Q: In your answer, Mr. Adams, you refer to a Hawkins file. Do you recall that reference?
A: Yes, I do.
Q: Do you have a Hawkins file?
A: Yes. And I believe it's been turned over to you.
Q: That's what I was going to get at. Are you familiar with any documents or notes or memoranda or anything that you have relating to the subject matter of the CBS broadcast that you have not turned over to your lawyers?
A: I don't believe so, no. There may be things, but I don't--no, I don't think I have anything.
Q: Are you aware of any written notation you made of a description by Colonel Hawkins of a May 1972 briefing with General Westmoreland that you made prior to 1972?
A: No, I don't believe that I did make any such written account. I may have. I don't know. I don't recall having done so and it would be for reasons that I gave you, that since what Colonel Hawkins was
telling me was basically that General Westmoreland was
in essence, in my view, doing—perpetrating an act which
may have been illegal under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, I did not want to have such a thing in writing
for fear that it would get Colonel Hawkins in trouble.

Q Did there come a time when you changed
your view as to putting down in writing what Colonel
Hawkins told you about a briefing he had with General
Westmoreland in May 1967?

A Yes, sir.

Q When was that?

A I'm not sure when. It would have been
after General—correction—Colonel Hawkins' retirement
from the army. That is why I think I might have written
that down in my notes in June of 1972. Again, I have to
say I'm not sure I did. But after his retirement from
the army I thought it was much less likely that the army
would retaliate against him for saying such things about
a superior.

Q What did Colonel Hawkins tell you about
the May 1967 briefing he gave to General Westmoreland
and when did he tell you?
A I believe he told me about the May 1967 briefing in January 1968. I'm not sure because I have no written record of it. Basically what he told me was this—and I repeat a story I have recounted a number of times and I'm not sure whether it's verbatim or not, but I will do my best to make it as accurate as I can.

He told me that he went into General Westmoreland's office during this briefing. He recollected at the time that General McChristian was there as well. He's not sure. He can't recall now whether McChristian was really at the briefing or not.

He said that General Westmoreland had hitherto instructed him to come in and give a briefing on the new figures that he had come up with for the various categories in the order of battle. And he described it to me—Hawkins described it to me very much like this: He said that he, Colonel Hawkins, was standing at an easel which had a flip chart on it. General Westmoreland was sitting at a desk or a table or something like that not far away from him.

The briefing, as he described it—my recollection of how he described it—went something like
this: "General Westmoreland, we have been studying the
defense order of battle now and have come to the
collection that the order of battle is much higher
overall than we have been describing it before."

He, Hawkins, thereupon went through the
order of battle category by category, the first one
being main and local forces; the second being
guerrilla-militia; third being admin. services and the
fourth being political cadres. I'm not sure I have the
exact order right.

He went through these categories one by
one, indicating first that he thought the main and local
forces, their estimate was relatively correct. He gave
a number for the political--correction--for the
guerrilla-militia which was on the neighborhood of double
that which was in the order of battle.

Q: Do you remember the number, or would--
A: He didn't remember it either. He just
remembered it was way higher. It was something like
double. He remembered a number that was much higher for
the administrative services and he remembered a number
that was considerably more than double for the political
cadres.

And then he gave a comparison of the two totals, the new totalling which he gave General Westmoreland was much higher than the official MACV order of battle, which was the current number at the time.

He said he looked at General Westmoreland and General Westmoreland was—who normally sat very straight in his chair, with a square jaw—was slumped down in his chair like this (indicating) and General Westmoreland said words to the effect, "My God, what am I going to tell the Congress? What am I going to tell the press? What am I going to tell the President?"

Then as Hawkins described it to me, my recollection of how Hawkins described it to me, was that Westmoreland gradually straightened up in his seat and turned around to General McChristian and said to General McChristian—this is Hawkins recalling McChristian was there—"General, I want you to take another look at those numbers."

Hawkins said to me that this signaled to him, Hawkins, that Westmoreland wanted him, Hawkins, to
lower the numbers, that he felt—that Westmoreland felt they were too high. This is in general what Hawkins described to me probably around January of 1968.

Q Is this account, what you gave your best recollection of, what Colonel Hawkins told you in or around January 1968?

A That is my best recollection.

Q Did Colonel Hawkins tell you whether he thought there might have been other persons present at the briefing?

A To the best of my recollection, he didn't.

Q Did you ask him?

A I don't remember whether I did or not.

Q Did you ask Colonel Hawkins any questions with a view to try and get additional details if there were any?

A Not at that time I did not. But I would like to say something in explanation here of why I didn't ask such questions.

At that time it was to me so shocking that such a thing should happen that I did not feel like pressing Colonel Hawkins for additional information on
something like that, because I thought it would be too embarrassing for him, Hawkins, to tell me.

Q Do you have any specific recollection as to where this conversation that you're describing took place?

A No, I don't. I do not.

Q Do you have any recollection whether anybody was present, other than yourself and Colonel Hawkins?

A I recall no one else was present.

Q Were you taking notes at any time during the conversation with Colonel Hawkins that included this incident?

A No, I didn't, for the reason as I have stated many times, that it was such an unusual and such a politically-explosive incident that to have it in writing, it seemed to me at that time would get nothing but Colonel Hawkins in deep trouble.

Q No. My question was did you take notes of any portion of the conversation with Colonel Hawkins in which this matter was discussed?

A I made--I know I made note of it when I
put together what I've called an order of battle chronology.

Q How many times did you meet with Colonel Hawkins in the period from the time that Colonel Hawkins returned to the United States, say, through 1968, to the best of your recollection?

A Through 1968?

Q Yes.

MR. BOISE: Can I have the question? (Record read.)

MR. BOISE: Through the end of '68?

MR. DORSEN: Yes.

THE WITNESS: Okay.

A I can't recall exactly, but I would say at least half a dozen times and as many as a dozen times.

Q Was this the first one, the one that was described in the January 16, 1968 memorandum?

A I remember I had a conversation with him—one or more conversations with him on the phone before I saw him here.

Q Was the discussion you just described with Colonel Hawkins in person or over the telephone?
I don't recall. I think—I remember—I take that back. It was in person because I remember he was asking a—gestures when he—I remember he looked very emotional and sort of sick-looking when he described the incident to me. He looked very nervous.

C Did he indicate whether General McChristian said anything?

A No, to the best of my recollection.

Q Did you ask or discuss with Colonel Hawkins at that time whether he had any other briefings with General Westmoreland in the May, June 1968 timeframe?

A No, I didn't.

Q Why is that?

A I had a—through 1967 and into 1968 I had a very peculiar relationship with Colonel Hawkins. He was basically my pipeline, I guess, into MACV headquarters, into finding out what the thinking was. I disliked asking Colonel Hawkins questions directly about whether he thought something was true or untrue because it was such a touchy subject. I preferred that he volunteer things to me, which he did from time to time.
I hated pressing Colonel Hawkins for fear that it would get him into grievous and deep trouble if he were to tell me—if he told me some of the things he did.

I did not like pressing Colonel Hawkins because he was the only person in MACV headquarters who was regularly telling me the truth.

At that time, I was not running an investigation. I was trying to find out how strong the Viet Cong were, and my prime interest at the time was to see, ascertain the strength of our adversaries in Vietnam because I thought this was what we should be telling the President.

I did not want to get involved in a series of questions which might involve things that would get Colonel Hawkins in trouble, which would create a turmoil in the conduct of the war, since many of the things that went on, I believe even now, were court-martial offenses, and so I tended not to try to carry out an investigation at that time into who was cheating and who wasn't because a war was on and I was trying to see how strong our enemy was.

So, you were making no effort to
investigate anything or disrupt anything. You were interested in finding out how strong the enemy was. Is that correct?

MR. BOISE: Object to the form of the question.

THE WITNESS: Sir, my prime job was as an intelligence analyst and—I could see a big offensive coming up and I didn't want to get involved in an investigation of why people were trying to falsify the order of battle.

I was trying to get a realistic order of battle, trying to get them to change their minds and issue real figures instead of wrong ones.

Mr. Adams, who have you filed complaints against or sought investigations of among people who were involved in the order of battle dispute in 1967, early '68?

MR. BCISF: Had you finished your answer?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

A Come again, sir?

Q Against whom have you filed charges or caused investigations to be initiated or otherwise
complained about through official channels of people who
were involved in the order of battle matters in 1967 and
early 1968?

MR. BOISE: Objection to the form of the
question.

A Sir, that is a complex question. I have
issued--I have made a number of complaints, as you call
them. I have made requests for investigations--

Q Why don't you start with the first one
you made. Who was that of and when?

A Okay.

Q Again, my question is who was it of and
when. Please confine your answer to that at this time.

A The first complaint, as you characterized
it, was made to the CIA Inspector General on or about
the 1st of April 1968. It was done orally--not to the
Inspector General himself but to one of his staffers.

Q When did you start preparing that
complaint?

A That morning.

Q Who was the subject of that complaint?

A Well, instead of answering your question...
directly, let me go on to the written version of that complaint, which was issued—which I sent to the CIA Inspector General on—in late May 1968.

MR. BOISE: If that's agreeable with you, Mr. Dorsen. If Mr. Dorsen wants to go at it in sequence, we probably ought to go at it in sequence.

It's up to Mr. Dorsen.

MR. DORSEN: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. DORSEN: I think we indicated we would take a break. I think this probably would be a good time to do that.

(Recess taken.)

BY MR. DORSEN:

Q Mr. Adams, we were discussing your filing of a request for an investigation by the Inspector General before the break.

In that written request, did you make any reference to the briefing as described by Colonel Hawkins that General Westmoreland was—was given by Colonel Hawkins in May 1967?

A No, I did not.
Q When for the first time did you state what Colonel Hawkins told you in any request for investigation, complaint or public statement?

A Let me go over that. Request for investigation, complaint or--the third--

Q Public statement.

A I don't really recall the first time I put it in writing--"it" being reference to the Hawkins briefing of Westmoreland in May 1967. I do recall mentioning the incident publicly in the Pike Committee hearings of late 1975. I did orally mention the briefing in my complaint or whatever you want to call what I submitted to the IG in 1968. Again, I was afraid at that time of getting Colonel Hawkins in deep trouble.

Q Didn't you feel an obligation to report that officially to your superiors?

A I did report it officially to my superiors on several occasions, but it was orally. You will recall at the time, which was 1968, there was a war going on. And the atmosphere was such that were I to let such a piece of information loose on a piece of paper, it was my conviction that the person who would
get in trouble was not the person who I thought deserved
to get in trouble, General Westmoreland, but the person
who told about it, Colonel Hawkins.

And in making these complaints and
requests for investigations and so forth, my feeling was
that I did not want my--my strong conviction was that I
did not want to get Colonel Hawkins in trouble.

C    Whom did you tell orally what Colonel
Hawkins told you?

A    Well, I'm sure I told it, as I said, to
George Allen. I may very well have relayed the story to
George Carver. George Allen, at the time, was my
immediate superior, the person to whom I would convey,
should convey such information. I may well have told it
to George Carver.

C    Do you recall whether you did or not?
A    I don't recall whether I did or not.
C    Anybody else you would have told it to?
A    I recall mentioning it in the many
discussions--among the many discussions I had with the
Inspector General. I don't recall specifically to whom
I made it, but I did say something like that, did relay
the story to somebody on the Inspector General's staff, or in fact the IG himself.

Q Did you convey the information to those people with a view to their acting on it?

A I conveyed the information to those people with a view to showing that my charges were extremely serious. My problem, as I've repeatedly said, that it's such a piece of information down on a piece of paper that I was afraid it would be Colonel Hawkins that would be the person to get in trouble, not General Westmoreland.

Q You thought this problem would be solved by telling it to the Inspector General's people orally?

A My feeling was that CIA people would probably not transmit that information to the army, perhaps because of bureaucratic rivalries. At least that was my hope, that they wouldn't.

Q And you didn't want them to, did you?

A I did not want to get Colonel Hawkins in trouble. This whole business of starting investigations in the middle of a war is very ticklish business. I did not want to disrupt our prosecution of the war, nor did
I want to get Colonel Hawkins in trouble. Basically what I wanted to do was improve our intelligence. And I didn't see how we could improve our intelligence by getting what I feared was getting Colonel Hawkins in trouble.

Q: Didn't you feel you had an obligation under the law to report this conduct if it was as you've described it?

A: Sometimes I felt I was the only person around who was reporting things that should have been reported. Many people knew what was going on, both within the CIA and within MACV headquarters. I knew they knew. I knew they were not reporting what they knew. I generally did report something if I thought it was wrong. I reported that. I chose not to report it orally--correction--I chose not to report it in writing. I reported it orally.

I reported many things in writing, jeopardizing, I think, my career. And to answer your question--which, as I understand, was didn't I feel it necessary to report wrongdoing in writing or at least wrongdoing, the answer is yes, and I did.
Q. Are you saying that you thought that filing something with the Inspector General concerning the director Richard Helms would not get you into trouble but filing a complaint about General Westmoreland would get you into trouble?

MR. BOISE: Object to the form of the question.

A. Sir, I was not concerned with getting myself into trouble. I was already in deep trouble and I knew it. I did not want to get Colonel Hawkins into trouble, too.

Q. And you thought that was more important than getting out and through proper channels what Colonel Hawkins told you about General Westmoreland?

MR. BOISE: Object to the form.

A. Come again?

MR. DOREN: Read it.

(Record read.)

A. It is hard to give a yes or no answer to your question, sir. I was always on the horns of a dilemma. My dilemma was how to get information of wrongdoing to proper authorities in such a way that the...
wrongdoing got corrected but that the people who told me about it didn't get into trouble.

I was always faced with that problem.

Q Isn't it true, Mr. Adams, that the reason you did not report it in writing was that what Colonel Hawkins told you was ambiguous in January 1968?

MR. BOISE: Object to the form of the question.

A Sir, what he told me was not ambiguous at all and the way he told it to me was not ambiguous at all. It was clear to him at the time and to me at the time from Colonel Hawkins, as he described it to me, that General Westmoreland had done something that he ought not to have done.

Q Did you ask Colonel Hawkins whether you could tell anybody else?

A No, sir, I did not ask Colonel Hawkins whether I could tell anyone else for the reason was that this was a terribly— I guess you'd have to describe it ticklish time. I knew I was sticking my neck out and I did not want to put Colonel Hawkins, for whom I had great respect— I did not want to put his career in
jeopardy.

I knew, for example, sir--and this is not something that Colonel Hawkins ever told me that I should take into consideration--but I knew that one of his daughters had diabetes and that if he were to--if he, Hawkins, were to get court-martialed for having told me this information about General Westmoreland, Colonel Hawkins would lose not only his pension but the access of his daughter to army hospitals which might treat his daughter's diabetes.

I did not want to put Colonel Hawkins in that kind of fix.

Q Didn't you think this was his decision, too?

A He decided to tell me what he told me and I decided to listen to it and I decided to act upon what he told me. I did not want to push Colonel Hawkins into telling me more than what he wanted to tell me.

Q Why is that again?

A Because, sir, during this whole period of time, as I have tried to describe it to you, Colonel Hawkins and I had a very unusual relationship. He was
trying to tell me the truth of what happened. He was
the only one that was trying to tell me the truth. And
I did not want to get him into further trouble. I did
not want to get him into any trouble at all.

Again, in, for example, January 1968, it
was clear to me that an enormous offensive was coming,
an offensive which involved an enemy force probably on
the order of double what the official books said it
was. And I did not want to get into a little
investigation--not a little investigation--into a side
investigation on who told what to whom when, when I saw
hundreds of thousands of enemy troops poised to attack
the American army.

Q And you do not believe that pressing what
Colonel Hawkins told you would have helped enlighten the
situation insofar as you saw it?

MR. BOISE: Object to the form of the
question.

A I would like to repeat, sir, that the
main interest that I had at the time--I was an
intelligence analyst. My job was to ascertain the
strength and the intentions of the enemy.
C  Strength or intentions or both?
A  The strength and intentions of the enemy.

In January 1968 I knew the enemy was
twice as strong as the official books said the enemy
was. I knew because I had been custodian--become
custodian of a memorandum written by Joseph Hubby that
the enemy was about to launch a large-scale attack using
all his resources.

I could see this thing coming. Every day
I went to somebody--to Carver, to George Allen--warning
him this thing was coming and that it was going to be
huge and that we better do something about it. And I
might say all other considerations in my mind were small
in comparison to that.

The fact that we had been cheating in
putting together the official books was not something I
thought ought to be revealed at the time, but something
that should be corrected so that we could meet the
onslaught which was about to come.

Q  And in the months after the Tet offensive
you still felt no compunction to disclose what Colonel
Hawkins told you; is that correct?
MR. BOISE: Object to the form of the question.

MR. DORSEN: Let me withdraw the question.

Q Once Ted came and you complained or filed charges with the Inspector General concerning Director Helms, is it your testimony that you still felt no need to disclose what Colonel Hawkins told you or ask Colonel Hawkins if he would consent to the disclosure of what he told you?

A Colonel Hawkins had told me what he had told me. I did not want to put Colonel Hawkins on the spot, asking his permission whether I could pass the information on. I did pass the information on orally. I did not want to put it in writing because I was afraid that Colonel Hawkins, in passing that information to me, would only get himself in trouble, perhaps court-martialed.

Q Colonel Hawkins would not get into trouble if you passed it along orally?

A I passed it along orally to the Inspector General's staff in the CIA. I did not think that it was the kind of thing that they would pass on to the army.
I hoped it wasn't. But I passed it on to them to indicate the seriousness of the charges I was making.

Was that the most serious charge you possibly could have made, Mr. Adams?

A No.

What was the most serious charge you could have made?

A The most serious charges that I felt I could make at the time were ones I made, which was that the CIA had acquiesced to MACV's manipulation of the books prior to Tet. I felt, since I was a member of the CIA, that it was more important that I take to task my own organization, which I knew a lot about and which I knew many of the details of what had gone on concerning, than I did about what had gone on in MACV, which I didn't know much about except for the small amount that Colonel Hawkins had told me.

So the manipulation that you're talking about that the CIA acquiesced to was the manipulation Colonel Hawkins told you about; is that correct?

MR. POISE: Objection to the form of the question.
A: Come again?

MR. DOREN: Read it.

(Record read.)

A: That's making the problem much too simple. There were some things that Colonel Hawkins told me about and many others he didn't tell me about. I found out over the years, later. I knew many of the things which had gone on in MACV—I knew some of the things which had gone on in MACV. I surmised many of the others. And so what I was complaining, the manipulation I was complaining about the CTA having later caved into had been revealed to me over many months of working on the problem.

C: Starting when, Mr. Adams?

A: I never knew exactly when it started. I had always wondered why MACV's books had never changed between August 1966, when I first found that something was the matter with them, and November 1967, when they actually changed.

I had had, of course, indications that MACV was reforming itself, was reforming the numbers, in February 1967. I began to think that something funny
was going on in June 1967, when, at the first meeting of
National Intelligence estimate 143.67, the D.I.A.
representative presented, as official, the same numbers
that had been used all along. And there started, from
June on--roughly June on--a series of events which I
could understand in no other way than by believing there
had been behind-the-scenes manipulations.

By August and September it was crystal
clear to me that they were faking the books. It was
crystal clear to me not only from what Colonel Hawkins
had told me but also from what other--many MACV analysts
had said, from cables that I was seeing at the time, and
from conversations I was having with CIA people.

So, Colonel Hawkins' story about his
briefing in May was only one piece of information cut of
a mass of information I had or thought I had concerning
the fakery of statistics.

Q  Did you have anyone else in MACV in May,
June, July, August, September, tell you in words or
substance that he thought that there was fakery of the
books at MACV, other than Colonel Hawkins?

A  Yes.
Q Who?

A Don't know. The incident occurred when George Carver and I were driving away from the first session in September 1967 of the order of battle conference held in MACV headquarters during that month.

I was riding in a jeep and I can't remember who was sitting where, but there was me, George Carver, a driver and a lieutenant colonel—I believe a lieutenant colonel.

The lieutenant colonel, whose name I cannot recall, was accompanying us for goodness knows what reason.

Carver and I were discussing the funny business that had gone on in that first session. The lieutenant colonel shouted over the noise of the traffic words to the effect that, "You know our real problem is that we have been told to stay under 300,000."

So, that's one instance.

Q You don't know who the man is?

A I don't know who this man is. I didn't—I didn't do what I should have done, which is take down his name, serial number, write down a memo of
conversation, because at the time I believed that the
CIA was continuing to fight for the higher, more
realistic numbers. And it was clear that he wasn't
adding anything new to what Carver and I already
believed.

Q Had you ever seen this man before?
A I can't recall who he was. I can't even
recall a picture of him now. I remember distinctly,
however, he said that. It may have been one of the
reasons that Carver wrote in his initial cable to the
director that he believed that there was a ceiling of
300,000 which had been imposed, he thought, by General
Westmoreland.

Q Let me interrupt, if I may.
Directing your attention to that cable,
did you see that cable at or about the time that it was
sent from Saigon to Washington?
A Yes, I did.

Q Did you have any role in writing it?
A No, I didn't.

Q Did you see it before it went out?
A Yes, I did.
Q Were you asked to comment on it?

A I think I told Carver, "Good cable."

Q Did you see any of the subsequent cables that Mr. Carver sent to Washington from Saigon?

A I saw the second cable he sent.

Q Did you comment on that to Mr. Carver?

A I'd like to look at the cable.

Q Do you have the cable there?

A I think I got it in this stack someplace. What would the number be?

Q I think it's Plaintiff's 118 or 119.

MR. POISSF: Let's be sure we have the right cable. What is the CIA number?

For the record, there are cables 291 and 292, and the references there are to the numbers affixed to the cable by the CIA at the time they were produced to the parties.

THE WITNESS: I see—I've glanced through the cables now. I would have to say that I distinctly recall seeing the first cable. After that, my--either I may or may not have seen subsequent cables. I know I did not see the last two cables. Whether I saw the
second one, I don't know.

MR. BOISE: For the record, can we identify what the first cable was?

MR. DARREN: The first cable, I believe, in terms of the exhibit numbers in this case, is Defendants' Exhibit 120.

MR. BOISE: Okay.

THE WITNESS: I would really prefer not getting into detail of whether or not I saw any specific cable after the first one, which I recall reading because it very distinctly mirrored conversations Carver and I had been having during the early part of the conference. I would like to say, however, that I was not apprised of the concessions that Mr. Carver apparently made to General Westmoreland and to the MACV delegation until after I returned to Washington.

Now, in other words, I don't know which of the second, third and fourth cables I saw.

Q I didn't really want to get into the discussion of substance but more of the documents. Let me ask one more question about the documents.

Do you recall whether you saw, in
September 1967, any cables from Director Helms to Mr. Carver?

A I do not recall whether I saw any or not. I believe I did not.

MR. DORSEN: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Q Mr. Adams, I believe for a brief period the topic we've been talking about goes back to another topic we had started earlier and not completed, and that is this: To the best--let me interrupt myself to tell you what I'm getting back into is the subject of infiltration.

To the best of your recollection and knowledge, did your notes of your conversations with Lieutenant Gattozzi fully reflect everything of importance that he told you on the subject of infiltration?

A I have no way of knowing. I would suspect not, since he told me a great deal. And I'm sure I didn't copy down everything.

Q Do you recall whether there was anything that he told you that you felt that it would be
inappropriate for one reason or another to put into your notes?

A I can't recall.

Q I'd like to direct your attention to Michael Hankins. I believe you earlier referred to him and to your notes of your interview. Your notes of Michael Hankins are Plaintiff's Exhibit 123.

The question I have is do you recall whether there is anything that Michael Hankins told you on the subject of infiltration that you did not put into your notes?

A I'm sure there must have been. We had an hour-and-a-half conversation and my notes are quite sketchy. However, the main purpose I called Michael Hankins was to find out whether the information, the most important piece of information about infiltration that Lieutenant Gattozzi had told me about, was true.

That piece of information, in my view, was whether at least a hundred thousand North Vietnamese infiltrators had come down the trail in the five months or so prior to Tet over and above that which was reported officially through official MACV channels.
I asked him that question, and he answered, "Yes." And this appears in my notes.

Would you point out where in your notes that appears?

It appears on Cravath numbering 27496, my numbering page 4, with the heading "Michael Hankins, August, 1980."

Could you read that portion into the record?

"September-January '68, 100,000 A--I clearly left out a word, month--correction, take that back. Let me start all over again. Sorry. "Sep-Jan '68, a hundred thousand." Then there's the word "a" there. Under a hundred thousand, it says, "MACV," and under MACV it says, "Yes."

I recall distinctly that this was my notation of what to me was the key question, whether there were a hundred thousand infiltrators over and above those which were reported officially to Washington.

And I asked Hankins if this were the case. He answered, "Yes," and that yes is, to me, the most important notation in this set of notes.
What does the next few lines say?

It says, "Depends on which of the cats or the figures, probable--" and it says "probable" again, but I put possible. And I "confirmed."

He was explaining to me that how you arrived at the higher number depended on how you counted probable, possible, confirmed.

What did he tell you?

I can't recall at this time exactly what he told me. However, these are the same categories that were reported officially, "probable, possible and confirmed."

And so, when he told me this, it merely confirmed in my mind that a hundred thousand was a valid figure as being the number of reported--unreported infiltrators before Tet.

Is there anything that you discussed with Michael Hankins on the subject of infiltration other than what you have just testified to that you can recall?

MR. BOISE: The question, please?

Not that I can recall offhand, which
isn't the same thing as saying we didn't talk of many
other things. I imagine we probably did.

Q: Did you ask him whether the hundred
thousand was a number that he had predicted or which had
been confirmed by post-Tet observations?

MR. BOISE: Object to the form of the
question.

A: I do not recall exactly that matter. I
do recall, however, distinctly, that I asked the
question in such a way that it concerned his perceptions
prior to Tet.

Q: Were you asking Lieutenant Michael
Hankins, then, "Prior to Tet, what was your estimate of
the number of North Vietnamese infiltrators that had
come into South Vietnam that were not counted"?

A: Something to that effect, yes.

Q: And he said 100,000?

A: No. I said 100,000. I said, "As it a
hundred thousand, as many as a hundred thousand, or
more?" I didn't put it "as many as." I said, "At least
a hundred thousand," and he said, "Yes."

Q: Did you ask him how he was able to come

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No, I did not. And I had a good reason.

What was the reason?

The reason was this: Lieutenant Gattozzi had told me at great length how the number was come--had come up with--how he'd arrived at the number. I wanted to call Hankins directly to see if Hankins would repeat the story.

My recollection is that I asked Gattozzi to call Hankins to see if it was okay if I did so. Gattozzi seemed to feel that Hankins was reluctant to tell outsiders something like this. There was a series of telephone calls between me and Gattozzi and Gattozzi and Hankins, setting guidelines on what I could ask Hankins and how, if indeed Hankins agreed to talk to me.

Hankins was reluctant to talk to me, I believe, for at least two reasons--

Did he tell you this?

Gattozzi told me this.

First, that a lot of this stuff was classified, and he was worried about that.

Second, that--I believe at this point
Hankins was employed by the Department of the Army and figured that he might get in trouble. So, finally, a telephone conversation was set up basically by me and Gattozzi with Hankins talking to Gattozzi, whereby I could call Hankins and I would read to Hankins or say to Hankins certain statements and Hankins would either agree or disagree with them, or make no comment.

And Hankins did not want to get into a long, involved conversation about communications intelligence with me because he didn't know where such a conversation would end. However, he was willing to answer yes or no to certain questions.

I asked this question: he answered yes.

I did not feel at that time I could go into more detail. He went into a little bit more detail himself.

Q I'm not clear on one thing, Mr. Adams.

Were you asking Mr. Hankins whether there were at least 100,000 North Vietnamese infiltrators who had remained unreported, or who had remained unreported in MACV's enemy order of battle summaries?

MR. MASTRO: Read the question.

(Record read.)