Q. Do you recall hearing while General McChristian was in Vietnam the term "crossover point"?

A. I remember that was used. I remember hearing that term when I first arrived in Vietnam.

Q. How as it used?

A. It was used to reflect the point in time when the enemy's casualties would exceed his imput.

Q. Were there any studies made of that while General McChristian was in Vietnam?

A. I don't recall. If they were made, they were made by the Estimates Branch, using Order of Battle information. This was strictly an item in the Estimates Branch, and I don't recall whether they made a study or not.

Q. You are not today aware of any study that they made?

A. I'm not today aware of any study that they made.

Q. Do you have any opinion as to whether the crossover point, as you have just defined it, was reached on or prior to June 1, 1967?

A. I have no knowledge at all.

Q. One way or the other?

A. None at all. I was concerned strictly with order of battle strength and identification, not estimates of that
Would you have disagreed with a statement in March, April, or May of 1967 that the crossover point had been reached?

A. I don't think I can give a sensible answer to that. I never even considered it. And I would have had to have considered it at that time.

Q. Could you tell us, Colonel Hawkins, as best as you recall what happened at the first briefing to which you have referred that involved order of battle in which General Westmoreland was present?

A. The briefing was on the irregulars and political order of battle strength. This was the initial briefing to General Westmoreland, as far as I know, on the results of the political order of battle and irregulars strength status.

Q. Where did that take place?

A. I think it took place in the Command briefing room in the Current Intelligence Section. I'm just about 99 percent certain that that's where it took place.

Q. How big a room is that?

A. That's a room twice as big as this room. It can accommodate a briefer and eight to ten people sitting around a long conference table. I'd say it was about twice as long...
as this room here.

Q. Could you estimate the length of this room?
A. I'd say this room was about 20 by 20, or something like that. A pretty large room.

Q. Were there eight to ten people sitting around the room? The table, rather?
A. I believe there were. I'm not sure about that, but I believe there were several people around the table. I don't know whether there were eight or ten or four or five or six, but General Westmoreland was never -- it was not a briefing to him by himself. There were other officers present at the time. At both briefings.

Q. Would the J2 have been present?
A. The J2, I believe, would have been present. Whoever was the J2 at the time would have been present.

Q. What about any of General Westmoreland's deputies?
A. I don't recall who else would have been there.

Q. Was General Westmoreland's Chief of Staff present?
A. I don't recall. I don't recall who would have been present.

I do know that General Westmoreland -- he's the only person I remember by face, by name, present. But it stands to
reason that the J2 would have been present, whether it was
General McChristian at the time or General Davidson, if General
Davison was onboard. But I just do not remember the faces
around the table that well.

I seem to remember General McChristian present, but
I wouldn't stake my life on it.

Q. Let me go back. Are you saying that as far as you
know this was the first time that General Westmoreland was
briefed on the higher numbers for political cadre and irregulars?

A. This, as far as I know, was the first time. And his
reaction would confirm that; that this was the first time he'd
heard these new figures.

Q. Could you tell us, as you recall it, what happened?

A. Well, I briefed the information and concluded my
briefing and then stepped back and waited for comments. And
the comments that General Westmoreland made, it seemed they
weren't made just to me but it was made to the officers who
were around the table; to the effect "What am I -- I think
he asked the question to himself -- sounded like he was talking
to himself -- "What am I going to tell Congress? What is the
press going to do with this?" And the problems that would come
up with explaining this new increase -- or this increase -- this
increase, which was a fairly substantial increase, in the bottom level strength of the enemy forces in South Vietnam.

They were comments to his concern of the reaction that these figures would cause.

Q. And do you recall that General Westmoreland made them, or that --

A. (Interrupting) General Westmoreland made those, yes, sir.

Q. And can you recall with any greater precision what words were used?

A. No, sir. That's the clearest I can recall the comments about the impact.

Q. Are you sure that he used the words "press" and "Congress"?

A. I'm certain of that; that the words "Congress" and "press" were used by General Westmoreland.

Q. Do you recall anything else about the context in which they were used?

A. No, sir. It was simply about the impact that would be caused.

Well, I remember another statement. Yes, here was a statement that the General made. "Here we've been here all
these months fighting this enemy, destroying this enemy, and then all at once we come up and say that we have more enemy than we've ever had before." That was a statement. That was a generalized statement made.

Q. Did you agree with that statement?
A. No, sir, I did not agree with it. No, sir.

Q. Well, did you --
A. (Interrupting) I went back and rewrote the briefing.

Q. No. What I'm saying -- and maybe I'm not being clear, Colonel.

Did you agree with the sentiment that here we've been fighting the enemy all these months or years, making progress, and yet's you're going to show a larger enemy?

MR. BARON: Object to the form of the question.

A. No, sir, I did not agree with it at the time, and that's why when I took the briefing back to redo it -- there was another statement, "May be should take another look at these figures," that General Westmoreland made. And I took that to mean that these figures were too high; they were not acceptable, and so I took it back and reduced them somewhat.

Q. Well, let me stay with that, if I may. I just want to stay a little longer with that.
A. Well, let me finish this.

Q. Of course.

A. I wrote this into the preface to the next briefing, to the fact that these were not -- this is not a new enemy which had just been discovered; that this new enemy strength figure was derived from better collection and better analysis of the available information. We had a lot more information available. We had more people to process that information. And this was my reaction to his statements there.

Q. Now, was there any discussion at that meeting as to whether progress had been made in destroying the enemy?

A. No. I didn't go beyond that statement that was made there as to how much progress had been made.

Q. Sir?

A. It didn't go beyond that statement that I just told you about. There was no follow-up on that.

Q. There was no discussion on that?

A. There was no follow-up on that that I can recall.

Q. Are you saying it might have happened but you don't recall?

A. I don't recall.

Q. But it could have taken place?
It could have taken place. It could have taken place.

Q. And how long was the discussion after your briefing?

A. Oh, ye, god, I don't know. Five minutes or so, I guess.

Q. Do you recall if the words were "take another look at the figures"?

A. I recall those words; that we should take another look at these figures.

Q. Just so that we're clear, it is those words rather than, for example, "Let's review these again," or something like that?

A. As I recall the phrase, it was "take another look."

Q. Was there any discussion that you were aware of as to whether General Westmoreland should have been told before the briefing as to what to expect at the briefing?

A. I don't know of any. I don't have any knowledge of what would have been told to him before the briefing what to expect.

Q. Is this something that occurred to you at the time?

A. No. I was concerned simply with briefing the figures and being able to explain, give a background, and then with the reaction. And the initial reaction sort of -- it was pretty
much a wet cloth -- and the initial reaction is, "Oh, god, here we go again."

Q. As far as you could tell sitting there, this was the first time General Westmoreland had heard the numbers?

A. As far as I could tell.

Q. Would you agree that if General Westmoreland had heard about the higher numbers before that meeting his reaction wouldn't have made any sense?

A. I don't know. You're getting me into an area I know absolutely nothing about. I don't know what General Westmoreland had been told before this.

But his reaction seemed to me to be one of surprise. That was what it seemed to me.

Q. Do you know whether prior to the meeting MACV J2 or people under the J2 had advised CINCPAC to expect higher estimates of enemy strength?

A. I don't recall any traffic. There would have well have been. There might well have been traffic. But just in the nature of this cable you just showed me a moment ago. I don't remember the date when this thing went out.

But I do believe that analysts in all of these areas were prepared for it because we did discuss this thoroughly at
the CINCPAC conference back in February of 1966. And I believe
that every analyst representing every agency there was prepared
for much higher figures.

Now, whether this went to the commanders, I don't
know. I'm just not aware of that situation.

Q. Do you recall anybody else saying anything at that
briefing?

A. No, sir. I don't recall any other conversation at
that briefing. I was concentrating strictly on what General
Westmoreland said and I don't recall other statements that were
made.

MR. DORSEN: Could we have marked as Plaintiff's
Exhibit 65 a one-page copy of a cable dated 10 June 1967 from
Admiral Sharp to General Westmoreland?

(The document referred to was
marked Plaintiff's Exhibit
Number 65 for identification.)

BY MR. DORSEN: (Resuming)

Q. Colonel Hawkins, I'm showing you what has just been
marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 65. Perhaps it would be best if
you read it out loud. It's not terribly long.

A. It's a date of 10 June 1967, from Admiral Sharp,
CINCPAC, Hawaii to General Westmoreland, COMUSMACV, Saigon.

"MACV MACJ223 letter of 19 May 67, subject:
revised strength estimate of Viet Cong irregular forces. I have been advised by back channel that DIA is anticipating new and significantly different MACV/CAS Saigon estimate of irregular and political OB strengths. They desire information on this for use in preparation of NIE 14.3-67.

"Their concern is also related to problem of premature release of new -- it says "of" but it probably means "or" -- "uncoordinated intelligence estimates to Washington visitors. I believe that February intelligence conference has been most helpful in keeping everyone in step on infiltration and OB matters, but continued close coordination between COMUSMACV, CINCPAC and DIA is essential.

"Request advise present status and recommendations concerning MACV study on irregular/political OB, proposed new figures and basis for estimates so that I might respond to DIA.

"Warm Regards."

And to repeat, this date was 10 June 1967.

Q. Had you seen Plaintiff's Exhibit 65 before today?

A. I don't recall ever seeing that. I wouldn't necessarily
have seen this cable. I don't remember it.

Q. Would you have seen a letter sent over General Westmoreland's signature to Admiral Sharp on the subject of order of battle?

A. No. I don't remember one, no, sir.

Q. Would you have ordinarily seen such a letter?


Q. Who would have drafted such a letter?

A. I don't know who would have drafted it.

Q. Who could have drafted such a letter?

A. Somebody on his staff. The General had a pretty good staff there.

Q. Well, could a letter of the type referred to in Plaintiff's Exhibit 65 have been sent over General Westmoreland's signature without General McChristian knowing about it?

A. It would seem to me that it wouldn't have, but I don't know whether it would have or not. It would seem to me that that would have been a courtesy to the staff officer to show him a copy of it.

Q. Does Plaintiff's Exhibit 65 at all refresh your recollection of any communications by General Westmoreland or
his staff to CINCPAC in May of 1967 on the subject of the order of battle?

A. No. I have no recollection of the correspondence, or any other correspondence of this nature. I'm not familiar with that.

Q. Were you aware of any feeling on the part of CINCPAC to coordinate intelligence estimates with respect to the order of battle?

A. Yes. I could derive that from the CINCPAC conference. That was one of the things we were supposed to achieve: coordination.

Q. What do you recall about the coordination?

A. Well, MACV had the primary voice in order of battle intelligence matters, but that everybody was to coordinate with one another in order of battle intelligence.

Q. And that included CINCPAC?

A. That would include CINCPAC, yes.

Q. And DIA?

A. Yes. DIA. Yes, it would include all of them.

Q. Did you feel in May of 1967 that MACV could by itself, and without the participation of CINCPAC, DIA or CIA, change the figures in the Order of Battle?
A. MACV had the primary authority. MACV had the best—they had the most people on the problem; they had all of the intelligence there, and it was simply a normal thing that MACV's voice would prevail.

Q. The question is, Colonel Hawkins, agreeing that it might prevail or would prevail, did MACV have the authority, in view of the discussions at the February, 1967 conference in Plaintiff's Exhibit 65, by itself, and without the involvement of CINCPAC and DIA, to increase the estimates in the irregular and political Order of Battle catatories?

A. I think he had pretty much that authority. I think if he'd have signed off on a cable he would have gone back and said this is what MACV believes at the present time. Now, I don't know all of the politics of how they would have got it accomplished; whether he would say, we accept this baldly.

But this could have been the official MACV position at that time.

Q. How do you know it wasn't the official MACV position at that time?

A. Because the figures were not accepted. As far as I was concerned they weren't accepted.

Q. But do you know what was in the letter referred to
in Plaintiff's Exhibit 65?

A. No, I don't know what was in the letter.

To me, if those figures had been accepted, then an order would have been given to me to prepare a cable sending it out to somebody saying this is the MACV position, and these figures would have been inserted in that cable.

Q. Let me go back one step to something we were discussing just a second ago. Are you saying that General Westmoreland could have by himself, and without the approval of CINCPAC or DIA, changed the Order of Battle?

A. He would have accepted this as the MACV position, the Command position.

Q. But he couldn't have changed it by himself?

A. I'm not familiar with the politics of it. I don't know just how the generals work that out. But he had a very powerful voice. This could have become the MACV position, and that's as far as I can take it.

Q. Now, you referred to a cable a minute ago. What cable did you refer to?

A. You'll have to refresh me.

Q. Let me go back. Do you recall seeing the broadcast of "The Uncounted Enemy"?
Q. In that broadcast, if I recall correctly, there was a reference to a cable presented by General McChristian to General Westmoreland.

A. Yes.

Q. Did you know about such a cable at the time?

A. I didn't know. I don't know about that.

Q. You didn't know about it?

A. I don't know about it. I don't remember it. I don't remember anything about it.

Q. Did you and Mr. Crile or Mr. Adams discuss such a cable before you were interviewed on tape?

A. I can't recall discussing it with Sam. No, I don't. I don't recall discussing it with Sam.

The fact is, I went into the interview pretty much blind, relying on what recollection I had at the time.

Q. Are you saying you had any discussions?

A. I had talked to Sam.

Q. Briefly?

A. Briefly, yes. I told Sam my recollection -- and I told George Crile -- my recollection were primarily general in nature.
Q. Had you talked to George Crile before you went on tape for the interview?

A. Discussions, yes. Not in any length on the order of battle.

Q. How long would such discussions have been?

A. We just met in passing, was all. We didn't have any lengthy discussions about what I was going to say. We had no discussions about what I was going to say. I just told him the general nature of my recollections was such that I wasn't going to be able to cite any specific figures. I could just tell him what I could remember at that time of what happened.

Q. Now, do you know anything about any cable that General McChristian showed or may have shown to General Westmoreland during that period?

A. I know nothing about it other than what I saw on the CBS Reports. That was the first knowledge that I had of any such cable.

Q. Wouldn't you ordinarily have seen or been involved in the preparation of such a cable?

A. No. Not necessarily. General McChristian could have had his deputy or executive officer prepare such a cable.

Q. Who would that have been?
A. Ralph Groover was his executive officer at the time, but I'm not sure whether Ralph was still there at the time or not.

Yes, I believe Ralph was still there. I don't remember who his deputy was at that time.

I would have had input into it, but I don't recall the specific cable, you know, that General McChristian said during his interview that he presented to General Westmoreland. It's just not in my memory.

Q. Are you saying you don't know what was in the cable?
A. I don't know what was in the cable, no.

Q. Did General McChristian himself send cables concerning matters such as the order of battle?
A. He did, but I don't think he would have sent anything of this impact without either getting General Westmoreland to sign off or getting General Westmoreland's approval for him to sign off.

Q. To whom did General McChristian send cables?
A. He sent them to all of the various commands.

Q. Were there any restrictions on to whom General McChristian could send cables?
A. I don't know what restrictions would have been on him.
That's his area to answer.

Q. As far as you know, could he have sent a cable to DIA or CIA or CINCPAC containing the latest estimates of the enemy order of battle?

A. I don't know. I have absolutely no knowledge of what he could have done or what he did do. His accountability.

Q. Could you think of any reason why you would not have been involved in such a cable?

A. I could have input to that without being aware of all of the details of it; of the circumstances and everything. I could have had some input.

And if it was a matter concerning order of battle figures, I'm pretty sure I must have had some input into it.

But I do not recall the details of the preparation of the cable or General McChristian going into his office. That's something I don't have any recollection of.

Q. Did General McChristian ever discuss this with you?

A. We talked about it once on the telephone.

Q. Recently?

A. No, not recently. He's called me recently on the phone, but this was back months ago. I think it was after -- it had to have been after the broadcast.

Q. What did he say?
A. Nothing more than he did present General Westmoreland a cable. He told me he was not present for my first briefing with General Westmoreland. I said, "General, I'm just telling it the way I remember it; you tell it the way you remember it."

I don't pretend to speak for him.

Q. Did General McChristian tell you what was in the cable?

A. No.

Q. Did he tell you when he presented the cable?

A. No. We just talked about -- this is something that came up and he did reiterate to me that he did present a cable to General Westmoreland.

I told him, "Well, I don't know anything about it."

He didn't say, "Well, you should have known."

Q. What happened at the second briefing?

A. One of the first comments that was made after the second briefing was when Special Ambassador Robert Comber made the statement to the effect that the briefing itself was Byzantine. That it was incomprehensible.

Q. That's what you understood the word "Byzantine" to mean?

A. Yes.
Q. Had you had any discussions with anybody on the subject of the order of battle between the first briefing and the second briefing?

A. I don't recall any of the discussions. I must have had discussions because I went on out to CICV and I sat down in a room and I closeted myself and I worked on this second briefing for several days.

But what conversations I had in the meantime with various people, I don't recall what those conversations were.

Q. And I'm including people under you as well as people over you.

A. Yes. I don't recall the conversations that I had with those people. I just remember going out to CICV and secluding myself and working on the second briefing.

Q. Do you remember the difference in numbers between the first briefing and the second briefing?

A. I reduced them slightly. It would have been in the nature of a few thousand. I don't think much more than tens of thousand in any of the catagories. I reduced them some.

Q. These were just the irregulars?

A. The irregulars. This was the only thing we were concered with at that time, was irregulars.
Q. Not the political cadre?

A. And the political. The irregulars and the political, yes.

Q. Who else was present at the second meeting?

A. I don't recall. I just don't recall. Other than General Westmoreland and Ambassador Comber, I don't recall any of the other people that were there.

Q. Do you recall that General Westmoreland said anything?

A. He had remarks to make but I don't recall the nature of his remarks at that time. Because after Ambassador Comber made his remarks I sort of cut it out of my consciousness.

"Here we go again," was my reaction, and I made no effort to -- I just knew the new estimate was dead, and I was thinking about that rather than what they were saying.

Q. Who was at the second briefing other than those two?

A. I don't recall.

Q. Do you recall how many people were there?

A. I don't recall how many people were there.

Q. Do you remember where it was?

A. As I best recall, it was in the same room. It was in the same Current Intelligence briefing room.

Q. Had you at any time when you were in Vietnam had
any experience like either of those briefings that you can recall?

A. You mean pretty tough situations? I've sat in when I was the Indonesia Desk Chief at the Pentagon in about '60 on national intelligence estimates and preparations, you know, where you had to sit with the highest ranking analysts to discuss enemy strength.

Q. I'll come back to that in a second. But in terms of while you were in Vietnam, did you have any other situations in which any of your briefings on enemy order of battle were not accepted?

A. No. This was the first thing of that magnitude. The earliest thing of any great magnitude was my briefing on the acceptance of divisional echelon units, and, of course, that was accepted. It was worked out and accepted. But this was something altogether different from anything I'd done before.

Q. I think you've testified or said you construed the statements at the two briefings as conveying a message to you.

A. Yes.

Q. Did you derive the message from anything other than what you have said today?
A. The message to me -- and I think I've stated this
before -- is that these figures are not going to be accepted
and they're going to have to be lowered.

Q. And the message you derived was from what you have just
said happened?

A. Yes.

Q. And you have described what happened to the very best
of your recollection?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you ever get any message prior to the first briefing
that higher numbers would not be accepted?

A. I don't recall any such message being given to me.

Q. At anytime prior to the first briefing, was there
any, let's say, guidance of any sort by General Westmoreland or
any superior to General McChristian concerning the size of
estimates?

A. No. Not that I know of. I went into that briefing
fully expecting the new estimates to be accepted -- to be
approved as the Command position.

Q. As far as you knew walking into that first briefing,
did you have any reason to suspect that General McChristian's
and your position would not be endorsed by General Westmoreland?
A. No. I had no anticipation of that. No reason to anticipate that.

Q. Had General McChristian indicated at any time prior to the first briefing that he had any problem getting estimates through?

A. No. He had not said that to me. He didn't discuss things like that with me.

Q. Had you seen any evidence prior to the first briefing?

A. No. I had seen no evidence.

Q. Of any problem getting any particular estimates through?

A. No. General McChristian was very tight-mouthed about his discussions with higher ranking officers. He didn't tell me what his reactions were. And I would have been a little bit embarrassed if he had told me about anything that went on between General McChristian and General Westmoreland. I didn't consider it my business.

Q. Did you have any knowledge of General Westmoreland's position on the size of the enemy as of the period we're talking about, through the second briefing, other than the two briefings that you've described?

A. No. That's the extent of my knowledge, yes.
MR. DORSEN: Off the record for a second.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. DORSEN: Back on the record.

BY MR. DORSEN: (Resuming)

Q. Did you have any reason to believe when you walked into the first briefing that the presentation you were going to make might displease General Westmoreland?

A. No, sir. I've answered that. I anticipated acceptance or approval of the estimates. Even if not full, with maybe minor adjustments.

Q. Other than what you have said here today, Colonel Hawkins, did General McChristian ever say anything to you about the briefings?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you ever tell General McChristian anything about the briefings?

A. Since then?

Q. Yes.

A. In talking to him over the telephone, I described briefly the briefings and the reactions.

Q. And that was the first time you ever mentioned it to him?
A. Yes.

Q. What did you do after the second briefing?

A. Well, I went back to work. I think from that point on we developed a sort of a spread which would sort of soften the impact. You know ten or twenty or thirty thousand -- I've forgotten how much it was between the figures. And we gradually reduced them.

But that's the way it continued throughout the following months, up until the time that I left MACV and returned to the States in September. I continued working on the figures, adjusting and readjusting.

Q. Between the time you had the second briefing -- let me withdraw that.

Did there come a time around July, 1967 when you had a meeting with General Davidson, General Peterson and/or George Carver of the CIA on the subject of the order of battle?

A. July? I don't remember. I don't remember the meeting.

Q. Do you have any recollection of such a meeting?

A. I don't remember the meeting, no.

Q. Prior to the time that you left in the summer of 1967 for the order of battle conference in the Washington, D. C. area, do you remember any other meetings you had on the subject
of the order of battle?

A. No. I'm sure there were meeting and there were meetings, but they all sort of ran together, and my attitude at that time was I would simply acquiesce in whatever the Command wishes to have known on these -- what figures they want to.

I explained to several people time and time again that you can have any figure you want. I mean, you simply write the rules and come up with what figure you want to. It was sort of a cynical attitude toward the whole thing.

If you want five million, you can write the rules, the criteria, to give you five million enemy. If you want a hundred thousand, we can rewrite the rules and drop it down to a hundred thousand. Give you what you want.

Q. Is this what you said in the summer of '67?

A. In general that was the tenor of my remarks and my conversations at different times.

Q. To whom did you say these remarks?

A. Well, this is to Charlie Morris, for one -- Colonel Morris -- and to General Davidson. I think I told him about this thing; that you could count what you want to count and come up with any figure that you want to come up with.
And I -- well, that's just about it in substance.

Q. Can you remember anything more specific about your conversations?

A. No, I can't. Not at this time.

Q. Do you remember the context in which you said that?

A. No. I don't remember the context. I think I told you about the incident this morning about coming up with a formula for attributing irregular strength forces on the basis of contact with enemy units.

Q. Do you have any information as to why General McChristian left Vietnam?

A. No, sir, I don't. I considered it to be the normal conclusion of a tour of duty.

Q. Was his time within the tour of duty up at that stage, as far as you knew?

A. I don't -- let's see, he had been there in '65. This would have been '66-'67. Two years. I considered at the time that it was probably a two-year tour of duty.

My tour was 12 months and I extended, at General McChristian's request, for 18 months. Mine went beyond the normal tour.

I saw nothing unusual in General McChristian being
transferred at that time. It was simply a normal train of events.

Q. At any time prior to your leaving Saigon for the Washington area in about August of 1967, did you have any other contact with General Westmoreland other than what you have described?

A. I don't recall any contact with him. My contacts with General Westmoreland throughout my 18-month tour were very few and far between. Briefings of this nature and to pass him in the hallway.

Q. Do you know whether General Davidson or Colonel Morris agreed or disagreed with the estimates that you had come up with?

A. Whether General Davidson and Colonel Morris?

Q. Yes.

A. I assumed that they were carrying out General Westmoreland's position that the figures were just unacceptable; they were too high.

Q. You say you assumed?

A. I assumed.

Q. What is that based on?

A. Well, the criteria were never challenged. I mean,
the basis of intelligence was never really challenged. The only thing that there was any concern expressed about was the magnitude of the figures. Methodology was never really criticized. It was just there's just too damn many of them.

Q. What I'm getting at is on what you base your statement that you assumed that General Davidson and Colonel Morris were carrying out General Westmoreland's position?

A. This is what I assumed. I don't read minds, no.

Q. It's just your assumption?

A. This is my assumption.

Q. Anything else that you can point to other than what you've said here today?

A. It doesn't come to mind right now, except for the fact I did it willingly.

Q. Well, let me ask you this. You said the methodology wasn't challenged. Didn't Ambassador Comber in a sense challenge your methodology?

A. No. He did not get that specific. He was challenging the manner in which I presented it, you know, by going back and saying this is not a new enemy force; this is something that's been there all along and it's because of the fact that we've been able to pay more attention to it that we've come up with
these figures.

Q. Am I correct that -- I'll phrase it differently. Did you give any reason for reducing your numbers between the first briefing and the second briefing?

A. I don't recall what rationale I used for it. I don't think it was really enough to present.

You know, I -- you could always lop off a finger here and there, you know, or a toe or something like that, without lopping off the arm, you know, to adjust. And that was sort of the method I used. But I don't remember what I presented in that briefing.

Q. Let me ask you this, if you can bear with me, Colonel Hawkins. If you had gone to the second briefing and without presenting any explanation reduced your estimates, would that have been the kind of presentation that would have inspired confidence in your presentation?

A. I don't see any reason why it would have affected the confidence that was in the presentation there.

Q. Do you understand what I'm saying? I'm suggesting -- and it's only a suggestion -- that --

A. I know what you're leaning at; the fact that I cut them off.
Q. Without any apparent reason. Could not that have led someone to believe that you didn't have confidence in your own estimates?

A. I don't really think it did at that particular briefing. It's entirely possible that people can react in that manner, but these figures had been heard, the methodology had all been explained, and by lopping off a few here and there, you know, you can say, well, you know --

Q. (Interrupting) Had the methodology been explained to General Westmoreland?

A. Yes. The methodology was explained in the first briefing. It was reiterated in the second briefing.

Q. What did you say concerning the methodology?

A. I don't remember specifically what my words were in the briefing now. I described what methodology we used, but other than that, that's the best recollection I have. I went in detail and describe the methodology of going down to the districts and provinces and the political order of battle methodology.

My exact words, good, god, I can't remember that.

Q. Are you saying that you may have, describing the same methodology, come up with a different total at the second
briefing than the first briefing without an explanation for it?

A. I'm not sure what kind of explanation I gave to come up with a slightly different total.

Q. Can you think of any one you might have given?

A. No. I don't know what I would have given; what I said at the time. My purpose was simply to reduce the figures so they were more acceptable.

The impression had been very strong at the first briefing that the fault -- I mean, the difficulty with the higher figures was the impact that they would cause. They had no criticism of the methodology at all. It was the impact.

Q. Had there ever been any concern previously for the impact of any activity on the press?

A. Not that I know -- well, there was always concern with the relations with the press, but I didn't get into that area; that was public relations. I just didn't get into relations with the press.

I stayed strictly down the line with Order of Battle and kept my mind focused on that particular area.

Q. Do you know whether General McChristian had ever expressed concern for the reaction of the press?
A. No. He never expressed that concern to me.

Q. And you don't know whether he expressed it to anybody else?

A. To anybody, I have no idea.

Q. Do you know whether the kind of statements made at the two conferences -- two briefings -- were unusual for those kinds of briefings?

A. Repeat that question now. I was thinking on --

Q. What I'm asking you is this. Do you know whether the kinds of concerns expressed at the two briefings were concerns that had been expressed on a number of occasions before?

A. This was the first time they'd ever been expressed to me by General Westmoreland.

Q. Had you attended many briefings for General Westmoreland prior to that?

A. Yes. Several briefings. I had briefed him, I guess, a couple or three times before on minor order of battle things, but nothing of that magnitude.

And I had been in the room on several occasions on the regular morning briefings to General Westmoreland. The Current Intelligence briefings.

But this was the first time that I'd ever heard a
reaction of that nature.

MR. DORSEN: Why don't we break for the day.

(Whereupon, at 3:20 o'clock, p.m., the deposition of Gains B. Hawkins was recessed, to reconvene at 9:00 o'clock, a.m., Wednesday, September 21, 1983, at this same location.)

Signature of the Witness

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ______________ day of ________________________________, 19__.

_________ NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission expires ________________________________.
CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER AND NOTARY

I, Kenneth W. Price, the officer before whom the foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition was duly sworn by me; that the testimony was taken by me by Stenomask and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under my direction; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this deposition was taken; and further, that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

[Signature]

Notary Public in and for the State of Alabama at Large