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AS OF 31 DEC 1967

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CINCPAC
MEASUREMENT
OF
PROGRESS
IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1967
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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this presentation is to provide a quarterly measurement of progress in Southeast Asia, with primary emphasis on South Vietnam. It is prepared in accordance with CINCPAC Staff Instruction 003100.3A, Subject: Measurement of Progress in Southeast Asia. RCS 3100-4 applies.

At the Honolulu Conference, February 1966, six goals were established as objectives for operations in South Vietnam during 1966. The goals were the basis for the measurement of progress last year. In November 1966 a new statement of CINCPAC Military Strategy was promulgated. The strategy includes three independent undertakings which constitute an integrated concept for the conduct of military operations against North Vietnam and in Laos and South Vietnam. The strategy and the 1967 goals are shown on the following page.

It is essential that persons using this publication consider that most of the data pertaining to the enemy forces, losses, casualties, and capabilities are based upon estimates. Similarly, most of the statistics pertaining to population and area control are based upon estimates that are as accurate as possible and are improving. These data are not precise and must be treated accordingly. Users of this evaluation are cautioned against deriving unjustified conclusions; and, when there is doubt, should request clarification of data as may be necessary. For additional copies or information concerning this publication write to the Joint Secretary, CINCPAC, FPO San Francisco, 96610.

Published Quarterly
by
Commander in Chief Pacific
THE STRATEGY

IN SOUTH VIETNAM:

- IN THE SOUTH - SEEK OUT AND DESTROY COMMUNIST FORCES and infrastructure by expanded, offensive military operations.

- NATION BUILDING - Extend the secure areas of South Vietnam by military operations and assist the GVN in building an independent, viable, non-communist society by civic actions coordinated with military operations.

OUTSIDE SOUTH VIETNAM:

- IN THE NORTH - TAKE THE WAR TO THE ENEMY by unremitting but selective application of United States air and naval power thus reducing HANOI's capability to support and direct military operations in South Vietnam.

GOALS

TOWARD WHICH PROGRESS WILL BE MEASURED

I. DURING CY 1967 BEGIN TO INFlict LOSSES ON THE VC/NVA FORCES AT A RATE WHICH EXCEEDS THEIR INPUT.

II. NEUTRALIZE THE VC/NVA BASE AREAS IN THE FIRST TEN PRIORITY GROUPINGS.

III. OPEN 100 PERCENT AND SECURE 50 PERCENT OF THE ROADS ESSENTIAL TO FRIENDLY OPERATIONS.

IV. OPEN 55 PERCENT OF THE RAILROADS AND SECURE THOSE IN THE NATIONAL PRIORITY AREAS OF II AND III CORPS.

V. SECURE THE WATER LINES OF COMMUNICATION IN THE NATIONAL PRIORITY AREAS OF III AND IV CORPS TACTICAL ZONES.

VI. INCREASE THE PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION LIVING IN SECURED AREAS TO 66 PERCENT AND SECURE OR UPGRADE 1100 HAMLETS.

VII. ACHIEVE AND MAINTAIN A LEVEL OF DAMAGE TO WAR SUPPORTING TARGETS WHICH WILL RENDER THOSE TARGETS UNUSABLE FOR THEIR INTENDED PURPOSE.

VIII. REDUCE CAPABILITY OF NVN TO MOVE MEN AND MATERIAL WITHIN NVN AND INTO SVN ALONG ALL LAND AND WATER LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

IX. AS AUTHORIZED, PROGRESSIVELY REDUCE MONTHLY MILITARY IMPORTS INTO NVN.

X. REDUCE CAPABILITY OF NVN TO INTERFERE WITH OUR AIR OPERATIONS OVER NVN, AS MEASURED BY ENEMY AIRCRAFT INVENTORY, SAM INVENTORY, AND THE FRIENDLY AIRCRAFT LOSS RATE.
NATIONAL PRIORITY AREAS

The following comment has been extracted from the Combined Campaign Plan for 1967, published by the Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and the Chief, Joint General Staff, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. The priority areas play a significant part in the overall strategy for South Vietnam and are therefore a part of the evaluation of goals III through VI.

"The people are the greatest asset to the enemy and control of the people is the enemy's goal. With them, the enemy has most of the ingredients needed for success: food, supplies, money, manpower, concealment and intelligence. During this campaign every effort will be made to deny these assets to the enemy. Map 1 reflects the National Priority Area for each corps tactical zone, and the area for priority of military offensive operations. These priority areas together cover a large majority of the population, food producing lands, and critical lines of communications within SVN.

"The National Priority Areas are areas of major significance at the national level where critical civil and military resources are focused on a priority basis for revolutionary development. The purpose of designating the area for priority of military offensive operations in conjunction with the national priority areas is to focus the attention and effort of RVNAF and US/FWMAF to those areas where operations will destroy or drive the enemy into sparsely populated and food-scarce areas; insure the protection of the population, control of resources and provide unrestricted use of major lines of communications, all of which will facilitate follow-on Revolutionary Development. Spoiling attacks to frustrate the VC strategy will continue to be conducted in other areas as directed."
SUMMARY OF PROGRESS TOWARD THE GOALS FOR SOUTH VIETNAM

GOAL I: VC/NVA losses for the fourth quarter amounted to 33,485—a two percent increase from the third quarter. Based upon the estimate of an enemy input of 30,750 during the latest quarter, the total losses exceeded the input by 2,735. For all of 1967, the enemy losses totaled 144,948 compared to the estimated input of 122,400—a difference of 22,548. Therefore, the goal to inflict losses on the VC/NVA forces at a rate which exceeds their input during 1967 was achieved.

GOAL II: Fifty-two percent of the enemy base areas in the first ten priority groupings were considered neutralized at the end of December, 48 percentage points below the 1967 goal of 100 percent. The total active base areas in SVN decreased from 77 to 53 during the year due to US/RVN/FWNAF pressure on the VC/NVA.

GOAL III: The 1967 goal of opening 100 percent of militarily essential roads was met (99.7 percent actual). Roads in the Secure category stood at 61 percent exceeding the 1967 goal of 50 percent.

GOAL IV: Railroads Open in SVN stood at 37.5 percent at the end of the year, compared to the goal of 55 percent, a reduction of 16 percentage points occurring in December. The goal of securing 100 percent of the railroads in the National Priority Areas of II and III CTZ was attained.

GOAL V: Water LOC's Secure in the National Priority Areas of III and IV Corps improved from 14 percent to 47.5 percent during 1967, compared to the goal of 100 percent. Waterways considered Open were 92 percent, a significant 30 percentage points above the initial March figure.

GOAL VI: The percentage of population living in secured areas using GVN criteria decreased from 65.1 percent to 63.6 percent at the end of the year, 2.4 percentage points below the goal of 66 percent. HES figures show 66.9 percent of the population living in secured areas, exceeding the 66 percent goal for the year.

The number of secured hamlets decreased during the quarter to 4,503 at the end of December. A total of 102 hamlets were reported secured during the year using GVN figures, considerably below the goal of securing or upgrading 1,100 hamlets. HES figures show 5,340 hamlets in the Secure category at the end of the year. Neither portion of this goal was met using GVN figures; however, HES figures show the population goal was met.
COMUSMACV OVERALL EVALUATION FOR DECEMBER 1967

The measurement of progress toward the goals for SVN is primarily based on information provided in the MACV monthly Measurement of Progress report. The following narrative is the MACV summary evaluation for December and is provided to give the reader a review of COMUSMACV's latest assessment:

"December was a month of accomplishment for three of the goals in the 1967 Combined Campaign Plan and produced evidence of progress in all of the goals for the year. Base area neutralization percentage continued to rise. In the overview for the year, 12 of the 41 priority base areas selected for the neutralization goal were dropped during the year as having been abandoned by the enemy due to Allied pressure or as having been completely neutralized by friendly operations. Of the remaining 29, four were neutralized in December and 13 are considered to be partially neutralized. These statistics produce a 52 percent accomplishment of the goal. It should be noted however, that during the year 33 of the original 41 base areas were neutralized at one time or another. In many cases, priority operational commitments preclude the retention of forces in these areas and the enemy was able to re-enter and re-establish some of the bases. Thus the 52 percent accomplishment figure does not truly represent the success attained during the year in denying the enemy the intended use of his base areas.

"Great strides were made during CY67 in securing the waterways in the priority areas of III and IV Corps, however, the goal was not attained. At the end of the year 92 percent of the vital water lanes were open to traffic and 47.5 percent were secure. The securing of the Dong Nai and Saigon Rivers in III Corps was of major importance for commercial traffic in this area and the securing of the Bassac River in IV Corps along with the opening of the Mang Thit River-Nicholai Canal in August measurably improved the economic well-being of the Delta. The seasonal flooding in the low-lying Delta prevents permanent establishment of security forces and the heavy foliage along the rivers and canals is of great aid to the enemy in allowing frequent opportunities for ambush and interdiction. Operations in early 1968 are expected to secure more of these waterways and open an even greater number throughout this highly productive area of the south.

"A comparison of the railroad security statistics as of 31 December with those of 1 January would indicate regression rather than improvement for the year. However, the rail lines in the priority areas of II and III Corps were secured and significantly relieved transportation problems within these areas. With the development of the many water supply ports along the coast and the great improvement in the road system, the importance of the railroads was lessened to some degree. Extensive reconstruction is programmed for 1968 to develop these rail lines for further expansion of the Vietnamese economy.

"Progress towards the goal for road security was noteworthy. At the end of December 99.7 percent of the roads deemed military essential in the Combined Campaign Plan were open and almost 61 percent were secure, above
the goal of 50 percent secure established as the goal. Route One was open from Saigon to the DMZ and traffic was able to move over the majority of the roads in the Plan.

"For the Pacification Goal, GVN estimates were initially used to measure population and hamlet security, being the only statistics available at the first of the year. However, the development of the Hamlet Evaluation System has shown it to be a more reliable system for evaluating population and hamlet security. Under this system, 66.9 percent of the Vietnamese population is considered to be in secure areas, above the 66 percent goal for the year. While the rise in secure percentage for the year is only 4.8 percent, this represents an increase of one million three hundred thousand people, a considerable increase for the year. An analysis of the hamlets in the GVN 1967 RD Program, due to be completed in late January, will provide a detailed evaluation of achievement in the GVN RD Program for the year.

"To measure accomplishment of the attrition goal for 1967 we have but to consider the statistics. In 1966, estimated enemy input by infiltration and in-country recruiting totalled 169,000, and his losses for the year numbered 93,326. The scales swung heavily in his favor by over 51,000. In 1967, the situation presents an entirely different picture. While his estimated input has numbered 113,700, his losses have totalled at least 145,200, resulting in a deficit in manpower of over 31,000 for the year. The crossover of attrition exceeding ability to input was attained in January and we have maintained this goal for every month of 1967.

"Progress for 1967 ranged from fair to excellent. Some goals were exceeded while others, below the desired percentages of accomplishment, still indicated substantial progress."
OPPOSING FORCES

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GVN &amp; FREE WORLD</th>
<th>VC/NVA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL STRENGTH</strong></td>
<td>1,311,273</td>
<td>224,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MANEUVER BATTALIONS</strong></td>
<td>282</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**STRENGTH RATIO** 5.8 to 1
**EQUIVALENT MANEUVER BATTALION RATIO** 3.2 to 1

**CHANGES FROM PRECEDING QUARTER**

<table>
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<th></th>
<th>GVN &amp; FREE WORLD</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>STRENGTH</strong></td>
<td>+ 4%</td>
<td>- 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MANEUVER BATTALIONS</strong></td>
<td>+ 15</td>
<td>+ 1</td>
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**CHANGES FROM PRECEDING YEAR**

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GVN &amp; FREE WORLD</th>
<th>VC/NVA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>STRENGTH</strong></td>
<td>+ 13%</td>
<td>- 22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MANEUVER BATTALIONS</strong></td>
<td>+ 24</td>
<td>+ 10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The total strength of the Republic of Vietnam and the Free World Forces (FWF) operating in South Vietnam at the end of December 1967 amounted to 1,311,273 while the total strength of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army forces operating in South Vietnam amounted to approximately 224,600 at the end of the same period. This force ratio of 5.8:1 represents an increase from the 5.2:1 ratio at the end of the preceding calendar quarter, and is significantly higher than the 4.1:1 that existed at the end of December 1966. The VC/NVA strength reflects the sum of VC/NVA combat strength, administrative service units, and guerrilla forces. Since there can be several months between the time an NVA unit arrives in SVN and the time that it is accepted in order of battle, the evaluation of the strengths of most recent months must be treated with appropriate caution.

GVN and U.S. forces increased by 29,511 and 21,008, respectively, from the end of the previous quarter, while Other Free World Forces increased by 1,478. The buildup of friendly forces during 1967 resulted in a year end total strength of 1,311,273 compared to the total strength of 1,159,082 at the end of 1966—a increase of 152,191. During 1967, GVN forces expanded by 37,439 from the end of 1966 while the U.S. forces and Other Free World Forces increased by 107,003 and 7,749, respectively.
As of 31 December 1967, GVN forces totaled 753,371, U.S. forces totaled 497,571, and Other Free World Forces amounted to 60,331. The GVN strength figure is composed of:

- Regular Forces: 341,000
- Regional Forces: 150,000
- Popular Forces: 148,000
- CIDG: 41,000
- National Police: 73,371

Total: 753,371

COMUSMACV has recently revised the VC/NVA order of battle. This revision has resulted in the elimination of the political cadre, the self-defense and the secret self-defense elements from the order of battle. Enemy strength has been restated, retroactively, to include only the combat forces, administrative service units, and guerrilla forces. The combat forces are the enemy's maneuver and combat support units. Administrative service units are composed of military personnel in identified COSVN, military region, military sub-region, province, and district staffs, and rear service technical units of all types directly subordinate to these headquarters. Guerrilla forces are full-time forces organized into squads and platoons to collect taxes, generate propaganda, protect village party committees, and conduct terrorist and sabotage activities.
VC/NVA forces at the end of December 1967 amounted to 224,600, a decrease of 14,300, or six percent, from the strength of 238,900 at the end of the preceding quarter. His combat forces were reduced by 4,100 while his guerrilla strength declined by 10,200. Although there appears to be a sharp decline in the enemy's guerrilla forces, there are reports that the enemy is upgrading these forces into combat maneuver units. At the end of December 1966, VC/NVA strength was estimated at 286,200. The end of December 1967 estimated enemy strength of 224,600 represents a decline of 61,600, or 22 percent, from the December 1966 strength.

The total number of enemy maneuver battalions (infantry, sapper, and reconnaissance battalions) at the end of December 1967 amounted to 169, an increase of one battalion from the end of the preceding quarter, but an increase of 10 battalions since the end of 1966 when the enemy had 159 maneuver battalions. However, in comparing the reduction of enemy strength of almost 62,000 during 1967 and the increase in his maneuver battalions, consideration should be given to the fact that 55,000 of the strength reduction was in guerrilla forces. This substantiates reports that the enemy is upgrading the guerrilla forces into combat maneuver units, thus maintaining or even increasing the numerical integrity of the maneuver battalions. However, this numerical integrity reflects loss of actual battalion strength and effectiveness. Of the 169 maneuver battalions at the end of December 1967, only 79 were considered to be combat effective, with 71 rated as marginal, and 19 as non-combat effective.

There were 282 total friendly maneuver battalions at the end of December 1967, an increase of 15 from the end of September 1967. The 282 total friendly maneuver battalions consisted of 102 U.S. battalions, 154 GVN battalions, and 26 battalions of other Free World Forces. GVN maneuver battalions include all Infantry, Airborne, Ranger, and Marine battalions.
The existing 10 GVN Armored Cavalry Squadrons are not included since they are normally split up and employed in small units. Maneuver battalions of the Free World Military Assistance Forces (U.S. and other Free World Forces) include Infantry, Marine, Armor, and Armored Cavalry. The Air Cavalry Squadron of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) is not included. The increase in the Free World maneuver battalions resulted from the entry into country of five U.S. battalions during October, and nine U.S. battalions and one Australian battalion during December. The total of 282 friendly maneuver battalions at the end of 1967 was an increase of 24 maneuver battalions from the end of 1966. GVN, U.S., and Other Free World Forces increased their maneuver battalions in-country by one, 20, and three, respectively, during the year.

Based upon the assumption that one maneuver battalion of the Free World Military Assistance Forces (including U.S.) is the equivalent of three RVN and VC/NVA maneuver battalions, an equivalent maneuver battalion ratio is computed by dividing $1 \times \text{GVN} + (3 \times \text{FW maneuver battalions})$ by $1 \times \text{VC/NVA maneuver battalions}$. The equivalent maneuver battalion ratio at the end of December 1967 stood at 3.2 to 1, up from the 2.9 to 1 ratio that existed at the end of the preceding calendar quarter and up from the 2.9 to 1 ratio that also existed at the end of December 1966.

Overall GVN desertion rates have been accumulated through the month of November 1967 as data concerning the desertion rate for the GVN Regular Forces are not available for the month of December 1967. The overall desertion rate at the end of November 1967 stood at 11.1 per thousand, up slightly from the 10.7 per thousand that existed at the end of September 1967 but slightly below the 11.2 per thousand that existed at the end of 1966. The average monthly desertion rate for 1967 was 11.1 per thousand.
compared to the average monthly desertion rate of 16.3 per thousand in 1966. The overall desertion rate is computed by utilizing the combined strengths of the GVN Regular, Regional and Popular Forces.

The highest desertion rates continue to be from the Regular and Popular Forces. During November 1967, the Regular Forces experienced an average desertion rate of 10.5 per thousand, up slightly from the 9.9 per thousand rate that existed at the end of the preceding quarter. However, the current rate of 10.5 per thousand in the Regular Forces is significantly below the 16.8 per thousand monthly average during 1966. The Popular Forces experienced 12.1 deserters per thousand during December 1967, down from the 14.2 deserters per thousand during September 1967 and down significantly from the 22.3 per thousand monthly average during 1966. The desertion rate for the Regional Forces stood at 9.3 per thousand, up slightly from the 9.2 per thousand that existed at the end of September 1967 and slightly above the 9.2 per thousand monthly average during 1966.
GOAL I
DURING CY 1967 BEGIN TO INFlict LOSSES ON THE VC/NVA FORCES AT A RATE WHICH EXCEEDS THEIR INPUT

SUMMARY

Efforts of the friendly forces in SVN continued at high levels of intensity during the calendar quarter ending 31 December 1967 but were slightly below the levels of the previous quarter. Arc Light sorties and battalion days on large operations remained at approximately the same activity levels as the preceding quarter. Rounds fired by naval gunfire increased 11 percent and resulted in a 50 percent increase in secondary explosions but resulted in the destruction of 18 percent fewer structures. Psychological warfare operations in SVN continued the upward trend that started in early 1966 by reaching record activity levels. Increased emphasis was placed on defoliation during the quarter and the number of defoliation sorties rose 44 percent from the previous quarter. Crop destruction efforts, however, dropped from the record activity levels of the previous quarter by declining 67 percent. Tactical air sorties within SVN declined 11 percent from the preceding quarter and resulted in substantial reductions in the number of secondary explosions and structures and sampans destroyed. However, the tactical air loss rate remained the same as the preceding quarter. Boarding and searching operations declined 17 percent from the record levels achieved during the previous quarter. The number of Chieu Hoi returnees continued the rapid decline that started in April 1967 as the number of returnees during the recent quarter reached the lowest level in two years.

In the fourth quarter, enemy forces suffered their greatest loss of weapons during the last two years. The downward trend that started in the beginning of 1967 of GVN weapons lost was sharply reversed as the weapons lost during the quarter amounted to the highest total of the year. VC/NVA incidents declined nine percent from the preceding quarter but the number of enemy initiated large scale attacks rose to 11 during the recent quarter from nine in the preceding quarter. Prisoners of war continued the decline that started during the second quarter of the year by declining 68 percent from the previous quarter. The number of enemy killed increased 11 percent from the previous quarter while the number of friendly killed increased 19 percent.

Total VC/NVA losses for the quarter amounted to 33,485—a two percent increase from the previous quarter. Based upon the current estimate of an enemy input of 10,250 per month or 30,750 per quarter, the total losses for the quarter exceeded the estimated input by 2,735 and therefore the goal of inflicting losses on the enemy at a rate which exceeds their input was achieved for the fourth quarter. For all of 1967, the enemy losses totaled 144,948 compared to the estimated input of 122,400—a difference of 22,548. Therefore, the goal to inflict losses on the VC/NVA forces at a rate which exceeds their input during 1967 was achieved.
INfiltration Routes

Infiltration of personnel and material into SVN is accomplished by the interchangeable use of main roads, mazes of trails and inland waterways, and numerous sea routes. The accompanying sketch presents the general traffic pattern of the principal infiltration routes. Tracing the infiltrators' exact routes is difficult due to lack of more definitive intelligence information and the enemy's constant ability to select from the multitude of avenues.

Routes employed to infiltrate into the DMZ area are believed to be Routes 1A, 101, and, to some extent, 103, supplemented by the maze of trails.

The personnel infiltration corridor in Laos has, in recent months, moved further west away from the SVN border as a result of air interdiction and friendly operations. Primary infiltration routes now appear to be generally as follows: through the northwestern corner of the DMZ, southwest to the vicinity of Muong Nong, south paralleling Routes 92 and 96, through the junction of Routes 96/110 and then south into Cambodia. The pattern flowing parallel to Routes 92 and 96 also branches eastward through Base Areas 610, 611, 607, 608, and 609.

Evidence indicates that beginning in 1965 there has been an increase of NVA personnel routed through Cambodia. In 1965 and early 1966, the major infiltration trail crossed a short portion of the northeastern tip of Cambodia in the tri-border area into SVN, down the valley of the Nam Sathay River almost to its junction with the Se San River, and crossed Highway 19 before heading into SVN again. Recent information indicates the addition of new western routes through Cambodia, giving infiltrating personnel a ready alternative to their existing approaches into SVN. The southernmost extensions of the infiltration route through Cambodia are not clearly delineated. It appears to swing back into SVN in the Nam Ly Mountain area; however, it may extend on the Cambodian side of the border, as it apparently has been extended on the SVN side to Tay Ninh Province. Enemy forces reportedly cross the border south of Nam Ly Mountain, but these crossings could be in-country units seeking resupply or sanctuary rather than an initial infiltration.

The two main logistical arteries from NVN run parallel with Routes 12 and 912. Military supplies shipped from Cambodia into Laos enter via Route 110. Recent indications are that material is entering Cambodia via Sihanoukville for VC/NVA use. Material is then moved north and eastward toward SVN along inland waterways and Routes 1, 7, 13, 19 and 110.

Despite apparent lack of significant success to date, NVN has indicated a continuing interest in sea infiltration. Current intelligence indicates that the enemy will probably continue attempts to infiltrate supplies along the coast from NVN to SVN using small waterborne logistic craft. The accompanying sketch indicates, by priority, the likely areas for sea infiltration.
INfiltration ROUTES

PERSONNEL ROUTES
LOGISTICAL ROUTES
BASE AREAS
SEA INFILTRATION AREAS BY PRIORITY
TOTAL VC/NVA PERSONNEL INPUT

The following chart is based on infiltration data provided by COMUSMACV. It shows the total accepted and possible infiltration, the in-country recruitment, and the total VC/NVA personnel input by month.
Statistics on NVA infiltration have been revised to incorporate the most recent changes to infiltration data. While the chart does not show any infiltration for December 1967, this does not mean that there were no infiltrators entering SVN during that month. There continues to be a significant time lag in receiving firm infiltration data. The average monthly infiltration for the period 1 October 1965 through 30 June 1967 is 6,750. The figures for 1 July 1967 through 31 December 1967 are considered incomplete; therefore, COMUSMACV estimates personnel infiltration during the past six months to be 6,750 per month. This figure is based upon the trend analysis of infiltration into SVN for the period 1 October 1965 through 30 June 1967.

In-country recruitment is estimated to have averaged 7,000 per month for 1966 and 3,500 per month for 1967. The in-country recruiting plus the infiltration figures constitute the reported total input for the accompanying chart.

For comparison purposes, the total enemy input capability is also shown. The input capability is the sum of the NVN training base plus the VC in-country recruitment. The NVN training base was estimated at 15,600 per month up until 31 October 1967 at which time it was revised to 8,300 per month based on a new estimate. This represents a practical limit of 100,000 men per year. This limit could be exceeded by shortening the training cycle or a maximum effort in training. However, a higher rate would be difficult to sustain and the quality of trainees would be reduced. The chart reflects the fact that during the recent months, the estimated total input is approaching the enemy's total input capability (training base plus in-country recruitment).

BOARDING AND SEARCHING OPERATIONS

Since September 1966, the U.S. Navy and the RVN Navy have established a goal to board and search an average of 800 junks daily in order to contribute to the effort of disrupting the enemy's capability to move men and material to their designated areas. USN operations of TF 115 (Market Time) and TF 116 (Game Warden) are included in this discussion. See glossary for purpose of Market Time and Game Warden.

The daily average of junks boarded and searched by the USN and VNN during the quarter ending in December amounted to 2,634, a decline of 17 percent from the record high average of 3,162 established during the preceding quarter. This decline in operations was attributable to the monsoon weather in the northern coastal areas which forced many of the smaller craft to move off-station to calmer waters inshore, thereby reducing the number of intercepts. Despite the decline in the latest quarter, the daily average of boarding and searching operations during the last half of 1967 amounted to 2,898, a significant 23 percent increase from the daily average of 2,364 for the first half of 1967. The daily average for all of 1967 amounted to 2,631, a 91 percent increase from the daily average of 1,376 established in
1966. The operations during 1967 resulted in boarding and searching more
than 960,000 vessels and detaining 22,944 persons and 1,661 junks.

The U.S. Navy experienced a sharp drop in their boarding and searching
operations during the last quarter. The daily average during the October-
December 1967 period amounted to 1,473, a 31 percent decline from the record
2,135 daily average achieved in the preceding quarter. However, daily
operations for the last six months of 1967 averaged 1,804, a 10 percent
increase over the 1,642 daily average experienced during the first six
months of 1967. During all of 1967, U.S. Navy daily boarding and searching
operations averaged 1,723, significantly ahead of their goal to board and
search 800 vessels daily and up a significant 131 percent from the 1966
daily average of 709.

The Vietnamese Navy boarded and searched an average of 134 more junks
daily during the latest quarter than they did in the preceding quarter—
1,161 compared to 1,027. Their efforts during the last six months of 1967
resulted in increasing their daily average of junks boarded and searched by
52 percent over the daily average achieved during the first six months of
the year. For the entire year of 1967, the daily average amounted to 908—
14 percent above their goal and 36 percent above the 1966 level of activity.
VC/NVA INCIDENTS

VC/NVA initiated incidents are classified by incident categories: terror, anti-aircraft, sabotage, propaganda, assaults, and attacks by fire. Definitions of these terms can be found in the glossary. These incidents provide the detection of total enemy progress and direction of effort of initiated actions.
Starting with September 1967, COMUSMACV added another category to the classification of VC/NVA incidents—attacks by fire. This category of incidents may further assist in the detection of enemy progress and direction of effort of initiated actions. Since September 1967, the enemy conducted 520 attacks by fire. The number of attacks by fire for previous periods is not available.

The total number of VC/NVA incidents taking place during the quarter ending December 1967, including attacks by fire, amounted to 9,193—a decrease of nine percent from the total incidents that took place in the preceding quarter. The intensity of the latest quarter's large-scale significant attacks, such as those at Loc Ninh and Dak To, probably accounts for some of this reduction. All categories of incidents, with the exception of sabotage, decreased in the latest quarter from the preceding quarter. Sabotage incidents continued the successive upward trend that started in the first quarter of the year.

The total number of incidents during 1967 amounted to 39,191, up four percent from the 37,731 incidents that took place in 1966. The average monthly incident rate in 1967 was 3,266 compared to 3,144 in 1966. Incident categories of assaults and anti-aircraft increased during 1967 from 1966 levels while sabotage, propaganda, and terror incidents decreased.

SIGNIFICANT VC/NVA INITIATED LARGE-SCALE ATTACKS

The accompanying chart shows the monthly number of enemy initiated large-scale attacks which are determined to be significant. The purpose of this chart is to measure and monitor the extent of large-scale enemy initiative. The term "Significant VC/NVA Initiated Large-Scale Attack" is defined in the glossary.
There were 11 significant enemy initiated large-scale attacks reported for the quarter ending in December 1967 compared with nine in the previous quarter. Two of the attacks took place in II CTZ, six in III CTZ, and three in IV CTZ. This represents an unusually high number for IV CTZ. Also notable is the absence of attacks in I CTZ where there has been a great deal of large-scale activity during other quarters. The 1967 total of significant large-scale attacks was 41. A summary of each attack for the quarter follows:

On 27 October in Phuoc Long Province, the 88th NVA Regiment launched a heavy mortar and rocket attack, followed by a three-pronged ground assault against the CP of the ARVN 3rd Battalion, 9th Regiment. Friendly losses were six ARVN KIA, seven civilians killed, 24 ARVN WIA, two U.S. WIA, and 18 civilians wounded. The enemy suffered 134 KIA.

On 29 October in Binh Long Province, two battalions of the 273rd VC Regiment attacked Loc Ninh SF Camp and sub-sector compound. Friendly forces lost one U.S. KIA, three RF KIA, two civilians killed, 14 RF WIA, and two ARVN WIA. The enemy lost 135 KIA.

On 2 November in Binh Long Province, the Loc Ninh SF Compound and sub-sector compound were again attacked by the 273rd VC Regiment. Friendly losses were one U.S. KIA, two ARVN KIA, four CIDG KIA, 11 U.S. WIA, 12 ARVN WIA, and 12 CIDG WIA. The enemy lost 463 KIA.

On 5 November in Dinh Tuong Province, an estimated three enemy battalions attacked Cai Lay district town manned by the 1st Battalion, 12th ARVN Regiment. Friendly losses included 28 ARVN KIA, three civilians killed, 23 ARVN WIA, 14 RF WIA, 13 PF WIA, and 60 civilians wounded.

In Binh Thuan Province on 8 November, elements of the 3rd Battalion, 44th ARVN Regiment, were attacked by an estimated enemy reinforced battalion. Friendly losses included 25 ARVN KIA, three civilians killed, six U.S. WIA, 35 ARVN WIA, and one ARVN MIA. An OH-13 helicopter was also destroyed. The enemy suffered 45 KIA.

On 24 November an estimated enemy battalion attacked the 3rd Battalion, 48th ARVN Regiment, in Binh Duong Province. Friendly losses included 28 KIA, 12 WIA, and 10 MIA. The enemy lost 30 KIA.

On 29 November in Phuoc Long Province, the Bo Duc district headquarters and the Bo Duc and Bu Dop SF Camps were attacked by two battalions of the 272nd VC Regiment. There were 10 ARVN KIA, one RF KIA, four PF KIA, 32 ARVN WIA, 24 RF WIA, one PF WIA, and one civilian wounded. The enemy sustained 39 KIA.

On 8 December an estimated enemy battalion attacked and overran the Tahine Post in Tuyen Duc Province. Friendly losses included 46 KIA, 13 WIA, and four MIA. Enemy losses were unknown.
On 20 December in Tay Ninh Province, the 2nd Battalion, 141st NVA Regiment attacked the base camp of the 4th Battalion, 9th U.S. Infantry Regiment. There were six friendly KIA and 12 WIA. Enemy losses were 40 KIA.

On 22 December in An Xuyen Province, an estimated enemy battalion attacked the Tac Thu Post manned by the 974th RF Company and an RD Team. Friendly losses were 19 KIA, 16 WIA, and 20 MIA. The enemy lost eight KIA.

On 31 December the 261st VC Battalion attacked the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the VNMC in Dinh Tuong Province. There were 19 KIA and 48 WIA on the friendly side. The enemy lost 60 KIA.

A VC SUSPECT IS TAKEN INTO CUSTODY BY TROOPS OF THE 42ND RANGER BATTALION, 21ST ARVN INFANTRY DIVISION, IN THE DELTA.
BATTALION DAYS ON LARGE OPERATIONS

The total number of battalion days on large operations during the quarter ending in December was slightly below the number of days in the previous quarter—15,897 in the latest quarter compared to 16,031 in the previous quarter, a decrease of 134 days. The last half of 1967 saw four percent more number of days than the first half of the year. There were 62,605 battalion days on large operations during 1967, an increase of 77 percent from 35,366 during 1966. The monthly average of battalion days on large operations during 1967 was 5,217 compared to 2,947 during 1966.

During 1967, the U.S. forces contributed 27,826 battalion days, GVN forces 32,455, and other Free World Forces 2,324. These amounted to 44 percent, 52 percent, and four percent, respectively, of the grand total. The continual buildup of U.S. forces during 1967 and the increased emphasis given to the GVN forces for the pacification program account for the change from 1966 when the U.S. forces contributed 32 percent of the total battalion days on large operations, GVN forces 63 percent, and other Free World Forces five percent.
There were 342 Arc Light (see glossary for purpose of Arc Light) strikes consisting of 2,489 sorties during the quarter ending in December 1967. Thirty of these strikes were followed up by ground action. The 2,489 sorties conducted during the period represents a one percent decrease from the 2,511 sorties conducted in the previous quarter. During the month of November 1967, 40 percent of the entire Arc Light effort was in support of the action taking place in the area around Dak To in II CTZ. In December, 30 percent of the sorties were flown in Laos against truck parks, storage areas, and supply transshipment points. These two efforts contributed to the decrease in the number of strikes followed up by ground action during the latest quarter.

Arc Light efforts during the last six months of 1967 resulted in a six percent increase in the total sorties flown when compared to the first six months of 1967, but the total number of strikes decreased eight percent and the number of strikes with ground follow up decreased by 41 percent. During all of 1967, there was a total of 9,705 Arc Light sorties—an 85 percent increase over the number of sorties conducted during 1966. The monthly averages for these two periods were 809 and 436, respectively. The total number of strikes during 1967 amounted to 1,451, a 125 percent increase over 1966. The monthly averages for 1967 and 1966 were 121 and 54, respectively. Strikes with ground follow up averaged 18 per month in 1967 compared to 16 in 1966.
TACTICAL AIR EFFORT, RESULTS, AND LOSSES

EFFORT

The total sorties flown by strike aircraft in the tactical air effort within South Vietnam include those sorties that are used for close air support, direct air support, escort, and interdiction.

![Tactical Air Sorties Chart](chart.png)

During the quarter ending in December 1967, there were 49,205 tactical air sorties, an 11 percent decrease from the 55,366 sorties conducted in the previous quarter. U.S. sorties decreased by 3,607 sorties from the previous quarter while VNAF sorties decreased by 2,554 sorties from the previous quarter.

During the last six months of 1967, the total tactical air sorties amounted to 104,571, an increase of two percent from the first half of the year. For all of 1967 there were 207,558 sorties for a monthly average of 17,297. This represents a 25 percent increase over the 166,406 sorties during 1966. The monthly average during 1966 amounted to 13,867 sorties. The substantial number of tactical air sorties flown in South Vietnam is indicative of the powerful support and interdiction role being played by the air units. The VNAF, with slightly over 16 percent of the total tactical aircraft in-country, flew 16 percent of the total sorties for the year.
RESULTS

The 11 percent decrease in the number of tactical air sorties flown contributed to substantial reductions in the results achieved during the latest quarter when compared to the preceding quarter. Structures destroyed as a result of tactical air strikes amounted to 15,125, a 21 percent decrease from the 19,179 structures destroyed in the preceding quarter. The number of sampans destroyed amounted to 1,247, a 28 percent decline from the previous quarter's total of 1,728. The number of secondary explosions amounted to 822, a decrease of 34 percent from the 1,246 secondary explosions observed in the preceding quarter.

[Graphs showing trends in structures destroyed, sampans destroyed, and secondary explosions over the months of JFMAMJJASOND in 1967 and 1968]
Structures and sampans destroyed during the last six months of 1967 declined 14 percent and six percent, respectively, from the results achieved during the first six months. However, the number of secondary explosions observed increased 21 percent during the last six months from the observations during the first six months. Although tactical air sorties during 1967 increased 25 percent from the sorties conducted in 1966, the 74,418 structures destroyed in 1967 was 30 percent less than the 106,959 structures destroyed in 1966. The monthly averages for these two periods were 6,202 and 8,913. A great portion of this decline can be attributed to diminishing structures and the greater role of tactical air in the close support of troops and interdiction efforts. Countering the decline in structures destroyed, sampans destroyed and secondary explosions observed rose 57 percent and 32 percent, respectively, during 1967 from the totals of 1966. Sampans destroyed in 1967 totaled 6,135 compared to 3,896 during 1966. The monthly averages for these two periods were 511 and 325, respectively. Secondary explosions observed in 1967 totaled 3,772 compared to 2,867 during 1966. The monthly averages for these two periods were 314 and 239, respectively.

In evaluating the results of tactical air strikes, adequate consideration must be given to the many instances when results of the air strikes cannot be observed.

LOSSES

During the calendar quarter ending in December 1967, the friendly forces lost 14 strike aircraft while conducting in-country tactical air strikes. U.S. forces lost nine of the total while the VNAF experienced five losses. The overall loss rate for the recent quarter was .03 percent, the same as the previous quarter.
Total losses for the last six months of 1967 declined significantly from the first six months of the year—29 compared to 45. Total losses for the year amounted to 74 strike aircraft, the same as 1966. However, because of the 25 percent increase in the number of sorties conducted during 1967, the loss rate dropped slightly to .036 percent in 1967 from the .045 percent in 1966. Of the 74 strike aircraft lost in both 1966 and 1967, the VNAF lost 13 each year and the U.S. forces lost 61 in each year. VNAF, during 1967, had 16 percent of the available strike aircraft, flew 16 percent of the total sorties, and experienced 18 percent of the total losses of strike aircraft.
Although the number of naval gunfire missions conducted during the quarter ending in December 1967 amounted to 535, down five percent from the 566 missions conducted in the preceding quarter, there was an 11 percent increase in the number of rounds fired—123,858 compared to 111,537. Structures destroyed during the recent quarter as a result of naval gunfire amounted to 1,616, an 18 percent decrease from the preceding quarter's total of 1,969. Secondary explosions amounted to 231, up 50 percent from the previous quarter's total of 154.

Naval gunfire missions during the last six months of 1967 totaled 1,101, a 14 percent increase from the 963 missions conducted during the first six months of 1967. The number of rounds fired during the last six month period amounted to 235,395, a decline of six percent from the 251,193 rounds fired during the January-June 1967 period. Structures destroyed and secondary explosions declined 62 percent and 26 percent, respectively, during the last half of the year when compared to the first six months. There was a total of 2,064 naval gunfire missions conducted during all of 1967, an 11 percent increase from the total of 1,857 conducted in 1966. The monthly averages for these two years were 172 and 155, respectively. The increase in the number of missions resulted in a 29 percent increase in the number of rounds fired—486,588 compared to 378,227. The monthly average of the number of rounds fired for 1967 was 40,549 while the monthly average for 1966 was 31,519. Structures destroyed during all of 1967 amounted to 12,944, a decline of 32 percent from the 18,998 structures destroyed in 1966. The monthly averages were 1,079 and 1,583, respectively. Secondary explosions increased 78 percent to 907 in 1967 from the 1966 total of 509. The monthly averages were 76 and 42, respectively.

HERBICIDE OPERATIONS

The accompanying charts depict the efforts being expended in the areas of defoliation activity and crop destruction to deny the VC/NVA the concealment and the food necessary for their effective prosecution of aggression.

The number of defoliation sorties during the quarter ending in December 1967 increased 44 percent from the number of sorties conducted in the previous quarter—1,477 compared to 1,027. During the last six months of 1967 there was a total of 2,504 defoliation sorties, an increase of eight percent from the 2,312 sorties conducted during the first six months of the year. During all of 1967 there was a total of 4,816 defoliation sorties, a 97 percent increase from the 2,459 sorties during 1966. The monthly average for 1967 was 401 sorties while the monthly average for 1966 amounted to 203 sorties.
Under the crop destruction program, areas sprayed for crop destruction are very carefully selected remote areas under VC control. In conjunction with the crop destruction program, there is an extensive GVN leaflet program stating that the purpose is to deny food to the VC in that area and that crop destruction will cease if the VC are driven out. A guarantee of indemnification for crop loss to all friendly people is a mandatory condition for each crop destruction mission. The crop destruction program is limited to local actions in which it is part of a concerted effort to disrupt supply lines or to force the VC to move from selected base areas. The program has importantly aggravated the VC and NVA supply problems and has forced the enemy to use his combat troops for extended rice-gathering forays. It is estimated that during 1967, the crop destruction program has destroyed between 80,000 to 100,000 tons of rice crops in rice-poor areas infested by the enemy.

Crop destruction efforts, expressed in hectares, decreased during the latest quarter. The destruction efforts covered 11,530 hectares compared to 34,494 in the previous quarter. During the last six months of 1967, there were 46,024 hectares covered, up 39 percent from the 33,093 hectares covered during the first six months. For all of 1967, there was a total of 79,117 hectares covered, an increase of 66 percent from the 47,683 hectares covered in 1966. The monthly averages for these two periods were 6,593 hectares and 3,974 hectares, respectively.

Since the accompanying charts reflect monthly activity over an extended period of time, consideration must be given to the probability of the loss of effectiveness of the defoliation and crop destruction efforts conducted in prior months.
WEAPONS LOST

VC/NVA forces lost 8,646 weapons during the quarter ending in December 1967. This was an increase of 1,043 or 14 percent from the total of the previous quarter. The increase was a result of several large enemy weapons caches uncovered by friendly operations in VC/NVA base areas. GVN forces lost 2,398 weapons during the latest quarter compared to 1,280 in the previous quarter--an increase of 87 percent. The U.S. and other Free World losses totaled 59 for the October-December 1967 period. The resultant enemy to friendly weapons loss ratio for the recent quarter was 3.5 to 1 compared to 5.4 to 1 for the preceding quarter.

The enemy's weapon losses for 1967 amounted to 31,729, a 75 percent increase over the total of 18,136 lost during 1966. The significant increase in enemy weapon losses during 1967 resulted from the increase in friendly operations deep into the enemy base areas. A decrease in the enemy's battlefield discipline may also be reflected in his weapon losses for the past year. The enemy's monthly average of weapons lost in 1967 was 2,644--up from the 1966 monthly average of 1,511. The enemy to friendly weapons loss ratio for 1967 was 4.0 to 1, almost double the 1966 ratio of 2.1 to 1. GVN losses for 1967 amounted to 7,563, a 14 percent decline from 8,770 lost in 1966. The GVN monthly loss average amounted to 630 in 1967 compared to the 731 monthly average in 1966.
KILLED IN ACTION

There were 22,774 VC/NVA KIA (body count) during the quarter ending in December 1967. This is an 11 percent increase from the 20,516 enemy killed in action during the previous quarter. Total friendly KIA for the quarter ending in December was 6,420, a 19 percent increase from the total of 5,398 friendly killed in action during the previous quarter. The enemy to friendly kill ratio for the quarter ending in December was 3.5 to 1, a decrease from the 3.8 to 1 in the preceding quarter. U.S. killed in action during the recent quarter amounted to 2,181, a 20 percent increase from the previous quarter's total of 1,810. GVN forces killed in action during the recent quarter were 21 percent higher than the preceding quarter--3,937 compared to 3,250. Other Free World Forces killed in action decreased in the recent quarter from the preceding quarter--302 compared to 338.

During 1967, there was a total of 90,021 VC/NVA killed in action compared to a total of 23,688 friendly forces killed in action. The enemy to friendly kill ratio for the entire year was 3.8 to 1. The kill ratio for 1966 was 3.5 to 1 when there were 57,383 enemy killed and 17,327 friendly forces killed. The monthly average of enemy killed in 1967 was 7,502 compared to 4,782 in 1966. The monthly average of friendly forces killed in
1967 was 1,974 compared to 1,444 in 1966. The total enemy killed in action during 1967 was 57 percent greater than the total killed in 1966. Friendly forces killed during 1967 were 37 percent higher than the total killed in 1966.

![Friendly KIA Graph](image)

**CHIEU HOI PROGRAM**

The Chieu Hoi returnee rate continued to drift downward during the quarter ending December 1967. The total number of returnees during the quarter amounted to 3,590, the lowest quarterly total during the past two years. A number of plausible explanations for the sharp drop in the returnee rate during recent months are:

- More effective VC countermeasures against the Chieu Hoi program including tighter control of personnel.
- VC propaganda concerning imminent negotiations and the possibility of a coalition government.
- The change in type and location of military operations.
- The fact that certain large pools of defectible VC have been previously attracted.
- Higher proportion of NVA in the enemy structure.
- Reluctance to rally during the harvest and planting seasons.
- The condition of the Chieu Hoi centers.
The number of returnees during the recent quarter was 34 percent below the 5,443 returnees during the preceding quarter. The majority of the decrease was due to a 40 percent reduction in the number of military returnees. Political returnees and "other" returnees decreased 17 percent and 29 percent, respectively. The classification of "other" returnees refers to those returnees who cannot be associated with either the political or military organizations. Because of the small number of "other" returnees, this category is not depicted in the accompanying graph but is included in the recapitulation shown on the graph.

The number of returnees during the last six months of 1967 was 50 percent below the number of returnees during the first six months of the year. The distribution of this reduction among the military, political, and other returnees was 47, 55, and 57 percent, respectively.

Although a declining trend was experienced during 1967, the number of returnees for the year was 27,178, a 34 percent increase over the 20,242 returnees during 1966. The distribution of this increase among the military, political, and other returnees was 37, 25, and 55 percent, respectively. The monthly average of returnees during 1967 was 2,265 compared to the monthly average of 1,687 during 1966.

To date, most of the military returnees are either new VC recruits or conscripts. A few of the military returnees come from the NCO and officer class and even fewer are field grade or senior NCO's. The number of NVA defections remains relatively low. In summary, the returnees to date reflect only low-level defectors whose primary goal is self-preservation and whose exposure to the Viet Cong has not only been brief but unhappy. The large defection of units has yet to be seen.
PSYWAR OPERATIONS

During the quarter ending in December 1967, loudspeaker hours in-country continued the upward trend that commenced in the beginning of the year. The latest quarter showed a total of 5,582 loudspeaker hours, a 21 percent increase from the previous quarter's total of 4,606. Due to winds and weather in the target areas, leaflets dropped over NVN continued its downward trend during the latest quarter by declining four percent from the preceding quarter. Leaflets dropped in SVN and Laos continued their upward trend by increasing 16 percent and 45 percent, respectively, from the preceding quarter.
Psychological warfare activity during 1967 was at higher levels than during 1966. Leaflets dropped in SVN, NVN, and Laos during 1967 were 281, 35, and 33 percent greater than the total dropped during 1966. In South Vietnam alone, more than 5.7 billion leaflets were dropped compared to the 1.5 billion leaflets dropped during 1966. Aerial loudspeaker hours during 1967 amounted to 16,270, an increase of 116 percent from the 7,533 hours conducted during 1966.

**TOTAL VC/NVA PERSONNEL LOSSES**

Total losses in the accompanying chart include VC/NVA killed in action (body count), Chieu Hoi returnees (military only), VC/NVA prisoners of war, and the estimated (35 percent of KIA) number of wounded in action that eventually died of wounds (DOW) or became permanently disabled (PD). Figures concerning the accompanying chart have been revised to eliminate the number of political Chieu Hoi returnees that were formerly included when computing total enemy losses.

Total VC/NVA personnel losses reported for the quarter ending in December 1967 were 33,485, an increase of 515 over the previous quarter's total of 32,970. Although there was an 11 percent increase in VC/NVA forces killed, there was a 68 percent decrease in PW's and a 40 percent decline in Chieu Hoi military returnees. Total enemy losses for 1967 were 144,943, a significant 55 percent increase over the 1966 total of 93,235. The monthly average of losses amounted to 12,079 for 1967 and 7,770 for 1966. The increase in enemy losses during 1967 not only reflects the increase in U.S.
forces and offensive operations during the year but also the enemy's increased willingness to sacrifice large numbers of men in his attempts to gain a major victory.

A breakout of the enemy's losses is shown on the accompanying charts. The PW figure reflects only those PW's who physically entered the PW compound during the month and the Chieu Hoi Returnees chart reflects only military returnees.

**CATEGORIES OF VC/NVA PERSONNEL LOSSES**

![KIA Chart](image)

![DOW/PD Chart](image)

![CHIEU HOI MILITARY RETURNEES Chart](image)

![PW Chart](image)

**VC/NVA LOSSES vs. INPUT (GOAL)**

The following chart portrays the progress toward Goal I, i.e., begin to inflict losses on the VC/NVA forces at a rate which exceeds their input. Since the total input data often lags many months behind actual events, it

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is appropriate to assess this goal only on a long term basis. MACV J2 has estimated total personnel input to avoid being misled by the low reported figures for the recent months in question.

![VC/NVA LOSSES vs INPUT (GOAL)](image)

Infiltration data for the period 1 October 1965 through 30 June 1967 are considered to be fairly firm. The average monthly infiltration during this period was 6,750 men per month. Infiltration data for the period 1 July through 31 December 1967 are incomplete. Based on past experience, MACV estimates that the rate of infiltration during this period is approximately 6,750 men per month. Since 1 January 1967, recruitment is estimated at 3,500 men per month. MACV estimates that the total enemy input (infiltration plus recruitment) for the past six months has been 10,250 men per month. The total VC/NVA personnel loss for the quarter ending in December 1967 was 33,485. Therefore, based upon present estimates of enemy input (10,250 per month), the enemy losses for the quarter ending in December was 2,735 greater than his total input of 30,750.

With the exception of the months of August and October, the enemy’s losses exceeded his input during 1967. For all of 1967, the enemy’s losses amounted to 144,948 compared to his input of 122,400—a difference of 22,548. Therefore, the goal to inflict losses on the VC/NVA forces at a rate which exceeds their input during 1967 was achieved.