Q. I'm just basically concerned with your statement, "I continued to report what was there."

A. What was there.

Q. You did that?

A. Yes. I can't recall the figures, or what new reporting there was on the irregulars in the Order of Battle, but so far as the main forces and local forces, anything that I had I continued to report.

This is a very vague statement in itself here, and it's still a rather vague statement when I look back on it.

Q. Were you ever -- did anyone ever tell you not to report anything?

A. No one ever gave me an order not to report anything.

Q. Now, on the next page of the transcript, Page 21, which I believe you read up to, "I'm not sure the word 'dangerous' is apt in this case, but the message I was reading that higher figures would not be approved. At least these figures at this stage would not be approved and that the only figures that would be approved would be figures more in keeping with the figures that we had before."

Now, what did you mean by the phrase "at this stage"?
A. Now. Now. Well, to me it's very clear. At that particular time there would be no -- that the higher figures would not be approved.

Q. They might be approved later?
A. Well, yes, I guess you could read that into it. I was concerned at this time it was out of the question that any higher figures would be approved. And I think I follow that up later and say that the only figures that would be approved would be figures more in keeping with the figures that we had had before. Which, of course, I was talking about the approximate 300,000 bottom line figure.

Q. Now, after the second briefing, do you recall any other activity in which you were engaged or involved that related to the order of battle up to the time you left for the United States?
A. Day-to-day activity.

Q. Related to the order of battle.
Well, let me ask you more specifically. Do you recall that Secretary McNamara came to Saigon in early July, 1967?
A. Right. That's vaguely there. I think I mentioned that in some of -- in a letter. It's been several weeks since I read those letters, but I think I mentioned that in one of
the letters to my wife.

Q. Do you associate the time period of Secretary McNamara's visiting Saigon with either of the briefings of General Westmoreland?

A. No, sir.

Q. They are independent as far as you can recall?

A. As far as I know, yes.

Q. Now, do you recall any of the briefings that were given to Secretary McNamara?

A. No, sir, I don't recall those.

Q. Did you give any?

A. I don't recall giving a briefing.

Q. You may have?

A. Wait. I remember working with General Davidson on his preparation of a briefing for, it must have been, McNamara.

Q. Do you remember what that briefing contained?

A. No, sir, I don't.

Q. Do you know whether --

A. I simply sat in while General Davidson read his briefing.

I was just sitting there.

Q. Do you know whether the briefing was an accurate briefing to the best of your knowledge?
A. I can't remember what was even in the briefing. I do remember a remark that General Davidson made either at that time or at a subsequent practice or rehearsal briefing, that Westy wasn't satisfied with something or other and he had to go back and work on it. I don't know what he was talking about.

Q. Was he talking about the size of the enemy?

A. I don't know. I just remember that; that Westy had said something -- had been dissatisfied with something, but specifically what it was, I don't recall.

That phrase hung in my memory. I didn't remember that until I read the letter. This sort of jelled together after that.

Q. You don't remember what he was dissatisfied about?

A. No. I don't know what he was dissatisfied about.

Q. Or whether General Westmoreland was looking for some different format?

A. I don't know.

Q. Or different results?

A. I don't know. I don't remember what it was all about. I don't know that -- he said so at the time, but I don't remember what he said. All I remember was Westy was dissatisfied. That's all I can remember from his phrase.

Q. Did General Davidson seem upset?
A. No. This was the normal course of events.

Q. What? For a commander to be dissatisfied?

A. For a commander to say, well, I like this or I don't like that.

Q. Now, do you recall taking a trip with Colonel Wiler, Lieutenant McArthur and Lieutenant Robinson in the summer of 1967?

A. I made a trip. I recall that Lieutenant McArthur was present. I believe Kelly Robinson was present. I don't remember the composition of the entire party.

But we went to visit -- as I recall, we visited district and province headquarters and corps headquarters.

Q. Do you remember how many provinces you visited?

A. I don't remember how many provinces we went to.

Q. Do you remember the purpose of the trip?

A. The purpose of the trip, I believe, was to check out these irregular estimates to see just what the people on the ground had, what they had worked with and what they thought about them.

I remember one captain -- if this was the trip -- you know, you make several trips -- I believe this was the trip -- this young captain was extremely bright, and he had his figures.
I believe this was the district level. I'm not sure. District or province. But I just marked him in my memory as the most competent and assured young intelligence officer that I met during the entire tour, whatever that tour was.

But that thing hangs in my memory. I remember a wild helicopter ride from Na Trang to Pleiku. We got lost in the fog and almost bought the farm. Things like that hang in my mind.

Q. Was the purpose also to develop additional intelligence on the political order of battle?

A. I don't remember whether the political order of battle was a consideration or not, but if Kelly Robinson was along, it more than likely was. Kelly Robinson's specialty was the political order of battle.

Q. Was this, to your knowledge, the first time any analysts had conducted a field survey or investigation into the irregulars and political order of battle?

A. Analysts had visited -- it had been a common policy for analysts, individual analysts, to go out into the field and visit with people. But for a party like this -- orientation tours, when they would come over they would go through orientation tours and visit out in the field.
But this one, I believe, was linked to the new update of the irregulars, and it must have been the political OC, too, since Kelly Robinson was, according to your information, a member of this party.

Q. Why was it necessary or desirable to have such a trip by the analysts?

A. This is standard procedure; to investigate the source of your figures. It's like going to the horse's mouth. To talk to the people and determine whether or not they seem like they're in control of things.

Q. Had analysts talked to the people in the field in the preceding few months?

A. We had had at least one conference at CICV in which analysts in the field had been brought in. There might have been two.

Q. Do you remember when that was?

A. No, I don't. It was all during this time frame. It would have been during the first five months of 1967 when we were developing this study.

I remember one such conference in which we had the conference room full of these young officers and the sergeants from out in the field who had come in. That was in the early
stages, I believe.

Q. Of 1966?

A. No. 1967. When we were just getting this thing off and were getting our first reports in. We were reviewing the reports that were coming in from the field; reviewing the sources of information.

Q. Was the trip in any way tied to the national intelligence estimate conference?

A. I don't recall that. This tour you are talking about?

Q. Yes.

A. Whether that was tied to it?

Q. Yes.

A. I don't recall that. Whether it had any tie-in with the national intelligence estimate.

Q. Do you know whether the tour by persons we have been discussing had any effect on the order of battle?

A. No, I don't recall that. I don't know what effect it had on it.

Q. Do you know whether, for example, Lieutenant McArthur felt that he wanted to make substantial revisions in the order of battle based on the tour?

A. No. I don't recall specifically McArthur's remarks.
I became aware in the early days that McArthur was unhappy and
I sort of tried to pat him on his fanny and pamper his psych
because I had victimized his figures; I had reduced his figures
rather arbitrarily.

Q. What period are you talking about?
A. This was in the summer of 1967. This was after the
two briefings to General Westmoreland. Sometime during that
time frame and later on toward the end of my tour there. But
I can't pin it down as to the dates.

But I vaguely talking to him in the work room out at
CICV and pacifying him because I understood that he was upset.
That's a vague rememberance of it.

Specific dates and all, no. I remember vaguely the
conversation and the purpose of my conversation with him, which
was to relieve his anxieties, which I don't think were relieved
because I think he was a very bright young man and he realized
that things were going on.

Q. Do you know whether he was unhappy with the figures
that were reported out of the SNIE?
A. I don't recall any dissatisfaction with the figure
reported by SNIE. I think he was dissatisfied with what we --
and you can read that primarily I -- was doing to some of his
figures before they got into MACV. So, it would have affected
the SNIE, surely.

But at the time that I talked to him, it had become
pretty firmly implanted in my mind that the ceiling figure of
approximately 300,000 was going to be and I just had to reduce
these irregulars and political order of battle to keep it in
line. And I was determined I was going to reduce them rather
than let anything happen to the main force figures.

Q You were satisfied with the main force figures?
A The main force figures I thought were excellent
intelligence, and they were the heart, the guts, of the intel-
ligence over there. The whole thing went to make up the entire
body. The irregulars and political were very important, but --
and I could rationalize that to myself; well, I can rape these
figures but these others have got to stand inviolate.

That might seem a strange rationalization, but that's
the way I did.

Q The local forces were in the same category as the
main forces?

A I didn't guard them as fiercely as I did the main
forces, but -- and I don't recall arbitrarily reducing any
local force figures. There was some problem with the
administrative figures. I don't know if this has ever come up, or been mentioned in any detail before, but I was very cautious about acceptance of a total figure in the administrative services category so that that would not affect the ceiling.

And I think that I possibly would have gone for a figure that we ultimately arrived at if I had not felt myself under the imposition of a ceiling on the administrative services category.

Q. Is this the first time you are telling anybody this?

A. I don't know whether I mentioned this to anybody before or not.

Q. Do you have any recollection of mentioning it to anybody?

A. No, I don't have any recollection of mentioning it before. It's just now we're discussing the entire picture there.

It's something that's been in the back of my mind, but I don't know that I've ever gotten around to talk to anybody about it.

The focus has always been on the irregulars and the political OB.

Q. Did you ever talk about it to Mr. Adams, for example?
A. I don't remember whether I did or not.

Q. Or Mr. Baron?

A. With Mr. Baron, I'm sure I didn't. I'm sure I didn't talk to Mr. Baron about it.

But I don't think I discussed it with Sam Adams.

Q. I'm sorry; did you say you had not discussed it?

A. I don't think I've discussed it with Sam Adams.

Q. And you have not discussed it with Mr. Baron?

A. I have not discussed it with Bob Baron, to the best of my knowledge. I don't recall any instance that I mentioned that particular problem to him.

Q. Have you ever given reasons why the administrative services number or estimate should be below that pressed by the CIA?

MR. BARON: Object to the form of the question.

A. During the time -- can I go ahead and answer?

Q. Let me rephrase the question.

MR. BARON: I objected only because it was vague.

MR. DORSEN: The witness understands the objection.

Well, let me rephrase it since we've gone a few lines.

BY MR. DORSEN: (Resuming)

Q. Did you ever defend the administrative services figure,
the MACV administrative services figure, as presented in the summer of 1967?

A. I defended the administrative services and all the figures that we had then.

Q. What arguments did you give the validity of the administrative services figure?

A. Sam Adams and I were at odds over this figure, and my argument was that we were going to try to narrow these down to just the military, strictly the military, figures.

The administrative services included a great number, a large number, of civilians, and I was trying to narrow it down. I believe my rationale was affected somewhat by the fact that we weren't going to be able to get over this 300,000 figure.

Q. But you never said that to anybody?

A. I don't recall that I ever said it to anybody. I used it as an argument.

Q. You used what as an argument?

A. The fact that -- I used as an argument that only the military, those who we would strictly identify as military, would be included in the administrative.

Q. Is it true that there were many civilians performing the administrative services work?
A. Oh, yes, there were many civilians. Many civilians.

Q. What kind of things did the civilians do?

A. They hauled ammunition; they did what we call the
toting and the fetching; the transportation. They had a very
good transportation network, and this was the primary category.
This was the hospital people. Anything that would be non-combat
support.

They were sort of a non-combat support force.

Q. Now, were any of the administrative service personnel
out of South Vietnam?

A. Some of them were over in Laos. Your 559 Transportation
Group operated from North Vietnam right on -- I believe it
operated from Laos right on down into South Vietnam. They were
under the overall control of the Rear Services Directorate of
the High Command in the North.

Q. Weren't some of the other functions of administrative
services performed out of South Vietnam, such as some of the
hospitals?

A. Yes. I would say yes.

Q. Didn't the order of battle confine itself, the order
of battle that we're talking about, confine itself to personnel
in South Vietnam?
A. I don't think it did with regard to the administrative services. That's where we had a problem there, because so many of these people were out but they were direct support. And this was part of presenting the total picture of the enemy force.

Q. But didn't the order of battle state that you were only counting people in-country?

A. I don't recall. We discussed that yesterday, but these combat -- the main force elements, as I told you yesterday, I believe we had a separate category at one time for those. We called them border units.

Q. But in the Order of Battle Summary, the one-page summary chart that listed corps by corps the totals, wasn't that strictly in-country? Inside Vietnam?

A. As best I recall, it was.

Q. Now, were the North Vietnamese organizations set up the same way as the Americans insofar as administrative services?

A. Well --

Q. Or did they have separate units that were strictly administrative?

A. Well, they had transportation group, transportation battalions. They had medical groups. To that extent, they were similar to the Americans. But a lot of the people that were
employed were civilians. I mean, they were not in uniform.

Of course, like we've got hospitals, you know, in the United States. In most of the hospitals you've got a lot of civilians employed. Well, that was their situation in Vietnam and Laos.

Q. Now, was there an order of battle for the Americans and South Vietnamese in Vietnam?

A. An enemy Order of Battle summary?

Q. No. It wouldn't be enemy; it would be sort of an allied order of battle for the South Vietnamese.

A. The ones that we had were distributed to the RVNAF, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.

Q. And this counted up the friendly forces, is that correct?

A. I don't know anything about a friendly forces summary. The only one I was concerned with was the enemy.

Q. You don't know anything about the friendly Order of Battle Summary?

A. About United States troops?

Q. United States and the South Vietnamese.

A. This was published by the G3 Office. It was out of our office. I know that such a summary was prepared. I vaguely
remember seeing copies, but I never concerned myself with that.  
I concerned myself with strictly enemy order of battle.  
Of course, that was order of battle. The order of  
battle term is not -- you know --  
Q. Both sides.  
A. Yes. Both sides.  
Q. Well, do you know whether for the friendly order of  
battle the counterparts to the self-defense forces were included  
in the order of battle that we drew up or the South Vietnamese  
drew up for the friendly forces?  
A. I don't know. I never paid that much attention to it.  
I just didn't have time to look at that.  
Q. Do you know whether the friendly order of battle for  
the South Vietnamese included political infrastructure of the  
South Vietnamese?  
A. I don't know.  
Q. Do you know whether it included civilians who performed  
administrative support duties?  
A. I don't know. I don't think it would have. I don't  
think for the purposes of the summary it would have been necessary.  
We -- there in Saigon our people knew what their political  
structure was. They knew what -- our own MACV help supply and
build up these friendly forces.

They weren't the same problems. This, sir, is like -- this is the old apples and oranges thing. The friendly Order of Battle Summary I don't think can be compared with an enemy Order of Battle Summary.

Q: Don't you think it would be misleading, Colonel Hawkins, if the enemy order of battle included whole categories, large categories, of personnel that the friendly order of battle didn't?

A: I don't think it would be misleading at all. I think it would be doing a disservice to your commander and the subordinate forces if you did not include this in the Order of Battle Summary.

Q: Which --

A: This is not something everybody knows.

Q: Yes. But you come up with -- you are talking about a bottom line total of 300,000 that included, at that time, political cadre, self-defense, administrative services.

A: Right.

Q: Now, how big was the friendly order of battle?

A: I don't know how big the friendly order of battle was. I never did pay that much attention to it.
Q. Well, isn't that crucial to an understanding of the nature of the war?

A. It's crucial to the understanding of the war, but it's hard to get at. You can go anywhere in Saigon to find out how many. That's just open information. This is not open information. It had to be developed as intelligence and presented as intelligence.

Q. But if the allied order of battle, the friendly order of battle, did not in its bottom line total include the political infrastructure, why should the order of battle for the enemy include the political infrastructure?

A. There was no other source for this information on the enemy. There were plenty of sources for information on the friendly forces, but the Order of Battle Summary was the only source.

Q. It was the only source, but it was not necessarily the only place it could be published, is that true?

A. Well, you could publish it as a separate document, but they all add up to the same thing, so why not publish it in the same document.

Q. Why don't publish all of the friendly people in the same document?
A. Because you don't need it.

Q. Well, if you are trying to present an accurate picture of the war -- aren't you, Colonel Hawkins?

A. Yes.

Q. Both sides. The enemy's total strength and the allied total strength, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And if you include in the enemy total strength political infrastructure, self-defense forces that you do not include in the total for the allied strength, aren't you giving a misleading picture of --

A. (Interrupting) No, I don't think you are at all. You've got a group here that's preparing the enemy order of battle. This is the only source available to all of your users of this intelligence. It should be consolidated in one. If you put it in one and send another, your people won't get the same thing.

The smartest thing to do, the most economical, the most effective way to present it is to put it in a monthly Order of Battle Summary and send it out.

I never did really pay any attention to the friendly order of battle. You say it's crucial; it wasn't crucial to me.
Q. That's because you were concerned only with the enemy order of battle.

A. Yes. That's right. That was my job.

Q. But wasn't it crucial to somebody who was trying to get an overall picture of the war to compare the friendly order of battle with the enemy order of battle?

A. It must have been. I think you've got to know something like that, but you've got different places to get it from.

Q. And would it have been appropriate in your opinion for somebody to say, well, the two orders of battle, the friendly and the enemy, should correspond?

A. I think it would have been silly.

Q. Silly?

A. Yes. I think it would have been utterly silly. There is just no comparison, sir, of the enemy situation and the friendly situation.

Q. In other words, you are saying --

A. The degree of concern there, you're in the dark about the enemy. You can call up the G3 and find out what the strength is of the friendly forces.

Q. But then why should there be an order of battle at all for the friendly forces?
A. It's something that the various officers that are concerned with various things there are going to have to have.

Q. Why won't they have to be concerned about the village defenders or the equivalent of the self-defense forces on the friendly side?

A. On the friendly side?

Q. Yes.

A. Why wouldn't they be?

Q. Yes.

A. Some people would be concerned about it.

Q. But you are saying --

A. Some people that worked with it would be concerned about it.

Q. But you see no correlation or relationship between the enemy order of battle and the friendly order of battle?

A. I see none. I think they are different things. Absolutely. The old cliche apples and oranges we're talking about here.

Q. Now, as long as people, the intelligence community, the DIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, knew how long each of the categories was: main forces, local forces, guerrillas, self-defense, did it matter whether it was all contained in one
A. I think it was most effectively presented in one document.
Q. What do you mean by that?
A. Well, it's all there together. I mean, it's your reference document.

Why have a dictionary that you go "A" through "D" and one for "E" through "F" when you can put it all in one book? It makes it more effective to use. It gives you the big picture.

If a man sees this category here in this document and he doesn't have this one, for some reason, he hasn't got it altogether. That was the purpose of the introductory pages of the summary, was to give you a summarization of all these various categories of enemy out there.

Q. Well, do you have any doubt that the people I have mentioned would not be able to go to two documents rather than one document for their information?
A. They could go to two documents, but this was more effective. This is a more effective presentation.
Q. More effective or more convenient?
A. Effective and convenient.
Q. Why more effective?
A. Because it's all there. I mean, you get to see this
one side by side with this one and you can correlate the various
things.

Q. So, you --

A. You've got a big board there. This is all of it. This
is the big picture. I mean, you don't have a segment that's
maybe over in this file cabinet or this is a segment in this
file cabinet. It's all presented there right before you.

Q. So, you always felt the political infrastructure should
be part of the same total along with the main forces and local
forces?

A. I didn't in the very beginning. I didn't challenge
General McChristian openly on it, but I came around. I realized
later, after working with the situation, that it was important
to have it there. That gave you the big -- the total picture.
The phrase that I continue to use, "the magnitude", "the
enormity" of the problem. The total picture there.

Q. What about people like the assault youth and other
groups, should they have been in there?

A. The assault youths I never felt compelled to include
in the Order of Battle Summary. They were -- I had some arguments
with Sam Adams on that, and I would still argue with him today,
whatever his opinion is today, about including the assault youth in the summary. There was a good argument for it, but I thought we had -- that they were just a little bit too much civilian oriented and that they weren't -- they should be known about but I didn't -- I think we've got to cut the summary off somewhere. And we had studies on the assault youth which I think satisfied the problem.

Q. Were there any other groups such as the assault youth that Mr. Adams and you discussed as to whether they should be in the Order of Battle?

A. I don't recall any at this time. Sam and I had a lot of arguments. I recall the argument about the assault youth. Other groups, I don't know.

Q. You think it was a matter of judgment where you drew the line?

A. Yes, it was a matter of judgment where you drew the line.

Q. And you and Mr. Adams disagreed on whether to include the assault youth?

A. Yes. We disagreed on that.

Q. Do you think other people could disagree on whether to include other categories?
A. Well, we could disagree on this because this was pretty far out there. I think when you come back to the political OB and the irregulars, I think your disagreement -- there is not as much room for disagreement on, say, the irregulars and the political as there is room for disagreement on including the assault youth.

Q. So, you don't think there is any real issue as to whether you should include the self-defense and the political cadre as part of the Order of Battle? You feel they should be included?

A. I felt they should have been noted. Should have been noted.

Q. When you say noted --

A. Yes. Should have been shown, yes.

Q. As part of --

A. (Interrupting) As part of the Order of Battle, yes.

Q. The military Order of Battle?

A. The military Order of Battle Summary. They were very closely related and very important part of the system.

Q. Have you ever referred to the figures for political infrastructure and irregulars as "soft"?

A. I don't recall using the term "soft".
Q. Would you consider them soft?
A. Of the political infrastructure?
Q. Yes.
A. I thought the political infrastructure figures, the first ones that Kelly Robinson prepared for the original briefing, were very good figures. On later months, as I backtracked to keep up with the -- well, to keep under the ceiling, I might very well have characterized them soft to excuse my actions, my own actions, for arbitrarily reducing them.

I had to give some excuse for reducing these figures arbitrarily, and I'm sure I rationalized some pretty good excuses to reduce them.

Q. Back in 1967?
A. In '67.
Q. But you wouldn't have used -- you wouldn't use that term today to describe them, is that correct?
A. No, sir, I wouldn't use it today.
Q. Do you recall whether you used that term with Mr. Crile?
A. I don't recall whether I used it with Mr. Crile or not.
Q. If you used it, would it have been an accurate term? one you believed in?
A. If I used the figure "soft" on it, I think it would
have been a careless error on my part.

Q. Well, could you turn to the bottom of Page 15 of Exhibit 62? I direct your attention to the last question and answer as a preliminary to the top of Page 16. And could you read -- there is a question -- read the question and then the answer.

A. Which one is this now?

Q. Start down here. (Indicating on document.)

A. "You look at those figures again -- do you want me to continue reading?

Q. Yes. Now, this is you speaking?

A. Yes. I looked at the figures again.

"Sir, did you look at them to see if there was some way you could lower them?"

Q. Now, this is you about to speak?

A. "This was -- certainly, this was -- this was a message you perceived to be delivered."

Q. And this again is you speaking?

A. This is me.

"This was the message that I perceived. And this information, George, is what we term 'soft information.' It could be challenged because it was not a question of we've got
two plus two equals four."

Do you want me to continue?

Q Yes.

A It just says, "It was a soft category, but when you went back, trying your best to follow General Westmoreland's request, did you find it possible to reduce these figures a great deal?"

Continue?

Q Yes, please.

A "Yes. That estimate was just like a budget. You can slice fat out of a budget. When you've got soft intelligence, you can go around -- go to the areas where the source material is the softest and slice that."

Q You can stop as far as I'm concerned.

A Okay.

Q And you are saying that your use of the term "soft" was careless?

A Was probably careless -- was careless at that time.

Q All three times?

A Yes, it was careless.

I'm a little bit surprised that I used that term. The terms "soft intelligence" and "hard intelligence" were used
throughout the Vietnam War, and I always thought they were meaningless.

Q. But other people --

A. Other people use these terms.

Q. Did other people use the term "soft intelligence" to apply to the intelligence estimates of the irregulars?

A. The term "soft intelligence" was used -- well, I'm not sure. I rejected it at that time. I didn't use it in Vietnam, when I was a professional there, because it really didn't mean -- one person would mean something by soft intelligence and another would mean something else. They just were not precise terms. And this was an imprecise statement.

I'm trying to be very cautious here and say just exactly what I regard these figures to have been, the importance to have been.

Q. Now, Colonel Hawkins, do you remember in the period prior to leaving for the national intelligence estimate in August, 1967 any discussion concerning whether the size of the self-defense forces should be discussed verbally as opposed to being given a number?

A. I don't recall that. I think -- there were all sorts of discussions about how they should be presented. I don't
recall just what was said at various times. Specific conversations are beyond me.

Q. Do you ever recall saying that the self-defense --

A. When was this?

Q. In July, 1967.

A. In July, 1967, I could possibly have said that because I was backtracking then, and I was justifying what I was doing to the figures.

Q. And this is what you may have told people at the time?

A. I may have told people at the time. I had to give some reason.

Q. Colonel Hawkins, if you said something like that, would you have told anybody that you didn't believe what you were saying?

A. I think if we go back to the conferences and at breaks in between at the conferences in Washington, D. C. and the ones in Saigon, I'm sure I admitted to Sam Adams that I was backing something here that I didn't really believe in. And I probably said it to some other senior analysts that I trusted.

Q. Senior analysts where?

A. At the conferences.

Q. From which organization?
A. I don't remember which ones I talked to that I would have said that to. I do know that I said it to Sam. But I might have said it to other analysts in addition to Sam.

Q. Do you have any recollection whatsoever of saying to other analysts what you said to Mr. Adams?

A. Of saying to other analysts what I said to Sam?

Q. Yes.

A. No. I don't have the specific. I might have.

Q. Do you know anything more than you might have?

A. There was a man named Barry Williams. I might have been very candid with him. He was an analyst with DIA. A very smart fellow.

Q. Do you have any recollection whether you did or not?

A. I don't have any recollection. I say I might have.

Q. Anybody else?

A. I don't have any recollection of it.

Q. Who was representing CINCPAC? Do you remember?

A. I don't recall the names of the officers who were representing CINCPAC. The officer or officers.

Q. Do you remember George Hampshire?

A. George Hampshire? I don't remember George Hampshire.

Not to this day I don't remember him.
Q. Was Barry Williams the head of the delegation for DIA?

A. I don't believe so. I think there was a George somebody in there. Fowler. If he wasn't the head of it, he was one of the top. I believe George Fowler was, but I'm not sure. I do recall Barry Williams, and I think there was a George Fowler from Saigon.

Q. Do you remember whether there was anybody else superior to Barry Williams from DIA?

A. I don't really recall any of the other people.

MR. DORSEN: Off the record for a second.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. DORSEN: On the record.

BY MR. DORSEN: (Resuming)

Q. I'm going to show Colonel Hawkins a document that has been marked as Defendant's Exhibit 35, which is a July 10, 1967 CIA cable, previously identified on the record.

I'll ask you, Colonel Hawkins, whether you have ever seen that document before?

(Witness reads document.)

Q. Colonel, Hawkins, I'm most interested for purposes of discussion in numbered Paragraph 2 on Page 2, and particularly
the reference to you.

(Witness reads document.)

Q. I guess at this time I want to ask you, Colonel Hawkins, whether reading Paragraph 2 refreshes your recollection in any way about any meeting you may have had with George Carver, General Peterson or General Davidson?

A. I don't remember this particular meeting at all. I can comment on -- it says, "He then had his OB Branch Chief, Colonel Hawkins, comment. He concurred." I was concurring in anything the Command wanted.

Q. Did the Command know that you were doing this?

A. I had made no -- Charlie Morris and I had talked very frankly. I had talked to Charlie Morris very frankly about it, and he knew that I was very cynical about the whole thing.

I don't know that I said as much to General Davidson. But I was in a position, I thought, where the best thing I could do was just go along and give them what they wanted and support them, and that's what I did throughout the summer of 1967 and throughout the Saigon conference, up until the date that I left there. And I've made this public.

Q. What did you say when you made it public?

A. I wrote to the Washington Post, and I believe I said
just about as much in the interview with George Crile.

Q. No. What did you say though to Charles Morris and General Davidson in 1967?

A. I don't remember the exact comments, but I knew the nature of the conversation was such that I was going to support whatever they wanted. That was the general tenor, but the conversations I don't remember.

Q. Did you tell them that you didn't agree with them?

A. I don't think I made any strong arguments of that nature.

Q. Now, do you believe today that the positions taken by General Davidson and Colonel Morris might have been their honest judgments?

A. I interpreted at the time -- and I still hold to this interpretation -- that General Westmoreland had set the course of action in rejecting these -- at least in not approving these figures, and that this total, bottom line figure was not going to go above this approximately 300,000 level. And everything that I did during that time until I completed my tour in Saigon was to cooperate.

No matter what I believed, I cooperated in it. I wasn't going to lead any one-colonel rebellion.
Q. My question was a little bit different, Colonel Hawkins. And that is, do you believe the positions taken by General Davidson and Colonel Morris in 1967 could have been their honest judgment and honest estimates?

A. I don't know that. I don't know that. As I said, I interpreted them as supporting the Command position of 300,000.

Q. You have said, have you not, though, Colonel Hawkins, that the positions taken by General Davidson and Colonel Morris could have been their honest judgments?

A. It could have been their honest judgments, yes.

Q. You said that to Mr. Crile, in fact?

A. Yes. It could have been.

Q. And you said it to Mr. Carter?

A. I said it to Mr. Carter, but I always had in the back of my mind that it was simply there to support. That's what I -- you know, it could have been their honest judgment. But my honest belief -- you know, you draw a line here. I see this -- I always interpreted their position as supporting General Westmoreland's and mine as supporting them. And I always thought that the whole thing led back to the fact that a line had been drawn there.

But whether they honestly believed in it, I don't know.
It could have been. Actually, it could have been. Anything is possible.

Q. But you are not sure, are you, Colonel Hawkins, when that line was drawn?

A. I think the line was drawn -- no, I don't think --

I don't know when the line was drawn. I think the beginning of the line was drawn at the second briefing that I gave.

Q. Not the first briefing?

A. The second briefing. That's when I knew it.

Q. But what about the first briefing?

A. It could have been drawn there. Started. Actually, probably started there. But I was convinced after the second briefing that there was a line there. And this other stuff just developed.

I didn't really know all of it. This all fell into place, and it took several weeks for me to realize, after talking with General Davidson and Colonel Morris, that we just weren't going to go above that figure.

So, I said to hell with it; I'll give you what you want. That was my attitude.

Q. But you don't recall, if I am correct, whether General Davidson was at either briefings, is that right?
A. No, I don't. I don't. I don't have any idea.

Q. What about Colonel Morris?

A. I don't remember whether Colonel Morris was there.

Q. You used the phrase, I believe, Colonel Hawkins, about a "commander blessing" briefing. Do you recall that?

A. Yes.

Q. What does that mean?

A. That means you approve it.

Q. Is that standard terminology in the military?

A. No. That's not standard military terminology.

Q. Well, do you use it in that sense?

A. I use it occasionally in that sense. It's more like a slang term. It's a slang term. You're blessed.

If you're talking to some cat out here on the street, you know, but if you're talking to strictly military people, you know, the language shifts around a little bit. The language becomes less precise. Because if you talk too precisely to civilians they don't understand what the hell you're talking about a lot of times.

Q. "Blessing" is a synonym for "approved."

A. For approved.

Q. And you've heard other people use it?
A. I don't know. I thought it was kind of original with me.

Q. When you use the term "enemy soldier" or "enemy troops," what do you have in mind in the context of the Vietnam War?

A. An enemy troop is somebody out there who is carrying the war to you. He's either attacking you or defending against you in some manner or form or fashion, whether he has on a uniform or not.

As you know, there wasn't a whole lot of uniforms in the Vietnam War. Most of them were black pajamas. That was one of the big problems over there.

But certainly an enemy troop, enemy soldier, in the Vietnam War context doesn't mean an enemy in a soldier's uniform.

Q. Could be a political cadre?

A. Yes. It could be a political cadre. If he's got a gun and he's going to shoot you.

Q. What about a political cadre without a gun?

A. He's still an enemy. A lot of times in World War II I didn't have my gun with me, but I was still an enemy to the Germans.

Q. Would you call a mayor of a town a soldier?

A. Not necessarily a soldier, no. Some of them did serve
in two positions.

Q. But the ones who didn't, you would not call a soldier, is that correct?

A. No. I wouldn't call him a soldier.

You know, you just go right on down. You're talking about the political OB, they were defined as such. Their positions were political in nature.

Q. Now, I believe you referred just now and yesterday to Viet Cong holding dual positions as political infrastructure, on the one hand, and irregular, on the other hand, is that correct?

A. Say that again now?

Q. Were there -- I believe you said that there were Viet Cong who had dual positions.

A. Some of them did, yes.

Q. And what dual positions would they have?

A. One of them might have been this mayor you're talking about, and he might have been the commander, say, of a local force group, or something like this. Or your security people might have been commanders of a self-defense or secret self-defense.

We found several instances of dual roles. Two hats,
we called it, was the slang expression back in those days.

Q. In fact, sometimes didn't these people use different names for --

A. (Interrupting) Yes. Yes.

Q. Do you know how large the overlap was in the dual role?

A. I don't recall. I don't recall. Kelly Robinson had all of those figures and he came up with some pretty good figures, as I recall, on that.

Q. How would you decide which total to include them in?

A. You simply made the judgment that you weren't going to count them twice. If you think you've got this fellow counted in this group, you're not going to count him in the other group. I think it's a decision that has to be made at the analyst level at the time.

He's the man who is discovering this information and he makes the decision. You throw this fellow into this pile; you throw him into that pile.

Q. So, the point is, don't you have two analysts who are working with the same people? Say, in this case, Richard McArthur and Kelly Robinson?

A. Well, no -- well, yes. You have them, and they
correlate their work.

Q. So, they would work it out between themselves?

A. I would hope that they worked it out among themselves. I know Kelly Robinson was very conscious of this and he was anxious to get accurate figures that would not be double counting.

Q. How do you know that Kelly Robinson and Richard McArthur, on the one hand, would count the people, the dual role people, the same way as Mr. Adams did?

A. Because I know that they worked very closely together.

Q. No, no. I'm saying -- let's assume that they agree that this group of people should be counted as guerrillas rather than as political cadre to avoid double counting. How do you know that Mr. Adams, for example -- who is sitting next to you -- would not have counted them the other way?

A. I don't have any idea whether he would have counted them or not.

Q. Could they have been --

A. I don't know of any studies he had on the political order of battle. I thought most of Mr. Adams' figures were on the guerrilla problem.

Q. How do you reconcile between the CIA and MACV as to where the people who had a dual role would fit into the order
of battle?

A. I didn't try to reconcile the CIA position. We reconcile the MACV position and presented this as the MACV position.

I mean, we were sort of antagonist around the conference table. I mean, these were MACV positions. I wasn't trying to reconcile what Mr. Adams was putting out there. Except wherever he gave explanations. He's very articulate and he explains his work.

But this, you know --

Q. Well, let's take a hypothetical. Let's assume that you have 50,000 guerrillas and 50,000 political cadre, and you explain -- and you resolve the double counting problem by counting them all as guerrillas. And someone from CIA or DIA says, "Well, what about counting the x-thousand people instead of as guerrillas as political cadre." Would you have objected?

A. I'm pretty sure I would have. I don't recall that this ever became a problem; that double counting ever became a problem among us. I thought we resolved it pretty well.

There was a possibility for double counting in there, but I don't recall the various arguments that were used at the various times. Of how much of an issue, if it was a big issue,
it became.

    It was something we were all cognizant of, the possibility that the people would be counted twice, and efforts were made to prevent this from happening.

Q. Do you have any recollection whatsoever, Colonel Hawkins, in the context of the SNIE in August and September, 1967, of the question of double counting coming up?

A. I don't recall it at all. I'm not surprised. It's one of the things that probably came up, but I don't recall the arguments that were put out.

    I was so intent upon supporting the Command position that I was interested primarily in keeping the figures where I understood they were supposed to be.

MR. DORSEN: Why don't we break for lunch.

(Whereupon, at 11:23 o'clock, a.m., the deposition of Gains B. Hawkins was recessed, to reconvene at 1:00 o'clock, p.m., the same day.)