Q. Do you remember, sitting here, what the MACV estimate was at the Langley conference for the SD and the SSDs?

A. What the MACV estimate was?

Q. Yes.

MR. BOISE: Object to the form of the question.

THE WITNESS: Not specifically, no, I don't.

BY MR. DORSEN: (Resuming)

Q. Was it in the range for 20,000 for secret self-defense militia, and 120,000 for self-defense militia?

A. I don't think so, but I don't remember.

MR. BOISE: Do you want to put his notes in front of you?

BY MR. DORSEN: (Resuming)

Q. Are there any notes that you took that would indicate those figures?

A. Which figures?

Q. MACV estimates of the size of the self-defense militia and secret self-defense militia presented at the Langley conference in August of '67.

MR. BOISE: Object to the form of the question.
THE WITNESS: I believe I have notes which indicate what may have been on a vu-graph, what may have been on a vu-graph, which may or may not have been shown at that time. But I got the notes from the vu-graph. I made the notes from the vu-graph, not from notes I made at the time.

BY MR. DORSEN: (Presuming)

Q  When did you make the notes from the vu-graph?
A  I believe sometime in 1976.

Q  Is there any discussion at the August 1967 Langley session, discussion among all the participants present of MACV, the size of MACV's estimate of the self-defense militia and secret self-defense militia?

MR. BOISE: Objection to the form of the question.

THE WITNESS: I certainly imagine there was, but I can't remember specifically what was said.

BY MR. DORSEN: (Presuming)

Q  Is it accurate to state that the principal subject discussed at the Langley session was the size of the various categories of enemy then in the MACV CF?

MR. BOISE: Objection.

THE WITNESS: No.
BY MR. DORSEN: (Resuming)

Q What was the principal subject?
A Perhaps I should put yes and no. It was certainly the discussion concerning how big the guerrilla force was, how big the political cadre force was, how big the service force was. There were many arguments over what categories to include in the order of battle or not, and there was beginning, as I recall, to be a discussion on whether to quantify certain categories or not, according to my present recollection.

Q Quantify which groups?
A Well, there were certainly discussions as to whether to quantify the self-defense and secret self-defense militia. There were also discussions as to whether to quantify the political cadres.

Q What was the CIA position on those?
A The CIA position at that time clearly was to quantify both the self-defense and secret self-defense and to quantify the number of political cadres.

Q What was the MACV position on quantification?
A According to my recollection, the MACV position -- I'm having problems with the term "MACV
position." What do you mean by that?

2 The position as propounded by General Godding and Colonel Hawkins at the conference, unless you have some other definition.

3 A I can't recall precisely when this came up, but I believe that towards the end of the August sessions General Godding was beginning to say that the MACV position was that the self-defense and secret self-defense should not be quantified.

4 Q What about the political cadre?

5 A I forget exactly when that came up. There was discussion of it, but I don't remember when.

6 Q Do you remember when General Godding first indicated that he did not think the self-defense militia, secret self-defense militia should be quantified?

7 A He personally?

8 Q Yes.

9 A I think General Godding has since indicated that he thought they ought to be quantified, so -- are you talking about the official MACV position or General Davidson's position or whose?
I'm talking about the position as presented at the conference by MACV representatives.

A I can't recall specifically when that came up. I would imagine it was towards the end of the conference, towards the end of the August phase of the NIE meetings at Langley, Virginia.

Q And at the beginning of the August 1967 session at Langley what quantification, if any, did the MACV representatives state there should be secret self-defense and self-defense militia?

MR. BOISE: Objection.

THE WITNESS: Let me say in my recollection of the NIE draft as drafted by CIA representatives that we thought that the number of self-defense and secret self-defense was in the neighborhood of a total of 120,000 -- roughly 100,000 self-defense, roughly 20,000 secret self-defense.

BY MR. DORSEY: (Resuming)

Q Did Colonel Hawkins ever indicate to you in words or substance that he disagreed with that estimate?

A The problem arises with the self-defense. It was not so much the size of the estimate, although there
may have been disagreements on that. The big problem
was whether to leave them in the order of battle and
whether later to quantify them.

The MACV position at the outset of the August
proceedings was that they should no longer be included
in the order of battle. It later became clear as we got
cables from MACV headquarters that the reason for taking
them out of the order of battle was political. And...
somewhere along the line... I can't say exactly
where -- during the August conference the argument began
to be made that not only should they be removed from the
order of battle, but they should also not be quantified.

Q Did this come as a shock to you or surprise to
you?

MR. BOISE: Objection.

THE WITNESS: Given the very peculiar behavior
of the MACV representatives, almost nothing would
surprise me. Their behavior was so patently dishonest
that, you know, it wouldn't have surprised me if they
wanted to non-quantify everybody.

BY MR. DORSEN: (Resuming)

Q Had you been given any warning that MACV might
take the position that the self-defense militia and
secret self-defense militia should not be quantified?

A I don't know about -- what do you mean by
warning?

Q A notice.

MR. BOISE: Unless you specify the context, do
we understand that when you say you, you're referring to
Mr. Adams personally?

MR. DORSEN: That's right.

THE WITNESS: Did I have any warning that they
might not?

BY MR. DORSEN: (Presuming)

Q Yes.

A I don't think anybody came up to me with a red
flag and flapped it in my face and said they might not
want to quantify the self-defense. Given the -- what
was clearly going on, or at least my perception of what
was going on, that they wanted to keep the numbers below
300,000 and that they wanted to portray -- "they" being
MACV -- that they wanted to portray an enemy that was
deciding in strength, it didn't necessarily surprise me
at all that they wanted to remove, not only remove the
self-defense, but they wanted not to quantify them.

Q At the beginning of the conference did anyone
tell you that the MACV either agreed or disagreed with
the CIA estimate of approximately 100,000 for the
self-defense militia and 20,000 for the secret
self-defense militia?

A The issue over the numbers of self-defense to
me was peripheral to the issue of whether or not they
were going to count them in the OB or whether or not
they were going to quantify them at all. The clear
position of MACV at that time was to keep the overall
number under 300,000 no matter what they did. That to
me was the thing that was going on.

Q Do you recall anyone stating out loud at the
conference in August 1967 at Langley that the MACV
position was or best estimate was that there were
approximately 100,000 self-defense militia and 20,000
secret self-defense militia?

MR. BOTSE: I think he's already answered that
question about twice, maybe more than twice. I'll let
him answer it one more time. But I do note for the
record that you're asking the same question repeatedly.
MR. DORSEN: Let him just answer one more.

THE WITNESS: They may have had a position like that. I can't recall exactly what it was.

But as I say, the most important thing about the self-defense was not the number; it was whether in order to stay under a ceiling of approximately 300,000, whether you had to take them out or not, and whether having taken them out, whether you quantified them or not.

BY MR. DORSEN: (Resuming)

Q Let me move ahead, Mr. Adams, to 1972. At that time am I correct that you were a witness in the prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg?

MR. BOISE: Are you going to another subject?

MR. DORSEN: Yes. We have six hours. We agreed on that. Are we going to do them all today?

MR. BOISE: Yes.

(RECESS.)

BY MR. DORSEN: (Resuming)

Q Mr. Adams, I'd like to direct your attention to the time you were aware of the prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg in and around 1972. Am I correct you were a
Witness at that trial?

A  May I correct you, Mr. Dorsen, about the timing? My participation in it was in 1973.

Q  Did it come to your attention in or around 1973 -- strike that.

Did you give the name of Gains Hawkins to anyone as a possible witness in the prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg?

A  I don't believe we did, no.

Q  Do you know if anyone gave Colonel Hawkins' name to any representative of the defendants as a potential witness?

A  I know that Gains Hawkins' name came to the attention of the defendants.

Q  Do you know whether Gains Hawkins was interviewed by the representatives of the United States government in connection with his possibly being a witness in the prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg?

A  When?

Q  In or around 1973.

A  No.

Q  Did there come a time when you learned that
representatives of the United States government interviewed Colonel Hawkins because he was a potential witness in the Ellsberg trial?

A The best of my recollection is that Colonel Hawkins indicated to me -- and I don't know when it was exactly -- that he had talked to government representatives in the 1973 period.

Q Do you recall approximately when Colonel Hawkins told you that?

A Come to think of it, I'm not sure whether it was Colonel Hawkins who told me that. It might have been Kelly Robins. I don't know.

Q Do you recall approximately when you first learned that?

A Okay. I did not learn it, as far as I know, in 1973. I can't remember. It has come to my attention. Precisely when I can't say. It may have been during the time I saw Colonel Hawkins during 1981. It might have been during my conversations with Kelly Robins. I really don't remember when I found out that might have been the case.

Q Do you recall whether somebody told you about
Colonel Hawkins possibly being a witness in 1981 or earlier?

A Witness for what?

Q In the Ellsberg trial.

A For anybody?

Q Yes.

A Well, it was -- certainly the defense was thinking of calling him as a witness in 1973.

Q Did you learn at any time in 1981 or earlier what Colonel Hawkins told representatives of the defense or representatives of the prosecution as to what he was prepared to testify to?

A Colonel Hawkins -- okay. I was at a -- you'd better come at me again on that one, okay?

Q Yes. In 1981 or earlier did anybody tell you what Colonel Hawkins was prepared to testify to if called as a witness in the prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg?

A No, I don't believe they did, no.

Q Did anyone ever tell you in words or substance that Colonel Hawkins was prepared to testify that nothing improper had occurred in connection with the
preparation of the order of battle in 1967 if you were
subpoenaed as a witness in the prosecution of Daniel
Ellsberg?

A I don't know for sure, but I don't think
anybody did. I don't recall.

Q Is what I'm telling you something that is news
to you or known to you?

MR. BOISE: Objection.

THE WITNESS: What are you telling me?

BY MR. DORSEN: (Resuming)

2 I'm telling you that there is some evidence
that Colonel Hawkins was prepared to testify that there
was nothing improper that had occurred in 1967
concerning the MACV OB. Not excepting what my
characterization is, had anyone ever told you in word or
substance that Colonel Hawkins was prepared to testify
in 1973, if called, as a witness in the prosecution of
Daniel Ellsberg to say that there was nothing improper
that had occurred in the preparation of the MACV OB?

A Put in those blanket terms, no. As far as I
can tell, Hawkins -- that's a pretty blanket statement,
that he was prepared to testify that nothing was
unusual, nothing wrong had occurred. Prior to 1981 no
one told me that.

Q Had anyone told you prior to, say, January 20,
1982 that Colonel Hawkins had stated in words or
substance that he was prepared to commit perjury rather
than testify in a matter that would help Daniel Ellsberg?

A Never in those terms prior to 20 January
1982. I do recall, however, when he wrote a -- when he
wrote an article for the Outlook section of the
Washington Post in I believe it was November 1982, he
said something to the effect that he was willing to
flirt with perjury, if not perjure himself. I would
have to see the exact text of the article.

Q Are you aware prior to January 20, 1982 of the
subject matter of that statement by Colonel Hawkins?

MR. POISE: Object to the form of the question.

THE WITNESS: The subject matter?

BY MR. DORSEN: (Resuming)

Q Was that the first time you heard from Colonel
Hawkins or anyone else in words or in substance that
Colonel Hawkins was prepared to flirt with perjury if
called as a witness in the Ellsberg trial?
I think that's the first time I ever heard it put in those terms.

What terms had you heard it put in?

Colonel Hawkins had indicated to me -- I believe it may have been -- I'm not sure -- I believe it may have been in 1982, I'm not sure -- that -- I take that back -- 1981 or 1982 -- that he had talked to government officials at the Ellsberg trial in that general area, and that he was very uneasy -- said he was very embarrassed and uneasy about everything that was going on at that time.

But as to his actually saying that he was prepared to perjure himself or flirt with perjury or whatever words he later maybe used in that article, I can't say as I recall anything like that.

Did Colonel Hawkins tell you in 1981 or earlier that he had made false or misleading statements to government officials when interviewed during the Ellsberg trial?

A '81 or earlier? You're meaning any time prior to 31 December 1981?

Yes.
A  I can't recall him saying anything to that
precise effect, that he was willing to make false or
misleading statements. My first clear information, if
you call it that, to that effect, was his article in
November 1982, and I would have to check the text of
what he actually said.

Q  What did you learn prior to January 20, 1982,
from Colonel Hawkins or from any other source as to what
Colonel Hawkins was telling people he was prepared to
testify to in the Ellsberg trial?

A  Well, I never heard exactly what he was
prepared to testify to... The -- I think the first
information I had concerning Colonel Hawkins even being
in contact with the government officials during the
Ellsberg trial was from Kelly Robins, I believe. I
don't remember for certain. And I can't remember when
that was.

I talked to Robins in '78 -- I talked to him
in '81; I'm not sure about '78, but somewhere in that
period -- and he indicated to me that Hawkins had been
talking to government officials.

Q  Did Kelly Robins indicate to you during those
conversations or conversation, if there was only one, that Colonel Hawkins was stating that he could not be helpful to the defense in the Ellsberg trial?  

A My main recollection was that Kelly Robbins told me that Hawkins was in contact with government officials at that time. Now, I don't think he told me one way or the other what Hawkins was prepared to say, but my distinct recollection is that he told me that Hawkins had been in contact with government officials.

Q As of January 20, 1962, had you heard anything more about what Colonel Hawkins was saying to the government officials or attorneys for the defendants on the subject matter of reliability of estimates of enemy strength other than what you testified to here today?

MR. POISE: By "attorneys for defendants" you mean attorneys for the Ellsberg defendants?

BY MR. DORSEN: (Resuming)

Q That's correct.

A Can you come again on that one? That was sort of a broad question.

Q I'm asking you other than what you've testified to already, is there anything that you recall
having heard on or before January 20, 1982 on the
subject of what Colonel Hawkins was telling government
officials or counsel for defendants or other
representatives of defendants of the Pilsberg trial on
the subject of enemy strength estimates in Vietnam?

A    I don't think so. I think that the main
information that I got was -- I got my information that
Colonel Hawkins may have been prepared to perjure
himself or flirt with perjury or whatever wording he
used was in the November 1982 article he wrote for the
Outlook section of the Washington Post. I simply can't
recall that before then he told me or anyone else told
me that he was about -- that he wanted to "flirt with
perjury," if that is in fact what he -- is the wording
he used. I'd have to check in the November 12 --
November 1982 article.

Q    Have you said everything you recall about what
Colonel Hawkins was telling representatives of the
government and representatives of the defendants during
1973?

A    Yes.

Q    That you were aware of as of January 20, 1982?
As far as I know, the main thing I talked to Colonel -- the main source I had was the November 1962 article concerning his willingness to "flirt with perjury," if indeed that is what he wrote. There is a reason for this... In fact, it is that I tend not to ask Colonel Hawkins things unless he wants to tell me, unless he wants to volunteer them... According to my recollection he didn't volunteer anything, and other people didn't know, or at least they didn't tell me about it.

Q. Now, at any time -- and I'm going to change the subject again, Mr. Adams -- at any time did you believe that MACV intelligence under General McChristian was keeping two sets of books?

MR. POISE: Object to the form of the question.

THE WITNESS: At any time did I believe that MACV intelligence under General McChristian was keeping two sets of books.

(Pause.)

I got information that MACV intelligence under General McChristian was keeping two sets of books on political cadres, and of course it is clear that in one
sense he was, because there was a number between say the period of August-September 1966 and through at least his exit from the J-2 post in 1 June 1967—that there was a number that was being released officially by MACV. That was 39,175 political cadres. If you want to characterize that as one set of books, okay.

It was also clear that during this period of time people under him were coming up with numbers other than that, higher, much higher numbers. And in that sense, I suppose you could say that he was keeping two sets of books. I don't think he characterized it that way, but you could if you wanted to.

Q When people told you this, as you described it, did you understand that these people were being critical of the procedure?

A Nobody told me that. What you're referring to, I guess -- what are you referring to?

Q Don't your notes refer, in words or substance, to two sets of books for political cadres at any time under General McChristian's tenure?

A I'd have to see my notes.

Q You don't recall, Mr. Adams?
I can recall that there was a reference to something like two sets of books during the time period prior to 1 June 1967, but again, this had to do with, as I mentioned, the fact that the official order of battle was coming out with 39,175, and his political OP analysts were coming up with much higher numbers than that.

Now, it seemed to me on the face of it that's two sets of books, and he would be, I would imagine, the first to acknowledge that the official number being promulgated, 39,175, was not a realistic one.

At any time did you believe that there was anything improper about having two sets of books, as you describe them?

MR. PORISE: Except as he has testified this morning, at least --

MR. DORSEY: I'm not sure he has testified about this subject.

BY MR. DORSEY: (Resuming)

Q I am asking Mr. Adams whether at any time did you believe that there was anything improper about MACV maintaining two sets of books as you've just described.
Well, again, as I testified this morning earlier, between August 1966 and February 1967 I suspected that something untoward might be going on, but when I attended the Honolulu conference on 6 through 12 February 1967, I found that in fact that although General McCrystian's official reporting -- not General McCrystian's but MACV's official reporting always issued the number 39,175 for the number of political cadres, the political or analysts and, as I understand it, General McCrystian himself, believed that there were much higher numbers. It was at that moment I decided there was nothing particularly improper in having, as you characterize it, in having two sets of books. One was an official number that had been kicking around since July 1965 and which everyone agreed at the Honolulu conference should be changed radically upwards, and the other was a larger set of figures.

Q Again, to change the subject, Mr. Adams, did you -- did Mr. Crile ever tell you why he -- let me start all over again.

You attended a number of the filmed or taped
interviews made in connection with the broadcast, is
that correct?

A Yes, I attended some.

Q Did Mr. Crile ever tell you why he wanted you
to attend them?

A It was never put in those terms. We would
discuss each individual interview as it came up. He
didn't say to me Sam, this is why I want you to attend
this one.

Q Did you have an understanding as to why you
attended the ones you attended?

A Not really, except I was friends with a lot of
these people. I had spoken at length to almost
everybody -- I had spoken at length to a lot of people,
and he felt, and I felt it would be a good idea for me
to go along.

There was also, I might add here, a problem --
not a problem, but a need on the part of Mr. Crile for
somebody to copy down questions as Crile was asking them
so that he could have somebody to -- so that he could
read these questions back when the camera was facing
him, and I seemed like a good person to do it.
Q Did Mr. Crile ever discuss with you or tell you why he did not have Alex Alben perform this role?
A I believe Alex Alben -- I'm not sure, as a matter of fact. I don't know why he didn't ask Alex.
But whether he did or did not ask Alex, Alex didn't by and large know these people, and I knew some of them.
Q Did Alex Alben attend any film interviews that you attended?
A I think he did, but I can't remember which ones. I seem to recall that he attended -- oh, he attended the Hampshire interview, I remember. It was in his apartment. There may have been others.
Q I'm not sure you answered this precise question. Did Mr. Crile ever indicate to you why Mr. Alben did not attend any other interviews?
MR. BOISE: Objection.
THE WITNESS: No, he did not. However, a reason might have been -- and I'm speculating here -- a reason might have been that some of the outlying interviews would require an extra plane ticket.
BY MR. DORSEY: (Resuming)
Q Did Mr. Crile ever indicate to you why Mr.
Alben did not attend instead of you?

A No, I don't think I ever discussed that with George.

Q Did Mr. Alben ever express any dissatisfaction in your presence concerning his failure to attend more interviews?

A Not that I recall. I think that Alex may have felt that he wanted to be more in on things in the sense that he was a research engineer and wanted to hear directly what people said; but I don't recall any discussion with Alex in which he said to me that, you know, he was complaining bitterly -- in which he was complaining bitterly about not being let in on such and such an interview.

Q Did you and Alex Alben ever discuss any aspect of his role as researcher on the broadcast?

A Of course we did.

Q Did he express any desire other than what you've testified to concerning whether he felt his role should have been larger?

(Pause.)

A I think the role of any -- let me scrub that
and start again.

I think any researcher feels he would like to have a larger role because you get information that way. However, I recall no specific discussions between me and Alex Alben in which he complained that he wanted to have -- that he was sitting in such and such an interview, no.

Did he ever indicate that he wanted to play a larger role than he was given with respect to any other aspect of his work at CBS?

Not really, I don't think. I think he accepted his role the way he had it. I think that he was an extraordinarily good researcher, and he seemed to enjoy doing it, and he didn't complain to me at any rate that he ought to -- in any specific terms that he ought to have had more of a role. I think he was hired on as a researcher, and that's what he did. I didn't hear him complain specifically about not being let in on such and such a specific interview.

Did he ever complain, to your knowledge, about not participating to a greater extent in any of the editing processes?
A: I don't think we talked about it any. I had almost nothing to do with editing, and it was just something that we didn't talk about.

Q: I would like to show you, Mr. Adams, what has been marked as Exhibit 239 and ask you if you have seen that before?

(The document was handed to the witness.)

A: Yes, I have. Some form of it, yes.

Q: What role, if any, did you play in drafting it?

A: This is according to my best recollection, so I can't guarantee that it is completely accurate.

MR. BOISE: May I inquire whether you got a copy of that exhibit that has the portions that are blocked out -- not blocked out. I'm not talking about the one that has the code words in it. I'm talking about the one that has the CIA-supplied information.

MR. DORSEN: I think that's the only copy we have for the record. That's a June 2, '67 cable. That's the only one I have with me.

MR. BOISE: My recollection is this is the one that was the subject of examination during George Carver, and there are at least three versions of this
document. This document has a bunch of stuff blocked out. There's a version that was the original of this document that is complete, but that document has a lot of sensitive material in it that we have all agreed need not be included. There is then a version that has a sanitized, if I can call it that, description of a blocked out material.

MR. DORSEN: If someone wants to put that on the record in a brief form, I will accept it.

MR. BOISE: I don't know what it is. All I know is there is an exhibit that does that.

MR. DORSEN: Can we just agree that if there's a problem going ahead with this exhibit, we will make the appropriate --

MR. BOISE: Why don't you go ahead with it, and while we're going ahead, I'm going to see if I can find that version.

Mr. Mastro has just returned from finding you the MacNamara transcript.

BY MR. DORSEN: (Resuming)

O Would you please continue with your answer?

A Would you put the question again?
You were testifying as to your recollection concerning the preparation of 239.

As a matter of fact, I have quite an extensive recollection of this cable.

Did you draft it, in whole or in part?

I did not draft the original, no.

Did you contribute to the drafting of the final version?

According to my best recollection, the paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, paragraphs 1 through 4 were drafted in their entirety according to my information at the time by the head of the Office of Current Intelligence, Indochina Division, a man by the name of Dean Moore. I don't recall that I even made any editorial changes on paragraphs 1 through 4.

Does your name appear on Exhibit 239?

Yes. It appears on page what is called JX-239, page 5 down at the bottom, where it says -- where my name appears is "Samuel Adams/SAVA," and under that "coordinating officer." Coordinating officer means in CIA parlance means reviewing officer, a person who is reviewing or coordinating a cable per se does not draft.
It. Coordinating officers review cables. And it was clear to me -- I now have 239A, which is a copy the CIA supplied us -- it was clear to me that the originator of that cable was the Office of Current Intelligence. It is clear to me from no less than three notations on it: I believe that in the upper lefthand corner there is a word which now seems to be blurred, but I think the word that is blurred there is "orig," originator is the CIA Operation Center, a unit, as it says below, of the Office of Current Intelligence to which Mr. Dean Moore belongs.

Q Who was the head of the Office of Current Intelligence at that time?

A According to my best recollection, a gentleman by the name of Drexel Godfrey was.

The second notation, which leads me to believe that this was drafted by the Office of Current Intelligence, was another notation just below the ones I was talking about which says OCI-4 under CONF. This is CONF, C-C-N-F. I believe that means confirmed, which means that the Office of Current Intelligence got the confirmed copy, and then I believe there were other
people that got info copies. They have been redacted on this particular sheet of paper.

A third place that leads me to believe that this was drafted in the Office of Current Intelligence was below that in which in the originator and addressee column the Office of the Current Intelligence is listed first, which leads me to believe according to office procedures then in existence that the Office of Current Intelligence drafted this. Furthermore, I have a distinct recollection of talking to Dean Moore about the first four paragraphs of this cable.

Q: When you say you have a recollection, is this a recollection that goes back to 1967?

A: A recollection that goes back to 1967, because Dean Moore, who had been the head of the CIA team that went to the order of battle conference on February 6 through 12, 1967 at Honolulu was intimately familiar with the paragraph in the Honolulu conference report which indicated that the self-defense militia and secret self-defense militia belonged in the OF.

I remember talking to him about this cable because we were in complete agreement about the first
four paragraphs of the cable, although he drafted the
first four paragraphs of the cable. I remember talking
to him about it.

My conversation is reflected in my notes
contained in the order of battle chronology, which we
have labeled JX-47, under the entry —-under an entry
which begins 2 June 1967. I remember other discussions
I had about this cable, which was a landmark cable,
which showed that the CIA was entirely, as far as I
could tell, behind the wording in this cable, which I
believe is very strong. I remember talking about this
cable to Donald Blascak, for example. I think I talked
about it to George Allen, although I can’t remember
distinctly.

You’re talking about in mid-1967?

That is correct. Either on this day or right
around this time period, very shortly thereafter. I
remember, in fact, talking about it to George Carver who
agreed that such a cable should be sent.

Those are among the things I recall about the
cable.

I believe you testified that Mr. Moore drafted
paragraphs 1 through 4?

A Yes.

Q Who drafted paragraphs 5, 6 and 7?

A Okay. I can't recall exactly. I remember I had an input to paragraphs 5, 6 and 7. I particularly remember that I had a strong input, if I did not draft it, indeed drafted it in its entirety, paragraph 7. I recall that because I remember distinctly that in the REFTEL, the so-called reference telegram, which is indicated on the front part of the cable, Exhibit 239A, as being Saigon cable 7423M7916, that in this cable the drafter of the cable, apparently Mr. Sandine, had indicated that the unofficial number being carried by the MACV political order of battle section was for the number of political cadres, 140,000.

Q Do you know the source of the figures in the REFTEL for guerrillas and political cadres?

A The source of the REFTEL?

Q What the REFTEL was relying on.

A I haven't got the REFTEL in front of me, and I don't recall having recently seen the REFTEL. I think the last time I saw the REFTEL was when the REFTEL came
in, which was presumably 1 June 1967, the day before.

Q Did you take a copy of the REFTEL when you
left the CIA?

A Well --

Q Or any time you were in the CIA did you take a
copy?

A Did I take a copy from where?

Q For you own personal use did you ever remove a

A I do not recall. I do recall distinctly
reading the REFTEL where I would have to see the REFTEL
to understand where the numbers contained in it came
from.

Q Do you have any present knowledge as to where
the numbers came from?

A No, except as contained in this cable here.

However, my recollection was; at least in paragraph 7,
was that the REFTEL had a reference to MACV, whether it
was MACV political order of battle section or MACV-J-2
in general, carried as an official number for the number
of political cadres the figure of 140,000.

Q Is it your accurate, then, that your
recollecţion of the REFTTEL that all the numbers in
paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 purported to come from MACV?

MR. BOISE: Could I have the witness' answer,
read back?

THE REPORTER: "No, except as contained in
this cable here. However, my recollection was, at least
in paragraph 7, was that the REFTTEL had a reference to
MACV, whether it was MACV political order of battle
section or MACV-J-2 in general, carried as an official
number for the number of political cadres the figure of
140,000."

MR. BOISE: Objection. I think that directly
mischaracterized what the witness just said.

BY MR. DORSENY: (Resuming)

Let me ask you the question, Mr. Adams. Is it
your recollection that the REFTTEL purported to describe
figures which the sender had obtained from MACV?

MR. BOISE: Objection.

THE WITNESS: I have a distinct recollection
of paragraph 7 that I remember paragraph 7 so well
because it was the first time I had seen a number as
high as 145,000 for the number of political cadres. I
was, in fact, astonished at how high that number was.  

Maybe "astonished" is putting it too strongly. I was  
very interested to find that they had numbers as high as  
145,000 for the political cadres. That is why this  
paragraph sticks very firmly in my mind, paragraph 7.  

BY MR. DORSEN: (Resuming)  

Q Did the RIEPTEL purport to describe or repeat  
estimates that had been prepared by MACV?  

A Let me read this over. Bear in mind I am  
reading references to RIEPTEL, not the RIEPTEL itself.  

(Pause.)  

MR. RCISE: So the record is clear, he is  
reading JX-239, pages 4 and 5.  

THE WITNESS: You really can't tell from this  
where this came from. For example, it is my belief that  
in paragraph 6, the number for admin services, 24,613,  
may well have been the official OB number. I don't  
know. It looks like the official OB number, but I would  
have to see the official OB to see whether the number  
coincides.  

BY MR. DORSEN: (Resuming)  

Q With respect to paragraph 7, is it your firm
belief that that was a MACV estimate?

MR. BOISE: Objection.

THE WITNESS: 140,000?

BY MR. DORSEN: (Resuming)

Q Yes.

A It is my belief that this was an estimate which the political order of battle section of some organization in MACV J-2 held for the number of political cadres, at least unofficially. You see, you've got a hodgepodge of numbers in these last three paragraphs, and I would have to see the REFTEL, which I don't have in front of me, and I don't know where it is, to see what numbers they are talking about.

Q Do you know where the number 60,750 came from in paragraph 5?

A No, I don't. It looks to me in paragraph 6 that the 24,813, which describes, purportedly describes the number of admin services, that to me looks like the official CF number at the time.

Q Do you know whether any of the figures in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 were CIA figures rather than figures that emanated from MACV?
Okay. I can tell you that the figure for 60,750 guerillas is not a CIA number. I know I recognize the document which indicates that as of 1966, a VC document indicated there were 180,000 guerillas and 150,000 militia. I recognize what seems to be a number purportedly carried in a notebook which says 191,296 for the number of guerillas in 1966. I recognize that because I think it's a typo. I think the cadres notebook actually listed 171,296. I'm not sure about that. I recognize those as being numbers that were actually -- probably that were in the bulletings they described. In other words, I think -- I haven't memorized by any means the CDEC number of where this 180,000 guerilla and 150,000 militia was, but that's a very familiar document to me, as is probably the cadre notebook which lists, it says here, 191,296 guerillas, which I believe is a typo, because I think the document actually lists 171,296.

Q What about the number in paragraph 7? Are you satisfied that that number emanated from MACV as opposed to the CIA?

MR. BOISE: He's answered that question two or
three times. I'm happy to have him answer it again, but I'm going to instruct him to give the complete answer that he gave you before. He has told you where he thinks that number came from.

MR. DORSEY: I'm trying to test how strong his recollection is.

MR. BOISE: If you want to keep asking him to test his recollection given the time limits, I'm going to let you spend the time how you want. All I'm saying is I am going to instruct the witness that when you ask him a question more than once, he ought to give the full answer and not try to shorthand. I think there is a potential for a misleading record when you keep repeating the question.

BY MR. DORSEY: (Resuming)

-- The question is what is your recollection of how strong is your recollection concerning the 140,000 figure in paragraph 7?

A My recollection is that the source of that information was MACV, and the recollection is very strong, because I remember at the time I had never seen a number anywhere near that high, and I wanted to make
sure that that was the number actually read. I think that's why I put this question here. As I recall, I got the answer sometime later that this was the number for political cadres. I think it was a total -- okay, let me read the cable -- "Re: political cadre and OB mentioned in para 4 REFTEL. What is the grand total of their revised political strength? 220,000 (total of accepted and possible or 140,000, listed as possible). We assume latter."

My recollection is that sometime later on I received an answer to this saying that in fact the number was -- the total number of political cadres held by MACV unofficially was 140,000.

Q Was this a total of possible political cadres?

A No. I think it was the total of accepted and possible. In other words, I think that was the number that the political OB section held, which apparently included both acceptable and possible, the total that they held for the number of political cadres, 140,000.

Q Do you --

A Now, since then, my recollection has been amply reinforced when later -- that is, I think sometime
while I was working in preparation for the broadcast --
when, with no prompting on my part, Captain, then
Captain Michael Dilly, who was a member of the order of
battle section, said the number that the political CP
section was carrying was, I think he said, 139,000,
which would seem to me that this is probably an accurate
figure here, 140,000, somewhere around that.

Q Did you ever ask Michael Dilly why this number
had not been seen by you before roughly June 1, 1967?
A Why it had not been seen?
Q Seen by you.
A No, I never asked him. However, I recall
going to the CICV political order of battle section in
April, in April 1967 when I was in Vietnam and talking
to the then political order of battle chief, Captain
Peter B. Sandmann. And he was giving me -- he gave me a
number which he characterized as a much better estimate
than the ones he had seen before -- something of 120,000
or more was a good estimate, a realistic estimate for
the number of political cadres.

Q Did this include both confirmed and accepted
and possible?
A: I don't remember how he parsed it out.

Q: Did you ever see a breakdown of accepted and possible in the time period April, May, June 1967?

A: Of political cadres?

Q: Yes.

A: I don't recall having seen one.

Q: Did you, prior to roughly -- prior to the time you'd seen the REFTEL had you seen any written communication containing an estimate of political cadre or a figure of political cadre for over 100,000?

A: Any written?

Q: Yes. Indication of an estimate for political cadre over 100,000?

A: I can't really recall. I may well have seen something over 100,000. I don't recall that. This is why this REFTEL sticks in my mind so much, because this paragraph 7 of JX-239A, because it was the first time I had seen such a high number in print. I can't really recall having seen a number higher than 100,000, but I may well have.

I had a recollection, a strong recollection of having heard of a number at least in the neighborhood of
120,000, because that appears in my notes of -- made on
approximately the 4th or 5th or 6th of September 1967 in
which I referenced a number of 120,000 as being a
realistic estimate for the number of political cadres as
propounded by somebody in MACV.
Q    Don't you also recall, Mr. Adams, that Harry
White told you that the number of political cadre in one
estimate was between 90,000 and 100,000 as of January
1967?

MR. BOISE: Object to the form of the question.

THE WITNESS: No, I have no recollection
whateoeer that that is the case. My recollection of a
conversation I had with Harry White -- and I may be
wrong on this -- my recollection is that he couldn't
remember what numbers he was coming up with.

BY MR. DORSEY: (Resuming)
Q    Did anyone ever tell you that there was an
estimate in the range of 90,000 to 120,000 for political
cadre in or around January 1967 by MACV?
A    Not in MACV proper. I wasn't there in January
'67, so the answer is no.
Q    Did anyone at any time ever tell you that
there was in January 1967 an estimate at MACV for
political cadre in the range of 90,000 to 120,000?

A Nobody ever told me. However, I was given
what was labeled a political order of battle chrono
by -- I think I got it from no less than three
sources -- by then Lieutenant Richard McArthur, by then
Lieutenant Nelson Hallmark, by then Lieutenant, maybe
even Captain, Kelly Robinson, that there had been an
unofficial estimate kicking around in the early part of
1967 of 90,000 to 120,000. I have seen things -- I have
seen that number somewhere, I think.

Q Did anybody ever tell you that number had been
briefed to General Maxwell Taylor in or around January
1967?

A I don't think anybody told me that. I have
this recollection that this kind of statement may have
been in that political order of battle chrono, and I'd
have to see it. I don't know. I don't remember.

Q Do you have any basis for your believing the
figure 90,000 to 120,000 for political cadre was briefed
to General Maxwell Taylor in or around January 1967?

A Come again on that.