COPIES OF MACV VU-GRAPH SLIDES FROM AUGUST NIE CONFERENCE
**DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY FORCES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VC <strong>MAIN</strong></th>
<th>IOTZ</th>
<th>ECTZ</th>
<th>IOTZ</th>
<th>IVCTZ</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VC <strong>LOCAL</strong></td>
<td>8.600</td>
<td>2.600</td>
<td>3.000</td>
<td>5.100</td>
<td>19,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCS'S <strong>PLT</strong></td>
<td>2.660</td>
<td>2.660</td>
<td>3.900</td>
<td>6.100</td>
<td>15,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUERRILLAS</td>
<td>2.990</td>
<td>5.700</td>
<td>4.777</td>
<td>8.065</td>
<td>21,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>17.150</td>
<td>23.950</td>
<td>6.700</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>65,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL** | 59,850 | 62,050 | 47,447 | 64,685 | 304,092

*Does not include admin services*

**Does not include admin services**
# POPULATION CONTROL
## AS OF 30 JUNE 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>I CTZ</th>
<th>II CTZ</th>
<th>III CTZ</th>
<th>IV CTZ</th>
<th>TOTAL RVN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CATEGORY A</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>199,100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>268,200</td>
<td>489,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATEGORY B</td>
<td>398,400</td>
<td>703,500</td>
<td>644,600</td>
<td>1,382,600</td>
<td>3,129,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATEGORY C</td>
<td>699,600</td>
<td>924,100</td>
<td>1,376,900</td>
<td>1,360,000</td>
<td>4,360,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATEGORY D</td>
<td>301,600</td>
<td>285,800</td>
<td>452,100</td>
<td>856,600</td>
<td>1,976,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATEGORY E</td>
<td>76,500</td>
<td>106,300</td>
<td>48,200</td>
<td>171,200</td>
<td>402,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC CONTROL</td>
<td>826,000</td>
<td>201,200</td>
<td>241,600</td>
<td>1,573,600</td>
<td>2,923,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Does not include 3,634,000 in non-hamlet & non-evaluated (grand total 17,165,300)*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>INFRA-STRUCTURE</th>
<th>VC CONTROL + CAT E</th>
<th>VC CONTROL + CAT C, D, E</th>
<th>TOTAL POPULATION</th>
<th>GUERRILLAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I CORPS</td>
<td>14,800</td>
<td>903,300</td>
<td>1,984,500</td>
<td>3,005,800</td>
<td>17,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.640%</td>
<td>1.690%</td>
<td>0.746%</td>
<td>0.865%</td>
<td>0.495%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II CORPS</td>
<td>19,400</td>
<td>387,500</td>
<td>1,597,400</td>
<td>2,915,100</td>
<td>23,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.020%</td>
<td>1.460%</td>
<td>1.220%</td>
<td>0.801%</td>
<td>0.667%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III CORPS</td>
<td>13,500</td>
<td>289,000</td>
<td>2,118,800</td>
<td>5,311,500</td>
<td>5,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.660%</td>
<td>1.960%</td>
<td>0.637%</td>
<td>0.254%</td>
<td>0.254%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV CORPS</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>1,744,600</td>
<td>3,961,400</td>
<td>5,933,100</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.720%</td>
<td>1.030%</td>
<td>0.758%</td>
<td>0.304%</td>
<td>0.506%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>77,700</td>
<td>3,325,400</td>
<td>9,662,100</td>
<td>17,165,300</td>
<td>64,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.370%</td>
<td>1.920%</td>
<td>0.805%</td>
<td>0.683%</td>
<td>0.455%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* TOTAL POPULATION INCLUDES CAT A-G, AUTONOMOUS CITIES & NON-HAMLET POPULATION.
POLITICAL ORDER OF BATTLE STRENGTH

0 ALL MEMBERS OF THE PARTY CHAPTER ORGANIZATIONS

0 LEADERSHIP ONLY OF THE PARALLEL FRONT ORGANIZATIONS

0 LEADERSHIP ONLY OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE IN EACH ORGANIZATION

0 DOES NOT INCLUDE THE PARTY ORGANIZATION IN THE MILITARY UNITS
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Villages</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24,800</td>
<td>8,800</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34,400</td>
<td>6,400</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35,500</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Estimated strength of VC:

- Estimated:
  - 83,000 (88%)
  - 91,000 (100%)

Revised:

- Low:
  - 83,000
  - 91,000

- High:
  - 88,000
  - 95,000
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAT.</th>
<th>NO. HAMLETS</th>
<th>LOW STRENGTH</th>
<th>HIGH STRENGTH</th>
<th>LOW TOTAL</th>
<th>HIGH TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>4,506</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>22,530</td>
<td>24,783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>2,156</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6,468</td>
<td>6,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>3,246</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6,490</td>
<td>6,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>1,776</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes V/C controlled HAMLETS.

TOTAL: 35,820 57,700
## Irregular Strength Estimate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Previous</th>
<th>Revised</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>112,600</td>
<td>183,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Guerrillas**: No breakout - 65,200
- **Self Defense**: No breakout - 95,850
- **Secret Self Defense**: No breakout - 22,000
### Previous Estimate

#### Combat Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maneuver</th>
<th>CBT/SPT</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Admin Services</th>
<th>Irregulars</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>108,200</td>
<td>12,200</td>
<td>120,400</td>
<td>24,800</td>
<td>112,800</td>
<td>39,000</td>
<td>297,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Revised Estimate

#### Armed Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maneuver</th>
<th>CBT/SPT</th>
<th>Admin Services</th>
<th>Guerrillas</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>108,200</td>
<td>12,200</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>103,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>226,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Total**: 226,000
- **Mean**: 298,000

#### Infrastructure

- **Control & Admin Pers Accepted**: 93,000
- **Possible**: 92,000

---

*Slide shown by Col. Hewes 14 Oct. 1961*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CTZ</th>
<th>GUERRILLAS</th>
<th>SD FORCES</th>
<th>SSD FORCES</th>
<th>TOTALS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>17,150</td>
<td>48,000</td>
<td>9,600</td>
<td>74,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>25,350</td>
<td>23,900</td>
<td>2,850</td>
<td>50,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>6,700</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>2,450</td>
<td>13,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>19,775</td>
<td>7,125</td>
<td>46,875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>65,800</strong></td>
<td><strong>65,075</strong></td>
<td><strong>130,100</strong></td>
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</table>
## GUERRILLA PERCENTAGES OF POPULATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VC CONTR + CAT. E</th>
<th>VC CONTR + CAT. E, D, C</th>
<th>TOTAL POPULATION</th>
<th>NUMBER GUERRILLAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I CTZ</td>
<td>1.090</td>
<td>0.865</td>
<td>0.572</td>
<td>17,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II CTZ</td>
<td>6.020</td>
<td>1.460</td>
<td>0.801</td>
<td>23,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III CTZ</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.260</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>5,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>IV CTZ</td>
<td>1.050</td>
<td>0.455</td>
<td>0.304</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# RETROACTIVE EST
## OF IRREGULAR STRENGTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>230,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>202,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1866</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHELON</td>
<td>REVISIONED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRI-THIEN MR MR V</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4,841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSVN LIBERATION ARMY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR 1,2,3,4,6,10 RSZ</td>
<td>3,35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>17,475</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
# COSVN

## 1965 ARVN Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MACV Identified</th>
<th>1200</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

## Military Regions

### MACV Files 1967

(Ident by Name & Position)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>MR 1</th>
<th>MR 2</th>
<th>MR 3</th>
<th>MR 4</th>
<th>MR 5</th>
<th>MR 6</th>
<th>MR 10</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>1154</td>
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<td>No. VC PROVINCES</td>
<td>PERSONALITIES IN MACV FILES - 1967</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>4,500</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. VC DISTRICTS</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>230</td>
<td>6,400</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAT.</td>
<td>No. VILLAGES</td>
<td>LOW STRENGTH</td>
<td>HIGH STRENGTH</td>
<td>LOW TOTAL</td>
<td>HIGH TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>949</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18,031</td>
<td>18,980</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>D</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7,735</td>
<td>7,735</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>7,878</td>
<td>7,878</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>752</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* INCLUDES VC CONTROLLED VILLAGES.

TOTAL 34,400 35,300
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (C-306D)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILITARY STAFF SECTION (C-308D)</td>
<td>140-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLITICAL STAFF (C-310D)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REAR SERVICE SECTION (C-312D)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILITARY INTEL SECTION (C-314D)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISTRICT WORKSHOP (C-316)</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDICAL SECTION (C-320D)</td>
<td>80-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONVALESCENCE UNIT (C-312D)</td>
<td>80-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMO-LIASON CO. (C-320D)</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 535
METHODOLOGY
COSVN TO DISTRICT

ACTUAL IDENTIFIED STRENGTH
(DISTRICTS AVERAGED BY
PROVINC)

VILLAGE & HAMLET

CAPTURED ADMIN PLANS
+ STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF 695
VILLAGES & HAMLETS

= TYPICAL VC CONTROLLED
VILLAGE & HAMLET
STRENGTH

= ADJUSTMENT FOR POPULATION
CONTROL

= TOTAL VILLAGE/HAMLET
PROJECTED STRENGTH
JX 250

CABLE, 8/19/67 FROM KOMER TO CARVER
FOR CARVER FROM KOMER

1. UNDERSTAND FROM MACV THAT ONE INSISTING ON INCLUSIONS 120,000 SDF AND SSDF IN NEW MIE FIGURES, THUS GIVING TOTAL OF 435,000 FOR ENEMY O/B.

2. YOU ARE FAMILIAR WITH NEW MACV FIGURES WHICH REPRESENT MAJOR STEP FORWARD TOWARD SOUNDER ANALYSIS. I CANNOT SEE CASE FOR INCLUDING VAGUE ESTIMATES OF LOW GRADE PART-TIME HAMLET SELF-DEFENSE GROUPS, MOSTLY WEAPONLESS, IN NEW O/B. FOR...

DO WE INCLUDE RDPGS, HAMLET MILITIA, OR COMBAT YOUT O/N GIV SIDE.

3. MACV IS DETERMINED STICK BY ITS GUNS, AND YOU CAN WELL IMAGINE RUCKUS WHICH WOULD BE CREATED IT IF CAME OUT AS EVERYTHING TENDS TO ON VIETNAM THAT AGENCY AND MACV FIGURES WERE SO WIDELY AS DIFFERENT. ANY EXPLANATION TO WHY WOULD SIMPLY LEAD PRESS TO CONCLUDE THAT MACV WAS DELIBERATELY OMITTING SDF/SSDF CATEGORY IN ORDER DOWNGRADE ENEMY STRENGTH. THUS, CREDIBILITY GAP WOULD BE FURTHER WIDENED AT VERY TIME WHEN IN FACT WE ARE MOVING TOWARD MUCH MORE VALID ESTIMATES.
4. ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT NIE PROJECTS 15,000 YAN ENH:
INCREASE BY END OF YEAR. ON WHAT IS THIS BASED? IT IS CONTRAST TO
WHOLE TREND OF ANALYSIS OUT HERE, INCLUDING HIGHER ENEMY LOSS RATES,

NEW OFFICIAL MACV ESTIMATE THAT IN-COUNTRY RECRUITING JANUARY-MAY
1967 PROBABLY DOWN TO 3500 PER MONTH, AND LACK OF ANY EVIDENCE THAT
INFILTRATION RATE UP IF INDEED IT IS AVERAGING AS HIGH AS LAST YEAR.

5. WILL YOU PLEASE HELP STRAIGHTEN OUT THIS MATTER, WHICH CONCERN TO WHOLE TOP LEVEL HERE. SURE YOU AGREE THAT WE HAVE ENOUGH REAL PROBLEMS WITHOUT ADDING ON PAPER WARS.

SECRET
A reference to the DIAAFAA 6717 and my previous answer to this message.

The further consideration reveals the total unacceptability of including the strength of the self-defense forces and the secret self-defense forces in any strength figure to be released to the press.

3. The figure of about 428,000, which includes all forces including SD and SSD, has already surfaced out here. This figure was stunned to embassy and this headquarters and has resulted in a scream of protests and denials.

4. In view of this reaction and in view of General Westmoreland's conversations, all of which you have heard, I am sure that this headquarters will not accept a figure in excess of the current strength figure carried by the press.

5. Let me make it clear that this is my view of General Westmoreland's sentiments. I have not discussed this directly with him but I am 100 per cent sure of his reaction.

6. Since your message does not give us adequate information to judge what is to be released to the press, request info on this facet asap.
JX 252

CABLE 8/20/67 FROM ABRAMS TO WHEELER, SHARP, WESTMORELAND
EIB961 SIB961
00 RUEIC
ZNY XXXXX Z'-V RUEISP
EKA1160AB142
CO YEKADL
DE YSEKO43 2332249
O 2122412 ZYH ZFF-1 ZFD
FM GEN WHEELER, CJCS
TO MR. HELMS, DIR CIA
ZEM
O 2002512 ZYH ZFF-1
FM GEN ABRAMS DEPCOMUSMACV
TO GEN WHEELER JCS WASH DC
ADM SHARP CINCPAC HAWAII
GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV
ZEM

1. (C) MACV REPRESENTATIVES TO THE DIA CONFERENCE DEALING WITH
ORDER OF BATTLE STRENGTH FOR ENEMY FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM REPORT THAT
THERE IS A CONTINUING CONTROVERSY REGARDING THE INCLUSION OF THE
STRENGTH FIGURES FOR SELF-DEFENSE FORCES (SD) AND SECRET SELF-DEFENSE FORCES (SSD) IN THE DRAFT NIE 14.3-67. IN GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S TEMPORARY ABSENCE, I THINK IT APPROPRIATE TO MAKE THE COMMAND POSITION ON THE INCLUSION OF THESE STRENGTH FIGURES CLEAR.

2. (S) IF SD AND SSD STRENGTH FIGURES ARE INCLUDED IN THE OVERALL ENEMY STRENGTH, THE FIGURE WILL TOTAL 420,000 - 431,000 DEPENDING ON MINOR VARIATIONS. THIS IS IN SHARP CONTRAST TO THE CURRENT OVERALL STRENGTH FIGURE OF ABOUT 299,000 GIVEN TO THE PRESS HERE.

3. (C) FROM THE INTELLIGENCE VIEWPOINT, THE INCLUSION OF SD AND SSD STRENGTH FIGURES IN AN ESTIMATE OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES IS HIGHLY QUESTIONABLE. THESE FORCES CONTAIN A SIZABLE NUMBER OF WOMEN AND OLD PEOPLE. THEY OPERATE ENTIRELY IN THEIR OWN HAMLETS. THEY ARE RARELY ARMED, HAVE NO REAL DISCIPLINE, AND ALMOST NO MILITARY CAPABILITY. THEY ARE NO MORE EFFECTIVE IN THE MILITARY SENSE THAN THE DOZENS OF OTHER NONMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS WHICH SERVE THE VC CAUSE IN VARIOUS ROLES.

4. (S) THE PRESS REACTION TO THESE INFLATED FIGURES IS OF MUCH GREATER CONCERN. WE HAVE BEEN PROJECTING AN IMAGE OF SUCCESS OVER THE RECENT MONTHS, AND PROPERLY SO. NOW, WHEN WE RELEASE THE FIGURE OF 420-431,000, THE NEWSMEN WILL IMMEDIATELY SEEZE ON THE POINT THAT THE ENEMY FORCE HAS INCREASED ABOUT 120-130,000, ALL AVAILABLE CAVEATS AND EXPLANATIONS WILL NOT PREVENT THE PRESS FROM DRAWING AN ERRONEOUS AND GLOOMY CONCLUSION AS TO THE MEANING OF THE INCREASE. ALL THOSE WHO HAVE AN INCORRECT VIEW OF THE WAR WILL BE REENFORCED AND THE TASK WILL BECOME MORE DIFFICULT.
5. (c) In our view, the strength figures for the SD and SSD should be omitted entirely from the enemy strength tables in the forthcoming NIE. This will prevent the possibility that they can be added to the valid figures, and an erroneous conclusion drawn as to an enemy strength increase.

6. (U) I realize that you are fully aware of the implications set forth above, and that you share our concern. Nevertheless, the matter is so crucial here that I think it advisable to make our position known to you.

7. I am informed that Joe Fried of the New York Daily News resident in Saigon has the gist of the new intelligence examination and the total figure of about 420,000. Zorthian and Siddle have talked to him and hopefully have persuaded him that any new figures would be premature now.
CABLE 8/20/67 FROM WESTMORELAND TO WHEELER, SHARP
SECRET MAC 7559 EYES ONLY

I have just read Gen Abrams MAC 7546, and I agree. I do not concur with the inclusion of SD and SSD strength figures in the overall enemy strength. It distorts the situation and makes no sense. No possible explanations could prevent the erroneous conclusions that would result. Warm regards.

CONFIDENTIAL
CABLE 9/11/67 FROM CARVER TO HELMS (CIA #293)
11220Z CITE SAIGON 1826

FREQUENCY DIRECTOR

Approved for Release
Date
Approved for Release
Date
03 AUG 1963

1. SO FAR, OUR MISSION FRUSTRATINGLY UNPRODUCTIVE SINCE
MACV STONEWALLING, OBVIOUSLY UNDER ORDERS, UNLESS OR UNTIL I CAN
PERSUADE WESTMORELAND TO AMEND THOSE ORDERS, SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF
EVIDENCE OR SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE.

2. SINCE ROOT PROBLEMS, AS WE ALL RECOGNIZE, LIE MUCH MORE
IN POLITICAL PUBLIC RELATIONS REALM THAN IN SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCE,
I HAD HOPE TO GET SHARP, WESTMORELAND, KOMER AND INNER AGREEMENT
ON PRESENTATIONAL PACKAGING QUESTION BEFORE ADDRESSING EVIDENCE
AND SPECIFIC FIGURES. VARIETY OF CIRCUMSTANCES, HOWEVER, TORPEDOED
THIS PLAN. IN BANGKOK ON 6 SEPTEMBER SHARP'S MORNING OBLIGATIONS
AT SEATO AND MY 1415 PLANE MADE 1300 - 1330 ONLY POSSIBLE TIME
FOR OUR MEETING. AS SHARP COMING UP EMBASSY STAIRS, HE GRABBED BY
DAVID BANG WHO, WHEN INFORMED SHARP GOING TO 1300 APPOINTMENT WITH
WASHASHINGTON REPRESENTATIVE, STOOD STUFFLY ON HIS PREPOTENTIALS,
AS DCM AND SWEEP SHARP INTO HIS OFFICE. THUS I MISSED SHARP,
THOUGH I WAS ABLE TO GIVE GIST OF MY POSITION TO ADMIRAL
READY. WHEN TEAM ARRIVED SAIGON 6 SEPTEMBER, WE LEARNED BOTH
ESTMOREPAND AND KOMER HAD TAKEN OFF FOR WEEKEND OF LEAVE IN
RESPECTIVELY, MANILA AND BANGKOK. THUS WORKING SESSIONS HAD TO
COMMENCE WITHOUT CONTROLLING POLICY QUESTIONS RESOLVED.
3. ON 9 SEPTEMBER, MACV J2 AND STAFF DEVOTED WHOLE DAY TO
BRIEFING US ON REVISED MACV ESTIMATE, WHICH WIDENED RATHER THAN
NARROWED OUR DIFFERENCES. MACV NOW STICKING ON 115,000 MAIN
AND LOCAL FORCE FIGURE, 29,000 ADMIN SERVICES 65,000 GUERRILLAS
AND 65,000 POLITICAL CADRE FOR (BY NO COINCIDENCE) MILITARY-AND
POLITICAL OR TOTAL OF 298,000. MACV ALSO ADAMANT-THAT-NO-FIGURE
OF QUANTITATED ESTIMATE BE GIVEN FOR OTHER ELEMENTS VC ORGANIZATION.
SUCH AS SELF-DEFENSE, SECRET SELF-DEFENSE, ASSAULT-YOUTH, ETC.
(196 DRAFT FIGURES ARE 121,000 MAIN AND LOCAL FORCE, 40-60,000
RANGE ON ADMIN SERVICE, 60-100,000 RANGE ON GUERRILLAS, 90,000
ON POLITICAL CADRE, AND 150,000 FOR OTHERS.)
4. 10 SEPTEMBER DEVOTED TO SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF EVIDENCE-
AND METHODOLOGY ON ADMIN SERVICE AND GUERRILLAS. WE DID NOT ARGUE
2,000 DROP IN MAIN AND LOCAL FORCE WHICH PROBABLY DEFENSIBLE OR 5,000 DROP IN POLITICAL CADRE WHICH, AT THE MOMENT, WAS SECONDARY-
ISSUE. I ATTEMPTED TO CLEAR ATMOSPHERE BY OPENING SESSION WITH-
STRONG PITCH FOR CAREFUL LOOK AT DATA CATEGORY BY CATEGORY, WITHOUT CONSIDERING ULTIMATE TOTAL UNTIL ANALYSIS EACH SEPARATE CATEGORY COMPLETED, AND BY OUTLINING HOW PRESENTATIONAL AND PUBLIC RELATIONS ISSUE COULD BE HANDLED IN FASHION BENEFICIAL TO MACV AND US GOVERNMENT CREDIBILITY WHEREVER WE COME OUT. I ALSO EXPLAINED, IN LOW-KEY AND WITH ALL POSSIBLE TACT, THAT NATIONAL ESTIMATES WERE DCI-ESTIMATES; THAT OTHER USIB MEMBERS COULD DISSENT, BUT NO ONE COULD-TELL THE USIB CHAIRMAN WHAT HIS ESTIMATE HAD TO BE. MY REMARKS SEEMED WELL RECEIVED BUT HAD NO INFLUENCE ON THE BEHAVIOR OF GENERAL DAVIDSON OR HIS SUBORDINATES.

5. 14.3 CASE ON ADMIN SERVICE AND GUERRILLA: FIGURES MOST ABLY PRESENTED BY MESSRS. ADAMS AND MYLAND. THOUGH TO DISCOMFITURE OF OUR HOSTS THIS CASE PATENTLY STRONGER THAN MACV'S, IT WAVED ASIDE BY GENERAL DAVIDSON. TWO EXAMPLES CONVEY THE PICTURE: 1. ESTIMATE DRAFT FIGURES INCLUDE 17,000 ADMIN SERVICE AT DISTRICT LEVEL; MACV ONLY ACCEPTS 5,000. MR. ADAMS EXPLAINED HOW OUR DISTRICT LEVEL FIGURE DEVELOPED FROM ADMIN TO COMBAT TROOP RATIO EXTRAPOLATED FROM DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE COVERING 14 DISTRICTS. GENERAL DAVIDSON TORE INTO THIS, SAYING 14 DISTRICT BASE TOO SLIM FOR EXTRAPOLATION OF VALID NATIONALWIDE FIGURE. SOON THEREAFTER,
However, officer who presented MACV case on this point had to admit (in response Davidson's own questions) that MACV 5,000 figure based on only three districts and, even here, MACV had made downward adjustment in what documents actually said. No matter, Davidson would not budge. When challenging MACV's adamant refusal to quantify estimate of irregulars (self defense, secret self defense), we pointed out 14.3 draft figures taken unchanged from July 1967 MACV study on irregulars. Again, no matter, no give. Even DIA team most irritated. After session, Mr. Fowler grumbled "we did not travel 6,000 miles to be insulted."

6. Variety of circumstantial indicators -- MACV juggling of figures its own analysts presented during August discussions in Washington, MACV behavior, and tacit or oblique lunchtime and corridor admissions by MACV officers, including Davidson -- all point to inescapable conclusion that General Westmoreland (with Hommer's encouragement) has given instruction tantamount to direct order that VC strength total will not exceed 300,200 ceiling. Rationale seems to be that any higher figure would not be sufficiently optimistic and would generate unacceptable level of criticism from the press. This order obviously makes it
IMPOSSIBLE FOR MACV TO ENGAGE IN SERIOUS OR MEANINGFUL DISCUSSION OF EVIDENCE OR OUR REAL SUBSTANTIVE DISAGREEMENTS, WHICH I STRONGLY SUSPECT ARE NEGLIGIBLE.

7. I HOPE TO SEE KOMER AND WESTMORELAND TOMORROW (11 SEPT) AND WILL ENDEAVOR TO LOOSEN THIS STRAITJACKET. UNLESS I CAN, WE ARE WASTING OUR TIME. TO SHOW, HOWEVER, THAT WE ARE WILLING TO GO EVEN BEYOND THE LAST MILE, MESSRS. KYLAND, MOOR AND ADAMS ARE GOING TO SIT DOWN WITH MACV'S WORKING LEVEL ANALYSTS AND REVIEW THE EVIDENCE ON ADMIN SERVICE, GUERRILLAS AND POLITICAL CADRE DOCUMENT BY DOCUMENT.

8. FOR COSMETIC REASONS, GIVEN THE SITUATION AND THE FACT THAT KOMER AND WESTMORELAND WILL NOT ARRIVE UNTIL 11 SEPTEMBER, IT WOULD BE A POLITICAL ERROR FOR US TO LEAVE ON 10 SEPTEMBER AS PLANNED. THUS WE WILL HAVE TO REMAIN AN ADDITIONAL DAY OR TWO FOR APPEARANCES SAKE IF NOTHING ELSE. IF I CAN BUDGE WESTMORELAND, THIS WHOLE MATTER CAN BE RESOLVED TO EVERYONE'S SATISFACTION IN A FEW HOURS OF SERIOUS DISCUSSION. IF I CAN NOT, NO AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE.

9. HAVE BOTH SEEN THIS MESSAGE. LEFT AFTERNOON 10 SEPTEMBER.
JX 258A

CABLE 9/12/67 FROM CARVER TO HELMS (CIA #292)
REPS:  
A. SAIGON 1925 ("4J006")  
B. DIRECTOR 34454  
C. SAIGON 1925 (50299)

1. SEPTEMBER 11 AND 12 FULL OF ACTION AND BEHIND SCENES SUMMING IN MACV, BUT HAVE PRODUCED LITTLE MOVEMENT. AT PRESENT, WE ARE AT AN IMPASSE. I HAVE SPOKE KOMER TODAY AND ARRANGED HAVING DINNER WITH HIM TONIGHT. I SEE WESTMORELAND WITH KOMER, DAVIDSON, THE DIA PRINCIPALS, AND MY TEAM ON TOMORROW, 12 SEPTEMBER. THIS MAY CLEAR THE AIR, BUT IT MAY LOCK US IN WHERE WE NOW ARE. I WILL SEE THE AMBASSADOR AFTER THE WESTMORELAND SESSION.

2. ON 11 SEPTEMBER, MESSRS. HYLAND, ADAMS, AND VICK REVISED THE DETAILED EVIDENCE ON, RESPECTIVELY, ADMIN SERVICES, GUERRILLA AND POLITICAL ASPECT. "FL ADAMS MANAGED TO GET MACV'S GUERRILLA FIGURES APPRECIABLY RAISED."

Approved for Release
Date 2 AUG 1983
INLAND MADE NO CHANGES IN MACV'S ADMIN SERVICE HOLDINGS, BUT SAW IN DETAIL HOW WEAK THEIR CASE WAS (E.G., A DOCUMENT USED TO PROVIDE THE MODEL FOR ONE OF THE THREE DISTRICTS OF WHICH MACV'S DISTRICT-LEVEL CASE WAS BASED HAD A PARAGRAPHS MACV DID NOT CITE, PROVIDING ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR MR. ADAMS' EXTRAPOLATED ADMIN TO COMBAT RATIO AT DISTRICT LEVEL). MR. HOOD MADE NO CHANGES, BUT ON 11 SEPTEMBER OUR POSITIONS ON POLITICAL CADRE WERE VERY CLOSE.

ANY WEATHER EYE ON A FINAL TOTAL. (DAVIDSON ANGRILY ACCUSED
ME OF IMPUGNING HIS INTEGRITY SINCE HE HAD ASSURED ME WE
HAD NO PRE-DETERMINED TOTAL.) I PRESENTED MY THOUGHTS ON
THE PUBLIC RELATIONS PROBLEM. NOTING THAT A CLEARING OF THE
ATMOSPHERE, NO MATTER HOW MUCH SHORT-TERM STATIC PRODUCED,
WOULD BENEFIT OUR CREDIBILITY POSTING THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL
TO ESTABLISH A VALID BASELINE WE WOULD NEVER
ADJUST UPWARD, AND THAT IF MACV WENT TO THE
PRESS WITH THE LINE TAUT AFTER AN EXHAUSTIVE REVIEW OF ALL
ITS EVIDENCE AND METHODOLOGY, IT CAME OUT WITH A MILITARY
PLUS POLITICAL TOTAL OF (BY STRANGE CONCINENCE) 257,727.
IT REALLY WOULD BE CRUCIFIED.

4. KOWER THEN LAUNCHED INTO AN HOUR-PLUS MONOLOGUE,
REVIEWING HIS AND WESTMORELAND'S PROBLEMS WITH THE PRESS,
THEIR FRUSTRATING INABILITY TO CONVINCE THE PRESS (HENCE THE
PUBLIC) OF THE GREAT PROGRESS BEING MADE, AND THE PARAMOUNT
IMPORTANCE OF SAYING NOTHING THAT WOULD DETRACT FROM THE IMAGE
OF PROGRESS OR SUPPORT OF THE THESIS OF STALEMATE. HE THEN
OPINED A STRONG ATTACK ON THE ESTIMATE DRAFT, FAULTING THE
QUALITY OF ITS PROSE AND ITS ANALYSIS AND CALLING IT A SLOPPY,
WHERE IT WAS NOT ACTUALLY WRONG. HE NOTED THAT OCI AND ONE
had only a small number of analysts working on Vietnam, how of
which knew much about OB. THE AGENCY'S ANALYSIS, CONSEQUENTLY,
could not expect to compare in depth and quality to that of
MACV with its batteries of specialists. He had much more
faith in MACV's figures than ours (though he thought MACV's
TOO HIGH) and would hence recommend to Westmoreland

AND THAT OURS

WAS REJECTED. HE DID SAY, HOWEVER, THAT HE AGREED THAT THE
298,000 TOTAL HAD TO BE CHANGED (FOR PUBLIC RELATIONS REASONS)
AND AGREED WITH ME THAT THE FINAL ESTIMATE SHOULD SHOW RANGES
RATHER THAN SINGLE FIGURES. HE WAS ADMITTED, HOWEVER, IN
INSISTING THAT THERE MUST NOT BE ANY QUANTIFICATION OF THE
IRREGULAR FORCES ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE PRESS WOULD
ADD ALL FIGURES, TOGETHER AND HENCE QUANTIFYING THE IRREGULARS
WOULD PRODUCE A POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE TOTAL OVER 400,000.

5. THE ATMOSPHERE CHANGED MARKEDLY AFTER THE KEYER
SESSION. DAVIESON EXHORTED HIS DELIGHT AT SCUTTLING THE 298,000
TOTAL. HE SAID HE WOULD HAVE GENERAL GORDON WORK OUT THE
SPREADS. I SUGGESTED WE DEVELOP THE SPREADS TOGETHER, CATEGORY
BY CATEGORY, BUT DAVIDSON DEMURRED. SHORTLY BEFORE WE LEFT,
HOWEVER, DAVIDSON'S DEPUTY SIDED UP TO MR. HYLAND TO ASK
"HOW WOULD YOU GET TO 309,000, SHOW ME AND YOU'LL HAVE A
PROPOSITION."

5. WHEN WE WENT TO PACU ON 17 SEPTEMBER GENERAL DAVIDSON
AND GENERAL GODDING HANDED ME A WHITE CARD WITH THE FOLLOWING
TYPED THEREON: QUOTE MAIN AND LOCALS 119,000, ADM SVC 25,320
- 35,000, GUERRILLAS 75,000 - 95,020, TOTAL 219,320 - 249,000
(MEAN 234,000); POLITICAL CADRE 72,000 - 78,000 - SELF DEFENSE
AND SECRET SELF DEFENSE, NO QUANTIFICATION, OPTIMISTIC
ATMOSPHERE IN NIE - UNQUOTE.

6. I SUGGESTED WE GET OUR ANALYSIS TOGETHER AND REVIEW
THE SPREADS CATEGORY BY CATEGORY. DAVIDSON REFUSED, SAYING
THAT WAS PACU'S FINAL OFFER, NOT SUBJECT TO DISCUSSION, WE
SHOULD TAKE OR LEAVE IT.

8. I THEN CONVEYED THE ENTIRE WASHINGTON DELEGATION TO
SEE IF WE COULD HAMMER OUT A POSITION DIA AND IHR WOULD JOIN
US IN. IT TOOK SIX HOURS, BUT WE SUCCEEDED. I THEN WROTE OUR
POSITION OUT AS A FORMAL MEMORANDUM (TEXT IN REF 5) WHICH I
PRESENTED TO GENERAL DAVIDSON AT 1800 HOURS.
9. YOU WILL NOTE I HAVE MADE A MAJOR CONCESSION IN NOT
QUANTIFYING THE IRREGULARS. IT SEEMED TO ME THIS WAS MACV'S
MAJOR STICKING POINT, THAT OUR FIGURES WERE NOT AT THAT FIRST,
AND THAT THE FREE TEXT ADOPTED MAKES IT CLEAR THAT WE HAVE
THE HUNDRED THOUSAND RANGE IS MIELD EVEN THOUGH NO PRECISE FIGURE IS

10. FOR THE REST, WE BUY MACV'S POSITION ON MAIN AND
LOCAL FORCE AND THEIR NEW POSITION (COURTESY OF MR. ADAMS)
ON GUERRILLAS. WE ARE EXACTING ON THE POLITICAL CABIN FIGURE
EVERYONE HAS AGREED TO IT IS IN A SEPTEMBER MACV STUDY
UNTIL TODAY, WHEN MACV WHACKED IT JUST TO GET THE TOTAL DOWN.
ON YOUR SERVICES, I AND MY COLLEAGUES BELIEVE WE HAVE GIVEN ALL
THE STATE WE CAN WITHOUT VIOLATING OUR PROFESSIONAL INTEGRITY.

11. AFTER READING MY PRECEDING, DAVIDSON SAID
THE ISSUE. MACV HAD MADE ITS FINAL OFFER AND
THERE WOULD BE TWO SETS OF FIGURES. I SAID THERE HAD TO
BE SOME FURTHER DISCUSSION SINCE I WOULD UNDER YOUR INSTRUCTIONS
TO DISCUSS THIS WHOLE SUBJECT PERSONALLY WITH GENERAL
YESTERDAY. AS NOTED ABOVE, THE YESTERDAY SESSION
IS NOW SCHEDULED FOR GOOD THURSDAY (10 SEPTEMBER).
REFUSES TO REMOVE THE STRicture OF A PRE-DETERMINED TOTAL, FIXED ON PUBLIC RELATIONS GROUNDS. WE CAN GO NO FURTHER (UNLESS YOU INSTRUCT OTHERWISE). IF HE LIFTS THIS STRicture, MACV'S ANALYSIS ARE DYING TO HAVE OUR REVISED FIGURES ACCEPTED.

12. I WILL REPORT TOMORROW ON THE KONEK DINNER AND WISTORELAND MEETING, AND WOULD WELCOME HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS AND GUIDANCE BEFORE THE LATTER. WE HAVE RESERVATIONS FOR THURSDAY, 14 SEPTEMBER (PUTT IN US IN WASHINGTON 17 SEPTEMBER), BUT WILL NOT LEAVE WITHOUT YOUR EXPLICIT AUTHORIZATION PER REFERENCE B.
PLEASE CORRECT THE GARBLED PORTION(S) OF THIS MESSAGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

"WE WOULD NEVER HAVE TO RETROACTIVELY ADJUST UPWARD AND THAT"