Q I think you also said in your affidavit that the Estimate was in due course completed and made public in this manner.
A That is correct.
Q Now, since you wrote your affidavit, you have had your recollection refreshed by something that indicated that the Estimate of the self defense forces was not, in fact, made public in that manner. What I'm trying to find out is what was it that refreshed your recollection.

MR. RIESE: Objection to the form.
A Well, I've already indicated that I have, and I think I mentioned that I have seen a text of the Sidle briefing, whether it was the final text or not I don't know, but the final text of the briefing does not include an exact figure. My recollection is that in some fashion that figure, in its broad outline, did become public and was in news stories at the time but that's a very vague recollection.

My recollection is a very short time after the briefing, the fact that there was a significant figure under the self defense forces became public knowledge, but just how, I do not know.
Q I want to pursue that. Are you saying that even though the Sidle briefing didn't make mention of the self defense forces or the number of self defense forces that somehow that number became public later?

A That's my understanding. My recollection of the time is whatever gap there was was very small, that very shortly it became known that that was a significant number, but that their function was, we thought, accurately described in the briefing, that is, that they were not without military significance but they didn't have enough military significance to be included in the military order of battle.

Q The self defense forces had been included in the military order of battle from the beginning, had they not, sir?

MR. RIESE: Objection.

A I have no specific recollection on that point but I tend to assume they had been, but I have -- on one of the documents I referred to, it would indicate there had been a previous estimate -- no, I'm sorry, that does not cover that at all.

I just don't remember exactly how
it had been described earlier.

Q. Was it your understanding that anything had changed that caused the self defense forces to be less of a military threat in late 1967 than they had been earlier?

A. No, I think nothing had materially changed as to their function. The question is now something you covered earlier in broadbrush fashion on other estimates, how it should be made more precise, and that is something we were all trying to do, first in the estimate and then in the briefing.

Q. You said the function of the self defense forces had not changed?

A. As far as I'm aware, they had not basically changed.

Q. Had the capabilities of the self defense forces changed?

A. We were now facing a situation where there was this evidence that their numbers were larger. So obviously they were somewhat more numerically significant, but their function had not changed.

Q. Had their capabilities, other than simply their numbers, changed?

A. Not to my knowledge, sir. In other words,
what it amounted to was the evidence suggested that the earlier estimates had been significantly too low. So there were really two questions: What is the figure and what is the trend.

The earlier estimate had been significantly too low and we now thought the figure was higher than previously thought, but this was substantially a question of having obtained better intelligence to correct earlier estimates. We still believed, and genuinely believed, that the trend line was down in this as in other categories.

Q From whom did you get that information?
A Well, this was the picture as I got it and I asked for specifics, particularly when I had occasion, as I've said in my affidavit, to conduct a briefing for a number of officials from other departments some time in later September of '67.

Q But from whom did you get this information that caused you to believe the trend line was down?
A That was over a period of time.
Q From whom?
A From Greene and Carver, I assume, Habib. They were the three I would have been turning to.
Q Let me take them one by one. Is it your understanding that Mr. Greene believed that enemy strength was decreasing?

I assume that's what you mean when you say the trend line was down.

Yes.

Q Did Mr. Greene believe that?

My recollection would be that he believed that. My recollection is that all three -- that there was a general consensus, at least among those three, that this was the trend line.

Q Did you have any understanding what they based that on?

Well, I assumed they based it on the exhaustive sharing of evidence between the Command and Washington because, to the best of my knowledge, the raw material available to the Command was in all cases made available in Washington.

Q Do you know what the volume of that raw material was?

It was enormous. I looked -- I had occasion now and then to look at captured documents for samplings and things of that sort. It suggested to me at all times there was a full sharing and I never heard
any suggestion from anyone in the CIA circuit that they were not seeing the same materials as McVey.

Q Let me focus on the volume. Do you know what the volume was in 1967 of this so-called shared intelligence?

A No, but I'm sure it was very, very great indeed. Captured documents alone from one of the times when you found them, and I'm quoting now from the broadcast, I guess Adams refers to a find in '66 and I think there was another find in the spring of '67. Those were vast findings and great effort and special measures were taken to reproduce those so that we did have full copies in Washington and I consulted them on occasion just to see what sort of material it was.

I have no idea in terms of thousands of pages per month or anything of that sort, Mr. Boise, but I was well aware it was a very voluminous set of evidence.

Q How many millions of pages were there in 1967?

A I have no idea, Mr. Boise. I know it was a very considerable job to get it copied and reproduced and get documents translated. We had to
lay on special efforts for all of that and those efforts were made.

Q Do you know whether it was more or less than half a million pages a month on the average?

A I have no idea. I would imagine it varied enormously from month to month. I would doubt it would go that high except possibly on one or two of the major hauls.

Q Do you know what the total number was in 1967?

A I have no idea.

Q Approximately?

A I have no approximation.

Q Do you know whether it was more or less than six and a half million pages?

A I would have no judgment on that. I would think it would undoubtedly be well up in the hundreds of thousands of pages. I can't take it any further than that.

Q How many people did the State Department have that devoted their time to reading these documents?

A I don't know the answer to that. We would have believed that the agency had the primary
Bundy

responsibility on the civilian side.

Q By "the agency," you mean --

A The agency on the civilian side and there were probably people in DIA doing it. I don't know how many in each agency.

Q By "the agency," who do you mean?

A CIA.

Q How many people did the CIA have reviewing these documents?

A I do not know the structure of the CIA operation except it was extremely full and sought to cover the matter with great care, admitting, of course, that its manpower at any time would be less than the people in the field.

But also they had the benefit of somewhat more continuity. That was always a problem in intelligence, the lack of continuity. The people in the field tended to be there a year at most, or sometimes two, and continuity was a problem and the youth and inexperience. By and large, the CIA people were and had become much more experienced.

Q Do you know the names of any of the CIA people that were actually reading these raw intelligence documents?
A I don’t recall knowing any of those names at the time. The people I dealt with were Carver and, on occasion, George Allen, as his deputy.

Q Do you have any estimate at all as to how many people the CIA had that devoted their time to reading these raw intelligence documents?

A I have no estimate with any reliability.

Q Do you know if it was more than three?

A I do not.

Q Did you ever try to find out?

A I don’t recall ever asking specifically. I got the strong feeling that, taking Washington as a whole, and that included DIA as well as CIA, that a significant number of people were reading them and reading them with care.

Q Who told you that?

A That would have undoubtedly been an impression gained. I would have asked specifically Greene, Carver or Habib.

Q Do you know how many people DIA had working on it?

A I do not.

Q Do you know if the Defense Intelligence Agency had anybody working full time on captured
enemy documents or raw intelligence?

A I do not know that one way or the other.

Q Who did you deal with at DIA?

A I didn't deal directly with DIA that I can recall on any occasion but I was well aware that they had a significant operation in this area. I did not know the strength sizes or how they were allocated.

Q Do you know anything at all about DIA?

A I only know that the DIA participating as it did in the intelligence estimates had an analytic capacity and I guess I was relying on my past experience in the fifties.

The DIA usually turned up with a significant group who were specifically analyzing the problem but I don't recall making any specific inquiry or the results of it.

Q Did anyone tell you that the DIA had been specifically enjoined to support the positions taken by MACV?

MR. RIESE: Objection to the form.

A I was never given any information of that type.
Q Would it have surprised you if that was the case?
A Not inordinately because DIA tended to, in this case with a field commend, with an extensive intelligence staff and network, just how much they should duplicate it I'm not sure, but I know of nothing that would indicate that DIA had such an injunction. They tended to generally, I guess almost viscerally, tended to support the commander in the field, but I have no knowledge at all that they were instructed to do so.
Q Who was the commander in the field?
A General Westmoreland and his intelligence people.
Q How many people did the MACV command have devoting themselves to review of raw intelligence?
A I don't know the answer to that in any specificity but that must have been a very significant group. I do not know the breakdown of the intelligence shop in MACV or its size.
Q Did you know approximately?
A I assumed it was a rather significant operation running, I would suppose, perhaps 50 or a hundred people at any given time.
Q You indicated that you had read the 1967 MACV briefing on enemy order of battle.

A I had read a version of it. Whether it is the final one, I do not know.

Q Who gave you this version?

A That I believe was in the papers that were in the Westmoreland packet.

Q That is the packet Westmoreland sent you?

A Yes.

Q Let me ask you to turn to page 5 of that document. In particular, I would ask you to read the third paragraph, if you would, please.

MR. RIESE: Mr. Boise, would you show me the first page of that document?

(Document handed to counsel.)

MR. BOISE: You now have the whole thing between you and the witness.

A All right. I see that page.

Q Would you read that paragraph into the record, please?

A Which one are we talking about now?

Q The third paragraph.

A "Whereas the guerillas are a definite 'military
threat,' our newest intelligence indicates that the order 70,000 subdivisions in the old 'irregular' total -- the self-defense and secret self-defense forces -- should not be considered part of the military order of battle."

Q Was that consistent with what you were being told in or about late 1967?
A Yes, in the sense that the briefing went on to say exactly what these elements did do. It went on to say, and I'll quote again, "While they are a large element obviously available as a base for recruitment as well as political and logistical support work" --

Q You've skipped to a different page; right?
A I just went to the next paragraph. I can read the whole paragraph if you wish. It's surely a matter of record.

Q All I'm asking is that when you skip around on a document that it be clear on the record.
A I'm reading from the next paragraph.

Q You skipped the paragraph on the bottom of page 5 and the top of page 6.
A I'll enter it in the record if you want.
Q. You can read whatever portion of this you want to read, Mr. Bundy. I just want to make clear on the record what's happening.

MR. RIESE: Have we marked this exhibit previously?

MR. BOISE: It's a plaintiff's exhibit that was marked during the Williams deposition, I think.

A. I think we know, but all I'm saying is the paragraph you asked me to read first was followed by -- and this was a matter of what the document itself will show -- two paragraphs explaining the functions of the self defense elements and the secret self defense forces and explaining why they were being left out of the military order of battle.

Q. Is that what you were being told in 1967, November?

A. That was certainly what I believed to be the case and therefore I was obviously being told it.

Q. In November of 1967, you believed that to be true, did you not, sir?

A. I did.

Q. Did you ever ask anyone what the nature
of this newest intelligence was?

A The newest intelligence on what point?

Q You just read --

A Let me see the document again, please.

Q Certainly. It says, "Whereas the guerillas are a definite military threat, our newest intelligence indicate that the order subdivisions in the old irregular total, the self defense and secret self defense forces, should not be considered part of the military order of battle."

Do you see that?

A Yes. I think this was from much longer studies on their functions and it came down, of course, into a question of judgment as to whether they were a military threat, whether they represented a component to be listed in the military order of battle.

The judgment of the estimate was that they should not be so listed but that their functions should be noted in separate parts, and I accepted that. I thought that was a judgment reached by people who had worked very much harder with much more knowledge on it than I could have.

I got that much from the estimate itself and the trio that kept me advised.
Q  What I'm asking you at this point is whether, in 1967, you had any understanding of what this newest intelligence was.

A  Well, the newest intelligence I would have understood to be simply a much more exhaustive picture of their strength and of their nature than had existed previously.

Q  Do you know who had compiled this more exhaustive study of the nature of the self defense forces?

A  No. I assumed this had been done as part of the detailed examination that went into the estimate and the final conclusions of the estimate.

Q  Did you know who was responsible for that?

A  Well, in effect the responsibility was very widely shared. I described earlier in this deposition the process of preparing a national intelligence estimate.

In this case, the CIA would have gone in to the evidence in detail. The DIA, using the MACV materials, would have done the same. I guess those would have been the principal agencies concerned and I guess State would have at least looked hard...
at the evidence because it was being asked to sign
onto an estimate in which this was a feature.

Q Is this what you thought was happening
back in 1967?
A I did.
Q You mentioned George Allen and George
Carver.
A Yes.
Q George Carver I think you may have
identified already as the director or special assistant
for Vietnamese affairs.
A That's correct.
Q And George Allen was his deputy?
A That is correct.
Q Now, did either of these two people
believe that there was new intelligence concerning
the nature of the self defense forces that indicated
that the self defense forces did not constitute
a military threat?
A Well --

MR. RIESE: Objection to the form.

A Well, let me say that one of the suggestions
I made, as my recollection is, was to eliminate
language that they were not a military threat at
all, that they had no military significance.

The summary was intended to convey they did have a limited degree of military significance but not nearly of the same order as the guerillas, let alone the administrative and main forces, and that therefore the decision had been made that they should not be included, and it was reasonable not to include them, in the military order of battle.

That was the decision reached in the estimate process by people I thought had argued the matter to the full and on the basis of all the evidence, including the cumulative evidence of how these organizations actually worked.

Q Did you believe that the decisions that were made in connection with the preparation of the estimate, and by "the estimate," I'm referring to SNIE-14367 -- is that what you were referring to, sir?
A Yes.

Q Did you believe the operation of that and the people who participated in the preparation of that believed they were acting correctly and in good faith in preparing that?
A I did.
SNIE-14367 had been prepared with George Carver?
A  I don't recall ever doing so. I wouldn't rule it out but I don't recall ever doing so.
Q  Did you ever discuss it with General Westmoreland?
A  I'm as good as certain I never discussed it with General Westmoreland.
Q  Did you ever discuss the process by which SNIE-14367 had been prepared with any of the people that participated in its operation?
A  No, I did not. I knew, as close personal friends of long standing, many of the members of the Board of National Estimates. I believe it was at the time chaired by a fellow by the name of Abbott Smith who was an old friend and associate and who was a rigorous citizen of Maine.

I knew that the Board had, on repeated occasions, questioned judgments from the Command and questioned the policy results, the results of particular programs like the bombing, were as favorable as some in the policy circle were inclined to believe.

In other words, I thought of them as performing their function of being truly detached from policy or Command viewpoint and going into
the matter in great detail and satisfying themselves of what was a reasonable statement of the best judgment one could arrive at from the evidence.

Q And you thought that was what was being done with respect to SNIE-14367?
A Yes, I did.

Q Do you think this was what the Board of National Estimates was doing?
A The Board of Estimates and all concerned. There is a certain ethos in the Intelligence Service and I expect, from one who spent 13 years of my life in the trade, my thought process was this was being done by people in senior responsibility and all were concerned, that I thought it was a good faith estimate and worthy of reliance as the best judgment that could then be reached.

Q In 1967 and 1968, did anyone ever tell you that participants in the preparation of SNIE-14367 believed it to be misleading?
MR. RIESE: Objection.
A The answer is no. Nobody conveyed that to me in any way and I thought I made that clear in earlier answers.

Q Do you know who participated in the
preparation of SNIE-14367 on behalf of the Defense Intelligence Agency?
A I do not.
Q Do you know who participated in the preparation of SNIE-14367 on behalf of CINCPAC?
A I do not. I wasn't aware there was CINCPAC participation. It wouldn't surprise me but I didn't know it.
Q Do you know who participated in the preparation of SNIE-14367 on behalf of MACV?
A No, I do not know.
THE WITNESS: Can we correct the record?
It was my 15th wedding anniversary I referred to before.
MR. BOISE: Fine.
Off the record, please.
(Discussion off the record.)
(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., a luncheon recess was taken.)
WILLIAM P. BUNDY resumed

and testified further as follows:

EXAMINATION (Contued)

BY MR. BOISE:

Q Mr. Bundy, among the materials that you have reviewed or that have been discussed with you, is there included a copy of Secretary McNamara's affidavit?

A No.

Q Did you --

A Oh, yes, I'm sorry. The affidavit? Yes. I may have skimmed that. I don't have it at all at my command.
Secretary McNamara indicates in his affidavit and testified in his deposition that he had concluded in 1965 or 1966 -- in any event, before 1967 -- that there was no way the Vietnam War could be won militarily.

MR. RIESE: Object to the form of the question.

Q Are you familiar, first, with the fact that he has so stated in this litigation?
A No, I'm not familiar with that.

Q Were you familiar back in 1967 and 1968 that Mr. McNamara held the view that there was no way the war could be won militarily?

MR. RIESE: Objection.

A I knew in broad terms that he was not sanguine that it could be done in the time frame that the American public would support without recourse to additional measures that I knew he opposed.

But I had no direct conversation with him that I can recall.

Q Other than direct conversations with him, did you have any other information about his views?
A I can't recall that I had anything very...
specific. I simply got the impression that he was physically worn down and discouraged but that's about as far as I can take it.

Q Did you have meetings with Secretary McNamara during 1967 and early 1968?

A Surely I must have had but by no means at the intensity as the ones we had in '64, '65 and, to some degree, in early '66. I didn't have direct conversations with him that, as it were, went to the root of one's beliefs or judgments at that point.

Q Did you have any conversations during 1967 with Secretary Rusk concerning Secretary McNamara's views of the war?

A Not that I can recall. It could have happened but it was not something that would naturally come up. I don't recall any such conversation.

Q I'm sorry?

A I said I don't recall any such conversation.

Q Were you present during 1967 at any conversations during which Secretary McNamara's views of whether or not the war could be won militarily were discussed?

A I recall none.

Q During 1967, were you aware of any
debate within the administration as to whether or not the war could be won militarily?

A In a broad way, but I don't recall that being particularly intensive or any systematic focus or anything where it sort of came to a memorable point in that period in the fall and winter, the early winter of '67.

Q At any time during 1967?

A At any time during 1967.

Q You said, I think, in your last answer you were aware of it in a general way. Is that what you said?

A In a general way, just by running into him and seeing him and all of that, that he was discouraged, that he was not sanguine in a broad sense about our ability, as it were, to bring this off. But that's as far as I can take it.

Q The "him" in this case is Secretary McNamara?

A That's correct.

Q Let me leave aside for the moment your conversations with Secretary McNamara and ask you, other than whatever conversations you may have had with Secretary McNamara, were you present at
any discussions during 1967 in which the issue as to whether or not the United States could win the war militarily was discussed?
A I don't recall any such specific conversations. We always wondered how much longer it might take, whether we had as much as we should have or whether we should shift the emphasis and put greater stress on the Vietnamese, that kind of subject was discussed. I don't recall conversations where we went into real "can we really get there" discussions, the root of the matter. I just don't recall any. I wouldn't be surprised if there were some. I simply don't recall any that register strongly on my mind.
Q Do you recall any that registered on your mind at all, whether strongly or otherwise?
A No, I do not.
Q In 1967, was this issue as to whether or not the Vietnam War was a war that could be won militarily a matter of some debate within the administration?
A I'm sure there must have been discussions of that sort. I simply do not recall the specifics of any such discussion.
Q Do you recall in general such discussion?
A. I recall that there must have been a broad discussion -- can we get there? -- with some a little more discouraged and others less so. I have no recollection of the specifics or the positions of individuals. It would have been just a very general discussion, if there were any, and, as I said, I don't recall the specifics of any such discussion.

Q. Do you recall that there were such discussions even though you say you cannot remember the specifics?

A. I only say that I think, when we were deliberating on bombing policy in the spring, when we were deliberating on whatever force increase Westmoreland requested, probably there was some mention of it at some point, but certainly none that I can recall directly with McNamara and I'm searching my mind. I don't recall any with others.

Q. What about prior to 1967? Prior to 1967 did anyone, to your knowledge, within the administration express any doubt as to whether or not the war could be won militarily?

MR. RIESE: I'm going to object to the form of the question.

A. Certainly there were doubts the fall of
1966. At that time we were at the Manila Conference and I seem to recall -- and again I can't state specifics for individuals -- but somebody was saying, who was just getting back from Vietnam, it just doesn't look like we're making anything like the kind of headway we should be making at this stage, that kind of thing.

I just don't recall anything more specific than that.

Q Other than the expression of the feeling people were not making as much progress in Vietnam as they should have been at this Manila Conference, can you recall any other discussion or debate within the administration prior to 1967 as to whether or not the war could be won militarily?

A You always were, in a way, discussing that subject. I remember we had some discussion on what progress can we expect to achieve in the year 1967 at the end of 1966.

There were some papers on what might we hope to achieve and this kind of thing. Of course, in a sense, you're discussing that point, what can you hope to achieve. But the general feeling that I had and I think the tenor of conversations was
"It's tougher than we had hoped it would be." It was not much tougher than I had feared it would be from the outset, and that this was rough. But I don't recall anything addressed specifically to the question are we really at the point where we have to conclude it, that it just can't be done.

Q Did there ever come a time, to your knowledge, when anyone in the administration concluded, in your words, that it just couldn't be done?
A I was not aware of any such conclusion. It may be that that was Secretary McNamara's conclusion. He did not impart it to me.

Q What was your belief in the fall of 1966 as to whether or not the Vietnam War could be won militarily?
A I would have thought then that, while we were not progressing as rapidly as we could, we were still moving ahead and we could hope to see really significant gains in the next 18 months, hope to see. I wasn't confidently predicting it but that would be about the way I saw it.

Q Were those gains ultimately achieved?
A Well, I thought we were making slow and grinding progress in the summer and fall of '67 which was
when the President started to talk in terms of this
war being stalemated.

In the back of my mind always there
lurked the feeling that this would come to a head
at this point. I had been an intelligence officer
and followed the history and later evidence of Norman
Dee and the Arnheim operation and the period when
the Germans looked about to crack and came back
with really one sharp lash of the tail in the Bulge
offensive, and it did seem to me, and I recall thinking
this in July of '67 where we had intelligence suggest-
ing that there had been quite a high level conclave
in Hanoi, and I thought of that conclave as more
likely to produce a willingness to move towards
some kind of negotiations or clinch than to produce,
as I now believe it did produce, the decision to
go for what became the TET offensive.

But the lashing out, the lashing out
along the way, was part of the feeling that they
were getting increasingly strapped and in difficulty,
as I believe in hindsight they were, and that the
reaction might take the form of one really sharp
try to pull off the equivalent of the Bulge, but
this time successfully, or the equivalent of the
investiture of Dien Bien Phu in 1953 or 1954 which I had known very closely as an intelligence officer at the time.

But this would be the type of tactic they would pursue but they would be doing it because they were in real difficulty.

Q Was that your belief at the end of 1967 as well?

A Yes, I think that would have been my belief.

Q At the end of 1967 and early 1968, immediately preceding the TET offensive, did you continue to believe that progress was being made and that the war could be won militarily?

A Yes, I did. I believed that it could be done. I tended to, as I think was the right attitude in a line officer, to not to try to weigh the willingness of public opinion to stay the course. If you spent all your time doing that, you wouldn't be doing your job.

So I didn't ever try to put that factor in. But I thought the job could be done if we could stick to it and I didn't know the answer to that.

Q Were there any discussions within the administration during 1967 as to whether or
changing almost under your feet with the New Hampshire primary being misread, perhaps, and other factors coming in all the time.

We certainly didn't, as it were, send a private pollster out and try to do anything of that sort. We didn't focus on it as one of the major subjects of the review at all. Indeed, we didn't really focus significantly on it.

Q I'm really not asking, obviously, about sending out a pollster. What I'm asking is, as part of your review of General Westmoreland's request, you and the others involved in that review, or at least some of them, considered and discussed the extent to which the American public was going to be prepared to continue the Vietnam conflict and for how long.

A Well, we did give it weight in the context of the implications in the broad political sense, not the partisan political sense, but in the broad political sense of the additional callup of reserves that would have been required to meet General Westmoreland's full request.

We did think that would be very likely to trigger outbursts of resentment and spread the
resentment into groups that were not then opposed
to the war, really. We had that kind of rather
focussed mention of the subject. But we did not
spend any significant time that I can recall saying
"What is the country now ready to support?" That
is part of a philosophy that I think we all pretty
much shared, that it was our job to say how important
is this request, how much will it mean, what can
we look forward to with or without this request,
all that kind of operational type of thing.

I think if you get the people advising
the President with their own minds, with public
opinion or tailoring their own minds, that isn't
serving the President as well as you can do from
where I sat.

Q The problem I'm having is I'm trying
to understand how you can formulate a recommendation
for the President as to what course to take in terms
of more troops or fewer troops without having some
context for how long you thought you had to fight
the war.

A Well, I simply don't recall its being dis-
cussed in those terms. What we concluded was that
with or without this particular troop increase,
it was going to be still a long, slogging fight.

We did not see a clear, negotiated way out, certainly not one that wouldn't leave Hanoi in a very commanding position or have that danger.

I can only rest on the answers I've given you, Mr. Boise, that from where I sat and in that group, the subject was not extensively discussed except in terms of specific reactions to such steps as calling up the reserves.

Q Were there any working assumptions which you used with respect to what public opinion would stand for in terms of length of commitment?

A No, I recall no discussion that produced anything in the nature of a working assumption.

Q In February 1966, there was a conference in Hawaii, was there not?

A Yes.

Q Did you attend that conference?

A I did not.

Q Did you prepare a memorandum concerning that conference?

A I may well have done. I have no recollection of it.

Q Who attended that conference?
That was a very large group of Cabinet officers, including John Gardner, including, if I recall correctly, several of the domestic Cabinet officers, the aim being to try and put on a big push to get the Vietnamese to focus on the domestic aspects, domestic reforms, ways of strengthening the country in a nonmilitary way.

Military subjects were also discussed.

I don't recall, but that's all in the public record. I don't have a detailed recollection of this. My recollection is that I had a very marginal role in the preparation of that meeting.

Q Did President Johnson attend that meeting?
A Yes, he did.

Q Did General Westmoreland attend that meeting?
A The record will show. I'm not positive about that. I don't remember whether he was brought in or not. The focus was on what can we do to focus these people on ways of what was called pacification in the broad sense, which included a great deal else in the way of domestic action.

Q Let me ask you to look at a document
that has previously been marked as Joint Exhibit 215. Before that it was also marked as Defendant's Exhibit 158. It is headed "1966 program to increase the effectiveness of military operations and anticipated results thereof."

Take a look at that and tell me if that's a document you have ever seen before.

A I see my name at the top, although somewhat misspelled, Bill McBundy, suggesting whoever put my name there didn't know me very well.

I don't recall this document. As I look at it now, I don't recall it.

If somebody said I wrote it, I would assume it is much more -- it is not the sort of paper that would have been written in the State Department because it dealt with the possible strength at the end of the year.

It speaks in Pentagonese. I may have seen it but I don't recall it.

Q This is a document General Westmoreland, as well as others, has given some testimony about, including testimony indicating that this set forth objectives, or at least in part set forth objectives, resulting from this February 1966 Honolulu conference.
Were you aware of those objectives, whether or not you were aware of this particular document?

A Let me look at the objectives.

To achieve the following results in 1966 -- well, raising the secure areas from 50 percent to 60 seems to me roughly what we did then think.

Critical roads and railroads -- construction of base areas, 40 percent?

No, this is not my kind of talk, I would say, Mr. Boise. I would repeat this is the way somebody in the Pentagon thinks and it could be the way my old friend John McNaughton thought.

Q Mr. McNaughton's name is also on that memorandum at the job.

A That's right. He had my old job, Assistant Secretary for ISA in the Pentagon.

Pacifying, and so on and so on -- I think this is a set of objectives that could easily be put down as what one hoped to achieve. I don't recall anything of this sort being adopted as an absolutely firm set of targets and expectations.

The last one, that you try to get them so you had their force level on a downward
trend, which is what that comes down to, would be something, of course, you would hope to achieve in that period. But I don't know that anybody adopted this.

This looks like a staff memo that McNaughton would have written and I very likely did see this in some fashion, possibly commented on it, but as I say it doesn't ring any vivid chord at all in my memory and I would not have recalled it but for your showing it to me.

Q In February of 1966, when you and others were making recommendations to the President --

Incidentally, there is an ambiguity. Bill McBundy -- my brother Mac was also in government at the time. It's possible he was the one who may have worked on it. I just don't know. I don't find myself familiar with either the style or the substance of this document.

Q Independent of this document, since as you say your recall of it is not vivid, do you recall, as of early 1966 when you and others were advising the President, as to whether or not in giving the advice that you gave you had any belief or working assumption as to how long the American people were
prepared to tolerate the kind of war that we had in Vietnam?

A No. I don't recall that we ever discussed that in any systematic fashion. From time to time I do recall hopes that we would have the thing on a clearly favorable trend basis say within 18 months. I may say those 18 months occurred at different times, that we would be able to see where we were really moving 18 months from the date of the discussion.

That figure sticks in my mind but not in the context of saying the American people will only put up with this for so long.

Q I'm not, at least at the outset, asking you whatever you would refer to as systematic discussions, whether such were had.

I'm simply asking, when you and when others, to your knowledge, were advising the President, whether you had any belief or a working assumption as to how long you had to pull it off, as you put it.

A I can only say I didn't and I don't recall hearing from anybody else any expression that was in more than very general terms.