MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: CIIC Meeting, 28 May 1967

This memorandum confirms oral guidance issued by COMUSMACV following the subject meeting.

a. Indications that the 330 NVA division may be deploying southward from its permanent base at Thai Binh raises the question of the size force the enemy can organize, deploy to SVN and support. A detailed analysis will be made to determine this. Significant factors to be addressed are: Replacement support for NVA/VC, recruiting problems, ammunition tonnage requirements, major transportation entry points for ammunition and war consumables into NVN. Additionally, all evidence of Cambodian involvement in logistic support of NVA/VC forces in SVN will be pulled into this analysis to include political arrangements with the Cambodian Government. (Action: J2 - Suspense: 7 June 1967)

b. In spite of recent US and ARVN aggressive spoiling actions, intelligence information still indicates the possibility of large scale enemy coordinated attacks on multiple fronts. It is possible that Hanoi has not accepted recent setbacks and has reacted to effective ROLLING THUNDER results by going for broke in the south. Such strategy could expose and make large numbers of the enemy's forces vulnerable. COC will advise all FWMAF and ARVN forces immediately to be prepared for such an eventuality. (Action: As indicated above)

c. COMUSMACV commented on the void in intelligence in the area around Khe Son. (Action: J2)
d. Recent photography reveals possible surface-to-surface missile/RX sites in Cambodia. DIA will be provided copies of these photographs without delay. It is imperative that this situation be watched closely. J2/SOG will prepare a back channel bringing this to ADM Sharp's attention and advising him to contact DIA for their evaluation. He will also be advised that COMUSMACV probably will request additional authority in this area by a subsequent front channel message. (Action: As indicated above - Suspense: 29 May)

e. The movement of two U.S. brigades from II Field Force makes it necessary to establish a General Reserve from ARVN Airborne/Marine forces. Immediate action will be taken to determine the mechanics and prepare the directive for one battalion to be on 6 hour alert, followed by additional battalions at 6 hour intervals. Necessary coordination will be effected with JGS and II Field Force. As a related action, a well organized harassment program to include B-52 strikes will be designed for the war zone C area. (Action: COC - Suspense: Completed action by 30 May)

f. The highly successful air campaign in NVN may possibly trigger retaliatory enemy attacks against SVN electrical power sources. The Saigon system would be a logical choice. In addition to insuring adequate security measures, a recovery plan is necessary. The availability of back-up resources either in stock or available for air lift will be determined. The possibility of obtaining nuclear powered generators will be investigated. (Action: DEP CORDS - Suspense: Give progress report at 3 June CIIC meeting)

g. COMUSMACV expressed his interest in experiments with the therelation process that have been taking place in Laos and directed the following priority actions:

(1) Seventh Air Force will develop air delivery methods for selected targets in the TIGER HOUND area.

(2) J3 will make a study of the use of this technique in selected areas in South Vietnam and determine the steps necessary to accelerate procurement. The Ashau Valley roads will receive priority attention in this study.
MACJ02
SUBJ: CIIC Meeting, 28 May 1967

(3) MACSA will express MACV's interest in the tactical application of this process to the Washington Scientific community. (Action: As directed above - Suspense: Each action agency report progress NLT 3 June)

h. SOG will investigate the potential use of the reported 342 LAVE tribesmen who have moved from Cambodia into southern Laos. (Suspense: Status report by 15 June)

i. Seventh Air Force was directed to be prepared to execute a GRAND SLAM in the DMZ area on short notice. Additionally, J2 will make a study of new SLAM targets in southern Laos before the full onset of the southwest monsoons. (Action: 7th AF/J2 in coordination with SOG)

j. As directed in the 20 May CIIC meeting, J2 presented a revised version of the latest VC Irregular Forces strength and Political Order of Battle. COMUSMACV directed the following: Coordinate the study with CAS and Barry Zorthian, Colonel Bankson will present the public release plan for approval, brief the Mission Council and obtain their endorsement before forwarding to higher headquarters and Washington. (Action: J2/IO - Suspense: Completed action NLT 5 June).

Copies furnished:

7AF
DEP CORDS
J2
J3
COC
SOG
MACSA
10
SJS (2)

A. M. HENDRY, JR.
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff

Page 3 of 3 pages
5/9/68 CABLE FROM WESTMORELAND TO WHEELER AND SHARP (MAC 6055)
CITE: MAC 6255

UTG: 090325Z

FROM: GEN WESTMORELAND, COMUSMACV

TO: GEN. WHEELER, CJCS
ADM SHARP, CINC PAC

REF: JCS 84816

1. IN REFERENCE YOU ASKED FOR MY COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE AND ATTRITIONAL COMPUTATIONS.

2. WITH REGARD TO SPECIFIC AREAS OF YOUR CONCERN, I SUBMIT THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS:

A. GUERRILLA'S - WE BELIEVE THAT THE SHIE FIGURE OF 72,000 - 90,000 GUERRILLAS WAS ABOUT RIGHT FOR 1 OCTOBER 1967. WE ESTIMATE 78,000 - 82,000 ON 1 JANUARY 1968 AND FROM 53,000 - 72,000 AS OF 1 APRIL 1968. THE DECLINE HAS BEEN DUE IN PART TO DIRECT CASUALTIES, BUT MOSTLY TO THE VC PRACTICE OF UPGRADING GUERRILLAS TO REPLACE MAIN AND LOCAL FORCE LOSSES - WE FAVOR THESE RATHER WIDE SPREADS TO ACCOUNT FOR THE ACCURACY PROBLEMS YOU MENTION. WE BELIEVE THAT OUR FIGURE COVERS ALL CATEGORIES OF GUERRILLAS WHICH REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT PART OF THE ENEMY THREAT, THAT IS, ALL VILLAGE AND HAMLET GUERRILLAS - AS COLONEL DAG STATES, THERE IS REALLY ONLY ONE KIND OF GUERRILLA - WE ARE ON SOUND GROUND HERE AND SHOULD SO REMAIN.

B. ATTRITION METHODOLOGY - THE IDEA THAT WE ALLOCATE ALL UNSYSCRIBABLE LOSSES AND GAINS TO GUERRILLAS IS A MISCONCEPTION OF MACV ATTRITION METHODOLOGY. THIS IS THE WAY WE GO ABOUT IT: WE CONSIDER ALL OF THE VARIOUS GAINS AND LOSSES CLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED REGRADING ARMY BY TAG PER ACCORDING TO ENEMY FORCES OVER A MONTH'S TIME.
ACT GAIN OR LOSS IN THIS OVERALL STRENGTH: THIS NET GAIN OR
LOSS IS THEN APPLIED TO THE PREVIOUS MONTH'S FIGURE TO PRODUCE
A NEW TOTAL STRENGTH: WE THEN DETERMINE HOW MUCH OF THE NEW
TOTAL IS REPRESENTED IN EACH OF THE VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF
FORCES: IN DOING THIS WE TRY TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE ENEMY'S
KNOWN PRACTICES IN REPLACING LOSSES THROUGH INFILTRATION AND
RECRUITMENT: FOR INSTANCE, WE KNOW THAT IN COUNTRY RECRUITS,
NORMALY BECOME GUERRILLAS FIRST, AND ARE LATER UPGRADED INTO
MAIN AND LOCAL FORCES AS THOSE FORCES REQUIRE REPLACEMENTS.
THE DRAIN ON THE GUERRILLA FORCES FROM THIS UPGRADE IS
INVERSELY PROPORTIONAL TO THE NUMBER OF INFILTRATORS ENTERING
COUNTRY DURING ANY GIVEN TIME SPAN: THE J2 MAKES A VALID ASSUMP-
TION THAT WHEN INFILTRATION OF REPLACEMENTS IS INSUFFICIENT TO
ACCOUNT FOR THE KNOWN STRENGTHS OF MAIN AND LOCAL FORCES, THE
DIFFERENCE HAS BEEN MADE UP BY A DRA\-DOWN ON THE GUERRILLAS.

THIS METHODOLOGY DOES NOT RESULT IN UNDERESTIMATING MAIN
AND LOCAL FORCES: NEITHER DOES IT RISK UNDUE REDUCING GUERRILLA
FORCES: SINCE WE EMPLOY ADDITIONAL METHODOLOGICAL CHECKS AND
BALANCES TO PREVENT IT: AS YOU NOW, WE RECEIVE REPORTS FROM
THE FIELD: IN MOST INSTANCES DOWN TO DISTRICT LEVEL: OF THE
TOTAL NUMBERS OF GUERRILLAS IN THE COUNTRY: TO DATE GUERRILLA
STRENGTHS DRAWN FROM THESE REPORTS (RITZ REPORTS) HAVE NOT
VARIED WIDELY FROM GUERRILLA FIGURES DERIVED THROUGH OUR ATTRI-
TION SYSTEM.

BOTH OF OUR METHODS INDICATE A SIGNIFICANT DECLINE IN
GUERRILLAS IN SOUTH VIETNAM: THIS IS BACKED UP BY NUMEROUS
ENEMY DOCUMENTS ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM OF "WEAKNESS OF THE
GUERRILLA MOVEMENT:": THE RALLIER, COLONEL DAC, ALSO TESTIFIES
TO THIS: IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT THE MONTHLY APPLICATION OF
OUR SYSTEM IS A BASIC PROBLEM EXCEPT PERHAPS WHEN THERE ARE

[Handwritten note: ...

[Classification: S3002... ]
GREAT FLUCTUATIONS IN ENEMY STRENGTHS BETWEEN REPORTING DATES, AS THERE WERE IN JAN AND FEB THIS YEAR.

C. POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE: WITH REGARD TO THIS CATEGORY OF STRENGTH, IT APPEARS THAT THE PROBLEM HAS BEEN ONE OF METHODOLOGY AND NOT OF DEFINITION. OUR MACV FIGURE IS THE SAME AS THE ONE AGREED UPON IN THE SNIE, AND INCLUDES, IN OUR VIEW, ALL SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE. IT INCLUDES MOSTLY RANK AND FILE SINCE THERE ARE UNLIKELY TO BE SOME 52,500 POLITICAL TYPES IN LEADERSHIP POSITIONS.

D. SELF DEFENSE AND ASSAULT YOUTH: AS YOU KNOW, THERE WAS AN ATTEMPT TO QUANTIFICATION OF THESE "OTHER COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS" IN THE SNIE. WE HAVE RESISTED ANY SUCH QUANTIFICATION ON THE GROUNDS THAT NO MEANINGFUL NUMBER COULD BE ASCRIBED TO SUCH ELEMENTS, AND ANY NUMBER SO ASCRIBED WOULD AUTOMATICALLY PROMOTE THEM TO AN IMPORTANCE FAR GREATER THAN THEY DESERVE. THE RALLIER, COLONEL DAC, STATED THAT HE HAD NEVER HEARD OF THE ASSAULT YOUTH AND DID NOT BELIEVE THAT ANY ONE IN THE VC HIERARCHY COULD PROVIDE A GOOD ESTIMATE OF THEIR NUMBER OF SELF DEFENSE PERSONNEL. HOWEVER, AS STATED IN THE SNIE, I.E., WITH AMPLITUDE CAVEATS, THIS FIGURE (52,000) APPEARS HARMLESS ENOUGH IF USED IN THE CONTEXT OF THAT ESTIMATE.

3. WE ARE ALWAYS READY TO REEXAMINE OUR INTELLIGENCE METHODOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS. I SUGGEST THAT CIA AND DIA SET FORTH IN DETAIL THEIR RECOMMENDED CHANGES NOT ONLY IN METHODOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS, BUT THE CHANGES IN ENEMY STRENGTHS WHICH WOULD RESULT. THIS STUDY WOULD THEN BE SENT TO CINCPAC AND MACV FOR THEIR COMMENTS. PERHAPS WE COULD REACH SOME AGREEMENT. IF NOT, YOU WOULD AT LEAST BE EQUIPPED WITH THE VARYING VIEWS OF THE DIFFERENT AGENCIES AND THUS PREPARED TO ARRIVE AT A CAREFUL AND EXPLORED POSITION.
3/25/67 CABLE FROM FOWLER TO BROWN
(DOD DOCUMENT 28)
IC INDICATED THEREIN. THE PRELIMINARY STUDY IS BASED ON TENUOUS METHODOLOGY. BECAUSE OF LACK OF DETAILED-COUNTRY-WIDE INFORMATION, EXTRAPOLATION AND CERTAIN ASSUMPTIONS HAVE HAD TO BE EMPLOYED. OUR PLANS ARE TO PURSUE STUDY IN GREATER DETAIL, TIME PERMITTING. TEAM'S PRESENT FEELING IS THAT POLITICAL ORDER OF BATTLE SHOULD, REPEAT SHOULD BE TREATED SEPARATELY AND NOT TALLIED WITH TOTAL ENEMY STRENGTH.

2. TEAM HAS PERFORMED CURSORY REVIEW OF POLITICAL ORDER OF BATTLE STUDY, IRREGULAR STRENGTH INCREases AND RECRUITING STUDY. OUR INITIAL IMPRESSION ON POLITICAL ORDER OF BATTLE IS THAT DEFINATE CHANGE IN PRESENTLY CARRIED 40,000 TOTAL IS WARRANTED BUT THAT DRAFT STUDY NOW BEING REVIEWED DOES NOT SUBSTANTiATE THE STRENGTH OF APPROX 85,000 INDICATED THEREIN. THE PRELIMINARY STUDY IS BASED ON TENUOUS METHODOLOGY. BECAUSE OF LACK OF DETAILED-COUNTRY-WIDE INFORMATION, EXTRAPOLATION AND CERTAIN ASSUMPTIONS HAVE HAD TO BE EMPLOYED. OUR PLANS ARE TO PURSUE STUDY IN GREATER DETAIL, TIME PERMITTING. TEAM'S PRESENT FEELING IS THAT POLITICAL ORDER OF BATTLE SHOULD, REPEAT SHOULD BE TREATED SEPARATELY AND NOT TALLIED WITH TOTAL ENEMY STRENGTH.
DOCUMENTATION SUBSTANTIATES INFRASTRUCTURE TO HAMLET-LEVEL BUT DOES NOT SUBSTANTIATE UNIFORM APPLICATIONS OF RATIONAL EMPLLOYED ON COUNTRY-WIDE BASIS. DOUBTFUL THAT MACV WILL HAVE POLITICAL JOB STRENGTH INCREASES AVAILABLE FOR COMMUNITY IN NEAR FUTURE. DATA FOR RETROACTIVE ADJUSTMENT OF POLITICAL UB APPEARS NOT AVAILABLE, BUT TEAM WILL STRESS NEED FOR TREND INDICATION CONSISTENT WITH REPORTING FOR LAST SIX MONTHS. INITIAL ATTEMPT BY MACV TO DETERMINE IRREGULAR STRENGTH SHOWS APPROXIMATELY 197,000, THIS TOTAL IS LESS THAN CIA IN-COUNTRY TEAM ESTIMATE. J2, MACV HAS RETURNED STUDY TO STAFF FOR FURTHER WORK, REFINEMENT, AND SUBSTANTIATION. A GREAT PORTION OF TOTAL COMES FROM ESTIMATES AND INFORMATION OBTAINED FOR SECTOR INTELLIGENCE ADVISORS. PLAN NOW CALLS FOR STUDY TO BE RETURNED TO EACH RESPECTIVE CORPS AND SECTOR FOR REVIEW AND SUBSTANTIATION OF ESTIMATES. TEAM HAS REQUESTED PERMISSION TO MAKE CHECK WITH SAMPLING OF SECTOR ADVISORS TO DETERMINE HOW THEIR ESTIMATES WERE DERIVED. RELATED PROBLEM ON ANY NEW TOTAL IS THAT SUFFICIENT INFORMATION ON WHICH TO BASE RETROACTIVE ADJUSTMENT OF TOTAL IRREGULAR STRENGTH HAS NOT BEEN UNCOVERED. ORIGINAL PLAN CALLED FOR CARRYING ANY NEW TOTAL ON STRAIGHT-LINE PROJECTION FROM DECEMBER 64 THROUGH PRESENT. THIS PLAN COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE TO J2, MACV AS WELL AS DIA TEAM. J2, MACV HAS INSTITUTED WORK TO DEVELOP REALISTIC READJUSTMENT OF ANY NEW FIGURE IN ORDER TO DEVELOP MEANINGFUL STRENGTH TREND. TEAM TOLD THAT WHEN MACV STUDY IS COMPLETED IT WILL BE FORWARDED TO DIA FOR COMMENTS PRIOR TO RELEASE.
JX 692

12/67, SOUTHEAST ASIA ANALYSIS REPORT (LBJ 5)
TABLE I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Old Estimate</th>
<th>New Estimate</th>
<th>New Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Gheel</td>
<td>Military Ghe</td>
<td>Total Gheel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VC</td>
<td>NVA</td>
<td>VC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Strength /</td>
<td>62,852</td>
<td>53,700</td>
<td>62,852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>116,552</td>
<td>110,700</td>
<td>116,552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Service</td>
<td>25,753</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregulars /</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secret Self Defense</td>
<td>73,173</td>
<td>155,475</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>122,750</td>
<td></td>
<td>155,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Cadre /</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(VC Infrastructure)</td>
<td>294,240</td>
<td>235,852</td>
<td>395,025-482,452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total All Categories</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Total and Military Force: Gheel Estimates} \\
\text{Old Estimate} & \quad \text{New Estimate} & \quad \text{New Estimate} \\
\text{Total Gheel} & \quad \text{Military Gheel} & \quad \text{Total Gheel} \\
\text{VC} & 62,852 & 62,852 & 62,852 \\
\text{NVA} & 53,700 & 53,700 & 53,700 \\
\text{Total} & 116,552 & 110,700 & 116,552 \\
\text{Administrative Service} & 25,753 & 32,000 & 35,000 \\
\text{Irregulars /} & \quad \text{Secret Self Defense} & \quad 155,475 \\
\text{Guerrillas} & 73,173 & 155,475 \\
\text{Total} & 122,750 & \text{ } & 155,475 \\
\text{Political Cadre /} & \quad \text{Total All Categories} & \quad 395,025-482,452 \\
\text{VC Infrastructure} & 294,240 & 235,852 & 395,025-482,452 \\
\end{align*}
\]

- The presentation and strength estimates used by MACV before 31 October 1967.
- The pre-31 October 1967 total Gheel presentation with the new estimates of administrative service, guerrillas and political cadre strength.
- MACV's new presentation, without self-defense, secret self-defense, and political cadre and his new strength estimates of administrative service and guerrilla strength.
- "The old data divided the 100,000 to 120,000 irregulars, roughly putting one-third of them into the guerrillas and the other two-thirds into self-defense and/or secret self-defense personnel." - MACV briefing on Enemy Order of Battle, 24 Nov 67.
- The self-defense forces provide a base for recruitment as well as for political and logistical support, but are not a fighting force comparable to the guerrillas. Although secret self-defense forces cause some casualties and damage, they do not represent a continual or dependable force and do not form a valid part of the enemy's military force. The political cadre (infrastructure) has no military function. - MACV briefing on Enemy Order of Battle, 24 Nov 67.
- Includes confirmed, probable, and possible.
Recent captured documents indicate that the guerrilla forces may be larger than previously estimated.\textsuperscript{b} MACV estimates that their current strength ranges from 70,000 to 90,000, much larger than its previous estimate of 33,000 to 40,000.\textsuperscript{b} Table 2 and Graph 1 show strength increasing steadily from December 1964 through December 1965, peaking at 125,200 and then declining sharply to 81,300 by October 1967. While this new estimate is an improvement over previous numbers, additional data in the future can be expected to modify it.

The old MACV estimate of 39,175 political cadre was based on an early GVN study. Although MACV has dropped this category from its military OB, it now estimates that political cadre have numbered between 75,000 and 85,000 since December 1964. (Its best estimate is 64,000.)

**Summary Effects of the Changes**

Column 3 of the Table 1 shows what happens when we place the new strength estimates into MACV's old format. If we assume that the self-defense and secret self-defense estimates have not changed (MACV did not revise the figures) we get a total strength of 395,052, about 100,000 greater than the old estimate and about 160,000 greater than the new estimate. If we assume that secret self-defense and self-defense forces still constitute two-thirds of the irregular forces\textsuperscript{c}, we get an estimate of about 480,000 VC/NVA, or twice the new military OB estimate. Thus the new estimate is 395,000 - 480,000 on a basis comparable to the old 294,000. The computations do not show that enemy strength has increased, but that previous estimates of enemy strength were too low.

The new MACV retrospective estimates of VC/NVA strength are presented above in Table 2 and Graph 1. They show a peak VC/NVA military strength of about 291,000 in December 1966 on a quarterly basis (strength actually peaked in October 1966 at 283,000) sharply declining to about 238,000 by October 1967, an average of 4,300 net losses per month. The 45,000 guerrilla decline accounts for 94\% of the total reported drop of 48,000. We note, however, that the Hamlet Evaluation System, from March to August 1967, reports a net increase of only five hamlets where the guerrilla's military control has been broken.

**Definitions**

MACV's definitions of the enemy's forces included in the old and new estimates are provided below.

\textsuperscript{a} For example, enemy documents (CDEC Log 01-2552-67, 02-1846-67 and 05-1704-67) captured in January and May 1967 suggest that guerrilla strength was between 150,000 and 180,000 at the outset of 1966.

\textsuperscript{b} "The old data divided the 100,000 to 120,000 irregulars, roughly putting one-third of them into the guerrillas and the other two-thirds into self-defense and secret self-defense personnel." - MACV briefing on Enemy Order of Battle, 24 November 1967.

\textsuperscript{c} See footnote \textsuperscript{d}, Table 2.
NEW RETROSPECTIVE ESTIMATE
OF VC/NVA ORDER OF BATTLE STRENGTH

Total

Combat

Guerrilla

Admin Ser

Definitions of Enemy Forces Included in the OB

Combat: Combat forces are the enemy's maneuver and combat support units. Maneuver units are infantry, armor, security, support and reconnaissance elements of platoon level upward regardless of subordination. Combat support units are those fire support, air defense and technical service units organized at battalion level and above, and not classified under administrative service. Separate fire support companies are classed as combat support.

Administrative Service: Military personnel in identified COSVN, military region, military subregion, province, and district staffs, and rear service technical units of all types directly subordinate to the headquarters.

Irregulars: These are organized forces composed of guerrillas, self defense and secret self defense elements subordinate to village and hamlet level VC organizations. These forces perform a wide variety of missions in the support of VC activities and, in fact, provide a training and mobilization base for the VC maneuver and combat support forces. Guerrillas are full-time forces organized into squads and Platoons which do not always stay in their home village or hamlet. Typical missions for guerrillas are collection of taxes, propaganda, protection of village party committees, and terrorist and sabotage activities. Self Defense Forces are a VC para-military structure responsible for the defense of hamlet and village areas controlled by the VC. These forces do not leave their home area, and they perform their duties on a part-time basis. Duties consist of conducting propaganda, constructing fortifications, and defending home areas. Secret Self Defense Forces are a clandestine VC organization which performs the same general function in GVN controlled villages and hamlets as do the self defense forces in VC controlled areas. Their operations involve intelligence collection as well as sabotage and propaganda activities.

Viet Cong Infrastructure: The Viet Cong infrastructure or political cadre is designed as the political and administrative organization through which the Viet Cong control or seek to control the South Vietnamese people. It embodies the party (People's Revolutionary Party) control structure, which includes a command and administrative apparatus (Central Office South Vietnam) at the national level, and the leadership and administration of a parallel front organization (National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam), both of which extend from the national through the hamlet level.

Source: MACV Monthly Order of Battle Summary, 31 August 1967.
11/15/67, CIA MEMORANDUM RE: CONTROVERSIAL JUDGMENTS IN THE SNIE (CIA #308)
MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Potentially Controversial Judgments or Data Holding Changes in 14.3-67

1. Infiltration:

Agreed figures for CY 1966 are:

- Accepted: 55,000
- Possible: 31,000
- Total: 86,000

Thus far in CY 1967 (through 30 September) agreed totals are:

- Accepted: 23,000
- Possible: 12,000
- Total: 35,000

Judgment made in estimate (paragraph 12) is that:

"Infiltration thus far in 1967 totals about 35,000 in all categories (accepted and possible). Allowing for the probability that later information will raise these figures, and extrapolating, it now appears that total infiltration for 1967 will be no more than last year's and possibly somewhat less. We estimate that some 65 to 75 percent of the infiltration will probably consist of replacement personnel for existing units. The remainder will probably include seven to nine organized regiments which will add to the Communist force structure but not necessarily their total military strength, because losses have resulted in generally lower unit strengths. There still appears to be no clear-cut seasonal pattern in infiltration or any significant indication that Hanoi is unwilling to dispatch additional men and units to South Vietnam."
There is no major controversy here, but individual infiltration is becoming more difficult to count, particularly in units that move back and forth across the DMZ.

2. Current Strengths:

14.3 changes both the figures and the format of current holdings. A copy of MACV's current (30 October) OB is attached. The estimate's changes are outlined below:

a. Regular (Main and Local) Forces: MACV holds 116,700 as of 30 October. Estimate says (para 25 and Table 3):

- NVA 54,000
- VC Main and Local 64,000
- Total 118,000

This figure fluctuates constantly. The discrepancy between MACV's figure and the NIE does not reflect a controversy.

b. Administrative Services: These (also called Support personnel) are now carried at 25,653.

The estimate (para 27) raises this holding to "at least 35-40,000 Administrative Service personnel in South Vietnam." This does not include Support personnel in Laos, Cambodia or immediately north of the DMZ. Furthermore, as indicated by the "at least," this figure in the estimate is a floor threshold, not an encompassing range. This has been an area of controversy.

c. Guerrillas and Other Paramilitary Elements:

The current MACV holdings carry an "irregular" figure of 112,760, which was encompassed by the old range of 100-120,000, carried in 14.3-66. This figure includes both guerrillas and other irregular elements (Self Defense and Secret Self Defense). The figure has been assumed to be
made up of 1/3 guerrillas and 2/3 "others," i.e., the actual implied holdings have been:

Guerrillas: 33,333 - 40,000  
Others: 66,667 - 80,000

14.3-67 carries (para 30) a range estimate of 70-90,000 for the guerrillas only. It does not quantify any current estimate for the others, though it does say (para 36) that some documents suggest that in early 1966 the Self Defense forces (alone) were on the order of 150,000. (The full text of para 36 is attached hereto.) MACV explicitly did not want any quantified estimate of these "other" paramilitary elements' current size. We attempted to evolve a compromise which avoided a specific current number, but indicated that the reader should be thinking in six digits.

This guerrilla/irregular estimate is another major source of potential controversy. Note particularly that the new guerrilla figure (70-90,000) is not a reduction of the old "paramilitary" figure (112,760) but, instead, an increase in that figure's guerrilla component (33,333 - 40,000).

d. Political Cadre: Old estimate (i.e., current MACV holding): 39,175. (NIE 14.3-66 said 40,000.) This is based on an old, out-dated and never accurate GVN figure.

14.3-67, on the political organization, says: "Its numbers are large -- with a hard core estimated at about 75,000 - 85,000 -- but more important is the wide geographical extent of its power and the dedication and effectiveness of its personnel." We regard the 75-85,000 figure a distinct improvement over the old figure but consider it subject to further analysis and refinement. The term "hard core" is intended to suggest that there are others who do not appear in this figure.

3. Communist Losses:

No controversy in this area. For 1966 all losses estimated at 103,000, and for 1967 we estimate comparable figure will be 170,000. [Table 3]

Problem area is that these totals cannot be applied to individual components, i.e., regular forces, guerrillas, etc.
4. VC Manpower Inputs:

Some controversy over recruitment level for this year. NIE’s estimate of what recruitment was last year -- 7,000 per month -- agreed to by MACV.

MACV estimates 3,500 per month for first half of 1967, and is revising downward for last half. NIE estimates recruitment between 3,000 and 5,000 per month for all of 1967. This is based on our evaluation of the MACV study.

GAC: mee
Copy No. 2 - Destroyed
Copy No. 3 - GAC Chrono
Copy No. 4 - VAS Chrono
COMMUNIST GROUND FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(MACV Figures As Of 30 October 1967)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulars</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NVA</td>
<td>53,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC Main Force/Local Force</td>
<td>62,902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>116,702</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Administrative Services | 25,653 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Irregulars</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>112,760</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note: about 1/3 of these are guerrillas, and 2/3 belong to either the self defense or secret self defense forces.)

| Political Order of Battle | 39,175 |
36. Our current evidence does not enable us to estimate the present size of these groups (self-defense, secret self-defense, the "Assault Youth," or other similar VC organizations) with any measure of confidence. Some documents suggest that in early 1966 the aggregate size of the self-defense force was on the order of 150,000. This force and the other groups, however, have unquestionably suffered substantial attrition since that time, as well as an appreciable decline in quality, because of losses, recruiting of some of their members into the guerrillas or other VC military components and, particularly, the shrinkage in VC control of populated areas. Though in aggregate numbers these groups are still large and constitute a part of the overall Communist effort, they are not offensive military forces. Hence, they are not included in the military order of battle total. Nevertheless, some of their members account for a part of the total Communist military losses.
# TABLE 5

## ESTIMATED COMMUNIST LOSSES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1967 (Estimated Total) (^a/)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed-in-Action</td>
<td>55,500</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanently Lost from Wounds</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>31,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Returnees</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>21,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisoners</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deserters</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>21,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>103,000(^b/)</strong></td>
<td><strong>170,000(^b/)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** About 1/8 of these are government, and 7/8 belong to either the self-defense or secret self-defense forces.

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\(^a/\) The 1967 estimated totals are the projections of averages of Communist losses during the first 9 months of 1967.

\(^b/\) These totals include not only Regular military forces and guerrillas, but also an unknown number of other Communist elements such as self-defense, secret self-defense forces, assault youth, etc.
9/11/67, DCI CABLE TO CARVER RE SNEIE DISCUSSIONS
(CIA #952)
TO PRIORITY SAIGON
FOR [FROM]

RE SAIG 1826 (IN-49006), AGREE YOU SHOULD REMAIN UNTIL YOU HAVE HAD SESSION WITH BOTH WESTMORELAND AND KOMER. PLEASE LET ME KNOW OUTCOME, AND PLEASE CLEAR WITH ME YOUR DEPARTURE FROM SAIGON. IN OTHER WORDS, TEAM SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT LEAVE FOR WASHINGTON UNTIL WE GIVE APPROVAL.

(END OF MESSAGE)
9/13/67, DCI CABLE TO CARVER (CIA #954)
OPERATIONAL BACKGROUND

SICK

(MONDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1985, PARAGRAPH 12)

WHOEVER SUBMITTED A REQUEST FOR EXTENDED SICK, IF YOU WANT TO WAIT UNTIL 15 SEPTEMBER, THAT IS ENTIRELY UP TO YOU. WIVES WILL BE LOST.

(END OF MESSAGE)

C/3 Comment: Messrs. Moar and Hyland have reservations leave 14 September; Funaro (11) has reservation for 16 September, but will not leave until concurs.

Approved for Release
Date 28 SEP 1983
4/10/67, BARRIE WILLIAMS MEMO—TRIP REPORT (DB-2C066)
Trip Report


2. **(U) Dates and Places Visited:** MACV J2, 15 March-3 April 1967; Defense Liaison Office, Hong Kong, 3-4 April 1967; CINCPAC J2, 3-4 April 1967.

3. **(U) Composition of Party:** Mr. G. C. Fowler, Jr., Major J. Barrie Williams, Captain Timothy J. Harrington, Mr. Walter E. Hancock, Eastern Area Office (DIAAP-4).

4. **(U) Purpose of Trip:** To resolve statistical differences in reported enemy-initiated battalion-size or larger attacks compiled from the OP-REP-5 Weekly Summary Reports and the J2 MACV PERINTREP, and related issues of operational/intelligence reporting, criteria, definitions, and procedures as directed by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, specific questions, relating to enemy order of battle in South Vietnam and estimative procedures being employed by J2 MACV were posed for answer by the DIADR.

5. **(U) Persons Contacted:**

   - **MACV**
     - M/Gen McChristian, J2
     - M/Gen Rosson
     - B/Gen DeSobry, SA 4th Corps
     - Col Lancaster, Chief Intel Division
     - LtCol Morgan, J2 Estimates
     - LtCol Hawkins, Chief OB Br, Intel Div
     - Other J2/J3 Staff, KV N08 Personnel and Advisory Personnel

   - **CINCPAC**
     - Captain McElwain, Deputy J2
     - Other J2 Staff

   - **HONG KONG**
     - LtCol Phillips
     - Maj Athens

6. **(U) Facts and Discussion:**

   a. Statistical differences in operational and intelligence reporting AP-4 of enemy-initiated battalion-size or larger attacks: A basic statistical divergence existed in the enemy large scale attacks reported in the OP-REP-5 Weekly Summary and the tabulation appearing in the J2 MACV January PERINTREP.
In an attempt to resolve these differences and determine the implications, if any, of the different totals, a joint J3/DIA/CINCPAC Team examined the problems in detail. The data relating to enemy attacks were examined together with the source of this data, criteria, reporting procedures, and sources of information. An additional examination of reporting techniques and procedures was conducted by two team members on a field visit to the MACV Advisory Group to the ARVN 4th Corps. Deficiencies were found in the implementation of JCS OP-REP-5 reporting procedures. In this connection it was found that although the OP-REP-5 reporting instructions provided for a paragraph on statistical data under each Corps area entitled "Part IV - VC Initiated Actions (Large Scale)," the paragraph was consistently published as "NONE." Data available at the time of submission of OP-REP-5 did show large scale attacks but these data were carried only in the narrative portion of the weekly OP-REP-5 and were not entered in the statistical data. An additional shortcoming in the system was that large-scale attacks reported to MACV after the report submission for a given time period but which occurred during the period of that report were not regularly covered by MACV in the narrative portion of subsequent OP-REP-5's. No updating of information was being accomplished. The detailed examination of the MACV related data on enemy-initiated attacks for January 1967 revealed that the definitions used by J2 MACV (as approved by the CINCPAC Intelligence Conference) produced data which carried a misleading implication. The enemy initiated battalion-size or large attacks as reported in the J2 MACV PERINTREP for January were not the product of refined data and were not evaluated as to significance. The need for such an evaluation was apparent. This led to the development of criteria to assist in evaluating the significance of reported enemy attacks (see Tab A for criteria). A reevaluation of the January PERINTREP attack data employing the new criteria is shown in Tab B. Future MACV OP-REP-5's will report "significant" large scale attacks under Part IV of the statistical data for each Corps area. The OP-REP-5's will also be updated. The MACV monthly PERINTREP's will include a description and evaluation of significant enemy attacks.

b. The information obtained from MACV on the specific questions posed by the DIADE are covered in the tabs as indicated:

Tab C - Increase in Enemy Irregular Strength.
Tab D - Increase in Enemy Political Order of Battle.
Tab E - MACV Combat Effectiveness Rating System.
Tab F - MACV Match List/Dropping Units from Order of Battle.
Tab G - Base Area Neutralization.
Tab H - Viet Cong In-Country Recruiting.
Tab I - Viet Cong Losses (DOW, Permanently Incapacitated).

7. (SECRET) Discussions with J2 MACV:

a. During the exit debriefing by the DIA Team with MajGen McChristian, he agreed that in the future any radical changes in procedures, such as
the irregular strength and political strength changes, will be forwarded to DIA for comments and concurrence/nonconcurrence prior to release.

b. The J2 was in full agreement with the recommendation of the DIABE the six-month time lag should be shown in all averages relating to NVA infiltration into SVN. This was implemented in the 1 April 1967 monthly report.

c. The team requested that a reevaluation be made of Viet Cong in-country recruitment. The J2 stated that the 7000/month figure was a "capability," and that a reevaluation would be accomplished as more information becomes available.

d. The J2 was not in favor of treating Political order of battle separate from other enemy strengths. He contend[ed] that the Political structure is an integral part of the enemy's strength and must be accounted for in assessing the elements considered as a threat which must be destroyed.

8. (G) A debrief of Mr. Fowler was conducted at CINCPAC by Captain McKiernan, Deputy J2, on 3 April 1967. The discussion covered in general the points raised at MACV and the reasons for the 1 April change in reporting infiltration monthly averages. Due to the forthcoming turnover in CINCPAC, J2 personnel, the value of this debrief was questionable.

9. (G) A liaison visit was conducted with the Defense Liaison Office, Hong Kong BCC and Chinese order of battle information passed back to DIAAP-4 on request of LtCol Phillips. This is a useful stop enabling exchange of ideas and information between liaison personnel and working analysts and should be encouraged on all future trips. Appropriate occasions.

MR. GEORGE C. FOWLER, JR.
GS-14
DIAAP-4
## COMPARISON OF STATISTICS

### VC/NVA Initiated Large-Scale Attacks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>OPREP 5</th>
<th>MACV PERINTREP</th>
<th>NEW CRITERIA*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966 Feb</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Sep</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Oct</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967 Jan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>38/33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* COMUSMACV assessment using new criteria.
INCREASE IN IRREGULAR STRENGTH

Initial attempts by MACV to determine the strength of irregulars resulted in an estimated figure of 197,000. The total was based mainly on estimates and Sector Intelligence Advisor (Ritz) reports. This study has not been approved by MACV and has been returned to each respective Corps and sector for review and substantiation of the estimates. The subject was also to be addressed in a conference held at MACV April 5-8, 1967 with both US and ARVN personnel in attendance.

A related problem to the acceptance of this figure or any new total is that sufficient information on which to base a retroactive adjustment of total irregular strength has not as yet been uncovered. Due to the lack of any definitive information, the original plan called for carrying any new total on a straight line projection from December 1964 to the present. This plan was unacceptable to DIA as well as to J-2 MACV who has directed that a realistic retroactive readjustment of any new strength figure be developed in order to portray a meaningful strength trend. When this study has been completed and approved by MACV, it will be forwarded to DIA for comments prior to release.
MACV's draft study on enemy Political order of battle, along with supporting documentation, was reviewed by the DIA Team. Although it is felt that a definite increase in the infrastructure total of 40,000 presently being carried is warranted, the draft study seemed to be based on tenuous methodology and did not validly substantiate the strength of approximately 88,000 indicated therein. Because of a lack of detailed country-wide information, extrapolation and a number of assumptions were employed in the study. Documentation substantiates infrastructure to hamlet level but does not substantiate uniform application of the rationale and structure employed in the study on a country-wide basis. Information is scarce upon which any new totals can be retroactively adjusted. When a final MACV study is completed it will be forwarded to DIA for comments prior to release. It is doubtful that a Political order of battle strength increase will be available in the near future.
TABLE

COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS

The system developed by MACV for evaluating the combat effectiveness of enemy units has not been in existence long enough to make a valid judgment as to the validity of the ratings given each element. A check by the DIA team indicated that there are many areas in which the units are given rating upon which there is no available information. By necessity these areas can only be evaluated as "unknown." The system is so designed that a unit is never evaluated higher than its lowest grade in a given area of evaluation. The Combat Effectiveness ratings are a tool for the tactical commander in that they give him some idea of what may be expected from the enemy units in a given area of operation. The fact that a unit is rated as "not combat-effective" (C-4) cannot always be a guide to that unit's ability to fight. An example of this was recently demonstrated during Operation JUNCTION CITY in Tay Ninh Province. The 272 Viet Cong Regiment, whose three subordinate battalions were rated marginally combat-effective (C-3), not combat-effective (C-4), and marginally combat-effective (C-3), respectively, sustained a 24-hour contact with US elements during the Operation.

The inherent danger in the Combat-Effectiveness system of evaluating enemy units at the strategic level is that the system
could lead to a gross underestimation of the enemy's ability to continue the conflict.

The teams check of this system merely substantiated the original feelings expressed by DIA when the system was first developed. It is a tool for the tactical commander, but should not be used as a judgment of enemy capabilities at national level.
BASE AREAS

Base areas can be considered denied to the enemy in whole or in part, when they are penetrated by friendly forces in strength. In order to be completely neutralized, the area must be permanently occupied, as evidence shows that the enemy can be expected to return to any base area following the withdrawal of friendly forces. Any installations which were destroyed are then rebuilt and supplies which were captured or destroyed are replenished. MACV J2 also holds a base area to be neutralized if it has been abandoned, which in turn removes it from the base area category. Before any area can be dropped from a "base area update study," the reasons for doing so must be explained to and be approved by the J2 MACV.

A friendly operation conducted in a base area environ will cause temporary neutralization only for the length of time that operation is being conducted in that area. These areas will continue to be denied the enemy as long as superior friendly forces occupy them or when any portion of an enemy base area is included in the tactical area of responsibility of a friendly operation.

Applying the above criteria, the percentage of base areas denied the enemy may be computed for a given period in time.
In the past, the criteria for dropping units from order of battle was one-year without contact. This criteria is no longer being used, and in actuality there is no set time-frame for a unit's existence without contact as a criteria for elimination from order of battle.

The tool presently being used is the MACV Watch List. Under this system, if a unit is not contacted or reconfirmed during a 90-day period it is placed on the Watch List. After placement on the list the list is then sent to the field where an intensified collection project is initiated. Any information uncovered on the unit is then spot-reported to J2 MACV. After 90 days on the Watch List without reconfirming information, the unit is subject to elimination from order-of-battle; however, such elimination is not automatic. A detailed evaluation of all available information plus an analysis of the activity in the unit's usual area of operation is conducted by the Corps analyst before a recommendation is made for elimination of the unit or retention in order-of-battle.

Since firm information is available on a unit before it is picked up in order-of-battle, MACV is reluctant to drop units based upon a lack of information or contact for a few months once they have been added to order-of-battle.
However, this figure should not be used as a tool for measurement of progress nor as a valid reflection of Allied combat success. It may be raised or lowered depending upon the number of friendly operations currently being conducted in portions of enemy base areas.

MACV J2 indicated that MACV J3 may be utilizing some invalid statistics on the percentage of area neutralized. These figures could have been derived from the amount of equipment captured, enemy combat fatalities, facilities and supplies destroyed etc., rather than applying the rule of either permanent or temporary occupancy of an enemy base area.
VC IN-COUNTRY RECRUITMENT

CICV documentation for Annex F to the CINCPAC Intelligence Conference Report, as pertains to local recruitment, was examined in detail. Of the six documents used as a basis for the country-wide extrapolation process which MACV used in arriving at their estimate of 7,000 local recruits per month during 1966, two related to goals during 1966, three related to actual recruitment during 1965, and one portrayed actual recruitment for the 1st half of 1966. Copies of the documents, or extracts/summaries thereof, were obtained from CICV for DIA analysis. While it is now generally agreed that the enemy made a concentrated effort in recruiting early in 1966 and that the recruiting rate of about 7,000 per month may have been relatively accurate, this rate does not seem realistic for late 1966 and 1967 in view of information indicating recruiting difficulties. It is therefore considered that the 1967 recruiting rate of 7,000 per month as projected by MACV in Annex F cannot be substantiated by current evidence. Reevaluation by MACV has been requested.
DIED OF WOUNDS AND PERMANENTLY DISABLED

Reference para E 2a (2) and para E 2b, Section V of the CINCPAC Intelligence Conference and para C, Section V of Annex F thereto, the DIA team discussed methodology and rationale for the wounded in action (WIA)/Died of Wounds (DOW)/Permanently Disabled statistical rates with representatives of the J2 Estimates Branch and US medical personnel of CICV who also provided copies of their updated study ST 67-018, "Medical Causes of Non-Effectiveness Among VC and NVA Troops." It was noted that the portion of this study which relates to DOW and Permanently Disabled was based on limited documentation and was at some variance with the percentages for losses from wounds as stated in Annex F. Copies of pertinent documentation for the CIVC study were obtained for DIA analysis. Due to absence of the originator of the percentages contained in Annex F, the team was unable to obtain methodology upon which they were based. J2 Estimates Branch personnel have stated they will follow-up on the matter. Annex F states that DOW and Permanently Disabled are 35% of those KIA (body count). This is arrived at after application of a 10% death during evacuation loss to the total WIA, followed by a 2% death rate at the hospital, followed by a 13% Permanently Disabled or long-range loss rate from those remaining. To construe the above percentages as totaling 25%
TAB I Continued

of the WIA is erroneous because the percentages for each step are applied to a decreasing number; the overall DOW/Permanently Disabled percentage of WIA then amounts to 23%. Accepting a 1.5 WIA to 1 KIA rate, the DOW/Permanently Disabled percentage of 35% of total KIA equates to 23% of the total WIA.
8/19/67, CABLE FROM GODDING TO PETERSON (DB-2C1 050)
FROM:  B GEN G. A. GODDING, DIA WASH D.C.

TO:  MAJ GEN C. G. PETERSON, J-2 CINCPAC

INFO:  B GEN P. B. DAVIDSON, J-2 MACV

SECRET/THIS ONLY BLAAF-44A AUG 67

REF:  MACY 7609 EYES ONLY.

AT THE 130000 BRIEFING OF THE CHAIRMAN JCS, GEN WHEELER CONCEIVED IN THE MACY APPROACH THAT THE SD AND SSD NOT BE INCLUDED IN THE OVERALL TOTAL FIGURE. HE FURTHER STATED THAT DOD COULD ACCEPT SOMETHING HIGHER FIGURES IN THE GUERRILLA AND ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES IF PUSHED BY JIA. GEN WHEELER'S RATIONALE FOR BARGAINING WITH JIA ON THE HIGHER FIGURES FOR GUERRILLAS WAS THAT IN ISOLATING THE ARMED IRREGULARS THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY THAT ALL WERE NOT ISOLATED. FURTHER, IN SUPPORTING A HIGHER FIGURE FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, GEN WHEELER SAID THAT A 6 TO 7,000 PERSONNEL INCREASE AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL SOUNES REASONABLE.

THE PRESENT SCHEDULE OF EVENTS INDICATES THAT THE NIE WILL NOT BE PUT TO BED UNTIL 1 SEPTEMBER. IF THE FIGURE
420,000 has leaked in Saigon, the Principals in Washington could address the NIE figures sooner, if energized by the Saigon Community.

DIA is in accord with the MACV figures, format, and rationale. Gen Carroll indicated he will support MACV in the USB meeting.

Recommend that you contact CAS and Embassy and have them convey to Washington the Saigon feeling - that is if they support the MACV position.

There are no agreed figures at the Washington level. The figures are still being argued at the working level. The regular forces figure has been adopted for the NIE.

There has been no contact with the Public Affairs people and it is not contemplated until such time as an agreed figure is arrived at by the Principals. At this time it will be stressed that any release be coordinated with MACV or that MACV make the initial release.

I have discussed your MAC 7809 with Gen Brown. A Gen Wheeler to Gen Westmoreland message will more than likely be dispatched Monday.

At the 18 August working level meeting the CIA rationale became very clear. Their approach is to justify previous-
DISCUSSED HIGH STRENGTHS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
AND GUERRILLAS WHICH THEY SURFACED IN THE WASHINGTON
AREA (PROBABLY BASED ON INITIAL MACV STUDY BRIEFED IN MAY).

THEREFORE, THEY DISCOUNT THE VALIDITY OF THE MACV RITZ
PROGRAM AND LOCAL SURVEYS AS BEING INCOMPLETE AND PROPOSE
MUCH HIGHER FIGURES BASED ON THE FEW AVAILABLE ENEMY
DOCUMENTS EXPANDED TO ENCOMPASS THE ENTIRE SUN. SPECIFICALLY,
CIA IS PROPOSING: ADMIN SV - "ON THE ORDER OF 50,000 AND
COULD BE HIGHER." GUERRILLAS - "CANNOT BE LESS THAN
65,000" - AND "ESTIMATE THAT THE NUMBER IS IN THE 80,000
TO 120,000 RANGE." — SP-1.

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS: DELIVER ASAP DURING DUTY HOURS.