But there is an even more compelling reason beyond the question of securing an historic scoop. What we see in this history is an open conspiracy, organized by our military establishment to deceive the country about a matter of critical concern to the nation. Presumably, General Westmoreland and the others felt that the Johnson White House wanted only good news and hence served it up. But what does that say about the reliability of military intelligence.

CBS REPORTS

"The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception"

Today, there is a controversy over the integrity of the Pentagon's assessment of enemy losses. General Graham, the official spokesperson, has been one of the principal spokesmen warning us that we have fallen dangerously behind. Graham has been a close advisor to President elect Reagan and may end up in a key national security post in the Reagan administration.

Are our present estimates correct? Is our deception?

Is the public being misled?

Is the Congress?

Is the President?

Can we be confident that our enemy's leaders will be basing their future decisions about peace and war on reliable information?

AN EXAMINATION

By Burton Benjamin

July 8, 1982
WHO'S WHO


Sam Adams - Former CIA analyst. Brought the charges to CBS News. Served as paid consultant, reporter and assisted in production.

Walt W. Rostow - Special Assistant to LBJ, 1966-1969. Was interviewed for three hours and not used.


Col. Gains Hawkins - Chief, Order of Battle (OB) Section, MACV Intelligence, February 1966-September 1967. Interviewed for broadcast and supported premise.


Col. George Hamscher - Military Intelligence, CINCPAC, Hawaii. Interviewed for broadcast and supported premise.

George Allen - Senior CIA officer in Vietnam; Sam Adams' boss. Long-time officer in Vietnam. Interviewed for broadcast and supported premise.

George Carver - Special Assistant to the Director, CIA, for Vietnam Affairs. Allen's superior. Interviewed by phone but not on camera.


Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham - During Tet, was Lt. Col. Graham; Chief of Current Intelligence and Estimates Division. Interviewed for broadcast, 21 seconds used. Appeared at Westmoreland News Conference.


Joseph Hovey - CIA analyst in Vietnam who, says Adams, predicted Tet. Interviewed for broadcast and supported premise.

Richard McArthur - MACV guerrilla analyst, 1967-68. Intelligence officer. Interviewed for broadcast and supported premise.

Col. Russell Cooley - MACV, in charge of infiltration analysis. Intelligence officer interviewed for broadcast and supported premise.
CBS REPORTS: THE UNCOUNTED ENEMY: VIETNAM DECEPTION

An Examination

By Burton Benjamin

INTRODUCTION

This paper is written at the direction of the management of CBS and CBS News. It began on May 24, 1982, when Van Gordon Sauter, president of CBS News, phoned the writer from San Francisco and asked if he would undertake the examination.

The TV Guide cover article, "Anatomy of a Smear," by Don Kowet and Sally Bedell (May 29–June 4 issue) had just appeared. The writer told Mr. Sauter he would take on the project.

The story was one of inordinate complexity. The 90-minute broadcast of January 23, 1982 had taken approximately 15 months to complete. The TV Guide article had taken two months to prepare.

The core of this report is a point-by-point examination of the charges leveled by TV Guide. But it goes beyond that. It includes an examination of the charges made in the January 26, 1982 news conference called in Washington by General William C. Westmoreland, commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, from 1964 to 1968. General Westmoreland was joined by five of his military and civilian associates from Vietnam.

I have read the criticisms of the broadcast in the press and in letters to CBS News. I have also read press-and-mail comments supportive of the broadcast.

The chapter headings for this report will be:

METHODOLOGY

TV GUIDE CHARGES

OTHER CHARGES

THE BROADCAST AND CBS NEWS GUIDELINES
The writer wishes to emphasize that he saw his role in this examination as reporter — not as judge, jury, prosecutor or defense attorney. My aim has been to get the facts.

I have been assisted in this inquiry by Toby Wertheim and Barbara Pierce of the CBS News research staff and by Shari B. Lampert, who served as secretary and research assistant.

It should be emphasized, however, that this report and the evidence therein are entirely my responsibility.

METHODOLOGY

The three sources for information in this examination are:

Reading
Interviews
Screenings and tapes

BACKGROUND: Much of the story in the CBS News documentary was not new. It was new to television as a prime-time documentary. Samuel A. Adams had been conducting his research for 15 years, first as an analyst for Central Intelligence and since 1973, when he resigned, as a civilian. In a computer search of the New York Times Information Bank I, we found 36 references to Adams and his work. Adams and George Crile, the producer of the broadcast, state that the infiltration figures in the broadcast were new. They also state that this is the first time MACV intelligence officers have publicly stated what they believed to be wrongdoing. Adams is currently writing a book on the subject with the working title "Who the Hell Are We Fighting Out There?" to be published by W.W. Norton in 1983 (Rose Franco, W.W. Norton, June 24, 1982).
While still in the CIA, Adams testified at the Pentagon Papers Trial of Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony J. Russo Jr. in 1973 (New York Times, Sept. 19, 1973, et. seq.). His testimony charged that top Army officers deliberately falsified critical intelligence information before the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam. The thrust of his testimony, Adams told us on June 21, 1982, was that the enemy-strength figures in the Pentagon Papers were false and therefore did not constitute a national-security leak.

In May of 1975 Adams wrote for Harper’s "Vietnam Cover-Up: Playing War With Numbers" with the sub-head "A CIA conspiracy against its own intelligence." The word conspiracy did not appear in the text. George Crile edited that article. "Lewis Lapham, the editor, put in the word 'conspiracy'" (Adams interview, June 21, 1982.)

Two letters, critical of Adams' article, appeared in Harper's in July, 1975. They were written by Rufus L. Taylor, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.), who was Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from 1966 to 1969, and by James C. Graham, former member of National Intelligence Estimates.

On September 18, 1975, Adams testified on the same matter before the House Select Committee on Intelligence (known as the Pike Committee). CBS and ABC carried accounts on the Evening News broadcasts. An account of his testimony appeared in the New York Times on September 19, 1975, and there was a column by Anthony Lewis on September 22, 1975. On December 3, 1975, his allegations were disputed by William E. Colby, director of Central Intelligence, and Lieut. Gen. Daniel C. Graham, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Two conclusions may be drawn from this:

- Adams and his thesis had received some exposure before our broadcast.
- The Adams thesis was controversial.

**READING:** The reading for this examination included newspapers and magazines, articles, books, the Congressional Record, military documents, George Crile's three-volume White Paper responding to the TV Guide allegations, and correspondence sent and received by CBS News about this broadcast.

We read approximately 20 hours of unedited transcripts of the interviews recorded for the broadcast.

We read the complete text of the Westmoreland news conference.

A full list appears in the Bibliography.

**SCREENING AND TAPES:** We screened the 90-minute CBS News' broadcast repeatedly.

We also screened the Westmoreland news conference.

We listened to an audio tape and had a transcript of Peter Boyer's commentary of 6/12/82 on National Public Radio about this examination.

We read a transcript of Barry Farber's radio show on the broadcast of June 22, on which Don Cowet of TV Guide participated.

We listened to an audio tape made by George Crile of a telephone conversation on January 30, 1982, with Colonel Charles A. Morris, former Chief of Intelligence Production for MACV.

While we read all of the unedited transcripts for the broadcast interviews, we did not screen the film of these interviews. Howard Stringer, the executive producer, and Andrew Lack, the senior producer, both expressed the view that we should screen these rushes. To do so would have delayed this report by several months, and I do not believe it would have changed the findings as far as the TV Guide charges are concerned.

**INTERVIEWS:** We interviewed 32 persons to prepare this report, 14 in person, 18
by telephone.

Twelve interviews were with CBS employees — all in person. They ranged from Vice President to assistant film editor.

Sam Adams was interviewed in person.

Robert Shaplen of the New Yorker, often called the most senior of all Vietnam war correspondents, was interviewed in person.

Eighteen persons were interviewed by telephone. These ranged from those with a direct tie to the broadcast, e.g. Gen. Phillip Davidson, Col. Charles Morris, Gen. George Godding, Col. Everette Parldins, to former war correspondents and others involved with the story.

We took notes during all of our interviews and telephone conversations. No tape recordings were made.

General Westmoreland, General Graham and Walt W. Rostow were not interviewed.

A full list appears in the Bibliography.

THE TV GUIDE CHARGES

The charges of Kowet and Bedell can be broken down in several ways. We will deal with them chronologically, i.e. as they were given in the piece. Looked at this way, there are 11 major charges. However, some of them contain subcharges and so the overall total is higher.

1. THE THEME

"THE EVIDENCE AMASSED BY CBS SEEMED TO PROVE THE U.S. MILITARY’S INTELLIGENCE OPERATION IN VIETNAM, LED BY GENERAL WESTMORELAND, CONSPIRED TO DECEIVE PRESIDENT LYNDON JOHNSON, THE CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC. BEGINNING IN 1967, THE DOCUMENTARY CHARGES, WESTMORELAND HAD SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERREPORTED TO HIS SUPERIORS, THE SIZE AND STRENGTH OF THE ENEMY, IN ORDER TO MAKE IT APPEAR THAT HE WAS INDEED WINNING THE "WAR OF ATTRAITION."

TV Guide Page 3

George Crile, in his "White Paper" (Volume III, page 54), maintains this was the theme:
"That in 1967, American military and civilian intelligence discovered evidence indicating the existence of a dramatically larger enemy than previously reported ... that instead of alerting the country, U.S. military intelligence under General Westmoreland commenced to suppress and alter its intelligence reports, in order to conceal this discovery from the American public, the Congress, and perhaps even the President."

In our interview of June 15, 1982, when presented with both versions, George Crile said:

Now that I look at it I would put a period after the words "intelligence reports" (third last line) and eliminate the rest of the sentence.

It is important to note as Crile points out (White Paper, I, 1) "Nowhere in the article do the authors challenge the central premise of the broadcast..."

2. CBS BEGAN THE PROJECT ALREADY CONVINCED THAT A CONSPIRACY HAD BEEN PERPETRATED AND TURNED A DEAF EAR TOWARD EVIDENCE THAT SUGGESTED OTHERWISE.

A. THE BLUE SHEET IS FILLED WITH REFERENCES TO CONSPIRACY. TV Guide, Page 5

The so-called Blue Sheet, which producers prepare for management to outline and protect ideas they want approved, is dated November 24, 1980, and runs 16 single-spaced pages. It is much longer than most Blue Sheets, many of which run only a single page. Crile attributes this to the complexity of the subject matter.

(CCNSPIRACY: An illegal, treasonable or treacherous plan to harm another person, group or entity... A combination of persons banded secretly togethers and resolved to accomplish an evil or unlawful end.

LAW: An agreement by two or more persons to commit a crime, fraud, or other wrongful act.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary

Random House Dictionary of the English Language

TV Guide quotes Crile as saying "Conspiracy ... was a characterization which we agreed to use in the script at the very end, after reviewing everything in the show." Crile in his interview with us (June 15, 1982):

"It was absolutely proper to use the word conspiracy. We went through everybody before we used the word. It was the
only word that worked for me to explain the pattern of events."
The word is used once in the broadcast — at the top, second paragraph.
However, a reading of the Blue Sheet finds the word "conspiracy" used
24 times and the word "conspirator" five times.
"Conspiracy" was used in the full-page ad for the broadcast. It was used
in the 20- and 10-second on-air promos for the broadcast.
The use of the word "conspiracy" has engendered considerable controversy.
Roger Colloff, Vice President, Public Affairs Broadcasts (interview June 24, 1982):
"We talked about it [conspiracy] at my and Bill's [Leonard]
screening. Is the use of the word justified? We concluded
that it was. It wasn't done haphazardly...."
"I would say the pattern of activity established not by Adams
but by other subjects would justify his use of the word..."
Robert Chandler, his predecessor, now Senior Vice
President of Administration, (interview June 18, 1982): "I wasn't terribly upset by the word... If people
said what Crile said they would, it fit the definition."
Sam Adams (Interview June 21, 1982):
"No doubt in my mind there was a legal conspiracy. I don't
intend to use the word in my book ... It was unlawful. No one
was being a traitor. I thought early on that conspiracy was
too strong a word... The ad was overblown."
Later he added:
"I'm not knocking George's judgement [in using the word
"conspiracy"]). It is not something I normally use. To
me it's a much more tragic story..."
Joseph Hovey, a favorable witness on the broadcast, was the man who reported
sent a memorandum to the White House warning about Tet two months before it
happened. In an unused part of his transcript (page 33): "I can't claim any
kind of conspiracy to suppress this report."
Another favorable witness, George Hamscher disagreed with the use of the
word "conspiracy":

- 7 -
Crile: "... it sounds like a full-fledged conspiracy to fake intelligence reporting."

Hamscher: "... faking intelligence reporting is a different thing entirely...."

Crile: "... It sounds like a full-fledged conspiracy."

Hamscher: "If it were a conspiracy — which I don't think it was — it probably had a good purpose...."

Mike Wallace, in a telephone conversation with the writer (June 18, 1982), said he initially wrote an opening to the broadcast which went something like this: "This is a mystery story ... about Duty, Honor, and Country..." But this opening was later changed.

David Halberstam, who won a Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting in the 1960's, said to the writer in a telephone conversation (June 25, 1982):

"It was crucial then to rig information. It was probably done unconsciously and therefore the word conspiracy is too strong. We created a vast lying machine starting in Washington with parallel parts in Saigon...."

The other side, those opposed to the broadcast, were very critical of the use of the word.

William E. Colby, former head of the CIA: "In his public writings and in testimony before this Committee (House Select Committee on Intelligence Hearings, page 1684), Mr. Adams has charged that CIA conspired with the Department of Defense to produce false and misleading estimates ... I reject this charge as unfounded and unsupported."

Before the same Committee (page 1653), Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, then head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said any attempt to link Abrams, Westmoreland, Bunker and others to any conspiracy "indicates a lack of rationality on the part of the accuser."

Graham, again, in General Westmoreland's news conference of January 25, 1982...
"Such a conspiracy would have to involve literally thousands of government officials in the State Department, Defense Department, CIA, NSA, the White House and elsewhere. There would have been enough conspirators in this conspiracy to fill a football stadium." (page 15A of transcript)

George Carver, Special Assistant to the Director, CIA, for Vietnam Affairs in the 1960's "... it is in my view a mistake to interpret differences of opinion as necessarily being any evidence of conspiracy, which is what Mr. Wallace charged, and my irritation with that charge is why I am here with General Westmoreland today (Westmoreland News Conference, January 26, 1982, transcript page 21A)

B. THE BLUE SHEET SCENARIOS WOULD APPEAR VIRTUALLY INTACT IN THE DOCUMENTARY

TV Guide page 6

The Blue Sheet does closely resemble the finished broadcast. In a June, 1982 memorandum to Mike Wallace (no date), Crile wrote:

"I presented Bill Leonard, Bob Chandler, Roger Colloff, and Howard Stringer with a 16-page, single spaced Blue Sheet, spelling out in great detail what I believed I could put on film and present as a documentary for CBS REPORTS. Throughout that Blue Sheet were references to 'conspiracy.' Throughout that Blue Sheet were references to Adams and a careful spelling out of the unusual and awkward relationship Adams would have to the project if we decided to take him on and pay him. As Bill Leonard said: 'these things either happened or they didn't; if they happened it was a very important story and we should run it.' My commission was to go out with Adams and prove on film that these people would testify to what Adams told us they had told him. So I did. And CBS News with its eyes wide open, looked at the interviews, decided to commission the documentary, hire Adams and sent us on our way to complete the word as spelled out in the Blue Sheet. The documentary they got is the documentary they commissioned."

Some of these statements are open for amplification.

Robert Chandler isn't sure he read the 16-page Blue Sheet. He did see a shorter version. He switched jobs, leaving the Public Affairs area, in February, 1981. (Interview June 18, 1982) Howard Stringer (Interview June 23, 1982) explained the use of the word "conspiracy" 24 times in the Blue Sheet as follows: "That was George trying to sell an extremely reluctant executive producer. The length of the Blue Sheet reflected a massive amount of skepticism on my part."
Roger Colloff (Interview June 24, 1982): "I don't recall ever seeing it. I don't know when it was done. We talked about it at my and Bill's screening."

Missing from the Blue Sheet was any indication of the controversial nature of the story.

C. CBS CAREFULLY SELECTED FROM SAM ADAMS' LIST OF 60, ONLY THOSE WHO WOULD SUPPORT THE CONSPIRACY THEORY TV Guide, page 6

The word "carefully" is loaded and I would not call it the "conspiracy theory" but rather the premise of the broadcast. The 8 people who supported Adams were all on the list, so were Westmoreland and Graham. Other than that, the charge appears to be true.

Sam Adams gave us his 'list of 60' (actually there are 80 names on it.) On the list are names of people who were in high position during the Vietnam War and would have challenged the basic premise of the broadcast.

The CBS News Guidelines clearly state (page 17) that "... the principle of fairness and balance is the cornerstone of our news and public affairs policy..." (William S. Paley speech, May 25, 1954).

The question must be asked: was this broadcast fair and balanced?

The role of Sam Adams is pivotal here. If one assumes that he is the principal adversary on one side, having leveled the charges, and that General Westmoreland is the principal adversary on the other side, having to defend against the charges (an argument which Bob Chandler, Howard Stringer, and Andrew Lack agree with), then the lineup of the broadcast was as follows:

**PRO ADAMS THESIS**

Sam Adams  
Col. Gains Hawkins  
Gen. Joseph McChristian  
Richard McArthur  
George Allen  
Col. George Hamscher  
Col. Russell Cooley  
Joseph Hovey  
Commander James Meacham

**OPPOSED**

Gen. William Westmoreland  
Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham
That is a 9 to 2 equation. Or, eight supporters for Adams and one for Westmoreland, and that one (Graham) was given 21 seconds on screen.

Measured another way, Westmoreland and Graham spoke for 5 minutes and 59 seconds. Adams and the eight supporters of the premise spoke for 19 minutes and 19 seconds.

The question that should be asked is this: is this fairness and balance in terms of people or time on camera?

It should be stated here that Crile disputes the role of Adams as adversary versus Westmoreland. Crile says (interview June 15, 1982):

"What the show is about is what happened internally at MACV. The real adversaries are Westmoreland and his perception of what the White House 'wanted' and the working analysts at MACV ... Adams was not delivering charges ... I rightly or wrongly was laboring under the impression that we were presenting unchallengeable facts — what people said happened."

The list of names and descriptions which Adams gave to Crile includes people who would challenge the very essence of the broadcast. Here are some excerpts from Adams' list:

Gen. Maxwell Taylor, former U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and one of the "Wise Men" who briefed President Johnson

(Adams: "I prepared for my interview [Note: prior interview not connected with our broadcast] for upwards of a month and in our hour and a half talk got nothing save one useable quote... Referring to the press, Taylor exclaimed angrily: 'Well, you had to do something to beat down those lying sons of bitches'....")


(Adams: "He is said to have cancer... Deathbed confession? Doubt it but maybe worth a call.")

Note: General Davidson has been cured of his cancer and is in good health. We will deal with this in section 7.

(Adams: "Bunker was in on all this although it's problematical how much he knew of the fakery... But he's awfully old now, and CBS might look like it's hounding an old man to his grave.")

Robert Komer, Special Ambassador in charge of Pacification.

(Adams: "He's an impressive man.")

Robert McNamara, former Secretary of Defense

Note: Crile interviewed him but it was off-the-record, no cameras. It was unusual in that McNamara has refused all interviews on the Vietnam war.

Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President, 1961-66

(Adams: "Would he finger LBJ?")

Note: He was interviewed for three hours by Mike Wallace for the broadcast on July 24, 1981, but his interview was not used.

Arthur Goldberg, one of the LBJ "Wise Men", former Supreme Court justice.

(Adams: "... He'd doubtless talk, perhaps endlessly.")

It should also be pointed out that in a June 9, 1981, letter to Mike Wallace and George Crile after his on-camera interview, General Westmoreland says: "If it is your purpose to be fair and objective during your quest which I assume you intend to be, I suggest that you interview:

Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker  
Mr. Robert Komer  
Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham  
General Walter Kerwin, Jr.  
Mr. George Carver (former CIA) and  
Mr. William E. Colby."

He also suggests "a colonel who was associated with Col. Hawkins whose name I believe was Morris." (He was referring to Col. Charles A. Morris, who was interviewed by Crile by phone less than a month before the broadcast aired.)

The charge of omitted interviews will be discussed in detail in section 7.

3. CBS PAID $25,000 TO A CONSULTANT ON THE PROGRAM WITHOUT ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATING HIS 14-YEAR QUEST TO PROVE THE PROGRAM'S CONSPIRACY THEORY. TV Guide page 3
CBS News did pay Adams $25,000 in five installments. His expenses totalled an additional $4,904.69. (Arthur Sekarek, Vice President Business Affairs, June 1, 1982.) Adams worked on the broadcast for the better part of a year.

Since he was also interviewed on camera, he should have been identified in the script as a paid consultant. Not doing so was a violation of CBS News Guidelines, 6/22/77, page 23.

Adams, thus, had several roles: consultant; interviewee; reporter (Crile: "Before it was Adams vs. the world; now it is Adams as the reporter" — interview, June 15, 1982). He also served as a sort of associate producer. He was present for the interviews with Hawkins, Cooley, Hovey, Hamscher, and Meacham. He screened rushes. He was in and out of the cutting rooms.

As to not investigating Adams' research, TV Guide offers no proof to this. Certainly George Crile was aware of it. He had edited Adams' 1975 piece for Harper's. Robert Chandler said he knew of the story since the Vietnam war. Roger Colloff had also read-in on the story.

The one thing that can be agreed upon is that Adams was controversial. On one side you have Greg Rushford, principal investigator for the House Intelligence committee writing: "Sam Adams was the best intelligence analyst I ran across..." (letter to Van Gordon Sauter, June 21, 1982) And Rep. Paul N. McCloskey (R.-Calif.) writing: "He (Adams) is a true patriot." (Letter to George Crile of February 1, 1982)

On the other side you have Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham saying to Mike Wallace on June 3, 1981 (transcript page 15): "He's (Adams) got a hangup that verges on a mental problem over people refusing to accept his number at the time of the Tet offensive. I think it's a mental problem."

And William E. Colby, Central Intelligence, testifying before Pike Committee (page 1693): "Adams overestimates the importance of his role in analysis. (Adams' testimony) reveals a "surprisingly dim awareness" of his contribution and the work of others.
Perhaps Adams defined his role in the broadcast best. "An actor in the controversy." (Interview, June 21, 1982).

A. WALLACE, COLLOFF AND STRINGER NEVER DID ANY MORE TO EXAMINE ADAMS' CREDIBILITY THAN SIMPLY SIT DOWN AND CHAT WITH HIM. TV Guide Page 6

Crile maintains (White Paper, Book I, page 9) that in 1975, he and Harper's editor Lewis Lapham did check Adams very carefully. He said Thomas Powers, author of The Man Who Kept the Secrets, a biography of Richard Helms, endorsed Adams and his research. He emphasizes that it wasn't only Adams and his research but eight former military officers and CIA men, willing to go on camera to corroborate the story, that gave the broadcast its credibility.

Colloff (interview June 24, 1982) says he did not have all that much contact with Adams. "I talked to him a number of times.... Adams did not carry the show... the only reason we went forward with the broadcast was that there were a large number of people adding to or confirming our story."

Stringer (interview June 23, 1982) says "We had a number of meetings with Adams before the show was even approved. He was in and out of the office."

Wallace (interview June 17, 1982) says "I had met Sam Adams. I read his Harper's piece. I did not read the Pike Committee Hearings nor did I know about his testimony at the Ellsberg Trial."

3. CBS VIOLATED ITS OWN OFFICIAL GUIDELINES BY REHEARSING ITS PAID CONSULTANT BEFORE HE WAS INTERVIEWED ON CAMERA TV Guide Page 4

Kowet and Bedell amplify this charge in their text. "... Adams was coached extensively ..." They quote an unnamed source: "... they [Crile and Researcher Alex Alben] did a mock interview ... ran through the questions in chronological order ..." did "... a run through - ... gave Sam definite feedback on his answers .... a conscious effort to rehearse the whole interview, from top to bottom." (TV Guide, page 9).

The article quotes Adam's denial: "I wasn't going over the questions for my interview."
For my interview with Mike Wallace I went in cold turkey." (Ibid.)

There is no question that rehearsing an interview, coaching or giving an interviewee questions in advance violates the CBS News Guidelines:

Interviews which are not spontaneous and unrehearsed are prohibited unless specifically approved by the President of CND. (CBS News Guidelines, 7/13/78, page 22)

Adams told us (interview, June 21, 1982): "We [Wallace and Adams] never went over questions. There wasn't a question there I wasn't totally aware of i.e. as far as information was concerned ..." Adams went on to recall one plan for him to get up and walk over to a blackboard, but it was later dropped for being clumsy. "... Crile went out of his way not to show me questions."

Crile in his White Paper (Volume I, pages 3 and 4) says: "There was no attempt to tell Sam Adams how to answer any questions that might be put to him by Mike Wallace. Anyone who has talked to Mr. Adams will confirm that there is no way to dictate or manipulate his statements or opinion about this subject. Certainly no member of the production staff attempted to do so."

Crile says virtually all of Adams' statements had appeared before — either in testimony before the Pike Committee or in Harper's.

Crile adds that there were a "... special set of problems Adams presented to CBS. Those were first set forth in my blue sheet ... (Ibid, page 3). Once the decision was made to have Adams serve as our consultant, involved in our investigation, while also appearing in the documentary, it was no longer possible to deal with him as just another interview...."

Crile writes: "... I went over with Adams those areas we intended to cover in the interview .... I did not even consider this process a rehearsal; in effect, I was serving as a traffic cop." (Ibid., Page 4)

Researcher Alex Alben, formerly with CBS News, (interview June 10, 1982) says he told Sally Bedell that Adams had not been coached. He describes the pre-interview sessions as follows: There were two sessions of one to two hours each. Associate
producer Joseph Zigman, film editor Ira Klein and Crile were there most of the time. "When the interview was set ... we decided to have this session to direct his interview. It was an effort to get Adams away from his chronologies and get him to talk to the camera .... Crile was concerned that Adams would talk of his experiences especially with his other book interviews [in mind] and not talk of what he learned as a reporter." Alben said it was giving Adams feedback but never shaping his answers editorially. He continued and added that Crile wrote Wallace's questions. Alben submitted some but 90% were Crile's.

Mike Wallace (interview June 17, 1982): "My job was to lead him but I was tough. I asked him some tough questions — about being obsessed, about his story sounding too pat, about being sold out by George Carver. But Adams was our employee, our consultant. I made handwritten notes before I met Adams, but I told Crile: 'I'm up to my ass, you have to fill me in.'"

Film editor Ira Klein (interview June 7, 1982): "Adams was definitely rehearsed. I was in there periodically .... Wallace was not there nor possibly even aware this was going on. When the interview came, Wallace was handed the questions that had been rehearsed."

This charge, as the above indicates, is open to question.

The further charge that Adams was given "sympathetic questions" will be dealt with in Section 5.

4. CBS SCREENED FOR A SYMPATHETIC WITNESS — IN ORDER TO PERSUADE HIM TO FE-DO HIS ON-CAMERA INTERVIEW — THE STATEMENTS OF OTHER WITNESSES ALREADY ON FILM. BUT CBS NEVER OFFERED THE TARGETS OF ITS CONSPIRACY CHARGE ANY OPPORTUNITY, BEFORE THEIR INTERVIEWS, TO HEAR THEIR ACCUSERS, OR TO HAVE A SECOND CHANCE BEFORE THE CAMERAS. TV Guide Page 11

One man, George Allen, formerly of Central Intelligence in Vietnam and Washington, was interviewed twice in New York on May 26 and June 29, 1981.

The interviews were shot in different locations but Allen was asked to wear the same suit.
Before the second interview, he was shown film of three other interviews (McChristian, Hawkins, Hovey), all of whom were on his side of the argument. The statement that these screenings were designed to 'persuade' Allen to do the interview is inaccurate. He had already done it once. Crile says the screenings were more in the nature of reassuring him (see Crile below).

The questions asked in the two interviews were virtually the same. The main difference was that in the second interview, some questions were asked about statements made by Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham who was interviewed on June 3, 1981 after the first Allen interview.

The double interview and the screenings are a violation of CBS News Guidelines quoted previously, i.e. that interviews be "spontaneous and unrehearsed."

The second part of the charge — that CBS never offered the other side a chance to hear their 'accusers' — is true but the analogy is skewed. Allen was allowed to hear not his 'accusers' but the people who supported his argument.

This Allen matter was brought up in several interviews:

**Producer George Crile, June 15, 1982:** There was nothing basically wrong with the first interview. This was a personal thing with me. Allen was particularly concerned about ratting on the CIA. He looked like hell, looked guilty, on those questions about the CIA .... I felt very badly for what it would do to Allen. No, I didn't tell Andy Lack or Howard Stringer that I did the interview twice. I don't know if they knew. No, I didn't know this was a violation of the CBS Guidelines. Why was it?

**BB:** How could it be spontaneous and unrehearsed if you interviewed him twice?

**GC:** I honestly was not aware of it being a violation of the Guidelines.

**Later in interview:**

**BB:** Why did Allen see the other interviews?

**GC:** For the same reason as the second interview. I know it's against the sensibilities of everyone here .... I don't think what I did there was right. Allen was caught in stage paralysis. He felt badly about doing the interview... he felt isolated as if he were a whistle blower. I wanted to show him he wasn't alone out there.
Roger Colloff, Vice President, June 24, 1982

BB: Did you know of the two Allen interviews?

RC: When Bedell was writing her article, Crile called me and said, 'Roger, I've got some bad news for you.' He was very agitated. I was upset. No, I didn't know at the time that Allen had screened other interviews.

Senior Producer Andrew Lack, June 22, 1982

BB: Did you know that Allen was interviewed twice?

AL: No.

BB: Do you agree there was a violation?

AL: First I would ask why it was done a second time.

BB: What about spontaneity?

AL: If you go back a second time to ask additional questions that is OK.

BB: What if you don't like the way it looks?

AL: I don't buy that.

BB: What if I say I'll screen other material for you?

AL: (shakes head no)

Sam Adams, June 21, 1982

SA: Allen is very loyal to the CIA as I am too. He came on because he knew I wouldn't screw the CIA. Allen was hesitant during the interview. He would pause and turn to me and note: Adams was on the set for this interview and say, 'Sam, is that all right? Have I got that right, Sam?' When we finished, Allen said, 'Thank God that is over.' Then Crile, Allen and I went out for some beers and Allen began to tell the stories that were much better than the interview. Crile said Allen feels a little bit pregnant, and unilaterally scheduled a second interview, which made sense to me.

Ira Klein, Film Editor, June 3, 1982

IK: Crile brought Allen into the cutting room. I looked at him as if he was out of his mind. 'You're compromising me and jeopardizing the project.' Crile said, 'Don't worry. Everything will be OK.' The next day Allen was in the cutting room again and everyone but me was told to leave. Crile said, 'Don't worry. George Allen is an old CIA man. This won't go any further.' I was stunned. They ran interviews for him.
5. CBS ASKED SYMPATHETIC WITNESSES SOFT QUESTIONS, WHILE GRILLING UNFRIENDLY WITNESSES WITH PROSECUTORIAL ZEAL. TV Guide Page 4

A reading of the full, unedited transcripts for the broadcast, some 20 hours of them, lends credence to the charge that the tone was harsher during the interviews of the so-called 'unfriendly witnesses' (Westmoreland, Graham, and Rostow) than it was during the interviews of the so-called 'sympathetic witnesses' (Adams, Allen, Hawkins, McChristian, McArthur, Hamscher, Cooley, Meacham and Hovey).

Mike Wallace interviewed Westmoreland, Graham, Rostow, Adams, and Marshall Lynn, a MACV intelligence analyst. George Crile interviewed the others.

Crile was asked directly about this charge (interview June 15, 1982):

BB: Were there soft questions for sympathetic witnesses?

GC: Allen certainly wasn't an adversarial interview. Hawkins was pretty tough. He was an agonized man.

BB: What adversarial interviews were there? ... Westmoreland, Graham, Rostow. Three. Correct me if I'm wrong.

GC: There is a place for an adversarial interview, but why do you want to go adversarial if a person is confessing?

Crile in his White Paper, Volume I, Page 6, writes: "This charge totally misrepresents the character of those interviewed and the nature of the questions put to them. None of the military officers who appeared in the documentary were eager to grant interviews ... it was an agonizing experience for them to have to admit to being part of a process that they believed to be dishonest and against the best interests of their country. [TV Guide] can hardly read the Hamscher, Hawkins, Meacham or Cooley interviews and conclude that these officers were subject to soft questioning."

The Meacham interview of March 2, 1981 which Crile cites is a case in point. (It was filmed in London — Meacham is military editor of The Economist — and both Crile and Adams were there.) Here are some excerpts which were not used in the broadcast:
Crile (pages 9 and 10): Help me. Lieutenant Colonel Ev Parkins, West Point graduate. Takes a report which is very alarming about a flood of regular troops coming down into the South and is cut off, told he can't send that report in, and he shouts at Colonel Morris; he's fired; you see him afterward. You find out that it's dangerous to report on enemy infiltration, Isn't it?

Meacham: No, that wasn't the conclusion that I had from Parkins' problems with Charlie Morris at all. That it was dangerous. What was obviously dangerous was to yell at the old man. I was never in the position that Ev Parkins was in but it — it — I don't know what you're trying to get me to say.

Page 26 — Crile is pressing him on the use of the word 'lying' in letters to his wife:

Crile: They're your words. 'Lying.' In other words, we will lie. "We're mesmerized by our own lies." "Some day it will come out." "Hope the roof doesn't fall in."

(later)

...they're about lying. They're your words.

Meacham: Well — well, I mean — so what — what do you want me to say about them?

Crile: Well, I was trying to have you put some light on it.

Meacham: Well, I'm not sure I can. I mean we've been over this several times ....

Page 34, Crile questioning him on altering computers:

Meacham: Well, I don't know. I mean, you're trying to make something harder than it is here ....

Page 34B, on altering figures in computer to show progress:

Crile: ... you wrote that [letter to his wife about above].

Meacham: Well, so what?

Crile: So aren't you saying that you were manipulating figures to come out with preconceived notions as to what the estimates should be? Faking intelligence.

Meacham: No, no. I'm not saying that at all.
Crile: You say, anyhow; 'We are winning the war and now I can prove it, having received sufficient, adequate guidance from my leaders.'

Meacham: Well, we certainly weren't faking any intelligence. Nobody that I have any connection with ever faked any intelligence.

None of the above made the broadcast. It can be argued that Crile is pressing Meacham here. But the question must be asked: Is he pressing him as an adversarial reporter or is he pressing him because the answers are not coming out to fit the overall story line?

What the TV Guide writers, reading page after page of unedited transcript saw, that may have made them refer to 'sympathetic witnesses' getting 'soft questions' could be exchanges like these:

Joseph Hovey Interview

Crile, page 3: ... you are 28... You're probably the man in Vietnam who knows as much about the Vietcong as any other American....

Crile, page 25: Well ... you must be something of a hero at this point. You've predicted the biggest event of the Vietnam war.

(Later - same page)

Crile: ... You had authored an extraordinary, predictive intelligence report. It's like having predicted Pearl Harbor.

George Allen Interviews

First Interview

Crile, page 3A: George, let me — don't worry about it. I know exactly what you're doing as I recall the way you told it first

Crile, Page 4A: ... If you were George Orwell trying to give a sense of how we went about thinking about the enemy in Vietnam, how would you characterize the thinking that went into our intelligence reporting?

Allen: I'm not sure what you have in mind, George.

Crile, page 15A: George, would you please help your old protege, Sam Adams, here in some way....
Crile, page 53A: Make it simpler, George.

Allen: I'd like to make it simple.

Crile: Not simple. Simpler.

Allen: Simpler.... I'm just grasping here for a simple expression.

Crile, page 56A: Where am I? What do you want me to say, George?

Crile: It's not what I want you to say, but somewhere in here, George, you're sitting back with a sense of history.

Allen: Yeah.

Crile: And a conviction that a mistake was being made that might have far-ranging consequences, and after Tet you reach back into your memory and look at that September concession of your boss, George Carver, and you say it was the mistake of the century.

Crile, page 78A: ...Come to the defense of your old protege, Sam Adams ...

The Second Interview

Crile, page 5B: ... We're going to keep at this until we get it right ... until we feel comfortable ...-

Crile, page 11B: There was more to it than that as you have explained it. Remember?

Allen: No, I don't remember. Refresh me.

Crile: I'll refresh you ....

Allen, page 13B: Is is really kosher to go over this?

Crile: Oh, this is what we do.

Crile, page 16B: George, you know ... if ... keep on your ... keep your enthusiasm. You're on the right side.

Allen: 'It's getting late.

BACKGROUND LAUGHTER
Allen, page 30B: I'm sorry, George, I don't know what you want me to say. I don't know what you're expecting me to say.

Allen, page 3C: Oh, George, I still don't have an answer for that one.

(Later, same page)
Allen: I'm going to have to come up for another interview, George. LAUGHTER. I've got to think about that.

The same or very similar questions were asked Allen over and over again with roughly the same answers. What required this repetition — his delivery or the substance of his remarks? His answers were consistently the same. Three times he is asked about Westmoreland's statement that irregulars were not a threat. Three times he is asked about Helms and Carver conceding to MACV. Seven times in the second interview he is asked to recount an anecdote involving General Graham.

The Sam Adams interview has a similar tone.

Interviewed by Wallace, he is told "This is perfect ... this is gonna be good ...." (Transcript, 2C) "... We're saying this again and it doesn't have the same flavor ... 'cause you never said this before, Sam. I'll try and get it out of you in the same way ...." (Transcript, 4C) After Adams says "I'm not doing this very well," Wallace replies: "Oh, no, no. You were perfect. Don't say that. You're doing it just right." (Transcript 17E)

There is also a repetition of questions. Four times Adams is asked about and tells how he came across enemy strength figures for Binh Dinh province.

George Crile, Mike Wallace and Roger Collof offered explanations for the way these interviews were handled.

Crile interview, June 22, 1982:

... the documentary interview is so different from live news, hard news or print interview. It is not supposed to be timeless, but you are supposed to get certain truths. It is a producer's nightmare. You are out on a limb. In print it doesn't matter if you get it over 12 hours. In a documentary the producer can only deal with what is on film. I need to find a way to get in the clear that person's perceptions of what we are dealing with. If a person is only saying lies or
speaking uncharacteristically, you have a different truth than what you know him to be. You're in a pickle .... To get to that right moment you go another route to get it out .... It's like a dance, an art form. You're moving toward a moment. You're trying to get the essence of truth on film.

Wallace letter to Benjamin, June 21, 1982:

... I sympathize with the chore George had in drawing them out. Most whistleblowers speak out of anger. These men spoke in sorrow, or in some shame that some of them had participated in a fraud. There was nothing in it for them to go on the record so long after the fact. It was painful and it showed. And a delicate chore to get it out of them.

Colloff interview, June 24, 1982:

... I don't think there's a difference in documentaries and a hard news interview. I do think this is an extraordinarily complex subject, therefore a lot more backing and filling of information. It's not the typical interview. Interviewees are not telling you something cut and dried. I think we'd be making a mistake if we look on this as just another show....

The point also should be made at this time that none of the so-called "friendly" witnesses that we know of has complained to CBS News about being misrepresented in the broadcast. No one has written that he was edited improperly or out of context. No one has suggested that we got them to say things they did not mean. As a matter of fact, four of the key interviewees — Hawkins, Allen, Hamscher and McArthur — have written very supportive letters to CBS News about the broadcast. "... I was perfectly satisfied that none of the information stated by me ... was taken out of context...." (Col. Hawkins letter to Van Gordon Sauter, June 21, 1982). "... as far as I'm concerned the documentary was produced as well as the events and people under examination would or will allow. I have no complaint about George Crile's conduct or his product, which is more than I can say for Don Cowet (sic) ...." (Col. Hamscher letter to Sauter, June 25, 1982).

"... all statements made by me in the telecast were absolutely accurate ...." (McArthur letter to Sauter, June 18, 1982).

"I believe "The Uncounted Enemy" was a reasonably fair and accurate depiction
of the 1967 controversy over the enemy "order of battle" ... despite my early misgivings about participating in a public airing of some rather "dirty linen", I'm glad that I did ...." (George Allen letter to Sauter, June 19, 1982)

Full copies of these letters will be found in the Appendix.

6. WESTMORELAND WAS NOT WELL PREPARED. THE TELEPHONE CALLS TO HIM ABOUT THE AREAS TO BE DISCUSSED WERE VAGUE. A LETTER SPELLING THIS OUT ARRIVED THE DAY BEFORE THE INTERVIEW TV Guide Pages 9 and 10

The interview with General William Westmoreland took place on May 16, 1981, at a New York hotel. On May 7, Crile and Wallace spoke with Westmoreland in South Carolina by phone. Crile (interview, June 15, 1982): "It was not difficult to reach him or get him to appear. It was tough to get through to him what we talking about — intelligence under him. He has always had a good cover story.... We told him we were doing the documentary on the role of intelligence using Tet as a jumping off point and were we alert to enemy strength?...."

On May 10, Crile phoned General Westmoreland again. He says he read him a letter he had drafted about the interview listing five areas for discussion (Crile, Ibid.). "We then spoke about the CIA, and he brings up the Adams story but never says: 'Is this the Adams theory?'"

On May 15, Crile says he had the letter which he had read to General Westmoreland on the phone hand-delivered by his secretary, Carolyne McDaniel, to the Plaza Hotel. The General had not checked in yet. The letter listed five areas for discussion. TV Guide charges: "...The real subject of the interview and documentary — 'What about the controversy between the CIA and the military over strength estimates?' — stood fourth on the list." (TV Guide, page 10)

Crile in his White Paper (Volume I, page 10) maintains TV Guide failed to acknowledge his lead-in to the five points: "Using the Tet Offensive as a jumping off point, we plan to explore the role of American intelligence in the Vietnam
War: How well did we identify and report the intentions and capabilities of the enemy we were facing?"

As asked why he found it necessary to send a letter the night before the interview after he had read the same letter to the General on the phone, Crile replied (interview, June 15, 1982): "I wrote the letter to get on the record and spell in out to Westmoreland."

Crile (Ibid.): Short of spelling out the accusations I did everything I could.

EB: He seemed ill prepared.

GC: There's something more fundamental here. This was the commander of the U.S. forces talking on a critical issue of the war. We were dealing with a very disturbing report, which he blocked...

EB: I had the sense that he didn't understand why he was here, that he was not well-informed.

GC: I have to get back to this. He was wearing the mantle of MacArthur and Eisenhower. There are serious charges.

EB: Do you think Westmoreland was somewhat inept?

GC: Yes. He seems stupid.

EB: Well, if he doesn't come off well, maybe you should have got someone else to defend him.

GC: Westmoreland was not the show.

EB: He came out as the heavy, George.

That Crile had some concern about how much the General understood is underscored by his memo to Mike Wallace of May 11, 1981 (White Paper, Volume II, A): "... I am a bit worried that he just doesn't understand that we are going to be talking to him about American intelligence, military intelligence during the Vietnam war. I just don't want to have him sit down and refuse to answer questions on the grounds that he can't remember certain things and that we hadn't told him what we were up to ...."
Roger Colloff (interview, June 24, 1982): "... If George was any more clear, it would have been a violation of standards. If Westmoreland wasn't more aware, I don't know what you can do. He could have cancelled."

Westmoreland's full transcript is contradictory. At one point he demonstrates he has done some preparation. In a discussion of enemy killed, Wallace cites the number 80,000. Westmoreland says it's 55,000 adding: "And I remember that because I just read the report that Admiral Sharp and I wrote." (Transcript, page 76). And yet, on the next page, he says: "I can't remember figures like that. You've ... done some research. I haven't done any research. I'm just reflecting on my memory."

TV Guide (page 10) says that during a tape-change break, Westmoreland turned to Crile and said: "You rattlesnaked me." No one from CBS News recalls him using those words, but those on the set agree that he was angry and may have said: "You ambushed me."

In his news conference of January 26, 1982, Westmoreland said: "... Little did I know that ... a real-life notorious reporter, Mike Wallace, would try to prosecute me in a star-chamber procedure with distorted, false and specious information ...."

On January 30, 1982, Westmoreland wrote a letter of "regret" to Crile for failing to make public at the news conference that he had received the May 15, 1981 letter, outlining the five broad areas for the interview.

7. CBS MISREPRESENTED THE ACCOUNTS OF EVENTS PROVIDED BY SOME WITNESSES, WHILE IGNORING ALTOGETHER OTHER WITNESSES WHO MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CHALLENGE CBS' ASSERTIONS. TV Guide Page 10

A. WESTMORELAND WAS MISREPRESENTED. AT LEAST 10 TIMES WESTMORELAND SAYS THE SIZE OF THE ENEMY WAS OVERESTIMATED AT TET. THIS VIEW WAS NEVER OFFERED ON THE SHOW. TV Guide Page 10

Westmoreland did make this assertion — that rather than underestimating the enemy at Tet, we overestimated him. He says this eight times, not "at least ten times." (transcript pages 16, 19, 33, 38, 39, 57, 84, 89). None of
it was used on the broadcast.

B. INFILTRATION FIGURES. CBS KNEW IN FALL OF 1867 MACV FIGURES HAD NEVER CLIMBED ABOVE 8000 A MONTH. WHEN ASKED, WESTMORELAND SAYS 20,000 A MONTH. THE DISCREPANCY WITH HIS 1967 "MEET THE PRESS" ESTIMATE OF 5500-5000. WESTMORELAND SENDS HIS CO-CALLED "CORRECTION" LETTER ABOUT THIS AFTER INTERVIEW WHICH CRILE NEVER SHOWS TO HIS SUPERIORS AT CBS OR TREATS ON THE AIR. TV GUIDE page 10

Here we enter the arcane world of infiltration figures. What TV Guide never deals with is that both figures may be wrong. The Vietnam War was a non-linear conflict, unlike World War II or Korea where intelligence could measure the armies along fronts or lines of battle. It has been said that even today, seven years after the end of the Vietnam War, military historians cannot give enemy strength figures with absolute precision. One compelling reason may be that there was no flood of captured enemy documents after the conflict was over. We did not win this war.

George Carver, Central Intelligence at the Westmoreland News Conference (page 32): "We were ... dealing off very spongy evidence, frequently capable of many interpretations..."

General Westmoreland (Ibid., pps. 9 and 10): "Intelligence is, at best, an imprecise science. It is not like counting beans. It is more like estimating roaches. And that was particularly true in the peculiar environment of the unique war in Vietnam."

Commander James Meacham (transcript, page 37): "Well, there isn't such a thing as an honest intelligence report; there's my view and somebody else's. We quite clearly didn't agree with the figures that we were having to use, but it's not a question of honesty or dishonesty, and I think it's wrong of you to use those words."

In response to Meacham's statement, Crile replied: "The purpose of the show was to state the CIA's figures were right, to try to demonstrate that military intelligence standards were violated to produce figures they could not
justify. This was an argument that went beyond honest differences of opinion."
(Crise interview June 15, 1982)

It seems apparent from the above that coming up with the "right" figure is beyond the scope of this paper.

Now to the "Meet the Press" allegations.

This is the full quote of what Westmoreland said on "Meet the Press."

The phrase in caps below was not used.

Spivak: What about infiltration? A year ago you said they were infiltrating at the rate of about 7000 a month. What are they doing today?

Gen. Westmoreland: I would estimate between 5500 and 6000 a month, but they do have the capability of stepping this up.

Crile says he didn't use the phrase above because it was contradicted by the page before in the full "Meet the Press" transcript. He did not respond when we asked: if it was contradicted on the page before, how did you know which statement was correct?

After General Westmoreland gave the 20,000 figure, Mike Wallace went back to it repeatedly to make sure the General was aware of what he had said. The General stayed with the figure.

On June 9, 1981, General Westmoreland sent a "Dear Mike and George" letter which, according to TV Guide, he considers a correction letter. The letter ran one page and nowhere in it does the General ask for a correction or say that he misspoke when he gave the 20,000 figure. With the letter came 72 pages of documents consisting of cables, declassified military documents, intelligence estimates and the like.

However, if one goes through the accompanying documents carefully, one finds a memorandum from Westmoreland to Wallace and Crile 27 pages in. It says: "As of November, 1967, infiltration (probable plus possible) was carried on the running tabulation as 5900. Hence my estimate given to Larry Spivak was generally

34482
correct."

What the General is saying is that he was right the first time ("Meet the Press") and wrong the second, our interview.

It is fair to say that it would have been a lot clearer if this statement had come in his covering letter with a line "I hereby ask for a correction..."

But Crile says the figures Westmoreland provided weren't relevant anyway because they weren't "contemporaneous." They were published a half year after Tet. Further, he maintains Westmoreland spoke truthfully when he said 20,000 in his interview.

Crile: "What I believe is that Westmoreland remembered the facts and forgot the cover story." (interview June 15, 1982) Colloff and Stringer were not shaken.

C. LT. GEN. DANIEL GRAHAM WAS A TOUGH INTERVIEW: OUT OF 90 MINUTES ONLY 20 SECONDS OF DENIALS AIRED. TV Guide page 11

General Graham, Westmoreland's chief of the Current Intelligence and Estimates Division J-2 MACV, was interviewed by Mike Wallace for over an hour and two sound bites totalling 21 seconds were used.

This was a judgement call on the part of the producer, and in this business there are hundreds of such calls in any documentary.

Among the subjects General Graham discussed in unused portions of his interview are:

— He thought the MACV enemy strength estimates were not too low but too high — 30% to 40% too high. They were getting all this pressure from CIA to raise the figures. (transcript, page 6)

— We had guys all over the districts trying to find out how many guerrillas there were. Better than a guy sitting in Washington looking at old captured documents. The military estimates were best. (7)

— Adams extrapolated, and he was wrong. (8)

— He alleged that Sam Adams had a "mental problem," and he had heard from "some of the CIA boys" that a psychiatrist had issued a report that "was not very favorable" when they "got rid of" Adams. (15)
Despite his so-called "crossover" memo — that U.S. forces were knocking out of action more enemy than they were able to replace — he nevertheless agreed with General McChristian that "the enemy could still continue for an indefinite period of time." (23)

He denies that MACV had put a 300,000 cap in its negotiations with CIA on enemy strength figures, i.e. that MACV would not agree to any figures over that. "Where would the order have come from except from me, and I gave no such order." (37, 38)

He says "nobody told me there was some figure I couldn't go over or under." (41)

He says Westmoreland was wrong in his interview when he gave Wallace the figure of 20,000 for enemy infiltration - Fall, 67. (50) "You managed to confuse him, Mr. Wallace." (52)

He says Tet was a military disaster for the enemy. (58)

This matter was discussed with George Crile (Interview, June 15):

BB (page 14): Should we have used more of Graham?

GC: Graham was not being candid. He was being demonstrably untruthful.

BB (page 15): Then maybe Graham was the wrong man to interview on camera. Why not Godding? (General George Godding, head of MACV delegation to the National Intelligence Estimate meeting at CIA Headquarters in Langley, Va., in 1967.) There was your horses' mouth.

GC: You can't underestimate the power of the Hawkins interview. He did state he received (a ceiling) instruction on paper during the meeting.

BB: The 300,000 ceiling was really pivotal.

GC: I think so.

BB: We'll call Godding on the ceiling figure and see if he was refused permission from General Davidson to increase the figure.

We did call General Godding. The matter of a 300,000 ceiling is another TV Guide charge. We will deal with it later in this section.

D. WALT W. ROSTOW WAS INTERVIEWED FOR THREE HOURS AND NOTHING WAS USED. HE COULD HAVE TOLD WHAT WE KNEW ABOUT THE INTELLIGENCE CONTROVERSY. TV Guide says ill ar:

Walt W. Rostow, special assistant and security advisor to President Johnson, was interviewed by Mike Wallace in New York on July 24, 1981. It was the last
interview filmed for the broadcast. None of Rostow's remarks were used.

Rostow wrote a letter to the New York Times on February 7, 1982, taking issue with the broadcast. TV Guide makes an additional charge: it quotes George Crile as saying that if Rostow had said in his interview what he said in the letter, his comments would have been included in the broadcast.

Crile maintains that TV Guide misquoted him. They confused Rostow's Times letter with a Rostow "Memorandum for the Record" which Crile says Rostow wrote to the LBJ Library on January 25, 1982.

We have a "Memorandum for the Record" which accompanies a letter Rostow wrote to Crile on January 25, 1982, two days after the broadcast. The only mention of the LBJ Library is this: "I am sure the LBJ Library would be grateful for the tapes of my three hours of fruitless labor for CBS to put with my other papers and records."

Our examination shows:

— All of the points in Rostow's Times letter were made by him in his interview with CBS News.

— His "Memorandum for the Record" has one key point not included in his interview with CBS News.

It is the memorandum, not the letter, that Crile says he was referring to in the TV Guide quote. The memorandum, which is harshly critical of the broadcast, is included in the Appendix.

The key point Crile said would have made the broadcast:

— The infiltration rate was higher than 25,000 a month.

In Rostow's memorandum, the first sentence of the paragraph containing this reads: "This background is required to understand the grotesque Crile-Wallace misrepresentation of the pre-Tet North Vietnamese infiltration rate. What was happening in the autumn of 1967 was not an 'increase in infiltration'; it was
a quite massive invasion by fresh, regular North Vietnamese units. The 'infiltration rate' may well have been higher for a few months than 25,000 (emphasis supplied). Everyone concerned, including President Johnson, knew this."

This is in direct conflict with Rostow's interview statement (transcript page 28).

WALLACE: ... The MACV analysts were reporting upwards of 25,000 North Vietnamese coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail each month and all of their reports were blocked.

ROSTOW: This is something I don't know but what I can tell you is that's not what President Johnson was looking at.

ROSTOW (page 29): ... I'd like to see the evidence. I don't know what the evidence is because they didn't mount that kind of order-of-magnitude attack.

Rostow knew before the broadcast that he would not be included. Crile told him this by letter on January 15, 1982. He explained why: that the broadcast was essentially evidence that General Westmoreland's command had suppressed and altered critical intelligence on the enemy during the year preceding Tet, and that Rostow had told them he knew nothing about it. Ergo, Rostow was not in a position to comment authoritatively on this.

In the interview with Wallace that was not used, Rostow did make these points:

— That he had informed LBJ that there was a debate going on between MACV and CIA about enemy-strength figures. (page 62)

— Helms would tell LBJ at the Tuesday luncheons that there were various estimates — "on the one hand there are these views, there are those views, this is my personal view." (62)

— CIA gave one figure, MACV another. CIA's was higher. The President was fully informed on it. (63)

— He had not heard of Westmoreland "blocking" higher enemy strength estimates. (75)
This "tortured debate" about order-of-battle and whether it was manipulated should not be confused with the range of information on which President Johnson made his assessments — before Tet, during Tet and after Tet. (94)

After the broadcast, on January 27, 1982, George Carver, formerly of Central Intelligence, said to the Christian Science Monitor: "Not only was (LBJ) aware of the debate, he said, 'Can't you guys get together on a number?!'"

Crile (interview, June 15, 1982) agrees that LBJ was aware of the dispute between MACV and CIA over enemy-strength figures "but he was not told, so far as we can tell anywhere, that MACV was aware of a far greater threat."

Crile also said: "I agonized over whether to use Rostow. I finally had to drop him for time .... The problem was Rostow was contradictory and in some places unresponsive ... No one has ever accused Rostow of being a liar but people do say he filtered information to LBJ .... He was considered intellectually dishonest in the academic community which is why he wasn't able to get any positions with Northeast universities. The Rostow interview was a colossal problem for us to cope with." (Ibid.)

Crile says Wallace and Colloff reviewed the Rostow transcript. Wallace supports Crile's decision not to use Rostow.

Wallace (interview, June 17, 1982): "Rostow and LBJ were not our story. Our story was that the 'books were cooked' ... After Rostow I went back to the Vineyard and then to China. I kept asking: 'Let me see the assembly on Rostow.' I never saw it. I was under the impression Stringer, Lack and Colloff had screened it."

Colloff (interview, June 24, 1982): "The point is that Rostow says LBJ knew there was a debate between MACV and CIA but Rostow basically consigned this to a technicians' dispute .... Never does (Rostow) say in the interview that LBJ was aware of the scope of guys within MACV not being given a chance to express dissent." Asked whether once you went to Rostow it was not almost incumbent upon
CBS News to use him: "In retrospect maybe we should. He could have confirmed what others said. But that's not the same as saying we distorted what was said by not using Rostow. The accusation is that Rostow said things that undercut the broadcast. No. Rostow has changed his position after the broadcast. The memo to the LBJ Library says things he didn't say in the interview."

Sam Adams (interview, June 21, 1982): "I wasn't persuaded there was anything in the Rostow transcript, but it wasn't my decision."

Howard Stringer (interview, June 23, 1982): "I think probably in retrospect I would have given time to Rostow even though at the time they convinced me Rostow was wandering off target."

Andrew Lack (interview, June 22, 1982): "If you go to Rostow you have to use him. You have to be very careful in explaining why you don't use someone. I'm alone in this."

There is one other aspect of the Rostow matter. There were in-house outtakes from the 1969 interview with Lyndon Johnson, exclusive with CBS News. The ad for the broadcast talks of "A deliberate plot to fool the American public, the Congress, and perhaps even the White House..." Walt Rostow was considered the closest source on what the late President knew. Was there any thought of hearing from LBJ himself?

Cridle says (interview, June 15, 1982) that he had turned this over to Researcher Alex Alben. Alben (interview, June 8, 1982) says he called the LBJ Library in Austin and was told they didn't have any of the outtake film. The matter apparently was dropped.

The film was in house. "They could have had a viewing cassette in two days," says CBS News Archivist Sam Suratt. (June 9, 1982).

The interview, filmed in 1969 and broadcast on February 6, 1970, (the writer was executive producer) has Johnson making these statements:
We were ready for Tet. My advisors told me in the late fall that a substantial move by the North Vietnamese was underway. The troop deployments, captured documents, information available to us said it was coming but we didn't think they would do it exactly at Tet, a religious holiday.

Westmoreland cancelled leaves so as to be prepared.

When LBJ went to Australia he said we were going to get an all-out kamikaze attack.

Tet was a military victory for us.

General Westmoreland called it.

The North Vietnamese took very heavy casualties.

E. CBS HAD NOT SOUGHT OUT A NUMBER OF OFFICIALS PIVOTAL TO THE CONTROVERSY COVERED BY THE PROGRAM.

On page 11 of this examination is a list of names that Sam Adams gave to George Crile who would have been critical of the broadcast's main thesis. It includes:

- Gen. Maxwell Taylor
- Gen. Phillip Davidson
- Ellsworth Bunker
- Robert Komer
- Robert McNamara

On page 12 is a list of names that General Westmoreland sent Wallace and Crile. In addition to Bunker, Komer, and General Graham (interviewed), he lists:

- Gen. Walter Kerwin, Jr.
- George Carver
- William E. Colby

There is another group of men who might have cast light on this subject, the so-called "Wise Men." Their official title was "The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," a group of distinguished Americans who were brought in by LBJ in 1967 to advise him on the war. Among those still alive today are:

- George Ball
- Gen. Maxwell Taylor
- Cyrus Vance
- McGeorge Bundy
- Douglas Dillon
- Gen. Matthew Ridgway
- Arthur Dean
It is this group that reportedly, upon hearing the evidence, told LBJ the war could last indefinitely. Some say (LBJ denied) their findings were instrumental in the President's decision not to run in 1968.

**TV Guide** concentrated on five people not interviewed:

- Davidson
- Bunker
- Carver
- Komer
- Col. Charles A. Morris.

General Davidson succeeded General McChristian as the J-2, MACV, Chief of Military Intelligence in Saigon, on May 27, 1967. He held that post until May 10, 1969. Tet therefore came on his watch. He was Lt. General Daniel Graham's boss.

**TV Guide** describes Davidson as the "most important" of the omitted interviews. The magazine claims that Crile and Wallace did not interview him because, as Wallace told Westmoreland, "General Davidson is a very, very sick man. We want very much to talk to ..." (Westmoreland interview, May 16, 1981). Instead, Davidson told the magazine that he had been treated successfully for cancer in 1974 and was now "healthy."

Crile says (interview June 15, 1982) that when he mentioned to Generals Westmoreland and Graham that Davidson was very ill, neither challenged this. Crile also says that a Col. John Lanterman had told Adams that Davidson was on "his death bed." We phoned Colonel Lanterman (June 9, 1982) who told us he had not seen Davidson since the early 1970s, was a professional colleague of the general not a friend, and never said he was ill because he had no contact with him.

Crile told us that he turned over the job of contacting General Davidson to Carolyne McDaniel, his secretary. McDaniel (interview June 11, 1982) says she tried to phone him many times during the normal work day but could not reach him. She never tried him at night. She told Crile, who said Davidson
was in a hospital dying but did not tell her what hospital.

We phoned General Davidson (512-682-8683) beginning on June 9, 1982. We phoned his house seven times between 12:30 p.m. and 7 p.m. On the last call his stepdaughter answered and said he was not in but would be calling her and she would give him the message.