Q. Do you recall --

MR. BARON: Will you let him finish

his answer?

Q. I didn't mean to interrupt.

A. I can't get any closer to it than that.

Q. Do you recall anybody specifically, other than Gaines Hawkins, at the August session of the SNIE?

A. My recollection is George Fowler was there representing DIA. My recollection is that J. Barry Williams was probably there also as part of the DIA representation, and probably Colonel Chuck Toman.

Q. Anybody else from any delegation other than CIA, that you can recall?

A. Other than CIA?

Q. Yes.

A. I haven't mentioned any CIA.

Q. I know that and I want to keep you on any people other than CIA.

A. I can't recall the names.

Q. Whom do you remember from the CIA being present?

A. Sam Adams, certainly. Dean Moore,
some other OCI people. Dave Laux, with the Office of National Estimates at the time. He handled OB rather well.

That's about it. You are talking about a conference room that probably accommodated 30, 35, 40 people.

Q. Is there anything else that you can recall at this time being there?
A. No.

Q. Am I correct that you did not personally attend the Saigon session of the SNIE in September 1967?
A. Are you referring to the conference in which Mr. George Carver, my boss, Mr. Highland, and Mr. Adams went back to Saigon?
Q. That's correct.
A. Did I attend that?
Q. Yes.
A. No, I did not. I was in headquarters, watching that go down in flames.
Q. Did you do any work in preparation for the visit of George Carver, Mr. Highland and Mr. Adams to go to Saigon in September 1967?
A. I had put order of battle books together for Mr. Carver at other times, the Guam
conference, the Wake conference, and a conference in Saigon that he had gone to on a TDY, but not that particular one, I did not prepare material.

Material prepared for that conference, which was rather small, was prepared by a highly charged group of guys directed to go over there by Mr. Helms and settle things, hopefully. They put their own materials together. And they had the capacity to do that.

Q. Did you attend any meetings that you can recall with Mr. Carver or George Alan between the start of the August 1967 SNIE conference in Langley, and the time Mr. Carver, Mr. Highland and Mr. Adams left for Saigon?

A. Did I attend any meetings with them? I did not see George Carver but probably once or twice a day, and that was every day, when I was not traveling on TDY, in and out of George Alan's office constantly, or he in and out of mine.

Sam Adams in and out all the time. I don't know what you are driving at. A formal meeting at a conference table where there was agenda?

Q. You have to understand one thing. I
wasn't there and I am, to some extent, trying to find out what happened. I may ask a question that seems silly but I don't mean to.

A. The suite of offices that we occupied was basically a long hall, about 40 feet long, seven offices off of it, and a large office at one end, which was occupied by Mr. Carver; four secretarial positions in the hallway, and it adjoined this vault that was still in the process of being built.

So we were very closely proximate to each other, and it was in and out and all around very easily. It was not a large separate area. So we had great recourse to each other's areas.

Q. So is it accurate to say you were in virtually, if not constant, near constant communication with the other people in the group?

A. Yes. I feel that very strongly.

Q. And who else --

A. It was an informal office.

Notwithstanding the prestige that George Carver carried, he related very well to his people. You didn't have to make an appointment to see him. You knocked on the door and said: George, I have this, or I have that. He would give you time. He
spent a lot of time running back and forth running across town, too.

George Alan was always available to us. Sam and I would pick up our staff and go in there and commiserate with George and come back out and do our own thing, or do our thing together, and advise and talk to each other. There was a hell of a lot of dialogue constantly.

Q. You mentioned in the last couple of minutes Mr. Carver, Mr. Alan, Mr. Adams and yourself.

A. Right.

Q. Who were the other people in that group at that time?

A. We had Colonel Birkett, a retired ordnance officer. He played with devices, booby traps and mines, phosphorous hand grenades and other aspects of maiming and killing weaponry.

Mr. Bud Roberts was in that staff with us. Bud was a project officer as well as an old tech and tell officer, that worked on the staff.

I am trying to think who the secretaries were. It was before we picked up the additional people to work in the all source center.
So we were shy five people that later came on to help with our capability.

Q. When did that happen, do you recall?
A. We were supposed to be finished with that facility by the 1st of November. As I recall we finished building it and became a mostly operational group by the first week in October. The only reason I can remember that is it happened to be that we got it done before schedule. It was just before TET.

Q. I am going to show you a memorandum marked as Exhibit 731, which is dated 9 July 1967. Can you take a look and see if you recognize that?

(There was a pause in the proceeding.)

Q. After reading the first page, if it looks familiar and you feel you can say something, fine.
A. It sums up in paragraph two the problem that I had with the entire MACV approach that I had with the order of battle. It was a time lag. It was, when they published it, not only low but three to four months old. In a situation following a circumstance, like we have as we collect order of
battle data on potential enemies -- that would obviously be the Soviet Union -- you can live with a three to four month time lag because you want to be precise.

In a situation that was indeed a war on hand at the time, as Viet Nam was, there is no soldier in the field that could live with that three to four month time lag, waiting for some multiple confirmation of data to come in.

So we always knew that we were late and on the skids with whatever order of battle projection it was that we had, and it did not represent the reality in a province or district or hamlet or village.

We knew that that order of battle published under those criteria didn't do a damn bit of good to a soldier slogging in a rice paddy.

The other problem, even though it was late, it was light and didn't reflect what we knew to be there.

You did a draw a methodology and then you try to adhere to it. Then you find you have a gap in time between the arrival of your old data that you are treating and any new data that you might get, and you have a hell of a delta in here
that is difficult to explain.

Q. Was that the problem with the methodology in July 1967, the application of the methodology, or both?

A. I think it was a problem potentially of the way we assessed our criteria.

To the reader in the States that wasn't likely to step on a puny stake in his backyard, the lag didn't make a hell of a lot of difference. But for the guy over there trying to use the product, the lag made a hell of a lot of difference. He is in a real time situation and you are telling him something that purported to be the condition as it existed 90 to 120 days earlier.

Now I can't live with that if I am a provincial adviser, district adviser or a young infantry company commander trying to win his spurs in the only war we had at the time.

That exacerbated the other problems with the order of battle. I haven't gotten into the political problem yet and I would like to read that.

Q. Let me ask you one or two more questions about the large paragraph on page one of Exhibit 731. Was it your understanding that the
methodology that MACV followed in preparing the order of battle will be arrived at at the Honolulu conference --

A. In November 1966. My understanding was that several members of the intelligence community accepted a criteria for confirming the order of battle, because we had a best evidence rule, and it was accepted that in good faith MACV would follow those rules and allow the order of battle to rise to the level that the evidence would support.

Q. Are you saying or suggesting that in your opinion in 1967 MACV was not acting in good faith?

A. Absolutely not.

Q. And when did you come to the conclusion that MACV was not acting in good faith?

A. As soon as it became known to several of us, and to me very, very bitterly, that there were real pressures being placed on the several agencies that were involved in Viet Nam to show progress, and we saw reporting across all aspects and functional areas coming out of MACV and Op reps, and whatnot, that began to herald that kind of progress, whether it be order of battle or the
amount of dunnage that was being built or the extensions of runways, a lot of which hadn't the vaguest thing to do with prosecuting the war, if you will, and hadn't been coordinated with the VC to a point where the VC recognized they were losing. Order of battle just being another such indicator.

The manifestation of that was brought home to me very, very vividly in a phone call one Saturday morning in April or May of 1967, and it was a Saturday morning. Like many things that you remember in your life that hit you funny as either a shock to your system, or sort of, was Mr. Walt Rostow on the phone. I answered the phone and he asked to speak to George Carver. Carver was not in. It was just George Alan and I holding down the fort that Saturday morning.

He said he would speak to George Alan.

George, when he found out who it was on the phone, a rather distinguished individual out of the White House, asked me to monitor. And in monitoring the conversation it disclosed that Mr. Rostow was very, very disturbed because the President was disturbed that the President was not getting so-called good news out of Viet Nam. And
the agency was being asked, Mr. Rostow
specifically asked our staff, to cull the data
that we were getting so that certain elements of
the data reflecting better news or good news would
cheer up the President.

Mr. Alan said, "We don't manage
intelligence like it were a daily newspaper. The
information coming out of Viet Nam will fall as it
may from both our reporting and our analysis of
MACV's reporting."

Rostow got quite upset and accused
Mr. Alan, and the stance that he had taken, as not
being loyal to the President.

Mr. Alan saw the better part of valor
and suggested that Mr. Rostow up his request an
echelon or two to the deputy director or the
director.

The kind of sends a chill down your
back when you are relatively junior and maybe even
a naive guy, recognizing that we are beginning to
try to manage news or suggesting to people that
they manage the news. And this was not subtle.
Conversely, it was not a direct order on the part
of Mr. Rostow, but the challenge was there to be
loyal.
I recognized or began to recognize -- you got to remember that our staff saw every single Op rep, Op rep one, two, three, four that came out of that theater, whether it was aircraft sortie rates, whether it was logistics reporting coming out of the logistics types in MACV, or personnel. It all took on a tone of optimism and progress being made.

Ridiculous things began to be additive in terms of a symbol of progress.

Q. Let me interrupt because the question I asked a long time was a very specific one.

A. Let's go back to it then. I tend to get off on kicks.

Q. The question was when for the first time did you feel that MACV was issuing reports or documents that you believe were not being sent out in good faith?

MR. BARON: Slightly different question. Is that your current question?

MR. DORSEN: I am not sure at this remote point what the other question was. But that is my question.

A. Say it again.

Q. I think you testified that at some
point in 1967 you came to the view that MACV was issuing reports or documents not in good faith.

A. That's right.

Q. And when for the first time did you come to that view or conclusion?

A. I think it was about that same time frame. I felt that the command had interpreted suggestion as a click your heels salute and let's get on with it. And I think that direction came out of the top of MACV.

I think it was clear in my mind that soldiers within MACV were beginning to march to the beat of a new tone or a new drum.

We had a song about it in those days and --

Q. Well, let's --

MR. BARON: You haven't made him finish. You can move to strike, but you must let him finish.

MR. DORSEN: I do it in court.

MR. BARON: There is a judge there to rule on it.

Q. I ask you to bear with me. Some of the questions are somewhat specific.

MR. BARON: You call your last
Q. What led you to come to the conclusion that MACV was issuing reports that were not in good faith?

A. Reviewing some of those reports?

A. I just mentioned them. We were in a position where we were on distribution for reports coming out of MACV that dealt with all aspects of MACV's overall endeavor to prosecute the war, not just solely intelligence. You had body count, you had weapons found, you had the passification reports that got strewn in their own right because of the absolute subjective nature of them, the levels of them that were aggregated by people who wanted to see progress made; just a whole screaming variety of different pieces coming together that said: Something ain't right here. It all had to do with: Let's get on with it and have some success.

I have to tell you that I wanted to win that war over there as bad as the next guy but I felt we had to do it with some sense of integrity and honor.

Conversely, the tone in the country was beginning to change a little as people tired
with, by that time, the longest war we had fought.

MR. DORSEN: Would you agree that the

witness is not being totally responsive at this
time to the question?

MR. BARON: No, I wouldn't.

Q. Colonel Blascak --

A. You are asking me to say that the
daytime group message, May, 1967, said thus and so,
and I will tell you, I can't do that, sir.

Q. Colonel Blascak, let me just try to
keep this on a calm level. I did not interrupt
you when you listed general categories of reports.
Then you turned to things like the mood of the
country and things like that.

A. Well, okay.

Q. I am trying to keep this going in an
orderly fashion.

A. I screwed it up. Go ahead.

Q. Do you have any recollection of
basing your view on anything other than reviewing
the documents?

A. I have been accused of being an idiot
but I ain't all that stupid. And I had time on
the ground in Viet Nam. I saw some things that
were cumulative and stuck with me from an earlier
tour, in areas that I knew damn well weren't pacified. And this is just six months before I got to the staff; four months before the time we are talking about. I saw guys prostitute themselves in the name of showing progress, and it didn't have anything to do with the condition on the ground.

Q. Can you fix the time that you came to this view with any greater specificity? I think you said it was April, May.

A. Yes.

Q. Anything more specific than that?

A. I know it was spring, I know it was a Saturday morning. I know it was George Alan and I in there alone.

I am drifting to the Rostow phone call --

Q. I am trying to focus on MACV at this point.

A. I still think in that churning time frame, April, May, June time frame when things just began to take a little different tone, or a worse tone than they had taken before.

At a point in time when we had at our disposal, based on two super good operations,
Junction City and either Cedar Falls or Birmingham, I can't remember, a treasure trove of documentation to go through and look at to see what this new volume of evidence showed us about the VC. And the analytic judgment from people coming back and forth on TDY said that the working level stiffs said that we have a better handle on this, we are going to be able to project better what is really out there at the hamlet and village level, on up through the Viet Coong structure.

Q. When were you in Viet Nam in 1967?

A. To do that right I got to go back to 1966 for a minute and determine when I was in Viet Nam in 1966. I had at least two TDYS in Viet Nam in 1966, one an extensive one for five, six weeks on a project. I would say probably two TDYS in Viet Nam in 1967 before the July time frame.

Q. Any after? In 1967?

A. No. Because we got a little bit more involved in the construction of our facility.

Q. When was the next time you were in Viet Nam after the spring -- the first part of 1967?

A. I would say sometime between the spring and the July time frame.
Q. That was in 1967?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And after that did you go back to Viet Nam at all?
A. Yes.
Q. When was that?
A. Right after TET, to set up a situation room in the new embassy that had been attacked during the TET offensive to parallel what we had, so their plots were the same as ours, so they would have some predictive capability there. They didn't get much warning when TET occurred.
Q. On the subject of TET, did you personally participate in any estimate of the size of the enemy attacking force at TET?
A. After?
Q. Yes.
A. We were up to our ass in the situation following, and I am talking about 18 to 22 to 24 to 36 hours at a stretch, from the evening of TET through mid February, until things stabilized and settled down.
A guy named Jim Borer and I, and a couple of other people that were working as Op
center people, were handling the entire flow of traffic, both agency and MACV, during that time frame.

We were feeding Sam Adams, Dean Moore, the agency, we did a daily situation report in terms of the status of the conditions in the provincial capitals, the district capitals, those provinces where the battles were raging, to the director of Central Intelligence. It was taken every morning by 7:30 by Mr. Carver up there.

We ran those special for about seven to eight weeks.

Again, a rambling way of saying did I work estimates? I didn't have time to work estimates, but we knew, just by what we were seeing the impact of, that our worst fear in terms of the numbers of enemy out there that were listed by MACV were sorely inadequate to explain the intensity of the TET attacks. No question about it. Any idiot would have seen that.

Q. Is it your testimony, and I am not trying to put words in your mouth, that you did not personally participate in any estimate, numerical estimate of the size of the attacking force of TET?
A. I can remember shoving all kinds of figures and data to Sam Adams, but I did not have time to work that data until the next order of battle conference, if you will, that fell after March. I can't put a date on it.

Q. I think the record will show it was April of 1968.

A. All right. I sure recall that one because I got stung.

Q. Let me ask you this: How long did you stay with the CIA working on Viet Nam related matters?

A. Oh, two and a half years. From January 1966 through August of 1968, when I went to Armed Forces staff college.

Q. I am changing the subject somewhat, just so the record is clear.

MR. BARON: It is an hour and 16 minutes, do you mind just a short break?

I am not feeling really well.

MR. DORSEN: We will take five minutes.

(Short recess.)

MR. DORSEN: Back on the record.

Q. Just so the record is clear at this point, I think a few minutes ago we stopped
looking at Exhibit 731. The question was whether you have any recollection of having seen that document in 1967?

A. Yes, I suspect I have seen it. I don't know within what context, but it is not unfamiliar to me. As we get into this, it occurs to me that this is an alternative that came out of the Vietnamese Affairs staff, where we split out, prior to going into the August meetings, the military from the nonmilitary.

Q. Do you recall anything else about it, about the document or any proposals contained in the document?

A. What should I -- sort of a CIA counterproposal to try and sort out where we were with categories and get some sweetness and light into the process that might be amenable and acceptable to MACV, so that MACV would allow the doggone thing to grow to a level that made some sense to us.

Q. Do you recall whether the proposal that is discussed in Exhibit 731 is one that you participated in drafting?

A. I saw drafts of it.

Input, again George Alan saying to
come into the office, Sam Adams saying, what do
you think about this, and from me asking the same
question. And this looks like George Alan, but I
can't swear to it, that this kind of thing emerged.

Q. Do you recall whether this was a
proposal that represented the CIA's position as a
way of including the proceedings in connection
with SNIE 14.3-67?

MR. BARON: Objection to form.

Q. I guess the question is do you know
what that represents in terms of the CIA position?

A. I think this was probably a very
honest attempt to break an impasse that was
brewing relative to the framing of the SNIE, and
trying to come in with something that said: Hey,
look, if we want to continue with the intel
process and not abandon it completely, in the
interest of some form of righteousness and
integrity, let's look at this thing from the
standpoint of some criteria determinations and
negotiation and try to beat on the good faith door
that was rapidly closing on us.

Q. Do you recall whether there was
anyone in SAVA who disagreed with the position set
forth in 731?
A. I think there was a vast giving on our part to write this. Hell, we went into the thing a couple of months earlier with a projection that we were content with, that was at the 605,000 mark, 500,000 mark, a range between 500,000 and 600,000, and felt we could probably support more based on the evidence and based on some analytic reasons.

So writing this, I think there was a visceral feeling that we were about to give away the store.

Q. Let me move back to where I was just before the break, and that is this: I think you indicated, and correct me if I am wrong, that you started doing something other than Viet Nam in mid 1968, is that correct?

A. No. In August of 1968, at the heals of my very final TDY, in early August I went to the Armed Forces staff college. That was my last association.

I worked the Viet Nam problem from thanks giving day -- correction. From February 1962 to August of 1968. That's what I did for a living.

Q. After August 1968 did you speak to
Sam Adams at all?

A. One time.

Q. And when was that?

A. April 1981.

Q. And do you remember how that came about?

A. Yes. He called me on the phone.

Q. And where were you at that time?

A. Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

Q. What was said in that conversation?

A. Well, you know Sam, I know Sam. It was, "Hi" just like we had seen each other on the street corner the day before. And we went from there. He was saying, "You know, we are putting together some material for my book and for a program that's in the wind, and I just wanted to ask you if you would reflect on some figures and statistics. Do you recall the infiltration we were monitoring in the time frame October through TET, through January 1967, 1968?"

I said, "I can't give you hard numbers, but it occurred to me it was in the order of magnitude of about three times the then accepted monthly infiltration rate, which was something like 6500 to 7000 a month," which would
have put it up in the 18 to 20,000 range for those months, latter October, November, December, January.

Q. Did you have a word before October?
A. Late October.

Q. Was this something that you were discussing with Sam Adams in 1981?
A. Yes, April 1981.

Q. And was the number that you are talking about, 18, 20,000, or thereabouts --
A. Range.

Q. -- was that a number that you had seen evidence of before TET or after TET, or both?
A. Before. In a single intelligence source accruing from NSA's product, we were seeing stepped-up infiltration, our magic room of maps allowed us to plot that infiltration as it occurred coming down the Ho Chi Min Trail into the I Corps area, into into the II Corps area and into the III Corps area. That was relatively real time intelligence.

Part of the problem then became how the hell do you put the real time intelligence, i.e., very current stuff, together with OB, which lagged by three to four months.
The answer to that was you can't.

The answer beyond that was we didn't have a charter to do it anyway. MACV had the infiltration charter.

Q. Let me go back to that for a second. Are you saying that the evidence of this range of 18 to 20,000 there about, infiltration, in late December, January --

A. Single source counting.

Q. That was NSA?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that per month that you are talking about?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. And do you know whether any effort was made after TET or at any time to corroborate or test whether that infiltration that you just described actually took place?

A. Yes, sir. After TET, the intensity of TET, and what we saw occur or accrue during TET, caused the agency to abrogate the we are rolling with MACV's figures philosophy, based upon them having the charter to do that. We said we were going to go our own route because you guys were wrong and we feel no obligation to go with you
They did indeed do some retroactive or adjusted look at the order of battle. You had casualty figures rolling in like it was going out of style. That alone, based on those ratios and the intensity of the conflict, had to tell you that numbers were wrong.

Q. Was the infiltration that was showing up pre-TET infiltration by NVA units, replacements, or some combination?

A. All of the above.

Q. Do you remember the proportion?

A. I do not remember the proportion. We were looking at regimental entities in terms of trying to peg flags.

I am walking on egg shells because some of the technical aspects of that are classified. They really are. And I am not trying to play games here.

Q. I understand that.

A. But you could get from the report the size of the unit that was associated with that type of intelligence report, if that makes any sense at all. And some were regiments, there were battalion entities and there were the packet
All of this were being picked up by NSA?

Single source NSA.

Isn't it true, Colonel Blasckak, that the NSA information was being transmitted more or less simultaneously to CIA, MACV, Department of Defense, White House, and perhaps other agencies?

Well, I know it fell out in our all source area. It was certainly available to DIA, and it was certainly available to MACV itself, because they had, in my view wrongly, established a single source, special departmented intelligence area, SCIF, and did not do all source analysis well, in my judgment.

They did collateral well and they did single source, but they did not do all source well. Their ability to blend stuff, in this day and age, was archaic, by the standards we use today.

Is it the case that whatever NSA produced in the way of information and intelligence on infiltration was generally known at the higher echelons of the intelligence community?

Not necessarily at all. It is often
referred to as raw intelligence. If you use the
MACV criteria for that you would have to hook to
it a couple of other sources, a photograph of what
was going on, or a prisoner from the unit. That
kind of stuff didn't roll out until after TET,
considerably after TET.

Q. When you say considerably, what do
you mean?

A. Five, six months. I think the CIA
had a better handle on it earlier than because we
started the doggone procedure within two weeks or
so after TET.

Q. Did the CIA start seeing two weeks
after TET a collateral source evidence of preTET
infiltration of the magnitude you just described?

A. Let me caveat that by saying that in
the magnitude I just described, they would, we
would see unit entities that were a part of the
magnitude I just described appear one after the
other as a unit left the field of battle or a U.S.
unit got a handle on that unit and got a document
or a prisoner or some indication of them. But did
it all just roll out and suddenly in the
collateral area were they able to stand up and say:
Gee, whiz, 18,000 guys came in October, November,
December and January? No, it wasn't quite that easy.

By the second day of TET we knew we had a hell of a lot of units out there that were never shown in the collateral order of battle, or ever handed up, saluted.

Q. Isn't it true you knew that actually before TET, that there were units up there that were not in the collateral order of battle?

A. We knew in the single source context that there were something out there that replicated itself as a regiment or battalion entity that would start in some portion of North Vietnam and wend its way down through the infiltration corridors and cut off into North and South Vietnam, Central South Vietnam, and generally areas not farther south than Saigon.

Q. Let me focus you for a minute, if I may, on collateral source data that came out on this higher infiltration.

I believe you testified, and correct me if I am wrong --

MR. BARON: Objection.

MR. DORSEN: I didn't ask a question yet.
MR. BARON: First of all, I assume your introduction was part of the question. My problem is you referred --

MR. DORSEN: Let me start again.

Q. I believe you testified, and please correct me if I am wrong, that starting a couple of weeks after TET you and others saw collateral source intelligence or data of high infiltration that had taken place before TET; is that accurate or not accurate?

A. Of units that we had never seen in the collateral order of battle before that were now on the doorsteps of a province, and a CIA or MACV report was saying the certain battalion of the certain regiment was engaged at our doorstep for the last 72 hours and now they have gone back in the bush.

We suddenly said: We never heard of them in the order of battle.

Q. But you heard of them from NSA, is that correct?

A. We saw raw reports that equated to the numbers realized there. We sometimes could not get from that NSA report the unit identification. But if I have an order of battle
in front of me, the detailed order of battle, and you have seen them; they roll them out promiscuously -- that says main force battalions, NVA regiment by number in X province or area, war zone D, or whatever it is. You go through that whole thing and there is no reference to something called the 375th Viet Min People's Regiment, or whatever the name might be.

Suddenly a provincial report comes in from either MACV or from a station report that says that we had contact during the last 48 hours with the 375th People's Viet Min Regiment; and you say that you either have a name change here or a cover name working for us or a new unit. Now let's take another look at it. And we had a hell of a laundry list of those by 36 hours into TET.

Q. You are referring to documentary evidence or prisoner of war reports?

A. I am talking about a unit banner with a number on it or an ID card or a piece of paper, APO kind of address in the pocket of a dead soldier.

Q. Was that material that you just described available to MACV, to the best of your knowledge and recollection, preTET or did it
become available for the first time with the TET offensive, to the best of your knowledge and recollection?

MR. BARON: Object to the form of the question.

A. I am not sure I understand the question.

Q. The question is this, and I will make it clear if it is not: You are describing certain documentary type evidence that became available to you after at the time on pre-TET infiltration. Was this material --

A. Here is the dilemma --

Q. Let me pursue sue it my way and I will give you an opportunity to answer. Was the documentary material you have just described, to the best of your knowledge, available to MACV intelligence before the TET offensive started?

A. Within the context of -- you don't really have apples and oranges. What you have is this kind of an entity, which later -- this is pre-TET. You have something that equates to a regimental formation described to you in NSA traffic. You can't identify it. It is one regiment.

After TET you have something that
shows up in that same area that has emerged as the 375th something and it was never shown in the order of battle before. Where you get set up is that nobody had tried to, preTET, blend to anybody's satisfaction that infiltration data with the order of battle.

The order of battle was a downward curve, saying everything is sweetness and light, it is going great, guys; we are winning, because MACV tells us so. The community is set up to say, yes, we are winning.

We see this other evidence of something happening; it doesn't break through the noise level, and when TET broke we said the unthinkable, the impossible has just occurred and, by God, we led ourselves right into it. We were in an absolute I-told-you-so condition at that time.

Q. The question I want to focus on for a little longer is this: The evidence that showed that the unit that was there but unidentified prior to TET and was identified ultimately as the 375th, was the data and information and documents that showed the unit to be the 375th, in the example you just gave, available to MACV preTET or
did that information just become available to MACV post TET, as you understand it?

A. The identification of the unit, and they had a fettish to push identification, because that was part of the criteria, and I can't really object to that. It is like your house number and my house number separates the two houses and makes it discrete.

The problem we had was that there was nobody willing to say: Oh, crap, we got this amassed group of something that should be additive to this. We have to warn somebody about this. We have got to get off the dime and say we are about to get waxed.

Q. Let me focus on a very specific question, which is this: You gave as an example that there was something out there that NSA picked up that was not put in the order of battle, MACV order of battle before TET.

A. That's right.

Q. At some point in your example it became evident that the unit in fact was or was believed to be the 375th.

A. The inference —

Q. Please bear with me. The question I
have is this. Was it your understanding that the
information that showed the previously
unidentified unit to be the 375th, was that
evidence, documents, letters, et cetera, available
pre-TET or did it become available for the first
time only with the TET offensive?

A. The only thing that was not available
was the linkage of the number with the entity.

Q. That became available post-TET, is
that correct?

A. That's right. So, in essence -- I am
trying to be rather clear on this, too. The MACV
prophecy that said confirmation had to be a series
of various different pieces of evidence, two
documents, three documents, one document, and a
prisoner, had not been realized. So this, in
essence, went down as a nonentity in single source.

And then the other notion was even
more difficult to prove or deny in the view of the
skeptics, which was: It could be one guy with a
radio, making a noise like a regiment. But it
surely turned out to be other than that.

MR. DORSEN: Let's take one minute.

(Short recess)

Q. Is what you are saying in one respect
that this should have been an all source order of battle summary?

A. Oh, I think so. But against the criteria that they had arranged to do their order of battle and against saying they had conjured 300,000, what the hell difference did it make? They were bent on the ceiling, at least it so occurs to my, to a point where it would have been rather embarrassing to roll that other business in, and it didn't get rolled in for a hell of a long time.

Q. Let's assume hypothetically there was no ceiling --

A. That's your hypothetical.

Q. Let's forget about a ceiling for a minute, and I am not trying to change anything in your testimony but just for the purposes of analysis -- under the criteria MACV was operating under as of October November, December, January 1967, 1968, could MACV appropriately have included those units that you were discussing in its MACV order of battle summary?

A. Under the criteria?

Q. Yes.

MR. BARON: The question is in the
order of battle summary?

MR. DORSEN: Yes.

A. Absolutely not. The classification is so moderately low to maximize the consumption of this thing, that there was no way they could drag it in.

Q. Did you discuss this subject with Sam Adams at the time?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he tell you he agreed with you?

MR. BARON: Objection. When you say the subject, do you mean the whole of Colonel Blascak's testimony with respect to the subject?

MR. DORSEN: If I am not clear, I want to be.

Q. Did you discuss with Sam Adams during of the period November, December 1967 what you have been testifying to about concerning the indications from NSA of additional infiltration?

A. Surely. Sam Adams had the same tickets that I had. He was in and out of that all source vault to look at our awesome maps on a daily basis.

Q. Did your maps show the units that were identified solely by NSA intelligence?
A. Yes. We had colorcoded pins to differentiate collateral from all source, and we tracked those pins from one position to another on a daily basis, and they were discretely numbered so that we would be moving the right pin that equated to the right entity.

Q. Who, other than CIA personnel, if anybody, came in and looked at those maps during that time period?

A. Our show in that all source area was not the biggest show in town until after TET. After TET we had Dean Acheson, we had advisers, we had Secretary McNamara, Maxwell Taylor, General DePew, and we were asked to replicate our plots in the JCS where they were still plotting all this stuff on page size graphics.

We were the only facility in the greater Washington area that was doing war following, situation following at the scale we had elected to do. There may have been some hip pocket analysis going on in NSA itself or over in some obscure portion of the Pentagon, but it was not known to me that was the case.

Nobody bothered to do those kinds of plots.
Q. At an earlier point we were talking about your conversation with Sam Adams in April 1981. Did you discuss any subject other than infiltration?

Let me go back a step. Do you recall saying anything about infiltration other than what you have described in the last time period?

A. No, not on an open telephone. We didn't get into any greater depth of detail. I don't know whether I was reconfirming something that he had already had recalled and remembered, or whether it was just reinforcing to him, or what. We chatted after that for a couple of moments, and he said, "By the way, when my book is published you will have a copy." I said, "Thank you, Sam, autograph it," and that was it.

Some two years later, I guess, I got a phone call relative to the special, which I had not seen, and that probably has something to do with why I am here now.

Q. Can you recall whether you discussed any substantive area with Sam Adams in April 1981, other than infiltration?

A. What we have just been talking about is a substantive area of infiltration.
Q. Anything other than infiltration.

A. His concern seemed to be to try to get corroboration or verification of that kind of an infiltration figure, and I think I was able to supply that, for whatever it was worth.

Q. Did he indicate whether he had any other information on infiltration at that time?

A. Well, I know you will understand Sam was an absolutely prolific notetaker, record keeper, file maker, and analyst with a meticulous zeal for perfection. Whatever Sam had it was probably two or three linear feet of records, and over the phone I couldn't tell that was the case. But Sam never took his tasks lightly. He didn't go in without being somewhat well prepared.

Q. And I believe you have just said, and correct me if I am wrong, that you did not talk to Sam Adams between April 1981 until after the CBS broadcast, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you and Sam Adams discuss the names of any people who might have information produced to Sam Adams when you spoke in April of 1981?
A. No. That's close enough to the present time frame that with great certainty I can say there were no throw-offs, no leads, no leads asked for and no leads given.

Q. I am sorry, were you finished?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall whether Sam Adams mentioned both a book and a television broadcast, or just one?

A. Both.

Q. Did he say anything --

A. And I mentioned that earlier.

Q. I recall now you did. I am sorry. Do you recall what, if anything, he said about the content of either the book or the television broadcast?

A. Well, he was very clear on the book. As I understand, and I have not seen a galley or proof of it, but the title is, "To Square a Circle," and it has to do with the SNIE and all of this; and the special by inference obviously followed suit, by inference. I had no problem stretching my imagination to carry the theme through.

Q. Did he say anything that shed light on the thrust or substance of the broadcast that
was going to be forthcoming?

MR. BARON: Objection.

A. No; as a matter of fact he didn't. I didn't know whether the special was going to be shown or released imminently or it was just a scheme in his mind's eye, or whether it was in the can, or whether he did it himself with his home camera, for that matter.

Q. Did you and Sam Adams ever discuss whether the TET offensive was a military defeat for the Viet Cong and NVA?

A. Certainly.

Q. And what was the discussion?

A. It was not a military defeat for the Viet Cong and NVA. Their ability to pull it off changed American opinion to an irreversible— in an irreversible way.

They weren't after a military victory. I think it was a throw-away attack with the full knowledge they were going to lose thousands but they would make a mark on history that would once and for all knock the American will, that was already wavering in the face of mixed signals.

This scrap, and it is only pure scrap, and it only underscores the intel sensitivity on
the type of war Viet Nam was on the part of our
leaders that said you had military victories that
could be achieved by political means.
That was the kind of thinking that
threw the French and us out, and we never read the
history of the French experience.

Q. Would it be accurate to say --
A. You keep goring my ox a little bit
and it causes me to make speeches.

Q. I don't mean to.
A. You hit nerves. Your questions ain't bad.

Q. Would it be accurate to say that the
Viet Cong and NVA were willing to suffer enormous
losses on the battlefield in order to effect
American public opinion in a way that would
undermine the American resolve to fight the war?
A. Again, if you read Ho, or any of
those guys that have done their homework in terms
of revolutionary warefare, they set the battle
field, they prepare the battlefield and strike at
a point in time of their own choosing for the
result that they want.

There was nothing that was
serendipitous or spontaneous about the TET
offensive. It was well orchestrated with a lots of forces in place that capitalized on the presence of the new infiltratees in order to bring it off.

I will tell you, to be able to coordinate the attack within the space of a four-hour time on a particular night in early 1968 is no small chore.

The preparation of the battlefield, done by these lower-level guerrillas that MACV claimed weren't there and weren't pertinent to the combatant power of the VC is just absolutely -- was brought out and brought to a head full bore by the conduct of the TET offensive.

Had they not been there, they would not have achieved the ability to stun the American public the way they did, and our decision-makers.

MR. DORSEN: Why don't we call it two hours and --

MR. BARON: I have one request and that is we get going tomorrow by 4 o'clock.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

(Deposition adjourned at 9:15 p.m.)
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

STATE OF NEW YORK:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK:

I, DONALD W. BLASCAK, certify that I have read the transcription of my testimony, and that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcription of same.

DONALD W. BLASCAK

Signed and subscribed to before me this day of 1985.

NOTARY PUBLIC
CERTIFICATION

I, RAYMOND DE SIMONE, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Notary Public, do hereby certify that the foregoing witness, DONALD W. BLASCAK, was duly sworn by me on the date indicated, and that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcription of my stenographic notes.

I further certify that I am not employed by nor related to any party to this action.

RAYMOND DE SIMONE, CSR