanoi. I would consider accepting an invitation from Hanoi if assured of an opportunity to talk about the opening of discussion which could lead to negotiations for peace." Congressman Schwengel seems to have tried to avoid going too far without knowing all the details of the matter. We have provided him with a text of the North Vietnamese News Agency report of the Pham Van Dong interview, in which Dong makes clear the purpose of any such visit would be to see bomb damage in North Vietnam.

At this writing we have been informed that he is planning to send a wire to the Prime Minister in Hanoi reiterating his willingness to go to Hanoi after he arrives in Bangkok the afternoon of November 24.

On November 21 we delivered to both Houses of the Vietnamese National Assembly an invitation extended by Congressman Reuss of Wisconsin and 25 other members of the House of Representatives that a representative delegation of both Vietnamese Houses visit Washington in January. We are awaiting a reply, but we are aware that there is very considerable interest
both in the National Assembly and in the Government of Vietnam as a whole in the visit, as well as concern that the Vietnamese delegation be composed of the best and most capable figures in the Assembly.

There have been no developments of significance regarding the return of the Montagnard leader Y Bham from self-imposed exile in Cambodia since his meeting with Government of Vietnam representatives near Van Me Thout in June. We have learned from Paul Nur, Ky's new Minister of Ethnic Minorities Development and a Montagnard himself, that he is planning a new effort to bring Y Bham back to Vietnam. Nur says he will be prepared to give up his post as Minister in favor of Y Bham; should the latter agree to return. Nur is approaching the problem realistically, planning to enlist the support of Vice President Ky in his capacity of ex-officio Chairman of the Ethnic Minorities Council provided for in the Constitution. However, the Ethnic Minorities Council must be established by law passed by the National Assembly before it can begin to function.

On November 20 the Viet Cong's Liberation Radio rejected recent public comments by President Thieu that he may send a letter to Ho Chi Minh, proposing direct peace talks, implementing a promise he made during the Presidential election campaign on August 25. The radio said that "Nguyen Van Thieu was ballyhood about negotiations, despite the fact that he does not have the capacity to represent anyone." The broadcast continued that "peace negotiation arguments definitely cannot deceive anyone." The broadcast restated the familiar Viet Cong theme that the National Liberation Front is the "sole genuine representative" of the South Vietnamese people. President Thieu is proceeding with his plans to send a letter to Ho Chi Minh sometime before Christmas and has apparently decided to ask the Japanese to transmit it to Hanoi. The Japanese Government has not responded to his request as yet.
The new British Consul-General in Hanoi, Brian Stewart, who arrived there early in October, recently visited Saigon.

There has been considerable play given to recent stories by Ray Herndon (UPI) and George MacArthur (AP) regarding a visit they made to a Viet Cong base camp in Eastern Cambodia near the Vietnamese border. An embassy officer had the opportunity to talk to MacArthur at some length in Saigon on November 23 (Herndon is believed to be still in Cambodia). MacArthur said he does not believe higher Cambodian officials or Prince Sihnouk expected the discovery of a Viet Cong base camp nor connived in any way in arranging or highlighting the discovery. He says that to the best of his and Herndon's knowledge, local Cambodian officials accompanying the two journalists did not
report back the same day to Phnom Penh after the camp was discovered. Therefore, Phnom Penh did not even know of the discovery until after the second day's trip. According to MacArthur, Cambodian officials in the border area know that the official and preferred Cambodian government view is that there are no Viet Cong using Cambodia. Hence, they do not report any Viet Cong activities to Phnom Penh and even go to the limit not to find Viet Cong. Even if they know of Viet Cong activity, they do not report these unpleasant facts to Phnom Penh, where such news is unwelcome. Local Cambodian officials report only US/Government of Vietnam incursions into Cambodian territory. MacArthur says that in Phnom Penh he discussed the matter with Cambodian Prime Minister Son Sann, who agreed only reluctantly to an official investigation of the area. We tend to doubt that the discovery of the Viet Cong base camp is evidence of a significant shift in Sihanouk's attitude towards the Communists.

C. Economic

The Saigon Retail Price Index declined to 301 for the week ending November 13 from the level of 304 previously reported. Price trends were mixed, with some increase in rice prices due to transportation problems related to a high level of Viet Cong activities in the rice-growing areas south of Saigon. Imported Commodity Prices were generally higher. The increase in commodity prices was partly due to widespread rumors of an increase in customs duties and the possible issuance of 1,000 piasters in banknotes.

The Directorate General of the Budget and Foreign Aid has approved a budget of 95 billion piasters for calendar year 1968, including 53 billion piasters for defense, 32 billion piasters for civil government, and 10 billion piasters in the American Aid Chapter. The new budget is increased from the revised 83 billion piasters in the 1967 budget. Considering the recently decreed military pay increases which are to become effective in January, the total budget is probably unrealistic and will have to be revised upward at least in the defense section.

Professor Vu Quoc Thuc and Mr. David E. Lilienthal presented a report developed by the Joint Postwar Planning Group to President Thieu on November 16. After the presentation to President Thieu, Mr. Lilienthal held a news briefing for the American press. The report, which is in its preliminary version, suggests specific areas in which progress can be made in the next four years, including: (1) a program of regional development,
starting with the Mekong Delta—an integrated development program is suggested, with an autonomous agency to design it and carry it out; 
(2) development of agriculture, aiming initially at self-sufficiency in foodstuffs through better land use and other means; 
(3) rational development of industry in land appropriate to the situation and potentials of Vietnam; 
(4) development of a program of land development and settlement, which will also serve to alleviate the plight of refugees and produce important long-term economic benefits. President Thieu described the program to Senator Tower on November 21 as being a very practical program.

D. Chieu Hoi

During the week ending November 11 there were 219 returnees, compared to 566 during the same period of 1966. The reason suggested for the lower level of Chieu Hoi returnees is the currently high level of Viet Cong activity throughout the country, which tends to increase the problem of security for those considering turning themselves in. The total number of returnees so far this year is 25,548 compared to 15,786 during the same period last year.

E. Americans and Vietnamese Killed

During the period from November 5-17, inclusive, the enemy killed 209 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 668, and kidnapped 446. Among the dead were nine Revolutionary Development Workers, one national policeman, 27 refugees, one Hamlet Chief, and one school teacher. Since January 1, 1967, the Viet Cong have killed a total of 3,306 civilians, wounded 6,514 and kidnapped 4,267.