Q. Did you yourself formulate estimates for the enemy's guerrilla, self-defense and secret self-defense forces?

A. Yes, I formulated estimates for the guerrilla forces and for the militia forces, covering the periods '66 through May, at least, of 1968.

Q. Were these reports forwarded to your supervisor or superior?

A. Well, some of them were. Some of the information that I was preparing -- some of the estimates I prepared for a specific conference, like the OB conferences in August and September of, I think, 1967, and again for the conference in 1968.

Also, I prepared a specific estimate or estimates during the negotiations over the SNIE in October.

Other than that, I maintained a document, which I would update on about a monthly basis, as I recall, showing the changes in the guerrilla and militia forces.

Some of those were passed on to my superiors, some of them were not.

Q. Mr. Parry, what types of security clearance did you have when you were working at the Agency?

A. I know I had top secret-eyes only and certain code words. I really can't recall exactly what all that code word intelligence clearances related to.
I know we got some NSA things, cables. I didn't know of anything that other people were getting that I wasn't getting, but that doesn't mean it wasn't possible.

Q. Mr. Parry, I would like to focus now on one subdivision of the category of enemy strength which you called guerrillas.

Let me begin by asking you whether in the fall of 1967 you personally formulated an estimate of total enemy guerrilla strength in South Vietnam?

A. Before that time period?

Q. Fall of 1967, Yes.

A. Yes, I did.

Q. What was that estimate?

A. The CIA estimate, South Vietnamese branch estimate for that time period was between 110 and 120 village and hamlet secret guerrillas.

Q. Do you recall what figure MACV was officially reporting for total enemy guerrilla strength in its monthly order of battle reports during that same time period, that is in fall 1967?

A. My recollection is that in September/October of 1967 the MACV order of battle for guerrillas was on the magnitude of 82,000, I think, and then through the fall it dropped to 71, 72,000 by the end of the year.

Q. At that time did you form an opinion as to the
accuracy of the enemy guerrilla strength totals contained
in the MACV order of battle report?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. What was that, if any?
A. My opinion was that they were way too low, that
they could not be based on the documentary evidence or the
evidence --
Q. Why was that?
A. The reason being was that the evidence was there.
We had the same evidence that MACV had and if you paid any
attention to those documents, those captured enemy
documents, you could not come up with the type of estimate
that they were coming up with.
They were also irrational. Provinces would stay
the same. I mean, you would have an estimate of 611
guerrillas and it would stay that way, or they may lose one
or two.
Just based on the evidence, they seemed to have
no foundation. They were certainly not something that I
relied on and they were not anything that I hope the
policymakers or field commanders would rely on.
Q. Why do you say that?
MR. DORSEN: Objection, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
A. Because the purpose of an order of battle as to
give the policymakers and the people who are fighting the
war a true assessment of the enemy force, and if they
relied on the MACV order of battle, they would not know the
enemy that they were going to meet.

They would be unprepared, they wouldn't know
what type of responses to make, and I think the best
e example of that is Tet. Relying on the SNIE --

THE COURT: I don't think you're answering the
question.

Why don't you go onto the next question.

MR. DUKER: Yes, your Honor.

Q. Mr. Parry, let me turn now to the period of
January 1968 and ask you whether at that time you
formulated an estimate of the total strength of the enemy's
guerrilla forces?

A. For January 1968, yes.

Q. What was your estimate at that time?

A. My estimate at that time was still between 110,
120,000, but it was at the high range, maybe even higher
than 120,000.

Q. Do you recall the figure MACV was officially
reporting at that time, that is January, 1968?

A. My recollection is that it was approximately
72,000.

Q. At the end of February, 1968, following the Tet
offensive of 1968, did you personally formulate an estimate of the enemy's guerrilla strength?

A. Yes.

Q. What was your estimate at that time?

A. My estimate at that time was between 110, 120 -- 100 and 110. It dropped because of the Tet offensive. Approximately 110.

Q. Do you recall what MACV was officially reporting in its order of battle reports during that period, that is towards the end of February 1968?

A. Yes, MACV's order of battle was in the magnitude of 50,000 -- 50,000.

Q. Did your research indicate that sort of decline in the enemy's guerrilla forces?

A. No. My research did not indicate such a decline in the enemy forces.

Q. Let me focus now, Mr. Parry, on the other category, subcategory, that is the self defense and secret self-defense forces.

While you were working in the South Vietnam branch during 1967 and 1968, was there, in your opinion, sufficient intelligence available on the enemy's self defense and secret self-defense forces for you to be able to formulate an estimate of total strength for self defense and secret self-defense forces?
A. In my opinion, there was.

Q. In the fall of 1967 did you personally formulate an estimate for the total strength of the enemy's self defense and secret self-defense forces?

A. Yes.

Q. What was that estimate?

A. Approximately 120,000 in the secret self-defense and self-defense militia.

THE COURT: You say that is a combined figure, 120, the two combined?

THE WITNESS: For the two groups, yes.

Q. Mr. Parry, in your opinion, was there sufficient evidence at that time, that is in the fall of 1967, to support the position that an estimate for self defense and secret self-defense could not be formulated with any measure of competence?

A. The documents that reported on guerrilla strengths generally reported on militia strengths. There was the same evidence available to make an estimate as to the strength of the militia as there was to formulate an estimate as to the strength of the self defense -- excuse me, the guerrillas and the self defense, same evidence, same type of evidence. If you can do one you can do the other. Yes, you could do it.

Q. Mr. Parry, do you recall what figure MACV was
reporting in the fall of 1967 for the total strength of the enemy's self defense and secret self-defense forces?

A. In the August order of battle, I think I mentioned before, MACV had a combined category called the irregulars, which included guerrillas and the self-defense militia.

After the Saigon conference in September, all of the self-defense militia were dropped from the order of battle and they only carried a figure for the guerrillas.

Q. Were you aware at that time of any evidence that supported the removal of those forces?

A. I was not aware of any evidence which would support such a removal.

Q. Mr. Parry, when you were working in the South Vietnam branch in 1967 and 1968, did you form an opinion as to whether the enemy's self defense and secret self-defense forces posed a military threat to our forces in South Vietnam?

A. Yes, I had an opinion.

Q. What was that opinion?

A. That opinion was that they posed -- certainly posed a threat to the American servicemen fighting in South Vietnam.

Q. In what ways did they pose a military threat?

A. They inflicted casualties on the American
servicemen. They planted mines, bombs, booby traps, pungi
sticks and they shot rifles, and they did all of those
things which, according to one cable, inflicted, I think it
was 30 percent of the casualties on the American soldiers.

This is what the self defense, the secret
self-defense militia was doing. If they were inflicting
that many casualties on the American soldiers, I believe it
was important to include them in the order of battle.

Q. While you were working in the South Vietnam
branch in 1967 and 1968, did you do any research on the
extent to which the self defense and secret self-defense
forces were armed?

A. Yes.

Q. What did your research indicate?

A. My research indicated that they were armed, that
usually a militia platoon or squad would have a few weapons.
They would be used, as I mentioned earlier, to train the
other members of the militia.

But that other weapons were available during
times of engagement with the Americans, so that rifles
could be passed out from the district arsenals, and if they
did not have a rifle, they had all of these other things
that were inflicting casualties.

Q. During that same time period, 1967 and 1968, did
you do any research on the composition of these forces, and

self defense and secret self-defense forces?

A. If I understand your question correctly, yes.

Q. Well, let me sharpen the question. By composition I mean the age, the section, the demographics of this group?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. What did your research on that subject indicate?

A. My research indicated that they contained a majority of able-bodied male individuals. They included some older men, some younger men, and they included a number of women that were also able-bodied; and that they did comprise a force which in its total, its age, the other things that were important to evaluate, was of high-fighting quality, or at least it was of a quality necessary to perform the function which the Vietcong had for the militia forces.

Q. During that same period of time, did you form an opinion as to whether or not the self defense and secret self-defense forces should be included in the order of battle?

A. Yes.

Q. What was your opinion?

A. That they should be.

Q. Why was that?

A. Because they were part of the enemy, and if you
were going to assess the strengths and capabilities of the
force you were going to meet, you had to include the
strengths and the capabilities of this group that was
inflicting casualties.

Q. Were there others at the CIA who were concerned
with this subject who indicated to you in the fall of 1967
that the self defense and secret self-defense posed a
military threat and should be included in the order of
battle?

A. Yes. I discussed that with numerous people at
the Central Intelligence Agency.

Q. Can you recall to with whom you discussed that?

A. Well, that was a topic of discussion following
the Saigon conference, as to the strengths of the militia
groups, and whether they should be included in the order of
battle.

So on an on-going basis I discussed that with
Ron Smith; on an on-going basis I discussed it with Paul
Welsh, who was I believe at that time acting Director of
the Office of Economic Reports, and I discussed it, of
course, with Mr. Adams and on one or two occasions I recall
discussing it with George Allen.

Of course, I discussed it with other members of
the South Vietnamese branch throughout that time period.

Q. Can you recall anything in particular about your
conversations with Mr. Smith, Mr. Ron Smith?

A. I can't really be specific, other than that in our discussions -- he would come to me -- it was the same type of discussion I would have with Paul Walsh -- and ask whether these groups should be dropped from the MACV order -- from the order of battle, agreed-to order of battle.

He, Ron Smith and Paul Walsh, explained to me that there was some dispute in formulating this estimate as to whether this group should be left out or not. So these conversations I had with Ron Smith and with Paul Walsh, I both gave my opinion and supplied them with documents which indicated exactly what the secret self-defense and self-defense militia was doing, what their strength was, what their capability was.

I recall giving them documents showing the weapons which they had, showing the demographics, if you would, of the different militia groups, so that they would have a better idea.

I did not get involved in the actual negotiations. I was supplying the information to those two individuals.

Q. Let me ask you one final question on the self defense and secret self-defense forces, and that is after the Tet offensive began in late January 1967, did you do any research on the extent to which the enemy's self
defense and secret self-defense forces participated in that offensive?

A. Yes.

Q. What did your research indicate?

A. My research showed that with the Tet offensive, almost all the groups were upgraded. So the -- and I mean upgraded in capabilities, upgraded in weapons and upgraded in size, and this happened to the militia, this self-defense militia.

The guerrillas and the militia groups traditionally are the fighting force of the Vietcong in the rural areas, as opposed to the main force units in the district towns and in the cities of South Vietnam.

So what happened during Tet was that these individuals not only, these units not only engaged in defense of the rural areas, but many of them were upgraded, at least in weapons and in purpose, to fight along with the guerrillas and not just maintain the defensive posture which they had in the past.

The documents reported that they were being killed during Tet and it also reported their victories during Tet of the militia. As I said before, this was mostly in the rural areas where the militia operated, not in the cities.

Q. Let me turn now to another subject, and let me
focus your attention on the period August August and
September 1967. Let me begin by asking you whether or not
during that period you were involved in any particular
projects?

A. The -- basically the projects during that time
period was to supply information to Ron Smith and Paul
Walsh concerning the estimates as they were negotiating.

As I recall, it was a national intelligence
estimate that was being discussed at that time.

So I did research and supplied information to
those individuals for their use at these conferences.

Q. Do you recall -- let me ask you first whether or
not you could tell us what the purpose, in general, of a
national intelligence estimate is.

A. The purpose of a national intelligence estimate,
or what a national intelligence estimate is, is a
collection of the best information available to the entire
intelligence community on a given problem.

In this case, in August/September, it was on the
capabilities of the enemy forces in South Vietnam. So the
purpose was to compile, assimilate in one document the best
information that was available concerning the capabilities
of the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong forces in South
Vietnam.

Q. In the fall of 1967 did -- were you aware of a
national intelligence estimate that was produced and published at that time?

A. I know that there was a SNIE, a special national intelligence estimate, that was published in November, I think, of 1967.

Q. Did you read that document?

A. Yes, I did, after it was published.

Q. At that time did you form an opinion as to the accuracy of the enemy strength estimates for the enemy's guerrilla forces contained in that SNIE?

A. Yes.

Q. What was your opinion?

A. My opinion was that the SNIE misrepresented the strength of the militia forces, the size of the militia forces, the capabilities --

Q. Let me focus your attention first on the guerrilla forces.

A. Guerrilla forces. That the numbers were not a correct representation of the guerrilla forces; and that it was -- it was misleading as to what their strengths were and capabilities were.

Q. So that the record is clear now, that was your opinion of the enemy's guerrilla forces.

Now, why don't you give us your opinion of the SNIE's presentation of the enemy's self defense and secret
A. Well, let me clarify that answer. The first half of that I was answering as to the militia forces. The last part was as to the guerrilla forces.

I think the representations of the militia forces in the SNIE were totally misleading. They didn't give a true picture as to what the strengths of the militia was, what their capability was, and what someone going out in the field would encounter.

It was just misleading. It was just untrue.

Q. Mr. Parry, did you have discussions regarding the SNIE that was published in the fall of 1967 with any of your colleagues at the CIA?

A. Yes.

Q. With whom did you discuss the SNIE that was published at that time, that is the fall of 1967?

A. Prior to its publication I was giving information to Ron Smith and mostly to Paul Walsh at this time.

I discussed it with them prior to the publication, or signing off on the SNIE. I talked to Adams about the SNIE throughout this time period, and -- well, other people, but I can't recall specifically conversations with other people.

Q. Do you recall your conversations with Mr. Walsh
regarding the SNIE?

A. Yes.

Q. Could you relate them to us.

A. During the period, about the middle of September through middle of October, towards late October, Paul Walsh used to meet with me on a regular basis and basically what he was asking was how strong are you on these numbers? How convinced are you that the militia ought to included in the order of battle?

I was supplying him my estimates. I was giving him the best evidence that I had as to the capabilities of the militia, the guerrilla, and their strengths. He explained to me -- he said he wanted to know this information because MACV was refusing to go above a certain number on these forces, and if that they did not believe that the forces could be quantified.

So during this time period I was giving information to Mr. Walsh as to how to quantify the self-defense forces and on their strengths and on the strengths of the guerrillas.

Q. Do you recall any particular conversations that you had with Mr. Adams at that time, conversations regarding the SNIE?

A. I can recall my conversation with Mr. Adams after the SNIE had been published.
Q. Could you relate those conversations to us.

A. Basically, what I related to Mr. Adams was my embarrassment, my frustration, my feeling of total abandonment, the principles of the agency, when I found out that the Central Intelligence Agency had signed off on that estimate.

I had had discussions, as I mentioned before, with Mr. Walsh and with Mr. Smith, and I repeated them to Mr. Adams.

One thing I recall stating to Mr. Adams was that Mr. Walsh came in after we had these discussions as to whether the militia ought to be included in the order of battle, and where he had reported to me that MACV wouldn't agree to that, saying that you couldn't quantify them, and then he finally came in and said, "Well, I have agreed to sign off on those numbers. There are so many caveats and footnotes in that document that it doesn't make any difference anyway."

I told Mr. Adams about this. I told Mr. Adams about the conversation I had had with Ron Smith, wherein he said, "Well, we lost this time, but just go back, work harder and we'll have another opportunity to see if we can convince them."

I mentioned these to Mr. Adams just because of my total frustration. I was disappointed with the Agency,
to think that -- my feelings were that these people who
knew the truth were willing just to sign off on something
they knew wasn't true.

I discussed that with Mr. Adams. The discussion
back the other way was -- Mr. Adams said the same thing,
and he discussed MACV's position. I did not negotiate with
MACV, did not have conversations with MACV personnel during
this time.

Q. Let me turn now, Mr. Parry, to the subject of
infiltration. While you were working in the South Vietnam
branch did you do any research at all on enemy infiltration?

A. The work that I did on enemy infiltration was as
that subject was related to the guerrilla and militia force
strengths.

I looked at it, because it was important to know
if you were going to be able to properly evaluate those
strengths.

I was not the one in South Vietnamese branch
that was particularly responsible for infiltration.

Q. Did you ever personally formulate estimates of
enemy infiltration into South Vietnam?

A. Yes.

MR. DORSEN: Objection, your Honor, not Vietcong

THE COURT: To that question?

MR. DORSEN: To that question.
THE COURT: You may proceed.

Q. Were you assigned to do that?

A. It was required as part of my research on the guerrillas.

Q. After the enemy's Tet offensive in 1968 did you personally formulate an estimate of monthly infiltration into South Vietnam for the period September, 1967 through January 1968?

MR. DORSEN: Objection, your Honor.

THE COURT: You're asking whether after Tet he formulated estimates of infiltration during the pre-Tet period of September through January?

MR. DUKER: That is correct, your Honor.

MR. DORSEN: Is this respecting guerrillas or everybody, your Honor?

MR. DUKER: Let me begin again.

Q. Let me begin by asking you, Mr. Parry, what you understood infiltration to mean.

A. Infiltration was the movement of men and material, in context, from North Vietnam to fight in South Vietnam.

To answer one of the questions that was asked by Mr. Dorsen, it was not Vietnamese guerrillas. These were North Vietnamese regulars that were moving down from North Vietnam to South Vietnam.
Q. Did you, during the course of your employment at the CIA, while you were working in the South Vietnam branch, task force, formulate an estimate for total enemy infiltration during the period September of 1967 through January 1968?

THE COURT: Simply answer whether you did or didn't. Don't give any numbers.

A. Yes.

Q. When did you formulate that estimate?

During the time that I was reading the documents, contemporaneous with that time period, during the September-January period, I had a rough estimate. After Tet the estimate was more.

Q. Let me see if I understand you correctly, let me ask you a few more questions. First, let me ask you what your estimate of enemy infiltration was during the period of September 1967 through January 1968?

A. That I made during that time period?

Q. No. Well, first, let me ask you first simply what your estimate of enemy infiltration was, infiltration during the time period September '67 through January '68, the estimate that you made following the Tet offensive when your information on infiltration was refined please.

MR. DORSEN: Objection, your Honor, to take a

Q. Mr. Parry, did there come a time when you formulated a particular estimate for infiltration during the months of September '67 through January 1968?

A. Yes.

Q. When did that period arrive?

A. Oh, late February, March of 1968.

Q. What was your estimate?

MR. DORSEN: Objection, your Honor.


Q. Mr. Parry, following the Tet offensive did you discuss enemy infiltration with Mr. Adams?

A. Yes.

Q. The Tet offensive in 1968?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall whether or not you told Mr. Adams, in words or in substance, what you believed enemy infiltration to be during the period between September 1967 and January 1968?

MR. DORSEN: Objection.

THE COURT: Sustained.

Q. Could you relate to us the substance of your conversations with Mr. Adams regarding --

THE COURT: Come to the point.

MR. BOIES: Is this of convenience?

break?
THE COURT: I have a hearing in another case that will have to begin at four or a few minutes after, so maybe it is time to knock off for the day, if this is a sticking point.

All right. The jury is excused. Just one second, please.

Are counsel here in the other matter? Both sides here prepared to go ahead with the hearing?

All right.

(At the sidebar)

THE COURT: I don't think, Mr. Duker, that you have laid enough of a foundation yet. You have brought out that he undertook to quantify the infiltration, but unless I have missed it, I don't think you have laid out sufficient foundation that he was assigned to do this and that the requisite materials were made available to him. Or perhaps even -- I'm not so sure of this, but perhaps even as to his having the requisite skills to do it.

I'm not saying that you can't lay that foundation. I don't know whether you can or not. But I don't think you've done it as of yet, and as to your question did he have a conversation with Mr. Adams, technically it's okay, but it just seemed to me that under the circumstances it was sort of an end run around an obstacle.
You might be able to ask that question ultimately even if you don't get to ask the first, but not in that fashion. I think you just have to lay the foundation stones.

So far as I think I have heard, I don't think he has testified as to his having the equipment to make the estimate that you are asking him about now.

MR. DUKER: All right, your Honor.

I will spend a few more minutes -- do you want to ask a few more questions now or do you want to wait until Monday? Maybe you ought to wait until Monday.

MR. BOIES: I think we could probably lay the foundation now, your Honor. My only problem is the jury has been sitting in the box for so long --

THE COURT: We haven't had a break for the whole afternoon.

MR. BOIES: The court has another hearing right now?

THE COURT: I have a hearing that will take about an hour or so. Why don't I dismiss the jury and you can take stock of that foundation issue and approach it Monday morning.

(Open court.)

THE COURT: Maybe I will take a few minutes and give you that ruling stuff after the jury leaves.
You are excused members of the jury. Have a pleasant weakened. Do not discuss the case. Do not be influenced by anything that you may read in the papers.

Remember, as I told you previously, that this case is this case and any other case that is being tried has nothing to do with this one.

You are not to be influenced in any way as a result of any other cases or what anybody may say in the press about any other cases or this case.

Have a pleasant weakened. You are excused

(Jury excused)

THE COURT: Let's take care of these rulings so I can get to the other hearing.

I have two applications to reargue positions. CBS reargues the overruling of its objection to the Stringer statements about Crile being a conspiracy thinker together with the passages from Stringer's deposition in which he denied having said it.

I have considered CBS's arguments and I adhere to the position previously taken, and there's a short written opinion here, which I will give you, which I will file.

The plaintiff applies for reconsideration of the ruling barring proof of violation of the CBS guidelines and I have considered your application and I will stick with my
earlier rulings, both for reasons set forth in the earlier ruling and for some additional reasons that are set forth in this memorandum, which is being filed today.

Now, I also had submitted to me a whole list of excerpts from the Benjamin report that the plaintiff is now offering after all the previous rulings, and I have a memorandum of objections from the defendant.

What I have done here is I have penned my rulings into the defendants' memorandum of objection. The defendants break down the plaintiff's submissions into separating sentence from sentence and paragraph from paragraph, and I have written my rulings in the defendants' book.

What I would suggest is that I just give this booklet to you with my handwritten notes in it, as we have done before. This is not to be filed or copied or anything else, it is just for your guidance to indicate to you what the rulings are and what the reasons are in many instances, and we can get up a more formal order based on this subsequently, and if there is any of it that you want to hash out further or argue further, I will hear you. But you can get indications as to what these rulings are from this document.

As I think I told you in an informal discussion previously, you will see that on many of these rulings I
have written the word "form" with a question mark, and --
this is in instances where I have overruled CBS's objection,
allowing the material to come in, and what that means is
that I find that the material is appropriately admitted
into the trial, but I don't find that the fact that it was
presented in the Benjamin report adds any evidence of any
value.

To the contrary. I find that it imports some
inappropriate prejudice, where, for example, the simplest
example, the Benjamin report is quoting something that may
have been said by Crile or Wallace or Adams or anybody else,
and those things are received as an admission of the
defendant or as an admission of CBS through a
representative or employee.

But I don't see any purpose to mentioning the
fact that it's in the Benjamin report, or what the Benjamin
report is all about.

Now, that does not apply to every single
instance. There are some in which the fact that it's the
Benjamin report has some appropriate bearing on the
admission.

I'm sure there are a couple of these that you
will want to discuss further and we can do that.

Anything else for now?

MR. BOIES: Just two scheduling issues, your
Honor. First, if we could get the times for the last two
days, and, second, although this gets us somewhat in
advance of the present time frame, on February 14 the Court
of Appeals --

THE COURT: You got a date?

MR. BOIES: I do, your Honor; maybe two dates,
one during the day and one later, but the one during the
day is with the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia on our motion to compel the production of various
government documents that have been withheld.

And I wonder if it is possible to recess court
that day to permit me to argue that before the the Court of
Appeals. The documents at issue are the documents at issue
in subpoenas issued in this litigation.

THE COURT: Do you have anything to say on that,
Mr. Dorsen?

MR. DORSEN: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: Mr. Boies wanted to take February 14
off to argue to the Court of Appeals to get some more
evidence to use in this case.

MR. DORSEN: I just missed the last request. I
have no objection, your Honor. Certainly I will
accommodate Mr. Boies. Is that a Thursday, your Honor?

THE COURT: That is Thursday the 14.

By my calculations, the time ought to running
out. Everybody's clock ought to be running out approximately the following Monday.

I think your taking the 14 off might put it off till Tuesday, assuming that we have pretty much five-hour days from now till then.

MR. BOIES: My calculation has been that we were going to finish on that day. I think that was a little optimistic. I think the court is right. We will probably finish the following Monday.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else for now?

MR. BOIES: Nothing, your Honor.

THE COURT: Let me just say a word to you at the sidebar.

(Trial continued to January 28, 1984 at 10:00 a.m.)
# WITNESS INDEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Direct</th>
<th>Cross</th>
<th>Redirect</th>
<th>Recross</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>George Warren Allen</td>
<td></td>
<td>7915</td>
<td>7972</td>
<td>8009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Resumed)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douglas Joseph Parry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8025</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# EXHIBIT INDEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exhibit</th>
<th>Identification</th>
<th>In Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>7955</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1829A</td>
<td>7963</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER, U.S. COURTHOUSE
FOLEY SQUARE, NEW YORK, N.Y. – 791-1020