MACV BRIEFING ON ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE—11/24/67
A new study of the size of the enemy military and political structure in South Vietnam has been concluded. The study has been conducted by this headquarters working with other segments of the intelligence community.

We have re-examined in depth over a period of several months not only the strength of the enemy's organized military units, but also his guerrillas, his administrative services personnel and the Viet Cong political organization.

Intelligence data for some of these categories is much more difficult to collect than is the case for others.

For some time now there has been relatively good intelligence available on the enemy's regular combat elements—his "hard core" of NVA units and Viet Cong main and local force units, but solid information upon which to base strength estimates for the guerrillas and the administrative services has only become available in recent months and this has made our new study possible. Information on the Viet Cong political infrastructure is also improved, although still spotty.

In 1965-1966, we aimed our collection mostly against the primary threat—the enemy's hard core forces. We were forced to rely on broad
estimates for other categories, knowing that these estimates were based on inconclusive data.

The situation has now changed. Over the past eighteen months, we have improved the quality and the quantity of our intelligence collection programs for all categories. These improved programs, along with the documentation being uncovered by allied search and destroy operations ranging into areas of South Vietnam formerly considered as safe havens by the enemy, plus a marked improvement in quality and quantity of reports from the local populace, prisoners and increasing numbers of defectors, have enabled us to make a better estimate of the enemy's total military strength figures.

I want to emphasize that the new figures we are releasing today cannot and should not be compared with other than the hard core category of the figures we have been using. Although these older estimates were derived from the best information we had at that time, our new, expanded intelligence base has not only resulted in more accurate figures but has also shown us the areas of inaccuracy in our old estimates.

As a result, it is impossible to use the new figures to show that one category has risen or fallen in strength over the last six or twelve months. Except in the category of hard core forces, the old data was incorrect by virtue of being incomplete and founded on an inadequate base. What we have done is essentially to start over from a sound,
I would like to describe to you today two basic categories of enemy strength figures—his armed forces and his political infrastructure.

The category of armed forces includes several subdivisions—regular forces (both North Vietnamese and Viet Cong), administrative services and guerrillas.

The political category includes only the political infrastructure.

Let me begin with the new order of battle for the enemy's armed forces, starting with his regular forces.

**REGULAR FORCES**

This category includes North Vietnamese Army units in South Vietnam and the Viet Cong main force and local force units.

The new estimates of the regular forces are essentially unchanged. We currently estimate a total of 118,000 regular forces opposing us. 54,000 of these are in North Vietnamese units, and 64,000 in Viet Cong main and local units. Of the latter, more than 10% are now North Vietnamese replacements, so that North Vietnamese now make up more than a majority of the manpower in the regular forces. As I said, our intelligence has been good on the enemy's regular elements and the new study confirms this. I might add that in retroactively adjusting our estimates of enemy regular strength as a result primarily of prisoner interrogation and captured documents, we now estimate that VC/NVA regular strength peaked at about 127,000 in
September 1966, and has since declined slightly to the present figure.

ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

The next category is administrative services, which comprises the personnel of military staffs from the national to the district level, as well as non-combat military support units directly subordinate to those staffs. As mentioned earlier, operations into former enemy safe havens and base areas have uncovered documentation of large numbers of these non-combat military people such as medical, personnel administrators, transportation and support elements.

Previously, we had no record of many of these. The old data indicated an estimated 25,000 in this category; our new estimates show that there are at least 35,000 to 40,000 full-time personnel. Let me re-emphasize that this does not mean an increase of 10,000 to 15,000 of the enemy in administrative services; it means simply that our intelligence data, while not firm today, is now better than it was in the past.

GUERRILLAS

The old intelligence data included an estimated 100,000 to 120,000 in a category of "Irregulars." It broke down these irregulars into three subdivisions---guerrillas, self-defense forces and secret self-defense forces. The old data divided the 100,000 to 120,000 irregulars roughly, putting one-third of them into the guerrilla subdivision and the other two-thirds into self-defense and/or secret self-defense personnel.
As I said, those were acknowledged as rough estimates at best.

The Viet Cong guerrilla alone is a full-time fighter who is usually organized into platoons and squads. He sometimes operates in his own village or hamlet and is usually assigned to protect specific villages and hamlets. He collects taxes and conducts terrorist and sabotage activities. He is a definite part of the military threat and often operates in concert with the members of VC/NVA regular units in his assigned area, but he has not been as identifiable.

Information from the documents captured this year strongly suggests that the guerrilla forces have been considerably larger than we had believed. They probably totalled well over 100,000 a year ago and some captured VC documents suggest that the early 1966 guerrilla strength was in the 150,000 range. Our recent studies put the probable guerrilla strength today between 70,000 and 90,000. Again, it should be emphasized that these figures are not as firm as the figures for the regular forces.

Whereas the guerrillas are a definite "Military threat," our newest intelligence indicates that the other subdivisions in the old "irregular" total—the self-defense and secret self-defense forces—should not be considered part of the military order of battle.

Self-defense elements, operating at all levels from village to region, are home guards, primarily for the control and light defense of VC-held areas. They are fixed; they perform most of their duties part time; they include personnel of all ages; and they have a high percentage of females.
Some are lightly armed; many are not armed at all. While they are a large element obviously available as a base for recruitment as well as for political and logistical support work, they are not a fighting force comparable to the guerrilla.

Secret self-defense forces are essentially low level fifth columnists, used for information collection. Although they cause some casualties and some damage, they do not represent a continual or dependable force and do not form a valid part of the enemy’s military force. We have, therefore, removed them from the order of battle.

The old system, then attempted to break down the 100,000 to 120,000 irregulars into guerrillas and self-defense/secret self-defense forces. The new tabulation eliminates the broad irregular designation, estimates the number of guerrillas now to be between 70,000 and 90,000—actually a decline over a year ago—and removes from the order of battle the self-defense/secret self-defense estimate.

To sum up, we now estimate enemy armed forces in the following categories with the current strengths indicated:

1. Regular—118,000 (54,000 in NVA units and 64,000 in VC Main and Local units.)

2. Administrative Services—35,000-40,000

3. Guerrillas—70,000-90,000

Total: 223,000-248,000
Now let me turn to the Viet Cong political structure—through which the enemy forces are directed, controlled and supported. These are the political cadre. They were previously included in the total enemy strength figures. From now on we will carry an estimate of these cadres, but they will not be carried as part of the total military strength.

I should also repeat that our data in this category is not as good as in the case of the military. We have already undertaken additional studies of the political infrastructure to give us a better understanding of how the political apparatus is organized, the missions of its component parts and their command relationship to each other. Obviously, some members of the infrastructure have more influence than others and are therefore more important pacification targets than others. In any case, we hope to have a better fix on the organization in the next few months. Once that is established, we will also have a better fix on its size.

The country team has developed the following working definition for this Viet Cong infrastructure: "The political and administrative organization through which the Viet Cong control or seek to control the Vietnamese people. It embodies the party (People's Revolutionary Party) control structure, which includes a command and administrative apparatus (Central Office for South Vietnam) which extends from the national level through the village level, and the leadership and administration of a
parallel front organization (National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam).

For a long time, we have carried a figure of 39,000-40,000 for this political infrastructure. This figure was based upon the CVN study from the early years of the war which went down only to the village level. Our increased intelligence now permits us to focus on the infrastructure in much more detail and we have modified that CVN estimate to a figure of 75,000 to 85,000. But this figure, while improved, is not considered at all solid. Hopefully, our estimates will improve as our studies continue over the next few months.

The function of the political cadre is not military. Therefore, we will no longer carry them in our military order of battle. However, the political organization, under orders from Hanoi, controls and directs all phases of the struggle, including the level of military operations. Therefore, they must not be overlooked as key elements who must be overcome along with the armed forces. We must consider them in enemy estimates, even though we have separated them out from the armed forces estimates.

RECAP

To sum up, our new, greatly broadened intelligence base has permitted a more realistic evaluation of enemy military and non-military strength. The total enemy order of battle is now between 223,000 and 248,000. We believe that this represents a decline in total enemy order of battle; our retroactive analysis estimates the enemy order of battle strength to
have been approximately 285,000 in the July-September period of 1966.

As I mentioned, VC/NVA organized unit strength probably peaked at about 127,000 in September 1966 and has declined slightly.

Our estimate of the political cadre is 75-85,000.

In closing, I would like to restate two points once more:

First, the new study has not changed our estimate of the regular forces we face. They remain at about 118,000.

Secondly, in all other areas the new study has resulted in new figures. But these must not be considered increases or decreases from old figures. Since they are based on new data, they logically cannot be used in conjunction with old data for any firm comparisons of past and present enemy strengths.
ARTICLE, 12/16/67 "WESTMORELAND'S PROGRESS REPORT" BY ANDREW HAMILTON
Westmoreland's Progress Report
by Andrew Hamilton

Gen. William C. Westmoreland has a winning manner. His heavy eyebrows, prominent chin and West Point posture combine with an almost boyish openness of countenance and a modest turn of speech to make him at once impressive and appealing. This, no doubt, is why President Johnson chose him to revive the public's flagging patience with the Vietnam war during last month's visit to Washington by the American team in Saigon. While Westmoreland and Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker shared a crowded week of speeches, a television appearance, briefings for Congress and background meetings with the press, it was Westmoreland who projected confidence most forcefully and most frequently.

The general's "Progress Report" before the National Press Club was artful, with its orderly analysis of the "four phases" of the course of the war. (We are rounding out the second, moving into the third and simultaneously glimpsing the fourth and "final" phase, perhaps two years away, when token withdrawals of American forces can begin.) But in spite of its freshness and its careful qualifiers ("We have reached an important point where the end begins to come into view") it conveyed the same message of official optimism that has been the government's Vietnam stock-in-trade since 1961. This is an understandable exercise for a government which is fighting to preserve its policy in Vietnam as well as its continued existence in office. But the number of Americans fighting in Vietnam will soon be raised by 50,000 to 525,000; and Westmoreland had asked President Johnson for still more. Last month's performance should be assessed as part of a political campaign, not as a candid review of the war situation.

For instance, during his briefing of the Pentagon pressmen, General Westmoreland disclosed a new intelligence estimate that North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam declined from 285,000 men to 242,000 men between the summer of 1966 and the summer of 1967. This was interesting news, because the figure routinely available at the Pentagon for the past several months showed the communist forces holding steady at 297,000, their high point in the war. Questioned about it, the general said his figures were "not inconsistent" with previous estimates, because they dealt only with "armed strength." He indicated that they came from a new study "which is not fully completed yet." Two days later, the US command in Saigon made public some results of the study, repeating the claim that communist "armed strength" in the South had declined by over 40,000 in the past year. But the study also made it clear that the total number of communist troops, militia and agents in the South is much larger than previously suspected. It could be over 400,000 at present.

The new study was based in large part on communist documents captured in the past two years. It made the largest changes in the estimated number of guerrillas and political cadre. The old figures placed the number of local and regional guerrillas at somewhere between 33,000 and 40,000. The new study puts the
number between 70,000 and 90,000, adding that the guerrillas "probably numbered well over 100,000 a year ago." The old figures placed the size of the communist political cadre in the South—what Saigon calls the "infrastructure" or the "shadow government"—at about 40,000. The new study estimates that there are 75,000 to 85,000.

Further, the old figures put the number of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong combat troops in the "main force" communist battalions and regiments at about 113,000 men. The new study says this number was actually as high as 127,000 men in 1966, and is now about 118,000. The old figures estimated that the communists had 25,000 administrative and support troops. The new study says the number is actually between 35,000 and 40,000.

In citing a figure for "armed strength" of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese, the new study includes main force troops, guerrillas and administrative personnel, but not political cadre. The new study drops altogether the estimates for two other groups of personnel that, along with the political cadre, were part of the old overall figure for communist strength of 297,000. These are the "self-defense forces" and the "secret self-defense forces." The former were described as "operating at all levels from village to region" as "home guards, primarily for the control and light defense of VC-held areas." They were said to include "personnel of all ages and to have a high percentage of females." The latter category was described as "essentially low-level fifth columnists, used for information collection." Although dismissing these groups from the official "order of battle," the study noted that "they cause some casualties and some damage" and form an intelligence network and a "base for recruitment as well as for political and logistical support work." The old estimates set the number of these harassing agents and home guards somewhat arbitrarily, at up to 80,000. The odds are strong that the actual number is much higher. But even if one accepts the old number and adds in the new estimates for the other components of communist strength in South Vietnam, the total comes to over 400,000 even after subtracting the losses cited by Westmoreland. This is 30 percent higher than the old estimate.

Two points about these numbers are of interest. First, General Westmoreland conceded at the Pentagon briefing, in answer to a question, that North Vietnam has units in reserve which could be committed to South Vietnam as reinforcements (as distinguished from the replacements which it regularly sends south). He also sidestepped a question concerning the problems that would be posed if China began supplying troops to replace the manpower losses of the Viet-
nnamese communists. The point is that the other side could prolong the big-unit war by drawing additional manpower from outside South Vietnam. Second, if the new estimates are accepted, the local, mostly native Viet Cong structure is about twice as large as anybody on the allied side was willing to concede officially as recently as midsummer, and this despite some attrition. The political part of the structure, the heartwood of the tree, appears to be untouched, suggesting that General Westmoreland's forces have at best pruned some branches. The size of the local Viet Cong structure helps to explain the slow pace of the pacification program.

One claim made by General Westmoreland and Ambassador Bunker during their visit here and frequently repeated was that about 67 percent of South Vietnam's 17 million people live under government "control," or as it is sometimes put by officials, under government "protection," and about 17 percent under Viet Cong control. This claim is based on detailed reports from American officers in the field under the Hamlet Evaluation Survey (HES). Following a checklist of 18 criteria, officers grade each of South Vietnam's 12,000 rural hamlets for degree of government control—or protection—on a descending scale of A through E. If the hamlet is thoroughly controlled by the Viet Cong it is graded V. In compiling its claim that two-thirds of the population live under government control, the American mission in Saigon lumps together 3.5 million living in cities and 8 million living in class A, B and C hamlets. About 2.5 million persons in class D and class E hamlets are said to be "contested," while just under 3 million persons are said to be under Viet Cong control. This interpretation—particularly the claim of government control of all 4 million persons living in class C hamlets—appears open to question (although it is said to be supported by experience in the recent elections). And it masks the existence of 2 million people whom bombing and other aspects of the war have turned into homeless refugees in the past two years.

Whatever the validity of doubts about this interpretation of the HES data, the monthly surveys throw a strong light on current communist military and political tactics in South Vietnam. Recent HES reports have recorded a substantial reversion of formerly secure hamlets in the northern provinces as the result of a coordinated effort by main force battalions and local guerrillas against the US Marines and Vietnamese army in the First Corps area. The big battles along the demilitarized zone last spring and summer drew the allied forces away from the populated areas, exposing them to repenetration by communist political agents and local guerrillas. The big battles had the further effect of dramatizing US casualties in a theatrically barren setting. Now the communist forces seem to be trying the technique further south. In the recent big battles at Loc Ninh in the Third Corps area and Dak To in the Second Corps area, the first part of the pattern was repeated. The communist threat brought the allied forces out of the coastal valleys and delta farmlands to fight for apparently worthless real estate in the remote border zones, under terms relatively favorable for the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units. The First Cavalry Division, for instance, sent
a brigade which had been engaged in pacification work in coastal Binh Dinh province. Earlier, the division had sent another brigade north to prevent the situation in the First Corps area from deteriorating further. "We have had to cancel the pacification operation in Anlao Valley (in Binh Dinh province)," said an official in Washington to Hedrick Smith of The New York Times. "In terms of Hanoi's strategy, this is a crashing success." It is too early to tell how well the communists will exploit this success. But they have clearly stepped up their hit-and-run raids in populated areas, following the pattern developed earlier in the year in the northern provinces. And Hanoi is predicting sustained pressure throughout the winter. So it seems too early as well for General Westmoreland's assessment of Dak To, which he called "the beginning of a great defeat of the enemy."

To sustain the pressure in the central highlands and west of Saigon, the communists must make use of sanctuaries in Cambodia for supply, training and planning bases. The units then slip across the border and quietly prepare the battlefields where they hope to draw the allies into a fight. When the allied attack is mounted, the communists can break contact and slip back across the border to safety. "It's hard to play chess with a man who takes his king off the board every time you're ready to checkmate him," complains an Army colonel. The United States would like Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk to make it harder for the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese, by cracking down on their rice purchases in his country and by exposing their presence in the remote northeast. Thus the recent pressure campaign, carried on through diplomatic channels as well as in the press. At a "background" dinner for reporters in Washington last month ("But Don't Tell Anyone I Told You," NR, Dec. 9) General Westmoreland disclosed a deeper concern about communist use of Cambodia when he spoke of possible arms shipments from ports on the Gulf of Siam to the sanctuaries. If the North Vietnamese could open up such a supply route, they could dramatically increase the tempo of communist military operations on South Vietnam's western frontier. And what if this should happen? Some officials speculate that allied "spoiling raids" would be carried across the border.

Two footnotes. A year ago, American officials were apt to put great stress on the significance of the rapid growth in the number of communists who defected to the South Vietnamese side. The argument was that these defectors "vote with their bodies." Plans were laid to handle nearly 40,000 new defectors in 1967, double the previous year's total, and the South Vietnamese government made new pledges of amnesty and security for those who chose to come over. For the first half of the year the flow of hoi chanhs was as predicted, reaching 18,546. Since then the flow has trickled off to less than last year's rate. By the end of November the number for the year stood at about 26,000. The rate appeared to be going down sharply in November, when the numbers coming in were lower than they were during the unsettled spring of 1966, when the northern provinces were in virtual revolt. Some officials blamed the drop on the election campaigns and changeover to a new government in Saigon; others thought it had something to do with the current situation in the northern provinces. Yet, Bunker said categorically, in New York on November 17, "defections under the Chieu Hoi program this year are running nearly 50 percent ahead of last year."

The high-level visitors from Saigon feared lest Washington and the public look with skepticism on the new claim that the other side is losing men faster than it has replaced them. James Reston, of The New York Times reported that "Bunker and Westmoreland" are "privately critical of past US intelligence estimates made by an American officer who has been transferred to another post, and confident about the intelligence estimates that they are now getting from his replacement." Others, however, rate the officer—reported to be Westmoreland's intelligence chief, Major General Joseph Alexander McChristian, who has been transferred from Saigon to Fort Hood in Texas—as very competent and a "realist."
MEMO FOR HELMS FROM GRAHAM AND HAMSCHER RE MACV/CINCPAC VIEWS—"CINCPAC/MACV DISSENT TO THE CIA ORDER OF BATTLE ANALYSIS SOUTH VIETNAM"
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HELMS, DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: Col Graham and Lt Col Hamscher, Chiefs of Delegations from MACV and CINCPAC to the DCI-sponsored conference on enemy strengths in South Vietnam (10-16 April 1968)

SUBJECT: MACV/CINCPAC Views

The undersigned are required to return to their respective duty stations in Saigon and Honolulu. Inasmuch as we have not yet received the CIA report of conference results, to which our views were to have been appended, the attached summary of those views is forwarded for your consideration along with the forthcoming CIA report. We have addressed the CIA views as we understood them at the close of the conference on 16 April 1968.

Very respectfully,

DANIEL O. GRAHAM
Colonel, GS
Hq MACV

GEORGE M. HAMSCHER
LTC, GS
Hq PACOM

Copies furnished:
Mr. Hughes, Dept of State
Lt Gen Carter, Dir, NSA
Lt Gen Carroll, Dir, DIA

Approved for Release
Date 19 OCT 1968
CINCPAC/MACV DISSENT TO THE CIA ORDER OF BATTLE ANALYSIS SOUTH VIETNAM

NOTE:

This document represents the views of the delegations of J-2 CINCPAC and J-2 MACV. While the position was approved in general, all details have not been accepted and are subject to command approval.

Approved for Release Date
CINCPAC/MACV DISSENT
TO THE CIA ORDER OF BATTLE ANALYSIS
SOUTH VIETNAM

NOTE:

This document represents the views of the delegations of J-2 CINCPAC and J-2 MACV. While the position was approved in general, all details have not been accepted and are subject to command approval.
CINCPAC/MACV DISSENT
TO CIA OB ANALYSIS, SVN

1. (S/NFD) CINCPAC and MACV do not concur in the CIA analysis of enemy strength in South Vietnam. CIA's presentation portrays, in effect, an enemy force of a half-million or more -- about twice the size previously estimated by USIB. The presentation exaggerates the threat conceptually as well as numerically.

2. (S/NFD) The attempts to affix numbers to specific elements of the broad base of willing and unwilling popular support of the enemy in SVN, or even to quantify that base in total, are fruitless and very misleading. On the one hand, harmless individuals are added to the hostile elements, exaggerating the threat; on the other hand the true size of the very large population base still subject to enemy exploitation is grossly understated.

3. (S/NFD) We believe that the description of the enemy strength in late 1967 contained in SNIE 14-3-67 was reasonably accurate and a more valid estimate than the CIA analysis. We note that the CIA analysis is essentially the same as that presented and rejected prior to the publication of the SNIE, with the exception of new minor differences with MACV concerning details of enemy order of battle. We believe that evidence acquired since publication of SNIE 14-3-67 attests to its general validity. In particular, we believe that enemy behavior during and after Tet offensive argues strongly against the general magnitude of strength indicated by the CIA analysis. We know that administrative personnel, political infrastructure, convalescents from VC hospitals, and even innocent bystanders were thrown into the Tet attacks. This suggests that VC manpower reserves were limited, i.e., not available in the large numbers indicated in the CIA view. Further, enemy forces were under the heaviest pressure to continue attacks after Tet, but were unable to do so -- a second wave of attacks on 17-18 February was rather feeble. An enemy document captured in May 1967 states that the total enemy strength in SVN (probably in mid-1966) was 285,000. MACV's retroactive
adjustment of strengths based on the SNIE 14-3-67 figures gives 286,300 for about the same period. We have strong evidence that North Vietnam is hurrying large numbers of personnel to the south to replace Tet losses. We believe that all the evidence above indicates that the previously agreed estimate of enemy personnel strength was probably about right, and argues strongly against the proposition that there are a half-million or more militarily important personnel now available to the enemy in SVN.

4. (S/NFD) We believe that the CIA analysis relies much too heavily upon extrapolation from enemy documents, most of which are neither current nor complete. MACV figures are based in part on documentary evidence and extrapolations therefrom, but where possible also upon reports from US and Allied officers in the provinces and districts of SVN. This basic difference in approach to available evidence is fundamental to the differences of analyst opinion as to enemy strengths.

5. (S/NFD) We believe that the field reports are unduly denigrated in the CIA approach. The MACV order of battle figures are essentially the sum of numerous small estimates of enemy strength in each of the units, districts and provinces of SVN. As such they almost certainly contain errors, but in the aggregate constitute the basis for the best estimate available for US planners and policy makers. Recognition of possible margins of error in the MACV estimates was the basis of the September 1967 agreements in Saigon to range figures upward toward the CIA views. However, we believe now as we did then that MACV estimates are not likely to contain errors of the magnitude implied by the CIA analysis.

6. (S/NFD) We believe that enemy strength including political cadres in SVN as of October 1967 was about 300,000-335,000 as indicated in SNIE 14-3-67. Since then the enemy launched his Winter/Spring Campaign to include
the Tet offensive which has been enormously costly to him in casualties. During the same time period he also launched a campaign to impress or recruit large numbers of South Vietnamese especially young teen-age boys and women. The enemy also infiltrated two additional divisions and a separate regiment during the period. We are especially uncertain as to the results of the enemy's recruitment drive. This tends to increase our range of uncertainty in strength figures. However, we estimate with reasonable confidence that enemy strength is now somewhere in the range of 278,000-328,000 men (including political cadres).

7. The following is our position on the strength of various components of enemy strengths:

a. COMBAT FORCES (Maneuver and Combat Support).

(Communist "Main and Local Forces" in CIA order of battle). The CIA analysis attacks MACV order of battle on the following three bases: (1) MACV collateral Order of Battle does not consider enemy units picked up by all-source evidence; (2) MACV OB omits large numbers of small units subordinate to echelons above village level; and (3) certain MACV accounting procedures tend to minimize the number of soldiers carried in units held in OB. The total of all these, CIA holds, would add as much as one-third to the MACV-held enemy combat forces.

(1) We accepted the obviously true contention that MACV's collateral OB does not contain enemy units, held.

At the conclusion of the conference, all participating agencies agreed with the CINCPAC/MACV holdings of enemy combat units.

(2) CIA contended that, in addition to the agreed enemy combat units referred to in the preceding paragraph, there are an additional 10-11,000 combat personnel not carried
in MACV OB. This contention was based on a review of 1966 and 1967 documents all of which have been available to and considered by MACV analysts. CIA analysts have interpreted certain of these documents to imply that many sapper, engineer, special action, and intelligence/reconnaissance cells, squads, and platoons exist on a country-wide basis and are not carried in MACV OB. It is interesting to note that the CIA analysts had interpreted documents pertaining to only 33 of the 225 VC districts and then had extrapolated the figures thus arrived at to give them their 4,000 additional persons. The same methodology was employed to arrive at the CIA estimate of 2,000 to 3,000 persons in specialized units at VC Province level. MACV analysts maintain that the majority of these small specialized units are, in fact, presently carried in MACV OB holdings. Some of these special units are actually a part of an existing local force battalion, company, or platoon with its own unique designation. Others are directly subordinate to a district or province committee and are carried in that area's administrative services strength. CIA further contends that "all significant urban areas maintain city units -- although only two city units are identified in MACV OB." CIA analysts again extrapolate this belief country-wide and arrive at the estimate that there are an additional 3,000 enemy personnel not carried in MACV OB. MACV contends that there is no evidence to indicate the presence of a city unit in each and every province capital. Further, if CIA analysts had studied MACV OB holdings they would have discovered that several enemy local force companies with a numerical designation are, in fact, city units. Some examples are the 480th LF Co (AKA Phan Thiet City Unit), C165 Co (AKA C Mau City Company) and, the C207 Co (AKA My Tho City Company). Additionally, MACV holds indications that some so-called city units are in reality political/military administrations and control-type elements and are carried within the political infrastructure figures. One example of this is the Da Nang City Agency which controls the 402d Sapper Bn.

(3) The CIA order of battle analysis further contends that there are an additional 11,000 to 16,000 enemy personnel that are missing from MACV OB totals because of faulty MACV accounting procedures. Six thousand of these are attributed to the belief that MACV probably carries enemy units at "on board" strength rather than at "assigned" strength. An additional 5,000 to 10,000 personnel are attributed by CIA to "unlisted service support personnel probably integral to divisions." The CIA analysis asserts that every enemy division in SVN must have a certain number of integral support units. After making this assumption, another mathematical extrapolation is used to arrive at the CIA figure. Evidence available to MACV indicates that no similarity or standard TO/E can be applied to every division. A good
example of this can be drawn from the 304th and 320th Divisions which entered SVN at the same time and place. The support elements organic to these divisions vary widely. In other cases, hard intelligence shows that some divisions have only company-size support units where other divisions are supported by battalion-size units. MACV feels that allied forces in SVN have had sufficient contact with all enemy divisions to have established division headquarters holdings far more valid than could be reached by mathematical extrapolation.

b. Administrative Service Forces: We believe that the description and strength estimate of this category as stated in paragraphs 26 and 27 of SNIE 14.3-67 was based on the best evidence available. There has been some attrition to this category of enemy strength since the publication of the SNIE. We now estimate that there are 30,000 to 40,000 administrative service personnel in SVN. We agree that there are some administrative service personnel not counted in this figure outside the boundaries of SVN who support enemy forces in the DMZ and the Western Highlands. The CIA view holds that VC/NVA administrative service personnel are present in SVN on a one-to-one ratio to infantry troops. This idea is based on a small sample of documents which we believe to be incomplete and outdated. For example only five documents, covering a small geographical area, are used by CIA to support the 1:1 ratio (infantry to admin/serv) at province level, none dated later than December 1966. More documents are used to argue the 1:1 ratio at district, but only six of these documents are of 1967 vintage. These would indicate a lesser ratio of administrative services to combat forces, i.e., about one to 0.8 (infantry to admin/serv). If the documentary evidence since mid-67 were applied the ratio would be 1:05. Later documentation than that used for the CIA analysis exists which if included in their sampling would significantly lower the ratio. Further, the small sample of documents used in the CIA analysis is pertinent almost exclusively to III and IV CTZs. Because of obvious differences between enemy forces in these and the northern two CTZs we do not accept the view that any ratio is applicable country-wide. We do not believe that there is any standard ratio of administrative personnel applicable throughout the enemy force structure.

c. Guerrillas

(1) CIA guerrilla figures are based on a methodology utilizing the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) population figures
CIA states that MACV direct field reporting (RITZ reports) is invalid. RITZ reports are direct reports of guerrilla strength submitted by trained intelligence officers located at district level headquarters. HES reports are reports of population control submitted by personnel of comparable qualifications from the same general level. But a rather arcane mathematical process coupled with some extrapolative assumption is required to correct HES population figures to guerrilla strength. It is not at all apparent that the combination of a population figure and mathematics is superior to direct reporting.

(2) MACV's determination of guerrilla strength is based on a study of captured documents and interrogation reports both at the grass root level where they are used in the preparation of the RITZ reports, and also by MACV analysts who verify and utilize these reports. Each district is treated separately and not extrapolated from other areas. A third element in the system which serves as a check is the derived guerrilla figure which results from the application of recruitment and attrition estimates to previous figures. We remain convinced that the MACV utilization of these methodologies to estimate guerrilla strength provides cross checks not used in the CIA extrapolations and results in more valid figures.

(3) We believe that the estimate of guerrilla strength contained in paragraphs 28, 29 and 30 of SNIE 14.3-67 was essentially accurate. Documentary evidence and field reports since that time show a definite further drawdown of this category of enemy strength, through both direct battlefield attrition and the upgrading of guerrillas to the enemy's main and local force units. The wholesale, countrywide upgrading of guerrillas was particularly evident just prior to the enemy's abortive Tet offensive. Considering available evidence, we estimate that the current strength of the guerrilla force is 50,000 to 70,000. If the enemy's recent recruiting efforts have been much more effective than current evidence indicates, the actual figure could be toward the high side of the spread. Even the lower end of our estimate assumes double normal recruitment since Jan 68.

d. Political Cadres: We believe that paragraph 31 of SNIE 14.3-67 adequately describes and accurately estimates the strength of the VC political organization in SVN. The higher CIA estimate includes in its total typists, guards, and other low level personnel serving in a support role to the infrastructure. While MACV acknowledges the existence
of these support people and their possible necessity for the internal functioning of the political apparatus, we do not consider them to be in significant leadership positions or in professional positions that may influence either the enemy's political decision making process, or his overall effectiveness in directing the insurgency in the south. They are therefore clearly in support of and outside the definition of the political infrastructure threat in SWN as interpreted by MACV. Although the VC political organization suffered some casualties and probable depreciation of cadre quality during the recent Tet offensive, we continue to believe that the SNIE estimate of 75,000 to 85,000 political cadre is valid.

e. We believe that the descriptions of other VC organizations contained in paragraphs 32-36 of SNIE 14.3-67 remain generally accurate. We support that document's essential conclusion that the size of Self-Defense, Secret Self-Defense, Assault Youth, and other such organizations could not be estimated with any measure of confidence. In an effort toward providing some estimative beginning, the SNIE noted that some documents over a year old had suggested a figure of 150,000 as a Self-Defense total. Other documentation, however, indicates that two-thirds of the people are to be organized as Self-Defense Militia. The CIA position ignores many people whose local support -- willing or unwilling, organized or levied -- is of great significance to the enemy insurgency effort; for example, the VC "Foster Sisters' Association" performs the necessary military function of caring for large numbers of enemy wounded. The Communists organize and use everyone with any capability, as was clearly pointed out by paragraph 32 of the SNIE. If any estimate of the number of people providing significant aid to the enemy (i.e., an "insurgency support base") were feasible, it would be a far higher figure than CIA proposes, and even less meaningful in terms of enemy threat. We believe it remains impossible to provide any meaningful quantification with respect to such elements as Self-Defense Guerrillas/Militia, Assault Youth, Secret Guerrillas, etc., and we consider that CIA's presentation inflates the enemy threat.

8. Attrition:

a. We believe that the subject of attrition must be addressed in this paper for the following reasons.

(1) The subject of attrition was incidental to discussions of all categories of enemy strength.
(2) CIA insisted, throughout the conference, that non-military elements (self defense, assault youth, etc) must be quantified in order that they can be attrited. Their argument insisted that MACV had been assessing significant losses against enemy armed forces strength which should properly have been assessed against the non-military elements such as self defense, secret self defense, and assault youth. We note that in CIA's 68 paper addressing attrition, no attrition was ascribed against these non-military elements during the period 1 January-31 March 1968.

b. MACV/CINCPAC views concerning attrition are based on the following inputs and losses to the total enemy armed forces.

(1) Enemy losses consist of KIA (body count), died of wounds/disabled, PW, Military Returnee (Hoi Chanh), and non-battle losses. We do not believe that any significant number of these losses should be ascribed to any but armed forces elements. We do not attempt to deny that the body count includes some civilians, self defense, assault youth and the like. On the other hand we know that large numbers of military personnel are killed by air and artillery strikes and are not included in body count figures. We believe the latter to be a significantly larger figure than non-military personnel included in the body count. Even if one could quantify the numbers of non-military personnel in the body count, he could not separate the innocent civilians from self defense, assault youth personnel and other persons from similar elements.

(2) Enemy gains come from recruiting and infiltration. In the last few months, impressment has been on a scale that might merit consideration separate from recruitment. It should be noted that all enemy gains are estimates for at least six months. The estimate of infiltration becomes hard data after six months; however, if during the six month period actual infiltration exceeds the estimate the actual figure is used in adjusting enemy strength. MACV estimates of monthly recruiting and infiltration have been revised upward to reflect evidence of increased enemy input since the first of the year from impressment and infiltration.

c. The following tables illustrate in detail the MACV/CINCPAC views of attrition to enemy forces for the period 1 Jan-31 Mar 68.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enemy Gains 1st Qtr 1968</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment/Impressment (est 7,000 per month)</td>
<td>21,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infiltration (est 7,000 per month)</td>
<td>38,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible Other Undetected Gains (Infiltration and/or Recruitment)</td>
<td>0 - 15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>59,000- 74,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enemy Losses 1st Qtr 1968</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KNOWN (KIA, DOW/DIS/PW, Returnee - excluding 10,000 Tet KIA ascribed to civilians, porters, etc)</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHERS (non-battle losses, estimated at 2,000 per month)</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>86,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| NET Enemy Losses, 1st Qtr 1968                                 | 12,000-27,000 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART</th>
<th>JUN 67</th>
<th>JUL 67</th>
<th>AUG 67</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>120,000-130,000</td>
<td>123,000-133,000</td>
<td>123,000-133,000</td>
<td>305,000-345,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM/SER</td>
<td>35,000-40,000</td>
<td>30,000-40,000</td>
<td>30,000-40,000</td>
<td>120,000-130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrilla</td>
<td>70,000-80,000</td>
<td>50,000-70,000</td>
<td>75,000-85,000</td>
<td>185,000-225,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>80,000-90,000</td>
<td>75,000-85,000</td>
<td>278,000-328,000</td>
<td>305,000-345,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>305,000-345,000</td>
<td>278,000-328,000</td>
<td>278,000-328,000</td>
<td>683,000-773,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NET GAIN/LOSS 1st QTR 1968:

- Plus 3,000
- Minus 0-5,000
- Minus 10,000-20,000
- Minus 5,000
- Minus 12,000-27,000
PENTAGON PAPERS—EXCERPT RE DAVIDSON BRIEFING TO MCNAMARA
UNITED STATES-VIETNAM RELATIONS
1945-1967

STUDY PREPARED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Printed for the use of the House Committee on Armed Services

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WASHINGTON : 1971

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Stock Number 5270-1201
strategy in the South is necessarily defensive, our tact- 

cies are decidedly offensive. 21/ 

Of particular importance General Westmoreland felt was that the 

enemy had been refused strategic or significant tactical success: 

It has been my objective to frustrate the enemy's 

plans, therefore I have given overriding attention to 
maneuvering troops to deny them battlefield successes 
and psychological opportunities. 

During the past year, the enemy has -- 

a. Been forced by our naval operations to abandon 
plans to bring in large tonnages by sea. 

b. Had to resort to use of the long rugged land 
supply route through Laos. 

c. Been denied recruits in the numbers required 
from the populated areas along the coast, thereby forcing 
him to supply manpower from North Vietnam. 

d. Been denied rice from the coastal provinces of 
I and II Corps in the quantities required, thereby forcing 
him to transport rice from North Vietnam or to buy rice 
from Cambodia. 59/ 

In summary, COMUSMACV believed that North Vietnam was paying a 
tremendous price with nothing to show in return. In his words: "The 
situation is not a stalemate; we are winning slowly but steadily and 
this pace can accelerate if we reinforce our successes. Therefore, I 
believe we should step up our operations in pacification in the south, 
increase the pressure in the north, and exercise new initiatives in 
Laos." 60/ 

The J2 estimate which followed COMUSMACV's overall assessment con- 
cluded that: 

Overall, the enemy must be having personnel prob- 

lem. His losses have been heavy, and his in-country 
recruiting efforts unsatisfactory. He is probably 
attempting to make good his losses by heavy infiltr- 
atlon, but we cannot conclusively prove this, nor do we 
know how successful he has been. We hear frequently of
the so-called "Cross-over point" --- that is, when we put out of action more enemy per month than we estimate he brought into country and recruited for that month. This is a nebulous figure, composed as you have seen of several tenuous variables. We may have reached the "cross-over point" in March and May of this year, but we will not know for some months; 61/and that the enemy could be expected to:

(1) present a constant threat in widely separated areas, (2) attrite US, RVN and ARVN forces, and (3) gain military victories for propaganda purposes.

If our analysis is correct, his Main Forces have failed to carry out their part of the enemy's campaign plan. He has maintained his Main Force units as a threat-in-being, largely at the sacrifice of the other MF tasks. His immediate problem then, must be to improve his MF capabilities and operations.

From this analysis, what can we expect of the enemy in the future?

North Vietnamese leadership in III CIZ is increasing with the introduction of NVA units and political cadre. Senior Generals in C3SVN are North Vietnamese. The B-3 Front and MR 5 are commanded by NVA generals. We have seen an increase in the number of personnel taken from MR III in RVN whereas most of his personnel previously came from MR IV. This indicates an enemy willingness to draw down on his strategic reserves in the North to restore the situation in the South. Another indication of growing NVA control is the increased professionalism of his operations. His equipment is better, he uses heavier and more modern weapons, and his techniques (infantry - artillery coordination) more polished. It is obvious that the NVA effort has increased and will continue to increase as the VC effort falters.

Second, since we foresee increased NVA participation, we believe that the enemy is now, or will shortly, bring in significant numbers of NVA infiltrates or units. He must attempt to reinforce the units in the coastal areas. He must attempt to regain the initiative around the periphery of SVN. He must attempt to attrite us. To do this he will need more strength than we now see at hand.
To support this build-up the Laos corridor becomes increasingly important to the enemy...you know of the location of base areas in the Laos Panhandle which serve as logistical, rest, and training bases and permit the orderly movement of both men and material to SVN. There has been heavy truck movement through the Laos Panhandle which began in November and December and continued throughout the dry season. To improve his capability of supporting the war in SVN, he has constructed numerous bypasses at critical points along roads throughout the Panhandle, extended Route 922 east into the Ashnu Valley, and improved and extended Route 96 south to Route 110 and Base Area 609....Prior to the onset of the Kansoon Season, Route 110 was a heavily used, main supply route leading from Cambodia, through Laos into SVN.

Use of Cambodia will also be increased....The enemy has established a Military Region 10 in SVN which extends into Cambodia. He has stated that MR 10 is to become the biggest base area of the war. He has formed a replacement and refitting center reported to be 6,000 strong, in the Fishhook Area for units badly mauled in SVN. An agent recently reported a VC arsenal in the Parrot's Beak which produces assorted mines, and repairs weapons. We do know that the Parrot's Beak area is often used by the VC in moving men and supplies between Tay Ninh Province and the Delta. 62/

Such an analysis held little prospect for the fading away which had been predicted for this time of year in 1967. Furthermore, these trends carried with them significant developments in terms of future enemy operations and these operations tended to shape the strategy which COMUSMACV was planning to pursue for the remainder of the year. The J2 summarized by noting, first, the advantages and disadvantages of the so-called enemy "peripheral strategy," an exercise which emphasized that the Laos and Cambodia sanctuaries were becoming increasingly important to the enemy:

What does this mean in terms of future enemy operations? From peripheral base areas in MVN, Laos, and Cambodia, he can launch attacks designed to draw us into the border areas.... These operations can be mounted from terrain which is most difficult for our intelligence effort to penetrate. When forced to withdraw, the enemy will have sanctuaries into which he can move to break contact, rest, refit and train. This arrangement gives him flexibility in choice of operational objectives. For example, he can launch offensive operations through the DMZ, he can attempt to seize the two
northern provinces; he can attempt a thrust through the Central Highlands from Base Area 609 toward the coast, he can threaten Pleiku and Darlac; he can launch an offensive from MR 10 toward Phuc Tuy Province. Obviously, he can combine several of these options. When he encroaches from the sanctuaries in force, we must go to meet him. We cannot permit him to win territory, intimidate the people, and move freely about the countryside and thus, gain the psychological victory he wants.

This enemy "peripheral strategy" has disadvantages, too. He will have to move supplies from secure areas in Laos and Cambodia to those units located deep inside SVN, where once he might have supported them with relative ease by sea. Weather conditions impose restrictions upon his land lines of communication, especially during the wet season. POL and wheeled vehicle requirements are increased as is his maintenance needs. Inside SVN, he will be hard pressed to support large scale military operations along the coastal plains because of his long, insecure, LOC's. Thus, he will find it difficult to make his main force presence felt in the heavily populated areas. In turn, this will reduce his access to manpower, food, rice and other supplies normally procured from these populated coastal areas.

SUMMARY

In summary, here are the significant elements of the enemy situation as we see them:

1. His strategy of the war of attrition is unchanged, and his determination to carry it out is evident.

2. He has been hurt, particularly in the coastal areas of II Corps and around Saigon.

3. His Main Forces have not carried out their part of the enemy's strategic plan.

4. His Main Force units require additional strength to carry out their role.

5. The war is becoming more and more an NVA war, and Laos and Cambodia are becoming increasingly important to him. 63/

The J3 briefing continually emphasized that a major redeployment of U.S. forces had been required to take full advantage of the opportunities to engage the enemy. This was especially true in I, II and
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Viet Cong Order of Battle

1. There are two basic facets of MACV's current Order of Battle problem -- one technical and the other political.

2. The technical problem is one stemming directly from the data base approach, as opposed to the estimative approach. MACV has been heist by the data base petard, in which most order of battle and infiltration statistics are based on confirmed, specific evidence, rather than estimative projections derived from cumulative (but incomplete) evidence. The data base is inherently incomplete and subject to a built-in timelag of significant proportions. We may have general indications, for example, that NVA regiments have an organic heavy weapons battalion, but may actually have confirmed the specific existence of only one such unit in one of the regiments of a three-regiment division. The estimative approach would permit the tentative acceptance of such units in all three regiments, pending confirmation, thus reflecting a realistic assessment of the enemy's potential. The data base approach, because of its incompleteness, will always reflect an ultra-conservative approach to the order of battle problem, and makes of it a rather complex, bookkeeping or accounting operation, rather than the basis for a valid appraisal of the enemy's combat potential.

3. The political problem is one essentially cosmetic in nature, i.e., how to rationalize a sudden increase in MACV's Order of Battle holdings. The fact of a sudden increase cannot be completely disguised from the inquisitive probings of the press, but the impact can be minimized by a variety of means. One of these would be the adoption of a more meaningful listing of the strength figures. The current listing groups all categories into one general figure for total VC/NVA, including combat, administrative support, guerrilla-militia, and political cadre. A more rational breakdown
would divide these elements into two principal groupings -- military and non-military. The military would include combat, administrative support, and guerrilla, while the non-military would include the self-defense (militia) and political. The totals for the military grouping would approximate the current total listing (295,000), and this is the figure MACV could use in discussing -- officially and unofficially -- the enemy's military potential. The non-military grouping would not -- and should not -- be used in assessing military matters, but would be considered in computations on input and loss computations, particularly with reference to Chieu Hoi figures.

4. MACV had earlier suggested a revised breakout, which would have permitted them to increase the Political Cadre holdings. This entailed dropping completely any reference to militia, and accepting a low guerrilla figure (60,000). This number being largely determined by the need to remain within the 290,000 ballpark. A comparison of MACV's current listing, his suggested revision, and our proposal is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MACV Current Listing</th>
<th>MACV Suggested Listing</th>
<th>Our Proposal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>116,000</td>
<td>Combat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin Support</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>Combat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrilla/Militia</td>
<td>112,000</td>
<td>Admin Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Cadre</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>Guerrilla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Political Cadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>293,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. MACV's problem with Admin Support is that they haven't done much research on this. There is overwhelming evidence that the ratio of combat to admin support at the district level is about 1:1; at provincial level, about 1.5:1; at regional level, even higher. A figure of 100,000 could be developed easily; a total of 75,000 is rather conservative. A similar problem exists with respect to guerrillas. Numerous documents indicate that guerrilla strength probably approximated about 180,000 in mid-66; it has since declined in most areas -- more in some areas than in others. Another major difficulty is that ARVN and National Police elements in the field often
don't comprehend the difference between guerrillas and militia, and are unfamiliar with the organizational pattern. MACV's figures are derived from these sources, rather than from documents and interrogations.

6. The Self-Defense should be separated from the guerrillas, because they are largely unarmed. They equate to our own Hamlet Self-Defense elements, which are rather an ad hoc, partially armed, indifferently trained and indoctrinated force. (One can equate the VC guerrillas with our own Popular Force elements -- full-time, organized elements; the VC local (or regional) force (district companies and provincial battalions) can be equated to our own Regional Force.

7. For your information, the standard VC doctrine calls for the organization of a concentrated guerrilla platoon in each village, plus a squad in each hamlet. Assuming platoons this level were reached in all villages and in the 7,000 hamlets rated as E and VC-controlled in the Hamlet Evaluation System, guerrilla strength would total 145,000 (2,500 villages x 30 = 75,000; 7,000 hamlets x 10 = 70,000; total 145,000). If the VC had reached only half this goal, guerrilla strength would be at least 72,500. Actual strength might logically lie between these two figures, perhaps closer to the higher figure since their reported 1966 goal of 300,000 guerrillas reflects an effort to double the standard TO&E; documents list 180,000 as actually being developed. We believe 100,000 - 120,000 to be a reasonable current estimate. The standard militia (self-defense) TO&E calls for a platoon per hamlet, plus one or more platoons at village level. If achieved this would provide 285,000 self-defense troops (7,000 hamlets x 30 = 210,000; 2,500 villages x 30 = 75,000; total 285,000). If only half this TO&E were achieved, self-defense strength would approximate 142,500. Documents showed an established goal of 300,000 for 1966, of which 150,000 had been developed. We believe 125,000 to be a reasonable current estimate.

8. In addition to discussing the above with Gen. Davidson, suggest you discuss it at length with Ambassador Komer. If he accepts the weight of our arguments, we will have an important point of influence within MACV. John Hart ought to be apprised of these problems also, and should be encouraged to speak thereon.

GEORGE W. ALLEN
Vietnamese Affairs Staff
LETTER FROM ADAMS TO HAWKINS (WED A.M.)
Dear Colonel,

I hope this gets to you before Saturday. It's the final version of the script. The one hundred and first page release about a week ago, with an endorsement date of 20 January 1964. Since being released, it has undergone a few more minor revisions, one of them being a correction to the spelling of your name. The correction was made out on an erasable sheet, which, in common with most erasable sheets, will doubtless be unreadable.

Maybe you can accommodate CBS by changing your name to GAINES. Sorry about the error, but I didn't see the script until after it had been released.

I finished editing on your letter yesterday. As you suggested, they were extremely helpful in establishing continuity. I am now entering them into my overall chronology. You'll have them back as soon as I finish.

D. X. 9-22-1964
I appreciate my comments you have
in the document. Overall, I think it's
reasonably good, but, as I mentioned before, there's
a major problem: The document seems to
pin the way one goes with transitions. Khon
it partially belongs higher than that. Let's
regard, I finally get hold of Khon. He's;
agreed "in principle" to come over in a few days
and maybe he'll change his mind after that.
The Saturday show. I'll tell you what he says.

Ethan and the boys. They were
regards to [illegible].

Ben T.

[Signature]
MEMO ROUTING SLIP

TO: Dir, Intel Pdn

ACTION
INITIALS
DATE
CIRCULATE
COORDINATION
FILE
INFORMATION
NOTE AND RETURN
PER CONVERSATION
SEE ME
SIGNATURE

REMARKS

1. Per request of M Gen Brown, are attached a current MACV strength briefing, and comments and corrections on a DIA brief.

2. This has been coordinated with and concurred with by CIIED.

FROM:

EDWARD V. HALPIN,
Colonel, USAF
U.S. Director, CICV

DATE: 24 FEB 1966

DD FORM 95
Replaces DD Form 94, 1 Oct 60 and DD Form 84, 1 Feb 50 which will be used until exhausted.
Prior to the TET offensive, the enemy's combat strength was carried at 115,016. This total does not include the 304th Division (10,000), 320th Division (7,600), and the 31st NVA Regiment (1,290). Including these units, the total combat strength would be 133,906. The total enemy armed forces strength, however, was not increased by 12,890 inasmuch as 6,590 of this increase had already been added to the total enemy strength through estimated but unconfirmed infiltration over the past several months. Total enemy armed forces strength shown in the 31 January 1968 CB Summary is 225,346. Adding the 320th and 304th Divisions and the 31st Regiment to CB holdings increases the total to 237,464. Retroactive correction to enemy losses during the 28 - 31 January period brings this total to 232,351. Net enemy losses, based on COC Log reports from 1 - 16 February, amounted to 38,454. This included 29,730 KIA, 5,203 DOR/DIS (Note 1), 2,500 POW (Note 2), 21 Hoi Chanh, and 1,000 non-battle losses. Enemy gains during this half-month period are estimated to be 3,500 by infiltration and 1,750 by recruitment. It is estimated that 5,000 of the enemy TET offensive losses can be attributed to the infrastructure and 5,000 to civilians and laborers impressed into service immediately prior to the offensive. Of the balance of 23,204 February enemy losses, and the 5,295 extra January losses 16,907 could be ascribed to enemy main and local force combat units, 4,000 to admin service forces, and 7,600 to guerrillas. We estimate total enemy combat forces, as of 16 February to be approximately 209,000.

The DIA briefer's estimate of 100,000 guerrillas is not considered supportable in view of the 31 December 1967 RITZ Report which totals 64,000.

In the September 1967 CIA/DIA/MACV Conference it was agreed that Self Defense, Secret Self Defense, and other like personnel were not a part of
the enemy military forces any more than GVN supporters are considered a part of RVNAP. There has been no subsequent evidence to support a change to this agreement.

It is possible that some of these persons were included among the individuals impressed prior to the TEIT offensive. It is of interest, however, that not one prisoner thus far upon questioning has admitted to being a member of a self defense, secret self defense, or assault youth; on the other hand many prisoners maintain that they had no affiliation with the VC before their impressment prior to the offensive. It appears unlikely, if the enemy had a large ready reservoir of semi-trained personnel, that he would impress unskilled personnel to fill his ranks.

Note 1. Inasmuch as approximately half of the KIA we're suffered in urban fighting the .35 died of wounds/permanently disabled factor was not applied to one half of the KIA figure. It was felt that, during the urban fighting, enemy personnel who were seriously wounded could not be evacuated and either died or were captured.

Note 2. Although the CCC Log showed over 5,000 detainees during this period, it was estimated that no more than one half of these will ultimately be classified as prisoners of war,