Q Is there anyone you would have included had he been alive at the time you wrote that?

A Well, this -- frankly, I forget when I wrote this. It was early on.

Q Early on being when?

A Can you give me a chance to take a look at this? I believe I can figure it out.

(Pause)

I notice here that I hadn't yet, at the time this was typed, I hadn't yet talked to Hampshire, and I would have to find out, I would have to check my notes as to when I talked to Hampshire.

Q Am I correct that you would have written that sometime after 1976?

A Yes, that's correct.

Q The question is, is there anyone who you were intending to exclude or were excluding as of the time you wrote that because at the time you were writing it the person was dead?

A Well, I can't say that I know specifically who else I would have included, nor can I say that right now I would put all these people on the list.
At the time you wrote that, was one of the people whom you were considering or would have considered including had he been alive, Earl Wheeler, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1967 and 1968?

Had he been alive at this time when I was writing this particular document, I might have included Earl Wheeler. However, I am not saying that right now, knowing what I know now, that I would include, for example, Rostow or McNamara or Wheeler, or LBJ, for that matter. I don't know.

If you were writing that today, who would you list?

In other words, you are talking about the persons still living whom I believe chiefly responsible for the falsification?

That's correct.

Certainly I would include General Westmoreland, I would certainly include General Davidson, I would certainly include Daniel Graham, I would certainly include Charles Morris, okay.

Now, as for direct responsibility, I am not at
all sure I would include either McNamara or Rostow, or
for that matter, Wheeler right now. I don't know. I
would say at this time I was a lot more certain in my
mind that there was higher level involvement than I am
now having read everything I have read in the course of
this litigation.

Q  What about as of January 20, 1982?
A  I would guess this was written somewhere
around 1977. I am not sure, something like that, '77,
'78, that timeframe. You are talking about January
'82.

Can you come again on the January '82?

Q  Who would you have included as of January 20,
1982, people alive as of January 20, 1982?
A  Certainly Westmoreland, Davidson, Graham and
Morris. I was at that particular point in time, was
certainly suspicious that both McNamara and Rostow might
have been responsible. However, I would have included
their names on a list like that conceivably.

Q  Would you have included Earl Wheeler?
A  This is a hypothetical question. We all
understand that.
Q Would you have included Earl Wheeler had he been alive on January 20, 1982, in the same category as Mr. Rostow and Mr. McNamara?

A Sir, you have gotten into a terribly complex situation here as to what "falsification" we are talking about. I have a pretty good factual grasp of who falsified what when. I have what I consider a pretty good factual grasp as to which of the four I mentioned, Westmoreland, Davidson, Graham, and Morris, knew about certain things that went on. I am less certain -- I don't really know even now exactly what McNamara knew or Rostow knew or Wheeler knew. It would depend entirely on what subject you are talking about. If you bring one up, I will comment on any one of those.

Q Is there any reason when you wrote S89 you did not include Richard Pelms?

A Yes, because I don't think he was responsible as a -- in the sense that he originated any orders for falsification. I don't think he was responsible for any falsification in the sense that he ordered somebody in MACV headquarters to falsify anything.

Q Do you believe that Mr. Rostow or Mr. McNamara
or General Wheeler may have ordered somebody in MACV to falsify something?

MR. BOISE: Object to the form of the question.

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. In phrasing that question, it sounds as if you are assuming that I think in terms of a gentleman going, a superior going to a subordinate and saying I hereby direct you to falsify such and such number. I don't believe that happened, and certainly in the case of McNamara and Rostow, that they put it that way, and in the case of Colonel Graham, for example, I think he might well do something like that, although again, I don't know that he might be even as bald as that in the way he gave orders. Basically you are asking a terribly -- you are getting into a terribly complex area here, and I would really request that you be very specific on what you want.

Q: Let me show you what has been marked as Exhibit 1212, which purports to be, let's say, notes taken during the Benjamin investigation about you or of you.

A: Okay.
Have you read or looked at Exhibit 1212 prior to now?

A I believe I have, yes.

I would like to direct your attention to various portions of 1212.

Okay.

And I will ask you specific questions.

Now, in the paragraph beginning "Crisle found Adams," there is a sentence that begins "After the Pike hearings fell through (which were Mickey Mouse)," did you state in words or substance to Mr. Benjamin that you believed that the Pike hearings were Mickey Mouse?

I can't recall saying these words. However, had I said something like them, I think I would probably be referring to the fact that nothing ever came of the Pike hearings. Pike and his research staff did what I regarded as a competent job in looking at evidence then available, evidence that was made available to it by DIA and CIA.

However, unfortunately, the Pike hearings, the results of the Pike hearings were leaked, unfortunately in my view. The Pike hearings -- the conclusions of the
Pike hearings were leaked to the Village Voice. What that meant was that the controversy over the Pike hearings was not over their findings but how good the security precautions were, and the fact of the leak became the main point of interest concerning the Pike hearings, and so unfortunately nothing was ever done with them, and people like Daniel Graham continued their rise to fame and fortune.

Q    Continuing with that paragraph, did you tell Mr. Benjamin in words or substance, "I called lots of people, about 300?"

A    Yes, sir.

Q    You did?

A    Yes, concerning my entire --

Q    Are you telling me what you told Mr. Benjamin, or are you trying to explain what is in there is something other?

A    Did I say this to -- did I call lots of people, about 300?

Q    Yes, in words or substance.

A    I may well have said something like that to Mr. Benjamin because I did talk to approximately 300
people in the course of preparing my book. I can't, as I say, recall specifically telling him that.

Q Did you tell Mr. Benjamin in words or substance "I was an actor and researcher?"

A Again, I can't recall -- these are notes based on what I said. No, I do not remember what I said to Benjamin at all or to his research assistants who were with him. This may have to do with my dual role in the production of broadcasts, that I was both an actor in the events that occurred in 1967 and '68 and that I was a researcher during the period of the broadcast. I am not sure about that. I assume that that seems to be what I was talking about. I'm not sure.

Q "As researcher, I convinced these poor fellows to tell their story on camera." Did you tell that in words or substance to Mr. Benjamin?

A I can't buy off on this, these notes, because I simply can't recall exactly what I told him exactly. I can't recall what I told Benjamin. However, it could be that I told him that one of my jobs as a researcher on the broadcast was to get some of the people who had talked to me during the course of my research for my
book to also share what they had to say with George Crile. That may have been what this referred to. I don't know.

Q I would like to direct your attention down to the paragraph that begins at the bottom of the page, "No doubt in my mind that there was a legal conspiracy."

Did you tell that in words or substance to Mr. Benjamin?

A Again, I can't recall what I said to Benjamin. It may well be that this reflects my belief that there was a conspiracy -- that legally speaking there was a conspiracy during the 1967-'68 period. I recall, for example, that in December 1972 I submitted to the Army Inspector General a --

Q Let me interrupt, Mr. Adams, because I want to make very clear what I am asking you in this question is what you told Mr. Benjamin, not what happened.

If you don't recall what you told Mr. Benjamin or you recall it differently or whatever --

MR. BOISE: Well, the problem I have with interrupting that answer is what he said is he doesn't recall specific words he used with Benjamin, but he is
trying to tell you why he thinks he either did or did not say a particular thing in substance, and obviously what his views were at that time is relevant to what he believes he would have said to Benjamin in substance although he can't remember the exact words.

Now, I don't want you to just go through, and if you can't remember the exact words, say I don't recall, when he remembers the substance and is telling you why he remembers is.

MR. DORSEN: Okay.

Well, let's --

MR. ROSE: You can conduct the examination however you want. I am concerned about a misleading record that gets used sometimes. If you only want to know whether he remembers the exact words, you can ask him that. If you want to know whether he remembers the substance, then I think you have got to take his description of the general point he would have been making.

BY MR. DORSEN: (Presuming)

Q When you were giving an answer a minute ago, were you trying to recall what you told Mr. Benjamin, or
1 were you trying to recall what happened in 1972?
2 A What I am doing here is looking at the
3 Benjamin notes, or whoever made these notes -- I don't
4 even think it was Benjamin. I see somebody called Toby
5 up there -- whoever's notes these were wrote down or
6 typed, no doubt in my mind there was a legal
7 conspiracy. This I presume is what Toby or whoever it
8 is thought I might have said in substance back then. I
9 don't recall whether I used these words.
10 However, these words bring to mind certain
11 things that I was thinking about, may have been thinking
12 about at the time.
13 Q Do you recall anything you told Mr. Benjamin?
14 A You are asking me if I can sign off on any
15 section of the wording of these notes? I really would
16 be very hesitant to do so unless I can really
17 specifically recall.
18 MR. BOISE: I also think he ought to be given
19 a chance to read through the thing in some detail if you
20 want him to sign off on the exact words.
21 MR. DORSEY: I don't think I am going to deal
22 with that right now.
MR. BOISE: All right.

BY MR. DORSEN: (Resuming)

Q. Let me direct your attention, Mr. Adams, to lower down in that paragraph which says "the ad was overblown. I would have played it differently. It doesn't bother me, the text. I didn't have anything to do with the ad."

Did you tell that in words or substance to Mr. Benjamin?

A. Okay, as to words, I cannot say whether I said that or not.

Q. As far as substance?

MR. BOISE: He was going on.

MR. DORSEN: I realize that, but I think he may be going on two or three steps further than I want him to.

The first one was do you remember saying that?

MR. BOISE: When you say do you remember saying that, are you asking him to remember saying those words?

BY MR. DORSEN: (Resuming)
Q Do you remember saying those words, Mr. Adams?
A No, I do not remember saying those words.
Q Do you remember saying those words in substance?
A I might have said something like that, but I certainly don't remember those words. I can describe to you if you want what I thought about the ad, if that is what you are driving at.
Q Why don't you do that. What I would like to do is to ask you very narrowly drawn questions to the best I can. Sometimes I won't ask you for an explanation. Other times you can indicate you have an explanation that I am not asking you for, but this time I am asking you how you felt about the ad as of January 22nd or 23rd, 1982.
A Let me say I first saw the ad, I think I saw the ad after the broadcast. I am not sure when I saw it, so I couldn't have had a -- if I hadn't seen it by the 20th of January '82, I couldn't have had, couldn't have had thought on it.

Are you asking me what thoughts I had when I
saw it?

Q Yes.

A The ad you refer to I would imagine is one that had the word "CONSPIRACY" in bold letters up top.

Q That's correct.

A First let me say I think there was a conspiracy during the period 1967 to 1968. I have never been in the advertising business. I have been a farmer and I have been in the intelligence business. As an intelligence analyst, I might well have put something different up there. As a farmer, I don't know what the hell I would put up there.

My feeling is, as I say, somewhere up here the story is very complex. I have always been hesitant to describe events with a single word. I probably would have gone and probably nobody would have read it, but I would have written a couple, three paragraphs trying to explain what went on without using a big word like that.

Q Are you finished?

A That's my answer.

Q On the next page, I would like to read to you
the paragraph beginning with "No," or at least a portion
of it, "No, I didn't say the premise was wrong. It was
up here. It may have been up here. I went in and said
something to the effect, if I had a problem with the
show, it was that it hung the rap too much on
Westmoreland and not enough White House involvement.
Ira Klein and Kent Garrett were there. I wouldn't say
the premise of the show was Westmoreland is
perpetrator. It says you talked to Laak on the phone.
There were a lot of premises, conspiracy, Westmoreland
up to his ears but not acting on his own hook."

Do you remember if you said those words to Mr.
Benjamin?

A Those are totally incomprehensible the way
they are laid out here. I don't think I said that to
Mr. Benjamin.

Q Do you recall whether you said to Mr. Benjamin
words, "If I had a problem with the show, it was it hung
the wrap too much on Westmoreland and not enough White
House involvement?"

A What I had to say to Mr. Benjamin here or
whenever it was I was talking to, or whoever overheard me
took these notes and typed this here, has to be taken in context, and basically the context in my view, my belief was this, that it was clear to me at the time and now that there was massive falsification of statistics emanating from the MACV command in 1967 and 1968. It is also clear to me back then and now that General Westmoreland was involved with the falsification in that at the very least he laid out a ceiling, according to what I have been told, on the order of battle, a ceiling of roughly 300,000 in early August 1967. At the time that I -- that this must have been typed, I assure it was typed not long after I talked to Benjamin, I suspected that although General Westmoreland was clearly involved in the falsification and that he had laid down the order and that he was aware of many of the things that went on, in my view, it was my suspicion that there may have been others higher than General Westmoreland who also knew about what had gone on, and I think that this is what is reflected in this typing here.

I might add that since the -- since these words were typed, General Westmoreland has filed his lawsuit in September '82, and that we have been the
recipient, as you know, of masses of material from the
Pentagon and from the CIA and from presumably White
House files as well. It is my belief on the basis of
the evidence that we have accumulated since then that
President Johnson, for example, did not know as much as
I suspected at the time that this was typed.

Q Did your views change between January 20 or
21, 1982 and the time you talked to Mr. Benjamin and his
colleagues?

A I don't remember when I talked to Benjamin.

Q I believe it was around June 21, 1982.

A 21 June '82, oh, yeah, okay. Between January
'82 and 21 June '82, in fact, according to my
recolleciton, they had changed somewhat. On the 20th of
January 1982 I believed there had been some -- there may
have been some kind of higher level involvement in the
promulgation of the orders that led to the massive
falsification of statistics, of which General
Westmoreland almost certainly was aware. Fight after
that, however, approximately somewhere right after the
broadcast, like 26, 27 January 1982, Walt Rostow wrote a
memorandum for the record which I believe he sent George Crile
and which I believe I read which indicated that the President was aware of, in essence, what Postow termed was a massive invasion of South Vietnam by North Vietnam in the autumn of 1967. The autumn starts in September and ends in December '67, in other words, that LBJ was aware -- could have been aware of massive infiltration in September, October, November, December 1967, parts of those four months.

This at the time reinforced my belief that the higher levels may have been aware of such things, at least of the influx of infiltrators during those months.

Since that time, however, by my understanding, Walt Rostow has gone back on that statement that the White House was aware of massive infiltration, in effect, in September, October, November, December of 1982.

The question you are asking was whether my thinking could change anywhere between 20 January '82 and 21 June '82, and my answer is yes. I had become more convinced. I felt my suspicions were confirmed as to at least the President's knowledge of infiltration.
since that time, and from what I have seen of what the
President saw, my feeling is that in fact the President
did not know about high infiltration during those
months, from what I can see in the documents which they
have released from the White House files.

2 Do you know whether Dr. Postow was talking
about the two plus divisions that entered South Vietnam
either in late December 1967 or in January 1968 when he
was talking about a massive invasion or whatever term he
used?

A Okay. I don't know. However, let me indicate
what my own understanding is of what happened concerning
divisions going into the Khe Sanh area. I have talked
since then at considerable length to John McKalski, who
was the North Vietnamese analyst in now General Graham's
CIAAD, and who incidentally thinks that General Graham
is a crook.

MR. DORSEY: I move to strike that as
nonresponsive.

THE WITNESS: I am continuing with my
response.

What McKalski has said is that he began to
discover evidence of a southbound movement of approximately five North Vietnamese divisions in August 1967.

BY MR. DORSEN: (Resuming)

Q Can I interrupt a second and ask you whether he told you this was picked up from NSA intelligence or some other source?

A I defer to you people.

MR. LAPRADE: I think if you had a conversation with him, I think you can give the extent of the conversation. The stipulation is still in for whatever it is in. It is in for the truth of what NSA had. I think if he told you what the state of the mind was --

MR. DORSEN: Mr. Boise is saying yes, and I'm saying no. I don't think Mr. Adams --

MR. BOISE: He is testifying as to his state of mind in the prebroadcast period.

BY MR. DORSEN: (Resuming)

Q Are you taking about the prebroadcast period?

A I'm not talking about prebroadcast here. You are asking me about, as I understand it, about the two
2. Let me interrupt.

A. In asking the question, you misstated the facts, in my view.

MR. LAPRADE: Mr. Adams, to clear the record, in your testimony are you talking about information you were told prior to the broadcast?

THE WITNESS: Not prior to the broadcast, no.

MR. DORSENY: Let me withdraw the question, if I may.

THE WITNESS: The reason I'm throwing this information in is --

MR. BOISE: Wait a minute. I have got to hear the question again.

MR. DORSENY: Let me withdraw the question and start all over again since I am not sure the witness is clear.

BY MR. DORSENY: (Resuming)

Q. Did you speak to Mr. McKalski before the broadcast?

A. No, I did not.

MR. BOISE: That solves the problem.
THE WITNESS: My problem here is --

MR. BOISE: That solves the problem.

MR. DORSEN: It solves one problem.

MR. BOISE: That at least solves the problem that we have right now.

THE WITNESS: You see, he was asking stuff about postbroadcast, etc.

MR. DORSEN: I may have been. I am not saying I didn't.

THE WITNESS: I can only answer postbroadcast or postbroadcast.

MR. BOISE: He was asking postbroadcast. That was postbroadcast. On the other hand, I think his postbroadcast stuff was largely irrelevant, and rather than getting into an issue with the CIA --

BY MR. DORSEN: (Resuming)

Q Let me direct your attention, Mr. Adams, to the bottom of page 38183. It says "Adams: Ira was in a state of agitation, God knows over what. He was sort of leading me into it. I said this a million times, we should have shifted the emphasis higher. I don't recall this as a big event in my life. This was something I
felt from the beginning. Crile was never adverse to
it. We never had the goods on who gave the orders to
Westmoreland."

Let me stop there if I may.

A Let's keep going.

Q "The Rostow memo, we now know LBJ knew. Crile
said the premise of the broadcast was wrong. Lack
called me.

I want to draw your attention to the sentence,
"I said this a million times, we should have shifted the
emphasis higher."

Did you say those words to Mr. Benjamin?

A I don't know if I did or not.

Q Did you say the substance of those words to
Mr. Benjamin?

A I imagine whoever typed this, who took notes
and typed this, maybe conceivably the Toby that appears
on the front page, I don't know who, was typing her
understanding of what I may have said about this general
thesis that I have talked to you about already, namely,
that there was massive falsification of the statistics
emanating out of Westmoreland's command in 1967 and
1968, that clearly General Westmoreland had instigated the falsification by his laying on of the ceiling in early August 1967, and that it was my suspicion at the time that persons higher than General Westmoreland may conceivably have instituted such an order or known about such an order, and it was perhaps in this context that this section here was typed. I don't know.

Q. Did you tell George Crile or anybody else connected with the broadcast prior to June -- January 20, 1982, that you felt the emphasis should have been shifted higher?

A. Again, to repeat, I don't want to repeat what I just said.

MR. BOISE: If he is asking the same question and that is called for, I want you to give a complete answer. In other words, don't try to shortcut the answers just because he asks the same question over and over again.

THE WITNESS: Okay.

What I told -- the discussions between George Crile and myself resembled what I just said about what I just said was the context of what may have been the
basis for what that guy put down on this piece of paper here, namely, that it was clear to me that there was massive falsifications of statistics in MACV headquarters in '67 and '68. It was also clear to me that General Westmoreland knew and had instigated the falsification by the laying on of the ceiling in early August 1967 and that it was my suspicion that the order may have been -- may have originated from a higher level than General Westmoreland or may have been known about at a higher level than General Westmoreland.

George and I talked about this at some length. We agreed that whereas we had very good evidence regarding General Westmoreland, we did not have such good evidence regarding the higher levels. The evidence concerning General Westmoreland was based on but not limited to what Colonel -- correction, General Godding told both me on the 9th of January 1980 and me and George in May 1981 that General Westmoreland had issued instructions to General Godding, then Colonel Godding for a few days, anyway, in early August -- correction, early August 1967, just before Godding went to the CIA to argue MACV's command position on the
numbers, that he, General Godding and his delegation, which included Colonel Hawkins, were to stay within the parameters of the May order of battle, and therefore, George and I -- George went with that but did not choose to speculate as much as I thought he might have in putting together the script of the broadcast.

It wasn't -- I wouldn't even say it was a source of major disagreement between George and I. It just may be that had I been writing it, I might have written this thing slightly different but not a great deal different.

Q Do you recall whether you told Mr. Benjamin or his aides that you said this a million times, we should have shifted the emphasis higher?

A Again, I don't remember if I said a million times or a thousand times, whatever I said. I don't recall what I told either Benjamin or Benjamin's assistant.

I might have said that we might have opened the door further to the possibility that there was higher level involvement, opened the door in the sense of mentioning the possibility that there was higher
level involvement. However, neither of us for a moment thought, or putting it into positive form, both of us believed that there had been massive falsification of statistics in the '67-'68 period, and that General Westmoreland had caused this falsification by the laying on of the ceiling in early August 1967.

Q You referred a few minutes ago to material that you had seen since the lawsuit started.

I would like to show you a document which has been marked as Exhibit 711 and ask you whether this is a document that you have seen for the first time since the lawsuit started?

A Okay. Let me see.

(The document was placed before the witness.)

THE WITNESS: I have seen this document before.

BY MR. DORSEY: (Resuming)

Q Before when?

A Before now.

Q Did you see it before the lawsuit started?

A No, I had not.

Q Were you aware that a document was being
prepared during the timeframe of November 1967 by George Carver or anybody else in the CIA concerning the order of battle?

A I have -- I have never seen this document before. I did not know such a document was in preparation at that time, if indeed it was, which I assume to be.

Q Were you in 1981 familiar with the Freedom of Information Act?

A Yes. That's where I was.

Q Had you ever used it?

A No, I never did.

Q Is there a reason you didn't use it?

A No. I don't really -- I had thought of it from time to time, but I don't really like the Freedom of Information Act as it has been used.

Q Why is that?

A Because I think it has so often been misused, and although I thought about using it, I didn't want to because I basically don't like the Freedom of Information Act as it has been misused, and I didn't want to sort of associate myself with an act that I
1 didn't like.
2 Q Did you ever discuss the Freedom of
3 Information Act with Mr. Alex Alben or George Crile?
4 A I'm sure I did, yes.
5 Q Do you recall the substance of any discussions
6 with them on the subject of the Freedom of Information
7 Act?
8 A No, I can't. I do remember that Alex was
9 considering using FOIA, F-O-I-A, to try to get some
10 documents out of various government agencies.
11 Q Do you know whether he actually utilized
12 FOIA.
13 A I don't know if he did or not. I don't recall
14 him ever having used it. He may have, but I don't
15 know.
16 Q Do you recall any discussion with him on the
17 subject of using it?
18 A I am sure I told him I didn't like it, at
19 least as it had been misused.
20 Q Did he indicate which documents or which types
21 of documents he was considering using FOIA for?
22 A I know he may well have, but I can't remember
the time. It may be in my notes, that there is some
mention of that, but I'm not sure.

Q    Did you ever discuss the Freedom of
Information Act with George Crile?

A    I am sure the act came up because it is a
common tool used by newspaper people, journalists. I am
sure also I told him I never used it.

Q    Did he ever tell you that he has used it?

A    No, I don’t think he ever did. I'm not sure
whether he did or not actually use it.

MR. DORSEN: Let's take a little break.

MR. BOISE: We are eleven minutes short of an
hour.

MR. LAPRADE: We started --

(A brief recess was taken from 3:37 p.m. to
3:48 p.m.)

BY MR. DORSEN: (Resuming)

Q    Mr. Adams, I want to clarify one thing in my
mind at least, and that is this, when you saw -- let me
withdraw the question.

At any time after you testified before the
Pike Committee, did you believe or suspect that General
McChristian might be reluctant to talk to you about order of battle matters?

A After the Pike Committee?

Q Yes, at any time after the Pike Committee.

A Yes, certainly. I think virtually everybody I thought of interviewing I thought might be reluctant to talk to me about order of battle matters.

Q Is there anything specific in the case of General McChristian?

A Well, I think it is possible that — I think something entered into my thinking that General McChristian was a major general and that he had gone to West Point, and this might make him more reluctant to talk about intelligence or to talk about order of battle matters than, say, a reserve lieutenant might be.

Q At any time after you testified before the Pike Committee did you have any suspicion or belief that General McChristian had done anything improper with respect to order of battle matters while he was MACV J-2?

A Prior to my speaking to General McChristian, there was of course — generally speaking s prior to my
speaking to General McChristian, whatever the date was -- it is in my notes -- I thought that General McChristian was probably honest. However, there was the possibility, and I reserved to myself the possibility that he hadn't been. I believe that when I went down to talk to General McChristian in Hope Sound, Florida, I said something to this effect, that I wanted to -- that I believed as far as I knew at that time that he had been playing things pretty straight, but that -- that he had played the thing straight, but I wasn't sure. I tried to lay my cards on the table.

Q    And did you have a discussion which related to whether he had played things straight?

A    Well, yeah, I talked to him for some seven hours at his beach house, and I did not get the impression during those seven hours that he was trying to hide anything, and I went into the discussion feeling by and large that what Gains Hawkins had always told me about him, that he is a straight shooter, that the impression that Gains Hawkins had was for me reinforced, and I felt he was, too.

Bear in mind, excuse me --
Q: Would it --

A: -- bear in mind that the only time that I had seen General McChristian prior to seeing him down at Hope Sound, Florida was at the February OB conference, and during that period of time between 6 to 12 February 1967, his principal agent on OB matters, Colonel Hawkins, was as far as I could tell completely candid with me. So I was inclined to think well of General McChristian.

Q: Was there anything that you and General McChristian discussed in meetings with him at Hope Sound that caused you to change your views of General McChristian in any fashion?

A: Certainly not radically. I might have had some view that changed in my mind. Before I thought he was honest. I held out that he might not be in all regards. But when I left Hope Sound I felt even more certain than I had been before that he played things on the up and up. He played things straight.

Q: Did anyone tell you in words or substance that General McChristian was of two minds on Westmoreland but was inclined to think that he, McChristian, was
screwed?

A Nobody told me that per se. That was my impression of what General McChristian had told me. General McChristian was always loath to talk about people in an uncomplimentary or denigrating way. There were some things he told me which led me to believe that although he in general would not say anything directly critical of General Westmoreland, that he in fact harbored some distrust of General Westmoreland. That's the impression I got by the things that General McChristian told me.

I believe there is a section in my notes on my order of battle chronology which at that time he asked me to use as background use only which led me to that belief, and my recollection in my notes goes something like this. I haven't got them in front of me, obviously. He told me in connection with General Westmoreland, without using General Westmoreland's name, words to the effect that I, General McChristian, always believed in being loyal up the chain of command and loyal down the chain of command. I do not feel, he said, or words to that effect, that I was always --
there was always loyalty down the chain of command in my
direction.

Again, I would have to look at my notes on
that. That was the impression that I got from General
McChristian. That is contained in my order of battle
chrono someplace.

Q Was General McChristian referring to General
Westmoreland?

A As I said, he did not refer to General
Westmoreland by name. However, it seemed to me that he
said it in connection with General Westmoreland by the
juxtaposition of my question to his answer, although in
his answer he did not use General Westmoreland's name.

Q Did you understand General McChristian to be
talking about General Westmoreland?

A That's what my understanding was. It may or
may not have been accurate.

Q Do you know what General McChristian -- what
did you believe General McChristian was referring to in
terms of loyalty down?

A I believe that General McChristian felt uneasy
about the circumstances of his transfer in May 1967
following cables which had been exchanged, as he told
me, in early March 1967. He felt -- my feeling of what
he thought was not so much what he said directly but
what he sort of held out as suspicions that his transfer
had something to do with his willingness to push for
higher numbers.

Q. Did you get any feeling as to what time period
General McChristian was alluding to if he was making
reference to any particular set of figures?

A. He kept referring to me, he kept repeating
something that he said that he repeatedly stuck a
paragraph that he repeatedly stuck on the end of his
monthly measurement of progress report which was dated
the last day of every month, and it said -- again I
would have to refer to my notes, but it said something
to the effect that we are fighting a war of attrition.
The enemy seems to be able to be increasing his forces
despite our best efforts.

Again, I would have to consult my notes and
also consult with General McChristian who said he said
the same statement several times. I think it was this
repeated declaration on General McChristian's part which
may have gotten him into trouble or which in his perception led to his transfer, possibly.

Q In what way would such a paragraph in your view have caused General McChristian problems?

A Because, God knows, I experienced the same kind of problem. There was, every time one pushed higher, for higher numbers, there were all kinds of feelings of bad vibes, that people didn't want higher numbers, that people wanted to be told that things were looking up. Even within the CIA, which I considered was played in a remarkably honest fashion, given the pressures that it perceived, there was this feeling that if you came up with higher numbers, you had better hunker down for the consequences.

I always had -- when the CIA came out, as it often -- as it did with indications that the numbers should have been another order of magnitude greater, I remember always sort of saying to myself, you know, the CIA is just playing with a hell of a lot of guts in this matter, and it was in this context that I -- in which I operated. I think General McChristian may have been operating in the same kind of context.
Q: Are you equating the kind of paragraph you just described with a suggestion that the numbers should have been higher?

MR. BOISE: Objection.

THE WITNESS: Yes. What he is saying, it seems to me, by saying that they are -- the enemy is constantly increasing, is the same kind of thing, if not exactly the same thing. I don't know if he was saying in that paragraph that he believed that per se right then that the order of battle ought to be doubled. I think that he had given indications as early as February 1967 that he thought the OB should go drastically -- should be revised drastically upward.

BY MR. DORSEY: (Resuming)

Q: To whom did he give these indications?

A: He certainly gave it in the Honolulu Conference Report.

2 Now, in the fall of 1967 were there articles in the press, one or more, that suggested in some fashion that General McChristian had met with displeasure on the part of one or more of his superiors?
Yes, there were. I recall specifically three such articles. The first one was published on the 22nd or 23rd of November 1967 in the New York Times, written by James Reston, headed something to the effect that an explanation of why Bunker and Westmoreland were optimistic. There were indications within that article that McChristian had been transferred.

A second article --

Q Let me stop you to ask you a question about that.

Do you know who the source of that article was?

A The source of that article is not contained in the article itself. The article was written by James Reston. He says in the article that Bunker and Westmoreland basically disliked the estimates of their old G-2 and liked the estimates of their new one. They didn't say that specifically, but it was clear that that's what they were talking about, at least to me.

Q Do you know who James Reston's source was?

A Yes, I'm getting to that.

Q I'm sorry.
A friend of mine at the time. It was much later. After I left the CIA, I asked around at some length as to where Reston had gotten this reported piece of information, allegation. It turned out that apparently he had gotten it from a luncheon attended by a number of New York Times reporters, including William Beecher, Neil Sheehan, two or three others, probably including Reston, given by then Westmoreland, then being November 1967, Westmoreland's deputy, Robert Komer. That is the first article.

The second article was written sometime prior to the 16th of December but published on the 16th of December in New Republic by Andrew Hamilton who had somehow also gotten the same information, perhaps from the people who were attending that briefing.

A third article was published in the Washington Post on the 30th of November 1967, written by Jack Anderson. It was also implying that Westmoreland -- correction, that McChristian had been transferred because he was coming up with assessments which were thought to be too gloomy.

Q Do you have any knowledge of any reported...
sources other than Robert Komer for the sources of these
articles?

A I would say I don't know where Andrew Hamilton
got his information. He might well have gotten it from
somebody besides New York Times reporters who were
going it from Komer, apparently getting it from
Komer. I don't know. They might have had other sources
as well.

Q Were you one of those other sources?

A In what?

Q For any of these articles.

A No, I was not a source concerning the transfer
of McChristian away from J-2 because I didn't really
know about it. At that time I didn't pay very close
attention to what was going on in the bureaucracy of
MACV J-2. I certainly had to have realized at some time
between February of '67 when I saw General McChristian
as J-2 at the Honolulu Conference and September 1967
when I saw Davidson sitting as J-2 at the Saigon
conference. I realized that there had been a change of
command, but I didn't know when it had occurred or what
reasons there had been for that, and frankly, I didn't
pay much attention at the time.

Q Other than the newspaper stories you have alluded to, and speaking to General McChristian, do you have any other sources of information as to the circumstances under which General McChristian was transferred?

A When was that, as of when?

Q As of January 20, 1982.

A There is, of course, General McChristian himself, who had told me and George Crile that it had certainly occurred to him that he might have been transferred for those reasons. Another source of it, of such a statement, was one that I simply didn't know how to take one way or the other. It was Richard Yoose, who was an aide to Rostow. It wasn't so much for the transfer itself but a source about thinking concerning General McChristian. He said that General McChristian's pessimism was not popular. There were, I believe I might have discussed this with George Allen. I think he was -- I'm not sure, but it seems to me that he had some suspicion that there was dirty work at the crossroads when all of a sudden McChristian, whom he had a great
deal of respect for, was replaced by Davidson about whom
he didn't -- about whom he knew relatively little. And
I don't think he liked him very much. I don't think he
thought very highly of him.

Q Mr. Adams, when you joined the CIA, did you
sign any affidavit concerning your care, custody,
retention of confidential records?

A I signed some kind of agreement. I would have
to see what the text of it said. I don't know what is
in there as I sit here.

Q When you left the CIA, did you sign an
agreement?

A No, I did not.

Q Were you asked to sign such an agreement when
you left the CIA?

A I believe I was asked, but I don't think I
ever signed it.

Q Any particular reason why you didn't sign it?

MR. BOISE: I instruct the witness not to
answer.

MR. DORSEN: On what grounds.

MR. BOISE: I don't think it is relevant.
You may say that I may be influenced in that judgment by the fact that I am reviewing your relevancy objections to the Godding designations.

(Laughter.)

MR. DORSEN: You may be influenced by the objections, by some of the objections you made, but I think as long as they are consistent, I have no problem.

BY MR. DORSEN: (Resuming)

Q Mr. Adams, are you prepared to request a copy of your affidavit that you made when you joined the CIA on the subject of retention of confidential records?

MR. BOISE: Let me think about the question before you answer, okay?

(Pause)

MR. BOISE: I want to consult with my client.

MR. DORSEN: Let me ask another question as long as we are here and you are going to consult with him.

BY MR. DORSEN: (Resuming)

Q I would also ask you to consent to the production of any agreements of any sort that you signed
or any written statements that you made with the CIA or any other government agency concerning your taking, retention or returning of confidential records that you executed that relate directly or indirectly to Vietnam.

MR. BOISE: It is 4:13.

(At 4:13 p.m. a brief recess was taken.)