MR. BOIES: Are you at a convenient point to break?

MR. DORSEN: Certainly, off the record.

(Recess.)

Q Mr. Adams, you referred, I believe, to a compilation or a total of guerrillas set forth in an enemy document that totaled 170,000; is that correct?

A That's correct, yes.

Q Do you have any knowledge of whether that total of 170,000 was based on adding up the reports from each of the provinces as submitted to some central authority?

A Yes, I have reason to believe so.

Q Would you give your reason?

A I did a study based on that document and I'd like to explain how I did it.

The document dated roughly mid-1966, early to mid-1966, stated there were approximately 170,000 Viet Cong guerrillas in South Vietnam.

The total 170,000 was the sum of guerrillas in six, I believe it was six Viet Cong regions.

I did a study to see if the provinces within
each of the regions came close to the total listed for
the regions, the sum of whose totals, the sum of the
totals being 170,000 countrywide.

I discovered, for example, that the Region
IV report, the Region IV being around Saigon, reports
from Region IV came to a total almost exactly to the
number listed for Region IV in the document and at the
present time, I can't remember the other regions
precisely but in each case, I came up with the number
which was close to the number listed in the region.

What I'm saying basically is the provinces,
the province totals added up to the region totals. The
region totals added up to 170,000.

I didn't have it for each region but I had
it for enough for me to believe the whole document was
probably in the right ballpark.

Q Do you know whether the document with the
total of 170,000 was prepared in precisely the way that
you described, namely, that it was prepared by adding
up the totals in the various provinces and regions?
A I certainly know the countrywide total was
the sum of the region totals. There was no indication
on the document itself that the region totals were the
sum of province totals as reported from the provinces.

By way of explanation, each region was
divided into a number of provinces or sub-regions.
However, we did have, for example, documents dated 1966
for the sub-regions, although sub-regions belonging to
Region IV. The documents we had for the sub-regions
had totals which added up to the total listed in the
document with a countrywide total of 170,000, which
added up to the Region IV number.

I'm afraid that's not really clearly
expressed for the record, but in other words, what I'm
saying is the documents checked out.

Q Do you know whether the Communists added up
all the regions and sub-regions and came up to a total
of 170,000?

A I don't know for a fact they did, but that
was a strong indication, that that was the way they
arrived at the number.

Q So if the numbers were wrong for regions and
sub-regions they would be wrong for the nationwide
total; is that correct?
MR. BOIES: Objection.

A In a theoretical way, I suppose you could say that. However, that isn't the way you conduct intelligence. You conduct intelligence with the best information you've got.

When, as in this case, a number of totals check out with what you've got, you thereupon make the assumption that the remaining totals are all right. You don't make the assumption that they're wrong.

Q On page 19 of Exhibit 231, with respect to the entry for Maxwell Taylor, I'd like to read the first sentence or two and correct me if I am reading it incorrectly.

"Advice to LBJ, etc. I prepared for my interview with Taylor for upwards of a month and our hour and a half talk got nothing save one usable quote."

What did you mean by that?

A I meant that in my view, General Taylor was extraordinarily evasive on some points, had bad memory on others and as a source for my book, was basically useless because he was so vague and forgetful.

Q Are you saying that in your interview with
General Taylor, he said nothing that was inconsistent
with the premises in your book?

A I don't know whether I would say I had
premises in my book. In my book I try to present what
happened. I don't believe that I started with a
preconception.

I found that what General Taylor told me
didn't tell me anything I didn't know already or that I
found useful in any way.

Q Useful in what sense or usable in what sense?

A My recollection is he had a very difficult
time remembering anything. I was trying to find out
what he recalled and he didn't recall much to me.

My recollection is that, for example, I read
him a number of Meacham's letters and he said something
to the effect, "Well, how can you pay attention to
somebody at such a low level?"

Q What did you say?

A I replied something to the effect, and I
don't recall precisely, I'd have to check my notes,
something to the effect that "Well, the man was
preparing the official strength statistics at the time
and this is what he said."

General Taylor, all he could say is "Well how can you trust," something to that effect of "How can you trust a man of that grade?"

Q Did you mean by the word "usable" that General Taylor said only one thing that was supportive of the material in your book?

MR. BOIES: Objection.

A No. He said something and what he said was in reply to a question I asked him concerning the 20th of August cable by Abrahms about dropping the self defense militia, the principal reason on being fear of press reaction.

When I read this to him, read the quote to him, he said something to the effect about the press, "Well, you had to do something to beat down those lying sons of bitches" referring to the press.

To me, even now, I don't think that's necessarily usable in my book but it gave an indication of his state of mind about the controversy concerning strength estimates.

Now, I don't necessarily think that's
usable. When I said, "usable" up here, that was
certainly a quote which shed light on the order of
battle controversy.

Q Did General Taylor say whether he read
General Abrahms' cable on or about August 20, 1967?

A I don't recall. I think I -- my
recollection is that I asked him, you know, I said, "Do
you recognize such a cable," or "Do you recollect such
a cable?" I forget what he said.

Q Do you know if Mr. Bostow saw General
Abrahms' August 10th cable on or about August 20, 1967?

A I don't know.

Q Do you know whether President Johnson saw
General Abrahms' August 20, 1967 cable on or about
August 20, 1967?

A I don't know.

Q Mr. Adams, I'd like to turn your attention
to what's been called, among other things, the session
in the little room in the Pentagon.

Prior to the broadcast, where did you get
accounts on which you relied for that incident?

A Prior to the broadcast, I relied primarily
on what Colonel Hamscher had told me. I had also heard
something close to an account of it out of Barry
Williams but I didn't realize they were talking about
the same thing.

Q Why didn't you realize they were talking
about the same thing?

A At the time before the broadcast, Williams
was talking to me and told me about an incident during
which some numbers were cut arbitrarily but I didn't
understand when it was.

Later, when George Crile and I talked to
Barry Williams in Fort Bragg, North Carolina, it became
clear that he was talking about the same incident that
Colonel Hamscher had described to me earlier.

Q When did each of them place this meeting in
time?

A I don't know. I'd have to consult my notes
which would be, of course, more than my notes of simply
of Hamscher and Williams interview.

Q Did Colonel Hamscher tell you whom he
recalled present at that session in the Pentagon?

A Yes, he clearly indicated to me that General
Graham was there, then Lieutenant Colonel Graham.

Q Who else did he indicate was there?

A I'd have to consult my notes. The only person he was absolutely dead positive was there was -- well, I'd have to consult my notes.

Q Do you have any independent recollection of who was present?

A I do know he remember Colonel Graham being there. Colonel Graham was the person who arbitrarily cut the numbers.

Q Do you recall if he remember General Godding being there?

A I would have to read my notes.

Q Do you remember whether Colonel Hamscher remember Colonel Hawkins being there?

A Again, I would have to consult my notes.

Q Do you remember who Barry Williams recalled being at the session?

A Again, the person Barry Williams remembers most clearly, because he was the person cutting, doing the actual arbitrary cuts, was Lieutenant Colonel Graham.
Without having access to my notes, it now comes back to me that Hamscher clearly remembers Williams being there because he told me that as Graham was cutting units arbitrarily that he and Colonel Williams looked at each other and shrugged and nodded and sort of gave gestures of disbelief and hopelessness.

Q Did Colonel Williams, Barry Williams, whatever his rank was there, tell you whom else he thought was at the session?

A I'd have to consult my notes.

Q Did somebody tell you that General Godding was at the session?

A Again, I would have to consult my notes.

Q As of mid-1981, did you believe George Godding was at the session?

MR. BOIES: Object to the form of the question.

A Again, I would have to consult my notes. I do recall that somebody suggested that General Godding was there, but I can't remember who it was.

Q Would it have been either Barry Williams or George Hamscher?
A It might well have been.

Q Did somebody tell you that colonel Hawkins was there?

A Again, I would have to consult my notes. I know for a fact, however, or at least it is my opinion, my strong opinion, that he wasn't there because his letters home indicate he left Vietnam in mid-August and I believe the meeting took place in late August.

Hawkins had left Washington in mid-August. The meeting which took place in Washington was held in late August, I believe.

Q Was there a period of time in 1981 and perhaps beyond, when you believed that Colonel Hawkins was at that meeting in the Pentagon?

A I believe that he might well have been there because I recall distinctly that he was in Washington in August. However, what I did not recall distinctly is when he left. I discovered when I read his letters home, which I obtained well before the airing of the broadcast, that he had left in mid-August.

Q That convinced you that he was not in Washington?
A Well, if he was in Vietnam, he wasn't in Washington.

Q Did Colonel Williams or Colonel Hamscher tell you which units were slashed at that session?

A No, they could not remember specific units which were slashed. However, General Hamscher did recall distinctly that some service units were slashed, administrative service units were slashed from the order of battle.

Q Did he identify which particular ones?

A He did not identify -- I do not recall whether he identified particular units.

Q Have you made any effort at any time to reconstruct or ascertain which specific units were cut?

A Yes, I have.

Q What did you discover?

A What I said is I made an attempt to ascertain, which is not the same thing as discover. What I was led to believe or what I came to believe is the type of units cut were administrative service units and local force units, local force units being Communist combat units subordinate to Viet Cong
provinces and districts.

I came to believe this for a number of reasons. One reason was because Lieutenant Colonel David Morgan, Deputy Head of the Order of Battle branch in Saigon said that in early September, which was only a short time after that time which I believe the Pentagon meeting took place, went through the order of battle section cutting units from local force units and from administrative service units.

In addition, Colonel Hawkins told me in January, 1968, and also in September, 1967, that he had arbitrarily slashed administrative service units.

Lieutenant Marshall Lynn told me the units of his which were cut in Saigon in early September, 1967 included the roughly half a dozen reserve units which he had responsibility for counting, such units serving in the Saigon area.

Since the units he was responsible for were, to my recollection, rear service groups, 80 through 86, I came to believe these units were arbitrarily slashed. I came to believe particularly, I think it was rear service group 83 had been slashed. So, I did
make an attempt to discovery which units had been cut.

Q Did you sit down with the August figures and
the September figures and any other contemporaneous
documents to try to pinpoint which units were cut and
by how much?

MR. BOIES: Except as to what he's already
tested?

MR. DORSEN: Yes.

A The answer to your question is to the best
of my recollection, no, because I did not have access
to the worksheets that they used in cutting the figures.

Q Do you have figures, OB figures for
administrative service units for July and August and
other figures for September and October?

A The trouble is that new units, the order of
battle units for September-- correction, that the
September order of battle was precisely the same as the
August order of battle. In other words, there wasn't a
new set of figures in September.

Q What about in October? Was there a new set
of figures then?

A There wasn't a new set of figures in October.
Q: They carried the same figures in the September and October orders of battle as had been carried in August but it was a straight line projection. They carried exactly the same figures.

Q: Again, I'll ask you what was slashed if the figures were the same?

A: Okay. When you get to the November order of battle, then you can -- one might be able to, and I probably did this back some time or another, one might be able to compare specific units as listed in the November OB to those listed in the August order of battle.

Q: And you haven't done that?

MR. BOIES: Objection.

A: I believe I have done that.

Q: Have you done it recently?

A: No, but by way of explanation, there were so many adjustments between -- arbitrary adjustments, fake adjustments, I'm referring to, between August and November, so many adjustments, that it is virtually impossible to track any given unit.

Q: Were there arbitrary or fake adjustments, as
you've described them, that were made as a result of
actions taken other than in the room in the Pentagon?
A Can you be more specific?
Q How many different times were cuts made in
administrative services?
A Okay. The ones that I know about, I know a
cut was made or a belief a cut was made on the basis of
what I was told in late August, 1967.
I believe a cut was made in unit strengths
in early 1967.
Q Early September?
A Correction, early September, 1967.
Q Is that an additional cut?
A I don't believe so. I believe that the
units were cut in Washington in late August, 1967 or
thereafter, sometime in August, 1967, and that there
were cuts made in Saigon to conform to the cuts made in
Washington.
Q Did General Graham order Colonel Morgan to
make these changes?
A No, according to Colonel Morgan, Colonel
Hawkins told him to make the cuts.
Q  Did Lieutenant Colonel Graham tell Colonel Hawkins that he should make those cuts?

A  I don't know whether he did or not.

Q  Was Colonel Hawkins a higher rank, the same rank or a lower rank than Lieutenant Colonel Graham?

A  Although --

Q  Could you please answer that first and then you can explain?

A  No, I'll answer it the way I think it should be answered, which is to explain how an apparently low ranking person can have more weight on a subject than a higher ranking person has.

Although Lieutenant Colonel Graham was technically outranked by Colonel Hawkins, by the time the September conference rolled around, Graham had more clout with the order of battle than Hawkins did because in my view, and I've been told this by other people, basically Graham had taken over the order of battle count from Colonel Hawkins.

So, although Hawkins, a Colonel, was technically of a higher rank than Graham, Graham had more clout.
Now, clearly Graham couldn't order Hawkins to cut the numbers. What probably happened, although I can't be sure, I don't know, but what probably happened was Lieutenant Colonel Graham went back to MACV headquarters and informed either General Davidson or Colonel Morris and General Davidson and Colonel Morris relayed the orders to Hawkins and that's how such a thing would be done.

Q: Did Colonel Hawkins tell you this?
A: No, he did not.

Q: Did you ask him?
A: Yes, I have. He said that he couldn't remember. He does, however, remember receiving from Colonel Morris orders to stay below a certain number.

Q: You're talking about what?
A: I'm talking about Colonel Hawkins -- Colonel Hawkins told me and has testified to under oath and has written in newspapers, in a newspaper article, that he received from Colonel Morris just prior to the opening of the order of battle conference in September, 1967, or sometime during the beginning part of the order of battle conference --
Can I interrupt you one second, Mr. Adams.
Are you sure Colonel Hawkins didn't testify it was in the latter half of the conference in Saigon, the incident you're describing?
A No, I'm not sure. My recollection is he told me it was in the beginning of the conference that he told me the order to stay under a figure written on a slip of paper.
Kelly Robinson's recollection was that the slip of paper was handed to him in the beginning of the conference, but to me it doesn't make any different whether it's the beginning or the end.
It does make some difference but to me, and the perception that Colonel Hawkins had, whenever exactly the incident took place that he was being given a ceiling to stay under.
Mr. Adams, were the administrative service units cut before or during the Saigon session?
MR. BOIES: Object to the form of the question.
Or some other time or not at all?
MR. BOIES: Or both?
MR. DORSEN: Or all four.

A They were certainly cut before the
conference on the unofficial books.

Q What was the relevance of the slip of paper
to the cutting of the administrative service figure if
they had already been cut?

A Sir, you're beginning to give me a very
close question of how exactly things happened. I don't
know exactly what happened during all these incidents.
I have tied them together as best I can.

However, the one thing -- the things that
come through very clear throughout this whole
proceeding was first, that there was a ceiling.

Virtually, everyone in the order of battle section that
had to deal with totals knew about the ceiling.

Second, that there were cuts in numbers.

Third, that there were manipulations up and
down to stay under the ceiling.

The precise order of how these things came
about, I can't necessarily say with any accuracy.

Q Mr. Adams, with respect to the
administrative services, did anyone tell you that what
happened was that certain types of administrative services personnel were deleted from the order of battle?

A What I was told about administrative service personnel was that they were arbitrarily cut.

Colonel Hamscher told me administrative service troops were arbitrarily cut. Colonel Morgan told me that administrative service troops were arbitrarily cut. Marshall lynn told me that administrative service troops were arbitrarily cut. Colonel Hawkins told me that administrative service troops were arbitrarily cut.

Q Did you ask any of them what they meant by the term "arbitrarily cut"?

A I'm sure I did.

Q Do you remember any answers?

A In general, without laying on specific language, in general, I was told that these units were cut without regard to evidence as to their strength. They were cut, in other words, arbitrarily.

Q Did anyone tell you, Mr. Adams, that the units were cut by deciding that certain types of
personnel such as drivers or porters or some other type of personnel should be herein after excluded from the category of administrative services?

At one time during the Saigon conference, the statement was made that they were cutting something -- I think the word they used was "hangers on." I have been subsequently told by many sources that this was baloney.

Q Did anyone ever tell you that what was done was that certain jobs were excluded or dropped from the administrative services category?

A Basically, no.

Q When you say, "Basically, no," do you intend to qualify that "no" in any way?

A I am trying to recall the smokescreen that was used at the time to conceal the fact that these people were being cut arbitrarily. Subsequently, everybody told me they were cut arbitrarily. Now, I'm trying to remember what the cover story was and I can't remember it.

Q Isn't it true though, Mr. Adams, that the MACV figures for administrative services actually rose
during this period?

MR. BOIES: Object to the form of the
question.

A The answer is basically no and I give this
reason: Everyone acknowledged that the number carried
on the official books from as far back as anybody can
remember until the Saigon conference, was baloney.
What people were trying to do, acknowledging that that
figure was worthless, was to come up with a new
figure. Everyone realized that the old figure was way
too low. They came up with the new figure that was
higher than the figure which everyone knew was too low.
But that doesn't represent to me an
increase. It merely represents an acknowledgment that
the old figure was baloney.

Q Mr. Adams, you've testified that MACV cut
its figures, did you not, slashed its figures?

A The figures that were slashed were the
figures carried in the unofficial set of books.

Q Are you saying that there was an interim
figure that was substantially higher than the figure
carried in the MACV set of books and higher than the
figure they ended up with as their position in September?

A In the minds of people who worked on the subject, yes.

For example, Colonel Hawkins indicated to a CIA employee in the CIA cafeteria in August, 1967, his belief that the number of service troops belonging to enemy service units serving in South Vietnam had a TO&E of 100,000.

Since TO&E's represent only a theoretical figure, he was indicating his belief that it was somewhat lower than that. He said, generally speaking, that VC units are carried at 70 percent TO&E.

In other words, he was indicating his belief to the employee at the CIA cafeteria that his belief of the number of service troops was in the neighborhood of 70,000.

Q Who was the employee, by the way?

A I would like to consult with my lawyer.

MR. BOIES: With your lawyer or with the CIA lawyer?

THE WITNESS: The CIA lawyer. It has to do
with whether the guy is undercover or not.

Mr. Laprade: Off the record.

(Dialogue off the record.)

The Witness: I have been discussing
security matters in the hall with the CIA people. I
gave them on a slip of paper a name which was the
person --

Mr. Laprade: We'll check it out.

The Witness: This was the person Hawkins
told about the service troops.

Q: Is what you're saying, Mr. Adams, that the
figures that were slashed in the little room in the
Pentagon were not MACV's official estimates but rather
some other numbers?

Mr. Foies: Objection.

A: I have never been precisely sure which
numbers were cut except that the numbers were cut
arbitrarily. They were, however, numbers which were
either in the order of battle or about to go in the
order of battle.

Q: But you're not sure if they were MACV's
official figures; is that correct, the figures that
1 were slashed?
2 A I believe they were MACV's official
3 figures. Now, out of which set of books, I don't know.
4 Q Are you saying MACV had several sets of
5 official books?
6 MR. BOIES: Objection.
7 A No, I'm not saying that. What I am saying
8 is that some units were arbitrarily cut in the narrow
9 room in the Pentagon, according to those sources which
10 I've talked to. It was clear to everyone in the room
11 that arbitrary cuts were being made contrary to the
12 evidence.
13 I wasn't in the narrow room and I did not
14 see what piece of paper was in front of General Graham
15 when he slashed the units. I have been told that they
16 were official figures but I am not sure they were
17 official figures.
18 Q What official figures could they have been?
19 A Order of battle figures.
20 Q Figures in the order of battle?
21 A Figures in the order of battle.
22 Q But you're not sure?
MR. BOIES: Objection.

A Precisely what the piece of paper was in front of General -- now General, then Lieutenant Colonel Graham, what the piece of paper was, I didn't see.

I have been told they were official figures.

Q But which official figures?

A As I say, I didn't see the piece of paper. I don't know.

Q Do you have any belief as to which official figures they were?

A My problem is there were so many sets of juggled numbers around. Now, I don't know which one Danny Graham was operating on at that time. What I do know is that Danny Graham was arbitrarily slashing numbers. Two people were in the room that I talked to who said he was doing that. A lot of other people have told me that he was responsible for blocking evidence.

Q What does Danny Graham say?

A Danny Graham says he never did anything wrong.

Q Did anybody that you spoke to and on whom
you rely for the statement that then Lieutenant Colonel Graham was slashing figures, tell you that there were other people in the room in addition to those you've already mentioned?

A I don't know. Hamscher told me Williams and Graham were there. Williams told me Hamscher and Graham were there.

Q Did either of them tell you that General Godding and Colonel Hawkins were there?

A I'd have to consult my notes. I don't know. The one -- the two people both of them were sure of, Hamscher was sure that Danny Graham was in the room because he saw Danny slashing the figures.

He was sure that Williams was in the room because he remembers nodding at him saying, in effect, "What the hell is Danny Graham up to."

Williams remembers that Graham was in the room because he saw him slashing the figures. He also remembers that Hamscher was in the room because he too remembers making looks of incredulity at Hamscher.

Q Weren't those three people at a meeting in April, 1967, a meeting in the Pentagon?
Williams, Hamscher and Graham?

Yes.

Yes, they were at a meeting at CIA headquarters. I think they were sitting in the same room together.

The CIA headquarters is not the same place as the narrow room in the Pentagon. They were not talking about the same meeting.

But the three of them were at a meeting in April of 1968, concerning order of battle matters; is that correct?

At CIA headquarters; that is correct.

Were there numbers slashed or cut at any of those sessions?

That was an entirely different episode because it was an order of battle conference. I was there among other people. It was an order of battle conference at which the CIA was arguing for one set of numbers and Danny Graham was arguing for another set of numbers.

According to our information, it was something similar to what happened in August, 1967, is
that correct?

A No, totally dissimilar. One was a meeting at CIA headquarters. The other was a meeting at the pentagon. One was a meeting at which large numbers of people were present, including myself. I remember it.

I remember -- in fact, I remember Graham, Hamscher and Williams being there.

Q Being where?

A In this large room at CIA headquarters in April, 1968.

What Hamscher and Williams were testifying about was a small room in the Pentagon at which only a very few people were present.

Q Haven't they also testified that they could not be certain the events took place in April, 1968?

A I am --

Q Excuse me, did they also testify that they could not be certain the events did not occur in April, 1968?

MR. BOIES: Which events?

MR. DORSEY: The slashing of figures?

MR. BOIES: Object to the form of the
question.

A I frankly don't know their exact testimony on this point. I do recall this, that Danny Graham had claimed that he never came back to Washington in 1967. He has also told Mike Wallace that he was back in 1967.

Q And he told him recently that he was back in 1967; is that correct?

A He told him during his interview that he was back in Washington, back in 1967.

Q Do you believe Mr. Graham may have been mistaken when he told that to Mr. Wallace?

A No, I don't believe Mr. Graham was mistaken.

Q You think he was lying?

A No, I think he was telling the truth when he said he was back in '67.

Q And you think he was lying the other time?

A Yes.

Q Did you see then Lieutenant Colonel Graham back in August of '67?

A I'm not dead certain if it was then or not but for a good reason; a) I didn't know him at the time; b) if I did see him, he would have been attending
a national intelligence estimate meeting. That's where I would have seen him. It was a meeting in a room this size with maybe 40 people in it. I can't recall whether I remember seeing him there or not.

I have a memory of it but I'm not absolutely dead certain.

Isn't it true, Mr. Adams, in your book you state flatly you did not see lieutenant Colonel Graham until September, 1969 in Saigon?

MR. BOIES: Objection.

I don't know. I may have said that. I'm not certain. I can't now recall whether I did see him or whether I did not see him.

I also have a memory of having seen him but I'm not certain of it at all. I am certain that Graham told Wallace that he was back in '67. I am certain that Charlie Morris said that Graham had gone back to Washington, that he had ordered Graham back to Washington in 1967.

Q When in 1967, did each of these people say that Graham was back in Washington?

A I can't recollect exactly when. But I do
recollect that Graham now claims he was not back in
Washington in 1967 until, of course, you know, he was
in Washington in June but he went to -- let me start
over again.

Graham went to -- he went from the United
States to Vietnam in June or July, 1967. He now claims
that he never came back to the United States. However,
he told Mike Wallace that he had come back. Charlie
Morris recalls that he had sent Graham back. John
Michalski told me he remembers Danny Graham coming back.

Q Mr. Adams, if you agree Colonel Graham was
back in the United States in October, 1967, if he was
that would not be consistent with the events as you
portrayed them in your book?

MR. BOIES: Could I have the question read
back?

(Whereupon the record was read back as follows:)

"Q Mr. Adams, if you agree Colonel Graham was
back in the United States in October, 1967, if he
was that would not be consistent with the events
as you portrayed them in your book?"

A I never said that Danny was back in
Washington in October.

Q No, my point is this, Mr. Adams: Isn't it crucial for the events as you have portrayed them that Lieutenant Colonel Graham was in Washington in or around the end of August, 1967?

A Could you ask me that again, please?

Q Yes, isn't the issue, the issue that my question raises, is whether Lieutenant Colonel Graham was in Washington in or about the end of August, 1967?

A In my view, the crucial thing is that Danny was in a room in the Pentagon prior to the Tet offensive, well prior to the Tet offensive, and began arbitrarily slashing numbers.

Q It doesn't matter significantly, are you saying, whether that took place at the end of August, September, October, November or December, 1967?

A I have come to the conclusion that it is likely that Danny was doing his number in August, 1967. Whether this is crucial to the entire story is something I would have to really think out. I don't think it is because the one thing that people agree on, Hamscher and Williams agree on, is that there was an
arbitrary reduction of numbers which took place in a narrow room in the Pentagon at that juncture, prior to Tet.

Q So that is what is crucial as opposed to whether it was at the end of August, 1967?

MR. BOIES: Objection.

A The most important thing about that meeting is that a member of General Westmoreland's J-2 staff, the head of the tank, was in Washington arbitrarily slashing numbers. That is a crucial event. Danny Graham was slashing numbers in an arbitrary fashion.

Now, precisely when this took place is important but it is nowhere near as important as the fact that he was doing it.

MR. DORSEN: Why don't we break for the day.

(TIME NOTED: 3:55 p.m.)

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SAMUEL ALEXANDER ADAMS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this ___ day of May, 1984.

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Notary Public
CERTIFICATE

I, JOHN V. STEWART, a stenotype reporter and notary public, within and for the State of New York, do hereby certify:

That SAMUEL ALEXANDER ADAMS, the witness whose examination is hereinbefore set forth, was first duly sworn by me, and that transcript of said testimony is a true record of the testimony given by said witness.

I further certify that I am not related to any of the parties to this action by blood or marriage, and that I am in no way interested in the outcome of this matter.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 25 day of May, 1984.

JOHN V. STEWART