We phoned on June 14, and his wife said he was at the post office. He phoned us later that day and said it would have been easier to reach him but he had been out of town at a college reunion.

Davidson said he was in fine health and has not had any signs of cancer since his surgery in 1974. He gave us permission to talk to his physician, Dr. Maruo Gangai. He was not the surgeon who operated on Davidson in 1974 but confirmed that the general is in "fine health."

General Davidson in his March 8, 1982 letter to the New York Times (unpublished) which, at General Westmoreland's request, he sent to Van Gordon Sauter on June 21, 1982 (see Appendix), wrote: "... Mr. Crile totally ignored the one official, myself, who had to have been pivotal within the conspiracy he alleges."


General Westmoreland (News Conference, January 26, 1982, page 33) said:

"I did have my military chain of command. I reported to the Ambassador for all functions. He was my on-the-scene boss." In his interview with Mike Wallace (March 16, 1982, transcript page 9, unused):

WESTMORELAND: ... I didn't report directly to Mr. Johnson. I never talked to him a single time between Washington and Saigon, not once. My chain of command was to the Ambassador, who had responsibility for all activities in Vietnam ...

In the interview with Walt W. Rostow (July 24, 1981, transcript page 14) there is this exchange:

ROSTOW: ... The most important part of the intelligence network, which everyone has missed ... were the weekly cables that came from the ambassador in Saigon —

WALLACE: Ellsworth Bunker.
ROSTOW: Ellsworth Bunker ... using all the resources that he had in the field. These were the country team assessments ... but with his own personal staff ... And I must say, historians are going to find them superb, accurate sources of ..., for their reconstruction of the period.

On Sam Adams' list given to George Crile, Bunker is named as a possible interview with this note: "Bunker was in on all this although it's problematical how much he knew of the fakery ... But he's awfully old now, and CBS might look like it's hounding an old man to his grave."

Bunker participated in the Westmoreland News Conference and although he appeared frail he did come to the microphone to answer questions and to speak. When asked by a reporter whether he knew of disagreements between Generals McChristian and Westmoreland on MACV and CIA order-of-battle estimates to be negotiated in November, he replied (Westmoreland News Conference, January 26, 1982):

BUNKER (page 48A): I was not aware of the details of these discussions as they went on. I didn't attempt to follow these...

BUNKER (page 48A, later): ... I also had contact with Ambassador Komer who was involved in some of these discussions ...

BUNKER (page 49A): ... I knew discussions were going on, but I didn't report until ... the conclusions were reached. Naturally, I couldn't report to the President every detail that took place in Vietnam ...

BUNKER (page 49A, later): ... I think he [LBJ] was aware of the fact that there was, had been disagreement, but that we came to a conclusion which was satisfactory to all of this ...

George Carver was Special Assistant to the Director, CIA, for Vietnam Affairs during the late 1960s. He was George Allen's boss, and he briefed both the Wise Men and LBJ on enemy strength estimates in March 1968, shortly before the President announced he would not run for re-election.

In the news conference after the broadcast, Carver said, "It was not General Westmoreland who dictated that they [the irregulars] be dropped from the order-of-battle, as Mike Wallace said in his rather stentorian tones. It was I who
suggested that because of the sponginess of the evidence." (Westmoreland News Conference, January 26, 1982, page 25A)

Carver was interviewed by phone by George Crile on January 11, 1982, which was 12 days before air. By that date, as Crile puts it, the broadcast was locked up.

Crile in his response to TV Guide (White Paper, Volume I, page 23) writes: "TV Guide states that Carver gave Producer Crile information that contradicted the show. TV Guide does not say what this information is because Carver in fact offered no information to counter anything that was stated in the documentary.

Crile says this about his decision on Carver (interview, June 15, 1982):

EB: Would you say that Carver was articulate?

CRILE: He's brilliant. It was going to be Carver or Allen all along.

EB: Allen is so tight on camera, you say, so inhibited. And his boss is so articulate.

CRILE: Allen was the most honorable, spoke with force and integrity. I relied heavily on Tom Powers. Carver was identified ... as Rostow's man at CIA. He had a willingness to think intelligence was the piece of paper that can get through the bureaucracy ... If Allen had not come on I would have felt compelled to have Carver on. But Carver was in a terrible position, having caved in ...

EB: Wasn't that good to have on the show?

CRILE: The CIA story wasn't the story in the show. It was a judgement call. Carver's position was firmly etched in documents in my file. His position flip-flopped. I could have turned the tables and tried to roast Carver.

EB: Couldn't you have let Carver tell his story and let the audience decide, which we often do around here, George.

Robert Komer was a special ambassador to LBJ who was in charge of the Pacification Program in Saigon, and "as such had a vital interest in enemy strength figures." (Davidson, Ibid.)

Sam Adams says of Komer (interview, June 21, 1982):
ADAMS: He would have been a damned interesting interview.

BB: What would Komer have said?

ADAMS: This is what Komer would have said. 'Of course, we did that stuff. The goddamned lying press. Of course we did that. We had to.

BB: Might have fortified your case?

ADAMS: Yes.

Col. Gains Hawkins in his interview with George Crile (March 9, 1981, transcript pages 52-53, unused) said his:

CRILE: ... why should we think that President Johnson knew about this [numbers] controversy?

HAWKINS: Because President Johnson had his special representative in Saigon, Mr. Robert Komer, who was acutely aware of every figure that was being prepared, every figure that was being accepted, every figure that was being rejected or not approved. Thoroughly, completely aware. And you must assume that he was ... reporting ...

CRILE: Back to the White House?

HAWKINS: To the White House. Else why was he there?

Col. Charles A. Morris was in charge of intelligence estimates and evaluations for MACV. He succeeded Col. Gains Hawkins in September, 1967. He was General (then Lt. Col.) Graham's superior.

Col. Morris was interviewed by phone by George Crile in December 1981 — "about a week or ten days before we locked up the show" (Crile memo to Benjamin received June 10, 1982). TV Guide charged: "Crile says that Morris confirmed the documentary's story, although Crile cannot explain why he left this important confirmation until it was too late to include it. (Morris himself, however, now denies that he supported CBS's allegations)." (page 13)

Crile's notes of his December 1981 conversation with Morris suggest that they did discuss numbers. Crile writes: "I tell Morris that Westmoreland had told us the infiltration figure was about 20,000 a month in the fall of 1967, and Morris replies: 'That's on the conservative side' but agrees that that was
roughly the size." On Westmoreland's "Meet the Press" quote of an infiltration figure of 5500-6000 a month, Crile quotes Morris as saying: "Westmoreland knew better at the time, and you've got to remember one little thing. Westmoreland was a pawn of LBJ." Morris is quoted as saying there was terrific pressure from the White House and Washington regarding the Crossover Point. Crile in his notes asks him: "Why have you just said he's no longer able to sustain this rate of infiltration and then say they're building up?" He quotes Morris as replying: "The only way of answering this is to say 'We screwed up and we didn't want to say it.'" Later: "He agrees with the premise that the American public was misled."

On January 26, 1982, Colonel Morris participated in the Westmoreland News Conference. He said he had "steadfastly refused" to give Crile any strength figures. He stated that Colonel Hawkins had never told him of his uneasiness about order-of-battle figures. He also said (Westmoreland News Conference, page 43):

> Had General Westmoreland told me to lie about figures, I would have resigned my commission, taken the consequences and left. I swear to you that no such thing was ever done.
> Nor did General Westmoreland ever approach me or anyone else and say we cannot exceed a certain figure in the order-of-battle.

In his second conversation after broadcast, Crile asks Morris about his "we screwed up" statement from the first interview:

MORRIS (page 8): We did screw up. There's enough bad we did over there to where if we just tell exactly what happened as best we can reconstruct it, we'd still be entitled to a knock on the wrist. But it was honest. There was nothing surreptitious about it. And that's what I really resent about the whole thrust of the program is that you said that Westmoreland and Phil Davidson, whom you people didn't even bother to contact, and Charlie Morris, Danny Graham were involved in a conspiracy. That's your word, I believe. Your program's word. A conspiracy to deceive and that couldn't have been further from the truth. (Morris transcript, January 30, 1982).
MORRIS (page 9): ... And God knows if you had just done to us what we're entitled to why we wouldn't have had a leg to stand on. But I just really am not at all interested in getting more information in your hand than I have time to sit down and give measured replies to.

MORRIS (page 10): I'll tell you for sure I wouldn't go on your program under any condition unless I had a legally binding contract and the right to edit it in the future.

We phoned Colonel Morris directly on June 21, 1982 (704-295-7030). He said: "I don't think I'd like to confirm anything. I was taken out of context by Crile. I might not want to say anything because I'm afraid this might wind up in court. The only thing I am willing to say on the phone is that Crile didn't use the general tenor or specifics of our conversation. The major thrust of our conversation (of December 1981) was misrepresented by him. Even the way the TV Guide story is written can be taken two ways. I deny that the original Crile story was correct."

F. THE MCCABISTAN-HAWKINS BRIEFING MISREPRESENTED STATEMENTS FROM THE TWO MEN. THEIR COMMENTS ABOUT THREE SEPARATE INCIDENTS WERE WOVEN TOGETHER INTO WHAT SEEMED TO BE ONE PIVOTAL MEETING. TV Guide page 13

From our reading of the unedited transcripts, there were clearly two meetings woven into one.

An April 1967 meeting between Westmoreland, Hawkins, and possibly McCristian. (Hawkins is sure McCristian was there. McCristian recalls a similar meeting in the spring, but is not sure if it's the same one.) This may be the third meeting to which TV Guide refers.

On page 5 of the broadcast transcript, Hawkins is quoted as saying: "I don't want to read anybody's mind, George, but there was a great deal of concern about the impact that this new figure would have. And General Westmoreland appeared to be very much surprised that — of the magnitude of the figure."

According to the unedited transcript, Hawkins is here referring to the April 1967 meeting. (See Hawkins unedited transcript for full context, pages 10-12)
It appears from the broadcast transcript that Hawkins continues to talk about the April 1967 meeting. He, in fact, according to the unedited transcript, is now referring to the August 1967 briefing. "There was no mistaking the message ... That there was a great concern about the impact of these figures, that — their being higher." (See Hawkins unedited transcript for full context, pages 16-20)

G. CBS SAID MCCARTHY’S REPORT WAS SUPPRESSED, AND HE WAS TRANSFERRED OUT OF VIETNAM, IMPLYING THE TWO WERE LINKED. TV GUIDE PAGE 14

TV Guide here is quoting from the unedited transcript (page 14 and 15) of the McCrystal interview with George Crile:

MCCARTHY: Just before I left Saigon, left my job as the chief of Intelligence, the reporting had just come in on updating the strength of the political order of battle, the Viet Cong infrastructure. And also on the guerrilla strength. I had a cable prepared to go to Washington on the new strength figures, and I took that cable to General Westmoreland because it was a big charge that we had been working on and anticipating for some time, but I wanted him to see this before it went in. General Westmoreland was perturbed by this because it was a large increase in strength, and he asked me to leave that cable 'cause he wanted to review it. Shortly thereafter, I left the country, and I don't know for a fact actually what happened to that message.

CRILE: So far as you know it, those increases did not go through?

MCCARTHY: So far as I know, I don't whether they went through or didn't go through. I don't know for a fact what happened to them.

Nowhere in his interview with Crile did McCrystal say that any of his estimates were "suppressed."

On his transfer being linked to his enemy strength estimates, McCrystal is pressed repeatedly in his interview with Crile but never concedes that this is so. He says (unedited transcript pages 26-27) that at the end of his two years of duty, Westmoreland asked him to stay an additional year as his chief of intelligence but he wanted to command a division in combat. "I didn't want to remain just an intelligence specialist ...." Westmoreland, he says, tells
him that he earned it and he would support his request. (page 27)

Later Westmoreland shows him a cable saying that extending general officers (note: commanding a division in combat meant staying in Vietnam) in Vietnam for a third year was "... not favorably considered at that time ..." But he would get command of a division at Fort Hood. The transcript continues:

MCCHRISTIAN (page 27): Now that's the actual facts of my transfer as I knew them at that time. I have heard many rumors since then that I don't know the facts on that indicate I was moved out of there to get me out of the way. But this I don't know for sure.

Crile then quotes a Jack Anderson column of November 30, 1967 alleging that McChristian had been transferred "... for reporting higher estimates than the Pentagon liked...." McChristian says he can't answer that question. The column "... was the first indication that ever came to my attention that I was moved out of Vietnam. I had just assumed it was normal army transfer policy orders." (unedited transcript page 28)

Crile quotes another Anderson column of 1975 alleging McChristian had spoken on the record of his suspicion that he had been moved because of his reporting of higher enemy-strength figures.

MCCHRISTIAN (page 29): Of course, all of the reports that have come to me through news media, through friends, various ways that I've learned about it, have raised a lot of questions in my mind. And it has made me feel that perhaps I was very naive at the time ... more than likely I was moved out of Vietnam to get me out of the way. But I don't know that for a fact.

The questioning continues on page 46 and from McChristian's next answer the broadcast extracts a quote which is used following this Wallace narration:

"Consider Westmoreland's dilemma. If he accepted his intelligence chief's findings, he would have to take the bad news to the President. If he didn't, well, there was only General McChristian to deal with." (broadcast transcript page 6) McChristian continues in the context of his transfer (above). The underlined section is what was used:
CRILE (continuing, page 29): ... Because you would not keep the numbers down ... the estimates?

MCCHRISTIAN: No, because nobody asked me that, because I reported it as I saw it, and evidently people didn't like my reporting, because I was constantly showing that the enemy strength was increasing. I was constantly reporting that the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong had the capability and the will to continue a protracted war of attrition at the same level of operations that were currently going on, for an indefinite period. And I personally wrote that paragraph in every estimate I sent in and insisted that be known. Maybe there was objections to that.

CRILE: Sir, that was running strongly against the grain of popular wisdom at that time.

MCCHRISTIAN: But not against facts.

In the broadcast (page 6) we go to Westmoreland for comment and he says that he did not accept McChristian's recommendation "... because of political reasons .... Because the people in Washington were not sophisticated enough to understand and evaluate this thing, and neither was the media."

Wallace underscores this in narration and back now to McChristian.

CRILE: In a time of war, when you're talking about enemy strength estimates, what are you thinking, General McChristian, when you confront your responsibility?

MCCHRISTIAN: Well, I feel this way, that decision-making in time of war not only involves the lives of the people on the battle-field, but involves the future liberty of your people at home, and that there's no place - and that's why the West Point motto has "honor" in it - there's no place for an officer in any executive department of government, much less the military, who cannot conduct his public duty honorably.

This comes from the unedited transcript, pages 11 and 12. It is in answer to a hypothetical question continuing a whole series of hypothetical questions which begin on page 8. It is not in answer to a specific question about a specific action.

Crile says (interview, June 15, 1982) that as long as McChristian was there Westmoreland could not go with lower figures. Researcher Alben checked
with the Center for Military History and found no such rule for general officers about a third year in Vietnam. Crile, who used to work for Jack Anderson, says he's pretty sure McChristian was the source for the Anderson column.

We checked the Center for Military History. Sandy Cochran, combat historian, told us: "It's like reassigning a corporate vice president. It's a very personal thing. You'd never find any written policy. You would for a colonel or below, but not for a general officer."

H. CBS MADE IT APPEAR THAT COL. GEORGE HAMSCHER WAS THE HEAD OF THE MACV DELEGATION TO THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES MEETING IN LANGLEY, VA. "TV Guide case 1"

In the broadcast (page 11) there is this lead-in to this section:

WALLACE: CBS REPORTS has learned that Colonel Hawkins was in fact carrying out orders that originated from General Westmoreland. Westmoreland says he doesn't recall these orders. But the head of MACV's delegation told us that General Westmoreland had, in fact, personally instructed him not to allow the total to go over 300,000. (narration)

CRILE: Wasn't there a ceiling put on the estimates by General Westmoreland? Weren't your colleagues instructed, ordered, not to let those estimates exceed a certain amount?

COL. HAMSCHER: "We can't live with a figure higher than so and so" -

CRILE: Three hundred thousand.

COL. HAMSCHER: -is the messa- is the message we got.

WALLACE: Colonel George Hamscher was one of several members of the military delegation troubled by having to carry out General Westmoreland's command position. (narration)

COL. HAMSCHER: I was uneasy because of the bargaining characteristic. This is not the way you ought to do it. You don't - you know, you don't start at an end figure and work back. But we did.

The juxtaposition of the lead and then Hamscher coming up on screen gives the impression that he is the head of MACV. Crile says (interview June 12, 1982) that Wallace's bridging narration line: "Col. George Hamscher was one of several members of the military delegation ...." takes care of this. "Eight seconds
later," Crile says, "Hamscher is identified as one of the troubled members of the MACV delegation."

The question should be asked: would not the head of the delegation also be one of the members?

Hamscher was a light colonel stationed in Hawaii. He was not even a part of MACV. He calls himself an "elbow man" (transcript page 5), "not the moving force" (page 19) and a junior officer (page 30).

Roger Colloff (interview June 24, 1982) says: "I discussed this specifically. I did not think we were wrong on that. It certainly doesn't imply he was the head. I don't think it does."

Mike Wallace (interview June 17, 1982) calls the lead-in "imprecise."

I. THE REAL HEAD OF THE MACV DELEGATION, GENERAL GEORGE GODDING, WAS NEVER IDENTIFIED. TV Guide page 14

Godding was not interviewed on camera for the broadcast. TV Guide quotes Sam Adams as saying the reason Godding was not identified in the script was "the same old problem ... the mention of too many names." Adams (interview June 21, 1982) confirms that he said this.

The magazine also quotes Godding as saying "I never quoted any figures to CBS. I told CBS I had the basis to negotiate ... it was no conspiracy at all. The material that we carried back to Langley at that time was the best estimate we had."

Crile spoke by telephone twice with Godding (undated). The number 300,000 is not in his notes of these conversations. He did say: "All negotiations in Washington were held to the MACV official figure for May order-of-battle" (first conversation).

In the second conversation he says "my position and guidance in Washington was to hold the line, and we did hold it ... I called back practically every
night asking permission to change, and [I was] always [told to] hold the line."

We spoke with Godding on June 20, 1982. He says he spoke with Crile four or five times but never quoted any number to him, and he would not quote any number to us. He said before leaving Saigon he explained his numbers to Westmoreland and Davidson who felt Godding had justified them and they "were the best we had." Westmoreland told Godding he could present those numbers (plural) to the NIE meeting.

Godding said the biggest problem with the CBS broadcast was that people don't know the difference between information and intelligence. "Intelligence is taking information and evaluating and synthesizing it."

Col. Gains Hawkins in his May 9, 1981, interview with Crile is asked this question (transcript, page 26):

CRILE: Now General Godding has told us that Westmoreland actually instructed him to keep below a certain number. This was his quote. Westmoreland apparently said this: "I don't care how you do it, use any number you want, just don't let the total go over three hundred thousand Viet Cong.

HAWKINS: I'm not familiar with that instruction.

We asked Crile about this in his interview:

EB: Godding says he never talked numbers with you.

CRILE: All I said was that was a red herring. We talked in terms of staying within parameters. That's a fair criticism in terms of precision.

EB: The specific number of 300,000 I find nowhere. Sam Adams calls it "the smoking gun." The specific charge by TV Guide is that the broadcast uses that number and then never backs it up.

CRILE: Hawkins said his understanding was a general order not to exceed the May OB. I spoke to Godding Sunday night. He said he was given a number, but he didn't have his records so he couldn't speak directly to it. If the issue is whether staying within the parameters of the May OB is not the same as a ceiling of 300,000 I'll have to plead guilty.
J. THE 300,000 CEILING — SAM ADAMS' "SMOKING GUN" PROVING A WESTMORELAND-LED CONSPIRACY — WAS THE GENERAL’S ORDER NOT TO GO OVER THAT NUMBER FOR ENEMY STRENGTH AT THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE MEETING IN LANGLEY. TV Guide page 14

This charge, about which TV Guide makes much, is poised on this question:

At the 1967 Langley meeting did someone from MACV have a piece of paper saying "Don't go over 300,000" or was the position "defend the MACV order-of-battle figure for May?" The latter position was for an enemy-strength figure of 296,000. Is this a 4000-man argument?

The broadcast script says unequivocally "... the head of MACV's delegation told us that General Westmoreland had, in fact, personally instructed him not to allow the total to go over 300,000." (Broadcast transcript, page 11).

Nowhere in the more than 20 hours of transcripts we have read does anyone say specifically that there was a 300,000 ceiling. TV Guide charges that Colonel Hawkins told Crile no fewer than four times that he had not been given a numerical ceiling. We can confirm that three times (TV Guide's fourth time was a reverse question) Hawkins refuses to confirm a 300,000 ceiling (unedited transcript pages 26, 27, and 28.) What he does say a number of times is that he was ordered to defend the MACV command position (296,000). For example (page 25), "No... specific instructions, George, except to defend the figures. These are the figures. Defend them, which I did."

Crile argues (interview June 15, 1982) that the difference between a ceiling of 300,000 and defending MACV's 296,000 is no more than a "semantic trick." Although Hawkins in his March 9, 1981 interview with Crile will not go along with the 300,000 he now says he was limited to "a ceiling" — but he does not specify what that ceiling was. In a letter to Van Gordon Sauter of June 21, 1982, (see Appendix) 15 months after this interview and five months after the broadcast, Colonel Hawkins writes that his orders were clear:

... there was no doubt in my mind before I attended the NIE conference ... that a ceiling existed and that the bottom line figure was not to exceed that ceiling.
This had become clear to me after two briefings ... to General Westmoreland, the first of such briefings having been attended by General McChristian. During the latter days of the concluding conference in Saigon this ceiling was confirmed on a piece of paper given to me by Colonel Morris. Colonel Morris stated to me at that time that this was to be absolutely the top figure acceptable ...."

Crile says (Ibid.):

... Mike was getting tired of renarration. I wanted to change to keep to the command position rather than 300,000 ... I would have felt more secure saying May OB. He at that point waved it off saying 'I don't think it makes any difference.' I was producer. It's my fault. It should have said: 'the May OB which was about 300,000.'

8. CBS TOOK QUOTES OUT OF CONTEXT, IN ONE CASE SHOWING WESTMORELAND REACTING TO A MEETING THAT TOOK PLACE AT THE PENTAGON WHEN ACTUALLY HE WAS RESPONDING TO A QUESTION ABOUT ANOTHER MEETING THAT TOOK PLACE IN SAIGON. TV Guide cases 14 and 15.

A reading of the unedited transcript confirms the charge. On the broadcast (page 14) Wallace's narration is about an August 1967 National Intelligence Estimate meeting at the Pentagon. He interviews Colonel Hamscher about this. Then we come to General Westmoreland on the next page. He is responding to a question about another meeting — an order-of-battle meeting in Saigon in September 1967 (unedited transcript, pages 57 and 58). Cut into this sequence, the General's answer is not about the same meeting the broadcast has been dealing with. Crile disagrees, calls the questions "generic" about a "pattern of miscommunication."


This charge is denied by Sam Adams. In his interview with us (June 21, 1982) he says: "If I had a problem with the show it was that it hung the rap too much on Westmoreland and not enough White House involvement... I wouldn't say the premise of the show is that Westmoreland is the perpetrator ...."

Andrew Lack (interview June 22, 1982) called Adams after Film Editor Ira Klein told him that Adams expressed doubts about the broadcast's premise. "I called Adams. He said he didn't know what Klein was talking about."
In a letter to the writer dated July 6, 1982, Adams says: "... I do not have, nor have I ever had, serious reservations about the CBS documentary ... On the contrary, I think it was a service to both the United States Intelligence and to the American public."

10. CRILE'S SUPERVISORS AT CBS NEWS FAILED TO OVERSEE HIS WORK EFFECTIVELY.

TV Guide page 15.

During the period of this production, CBS News was undergoing a series of transitions. In February of 1981 Roger Colloff replaced Robert Chandler as Vice President, Public Affairs Broadcasts. Bill Leonard was stepping down and Van Gordon Sauter stepping up as president of the division. Howard Stringer and Andrew Lack were immersed in the five-part "The Defense of the United States."

Stringer was also serving as executive producer of four other "CBS Reports."

Then, in December, a month before this broadcast was to go on the air, Stringer was appointed executive producer of the "CBS Evening News."

At the same time in August, George Crile took on a hard-news assignment which took him out of the mix for almost an entire month.

TV Guide provided no supporting data to prove its charge. Roger Colloff went far beyond what a vice president with extensive managerial functions normally does on a broadcast — reading some transcripts and meeting with the producer. Stringer believes had he not been pulled off a month before air, he might have been able to contribute more and eliminate some of the problems that eventuated.

Lack was named Senior Producer in November, a position created for the Defense broadcasts. He told us he had nothing to do with the Vietnam broadcast until November when Stringer asked him to come to a screening, which Lack feels was "... a matter of professional courtesy." (interview June 22, 1982)

Stringer believes leading correspondents may be cut too thin and used to showcase broadcasts (interview June 23, 1982). "But part of the attraction of having Mike Wallace on the piece is he's tough — not just in interviews but..."
on producers."

Wallace (interview June 17, 1982) says that during the production period of the Vietnam broadcasts he was involved in "60 Minutes", "Mike Wallace Profiles" and "Up to the Minute." He was not, he told us, as involved with the Vietnam broadcast as he is on "60 Minutes" where "I work differently. It's my face hanging out. I ask my producers: 'is that true? Can we prove it? You didn't do it here.' On this broadcast, I thought these questions would be asked by Chandler, Colloff, Stringer, and Lack."

Wallace was hardly uninvolved in the Vietnam broadcast. He attended some screenings, adjudicated some creative disputes and conducted four interviews for the broadcast.

11. TV GUIDE SAYS IF THIS BROADCAST IS ANY INDICATION, NETWORK NEWS DEPARTMENTS ARE NOT DOING ENOUGH TO KEEP THEIR OWN HOUSES IN ORDER AND NEWS SAFEGUARDS FOR FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY NEED TIGHTENING, IF NOT WHOLESALE REVISION. TV Guide case

This seems to us an editorial opinion, not reportage. As such, we see no point in addressing ourselves to it.

This concludes the TV Guide charges.

12. OTHER CHARGES MADE AGAINST THE BROADCAST

There are three additional charges made against the broadcast, two of which surfaced in the Westmoreland News Conference of January 26, 1982.

A. THE GENERAL GRAHAM GUID PRO QUO.

General Graham made this statement at the news conference (pages 15a, 16a):

GRAHAM: ... When Mr. Wallace asked me for an interview, I said I would do so on one condition — that I be allowed to state the facts, which he could check out easily, that the size of the enemy attacking force in the all-out Tet offensive was under 100,000 and this made MACV's estimate of 285,000 look a lot better than Adams' estimate of 600,000. That he, Wallace, would leave that in my interview after editing. He agreed to do so, but he did not honor that agreement.

Both Crile and Wallace deny that they made any such agreement — i.e. to ask the question and use his answer. They only agreed to ask a question in
that area, they say, and they did. The very first question asked of General Graham by Wallace in the interview of June 3, 1981:

WALLACE: All right, the point you want to make about Tet. Why don't you make it right off the top so we can more fully understand.

On February 17, 1982, Roger Colloff sent General Graham, at his request, a full transcript of his interview in accordance with CBS News Guidelines, and wrote him this: "Mr. Wallace in no way acted dishonorably. He and George Crile have told me that when they spoke to you both on the telephone and at the time of the filmed interview, there was an agreement to deal with the topic of Vietcong strength during Tet in that interview. In fact, you will notice the very first lines of the transcript reflect Mr. Wallace's discussion with you on this subject before the interview began. But both Mr. Wallace and Mr. Crile indicate firmly that no assurance was given that this subject would be included in the final broadcast. Such an assurance would have been contrary to CBS News Standards."

B. THE PARKINS STORY

On page 18 of the transcript, the broadcast states that in 1967, Lt. Col. Everette Parkins, a West Point graduate, became "... so incensed at MACV's refusal to send on the reports of enemy infiltration of 25,000 a month that he lost his temper and shouted at his superior." Col. Russell Cooley, who was not in the room at the time but says he heard it from Parkins, then described the incident.

At the Westmoreland News conference, that superior officer, Col. Charles Morris, denied the story (page 42). He said the argument was over an order he gave Parkins to try to get "... a better handle on relating reported killed in action to actual killed in action, or wounded in action...." Morris said they had a wealth of captured documents, and he asked Parkins "to see if he could detect a pattern between what our people had reported on those operations,..."
and what the enemy documents said. Morris said Parkins told him it couldn't be done and he wouldn't try. "Now, no officer in combat tells me he won't try," said Morris, "and for that he was fired."

Morris seemed to confirm this in his first telephone conversation with George Crile in December of 1981. He acknowledged firing Parkins because he couldn't "develop a formula for strength formulations." The matter of blocking Parkins' 25,000 infiltration figure was not mentioned.

Sam Adams says (interview June 21 1982) that he got the broadcast's version of the Parkins story from Parkins himself in a three to four hour interview in 1980. He said two other officers confirmed it.

We spoke to Parkins twice (June 11 and 15, 1982). He said he and Morris had had a personality conflict for a long time. He would neither confirm nor deny either version of the story. He said on the advice of his lawyer he did not want to discuss the Morris incident with us.

C. THE ABRAMS CABLE

On pages 13 and 14 of the broadcast transcript, Mike Wallace questions General Westmoreland about a cable Wallace says he sent on August 20, 1967, on why the self-defense militia must be removed from the enemy order-of-battle. "I have a copy of your August 20 cable ..." Wallace says on page 13. Then on page 14 he quotes the beginning: "We have been projecting an image of success over the recent months."

There appears to be an omission and an error here. The full sentence in original cable reads: "We have been projecting an image of success over the recent months AND PROPERLY SO." The last three words are omitted.

Second, Westmoreland did not send this cable. Gen. Creighton Abrams did, and Westmoreland "signed off" on it as did Admiral Sharp, CINCPAC in Hawaii. But Abrams was the sender.
12. CBS NEWS GUIDELINES IRREGULARITIES

Throughout this paper we have listed some violations of CBS News Guidelines, such as interviewing the same man (Allen) twice. There were other violations involving a section of the Guidelines (pages 9-10, 7/13/78)

1. If the answer to an interview question, as that answer appears in the broadcast, is derived, in part or in whole, from the answers to other questions, the broadcast will so indicate, either in lead-in narration, bridging narration lines during the interview, or appropriate audio lines.

In short, what this section says is that you cannot cut together two answers from two separate questions as a single answer to one question.

Westmoreland: His answer on page 4 is a combination of two answers coming from pages 15 and 18 of the full transcript.

Allen: His answer near the bottom of page 12 is a combination of three answers coming from pages 13B, 20B and 21B of the transcript.

Adams: His answer at the bottom of page 25 is a combination of two answers coming from pages 17G and 18G of the transcript.

McArthur: His answer at the bottom of page 22 is a combination of three answers from pages 32, 33, and 37 of the transcript.

None of these combined answers distort the meaning of what the interviewees are saying. They do, however, violate the Guidelines.

Asked about this (interview June 15, 1982), George Crile said: "My understanding is that as long as you begin the answer you can jump if it's the same subject." Told that Guidelines were specific in prohibiting this, Crile responded: "I believe people would be surprised (to learn about this), and I don't think it should be part of the Guidelines."

"The Guidelines"

Roger Collof said that he had gone over this with Crile with "a fine tooth comb." Neither Collof, Stringer, or Lack believe there should be different Guidelines for documentaries than there are for Hard News.
3. SUMMARY

Based on our examination, the broadcast had these principal flaws:

— The premise was obviously and historically controversial. There was an imbalance in presenting the two sides of the issue. For every McChristian, there was a Davidson; for every Hawkins, a Morris; for every Allen, a Carver.

— A "conspiracy", given the accepted definition of the word, was not proved.

— The double interview of George Allen.

— The screening of interviews for Allen.

— Sam Adams not being properly identified as a paid consultant.

— Journalistic oversight which permitted two McChristian-Hawkins meetings to appear to be one meeting.

— Journalistic oversight which permitted General Westmoreland to discuss one meeting which was then cut into a sequence about another meeting.

— Other violations of CBS News Guidelines.

— The coddling of sympathetic witnesses.

— The lack of journalistic enterprise in trying to find General Davidson or in checking out his "illness".

— Imprecisions in the handling of the Hamscher introduction and in the "Meet the Press" matter involving Westmoreland's "correction letter."  

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On the other hand, TV Guide may have been wise in not challenging the premise of the broadcast. It seems odd, to say the least, for the magazine to launch an attack of this dimension and still say of its investigation: "Its purpose was not to confirm or deny the existence of the 'conspiracy' that CBS's journalists say existed."

The reason for that may be that even today military historians cannot tell you whether or not MACV "cooked the books" as the broadcast states. The flow of definitive information is painfully slow and may never be conclusive.

To get a group of high-ranking military men and former Central Intelligence Agents to say that this is what happened was an achievement of no small dimension. These were not fringe people but rather prototypical Americans.

Mike Wallace in a letter to this writer dated June 22, 1982:"... basically I think 3-511
the piece itself is accurate, that it faithfully represented what went on back in 1967 and '68. It was not just an intelligence dispute among analysts; it was what we said it was, out of the mouths of those who were there when the books were "cooked."
Howard Stringer (interview June 23, 1982) put it this way: "If all the standards of fairness had been followed, it would not have changed the outcome of the broadcast."
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*Credits

"The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception"
January 23, 1982

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George Crile

Written by

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"Credits (continued)"

"The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception"
January 23, 1982

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