12/20/67, CABLE FROM WESTMORELAND TO WHEELER, SHARP
CITE: MAC 12897

DTG: 203639Z

FROM: GENERAL WESTMORELAND, COMUSMACV, SAIGON

TO: GENERAL WHEELER, CJCS, WASH

INFO: ADM SHARP, CINCPAC, HAWAII

REF: CINCPAC DTG 112241Z OCT 67

1. THE PAPERS PREPARED FOR AMB LOCKE STRESS THAT THE ENEMY MUST MAKE A SIGNIFICANT DECISION REGARDING THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN THE NEXT TEN MONTHS. WHILE THIS IS PROBABLY TRUE, I BELIEVE THAT THE ENEMY HAS ALREADY MADE A CRUCIAL DECISION CONCERNING THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR. IN LATE SEPTEMBER, THE ENEMY DECIDED THAT PROLONGATION OF HIS PAST POLICIES FOR CONDUCTING THE WAR WOULD LEAD TO HIS DEFEAT, AND THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT TO REVERSE THE DOWNWARD TREND. THE ENEMY WAS FORCED TO THIS GRAVE DECISION BY THE DETERIORATION OF HIS POSITION OVER THE LAST SIX MONTHS, AND A REALIZATION THAT THE TRENDS WERE RUNNING HEAVILY AGAINST HIM. HIS FORCES WERE TAKING HEAVIER LOSSES THAN HE COULD REPLACE. HIS COASTAL DIVISIONS WERE BADLY HURT. HE FAILED TO DISRUPT THE GVN ELECTIONS. HIS INFILTRATION COULD BE HAMPERED IN THE NEAR FUTURE BY THE MUSCLE SHOALS PROJECT. MOST IMPORTANT, HE CONTINUED TO LOSE CONTROL OF THE POPULATION, WITH ALMOST 900,000 ADDITIONAL PEOPLE COMING UNDER GVN SECURITY CONTROL IN THE FIRST NINE MONTHS OF THE YEAR. HIS DECISION THEREFORE WAS TO UNDERTAKE AN INTENSIFIED COUNTRYWIDE EFFORT, PERHAPS A MAXIMUM EFFORT, OVER A RELATIVELY SHORT
PERIOD. WE FIX THE DATE OF THIS KEY DECISION FROM A STUDY OF
ENEMY DOCUMENTS AND SUBSEQUENT IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS. SHORTLY
AFTER THE 14-16 SEPTEMBER PUBLICATION OF GENERAL GIAP'S
ARTICLE (PROCLAIMING A PROTRACTED WAR OF ATTRITION AND
CONSERVATION OF FORCES), CAPTURED DOCUMENTS BEGAN TO INDICATE
A CHANGE IN POLICY. HIS FORCES WERE EXHORTED TO MAKE A
MAXIMUM EFFORT ON ALL FRONTS (POLITICAL AND MILITARY) IN ORDER
TO ACHIEVE VICTORY IN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. IF THE ENEMY
IS SUCCESSFUL IN WINNING A SIGNIFICANT MILITARY VICTORY
SOMEBEAT IN SUCH OR GAINING ANY APPARENT POSITION OF
STRENGTH, HE MAY SEEK TO INITIATE NEGOTIATIONS. IF, ON THE
OTHER HAND, HE FAILS BADLY, HE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT HE WILL
NEGOTIATE FROM WEAKNESS, BUT WILL CONTINUE THE WAR AT A
REDUCED INTENSITY. IN SHORT, I BELIEVE THAT THE ENEMY HAS
ALREADY MADE A CRUCIAL DECISION TO MAKE A MAXIMUM EFFORT.
THE RESULTS OF THIS EFFORT WILL DETERMINE THE NEXT MOVE.

2. IN CONSIDERING OUR POSITION IN CASE A NEGOTIATION
PHASE SHOULD MATERIALIZE IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS WE SHOULD NOT
DELUDE OURSELVES INTO BELIEVING THAT THE ENEMY WILL ENTER IN-
TO NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH. THEIR WILLINGNESS TO
NEGOTIATE WILL NECESSARILY BE A RESULT OF UNACCEPTABLE
PRESSURE OR THE VIEW THAT THEY CAN ATTAIN THEIR ESSENTIAL
OBJECTIVES BY NEGOTIATION. PAST EXPERIENCE WITH THE
COMMUNISTS AMPLY ILLUSTRATES THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO
PURSUE THEIR BASIC OBJECTIVES WITH WHATEVER MEANS THEY ARE
PERMITTED, IN SPITE OF ANY OUTWARD MANIFESTATIONS OF GOOD
FAITH. WE MUST CONTINUE MILITARY AND POLITICAL PRESSURE TO
RETAIN CONTROL OF THE SITUATION AND DENY THE ENEMY THE
OPPORTUNITY TO VIOLATE THE AGREEMENT.

3. SHOULD A CEASE FIRE BE ARRANGED DESPITE STRONG
MILITARY OPPOSITION PRIOR TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES RECOMMENDED IN
PARAGRAPH 5 OF REFERENCE, THE DISPOSITION OF FRIENDLY FORCES
IS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE. MY GREAT CONCERN WOULD BE THAT
WE DO NOT SABOTAGE OURSELVES OR THE CVN WITH TRUCE TERMS
INIMICAL TO OUR OBJECTIVES. I BELIEVE VERY STRONGLY THAT WE
MUST RESIST THE IMPOSITION OF ANY TRUCE TERMS WHICH WOULD
SABOTAGE FRIENDLY FORCES, PARTICULARLY RVNAF, TO ACCEPT A
FREEZE OR STAND-IN-PLACE AGREEMENT DURING NEGOTIATIONS. THIS
WILL ONLY SERVE TO AFFORD THE ENEMY A PERIOD OF GRACE FOR
REFURBISHMENT OF HIS FORCES. AS A SOVEREIGN NATION WITH A
CONSTITUTION AND A LAWFULLY ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENT, CVN
TRUCE PERCEPTIONS MUST NOT BE LESS THAN ENTITLEMENT TO FULLY
OCCUPY AND CONTROL THE COUNTRY. THE RIGHT OF RVNAF TO DEPLOY
THROUGHOUT CVN MUST PREVAIL SO LONG AS WE ARE DEALING FROM A
POSITION OF STRENGTH. TO DENY THIS RIGHT WOULD PLACE THE
VIETNAMESE IN THE UNACCEPTABLE POSITION OF BEING UNABLE TO
MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY WHILE LEAVING THE
ENEMY FREE TO MOVE THROUGH LARGE AREAS OF THE COUNTRY WITHOUT
OFFICIAL DETECTION. ADDITIONALLY, INTELLIGENCE IS VITAL
DURING ALL STAGES OF NEGOTIATIONS AND POST-NEGOTIATIONS
ACTIVITIES. WITH THE LOSS OF INTELLIGENCE FROM COMBAT
CONTACTS, ESPECIALLY PRISONERS AND DOCUMENTS, FREEDOM OF
MOVEMENT FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES THEREFORE BECOMES ESPE-
CiALLY IMPORTANT. FINALLY A FREEZE COULD LEAD TO THE ENEMY
CLAIMING A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF SVN BY VIRTUE OF HIS
SCATTERED POSITIONS THROUGHOUT THE MOUNTAINOUS AREAS. SUCH
A CLAIM PROPERLY PROPAGANDEIT DURING NEGOTIATIONS WOULD
CLEARLY BE AGAINST OUR BEST INTERESTS.

4. TO THE EXTENT POLITICALLY FEASIBLE, FREE WORLD FORCES
SHOULD BE ACCORDED SIMILAR PEROGATIVES FOR DISPERGAL AND
OCCUPATION. I HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING THE US/FRNAAFT POSTURE
DURING POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS FOR SOME TIME. THE EARLY
ARRIVAL OF THE 11TH AIRBORNE DIVISION (→) AND THE 14TH INF
ENGINEER HAS RECONVIOUS WITH THIS IN MIND. THESE UNITS HAVE
GREATLY INCREASED OUR CAPABILITY IN I, II AND III CTZ AND AS
THE 9TH DIVISION MOVES INTO THE DELTA, IN IV CTZ.

5. OUR CAMPAIGN PLAN FOR THE CURRENT MONSSON SEASON IS
COMPATIBLE WITH DISPERGAL, OCCUPATION AND EXTENSIVE TERRITO-
RIAL CONTROL. YORK OPERATIONS AND CONCURRENT ESTABLISHMENT
OF CIBG CAMPS IN WESTERN I CTZ DURING THE PERIOD FEB ON INTO
EARLY SUMMER WILL GIVE US PRESENCE IN A HERETOFORE ENEMY
SANCTUARY. OUR PRESENCE, OF COURSE, ALREADY EXISTS IN THE
POPULATED AREAS OF I CTZ AND ALONG THE DMZ. IN II CTZ OUR
FORCES HAVE A BROADLY ESTABLISHED PRESENCE THROUGHOUT, EXCEPT
IN UNINHABITABLE MOUNTAINOUS AREAS. YELLOWSTONE (WAR ZONE C),
SAN ANGELO (XR-10) AND DODGE CITY (WAR ZONE D) WILL COMPLETE
THE DEPLOYMENT OF FRIENDLY STRENGTH THROUGHOUT III CTZ. IN
IV CTZ WE NOW HAVE DEPLOYED OUR FORCES THROUGHOUT MOST OF THE
CORPS AREA. IN SUMMARY IT WOULD BE PROFITABLE FOR US TO PUSH
AHEAD WITH ALL OF OUR CURRENT PLANS SO AS TO ESTABLISH RVNAAF/
FRNAAFT PRESENCE ON THE WIDEST FRONT POSSIBLE THROUGHOUT
SVN.
6. AIR AND NAVAL OPERATIONS WILL ALSO BE OF CONTINUED
IMPORTANCE TO US DURING ANY NEGOTIATION PHASE. ALTHOUGH WE
MAY BE STOPPED FROM BOMBING NVA TARGETS, WE MUST MAINTAIN THE
CAPABILITY OF QUICK REACTION FORCES, RECONNAISSANCE AND
SURVEILLANCE OF ALL OF SVN, LACS AND AREAS OF NVA. LIKewise
MARKET TIME AND CAGE HARDEN FORCES MUST CONTINUE TO OPERATE
TO DENY CLANDESTINE ENTRY BY SEA, MOVEMENT OF PERSONNEL OR
SUPPLIES THROUGH WATER LOC'S IN III AND IV CORPS AND TO
MAINTAIN SECURITY OF THESE KEY WATERWAYS.

7. WITH REGARD TO THAT WE ARE DOING OR PLANNING TO BE
DOING, WE ARE ALREADY WORKING ON A NUMBER OF PROGRAMS FOR
IMPROVING THE POSTURE OF RVNAF AND GRADUAL TRANSFER OF
RESPONSIBILITIES. THESE ARE SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO PLACE
THE VIETNAMESE IN A BETTER POSITION TO CONTINUE WITH
SECURITY AND NATION BUILDING ONCE WE BEGIN TO WITHDRAW,
EITHER AS A RESULT OF NEGOTIATIONS OR OF REACHING
THE STAGE WHERE OUR BASIC OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED.
MY STAFF IS CURRENTLY REVIEWING AND COMBINING THESE PROGRAMS
SO THAT OVERALL PROGRESS CAN BE EVALUATED FREQUENTLY AND
EMPHASIS AND PRIORITIES ESTABLISHED AS NEEDED. ONE OF THE
SCENARIOS USED TO DEVELOP THESE PROGRAMS ASSUMES THAT
NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN IN SIX MONTHS. SOME OF THE PROJECTS
WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE IN THAT TIME, I.E. FORMATION OF AN ELITE
AERORNE DIVISION, FURNISHING BETTER EQUIPMENT AND ADDITIONAL
ADVISORS TO THE RF/PF AND INTENSIVE ISSUE OF THE M16 RIFLE TO
RVN UNITS. HOWEVER, IT WILL NATURALLY TAKE CONSIDERABLY
LONGER BEFORE THE VIETNAMESE CAN BE CONSIDERED FULLY CAPABLE
OF TAKING OVER THE JOB AT HAND, DEVELOPMENT OF A SELF-SUFFICIENT LOGISTICS CAPABILITY AND ACTIVATION OF THE REQUIRED ORGANIC ARTILLERY AND RECONNAISSANCE UNITS FOR ARVN ARE SIGNIFICANT PARTS OF OUR FY69 AND FY70 PROGRAMS. TRAINING RVNAF PILOTS AND EXTENDING THEIR RECONNAISSANCE AND HELICOPTER CAPABILITY TO THE DEGREE NECESSARY WILL EXTEND EVEN FURTHER INTO THE FUTURE.

6. WE CAN ALSO HELP OURSELVES AS CONCERNING THE ENEMY'S USE OF BORDER SANCTUARIES. I AM PARTICULARLY CONCERNED OVER THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE SITUATIONS IN CAMBODIA, AND LAOS, WITH RESPECT TO PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH MIGHT DEVELOP. WE HAVE CONTINUOUSLY FACED THE SANCTUARY PROBLEM IN THE FRAMEWORK OF ACTIVE HOSTILITIES. THIS COULD BECOME AN EVEN GREATER DANGER DURING NEGOTIATIONS AND DURING ANY AGREED WITHDRAWAL, UNLESS POSITIVE VERIFICATION OF DISPOSITIONS IN THE BORDER AREAS IS PROVIDED. I BELIEVE IT IS GENERALLY ACCEPTED THAT ONLY US/RVN/FW FORCES CAN FURNISH VALID VERIFICATION. THE SITUATION NVA ATTACKS AGAINST LAOTIAN TROOPS ABOUT A WEEK AGO, ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE LAOTIAN GOVERNMENT, AS WELL AS OTHER RECENT ACTIVITIES, SUGGEST AN INCREASING ENEMY INTEREST IN THAT AREA. MOVEMENT OF MAJOR NVA AND MAIN FORCE VC UNITS INTO LAOS AND CAMBODIA, EITHER TO WAIT OUT A US WITHDRAWAL AFTER NEGOTIATIONS OR TO TRANSFER THE INSURGENCY EFFORT THERE OR TO THAILAND WOULD CONSTITUTE A CONTINUING MAJOR THREAT TO OUR OBJECTIVES IN SPITE OF AN AGREEMENT ON VIETNAM. IN PREPARING FOR POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THIS RELATED PROBLEM BE CONSIDERED SIMULTANEOUSLY TO INSURE THAT BOTH
During and after negotiations we have access to the intelligence which is vital to our objectives.

9. To pursue the enemy by fire in the tri border area now, and to execute limited raid operations of battalion/brigade size into base areas such as 637 or 611 prior to any negotiation phase, would put us in a better position as regards the enemy's continued use of these sanctuaries during negotiations. I strongly recommend this.

10. In sum, the enemy has already made a crucial decision to make a maximum effort to achieve a victory of some sort in a short period of time. If we choose to negotiate in the near future, we must be ready to react quickly. To do this, we must retain the ability to move our forces where they can rest, occupy and secure the country, have an effective surveillance system both air and ground, maintain a mobile strike force capability to react to contingencies, and continue to maintain pressure on the enemy by every available means.
12/20/67 NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE, "U.S. RAISES ESTIMATE OF FOE'S STRENGTH IN SOUTH VIETNAM"
## U.S. Raises Estimate of Foe's Strength in South Vietnam

**By ESTEBAN RUIZ**

**WASHINGTON, Dec. 16—**Government officials say privately that they now estimate enemy military and political manpower in South Vietnam at 415,000 to 433,000, much higher than the figure of less than 300,000 reported in 1963.

"In terms of destroying the enemy's structure of power, we are further away from victory now than we thought we were last year," one government analyst said. "The more we find out, the worse it looks. It looks worse than a year ago."

During his recent visit to Washington, Gen. William C. Westmoreland of the American Command in Saigon, reported "remarkable progress." He presented charts showing a decline in enemy armed strength from 225,000 in late 1965 to 220,000.

The concern in Washington is that there has been some increase in enemy forces. Continued on Page 14, Column 7.

## Payments Deficit Worsens for U.S.

Selling of stocks by Britain after devaluation causes much of quarter's sag

**By ELWIN L. DALLE Jr.**

WASHINGTON, Dec. 19—The deficit in the United States balance of international payments has worsened significantly in the current quarter.

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## Narcotics Addicts Reinstated by State

The Appellate Division yesterday ordered the reinstatement of permanently-involuntary addicts. It had been declared by the state supreme court justice. While the procedure might violate the civil rights of the addict, it was ruled in a 4-1 decision that "the public interest in balancing the interest of society with the rights of the individual."
U.S. Officials Increase Estimate of Enemy's Strength in Vietnam

Condensed from Page 1, Col. 2, printed in 137.000 to September 136.

The political apparatus, including the Vietcong political leaders, hamlet organization, and propaganda fabric, was estimated in late 1966 to be 75,000 officials. This figure was increased to 83,000 in 1967, and to 89,000 in late 1968. The figure for 1967 was increased to 89,000 in late 1968.

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U.S. Officials Increase Estimate Of Enemy's Strength in Vietnam

Continued From Page 5

moreland suggested.

For one thing, officials say that new intelligence shows that a year ago they were grossly underestimating enemy strength, especially the Vietcong political apparatus and low-level militia forces.

This helps explain the wide gap between the total of 285,000 in 1966 and more than 400,000 today. Essentially, Administration specialists now conclude that the enemy organization is—and has long been—numerically much more formidable than Washington previously reckoned.

In addition, officials explain that the Government changed its method of keeping score in Vietnam this fall and that the figures for 1967 cited by General Westmoreland are not strictly comparable to those used for 1966.

His 1967 figures include North Vietnamese and Vietcong regular units, guerrilla units below district level and the Vietcong logistics and administrative structure. The Pentagon estimates these categories at 223,000 to 249,000 in all. General Westmoreland used the figure 242,000.

2 Categories Excluded

His 1967 figures, however, excluded two categories that were included in 1966. These are the Vietcong political apparatus, now estimated at 75,000 to 85,000, and the local self-defense militia, now tentatively estimated at 120,000 to 150,000. If these two categories are included, to make the 1967 figures roughly comparable to those used in 1966, the total of enemy military and political strength is 418,000 to 483,000.

The picture is complicated by the fact that, despite the higher over-all numbers being used today, all key Government agencies accept the conclusion that enemy armed strength has declined somewhat since September, 1966.

Washington has arrived at this conclusion by using new intelligence to revise its 1966 estimates. The consensus is that the over-all strength figure probably exceeded half a million in late 1966.

But most specialists add that almost all figures are tentative and that future intelligence may bring further readjustments. With that proviso, officials present the following picture of enemy strength:

The figure for regular forces, covering North Vietnamese units and main Vietcong units, is estimated at 118,000, compared to 127,000 in September, 1966.

The political apparatus, including the hard-core Vietcong political leaders, hamlet organizers, tax collectors and propagandists throughout the country, was estimated in late 1966 at 39,000 to 40,000. The current estimate is 35,000 to 38,000. Officials say this reflects better intelligence, not an increase.

In 1966, the United States lumped together three groups of irregular forces, setting their total at 120,000 to 150,000. If these two categories are included, to make the 1967 figures roughly comparable to those used in 1966, the total of enemy military and intelligence agents for main-force units.

These categories are now treated separately:

Administrative and logistics structure—This category, including noncombat soldiers and supply teams, medics and clerks, is estimated at 35,000 to 40,000. A year ago the figure was 25,000. Officials say the change represents better intelligence, not an increase.

Guerrillas—Pentagon estimates set their strength at 70,000 to 90,000. In 1966, the figure was less precise, but generally lower than the current figure. On the basis of new intelligence, however, military officers believe that guerrilla strength totaled 150,000, and may have reached 180,000, in 1966. Civilian analysts suggest that peak guerrilla strength in 1966 ranged from 125,000 to 135,000.

Self-defense militia—A year ago the United States estimated this category at 50,000 to 70,000. Since then, American military forces have captured enemy documents placing this figure at a peak of 150,000 in 1966. The figure in still the official Government estimate, but many officials suggest that the actual figure is lower, perhaps 120,000.

The Administration has put a generally optimistic assessment on these new intelligence estimates. But some officials are wary of putting too much emphasis on statistics to prove that there has been a decline in enemy strength.

"On the basis of these statistics, it is hard to argue that we are really doing well," one official said. "We may be humping together three groups of irregular forces, setting their total away at the regular units and at the guerrilla strength. But the problem is that the more information we get, the bigger they end up looking over-all."
7/11/67 SCORBURG CABLE TO DIRECTOR
SECRET 110954Z CITE SAIGON 9136
DIRECTOR

REF: DIRECTOR 15913
FRG: ..........................

1. IN DISCUSSION 9 JULY ARRANGED BY BRIGADIER GENERAL DAVIDSON AND HIS OB SPECIALIST COLONEL HAWKINS MADE CLEAR THAT THEY BREAKING FROM PAST PRACTICES. IN PARTICULAR, THEY WISHED TO USE FIGURES ROUNDED TO THREE ZEROS ON TOTAL OB AND USE RANGES FOR OTHER THAN MAIN-FORCE FIGURES.

2. MAJOR GENERAL PETERSON, CINCPAC J-2, AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL CANNY GRAHAM ALSO PRESENT AND FAVORED MORE GENERALIZED FIGURES. LATTER OFFICER HAS TAKEN OVER BOTH THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE AND ESTIMATES SHOPS OF MACV AND HIS REALISTIC APPROACH SHOULD BE ASSET.

3. REGARDING PARAGRAPH TWO OF REFERENCE, PICTURE LOOKS DIFFERENT FROM HERE. IN EVERY ONE OF SEVEN Instances NOTED IN PAST 10 DAYS, CONTACTED ENEMY UNIT PROVED TO BE SMALLER (SOMETIMES HALF) THAN MACV UB CARRIED. ERRORS IN THIS DIRECTION MAY COMPENSATE FOR DELAYS IN NOTING REPLACEMENTS IN
BATTERED UNITS. UNTIL RECENTLY MACV J-2 WAS UNDER ATTACK
BY JADOP, AMONG OTHERS) FOR CARRYING AT NORMAL STRENGTH
UNITS WHICH ONLY A FEW DAYS BEFORE HAD SUFFERED KNOWN CASUALTIES
OVER 50 PERCENT.

4. ENEMY'S INTENTION TO REPLACE LOSSES CANNOT BE
CAUGHT, BUT HIS ABILITY TO DO SO IS NOT UNLIMITED. Since
MOST REPLACEMENTS NOW COME FROM NORTH VIETNAM, THE REPLACEMENT
RATE TENDS TO BE LESS RAPID THE FURTHER SOUTH ONE GOES. IN
ALL BUT THE CORPS THERE ARE MANY UNDERSTRENGTH UNITS WHICH HAVE
BEEN UNDERSTRENGTH FOR A LONG TIME.

5. THE IDEA OF KEEPING GENERALIZED, MORE OR LESS
"ESTIMATIVE" FIGURES FOR INDICATING ENEMY STRENGTH IN BROAD
AREAS WHILE KEEPING A SEPARATE BUT RELATED DETAILED DATA
BASE SEEMS GOOD IDEA AND MIGHT BE SALABLE.

6. CONCUR WITH PARAGRAPH FOUR OF REFERENCE EXCEPT TO
EXTENT IT IMPLIES PRESENT MAIN-FORCE FIGURES "UNREALISTIC.”
THEY SEEM pretty close to truth. ESPECIALLY LOCALLY, CARRYING
AN ENEMY UNIT AT AN UNCHANGING PERCENT OF TO AND E IN THE FACE
OF EVIDENCE IT HAD JUST BEEN NEARLY WIPED OUT (OR REINFORCED TO
FULL TO AND E PLUS) WOULD NOT SEEM MORE REALISTIC.
7. However, if present methods are kept for the LTHILDE database and more stable, generalized figures used for total and corps 03, this should not be serious problem. The more serious problem comes in the time lag in not picking up whole new units, frequently of regimental size, until long after they have entered the country. MACV would be receptive to good ideas for overcoming this weakness.

6. The other serious weakness (which has played the major role in making analysis of the "crossover" point a reckless exercise) has been the inclusion of the very dubious figure for "irregulars," including self-defense, as part of the enemy military strength figure. This inclusion gives the total strength figure a probably error of at least plus or minus 25 percent. (The "input" figures are equally imprecise) since the loss figures also have a substantial margin of error, trying to match the two and say exactly when we have reached a crossover point is hopeless.

9. Our own judgment is that main force strength is probably still increasing, mainly because of very heavy infiltration. On the other hand, the decline in the large
6/23/67 DRAFT MEMORANDUM BY ADAMS ON NIE SESSION
(05523-26)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NIE 14.3-67 - The USIB Representatives Meeting 23 June 1967

1. General Collins, who was the chairman of the meeting, announced at the outset that since "the numbers game" was the guts of the NIE, it should be disposed of before proceeding to the estimate itself. He decided, therefore, to attempt to get in agreement on strength, loss, and tonnage figures. Mr. Robert Layton of the ONE Staff had prepared charts (attached) for the various representatives to put their estimates in. General Collins then asked the various representatives to state their cases.

2. The battle was immediately joined. Mr. George Fowler of DIA read out the official DIA/MACV figures stating that he saw no reason to accept any others. Mr. Layton, on the other hand, read out estimates of VC strength, which were based on figures contained in the CIA memo entitled "The Vietnam Situation: An Analysis and Estimate" of 23 May 1967.

3. A comparison of the DIA and CIA figures for mid-1967 follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CIA</th>
<th>DIA</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NVA Troops</td>
<td>53,000</td>
<td>53,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC Main and Local Forces</td>
<td>63,000</td>
<td>63,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregulars*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrillas</td>
<td>60-120,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Militia</td>
<td>125,000**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Admin Services</td>
<td>75-100,000</td>
<td>23,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>80,000**</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>456-541,000</td>
<td>279-299,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* CIA did not add the two types of Irregulars because guerrillas and militia are so dissimilar. Guerrillas are combatants, militia largely non-combatant.

** Minimum

4. Mr. Fowler questioned Mr. Layton on how the estimate for the number of admin service personnel was arrived at. Mr. Layton said that there were a number of obvious omissions in the MACV Order of Battle and extrapolations from a limited number of documents indicate that the number of troops assigned to the admin services were probably several times larger than that carried in the MACV OB. He noted, for example, that the Order of Battle omitted large numbers of medical, logistic, signal and transport personnel and other VC support soldiers assigned to various VC bases. Mr. Layton then pointed to the undersigned and asked him to enlarge on these remarks.

5. The undersigned observed that the holes in the MACV Order of Battle for admin services were numerous, that basically the figures had been arrived at in late 1964 and that there had been only minor changes since then.
He said he felt that a one to one ratio of admin services to combatant personnel was unfortunately supported by only a limited number of documents. He cited a VC district document in which the number of combatants listed was 50 while the total of admin service personnel was 59. He added that a provincial document of the VC province of Can Tho indicated that there were only slightly fewer service personnel than there were combatants. He also said that in his talks with MACV analysts, familiar with captured documents, that they had stated that there may well be as many as 25,000 admin service personnel (these are contained in the MACV OB) in "War Zone C" alone.

He admitted his case was none too good, but that it seemed obvious nonetheless that the MACV Order of Battle was far too low for the category.

6. Mr. Fowler stated that the DIA was intended that the number of Irregular to be listed in the estimate should be consistent with the MACV Order of Battle. Messrs. Adams and Layton brought his attention to three high-level VC documents, all of which indicated that the number of guerrillas was in the neighborhood of 180,000. Mr. Fowler said that the documents were probably merely recording a propaganda speech. Mr. Fowler observed, however, that one of the documents contained a breakdown of guerrillas by region and would not have the appearance of being a piece of propaganda.

The undersigned observed that the question of the number of Irregulars had been brought up last August and that the MACV OB is still the same now as it was then.

7. The number of political cadres was the next brought up. Mr. Fowler insisted again that the MACV figure should be used in the estimate. Mr. Fowler asked CIA reps how they had arrived at the figure of 80,000. The undersigned stated that he was basically using the MACV figures. The head of the political
Order of Battle section of MACV J-2 had stated that 80,000 should be regarded as a rock bottom minimum and that the figure might well be 150,000. Mr. Fowler commented that the political Order of Battle section of MACV J-2 in arriving at its estimates had by and large used extrapolations from a limited number of documents and that such high numbers were unwarranted. The undersigned observed that the 40,000 figure, which was arrived at in late 64, was based on even fewer documents and omitted political cadres serving at hamlet levels. Mr. Fowler reiterated the dangers of estimating numbers from a few documents and said that this was the method used by the political OB section in estimating the number of hamlet cadre.

General Collins said at this point that the question concerning numbers appeared to boil down to this: whether to use a "best estimate" or to use MACV's old figures with the caveat that the MACV figures might be too low. Mr. Fowler said that the latter course was best. General Collins then asked other servers to comment. Generally, CIA reps including the undersigned, Mr. Layton, Mr. Laux and Board members - Mr. Graham and Mr. Kent, thought that the "best estimate" should be used. State Department reps concurred.

The NSA representative, as far as could be determined, also concurred noting that in the last three years the number of radio nets associated with Communist political and military apparatus had had a several fold increase. The Army representative, prefacing his remarks that he would just as soon not get involved, said that it would probably be best to use the MACV Order of Battle studded with caveats.

8. The morning session broke up with no agreement as to which figures should be used.
5/18/81—LETTER FROM CRILE TO MIKE
Mike:

The interview was a classic. It keeps growing in my mind. I don't think you could have possibly done a better job; I certainly know no one else could have. It was wonderful having you as our champion.

Now for the reaction. I can't imagine Westie taking this lying down. I'm sure he has already called Danny Graham which is fine and to be expected. I think we should call Graham ourselves and line that interview up for you right away. How about booking it for the first open date on your schedule after the operation.

The next thing I would propose is a call to McNamara. I'd like to talk this one over with you but it does seem to me that we might consider leveling with him to a certain extent. That is letting him know that we have found overwhelming evidence that MACV was faking its intelligence reports - that it happened on his watch - that we feel he along with the President may have been seriously misled. Then if he refuses us... is it not an admission of sorts? Anyway let's talk that one out and move on it as soon as possible.

May 18, 1981
8/29/67 CIA CABLE WASHINGTON TO SAIGON
1. AS SAIGON AWARE, PRODUCTION OF NIE 14.3-67 HAS PRODUCED CONSIDERABLE DEBATE IN WASHINGTON, IN WHICH BOTH COMUMACY AND CINCPAC VERY MUCH INTERESTED PARTIES AND IN WHICH BOTH COMMANDS HAVE PARTICIPATED BY OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE AND DISPATCH OF TDY REPRESENTATIVES, DEBATE HAS PRODUCED MORE HEAT THAN LIGHT SINCE MAJOR DIFFERENCES LIE IN REALM OF CONCEPTUAL AND PRESENTATIONAL METHODOLOGY RATHER THAN IN GENUINE DISAGREEMENT OVER SUBSTANTIVE FACTS. ISSUES ARE COMPLICATED BY FACT THAT ANY CURRENT ESTIMATE ON SIZE AND STRENGTH OF COMMUNIST FORCES IN SVN IS INEVITABLY CHARGED WITH POLITICAL AND PUBLIC RELATIONS OVERTONES.

2. TO RESOLVE THESE DISAGREEMENTS, JOINT CHIEFS HAVE ASKED DCI (AS CHAIRMAN OF USIB) TO SEND PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO SAIGON TO REVIEW LIDING WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND AND ATTEMPT TO REACH
AGREEMENT WHICH WILL ELIMINATE APPEARANCE OF WASHINGTON-SAIGON DISPUTE ON THIS POLITICALLY TOUCHY SUBJECT. CHIEFS ALSO REQUESTED DCI REPRESENTATIVE TAKE WITH HIM ANALYSTS QUALIFIED DISCUSS DETAIL EVIDENCE WITH MACV COUNTERPARTS TO RESOLVE OR PINPOINT GENUINE SUBSTANTIATIVE DIFFERENCES. DCI IS ACCORDINGLY SENDING AS HIS REPRESENTATIVE, ACCOMPANIED BY MESSRS. WILLIAM HYLAND, DEAN MOOR AND SAMUEL ADAMS TO PROVIDE ANALYTIC BACK-UP. GROUP PLANS LEAVE WASHINGTON ON 5 SEPTEMBER AND SHOULD ARRIVE SAIGON ON 6 SEPTEMBER. FIRM ETA FOLLOWS. REGRET INUNDATION AT THIS BUSY TIME BUT REQUEST SAIGON ARRANGE TO MEET AND BILLET.

3. GENERAL WHEELER IS SENDING PERSONAL MESSAGE TO GENERAL WESTMORELAND ON THIS MATTER ADVISING HIM OF DISPATCH OF USIB CHAIRMAN'S REPRESENTATIVE. REQUEST ADVISE AMBASSADOR BUNKER AND ARRANGE ANY EMBASSY CLEARANCES TECHNOICALLY REQUIRED. DIA ALSO SENDING TWO OFFICERS TO SIT IN ON DISCUSSIONS BUT THEIR ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE HANDLED THROUGH DOD CHANNELS.
4. [Redacted] HAS DISCUSSED THIS WHOLE SUBJECT WITH GENERAL GODDING, MACV DEPUTY J-2, WHO RETURNING SAIGON ON 30 AUGUST AND CAN GIVE GENERAL WESTMORELAND PRELIMINARY BRIEFING ON WASHINGTON THINKING. GODDING WILL HAND-CARRY SINGLE COPY OF 28 AUGUST ESTIMATE DRAFT TO BE SEEN ONLY BY GENERALS WESTMORELAND, ABRAMS AND DAVIDSON, AMBASSADOR KOMER AND, IF HE SO DESIRE, AMBASSADOR BUNKER.

5. FOR RE REF, GENERAL PETERSON HAS SITUATION GARE. CIA DOES BELIEVE ESTIMATE SHOULD REFLECT IRREGULAR MILITIA (WHO MUCH MORE THAN COOLIES AND CONSTITUTE PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF CHIEU HOI RALLIERS), BUT DOES NOT REPEAT NOT ADVOCATE THEIR INCLUSION IN FULL-TIME MILITARY FORCE STRENGTH FIGURE. OUR POSITION ESSENTIALLY THAT OUTLINED TO PETERSON BY DURING CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL DAVIDSON IN SAIGON AT TIME OF McNAMARA VISIT. WILL STOP HONO-LULU AFTER SESSION WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND TO BRIEF PETERSON AND ADMIRAL SHARP ON SAIGON DISCUSSIONS.

END OF MESSAGE
C/S Comment: * Requested Hqs. comments on current status of reported disagreement on upcoming NIE on South Vietnam and the prospects for a settlement.
B-348

JX 602

1/22/68, McNAMARA TESTIMONY
(EXCERPTS CONCERNING VIETNAM)

... Southeast Asia remains for the United States a test of the viability of our collective defense policy. Here in close proximity to Red China lie a number of small, noncommunist states, each of which in its own way is striving to maintain its freedom and independence. The confusion and discord within the communist camp is well illustrated in this region. The U.S.S.R. is nominally joined with the Peking regime in supporting Hanoi's operations against South Vietnam, but each of the major communist powers is seeking to prevent the other from gaining dominance in Hanoi, while North Vietnam itself probably wishes to fall under the dominance of neither. It is thus possible that Moscow, Peking, and Hanoi all disagree as to what the future shape of Southeast Asia should be, yet these disagreements have allowed Hanoi while pursuing its drive to conquer the South--to play the Soviet Union off against China for material assistance. Thus, while polycentrism within the communist world is generally a welcome development, there will be cases, as in Vietnam, where it may intensify our problems rather than ease them.

The Soviet leadership may now believe that North Vietnam will be an outpost for their more pragmatic form of Marxism, to serve as a buffer hemming in the doctrinaire zealots of Peking. If this is their calculation, they are playing a dangerous game. A communist victory in South Vietnam would erode the position of all the non-communist states in Southeast Asia, and the chief beneficiary would be China—not the Soviet Union. Such a victory would be seen as a triumph for the Chinese militancy and as a vindication of her position in the ideological dispute with the Soviet Union. And, in contrast to North Korea, which borders both, Southeast Asia is separated from the Soviet Union by the great

mass of China. It is, therefore, unlikely that the Soviets could long maintain a special position in that area in defiance of China.

But our real concern is not over which of the two rivals emerges dominant. Our concern is that no great power dominate the area. As I have so often told this committee, the United States has no desire to compete with either the Soviet Union or Red China for hegemony in Southeast Asia, or to achieve any special position there. This is not to say that we are indifferent to what transpires on the other side of the Pacific Ocean. Whether we like it or not, we are a Pacific Ocean state. Our west coast borders on the Pacific and our 50th state lies halfway across that ocean. Moreover, we have important historical ties and treaty commitments to many of the nations in the western Pacific. So, we have a vital strategic interest in that area, an interest that we cannot ignore.

In this connection, I want to clear up one misunderstanding that has gained some currency in the press during the last few months. It has been alleged by some commentators that the Administration, last fall, changed its rationale for our military involvement in Southeast Asia—that we are now emphasizing the importance of Southeast Asia to our own security, whereas earlier we had said that we entered the conflict to honor the commitments of four Presidents to protect the freedom and independence of the people of South Vietnam, and to ensure their right to decide their own destiny.

The fact is that all of these reasons have been involved all along; no one is exclusively determining, as we have repeatedly tried to make clear. The important point is that all of the reasons we have given for our involvement in the Southeast Asian conflict are directly derived from a single basic policy, which is collective security. We are fighting there for the right of nations to live in freedom and independence, unmolested by their neighbors and free of fear of domination or attack by any of the great powers. It is from this right, as I have so often stated, that our own security derives, and it is precise the objective of our collective defense policy in all parts of the world. Not to honor our commitments in South Vietnam would thus cast doubt on our determination to honor our commitments elsewhere in the world.

I believe that over the long run a truly independent Southeast Asia would best serve the interests of all the nations involved. It would remove one more source of strife between the outside world and the communist camp,
and within the latter as well. Moreover, it would create the kind of environment required for the rapid development of the region's basically rich natural resources, to the benefit of all.

This vision of a peaceful and more prosperous order in Southeast Asia is shared by our friends and allies in the western Pacific. I am sure that you have noticed an increased appreciation among the leaders of Asia and the Pacific nations for the contribution which our efforts in Southeast Asia are making to their own freedom and independence. Of the seven nations actively participating in the struggle with their own military forces (South Vietnam, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and the United States), all but one have agreed in the last 12 months to increase their force contributions in South Vietnam. And, all of these leaders—and those of many other noncommunist nations—are firm in their support for our goals and objectives in Southeast Asia. I think there can be no doubt that this trend is directly related to our determination to fulfill our obligations in that area and to a rising confidence among Asian leaders that we will persist in that determination.

The Statement of Principles enunciated at the Manila Conference of October 1966 continues to guide our efforts in Southeast Asia. These principles include the following four points: (1) Aggression must not succeed in South Vietnam; (2) we must break the bonds of poverty, illiteracy, and disease throughout Asia and the Pacific area; (3) we must strengthen economic, social, and cultural cooperation within the region; (4) we must seek reconciliation and peace throughout Asia.

The seven participating nations agreed that the South Vietnamese people shall not be conquered by aggressive force and shall enjoy the inherent right to choose their own way of life and their own form of government and that this commitment shall be backed by military force and other efforts as necessary. But at the same time, the seven nations also proclaimed their readiness to pursue any and all avenues which might lead to a secure and just peace, either through discussion and negotiation or through reciprocal action on both sides to reduce the level of violence. They made it clear that their sole demand on the leaders of North Vietnam is that they abandon their aggression. More specifically, the Manila Declaration stated that:

Allied forces are in the Republic of Vietnam because that country is the object of aggression and its government requested support in the resistance of its people to aggression. They shall be withdrawn, after close consultation, as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides. Those forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled.

These are still our policies. As you well know, the U.S. government has continued to explore every possible means of achieving a just settlement of the Vietnam conflict. These efforts have thus far yielded no positive results, but our search for peace continues.

The importance of our efforts in Vietnam to the ultimate achievement of economic development, area cooperation, and political independence in Southeast Asia and the southwest Pacific is accepted not only by the seven nations actively involved in the conflict, but by leaders of other Asian countries as well. Prime Ministers Sato of Japan and Loe of Singapore are among those who have recently spoken out in unequivocal fashion on the need for the allied shield in Vietnam to permit orderly Asian development.

The Suharto regime in Indonesia, though remaining unaligned, is painfully aware of the sources of danger. Wholesale North Vietnamese violation of Laotian territory has been officially denounced by Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. Burma and Cambodia also recognize the threats of Chinese Communist pressures. This is not to imply that these nations will revamp their present foreign policies, but it does suggest that even those least willing to appear aligned with the United States are increasingly disturbed about Red Chinese or North Vietnamese designs.

The turmoil in Vietnam has tended to obscure the substantial progress being achieved elsewhere in the area. The time being purchased in Vietnam at such heavy cost is being put to good use by the noncommunist Asian states, and there is a growing appreciation of the need for collective action to meet common problems. Although the conflict slowed the Mekong Development Project, it and other regional efforts, such as the Asian Development Bank and the Asia and Pacific Council, are moving forward.

The most significant regional development during the past year was the formation in August of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, comprising Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The Association is starting modestly with annual Foreign Ministers' meetings and proposed economic, social, and technical programs.
Thus, there is a growing web of cooperation among the area's noncommunist nations, comprising both functional efforts focused on common practical problems and broader ties with more ambitious goals. We can hope that such evolving mechanisms will eventually provide the region with collective political, economic, and military strength necessary to guarantee that its destiny will be determined by these nations themselves.

Our role in this process will be particularly important. First, we must see the Vietnam conflict through to a conclusion that permits the growth and securing of regional cooperation. We will, of course, maintain our SEATO, ANZUS, and other commitments in the area. We should also continue our carefully structured assistance to countries in the area. Beyond this, American policy toward Southeast Asia and the southwest Pacific area must blend concern and restraint as we help the East Asian nations to build among themselves the true security that flows from economic and social progress. We must lend support and assistance, where requested, yet remain constantly aware that these countries are both equipped and entitled to lead themselves, and that it is in our interest that they do so.

Clouding this picture are intra-regional political frictions that could frustrate Asian security cooperation. Nevertheless, some elements are relatively clear. We shall encourage a prominent Australian-New Zealand role and continuing Australian efforts to consult the countries of the region about arrangements that will compensate for the British withdrawal. We shall encourage Japan to increase its contributions to the area commensurate with its own economic and security interests. We intend to avoid unilateral actions that force the pace or the nature of the evolving regional economic organizations.

Outright overt aggression by large conventional forces is unlikely in the region. Internal conflicts, fostered by socio-economic stagnation, communal disputes, or externally supported, communist-nurtured subversion are the more plausible threats.

Let me now briefly touch on the special situations in Thailand and Laos in view of their relationship to the Vietnam conflict.

Both of these nations are themselves threatened by externally supported insurgencies. They are also threatened by the debilitating economic, social, and political conditions common to much of the area. During the past year the Thai government assumed a leading role in regional cooperation. It was instrumental in the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and was a prime mover in fostering closer political consultation and action among neighboring nations. At the same time it stepped up its assistance to free-world forces in Vietnam. An additional 10,000 Thai troops will be sent to South Vietnam, and, as you know, we are using Thai bases for air operations against North Vietnam. The Thais' own counterinsurgency effort against the guerrillas in the northeastern provinces improved measurably during 1967. This effort, which consists of combined military/police operations, is designed not only to quell the externally supported insurgency but also to eradicate the factors which facilitate its growth—such as poverty, illiteracy, and long years of minimal contact with the area by the central government.

Internal conflict is greater in Laos than in Thailand primarily because external involvement there is greater. The North Vietnamese Army continues to infiltrate south through Laos, and North Vietnamese troops reinforce the Pathet Lao against the Royal Lao government. North Vietnam is also providing substantial military assistance to the insurgents. But, for a number of reasons, including continued international support for the 1962 Geneva Accords, our economic and military assistance to the government, and Laos' own growing political stability, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma has been able to maintain a partially successful defense against North Vietnamese aggression. We intend to continue to support his efforts while at the same time respecting the neutrality of his government.

SOUTHEAST ASIA OPERATIONS

Last year and the year before, I discussed in considerable detail our military objectives in Southeast Asia and the concept of operations developed to achieve them. However, it might be worth pointing out once again that we are dealing here with an immensely complicated problem, involving not only our immediate and longer range military and foreign policy objectives, but also local political, economic, and social considerations as well. While the military task in Vietnam is beginning to assume some aspects of a conventional limited war against overt external aggression, our overall Vietnam task remains that of making it possible for the South Vietnamese to cope with and suppress an insurgency which is externally directed and supported; to rectify the social ills on which that insurgency battens; to reestablish law and order; to revive and sustain the economy; and to create a viable, independent political structure. This total
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While the Vietnamese and other friendly forces have won every major battle in which they have been engaged since their commitment in South Vietnam. I believe it has been conclusively demonstrated that the communist main force units are simply no match for our forces in such engagements. Moreover, because of our great firepower and mobility, we are able to come to the aid of the South Vietnamese and other friendly forces whenever they encounter sizable enemy concentrations.

Indeed, during the last year the free-world forces have severely mauled most of the communist main force units in the coastal areas (excluding the IV Corps, where no regular North Vietnam units and few U.S. units are engaged). Many of the communist main force battalions has also been reduced as a result of continuing combat attrition, difficulty in recruiting local manpower, and the transfer of key cadre to units outside the Delta. However, none of these Delta units has been completely destroyed. Furthermore, partly
to conserve their forces, the communists are increasingly resorting to hit-and-run attacks with mortars and recoilless rifles not followed up by sustained ground action.

Countrywide, the evidence appears overwhelming that, beginning in 1966, communist local and guerrilla forces have sustained substantial attrition. As a result there has been a drop in combat efficiency and morale among many such units, though the guerrilla situation varies radically from area to area. In the northern I Corps, for example, where guerrillas are backed up by strong main force units, the guerrilla elements remain an important threat. They also seem to have maintained their effectiveness in the Delta, where allied pressure has been the lightest. Elsewhere in the country these forces appear considerably less effective than in 1965. I should caution, however, that the communists are well aware of the deterioration of their guerrilla forces and they are making great efforts to increase their effectiveness through consolidation and new tactics, and the augmentation of guerrilla efforts with main force specialists, such as sapper units.

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In the second major area--pacification--progress continues to be slow and uneven, with gains in some areas and setbacks in others. Although the pacification program registered definite net progress in 1967, achievements fell short of the goals.

As I pointed out last year, the military problem in pacification operations is to eliminate the Vietcong guerrilla forces district by district, and village by village. For the most part, guerrilla forces are local groups whose mission is harassment, sabotage, control, and intimidation of the local population, as well as the provision of intelligence, terrain guidance, supplies, and recruits for main force units. Only when these local guerrilla forces are permanently dispersed or harried into the ground can the full range of revolutionary development measures be undertaken on a permanent basis.

Pacification is a very slow and painstaking process. Even after an area has been essentially "cleared" of main force elements, a free-world military presence must be maintained to cope with residual guerrilla units. In fact, we have found that it is very difficult to clear, completely and permanently, any area in which the guerrillas were once well established. Even where we have been conducting clear-and-secure operations for several years, guerrilla hit-and-run attacks still occur. It was for this reason that we decided last year to increase substantially the amount of military resources devoted to the pacification effort. To this end, about one-half of the regular South Vietnam Army has been assigned to this mission (one obviously best performed by Vietnamese), and we are now engaged in building up and retraining the Regional and Popular Forces who are most directly involved in providing the local security that permits pacification efforts to proceed. We also intend to continue to build up the national police, whose task is to ferret out the hidden Vietcong infrastructure, and the Revolutionary Development cadres, whose task is to help the villages and hamlets restore local government, construct community facilities, and improve agricultural practices.

In the final analysis, the ultimate success of our entire effort in South Vietnam will turn on the ability of the government to reestablish its authority over its territory so that peaceful reconstruction can be undertaken.

Perhaps the best single measure of pacification is the extent to which the population has been brought under government control and protection. To provide a more valid standard of measurement, we have developed a device called the Hamlet Evaluation System. This new reporting system, which went into effect early in 1967, indicates that about 67 percent of the people of South Vietnam live under allied military protection and some form of continuing GVN administration.

For a number of reasons, the pace of the pacification program in 1967 was relatively slow. The security problem has already been touched on. Village and hamlet elections last spring and national elections in September and October preoccupied the GVN authorities and diverted security forces from purely pacification objectives. Although this diversion of effort contributed importantly to long-term nation-building objectives, it has slowed the momentum of the pacification program. Furthermore, even under optimum conditions, pacification progress is not going to be rapid, since pacification involves nothing less than the restructuring of Vietnamese society.

Moreover, Vietcong counteraction to the pacification program intensified appreciably during 1967 in a manner that constitutes an indirect tribute to the program's concepts but inhibited its rate of progress. In addition to continuing their direct attacks on pacification teams in the secure hamlets, the Vietcong stepped up their attacks against district towns and provincial capitals. While the Vietcong have been unable to hold any of these urban centers, the attacks have heightened the feeling of insecurity in those areas. The overall impact of the Vietcong attack on the pacification effort is reflected in
the Hamlet Evaluation System reports for 1967, which indicate that there was improvement in 35 districts but some deterioration in 29. By and large, the gains occurred in areas near large cities where allied forces were concentrated, and the losses occurred in the more remote areas where allied forces operate in a more dispersed pattern.

In a related effort, we believe progress is beginning to be made in ferreting out the hidden Vietcong infrastructure. Despite some overall management problems, the Vietnamese military and security services, including the national police, are now mounting an increased number of attacks on the infrastructure at the local level with encouraging results. The tempo of this activity can be expected to increase significantly in 1968.

Similarly, the Revolutionary Development cadres program is moving forward despite a number of difficulties. Almost all teams have now completed their work in their initial hamlet assignments and have moved on to their second assignments. Losses from Vietcong attacks and other causes were high in 1967, but they have been more than offset by recruitment of new cadres from the training center (which is now meeting its monthly quota), and steps have been taken to improve the discipline, morale, leadership, and overall quality of recruits.

With regard to the economy, the principal problems have been to keep the inevitable rise in prices under control and to revive agricultural production. Although the general price level continued to rise during 1967 as the result of the continued influx of U.S. troops and our large construction program, the rise has been kept to manageable proportions. We, ourselves, have taken drastic action to limit our expenditures in South Vietnam. To reduce the personal spending of our troops in South Vietnam, we have made full use of the new authorization to pay 15 percent interest on the savings deposits of military personnel serving in Southeast Asia. We are also sending our military personnel to other countries for rest and relaxation. Finally, to offset the inflationary impact of our presence in South Vietnam, we are providing a substantial amount of economic assistance, particularly in the form of imports. As a result of these efforts, the increase in the overall price level was held to under 35 percent during 1967, far less, for example, than the Korean price level rose in the second year of that war.

Because most of the combat operations are conducted in rural areas, and because of the diversion of indigenous manpower to wartime tasks, agricultural production and distribution have suffered greatly. Deliveries of domestic rice to Saigon (which is the main distribution point for the rice-deficit region to the north) have declined sharply since 1963. But we believe the decline has bottomed out, and we are attempting to increase production and deliveries in 1968. The rice producers are now using increasing amounts of fertilizer and some simple farm machinery, as well as some new more productive varieties of rice, all of which should help to increase yields both per hectare and per hour of labor. In addition, vegetable and poultry production have been rising steadily, and we are meeting some of our own needs from local sources. All in all, I believe we have been seeing the worst of the agricultural decline and the future looks much more promising.

However, much more needs to be done by the government of South Vietnam. Incomes of government employees, both military and civilian, have not kept up with the rising price level and will have to be raised if corruption is to be reduced and efficiency increased. Rural income will also have to be raised to promote pacification and reduce migration to urban areas. In contrast, incomes in other private sectors of the economy have been increasing faster than the price level and should be restrained. This will require new tax legislation and a restraint on nonessential government spending. Finally, restrictions on the movement of goods throughout the country must be eliminated.

In the political arena as well, there has been encouraging progress. Step by step, and notwithstanding the Vietcong attacks and the great skepticism expressed both within and without South Vietnam, the people of that country have moved toward constitutional government. A Constituent Assembly was elected, a new constitution written and a new national government elected and installed. Although the political structure is still very fragile, the first essential steps in the evolution of a viable South Vietnamese state have been taken. Furthermore, over half of the entire adult population of South Vietnam (including those adults working or serving with the Vietcong) participated in the electoral process through which these new institutions were brought into being. Political evolution, moreover, has not been confined to the national arena. Some of the hamlet and village councils recently established by popular election represent a structure that over the long run could outweigh in importance the more widely publicized advances in the national government. But at all levels of government, continued progress toward stability and responsiveness requires a determined attack on
basic social ills, including the problem of corruption.
The fate of the government rests on its success in sur-
mounting obstacles to the prompt development and intro-
duction of the economic and political programs that will
gain and retain wide popular support.

The air campaign against North Vietnam has included at-
tacks on industrial facilities, fixed military targets,
and the transportation system.

Attacks against major industrial facilities through 1967
have destroyed or put out of operation a large portion
of the rather limited modern industrial base. About 70
percent of the North's electric-generating capacity is
currently out of operation, and the bulk of its fixed
petroleum storage capacity has been destroyed. However,
imported diesel generators are probably producing suf-
ficient electricity for essential services and, by dis-
persing their petroleum supplies, the North Vietnamese
have been able to meet their minimum petroleum needs.
Most, if not all, of the industrial output lost has been
replaced by imports from the Soviet Union and China.

Military and economic assistance from other communist
countries, chiefly the Soviet Union, has been steadily
increasing. In 1965, North Vietnam received in aid a
total of $420 million ($270 million military and $150
million economic); in 1966, $730 million ($455 million
military and $275 million economic); and preliminary
estimates indicate that total aid for 1967 may have
reached $1 billion ($660 million military and $340
economic). Soviet military aid since 1965 has been con-
centrated on air defense materiel--SAMs, AAA guns and
ammo, radars, and fighter aircraft.

Soviet economic assistance has included trucks, railroad
equipment, barges, machinery, petroleum, fertilizer, and
food. China has provided help in the construction of
light industry, maintenance of the transportation system,
and improvements in the communications and irrigation
systems, plus some 30,000 to 50,000 support troops for
use in North Vietnam for repair and AAA defense.

Damage inflicted by our air attacks on fixed military
targets has led to the abandonment of barracks and
supply and ammunition depots and has caused a dispersal
of supplies and equipment. However, North Vietnam's air-
defense system continues to function effectively despite
increased attacks on airfields, SAM sites, and AAA posi-
tions. The supply of SAM missiles and antiaircraft
ammunition appears adequate, notwithstanding our heavy
attacks, and we see no indication of any permanent drop
in their expenditure rates.

Our intensified air campaign against the transportation
system seriously disrupted normal operations and has
increased the cost and difficulties of maintaining traffic
flows. Losses of transportation equipment have increased
but inventories have been maintained by imports from com-

The systematic air campaign against fixed economic and
military target systems leaves few strategically impor-
tant targets unstruck. Other than manpower, North Vietnam
provides few direct resources to the war effort, which is
sustained primarily by the large imports from the coun-
tries. The agrarian nature of the economy precludes an
economic collapse as a result of the bombing. Moreover
while we can make it more costly in time and manpower, it
is difficult to conceive of any interdiction campaign
that would pinch off the flow of military supplies to the
South as long as combat requirements remain at anything
like the current low levels.

THE COMMUNIST FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Last year I described in some detail the complexities in-
volved in estimating the communist "order of battle" in
South Vietnam. Since that time, MACV has been restudy-
ing the entire problem and has now evolved a new format which
we believe more clearly depicts the significant trends
in the strength and character of the communist fighting
forces. We have never been satisfied with the estimates
of the communist political cadres (i.e., the Vietcong
infrastructure) or the so-called Self-Defense and Secret
Self-Defense forces. These are very vague categories
which do not lend themselves to any kind of reasonably
precise measurement. Even more important, they are not
fighting forces and, therefore, didn't really belong in
the order-of-battle estimates. Accordingly, the new
order-of-battle estimates now include only three cate-
gories of fighting forces: combat, administrative
Services, and guerrillas. The first category includes
the combat and combat-support units; the second, the rear
area technical services; and the third, the full-time
irregular but organized units.
The estimates of enemy strength are subject to frequent change, and it is difficult to spell out at any one time the detailed changes in enemy force structures; however, it seems quite certain that total enemy strength did decline during 1967. Most of the decline took place among the irregular forces. The strength of enemy regular combat forces has been maintained at a relatively constant level of about 110,000-115,000 during the past year. The participation of the NVA increased from about 9,000 men in June 1965 to between 50,000-55,000 at the end of 1967.

In addition, some 10,000 NVA troops have been placed in Vietcong combat units to help them maintain their strength at about 60,000-65,000 troops. The number of administrative support troops who back up the combat regulars is at least 35,000-40,000. The number of guerrillas has been declining during the past year and is estimated at between 70,000-90,000.

It is estimated that, during all of 1967, the communists lost about 165,000 effectives; about 88,000 killed in action, 30,000 dead or disabled from wounds, 6,000 prisoners of war, almost 18,000 defectors to the government of South Vietnam, and about 25,000 disabled by disease, deserted (other than to GVN), etc. These estimates, however, must be used with a great deal of caution. We know the number of communist prisoners of war and defectors. But the estimates of the number killed in action are based on a body count which includes many judgment factors, and the number dead or disabled from wounds is a computed figure representing 35 percent of the body count. The number disabled by disease, etc., is simply a guess, since we have no solid basis for calculating this figure. In any event, communist losses in 1967 were extremely heavy and were at least 50 percent higher than in 1966.

These losses are replaced by recruitment within South Vietnam and infiltration from the north. The Vietcong have had considerable difficulty in meeting recruitment goals. Although we can make only rough estimates of actual recruitment, we believe that it has declined from a level of about 7,000-8,000 men a month during 1966 to something on the order of 3,000-5,000 men a month by the end of 1967. The balance of the manpower drain must be filled by infiltration. Infiltration from the north averaged about 7,000 men a month during the first half of 1967. It will be several months before we have final estimates for the second half of 1967, but preliminary indications are that it has been continuing at about the same rate.

A recent appraisal of the manpower situation in North Vietnam shows that North Vietnamese manpower reserves are adequate to meet current demands and that Hanoi could support a military mobilization effort higher than present levels. North Vietnam's present force level of 480,000 represents only about three percent of the population. More than half its male population of 2.8 million between the ages of 17 and 35 are believed to be fit for military force level requirements at the present time simply by drafting all or almost all of the estimated 120,000 physically fit men who reach the draft age every year.

As to the future, our estimates are, of course, very uncertain. We believe that any net increase in communist strength during 1968 will have to come from North Vietnam; the local supply of Vietcong manpower is growing more limited with each succeeding year. We have reason to believe that new North Vietnamese divisions have moved South. (As I pointed out last year, North Vietnam has not infiltrated into the South any very large part of its active Army. The limiting factor is not the total size of the North Vietnamese Army but rather the number of men that they are capable of training and infiltrating into South Vietnam, particularly the number of essential cadre available.) These divisions have not yet been reflected in the order of battle. Thus the combat strength of the NVA in the South may increase sharply in the next few months, and we have provided for this development in our own plans.

The South Vietnamese Armed Forces

At the end of 1967, the government of South Vietnam had a total of about three quarters of a million men under arms--about 341,000 in the regular forces (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force), 150,000 each in the Regional and Popular Forces, 42,000 Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) forces, and 70,000 national police.

The regular Army now stands at about 301,000 compared with 284,000 in December 1966. Last year I noted that a major effort would be made in 1967 to bring the "present-forduty" strength of the Army maneuver battalions up to an acceptable level. This has been substantially accomplished with the increase of about 17,000 men in Army strength.

The strength of the Regional and Popular Forces will be substantially increased. In addition, as I noted earlier, these forces will be retrained and provided better equipment since they play a major role in the pacification.
effort. Similarly, the government will continue its effort to increase the size of the national police force, the expansion of which has consistently fallen behind schedule. Although recruitment for this force has lagged and certain units are still not properly assigned, the government hopes to increase the strength to about 98,000 by June 1969, compared with about 58,000 at end 1966.

A further small increase will also be made in the CIDG, and many of these units will be moved from the coastal provinces into the highlands where they are now most needed.

To meet these increased manpower goals and to replace losses (i.e., casualties and desertions), a partial mobilization has been decreed by the government, and the details of the new measure are now being debated in the legislature. It is our hope that the draft will be expanded and intensified, since we feel very strongly that the recently announced increase in our deployments should be matched by an increase in the South Vietnamese forces.

In this connection, I should point out that the performance of the South Vietnamese forces improved in 1961. Many of their units have achieved major victories, particularly those operating with our own forces. Desertions are down sharply from the first half of 1966.

OTHER FREE-WORLD FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Excluding U.S. forces, there are now a total of about 60,000 other free-world military personnel in-country. South Korea, with a strength of 48,800 has furnished two divisions and one brigade—a total of 22 infantry-type battalions. Australia, with a present strength of 6,600 has furnished three infantry battalions, a squadron of eight attack bombers, and a guided missile destroyer. New Zealand has increased its strength to about 500 and the Philippines have furnished a reinforced construction battalion of about 2,000 men. Thailand now has one maneuver battalion in South Vietnam with about 2,400 men. This force will grow to 12,000 men by June 1969. All of these nations, except the Philippines, have increased their force commitments since last year.

V. U.S. FORCES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Last year we budgeted for a total of about 470,000 men in South Vietnam by June 1968, but last summer General Westmoreland requested and the President agreed to provide additional forces. Thus, by December 31, 1967, we had about 485,000 men there, and this number will grow to a total of 525,000. Total allied forces in South Vietnam increased from 690,000 in June 1965 to 1,298,000 in December 1967 and are scheduled to grow to about 1,400,000 by June 1968. The U.S. ground forces in December 1967 included 102 maneuver battalions (79 Army, 23 Marine Corps). The ground forces are now supported by about 3,100 helicopters, and this number will continue to grow.

In June 1965, before the major buildup of U.S. forces in Vietnam began, both the consumption and production of ground ammunition were running at relatively low levels, as is normal in peacetime. Since then, both consumption and production have increased manyfold. During the early months of the force buildup, when consumption outpaced production, ammunition requirements were met by drawing down reserve stocks which, of course, is just what our planning envisioned. Actually, the amount drawn down was small in relation to our total stocks. (All ground ammunition figures relate to the 40 major items accounting for about 85 percent of the tonnage used in Vietnam.)

During the past year, ammunition production has nearly tripled—from 39,000 tons in December 1966 to 113,000 tons in December 1967—and since June has equaled or exceeded consumption. Actual consumption of the 40 major items in 1967 was a little over one million tons (compared with last year's estimate of 900,000 tons). Production will continue to increase during the next few months and should level off at about 130,000 tons per month by December 1968.

The excess of production over consumption will be used to replace the reserve stocks drawn down earlier and will also serve as a safety factor in case consumption exceeds the planned levels. Our reserve production capacity, which will still be large, serves as a second safety factor to meet even larger consumption requirement. The FY 1969 Budget includes about $2.8 billion for ground ammunition.

We now have a total of about 1,000 fighter/attack aircraft based in South Vietnam. Thailand, and aboard carriers offshore. We are now flying a total of about 28,000 to 30,000 attack sorties per month. In addition, the B-52 force in 1967 flew a total of more than 800 sorties per month. Total air ordnance consumption was running about 83,000 tons per month in the last few months of 1967. (Air ordnance data refer to the 51 major items which account for about 95 percent of the tonnage used in Southeast Asia.) Production at the close of 1967 was running at about 100,000 tons per month.

As of that date, the worldwide inventory considerably exceeded the June 1965 figure. This is more than we believe is needed with a "hot" production base. Accordingly, we now plan to reduce these inventories somewhat, resuming the buildup to our "cold base" objective after hostilities...
are terminated. This will allow us to shut down the lines gradually, thereby avoiding unwanted surplus and cushioning the impact on the economy.

Large quantities of air-delivered munitions will continue to be needed, and a total of about $3.5 billion is included in our FY 1969 request for these items for all the Services.

No major change is planned in the "offshore" naval forces, except for the battleship New Jersey, which will deploy to the South China Sea. The river patrol force will be further increased from about 159 vessels in December 1967 to about 250 by December of this year.

During the past year, we have battle-tested the first mobile "Riverine" force in the Mekong Delta. This force of three battalions has been stationed on two naval barracks ships (plus a barracks barge) and at a nearby land base (two battalions afloat and one ashore). We now plan to increase the size of this force.

Other additional deployments to Southeast Asia will require only a very small increase in the number of U.S. military personnel in Thailand, to a total of about 48,000. No significant increase will be needed at our bases in the western Pacific (Ryukyus, the Philippines, Taiwan, Japan, and Guam), where we have about 120,000 military personnel.

I noted earlier that our success in pushing the communist main force units back into the highlands along the borders of South Vietnam has created new problems. Operating in such close proximity to the borders, our forces do not have much room for maneuver in attempting to cut off communist units from their lines of communication. Consequently, we have had to develop new means for intercepting the flow of men and supplies to these units, e.g., the barrier system just south of the DMZ.

APPENDIX V

NEWS CONFERENCE, AMBASSADOR ROBERT

General Winant K. Sidle: It's a have Ambassador Komer back again. know, he's going to give a sort of have a handout with the statistic's bound to reach here before we're yet due to the traffic, but I'm going to go a little bit without further ado, Ambassador Komer: Thank you, Sir, morning as part of our series of sum up how we did in pacification isn't a sexy subject, but it's pretty doggoned important to what we want. I'd like to talk a little bit about pacification, what did we accomplish, what's the key is, who pacifies, why is pacification important, what's the next step? First of all, what is pacification nature a pretty slow and undramatic security, providing assistance to countryside, showing that the GVN is taking care of refugees and the very complex set of interlocking problems as I say, the key is adequate local people. This is primarily a military function, as you know, of the ARVN. There's just no point in trying to train teachers or provide fertility, because you just can't. VC/NVA main forces have been driven: got a situation where you can bring units, you really can't move on pacification. This is a lesson that we learned the
JX 661

4/4/68, CABLE COMUSMACY TO RUEPJS/NMCC, 09465
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
B-360

SECRET OF DEFENSE

CONFIDENTIAL D9465. SECTION 1 OF 11

SUBJECT: ORDER OF BATTLE JU 3

REFERENCE: NMCC HSG UTG 022011Z APR 67

IN RESPONSE TO THIS REFERENCE, THE FOLLOWING ANSWERS ARE PROVIDED IN
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS POSED THEREIN:

Q. HOW DID YOU COMPUTE GUERRILLA STRENGTHS IN YOUR LAST
SEVERAL OB CHANGES

A. OUT DROP IN GUERRILLA STRENGTH FOR 72,000 TO 47,000 HAS
DERIVED IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER:

AS OF 31 JANUARY 1968 OUR OB STRENGTH H 5619

VC 595397

ADM5 TOTAL 115016

SUBtle TOTAL 37725

GUERRILLAS 72805

TOTAL 224356

DURING FEBRUARY 1968 THERE WERE A NUMBER OF CHANGES THAT
OCURRED WHICH BROUGH ABOUT A Retroactive ADJUSTMENT OF OUR
3 JANUARY OB STRENGTH FIGURES, FIRST, THERE WERE AN ADDITIONAL
19,400 INFILTRATORS DURING JANUARY, PLUS 500 THAT INFILTRATED
DURING AUGUST 1967, THAT PREVIOUSLY WE WERE UNAWARE OF; HE HAD
ALREADY ESTIMATED 7,000 INFILTRATORS FOR JANUARY, SO THIS LEFT
AN ENEMY GAIN OF 12,900 THAT HAD TO BE ADDED TO OUR JANUARY
FIGURES (19,400 PLUS 500 - 7,000). IN ADDITION, BECAUSE OUR KNOWN
LOSSES ARE NOT AVAILABLE UNTIL BETWEEN THE 10-15TH OF THE
FOLLOWING MONTH, WE ESTIMATED KNOWN LOSSES FOR JANUARY WHICH
DURING FEBRUARY HAD TO BE CORRECTED. HE ESTIMATED DURING
JANUARY THAT KNOWN LOSSES WOULD BE 15,500, THIS TURNED OUT TO BE
QUITE FAR IN ERROR, AS THE TACE OF OFFENSIVE CONTAINED JUST PRIOR TO

ACT... NMCC-1

INFO... S/DEF-7 ASD/COMP-1 ASD/SA-1 DIA-15 FILE-1(26) HAT/DC
As you know, under our accepted methodology of computing strengths, all known gains and losses which cannot be ascribed to specific enemy units are applied to the guerrilla force. This is done so that the total strength figure will reflect gains and losses which we know. The use of the guerrilla category as the "soft" figure corresponds to what we know of the enemy's practice. He uses this force to absorb new recruits and is constantly engaged in upgrading out of it to provide fillers for main and local force. Thus guerrillas comprise the segment of his force which fluctuates most markedly in response to his overall personnel requirements.

Thus February's enormous losses of the Tet offensive were assigned largely to the guerrilla force; about 16,000 could be ascribed to specific units. While minor adjustments are still to be made resulting from additional ascriptions, we do believe this figure reflects generally the true situation. We know that large numbers of guerrilla were killed outright during the Tet fighting and that significant numbers were upgraded to fill gaps in local and main force units.

The net change that has applied to the January figures has plus 7,577, i.e.,

NE INFIL 12,900
NEW LOSSES 5,323
NET CHANGE PLUS 7,577

Our update January figures as of 29 Feb therefore were:

- NVA 77,700
- VC MF/LF, CO/PLT 60,000
- SUB TOTAL 138,500
- ADMIN SVCs 37,700
- GUERILLAS 56,723
- TOTAL 232,923

At the end of February he estimated the following losses:

KIA 27,000 (EST 37,000 - 10,000 POL AND CIV)

2 DF 3

23,850

Regraded Unclassified
Order SEC Army by TAG per 831224

Confidential
DOY-DIS 4297 (SEE QUESTION 3)

HHC 500
PHS 1900
TOTAL 37297

TO THESE KNOWN (EST) LOSSES WE ADDED THE ESTIMATED NON BATTLE LOSSES FOR TOTAL 39297.
WE ESTIMATED AS - B, 7000 INFIL AND 3500 RECRUITMENT FOR A MONTHLY GAIN OF 10500, THIS LEAVES A NET CHANGE OF 20797.
(39297 - 10500), OUR FEBRUARY FIGURES AS OF 29 FEB THEN WERE:
NVA 72793
VC HF/LF 50138
SUB TOTAL 122931
ADMIN SVCS 33725
GUERRILLAS 47470
TOTAL 204126

Q. HOW DID YOU ARRIVE AT THE ESTIMATE THAT 10,000 OF THE 40,000 KIA DURING GEU WERE LABORERS ETC
A. THE FIGURE OF 10,000 LOSSES ATTRIBUTED TO LABORERS, POLITICAL CADRE, AND RECENTLY IMPRESSED PERSONNEL HAS DEVELOPED FROM A STUDY OF DOCUMENTS AND ALSO FROM THE RATIO OF PRISONERS TAKEN RELATING TO THE TET OFFENSIVE; AVAILABLE FIGURES OF THE PEOPLE ENGAGED INDICATED ONE OF FOUR HAS EITHER A MEMBER OF INFRASTRUCTURE OR LABORER FOR FRESH IMPRESSEE, KIA'S WERE ASSUMED TO BE SUSTAINED IN THE SAME PROPORTION AS PERSONNEL ENGAGED, THUS OUT OF ROUGHLY 40,000 CASUALTIES (WE ESTIMATED 37000), 10,000 HERE ESTIMATED TO BE OF THE POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE OR RECENTLY IMPRESSED SOLDIERS AND LABORERS.

Q. HOW DID YOU DIVIDE THE REMAINING 30,000 KIA BETWEEN CITY FIGHTING AND OTHER
A. OF THE KIA DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF THE TET OFFENSIVE WE ESTIMATED 1/2 AS CITY CASUALTIES AND APPLIED NO DOY/DIS FACTOR THERETO, IN ADDITION, NO FACTOR WAS APPLIED TO THE KIA IN THE HUE FIGHTING UP TO THE SECURING OF THE CITY, THE REASON FOR THIS DEPARTURE FROM NORMAL METHOD OF DETERMINING DOY/DIS IS THAT BECAUSE OF THE CHARACTER OF CITY FIGHTING WE BELIEVE ALMOST NO DOY/DIS WERE SUSTAINED DUE TO VIRTUAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF EVACUATION, THOSE WHO WERE SERIOUSLY HOUNDED EITHER DIED AND BECAME PART OF THE BODY COUNT OR WERE TAKEN PRISONER.

Q. WHAT ACTUAL FIGURE ARE YOU USING AS TO ENEMY RECRUITING IN NOVEMBER, DECEMBER, AND JANUARY, AND POST TET
A. WE ESTIMATE RECRUITING FOR THESE MONTHS AS FOLLOWS:

MONTH INITIAL EST. CURRENT (31 MAR) EST. ORDER SEC. ARMY BY TAG PER
NOV 3500 3500
DEC 3500 3500
JAN 3500 7000+
POST TET FEB 3500 7000+
MAR 3500 7000+

Q. WHAT WERE THE FIGURES REGARDING PHIS, CHIEU HOI, RECRUITING
A. IS 5283 (DIA)

CONFIDENTIAL
CABLE FROM WHEELER TO WESTMORELAND AND SHARP (CJCS 0547-67)
CITE: CJCS 6547-67  
DTG: 205611Z  
FROM: GEN WHEELER, CJCS, WASHINGTON  
TO: GEN WESTMORELAND, COMUSMACV, SAIGON  
ADM SHARP, CINCPAC, HAWAII

20 JANUARY 1967

1. UPON MY RETURN TO WASHINGTON, I FIND THAT THE VALIDITY OF THE 
ESTIMATES OF THE ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE AND INFILTRATION IS STILL 
VERY HIGH ON THE INTEREST LIST AT ALL LEVELS. WE HAVE HAD SEVERAL 
CONGRESSIONAL AND WHITE HOUSE QUERIES CONCERNING APPARENT 
DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE SEVERAL SOURCES OF THE DATA. AS I DISCUSSED WITH 
YOU, IT IS MY FEELING THAT MANY OF THE PROBLEMS STEM FROM 
AN IMPRESSION OF PRECISION WHICH DOES NOT ACTUALLY EXIST IN OB AND 
INFILTRATION FIGURES. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN ESTIMATES OF GUERRILLA 
AND POLITICAL CADRE STRENGTH. THIS IMPRESSION HAS BEEN GENERATED 
BY TWO THINGS: FIRST, THE LACK OF SUFFICIENT EMPHASIS ON EDUCATING 
ALL CONCERNED REGARDING THE DERIVATION OF OB FIGURES AND THE DIFFICULTY 
OF OBTAINING HARD INTELLIGENCE TO SUPPORT FIGURES IN THESE AREAS; AND SECOND, AN INSATIABLE THIRST FOR HARD NUMBERS HERE IN 
WASHINGTON. THE COMBINATION OF THESE TWO FACTORS HAS RESULTED IN A 
GENERAL MISUNDERSTANDING OF BOTH THE DERIVATION AND ACCURACY OF OB 
FIGURES.

2. TWO OTHER SOURCES OF CONFUSION EXIST. THE FIRST IS CAUSED BY 
INCONSISTENCIES IN THE METHODOLOGY FOR DEVELOPING AND PRESENTING OF 
AND INFILTRATION DATA. SPECIFICALLY, OB TABLES DEVELOPED BY YOUR J-2 
DO NOT INCLUDE RETROACTIVE CHANGES FOR PAST MONTHS GENERATED BY NEW 
INTELLIGENCE INPUT. ON THE OTHER HAND, SIMILAR INFILTRATION TABLES
DO CONTAIN THESE UPDATING CHANGES. ADDITIONALLY, ASD (COMPTROLLER) PUBLISHES TABLES ON OB WHICH INCLUDE THE RETROACTIVE CHANGES; BASED, I AM TOLD, ON INFORMATION PROVIDED BY YOUR J-2. THIS RESULTS IN INCONSISTENCIES WHICH FURTHER FRUSTRATE OUR EFFORTS TO PRESENT A CLEAR PICTURE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION TO THE CIVILIAN AGENCIES HERE. THE SECOND PROBLEM AREA RESULTS FROM WHAT SEEMS TO BE A CONTINUOUS CHANGE IN ENEMY UNIT DESIGNATIONS. I AM AWARE OF YOUR EFFORTS TO USE THE SAME NOMENCLATURE WHICH THE VC/NVA USE, BUT I AM SURE YOU CAN APPRECIATE THAT THIS ALSO COMPOUNDS OUR PROBLEMS.

3. My recent trip has convinced me that you and your people are doing everything possible to exploit available intelligence. It also convinced me that the basis for actual strength figures on guerrillas and political cadres in SVN does not and probably will not exist until the revolutionary development program is much further down the road. This program appears to me to offer the greatest hope for more accurate estimates on the local irregular forces. I am also convinced that more can and must be done to standardize the development and presentation of the OB and infiltration data.

4. In order to eliminate the basic problems which now exist in this area, I have directed DIA to undertake to resolve the questionable areas. The text of my directive follows:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: STATISTICS ON ORDER OF BATTLE AND INFILTRATION

1. I am becoming increasingly concerned over the contradictory order of battle (OB) and infiltration statistics which are contained
IN THE NUMEROUS DOCUMENTS CURRENTLY BEING CIRCULATED THROUGHOUT WASHINGTON RECENTLY, THERE HAVE BEEN SPECIFIC QUERIES BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, WHITE HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES AND OTHERS CALLING ATTENTION TO THESE DISCREPANCIES. IN ADDITION TO THE TIME AND EFFORT WHICH IS REQUIRED TO INVESTIGATE AND ANSWER THESE QUERIES, THE CONFUSION CREATED BY THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL DIFFERENT SETS OF DATA IS CAUSING SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS.

2. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THIS PROBLEM BE RESOLVED ON AN EXPEDITED BASIS. THEREFORE, I DESIRE THAT YOU UNDERTAKE WHATEVER ACTIONS ARE NECESSARY AND COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, DOD, CIA AND YOUR OWN ORGANIZATION TO ENSURE THE USE OF STANDARDIZED METHODS FOR DEVELOPING AND PRESENTING STATISTICAL ON OB AND INFILTRATION TRENDS, ESTIMATES AND CURRENT HOLDINGS, AND THAT THE PROPOSED SYSTEM IS USED AS THE SINGLE FORMAL SOURCE FOR THIS TYPE OF INFORMATION BY ALL AGENCIES INVOLVED. AMONG OTHER CONSIDERATIONS, I DESIRE THAT THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT OB STRENGTHS SHOULD BE UPDATED ON A RETROACTIVE BASIS AS NEW INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION BECOMES AVAILABLE BE RESOLVED.

IN THIS RESPECT, THE MOST LOGICAL APPROACH SEEMS TO BE A CONTINUOUS UPDATING OF PAST AS WELL AS CURRENT OB AND INFILTRATION INFORMATION. ONLY IN THIS WAY, CAN THE REAL TRENDS IN ENEMY BUILD-UP BE DETERMINED.

3. YOU SHOULD LOOK INTO THE CONSTANT CHANGES IN UNIT AND AREAS NOMENCLATURE WHICH ARE BEING MADE IF THE OB. WHILE I RECOGNIZE THE VALIDITY OF MACV'S ATTEMPTS TO PARALLEL THEIR NOMENCLATURE WITH THE CURRENT ENEMY DESIGNATIONS, THE FREQUENT CHANGES IN UNIT DESIGNATION ARE AN ADDITIONAL SOURCE OF CONFUSION AND CONTINUALLY FRUSTRATE OUR EFFORTS TO PROJECT A CLEARER PICTURE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION TO THE VARIOUS CIVILIAN AGENCIES IN WASHINGTON.

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ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER

[Handwritten note: SECRET]

PAGE 3 OF 6 COPIES
I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU WILL ACTION TO
STABILIZE THESE ITEMS:

4. IN VIEW OF THE FORTHCOMING CONGRESSICAL HEARINGS, THESE
MATTERS MUST BE RESOLVED ON AN URGENT BASIS.

SIGNED: EARLE G. WHEELER
CHAIRMAN
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

5. YOUR FULL COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE IN THIS MATTER IS REQUESTED.

CAPRE REGARDS, GP-3

a. Indications that the 33C NVA division may be deploying
from its permanent base at Tha Binh raises the
question of the size force the enemy can organize, deploy to SVN
and support. A detailed analysis will be made to determine this.
Significant factors to be addressed are: Replacement support for
NVA/VC, supporting problems, ammunition, logistical requirements,
major transportation entry points for ammunition and war consum-
ables into SVN. Additionally, all evidence of Cambodian involve-
ment in SVN must be reexamined to include political arrangements with the
Cambodian Government. (Action: J2 - Suspending: 7 June 1967)

b. In spite of recent US and ARVN aggressive spoiling
actions, intelligence information still indicates the possibility of
large-scale enemy coordinated attacks on multiple fronts. It is
possible that Hanoi has not accepted recent set-backs and has
reacted to effective ROLLING THUNDER results by going for targets
in the south. Such strategy could expose and make large elements
of the enemy's forces vulnerable. COC will advise all SWAC
and ARVN forces immediately to be prepared for such an
activity. (Action: As indicated above)

c. COMUSMACV commented on the void in intelligence
in the area around Khe Sanh. (Actions: J2)

GROUP 1
Declassified at 32 year intervals
Was automatically declassified

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