If you didn’t have access to all of the clearances that, for example, George Carver had, would you know that?

MR. BOIES: Objection.

I would have to say that in the case of George Carver, he may have had access to some very highly classified agent information which I did not have access to. He certainly wouldn’t tell me that that was the case.

Isn’t it true that Mr. Carver would be the person to ask whether you knew everything he knew?

MR. BOIES: Objection.

I don’t know what you’re asking by that question, but I think on certain subjects, I knew a lot more than Carver did.

Let me reframe the question. Would Mr. Carver be the person to ask whether he had clearances that you did not have?

He might be a person to ask, yes.

Who might the others be?

People who had similar clearances.

Now, did you run across the names of...
other people who worked in CIIED during the fall of 1967 in addition to Talbot, Fress and Oschery?

A There were a lot of people -- come again? I'm sorry.

Q Did you come across the names of intelligence officers who worked in the current intelligence branch of CIIED in the fall of 1967, other than Talbot, Fress and Oschery, if they were in fact in current intelligence?

A I've run across the names of people in current intelligence in the tank, yes.

Q Did you ever ask any of them whether they had access to intelligence sources or other intelligence matters of a highly classified sort that were not available to Mr. Hankins or Mr. Gattozzi?

A I did not attempt to find out whether there was some kind of esoteric source that they had access to.

Generally speaking, it was agreed by everyone I talked to that the big mass of intelligence was available to anybody who walked in the tank if they had clearance at the tank.
Q Who told you this?
A Virtually everyone I talked to.
Q Give me some names, please, Mr. Adams.
A Okay.
First let me answer your question by
giving you what was described to me frequently as a
physical description of the tank.
It was a great big room in which sat at
least 50 and perhaps as many as 100 people with no
partitions between the desks. A person who entered the
room would have complete access to it. There were no --
-- once you got in the tank, you could go anywhere in the
tank.
Q Who told you this?
A Virtually everybody I talked to who had
access to the tank.
Q Of the people who worked full time in the
tank, who told you that?
MR. BOIES: Object to the form of the
question.
A I was given a physical description of the
tank and the open nature of the tank by fairly large
numbers of people. Neon gave me a description of it; Delpercio; McCloskey; Gattozzi did; Hankins did and so forth.

Q The question I asked was the people who worked full time in the tank as opposed to entering the tank on a periodic basis, of those people, who if anyone told you that people who walked in had access to any of the materials in the tank?

MR. BOIES: I'm not sure he finished his last answer. I don't particular need to have him finish his last answer, but the only thing I want to be clear about is I think there are a number of cases in which he's in the middle of an answer and you pick up on something to ask a follow-up question.

I don't mind that but the only thing I want to be sure of is that in future when you do that, just let the record note that you want to ask him something.

I think it happened with respect to when he was in the middle of describing the tank and the partitions or lack of partitions in the tank. He got part way through the answer and with respect to what I
thought was a statement in the middle of what would have
been a longer answer, you asked who told him that.

Q Let me go back over this.

Is it your understanding, Mr. Adams, that
there are no partitions in the tank?

A It is my understanding that there were no
major partitions in the tank. There were rooms in the
tank, for example. It is my understanding there were
rooms in the tank. I understand, for example, that
there was a briefing room, there was a graphics room,
there was Colonel Graham's office in which the estimates
people sat.

But the massive, the big room out front
was without partitions.

Q Are you familiar with the phrase, "behind
the green door"?

MR. BOIES: Do you want to place a
context on that?

Q In connection with the secure area in
MACV intelligence.

A I have heard the phrase, "behind the
green door," but I don't know, not having been to the
tank, I don't know which door was painted green.

Q Do you have any information as to, and

I'm not asking you at this time to say what the
information is, but do you have any information as to
what the phrase referred to, "behind the green door"?

A I've heard the phrase, "behind the green
door." I don't know to what door they're referring to.

Q Did you ask anybody?

A I can't recall asking anybody but I'm not
sure. I might well have done so.

Q Let me ask you this, Mr. Adams:

Concerning the access by Mr. Hankins and
Mr. Gattozzi to intelligence available in the tank, did
you ask Mr. Delpercio whether Mr. Gattozzi and Mr.
Hankins had unlimited access to all intelligence in the
tank?

A I don't believe I asked Mr. Delpercio. I
might have. I don't know.

Q You don't recall?

A I don't recall whether I did or not.

Q Did you ask Bobby Overcash whether Mr.
Hankins and Mr. Gattozzi had unlimited access to all
intelligence in the tank?

In the case of both Mr. Delpercio and Mr.
Overcash, I'm not even sure they knew who Hankins and
Gattozzi were.

Did you ask them.

I did not ask them -- to the best of my
recolletion, I did not ask them whether Hankins and
Gattozzi had access to the entire space and for good
reason. Both Delpercio and Overcash were corps analysts
who would not necessarily know anything about that.

Know anything about what?

Know anything about, I presume,
infiltration.

Are you saying to the best of your
knowledge, Mr. Overcash, then Major Overcash, did not
know anything about infiltration?

Objection.

He might well have. I didn't question
Mr. Overcash on infiltration, nor did I question Mr.
Delpercio on infiltration, Delpercio being a 4 corps
analyst where there was no infiltration.

And Mr. Overcash being a 3 corps analyst
where there was infiltration?

MR. BOIES: Did you say, "was"?

MR. DOREN: Yes, "was."

A I don't recall what I asked Mr. Overcash on the subject.

Q Did you ever discuss with any of the people who were heads of current intelligence whether Mr. Gattozzi and Mr. Hankins had full access to all intelligence concerning infiltration?

A No, I did not. I did not feel there was any reason or need to do so, because of the open nature of the tank, which was a great big room which people could walk around freely in once they got in.

Q Is the fact that somebody can walk around freely in a room mean that they have in your mind unlimited access to all material in that room?

A That generally is the way intelligence works unless somebody has something squirreled away in his desk.

Generally speaking, if you have access to a room, you have access to the information in that room.

Q General speaking?
A Yes. The theory of intelligence compartmentation is that somebody walking into a space has to have access, has to have clearance to the material in that space. Otherwise, he wouldn't be let into it.

Q Mr. Adams, it's true, is it not, you never were in the tank?

A I never was in the tank, no.

Q Is there any reason for that?

A Yes. The tank was built in August, 1967. The last time I was in Vietnam was in September and I was entirely tied up with an order of battle conference during that period of time and I had no opportunity to visit the tank. I had clearances to go in the tank, however.

Q Who was John Stewart?

A John Stewart was a current intelligence analyst in the tank. I'm not sure which area.

Q Did you ever speak to John Stewart?

A No, I never did. I attempted to find him but I was unable to do so.

Q How did you attempt to find him?
A I don't recall precisely at this time, but I believe I asked other people if they knew where he was. I don't think I ever tracked him down.

Q Weren't you told John Stewart was an officer in active duty in the Army of the United States of America?

MR. BOIES: Could I have that question read back, please?

(Whereupon the record was read back as follows:)

"Weren't you told John Stewart was an officer in active duty in the Army of the United States of America?"

A I was told that and I made an extensive attempt to find out where Stewart was and I never found him.

Q Why did you make an extensive effort to find John Stewart?

A Because he was -- I was told that he was one of the people in the tank.

Q Weren't you also told by a number of people that he was one of the most able people in the tank?
A To the best of my recollection, somebody told me he was able. I had no opportunity to -- since I didn't talk to him, I had no opportunity to check to see if he was.

Q Is it your recollection that one person told you that or more than one person told you he was able?

A I frankly don't recall. I'd have to look at my notes. I can find out.

Q What would you have asked Mr. Stewart if you had an opportunity to have interviewed him in 1981?

A I presume I would have asked him about order of battle matters, about infiltration, about recruitment and other matters having to do with the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese activities and strength.

Q What would you have expected Mr. Stewart, then Captain Stewart, to have known about infiltration?

A Well, I wasn't -- I wouldn't have known. I would have had to ask him what he knew.

Q Do you know what Corps Captain Stewart was responsible for in current intelligence?

A I don't recall. I do recall that it was
either one or two corps, I think.

Q  Do you think he would have had useful knowledge on infiltration?

A  It is my belief that he would have had knowledge of infiltration. It is not my belief that he would have had anywhere near the knowledge that Hankins did for this reason: My understanding is that Stewart was a desk analyst on one of the desks, either one or two corps, I don't know which, I forget which or never knew which for sure, and that as such, he would be following an enormous amount of territory and activities within that territory.

He would be following the movements of all the units within that geographical area which was huge, either one or two corps. He would be following terrorist incidents. He would be following presumably what the infrastructure was up to. He would be following all kinds of activities having to do with his corps area.

Infiltration would have been one of the things he would be following. However, he would be following infiltration only insofar as infiltrators came
into his area.

As to an overview of infiltration, I don't think he'd have one.

Q How much training did Michael Hankins have on infiltration before he arrived in Vietnam?
A I don't know. I have heard of no infiltration he had before then.

Q How much training did he have after he got to Vietnam?
A My understanding is he arrived in June or July, 1967. He took over from Eric Kronan either in late August or early September.

Q Do you know what kind of training he had?
A He had, in my view, by far the most effective kind of training, which is on-the-job training, during that period of time then and he may have had some kind of training before then.

I would like to stick in my view, that there is no such thing as infiltration training, that what you've got to do is sit down with material and read it, which is basically the way to become familiar with how to determine what enemy infiltration is.
Q What do you base that statement on, Mr. Adams, that you just made?
A I base that statement on having worked on infiltration myself.
Q When did you work on infiltration yourself?
A I've worked on an odd corner of infiltration in 1967. The odd corner was civilian infiltration, but we had the same characteristics as the other type of infiltration. I worked on infiltration in general in 1968 off and on through '73.
Q Did you work primarily with documents?
A You work with a combination of documents and higher, more highly classified intelligence.
Q Is it your belief, Mr. Adams, that Second Lieutenant Michael Hankins was the Army's principal infiltration analyst in Vietnam during late 1967?
A Yes, sir, it is my belief and I believe that because I have seen infiltration reports, official infiltration reports, such as those which General Westmoreland handed to us which have his name on it as
Being the infiltration analyst.

Q Were there any other information on infiltration other than contained in those infiltration reports?

A Come again on that one, please? I'm sorry.

Q You referred to infiltration reports; is that correct?

A That's right.

Q First of all, were those collateral source infiltration reports?

A The reports I referred to were collateral source infiltration reports, but my understanding is that these collateral source infiltration reports reflected communications intelligence, even though the reports themselves were not -- they didn't have SIGINT classification.

Let me explain. For example, March, April and May of 1968 and June of '68 and July of '68, there were reflected in MACV collateral reports on infiltration, very high numbers. The high numbers carried in those reports reflected communications
intelligence.

MR. LaPRADE: Wait, wait, we have to have a break now.

Can I talk to Sam outside?

MR. BOIES: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Q Is it your understanding, Mr. Adams, that in 1967, the infiltration summaries were, the ones you referred to a few minutes ago, were collateral source summaries?

A My information is that the 1967 infiltration reports were faked in order to indicate there were less people coming down the trail than all the analysts who worked on the subject thought.

Q Such as Captain Stewart?

MR. BOIES: Objection.

A Captain Stewart, according to my understanding, did no work on the subject of infiltration.

Q That's your understanding?

A My understanding is that he was a corps analyst and that one of his duties was, naturally,
infiltrators that were coming into his corps area.

Q Is it your testimony that you believe
that Bobby Overcash thought the estimates of
infiltration were faked?

A I never talked to Overcash on the subject
of infiltration.

Q Is it your testimony that Commander
Robert Heon, who was the head of current intelligence,
thought the infiltration numbers were faked?

MR. BOIES: Objection.

A Commander Heon made two comments to me
concerning infiltration. There were two main things he
told me about infiltration.

The first was that he was aware of large
numbers of people coming down the trail in the period
well before Tet and that it was difficult to get mention
of the size of the infiltration put into the WIPU.

Q Did he tell you anything else?

A I would have to look at my notes.

Q Did he tell you how he learned of these
infiltrators?

A He may have but I'd have to look at my
notes to see.

Q Did he tell you Michael Hankins had told him about them?

A I don't recall. My feeling would be, to the best of my recollection, I don't think he mentioned Hankins.

Q Do you know whether he knew Michael Hankins?

A No, I don't know whether he knew Michael Hankins.

Q Did you ask him whether he knew Michael Hankins?

A I may have. I don't know.

C Don't you think it's important that the head of current intelligence be familiar with the government's leading intelligence analyst in Vietnam?

MR. BOIES: Objection.

A He may well have known Hankins.

Q Would he have had to have known Hankins if your understanding is accurate, Mr. Adams?

MR. BOIES: Objection.

A Certainly it would have been a good idea
for him to know Hankins if he was to stay on top of what
was going on.

Did you know, Mr. Adams, whether in the
fall of 1967, the most reliable sources to infiltration
came from Washington to Vietnam?

MR. BOIES: Could I have that question
read back, please?

(Whereupon the record was read back as follows.)

"Did you know, Mr. Adams, whether in the
fall of 1967, the most reliable sources to
infiltration came from Washington to Vietnam?"

A I'll try to answer that loaded question --

MR. LaPRADE: Could we get a yes or no
answer first? I don't want for this problem to arise
but I can see the problem coming.

MR. BOIES: It may not be a yes or no
answer.

MR. DORSEN: So that everyone is clear,
I'll try to do this step-by-step and if you answer the
question precisely, I'm hopeful there will be no
violation that could cause security concerns.

MR. BOIES: I want to talk to the CIA
people.
(Discussion off the record.)

MR. DORSEY: We have just had an off-the-record discussion involving the various people in this room, including the CIA with the understanding that we will try to avoid any discussion of matters relating to national security considerations.

As a result, my questions may be more limited than I otherwise would have put to the witness, but I'm prepared to proceed at this time on that basis.

Q Mr. Adams, were you aware in 1967 of the existence of a variety of sources that related to infiltration?

A I was aware of the existence, yes, of a variety of sources.

Q Do you know whether the most reliable sources of intelligence with respect to infiltration came out of Washington in the fall of 1967?

A I would have to answer that by saying that the best way to determine infiltration is to combine a variety of sources.

Q What is a collateral source, Mr. Adams?
A collateral source in the Vietnam context was a captured document, a prisoner report, a defector report, an agent report, overhead photography report and other reports like that.

Q Those sources, those types of documents that you refer to permit, by themselves, someone to come up with a real time estimate of infiltration?

MR. BOIES: Could I have that question read back, please?

(Whereupon the record was read back as follows:)

"Those sources, those types of documents that you refer to permit, by themselves, someone to come up with a real time estimate of infiltration?"

A An analyst using those sources of information could come up with an estimate of infiltration which was real time, if he combined it with source X.

Q But by themselves could an analyst come up with a reliable real time estimate without source X?

MR. BOIES: Objection.

A To my knowledge, the people who we have
discussed so far in the case of infiltration analysts or people working on infiltration such as Hankins, Gattozzi and others, had access to source X and used it.

So what you're asking is a hypothetical question.

Q Isn't it true, Mr. Adams, that it's hypothetical only if Mr. Hankins and Mr. Gattozzi did, in fact, have full access to source X?

A To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Hankins and Mr. Gattozzi had full access to source X.

Q But isn't it true that if they did not, they would not have been able to make a reliable estimate of infiltration in the fall of 1967?

MR. BOIES: Objection.

A I find it very hard to answer your question since they did have access to source X. I presume if they didn't have access to source X, which they did have access to, they might have had a harder time making an accurate assessment, a real time assessment of infiltration.

But, of course, they had access to source X.