AFTERNOON SESSION

Whereupon,

GAINS B. HAWKINS

the witness at the time of recess, having been previously duly sworn, was examined further and testified further as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF RESUMED

BY MR. DORSEN:

Q. Colonel Hawkins, going back to one subject we touched upon before lunch concerns the tour of the provinces undertaken by Kelly Robinson and Richard McArthur. Why was that not done before the briefing of General Westmoreland?

A. I don't recall why it was not done. To me it was just one of these things you get out and do. I don't know why it wasn't done.

Q. Did you consider that an integral part of developing an order of battle estimate?

A. Well, we had had conferences before. I think I mentioned that this morning. We had had conferences and we had pulled the people in from the field. But this was simply a continuing thing in development of the production of the order of battle intelligence.

I wasn't even aware of the — I remember making the
trip, but I wasn't even aware of the dates we made the trip.

What does your record show when we made the trip?

Q. I think the trip was in July, 1967.

A. In July. No. I -- It was simply one of the continuing projects in developing intelligence.

Q. Did you consider it a useful project?

A. Yes. I think any time you get out in the field and talk to people in the field that it's useful. If you're going to surface disagreements, you examine the material and so forth. It's always useful.

Q. Do you recall what Lieutenants Kelly Robinson and McArthur thought of the tour?

A. No, I don't.

Q. Or how they utilized the information in the order of battle?

A. I don't recall how it affected the input at that particular time.

Q. Now, after the second briefing, I believe you testified you lowered the order of battle estimates lower.

A. Yes.

Q. How much lower?

A. I'm not sure how much. Like I said this morning, I
go back to my statement this morning when we touched on this, 
I lowered them some, but I'm not sure. I don't think I lowered 
them much more than ten thousand or so. 

Q. This is after the second briefing? 
A. After the first briefing. 

Q. What about after the second briefing? 
A. After the second briefing, as best I recall, it was 
continually lowering until -- we started out with a spread, 
and then we went -- and this was to soften the impact of the 
figures. And then I think we just continued, as I recall, lowering 
these figures. 

This is when I gradually became to realize there was 
a ceiling there that we weren't going to get above and these 
figures were going to have to fit in this can, so to speak. 

Q. Do you remember why, specifically why, you lowered 
the figures? 
A. I lowered the figures to keep within the ceiling; 
to keep within the guidelines that were furnished to me by 
Colonel Morris and General Davidson. 

Q. Anything in addition to what you've said? 
A. Generalities is all I recall. I don't recall specific 
conversations.
Q. Now, I believe you were asked by Mr. Crile as to possible instructions that General Westmoreland is alleged to have given George Godding, and it's on Page 26 of the transcript of your interview. I'll read it.

"Now, General Godding has told us that Westmoreland actually instructed him to keep below a certain number." This was his quote-- Westmoreland apparently said this-- "I don't care how you do it. Use any number you want. Just don't let the total go over 300,000 Viet Cong." And your answer was, "I'm not familiar with that instruction."

Is that true?

A. I didn't know about that specific instruction. I knew that when we went on that trip that there was a ceiling that we weren't going to get above and General Godding was perfectly aware that the ceiling was there, and he corroborated that when he called me at my home after the CBS documentary. That there was a ceiling that we had to stay under.

Q. Is what you are testifying to in answer to my last question the same as what you testified earlier?

A. This morning?

Q. Yes.

A. I think it's the same testimony I gave this morning.
I didn't know about this specific wording.

Q. If it occurred?
A. Yes. If it occurred.

Q. Now, do you recall what the figures were that MACV took to the conference in Saigon -- I mean Langley?
A. No, I don't recall what the figures were.

Q. Do you recall whether there was a change in the components of the order of battle?
A. I don't recall that.

Q. Do you recall whether the MACV figures and totals included the political infrastructure?
A. I thought they did.

Q. Your recollection is they did?
A. I thought they did. I'm not sure. Really, my best answer to that is I don't recollect.

My recollection of the events on that trip were very hazy. I think I just shut a lot of it out of my mind. I just don't remember.

I felt under pressure all the time to defend some figures that I didn't quite believe in.

Q. Is it your recollection that the figures you defended were the same figures that had been carried all along in the
order of battle?

A. I don't recall. My recollection is I believe in the figures that were larger than the ones that we were representing at this conference.

Q. Do you know how much larger you believe the figures to be than the ones that you were representing?

A. No. I can't tell you. Tens of thousands. The best word I can use is "considerable." I know you want something more specific, but that's the best I can give you.

Q. Do you remember anything that happened at the conference in Langley?

A. In Langley?

Q. Yes.

A. Very few details of that conference stay in my mind. Now, this is what month?

Q. This is August of 1967.

A. I don't know whether -- I thought we went to places other than Langley and talked to people. There is somewhere in the back of my mind that in the summer, and it happened during that tour, that we walked into the office of some high-ranking civilian in the -- I thought it was in the Department of Defense, or OSD -- that would have been it -- and that we brought our
briefing papers in there and the man actually laughed at us.
He ridiculed us.

This was another one of those things that, you know, it doesn't happen to you every day in your life.

Q. Was anybody with you?
A. I don't recall who. Someone was with me; I don't recall who it was. I don't recall whether it was Colonel Godding at the time or who it was.

But there were two or three of us that walked into this office and the man just laughed and said, "Well, I see ya'll have got a little something for everybody." And it was said in a ridiculing manner, you know.

He had no confidence at all in what we had there.

That's about all I remember.

Q. You don't remember where it was?
A. I don't remember where. I thought it was in ODS -- no, it wasn't OSD Office. I don't recall. It's just one of those little fragments that stay in the back of my mind.

MR. DORSEN: I would like to have marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 68 a set of copies of documents bearing Numbers 05502 to 05522. The first page is rather illegible. The second page is headed "Distribution of Enemy Forces."
(The document referred to was marked Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 68 for identification.)

BY MR. DORSEN: (Resuming)

Q. Colonel Hawkins, I show you what has just been marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 68, and ask you to look at it and tell us if you can identify it?

A. On the face of it, I can't, because --

Q. I believe these are copies of view graph slides that existed.

A. Inside, yes. If you look inside they appear to what could be copies of view graph slides.

Q. Does that refresh your recollection?

A. No. It doesn't refresh my recollection at all.

Q. Could you turn to Page 05512.

A. Yes?

Q. I ask you if you recall that particular document or slide containing that information?

A. I see it says at the top of the slide "Shown by Colonel Hawkins," but I don't recall it. I don't recall the circumstances of the figures.

Let me see what it says here.
(Witness reads document.)

A. I just simply don't recall the specific circumstances of it.

Q. Now, if you look at Page 05512, I think you'll see that the total consists of the components -- well, it's called the armed forces, maneuver, and then going down through guerrillas, and that comes to between 280,000 and --

A. (Interrupting) Three hundred and ten thousand with a mean of 298,000, which is two hundred above the total in the one labeled "previous estimate." Two hundred difference.

Q. I'm sorry, I think I indicated -- the overall total two ninety-eight to three ten and the total for the armed forces is one ninety-eight to two twenty-six.

And the total for the infrastructure I think it says "Accepted 83,000 and Possible 92,000."

A. Right.

Q. Do you know number what circumstances the infrastructure was separated in this fashion from the armed forces?

A. I don't recall.

Q. Would that have been done with your approval?

A. It's just like in the case of the cable you showed me this morning. I did what I was expected to do. And I'm sure
this is what I was expected to do because that was my attitude throughout the trip. Defend the position.

Q. Do you know how the spread or range for administrative services and guerrillas came to be put in there?

A. I believe I've addressed this before, that this was one of the things we started doing after the briefing and the estimate was not approved; that we'd just get the figures down there where they'd be about where they were before. That's where the mean put it. It shows that there was no increase of more than 200 people.

It was a means of arriving at a figure. This is what this means to me right here; that this substantiates what I've been saying all along; that there was a ceiling.

Apparently the figure we were carrying in the OB Summary was 297,800 and we were breaking out a revised estimate which showed no more than 200 increase.

Q. Do you know what happened to the self-defense and secret self-defense forces in that estimate?

A. No, sir, I don't remember what happened to it.

Q. Isn't it true, Colonel Hawkins, that the revised estimate covers fewer categories of enemy than the previous estimate?
A. I don't recall this. I'd have to look further in here. See, the only thing I see here is the total of irregulars here and a total of guerrillas here. I don't see anything else here.

Q. So, doesn't the revised estimate, in fact, when analyzed properly, show a substantial -- reflect a substantial increase over the previous estimate?

MR. BARON: Object to the form of the question.

Q. Please answer it.

A. It doesn't affect the bottom line figure to the extent of more than 200 personnel. No matter how you slice it, whether you say you've got peas, potatoes, apples, the bottom line figure was the primary concern that this enemy force in this revised estimate would not be more than what we currently carried on the books.

Q. Did it matter what the bottom line was the total of?

A. To me, that was the magic figure, the bottom line.

Q. Why was the bottom line so important?

A. Because we were going to exceed the total strength that we'd been showing all along.

Q. Was there an accepted ratio of guerrillas to self-defense to secret self-defense?
A. An accepted ratio of guerrillas to secret self-defense?
Q. Yes.
A. I don't believe so. I thought that we arrived at those separately.
Q. Well, do you know in late 1966 and early 1967 what proportion of irregulars the guerrillas were?
A. I don't recall that figure.
Q. You believe you knew it back in 1966 and 1967?
A. In 1966 and 1967 I was familiar with all of these figures.
Q. Were other members of the intelligence community familiar with those numbers, too?
A. I can't speak for the other members. The ones that were keeping up should have been familiar with it.
Q. Was Mr. Adams familiar with it?
A. I'm sure Mr. Adams must have been familiar with those figures.
Q. Do you recall whether the guerrillas constituted approximately one-third of the irregular force?
A. I don't recall that. I just don't recall the figures.
Q. You have no recollection at all?
A. I don't have any recollection. I do know that there
is a copy of an OB Summary there that shows -- what is that? May 31 1967? I just don't have a recollection of the total figures.

Q. Now, when you have ranges down here, would the higher end of the range reflect a number that MACV considers the maximum number of enemy for that category?

A. I don't quite understand your question.

Q. When you have, for example, administrative services, 17,000 and then a line, 35,000, what does the 35,000 represent?

A. The 35,000 represents a top figure, a maximum, of what we estimate them to be, and the 17,000 would be a minimum figure of what we would estimate them to be.

Q. Was the 35,000 figure then within the range of numbers that MACV would be willing to accept?

A. It was the maximum that MACV would be willing to accept at this time.

This whole thing here was sort of a gimmick. I mean, to keep these figures around this bottom line figure. The problem was don't go above the figure that we've got right now, however you slice it.

Q. Let me ask you another question. Was 70,000 the maximum that MACV would have accepted for guerrillas?
A. This is what it shows here. This is what MACV position is indicated here; that 70,000 would have been the maximum that they would accept.

Q. Are you saying that MACV would have accepted a total of 226,000.

A. As a maximum figure as is what is indicated on this slide.

Q. And how many infrastructure was MACV willing to accept?

A. According to this, they were willing to accept 83,000, and they have a "Possible" category here of 92,000.

Q. Would MACV have been willing to accept 92,000?

A. This is indicated on this as the MACV position; that they would accept 92,000 labeled under the "Possible" category.

Q. Would MACV then be willing to accept an armed forces of 226,000 and an infrastructure of 92,000?

A. The gimmick here is that you're supposed to take your mean figure and come up with the figure which it doesn't show you. See, the mean is very clearly labeled here 298,000.

Q. But Colonel Hawkins --

A. This is being explained to you as you look at this.

Q. Yes. But didn't you just testify a minute ago that MACV was willing to accept administrative services of 35,000?
MR. BARON: Object to the form of the question.

A. I said that this is what the thing shows here. This is what the document shows that they were willing to accept a maximum figure of 35,000.

Q. Suppose, Colonel Hawkins, in August of 1967 the CIA had said to you, "Colonel Hawkins, Colonel Godding, we are prepared to accept as the best collective estimate maneuver forces of 108,200, combat support, 12,200, administrative services, 35,000, guerrillas, 70,000, infrastructure of 92,000," what would you have said?

A. If MACV was willing to accept that?

Q. Yes.

A. I would say, no, MACV was not willing to accept that unless it was qualified as it is qualified right here.

In other words, for your infrastructure MACV says here plainly we would accept 83,000 but we would qualify a possible 9000 more. We would qualify it.

Q. What about the 226,000 plus 83,000? Would you have accepted that?

A. The 226,000?

Q. Yes.

A. I don't believe MACV was willing to accept these
figures unless they were displayed as they are right here in these spreads.

Q. Who told you that?
A. That's my recollection of it. I was an officer. This is the way I interpreted it. Now, I wasn't the man to make the decision, but this is the way I'm telling you that I remember it and the way that I interpreted it.

Q. Who was the man to make the decision?
A. General Godding was the head of the delegation.

Q. Do you have any reason to believe that he would have rejected an estimate of 226,000?
A. I don't have any idea what he would do. But I know that we were not supposed to accept anything that would go over that magic figure of approximately 300,000. And this plainly states that that was what we were doing.

Q. Where does it plainly state that?
A. Right here. A mean figure of 298,000. This becomes the bottom line figure.

Q. Where does the mean figure say anything about what MACV would be willing to accept?
A. It says it right here. This is the MACV estimate.

Q. Isn't the MACV estimate up to 226,000, plus up to
92,000?

A. The MACV estimate says a spread of 280,000 to 310,000, and then in big block letters on the right-hand side it says a mean of 298,000, which is the last figure that you read and the last figure that's in your mind. This is what the total enemy strength is: 298,000.

Q. And that's your testimony?

A. Yes, sir. That's the way it is here. That's what's reflected on this view graph slide, if it is a view graph slide.

Q. And you are saying that you did not believe that you could accept -- you and Colonel Godding could accept as a joint position of the NIE an armed forces of 226,000?

A. It was distinctly my impression that we could not accept that. But, of course, General Godding was the man in charge.

Q. And if he said he would have accepted 226,000, what would you say?

A. If General Godding had said he would accept that, I would have had to have gone along with him. Absolutely. He was the MACV -- he was in charge of the delegation and I would have supported him.

And I would have been glad to go to the higher figure,
believing still that it was possibly even higher than that. We had evidence to support it.

Q. Would you turn to the last page of the exhibit, which is 05522, and I ask you if you can identify that document?

(Witness reads document.)

A. This appears to be a copy of a view graph slide. It's very hazy. I can see "actual identified strengths, districts, average by province." And it says "village hamlets, captured administrative plans, statistical and something of 695, villages and hamlets, typical VC control village and hamlet strength, adjustment for population control, total Viet something hamlet projected strength."

This means nothing to me at this time. I don't remember it. Perhaps something else in here might make it more meaningful to me, but I just don't remember this particular page here.

I'm not even sure -- I don't even know what it means at this time. I'm certain that I knew what it meant then.

Q. I believe you testified earlier, Colonel Hawkins, that you were having private conversations with Mr. Adams?

A. I would pass Sam in the corridor or maybe we might go to the bathroom together at the same time. Yes, we spoke
to each other several times during breaks.

Q. I believe you told Mr. Crile on Page 33, in the middle of the page, in the middle of an answer, it starts, "I've always been very candid and frank to Sam. He had been the same." Is that correct?

A. That is the way I remember our relationship.

Q. To the best of your knowledge, did MACV ever withhold any evidence concerning the enemy order of battle from Sam Adams?

A. I don't know of an instance that we withheld any intelligence information from Sam. I think Sam got what went through the regular channels to Central Intelligence Agency and whatever he gathered on his trips to Vietnam visiting down in the provinces and at the corps.

Q. Now, do you remember anything else that occurred at the conference in Langley and during your trip to Washington or Langley in August of 1967?

A. Not right offhand.

Q. Do you recall that Mr. Crile asked you about a meeting in a little room in the Pentagon where estimates were slashed?

Do you recall his asking you about that?

A. No, I don't. I'd have to re-read the script here -- the transcript. As I said yesterday, it's been some time since
I read this. I couldn't find my copy of it.

Q. If you would turn to Page 39, if you would read that to yourself.

(Witness reads document.)

Q. I'd ask you read to yourself Pages 39 to the first answer on Page 41.

(Witness continues to read document.)

Q. And for the record, those are Pages 10673 through 10674.

A. Let me find out who is speaking here.

Q. The questions, I believe, are Mr. Crile, and the man, I believe, is you.

Q. How far do you want me to read?

A. From the question on Page 39 down to the first answer on Page 41.

A. I'm down to "These main force figures remained stable."

Q. First, is it your testimony that you were not at such a meeting?

A. No. I think I made it clear that I didn't remember the meeting.

Q. But you might have been at it?

A. I could have been at it, yes. Like I told him here
in my answer here, there were a lot of meetings and I just don't remember all those various meetings.

Q. Did Mr. Adams ever tell you he was sure you were at such a meeting?

A. I don't recall him ever doing that. I don't remember. Not that Sam telling me he was sure I was at such a meeting.

Q. Did he tell you he believed you were at that meeting?

A. I don't even remember discussing it with him. We could have. We could have discussed. But what he would have told me would not have shaken my own recollection.

He could have very well have said that to me, but I don't remember it to this day.

Q. Now, do you know whether between the time of the August meeting in Langley in 1967 and the time you left MACV in September of 1967 any of the main force units had been cut without your permission?

A. I have no knowledge.

Q. Would you have known whether they were cut?

A. I should have known it, but I was concentrating on this irregular and political strength, justifying all this stuff, but most certainly I should have known about it if they were cut.

Q. What about local forces? Would you answer be the same?
A. Local forces, my answer would be the same. I don't remember any cutting of those. And I would have opposed it if I had known about it.

Q. And what about administrative services?

A. Administrative services, we were juggling these things to come up with whatever would fit the ceiling.

Q. Do you know whether any forces were cut without your participation or knowledge in the period August-September?

Q. The only thing that were cut that I recall were the irregulars and the political OB and the administrative services. I think I said this morning, in my own mind, as I recall it, I would have been able to go for a higher figure in the administrative services but, hell, there was no where to put them. They just wouldn't fit in the can.

Q. Now, in your answer, Colonel Hawkins, you said that -- or Mr. Crile said, "You actually said you had something of a mental block over those two months once the new regime came into power at MACV intelligence." Did you have a mental block?

A. I must have inadvertently blocked out some of these things here. See, it indicates here that he has pretty good information and if I was still there I should have been at this meeting, but I don't remember a thing about it. So, I must have
just blocked it out.

Q. Do you know what period you blocked out?

A. I don't know because I had never really considered it again until I was questioned about it in this interview with George Crile. But when he asked me about it I would not remember anything about the meeting.

Q. Well, according to Mr. Crile, he says -- and I'm quoting the transcript at Page 10673 -- "You -- meaning you, Colonel Hawkins -- "actually said that you had something of a mental block over those two months once the new regime came into power at MACV intelligence." Did you tell that to Mr. Crile?

A. Let's see. Let me see what I said here.

Here's what I say: "I don't recall that particular meeting, George, there; there was a lot happened, and I didn't take notes and my mind could be blocked out, not for self-serving purpose, because I simply don't -- because everything -- everything has happened."

Q. Do you recall whether you ever unblocked to any extent?

A. Not on this particular one. Some of these things over the months, you know, in discussion, have come to me a little clearer, but this one I still don't remember. I still
don't remember this meeting.

Q. Well, in talking to Mr. Crile or Mr. Adams, did you suddenly remember things that you had not remembered before?

A. Not very much. Not at that time. I was still pretty hazy. I was very determined that nobody was going to put any words in my mouth.

Q. Do you know why Mr. Crile would have told Mr. Bernard Katozzi -- do you know Mr. Katozzi, by the way?

A. I don't know Mr. Katozzi.

Q. He may have been there after you left, Colonel Hawkins, but according to the transcript provided us by CBS -- and I'm reading from Pages 23517 to 23518 -- question by Mr. Crile: "Well, let me -- let me throw it back a different way, with the way -- and believe me, Bernie, and I say that I consider this to be a strong possibility because I went through it as I told you with Gains Hawkins."

Katozzi: "Oh, okay."

And Mr. Crile continues: "A man who I respect as much as anybody I've ever run into. He had a legitimate total block, memory block, about -- around a certain area until he started to -- until he struggled with us to go through the chronology and it all came out, and it came out legitimately. Everybody's
has different ...." and it goes on to another subject.

   Do you know what Mr. Crile was talking about?

   A. No, I don't know what he was talking about except that
we had talked and I had asked Sam to show me a chronology of
events because I didn't even remember what period was what. I
said give me a chronology of what happened here and perhaps
some of this stuff will come back because it's very hazy in my
mind and I think only in generalities.

Because I didn't even know what month any of -- I
knew that I left there in 1967, and I knew the things that were
in my mind were about the ceiling; we had a ceiling, but what --
but when there was a conference at the Pentagon -- I did know
that the conference at Saigon was during my last days there.

And I said show me a chronology of various events
and maybe I can -- these will serve as memory pegs to me for
something.

   Q. Did it help you?

   A. It helped some, but not a great deal. As you can see
through this transcript here, I didn't remember a whole lot.
I didn't remember the meeting in the small room in the Pentagon,
for example.

   Q. First, Colonel Hawkins, we don't know what you
remembered before you saw the chronology. Do you remember what you learned from the chronology?

A. Not a great deal. It's evident here I didn't remember a whole lot.

Q. Well, are some of the things that you testified to yesterday and today things that you remembered after having read the chronology that you had not remembered before you read the chronology?

A. State that again.

Q. Are there things that you testified to yesterday and today that you did not remember before you read Mr. Adams' chronology that you remembered after you read Mr. Adams' chronology?

A. I have remembered things since that interview; a few things, but I don't attribute it to the chronology itself. I've done a lot more thinking since then about things that have happened.

Q. And have you also done a lot of talking to Mr. Adams?

A. I have talked with Mr. Adams.

Q. And Mr. Baron?

A. Yes, I've talked with Mr. Baron.

Q. And has that helped your recollection?
A. I don't know that it helped a whole lot. It possibly has helped some. Yes, it must have helped some, but they didn't —
Sam Adams and I can't sit down for five minutes without talking order of battle. It just comes out naturally. That was our life and we talked the Vietnam order of battle.

Q. How many hours would you say you talked with Mr. Adams before you went on the broadcast, starting in the period, say, 1970 to 1981?

A. How many hours I talked with Sam?

Q. Or how many days?

A. There is no -- I don't have any idea how I could add that up. There weren't many occasions. He was up here in Virginia and I was down here in Mississippi.

Q. But there is a telephone, isn't there?

A. There is a telephone, yes.

Q. Did you discuss it occasionally on the telephone?

A. We might have talked on the telephone. I just don't recall telephone conversations with him on it.

Q. Well, wasn't Mr. Adams in touch with you repeatedly during the period 1968-69 until the present?

A. Mr. Adams called me several times, yes. This was during the period of the Daniel Ellsberg trial, and he came down to
Mississippi on one occasion.

Q. And spent some time discussing these things with you?
A. Yes. He spent a night or two nights. I'm not sure how long.

Q. Did he also talk to you around the time of the Pike Committee hearings?
A. He might have. I don't recall. I don't recall much about the Pike Committee hearings. I think that's brought out in here somewhere. Either this or in -- this was brought out in the Hodding Carter interview. I didn't remember anything about it.

I remember reading about it in the newspaper -- vaguely reading about it in the newspaper.

Q. Now, going down on Page 41, Colonel Hawkins, if you could just read to yourself through that page, I have a question to ask you.

(Witness reads document.)

Q. It says, "Question: Let me back up again. As I understand it -- as I understand it, after the Washington session, the battle with the CIA, back in Saigon you actually cut individual units to conform with the figures being debated against the CIA. One of the people that you directed to assist you in that
was Lieutenant Colonel Morgan. Do you remember that?"

And says you, "Man: 'I don't remember that, no, no. No, I don't believe that.'"

Was that an accurate answer?

A. Yes. That's the best I recall. I do not remember it.

Q. Do you remember doing anything with Colonel Morgan concerning order of battle in the August-September, 1967 time period?

A. I simply don't remember.

Q. When you say "I don't believe that," what did you mean by that?

A. Obviously I didn't believe I ordered Colonel Morgan to assist me. I was trying to keep this thing on my own. I was the man responsible.

Q. Now, do you remember any conversations, meetings or briefings that took place between the conference in Langley and the conference that took place in September in Saigon on the order of battle?

A. Not right offhand I don't remember.

Q. Did you attend the Saigon session on the order of battle?
A. Yes, sir, I was there. The Saigon conference, yes.

Q. Could you tell us as you recall it what happened at the Saigon conference?

A. Oh, god, that's a big order. I can't dredge up all of this from memory. I know though that we had representatives there from the intelligence community: CIA, DIA, NSA, OSD and there might have been some others there. I don't recall whether there was -- there must have been somebody there from CINCPAC. There would have had to have been someone.

And we sat around hour after hour, day after day, arguing about these figures. But except for the fact of arguing about the figures -- Sam would advance some good arguments and I would shoot him down. And I think there were one or two occasions there -- as I remember one occasion -- I don't remember the specifics of it -- but we got a little bit embarrassed because our argument to contradict what Sam was saying blew up in our faces because our documentation wasn't -- it was -- I think I classified this before as sort of like a layman negotiation in which it wasn't intelligence, it was sort of a ridiculous exercise, as I recall it.

We weren't concerned so much with the validity of intelligence, it seemed to me, as I recall that conference, as
we was with coming up with a figure that would meet the Command, MACV Command, position. And to the best of my knowledge, that position did prevail.

So, that's the best I can recall that.

Q. Who was the head of the MACV delegation or the MACV team at the Saigon conference?

A. Well, I would have been in charge of the OB. Now, General Davidson was in the room from time to time. He popped in and popped out.

Now, who was considered to be in command, whether it was Colonel Morgan -- I mean Colonel Morris -- I don't know. I don't remember who was supposed to be our chief. We had several MACV people in the room.

Q. Do you recall anyone giving you any instructions during the conference on the order of battle?

A. One morning, right toward the end of the conference, I was given a slip of paper by Colonel Morris that this was the top figure that MACV would accept and this was as far as we would go.

This was toward the end of the conference.

Q. Was it at the very end, do you recall?

A. It was toward the end of the conference. I don't
remember how many days.

The best I recall, the conference ended shortly thereafter.

Q. Would it have been a matter of minutes or hours?

A. No. Days. A day or so. I don't know whether it was two days or three days.

Q. How long was the whole conference?

A. I don't know how long the conference lasted. It seemed to me that it lasted forever.

Q. If the conference lasted three or four days, when would this slip of paper have been handed to you?

A. It would probably have been handed to me the last day or the day prior to that.

Q. What did the slip of paper say?

A. It had figures on it in the various catagories. "This is the top level figure we will take for this catagory, this catagory, this catagory and so forth."

Q. Do you remember what catagories were on the list?

A. Every catagory that we were considering in the MACV order of battle. It was irregulars, politicaals -- I'm not it was whatever the catagories that we were considering; that we were contending -- that were in contention at the conference.
Every category. What our top and what our bottom line figure was going to be. The bad part was that bottom line figure. I had to adjust figures in these categories to make that bottom line figure come out.

Q. Do you remember the bottom line figure?
A. No. I don't. I think it was in the neighborhood of this 300,000.

Q. Could it have been 309,000?
A. I don't know. I don't remember the exact figure. It was in that neighborhood. As best I recall, it was in that neighborhood.

Q. Now, do you know how the conference ultimately was resolved?
A. I don't know how it was resolved, and how the decision came about, but the best I recall, the bottom line figure of MACV's prevailed. It was just an approximate figure.

Q. Did you learn that as part of the overall resolution of the conference that the self-defense and secret self-defense and political cadre were all omitted from the bottom line total of military forces?
A. I don't recall that happening while I was there. It's been my best recollection of this --
with Sam Adams -- that I don't remember them being cut out before I left there; that this is something that I remember as I learned about after I left Vietnam. And I learned about it later -- sometime later -- that the self-defense and secret self-defense and the political order of battle had been dropped. But I don't remember it happening while I was there.

Q. What was the status of the conference at the time that you left?

A. The status of the conference, as I judged it when I left there, is that MACV's position had prevailed, now, Hawkins, you can go home; you have done your work.

Q. Did there appear to you to be a resolution at the time you left?

A. I don't remember the resolution. I wasn't even concerned. The only thing I wanted to do was get out. I didn't really give it much attention. I was told that I could go home and I left.

Q. Again, Colonel Hawkins, why was the bottom line so important inside the intelligence community?

A. Inside the intelligence community, I don't know, but I think I made the quite clear that the word that was spoken at the first briefing that I gave to General Westmoreland was
the impact of the figures. Above that, I don't know.

I don't know why -- or what DIA's concern was, or
CIA's concern was. I stayed strictly within my own little world
and I worked within that world to defend the MACV position. I
didn't concern myself with the politics of it at all.

Q. Was the conference acrimonious?

A. I would think we argued like gentlemen. I think at
times our voices were raised. Maybe remarks were made across
the table. But I would find it hard to characterize the entire
proceedings as -- let's see, I think about the best word was
they were lively.

Q. Vociferous?

A. Vociferous.

Q. Did you have conversations with Mr. Adams in the
hallways or in the men's room or places like that?

A. Wherever we met we had conversations. We really didn't
talk about anything else.

Q. Were you candid with him in those conversations?

A. As I recall, I was very candid with Sam at all times.

Q. Do you recall whether you were candid with anybody
else during conversations?

A. Any of the others? I don't recall specifically any
of these people that I would have made remarks to. It is possible that I might have spoken, say, to Barry Williams in this similar vein. He was -- I believe Barry Williams was at this conference.

These conferences get to milling around in your mind after 16 years or so. But as I recall, Barry Williams was at the conference. And there was a fellow named George Fowler there, and George Fowler would have outranked him. Even though he was a civilian, he would have been senior. But Barry would have been the sharper individual.

Barry was the kind of fellow that when you talked you listed to, and George was the kind of fellow when he talked you doodled.

But it is possible if Barry was there I most likely -- I would have been candid with him. I don't remember whether he was or not.

The fact is, I just don't remember.

Q. Do you remember whether John Lanterman was at the Saigon conference?

A. John Lanterman, I don't recall his presence. He could have been there, but I just don't recall him being at the conference.